Researcher4109: Procedure for the disposal of assets is clearly stated in the Public Procurement Act 2004 (Section 67). It states that surplus or obsolete items should be disposed of either by transfer to other government departments without payment, sale by public bidding process, sale by public auction or destruction. The responsibility for this process is of the Head of the Procuring Unit and the relevant MDA. However there is no public knowledge or oversight to ensure that these measures are adhered to and the importance of ensuring that asset declaration is made public knowledge was recently reinforced by the Anti-Corruption Commissioner as a key method for promoting accountability and efficiency within MDAs. There is no mention of the process in defence and security documents.

The asset disposal account was not submitted to the Auditor General as requested for the 2013 audit meaning that scrutiny of how this has been done is not available, which raises questions about the processes.

No media evidence of corrupt practice was found to be publicly available but there is speculation in the media about the lack of transparency around asset disposals.

Researcher4109: In line with the Public Procurement Act of 2004 (section 66) the head of a procuring entity, for example the MOD, shall convene a Board of Survey comprising representatives of departments with unserviceable, obsolete or surplus stores, plant, equipment and vehicles which shall report on the items and, subject to a technical report on them, recommend the best method of disposal after the officer in charge has completed a Board of Survey form.

There is no evidence to suggest that independent bodies are involved in this process nor is the information made available to the public. The justification as to why the asset is to be disposed of or where it is removed to is not clearly stated in law. The Anti-Corruption Act does cover asset declaration (Section 119-122) of public officials and where there are questions raised the ACC has the power to investigate and may publish the names of those who refuse to disclose in the media and petition the courts to compel disclosure, as failure to comply can result in a fine or one-year imprisonment.

Researcher4109: The indicative budget for 2014 shows that Le 5.6 billion will be allocated to the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU) and the Office of National Security (ONS) with no further breakdown as to how that money is to spent. This accounts for 3.1% of the total budget allocated for the security services and in light of the fact that no further information is given as to how this money is to be spent it is fair to classify these as secret items. Although spending is broken down into more detail for other aspects of the defence, there is simply one line allocated to the ONS and CISU. The assessor was unable to find any further details on what this line is intended to be spent on.

Researcher4109: The National Security and Central Intelligence Act Section (16) states that the central intelligence authority, through the minister who is assigned responsibility for it, is to present an annual report for review which is to be approved by the National Defence Council. The approved report is to be presented to parliament for scrutiny but there is no detail regarding what should be contained in the report which means that it can be very abridged and information omitted. Spending and justification for that spending should form part of that report but items can be omitted by invoking the national security clause.

Despite the committee having power, enshrined by Section 93 (6), to compel the production of documents, certain information can be withheld if deemed a threat to national security under section 37(2) of the National Security and Intelligence Act. The information can still be requested but the decision then rests with the Supreme Court. The 2014 budget speech given to parliament allocated Le 64.6 billion to certain project areas, leaving Le 6 million that remained secret. A breakdown of how this money would be spent was not given to the legislature.

Although Source 4 shows that the 2015 national budget has been debated in parliament, how much time was devoted to consider defence spending, or secret spending in particular, is not clear.

Researcher4109: The assessor has not been able to find any published information on the auditing of secret programs and there is no media coverage of parliament scrutiny of the defence spending audit.

No verifiable evidence was found to when/how audits on secret spending have been presented to Parliament, and when/how they were subsequently debated. Interviewee 3 has stated that Ministry of Defence accounts are audited internally and by the auditor general, though there are some items that can be, or are, omitted in the interests of national security. The interviewee also stated that the level of parliamentary scrutiny is quite low and basic information is provided with considerable omissions.

Researcher4109: Off-budget purchases are not permitted except in times of national emergency/security threat, as is stated in the 2004 Public Procurement Act, and this is applicable to all Ministries, including defence. Legislative guidance is also provided by the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act, 2005 (Section 28).

The ongoing reform of the MOD and the direct involvement of external actors in the budgetary process have greatly reduced off-budget expenditure since 2001 (3). One exception arises from the participation of the RSLAF’s maritime wing in joint surveillance operations to capture poachers in the country’s waters.

There are other purchases made by MDAs, that are not involved, per se, in the defence sector. This includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Development and Financial Planning (who deal with money provided by donors).

Researcher4109: Off-budget purchases are not permitted except in times of national emergency/security threat, as is stated in the 2004 Public Procurement Act, and this is applicable to all Ministries, including defence. Legislative guidance is also provided by the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act, 2005 (Section 28).

The researcher found no evidence of off-budget expenditures in practice. The interviewee, who has worked with the MoD, also confirmed that they did not come across any indications of off-budget expenditures during their time there. One exception arises from the participation of the RSLAF’s maritime wing in joint surveillance operations with the Ministry of Fisheries to capture poachers in the country’s waters according to Gbla. Those surveillance operations took place in the 2002-03 immediate post-war period however - if such joint missions are now undertaken, given how much progress has been made in reforming RSLAF it is reasonable to assess they would now be budgeted for.

DFID provides direct budget support to Sierra Leone and in its 2004-2007 strategy found off-budget expenditure to be an issue where improvement was being made. There is no mention of the issue in the 2011-2015 strategy which is an indication of improvement in that area.

Researcher4109: Section 15 of the 2013 Right to Information Act permits the withholding of information if making it public knowledge would be detrimental to the national security of Sierra Leone. The vague nature of the definition means that this remains open to interpretation however.

The 2002 National Security and Central Intelligence Act provides some details on when information can be classified as threats to national security in Section 12(2). This includes (a) espionage or sabotage (b) foreign influenced clandestine activities (c) serious violence or threats of violence that have a political objective. However there is no information given as to who is responsible for deciding on what constitutes each of these and subsequently individuals or agencies have the potential to influence decisions.

Disputes over what can or cannot be released may be brought to the Supreme Court for a final ruling according to The National Security and Central Intelligence Act, Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol, CXXXII, No 42, 4 July 2002, 37 (2) - but there is no evidence to suggest that this has taken place nor does it seem likely that they would overturn a decision may by the Director-general of CISU.

No additional public sources were found during research, and there is no available evidence that these legal requirements have been upheld in practice.

Researcher4109: RSLAF owns a large amount of land at Motorbon and Khoifa Bang in Moyamaba District. Although it is public knowledge according to the interviewee, RSLAF does not provide information about the amount of rice produced, the details of the business or the operational costs associated and who provides the financial inputs. The farming on this land is mechanized and it was established to help the army achieve the President's promise of each member of the security forces receiving one sack of rice per year. In the defence budget (Le 17.3 billion) is set aside for rice. There is limited information about the yields means that it impacts the overall transparency of the defence sectors spending. It is not clear if this is a business or an operation of the Ministry of Defence.

Information about the enterprise was discussed in the 2013 Auditor General's report where several concerns were raised about oversight of spending and a lack of accountability for sales. It clearly states in the report that a percentage was sold to the public with the profits being deposited into an RSLAF bank account (Audit Service Sierra Leone, &quoute;Auditor General's Report 2013&quoute;, pp. 106-113 available online http://www.auditservice.gov.sl/report/assl-auditor-general-annual-report-2013.pdf).

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS:

Although the second peer reviewer is correct in his comments about Ministers, it appears that there is no legislation for RSLAF to own a business in the country, there is nothing explicit in the law to forbid them from doing so.

It does seem that it is a commercial operation and although both the public and auditor general are aware of it, details of it are quite limited. This makes the question of a percentage of the defence budget hard to address but I would suggest that it would be quite minimal seeing as this is a relatively small operation of a crop that doesn't have huge value (compared to minerals for example).

Score changed to 2 and discussion updated.

Researcher4109: There are no publicly declared military-owned businesses in Sierra Leone. There are suggestions that defence and security personnel having large and even controlling stakes in businesses through proxies in the country according to the interviewee, although no publicly available evidence could be found to substantiate these claims. Score 2 awarded as the lack of appropriate oversight mechanisms means there is a potential risk. Further investigation is required.

As discussed in the previous question, RSLAF also owns a large amount of land at Motorbon and Khoifa Bang in Moyamaba District. Although it is public knowledge according to the interviewee, RSLAF does not provide information about the amount of rice produced, the details of the business or the operational costs associated and who provides the financial inputs. The farming on this land is mechanized and it was established to help the army achieve the President's promise of each member of the security forces receiving one sack of rice per year. In the defence budget (Le 17.3 billion) is set aside for rice. There is limited information about the yields means that it impacts the overall transparency of the defence sectors spending. It is not clear if this is a business or an operation of the Ministry of Defence.

Information about the enterprise was discussed in the 2013 Auditor General's report where several concerns were raised about oversight of spending and a lack of accountability for sales. It clearly states in the report that a percentage was sold to the public with the profits being deposited into an RSLAF bank account (Audit Service Sierra Leone, &quoute;Auditor General's Report 2013&quoute;, pp. 106-113 available online http://www.auditservice.gov.sl/report/assl-auditor-general-annual-report-2013.pdf).

Researcher4109: There is nothing in law to explicitly outlaw private enterprise by military officials using the authority given to them by their position. The interviewee stated that whilst there is no concrete evidence to confirm these claims, nor is there evidence to suggest that the government itself is a beneficiary of this private enterprise, although there are indications in the public sphere (4), that high ranking military officials are engaged in private enterprise. There were even accusations revealed by Wiki leaks that the Minister of Defence was involved in illicit enterprise arounds an arms deal in 2009 but these claims were never substantiated. However the recent sacking of Richard Conteh, Chief of Staff, for unauthorised private enterprise and the launch of an investigation into his affairs suggest that in some cases sanctions are being applied, normally when directed to by the President, but this is not always the case.

Researcher4109: The MOD official website lists its top priorities in the country and here there is no reference to tackling corruption or improving integrity within the sector. Furthermore there is little, to no evidence, of public commitments by key defence officials or the Ministry itself, to tackling corruption or to discussing the issue of improved integrity in newspapers or other media sources. Only, Dr Ernest Bai Koroma, the President, and Commander and Chief of the Army, regularly refers to his ambition to tackle corruption in Sierra Leone but this is more of a general commitment not specific to the defence sector. Most visible recently has been the public launching of a 'Pay No Bribe' campaign that aims to create Service Charters for key institutions and agencies on what the public should expect. At the launch Koroma vowed that &quoute;as a nation, we will not relent in the fight to tackle corruption in the country.&quoute;

Researcher4109: Soldiers are accountable to the law under the Anti-Corruption Act 2008, although there is no clear evidence that any further defence-specific measures exist.

Dismissal of soldiers is done in line with Army Orders Act of 1965 which confers immunity on the army from appearance in any court or any commission established by law. Instead they must appear in front of the Court-Martial Board, re-established in 2009. The Judge Advocate is aided by six experienced military officers, inclusive of the President, who together constitute the court martial board. Research was unable to find a prescribed punishment for those found guilty of bribery by the court martial board.

The approach in all cases is not systematic or uniform, although there are examples of these mechanisms working. Recent cases have seen the dismissal of 11 members of the peacekeeping force for a number of relevant transgressions however, including the selling of fuel that was to be used to complete missions. In 2010, two public officers of the Ministry of Defence were also indicted by the High Court for three separate breaches of the 2008 Anti-Corruption Act (Sections 42/43/44) and fined 30 million leones or, if they could not pay, serve a three year jail term. By contrast, however, the presidential Chief of Staff was recently dismissed from his role due to alleged improper conduct in dealings with extractive companies and an investigation has been launched into these activities by the President. He was not handed over to the Anti-Corruption Commission however but instead left the country without facing punishment or investigation into the allegations against him.

In comparison, in the area of policing, the Police Complaints, Discipline and Internal Investigations Departments (PCDID) is a mechanism in place to address issues of bribery and corruption particularly among junior police officers. In the first half of 2013 they received 790 complaints, as a result 23 officers were dismissed and 74 were suspended. Bribery by/of a public officer to influence the decisions of a public body is liable to a fine not less than thirty million leones or to imprisonment for a term not less than three years or to both. The misappropriation of public funds or property, bid rigging, corrupt acquisition of wealth and the abuse of office/position carries the same penalty on conviction

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Discussion updated.

Researcher4109: Whistle-blowing features in Section 50 of the Right to Information Act 2013. It states that no person shall be penalised in relation to any employment, profession, voluntary work, contract, membership of an organisation, the holding of any office or in any other way, as a result of having made or proposed to make a disclosure of information which the person obtained in confidence in the course of that activity if the disclosure is one which is in the public interest. Whilst not specifically related to the defence sector there is nothing to suggest that this law is not applicable to security forces. However other than a link on the ACC website, there is little active encouragement of whistle-blowing by the government and the broad language used, particularly the phrase ‘in the public interest’ leaves it open to interpretation and potential abuse as it will often be the government who will decide on whether or not it is in the public interest and it can often been their institutions of practices on whom the whistle is being blown. Other than this, there is no legislation to formally protect whistle-blowers or mechanism to support them.
Source 3 claims that whistle-blowing is alien to the culture, where patrimonial networks have such a powerful influence. The assessor could not find any evidence of whistle-blowers in the military/defence forces.

Researcher4109: The key Procurement & Finance posts are defined by Human Resources Management Organisation (HRMO), in line with all Government Departments. Procurement personnel are provided by the National Procurement Policy Agency (NPPA) and the Minister of Defence only gain control of the personnel once they are in the MOD.

Research found no rules of conduct in the public domain that pertain to the length of time in post. The interviewee noted that there is no evidence that vetting is carried out on these staff and issues with them are resolved by moving them on early (unofficially but often deliberately), rather than there being any clear system in place. Although the Civil Service practice is to rotate persons every 2 years in this type of post this does not always remain the case. There is no public evidence to support these claims however.

The 2013 Auditor General's Report cited throughout this assessment also highlights a number of oversight shortfalls around the peacekeeping operations of RSLAF and so it is a logical follow on that with these weaknesses there is greater opportunity for corrupt practices to happen.

Researcher4109: According to the Payroll Budget Summary for 2014 the Ministry of Defence (figures correct as of September 2013) had a total number of 8,810 staff broken down as 651 civil servants and 8,159 military personnel. More recent numbers have not yet been published on the website. According to Auditor General's report in 2012 there may be some inaccuracies on the payroll but only a very small scale, less than 1%.

No information is provided at all regarding staff that work either for the Central Intelligence and Security Unit or the Office of National Security. The 2013 Auditor General's Report stated that in &quoute;2011 there were 111 instances of unverifiable staff which increased to 147 in 2013&quoute; in the MoD.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Agree; discussion updated.

Researcher4109: The 2014 GoSL budget that was presented by the Finance and Economic Development Minister, announced an improved minimum wage of 480,000 Leones ($107) per month and a similar improvement to the wages of police/military personnel who can now expect to receive 600,000 Leones ($133) per month. However salary scales for more senior officials are not publicly available and there is limited information about additional allowances that are given to employees in the defence sector. This is despite the 2014 budget allocating 17.3 Billion Leones for officers and other ranks. Information has also been shared about the salaries of military personnel involved in peacekeeping operations with the Minister of Defence confirming that each soldier in Somalia is paid $828 per month. However whilst sporadic information is available regarding pay rates there is no systematic sharing of the information in place and the information available reduces for more senior officials.

Researcher4109: Research found that the payment system is not published or well established. Interviewee 3 stated that payment of salaries is generally done on time however, and that in fact the Ministry of Defence is the first ministry to be paid by the Ministry of Finance based on a presidential directorate. The interviewee indicated that there have been occasions when payments have been delayed however, particularly to those soldiers involved in peace-keeping operations. This was stated to be because the funding for the peacekeeping missions is reimbursed by the African Union and on occasion slow government processing has caused delays (1&3). Research found a lack of clarity as to how payment is made to soldiers serving on peacekeeping missions that has led to accusations that incorrect payments have been made. The Auditor General's report also indicates evidence of pay inconsistencies to staff on the same level without evidence to justify the difference in salaries or why some have received extra in allowances.

By contrast, Sierra Leone Police salaries are generally paid on time but reports indicate other benefits such as raincoats (to enable them to carry out their work effectively during the rainy season) and bags of rice have not always been delivered either on time or to the amount/quality promised. As salaries are quite low for junior police officers these additional benefits are of significant importance and the reasons for the delay are often unclear.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Comments and source updated.

Researcher4109: There is an established system for the appointment of military personnel, but specific detail on it could not be found during research.

The civilian staff at the Ministry of Defence are part of the Pay and Perform Project that has been undertaken by the Human Resource Management Office (HRMO) with funding from the World Bank. This process has seen the the appointment of 22 new senior military officers in 2013. For military personnel however the Anti Corruption Commission has continued to push for greater public transparency in the promotion process and more monitoring of those decisions so that they can be publicly scrutinised.

When 16 Lieutenant-Colonels were decorated in 2013, the Chief of Defence Staff noted the 'promotions were meritorious, based on a set criteria and existing vacancies'. However, the criteria are not published. Evidence also indicates that when the Deputy Chief of Staff was appointed in 2012 this was done so on merit and without links to patrimonial ties - both he and the Defence Chief are southerners, whilst the ruling APC party has its main support based in the North.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Discussion updated. Please note the score has now been revised from 3 to 2. There is much suggestion that positions are given based on merit, and there was much effort to reform the military in this way in the writing of the Defence White Paper, 2003. However the process of appointment is not clearly stated and publicly available; leaving it open to abuse. For example, it is not clear if the civil service promotions system described by Peer Reviewer 2 covers senior defence appointments (eg., the Chief of Staff / Chief of Defence Force, or single-service chiefs), nor enough evidence of a similar system for other military officers for promotion to colonel and above.

Researcher4109: The World Bank funded Pay and Perform initiative which has the overall objective of improving competitiveness in pay, performance management and accountability of, and increase staffing of middle and senior staff in, the civil service in Sierra Leone. This is done by annual performance appraisals of officials, target setting and annual recruitment planning and this information shapes the appointment decisions taken by the President. The interviewee stated that appointments are made by the President based on the information given to him by the promotion board within the Ministry of Defence, through the National Defence Council.

Adherence to the process has been thrown into question by some events however. There were accusations in 2013 that the mass forced retirement of over 20 high-ranking military personnel was a politically motivated act and critics suggested that the top decision-making body of the army was deliberately chosen to favour President's northern lineage. These claims were refuted by the Minister who again re-affirmed his commitment to promotions based on commitment, hard work and diligence towards duty.

Researcher4109: Compulsory conscription does not exist in Sierra Leone. Voluntary conscription is allowed for those aged 18 years an above (although this can be less with prior parental consent). The GoSL declaration accompanying ratification of the Optional Protocol of the Convention of the Rights of the Child in May 2002 affirmed this commitment. There have been no changes since the 2004 report. The interviewee confirmed this.

Researcher4109: Voluntary conscription is allowed for those aged 18 years an above (although this can be less with prior parental consent). The GoSL declaration accompanying ratification of the Optional Protocol of the Convention of the Rights of the Child in May 2002 affirmed this commitment. The ACC Act states that influencing a public officer, corruption a public officer or bribing a public official to solicit an advantage are all offences that can be punished with a fine of Le 30 million or imprisonment for up to three years. This is not explicitly linked to the conscription process nor do the examples given in the ACC Act refer to preferable postings in the examples provided. There is no evidence to suggest that this bribery takes place in Sierra Leone and the workings of the Promotion Board, which is established to carry out the process, has not been accused on any malpractice. Conscription does not occur.

Researcher4109: Currently there is no firm evidence of ghost soldiers in the country however there are loopholes in that payment system that suggests it could be a possibility. The Auditor Generals Report of 2012 found that it was unable to physically verify 113 civil personnel in Ministry of Defence who were on the payroll and one of its key recommendations to improve transparency was that registers should be maintained at all military locations across the country. However, the removal of ghost soldiers from the payroll was delivered in partnership with the International Military Assistance Team (IMAT) that supported the re-building of the Sierra Leonean Army after the war ended and so far, the systems established have, it seems, been adhered to 52).

Interviewee 3 stated that ISAT worked extensively to remove ghost soldiers from the payroll by completely reworking the database. The interviewee indicated that while it would have been possible for individuals to have been added subsequently, this would have been quite limited.

Researcher4109: Payment of salaries is done by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development to members of the armed forces which means that it is difficult to for the abuse of a position in refusing payment of salary. Whilst in the case of salaries there is a distinction between chains of command chains of payment this is not the case for other financial engagements such as the allocation of allowances, disbursement of bags of rice and travel requests where chains of command and chains of payment are not separated. Rice is an important, symbolic and financial, part of a soldiers compensation. It has been an issue which has been a major point of advocacy for troops in the country and the reaction to the decision to re-introduce monthly rice quotas was very well received. This is generally because salaries are low and rice, being the staple food, removes the threat of food insecurity for a soldiers family. MOFED publishes monthly documents detailing how much money is issued to each department for payment of staff.

Researcher4109: The Civil Service Code is comprehensive in what it sets out regarding corruption for those in the civil service. However, the oversight mechanisms are poor and gifts/hospitality are common features of the roles of senior members of MOD/RSLAF (2). Furthermore there is no recording of these 'transactions'. There is a recommendation from the ACC that Codes of Conduct should be binding but currently they are not. There is also a lack of clarity as to whether there is a code of conduct applicable to rank and file officers within the military. Issues around conflicts of interest are also covered by Section 33 of the Public Procurement Act but this is only applicable to the procurement situation and again there are questions about how strictly it is enforced.

Researcher4109: Breaches of the code of conduct are sporadically investigated, normally this is only done when the media brings issues and attentions into the public domain, the interviewee noted. He/She suggested that there is limited appetite within MOD to tackle breaches of the code on conduct and normally investigations only occur for lower ranking personnel rather than those in positions of authority. When prosecutions are made they are available to the public. Five officers were given compulsory retirement in November 2014, three for personal misconduct and two for bribery, for involvement in an incident at a checkpoint during the Ebola outbreak.

Researcher4109: The Anti-Corruption Commission does undertake anti-corruption training on a fairly regular basis but there is not necessarily a structure to the frequency and the personnel who are expected to attend. In general the training is delivered to rank and file officers in the police and the military but it is questionable how much impact it has due to the lack of structured follow up. The launch of the Pay no Bribe Campaign and the ACC 2014-2018 Strategy shows a continuing commitment to tackling the issue in the defence sector and recent events, building on the back of these commitments have included, awareness raising on Service Charters (though not specific to the defence sector) and a meeting between 85 members of the Sierra Leonean Police Force and the Public Outreach Unit of the ACC to discuss joint strategies for tackling corruption in the country. Guidelines and posters are a feature of the MOD building but how effective they are is questionable.

Researcher4109: There is no policy that compels the information to be made public but in general the outcomes of corruption cases involving defence personnel have been made public, especially those cases being taken on through the Anti- Corruption Commission. In March 2010 former Director of Procurement at the Ministry of Defence, Joe Michael Sewoh and Major Idriss S. Kamara of RSLAF were convicted under Section 42 of the ACC Act and sentenced to pay or fine or face imprisonment. This information was communicated to the public through the release of information to media/civil society. However, there were suggestions in 2010, that the resignation of ACC Commissioner Tejan-Cole, was due to undue government interference in the work of the commission particularly in its efforts to indite several members of the ruling APC.

Researcher4109: The 2008 Anti-Corruption Act provides clear indication of the list of offences that are illegal and these include bribery of or by public officer to influence decision of public body (34), corrupting public officer (33) and abuse of office position (42/43) which all have the punishment of a fine of 30 million leones or three years imprisonment. The 2008 Act also outlines the Powers of Investigation (53-88) of the Commission and the expected Prosecution of Offences (89-102).

There is evidence that these measures do not adequately discourage bribes and facilitation payments however (sources 1 & 4). The ACCs own perception survey found that 96% of respondents felt that corruption had got worse in 2013. 84% of Sierra Leoneans admitted to having paid a bribe in order to access a public service or to avoid confrontation in 2012 and although 2014 saw the launch of the 'Pay No Bribe Campaign' which aims to respond to these allegations bribes continue to be widespread.

Researcher4109: With the support of IMATT/ISAT a military doctrine was developed which does address the issue of corruption however how the definition and understanding of corruption is at best misunderstood by RSLAF as there is limited training, for rank and file officers, the interviewee stated. So it has challenges becoming operational. The document is not publicly available nor can it be obtained using the Right to Information Act 2013 as it is an issue of national security. An example of the strategic thinking on corruption that is in place, and that the army is trying to translate into operations, was the training, by the Anti-Corruption Commission of military personnel, police officers, prison officers and staff from the Office of National Security (ONS) on tackling corruption

Researcher4109: There is no known training for commanders within the SLAF. However, Sierra Leone has peace-keeping troops deployed on African Union peacekeeping missions in Somalia and South Sudan. Deployed troops, and in particular their commanders, receive briefing from the United Nations and African Union on corruption as part of their pre-deployment training. In Sierra Leone, pre-deployment training has also been provided by the US Army which has included sessions on avoiding engagement in corrupt practices (3).


There is some evidence indicating that corruption issues may be mishandled. There is no formal reporting mechanism on corruption from deployed troops or their commanders and in the case of Somalia there have been cases of other forces engaging in corruption. It is therefore possible that Sierra Leone troops have also engaged in similar activities that have gone unreported (1).

There have also been rumours and claims in the media that soldiers undertaking peacekeeping missions, for which the pay is significantly higher than ordinary work, have been able to stay beyond the maximum one-year term if they pay superiors a small percentage of the salary they are given. These claims have been vehemently denied by the Defence Ministry in Sierra Leone (7). No further evidence was found that could substantiate this however, nor of any related investigations occurring. Sierra Leonean soldiers have also argued that the process of selection for peacekeeping missions has been corrupted. For example, soldiers have alleged that in order to be selected to go on a peacekeeping mission, they are expected to pay the assigning officers ‘something like ten percent ... . It is a mission, if you are fortunate to go they want you to give ten percent. If you don’t do it they hold up your rank, they make you relinquish your appointment.’ (8)

Researcher4109: There are no identified requirements, requests, nor plans to deploy corruption monitors to ensure that codes of conduct and training, where delivered, are followed in the field by the Ministry of Defence in Sierra Leone. Not only are there no corruption monitors who carry out reports in the field, but there is no evidence that there are any persons responsible within the military for reporting on corruption in any formal way, the interviewee noted. This is despite a recommendation to do so by the Anti-Corruption Commission in 2011, &quoute;It is important to set up a system of accountability to clearly define the responsibilities of personnel and effectively supervise their activities”. Training of army officers has taken place in an effort to tackle corruption but it is not clear if this recent initiative will have a significant impact or corruption monitors.

Researcher4109: There are loose guidelines for addressing such corruption risks but they are not made publicly available and there is little evidence to suggest that they are documented in a formal way. The interviewee explained that it is generally the principal of RSLAF that in-theatre procurement should be kept to the minimum but when it does occur there is little to no guidance of how it should be done and very little evidence that even those loose guidelines are adhered too. Staff training of military officers and personnel, designed to tackle corruption risks during operation were delivered to some members of the army in July 2014. The impact is not yet clear

Researcher4109: PMCs were a major feature of the conflict that affected Sierra Leone between 1992-2002 with a number of mercenary forces fighting on both sides with impunity. The absence of recent reports, media coverage or other evidence suggests that PMCs are no longer a major feature of the landscape in Sierra Leone however. Nonetheless, no penalties appear to exist for corrupt PMCs and there is no evidence of any efforts being undertaken to address this.

Currently the extent of Private Security Company (PSC) engagement in Sierra Leone is minimal and surrounds the protecting of diamond/iron ore mine sites. Mining sites are run by private companies and they are responsible for providing their own security; there is no evidence to suggest that the government is currently engaging PMCs.

PSC engagement is regulated by the National Security and Intelligence Act of 2002 and the Office of National security who are responsible for licensing and registration. However there are no clear assessment mechanism for taking these decisions, the Act is not supported by any regulations and penalties for breach of this Act are not stated. Therefore the application of this Act can often vary widely and is open to abuse on both sides though information on if and how this takes place is difficult to obtain.

Researcher4109: In 2004 GoSL passed the Public Procurement Act, with the National Public Procurement Authority established in 2005. This legislation, in the main, applies to the defence and security sector and it details the four types of bidding process allowed (1) international competitive bidding (2) national competitive bidding (3) limited international bidding (4) request for quotation shopping. The Ministry of Defence has an Equipment, Approvals and Procurement Committee, led by the Director-General , which is responsible for oversight of the procurement process. However its application to the defence sector can be curbed by the Minister of Defence who can bypass this legislation for procurement of items deemed sensitive to national security. There is no formal mechanism in place for independent scrutiny of these items. In fact the Auditor Generals Report pointed to the lack of will to make the 2004 Procurement Act work and suggested that, across the board, it was likely that collusion between suppliers and public officials was still taking place as it is very difficult to ascertain precisely this.

Researcher4109: There is no evidence that the defence procurement cycle is disclosed and the extent to which it has been formalised is unclear. Research suggests the full defence procurement cycle process is only made available to those who sit on the Defence Procurement Committee. The interviewee explained that the information that is shared with the public is often abbreviated and does not disclose information regarding the assessment of needs, decision behind selection and even in some cases the supplier selected. In most cases, other than on procurement which may be deemed an issue of national security, the tenders for bidding are publicly available (for example a 2014 Infantry Barracks construction invitation to tender was published online) but there is a lack of adherence to Section 26 of the 2004 PPA which requires all awarded contracts over a certain value to be published in nationwide newspapers detailing the successful bidder and contract price.

Researcher4109: Whilst the Public Procurement Act of 2004 sets out that each MDA must have a procurement unit and also establishes an Independent Procurement Review Panel there is little to suggest that these bodies are either active or transparent in the defence sector. The Act also details clear guidelines as to who can approve a procurement based on the type of services provide and the amount (First Threshold). The Auditor General's office is better established however - its report in 2012 found over Le 24 billion in procurement deviations across all the MDAs, highlighting that although collusion between suppliers and public officials can be very difficult to detect there need to be more structures for holding procurement unit heads accountable and/or engaging the ACC.

According to the Auditor General, ‘the governance, legal and enforcement framework contained in the National Procurement Act 2004, is well designed but the will to make it work seems to be missing’. This is particularly true of the defence sector where it seems that secrecy continues to be a feature of operations. The Ministry of Defence were one of five MDAs in 2013 who failed to attend the NPPA's procurement validation exercise for MDA and Local Council procurement plans, despite it being a mandatory requirement. There is no evidence to suggest this has impacted on the money the Ministry secured for 2014 so far however.

Across MDAs there is a problem with unfair and uncompetitive behaviours in the procurement process with little or no transparency, little contract management and the absence of important tender documentation. Procurement officers are not respected and are often isolated from the workings of MDAs. Procurement officers are themselves underpaid and often do not possess the required skill training to perform their duties. The NPPA itself is underfunded with around 50 staff. In specific reference to the MoD procurement of goods amounting to Le6,347,172,532 had not been accounted for under the procurement plan. The procurement plan itself had not been approved by the Procurement Committee and there were no mechanisms in place to track the progress of contracts.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Discussion updated.

Researcher4109: There is no policy to disclose defence purchases and in most cases the information is not made public as explained by the interviewee. There are justifications made that certain purchases cannot be disclosed in the interests of national security, however, even more mundane items are not made public. They are looked at by the Parliamentary Sub-Committee and very limited information is given at an annual media event. There is a Right to Information Act 2013 that in theory would allow citizens to request this information however there are a number of broadly defined caveats limit disclosure of information if it is threatening national security, the work of security service personnel (15,18), impact on commercial interests or legally privileged information (20,22). There has also been a website funded by the Integrated Public Financial Management Reform project (IPFMRP) which aims to publish details of awarded contracts and suppliers but as of June 2014 the details are not uploaded. So far there is no evidence to suggest that this has been used to improve information flow regarding defence purchases. In fact the Executive Director of the National Public Procurement Authority accused the Ministry of Defence of failing to adhere to the procurement planning process, and hence acting against the law, in 2013 (3).

Researcher4109: There is no evidence that discrimination is made between companies on the ground of their integrity. This is not to say that companies with clear frauds against them aren't dismissed, rather that there is a lack of evidence that due diligence is conducted beyond the submission of documents.

The Ministry of Defence has an Open Bid Process for items that are not deemed a threat to national security. Potential suppliers are subsequently required to provide information regarding their business registration, a Contractor’s Classification Registration Certificate, three- years of audited financial accounts and evidence of tax clearance from the National Revenue Authority for national suppliers (1). However there is no requirement placed on companies to sign no-corruption clauses in contracts or to have specific business conduct programmes that focus on transparency.

This is even the case for more sensitive procurement when single-sourcing takes place. However there are suggestions that due to the high levels of corruption in the country defence officials can be bribed so that companies without the relevant documents can still take part in the procurement process (3). But there is no proof to support these accusations.

There have been allegations that some suppliers, including one in the president's immediate family, have multiple companies to avoid problems so that if one gets accused they can still continue to operate through others (4) - but again there is no proof to substantiate this claim.

Researcher4109: The interviewee explained that the Ministry of Defence submits an annual procurement plan for the 2014/15 financial year for example before the end of the 2013/14 financial year which has to be agreed on by the Parliamentary Sub-Committee. However there is a prevalence within RSLAF for high value demands to be left to short notice to force single source procurement and therefore the plan developed at the start of the year often varies significant from the actual expenditure. The lack of internal audit capacity is an important factor to consider, as is the lack of capacity in procurement planning, as this impacts on the quality of planning and can often mean that ad-hoc procurement is forced as well as opportunistic. A claim made by a Justice Africa report which finds that there is a dire lack of comprehensiveness and clarity in all the defence budgets reviewed and a failure to declare defence procurements within the defence budget and to pursue procurements on an ad-hoc basis.

Researcher4109: The interviewees explained that the Defence Procurement Committee is tasked with developing a procurement plan, annually, which is to be reviewed and approved by parliament before it is approved. Definition of the requirement is a clearly defined process, internally, though that process is not made available to the public. However this process is not routinely adhered to by RSLAF or the MOD and often this is because poor planning has taken place. However sometimes a purchase is deliberately omitted from the procurement plan to allow for single-sourcing to be pursued, using suppliers that are seen by the public to have favourable relationships with defence officials.

The report by Justice Africa does suggest this is also happening (p16) across 8 countries it looked at, one of which is Sierra Leone.

No other public sources were available to comment on this question.

Researcher4109: In most cases the procurement procedures laid out in the 2004 Act are followed with some exceptions for items that it is deemed not to be in the interests of national security to disclose (3).

Invitations for tenders are advertised in at least two or three local printed newspapers and all suitable suppliers are encouraged to bid. However there are accusations that many of these contracts have already been agreed in principle and that this process has no bearing on the outcome of who is awarded the contract (2). This claim is difficult to substantiate as the MOD Procurement Committee does not share enough information to validate. Section 46, legally outlines the cases where single sourcing is acceptable – only one supplier, urgency, extension of contract services where it would not make sense, economically, to re-advertise and unique consultancy skills – and these can only be granted after prior consultation of the Procurement Committee. However this is not always adhered to (3). There is no evidence to support the claims that exemptions are justified to scrutinisers.

Researcher4109: According to the interviewee tender boards are regulated based on codes of conduct, however this information is not publicly available. Internal auditing of these procedures does take place but the capacity of the internal auditors means that the findings are not always to the standard expected. These seem not to be made public, they are however made available to the auditor general when her team carries out the report. Although the Public Procurement Act outlines that a technical evaluation committee should be established, comprising of a minimum of three individuals, one of whom should have technical expertise in the area of procurement there is little information as to how this selection is undertaken. Tender Boards are part of the national auditing process and have been engaged in performance auditing but this is a very recent innovation. The assessor could not find a copy of the results.

Researcher4109: Collusion in the procurement process by public officials is clearly defined in the PPA Act (2004) Section 33 which requires any public official involved in the procurement process to avoid conflicts of interest, to ensure a fair and competitive process and not commit or abet corrupt or fraudulent practices, coercion or collusion, including the solicitation or acceptance of any inducements. Section 34 outlines similar criteria for the conduct of bidders and suppliers which includes impinging of the transparency of the procurement process, giving bribes to improve chances of success or efforts to detrimentally affect competitors. This is a legislation applicable to all government procurement and not specific to the defence sector (3). There is little to no evidence that these measures are enforced due to the finite number of suppliers and a public sense that this collusion happens even if it is not publicly acknowledged (2). Source 4 reported on cases of collusion going unpunished.

Researcher4109: Procurement staff are trained but there is no publicly available sources to confirm that there is undue influence from higher grades within the organisation though there are a very small number of claims that undue evidence may even come from contractors who have relatives within a Ministry or at the executive level (5).
Despite the establishment of a Procurement Unit at the Ministry of Defence which has the responsibility for conducting all procurement in line with the 2004 Public Procurement Act there is a lack of capacity to carry out the role with any great expertise. There is a need to promote procurement as a specialist discipline within government in order to ensure that legislation is fully adhered too particularly in the defence sector. There also needs to be greater oversight of the work of the procurement unit in carrying out monitoring of the contractor as in 2010 the Director of Procurement at the Ministry of Defence was convicted by the ACC for corruption. Procurement accounts for 56% of government expenditure across all MDAs and hence the need for more trained staff to ensure procedures laid out in the 2004 Act are followed.

Researcher4109: The Public Procurement Act 2004 Section 65 and Regulation 157 of the Public Procurement Regulation of 2006 has provision to allow suppliers the opportunity to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement to the Independent Procurement Review Panel providing any submission is done within 10 working days and is accompanied by a fee of Le 2 million which has been put in place to prevent unsubstantiated allegations. That panel, in theory at least, has the capacity to annul part of all of a bidding process for irregularities or even reverse the decision made by the MDAs Procurement Committee, but there is limitations to its authority to enact and there is no legislation to allow for judicial review if that is sought by the supplier. According to the interviewee, there is little to no evidence of suppliers using these mechanisms though suggesting that they do not feel as though it is an avenue that will be beneficial.

Researcher4109: Bidders and suppliers who engage in fraudulent, corrupt or coercive practices in connection with public procurement are subject to prosecution pursuant to the applicable criminal laws, including the Anti-Corruption Act, 2000. The Procurement Authority can, in line with Section 35 of the 2004 Act exclude a bidder or supplier from engagement in the procurement process for a period of between one and six years for malpractice, false information and collusion prior to bidding. However there is little to no evidence of these measures being applied. The list of corruption cases listed on the ACCs website does not make reference to successful prosecutions of suppliers to date.
Source 3 provides information regarding impunity that contractors, particularly those who are related to the President, have been able to enjoy in Sierra Leone. Example of army rice supply contract being withdrawn from one company and being given to another (run by Presidents brother) without justification.

Researcher4109: There does not appear to be legislation regarding off-set contracts in Sierra Leone and no publicly available sources of information were available to verify this question.

According to the interviewee, offset contract negotiations do in general follow the same due diligence requirements as normal contracts though because of the short time-frame they often lack a suitable level of interrogation. According to the interviewee these contracts are still subject to internal and external audit processes, in line with standard procedure, but integrity checks are of minimal concern. This was not able to be verified however.

Score 1 has been awarded in light of the increased corruption risk in this area, given the absence of legal provisions and lack of publicly verifiable information.

Researcher4109: The government publishes only basic details, the contractor, the total amount, and the service to be provided in the public domain, currently using newspaper and media briefings, but there is a plan to have the details on the National Public Procurement Authority Website, according to the interviewee. This does not yet happen and even still the details of what information is to be contained is not clear.
Not all offsets are published. There is a degree of selection in the process which is not transparent.

Researcher4109: No publicly available information was found during research to verify this question. The interviewee stated that whilst some degree of competition regulation this is less than for the main contract and in some cases contractors are identified for the work prior to the 'competitive' process taking place. There is no legislation regulating competition for offset contracts so it is often at the discretion of the MDA and procurement committee.

One possible example may come from a contract in 2011 where China agreed a deal to supply a small number of weapons to the defence sector in Sierra Leone, noting how closely aligned the China 7th Railway Group is with the Chinese government and the number of contracts for infrastructure building that it has been awarded in Sierra Leone.

In the absence of any public source and legal provisions which manifest a lack of transparency and heighten risks of corruption, a score 0 has been selected.

Researcher4109: Proxies or intermediaries are not excluded from the project cycle by law and it is generally accepted that they are a feature of procurement processes on both sides (government and supplier). Often with a degree of overlap, according to the interviewee. Although it is difficult to find proof to substantiate these claims with regards to the defence sector, a corruption scandal at the Ministry for Health in 2011 and subsequent investigations have found a number of practices, such as multiple guises for the same bidder in the procurement process providing the illusion of a competitive bidding process, to have taken place. This is not to say that such practices occur in the defence sector but that there is little scrutiny or control exercised by the government to pre-empt this potential threat.

Researcher4109: In 2010 the UN and the EU lifted the arms embargo on Sierra Leone allowing it to purchase weapons. However, according to the interviewee, in the subsequent deals/donations that have occurred there has been very limited public information made available particularly surrounding the financial package and the identity of the supplier. There is no publicly available information regarding the decision to select certain suppliers or the details of what has been procured nor is this a requirement of the Public Procurement Act. For example, in 2011 a contract to supply arms for Sierra Leone was won by Amylam Sierra Leone Ltd, the information given about this deal in a press release stated only the indicative amount ($5 million), then period when the payment will be made (2010-2012) and the arrival date of the shipment. The Right to Information Act 2013 allows requests to be made but this information will not be disclosed in the interest of national security.

Researcher4109: There is nothing in the law, the Public Procurement Act or the Anti Corruption Act, that stipulates that contractors or sub-contractors should adopt anti-corruption programmes. Although contractors can be disbarred for engaging in corrupt practices around the procurement process this is not regularly enforced by the government. There have been recent efforts to encourage corporate entities in Sierra Leone to improve corporate integrity from the Anti-Corruption Commissioner but there are no public declarations to similar effect from senior government officials in the defence sector for example.

Researcher4109: Defence spending has increased year on year since 2008, totalling Le 131 million in 2013 according to SIPRI.

The only 2 import deals relating to defence in SIPRI database were with China in 2011 which does suggest a level of political influence as China has invested heavily in Sierra Leone building roads and other infrastructure projects.

One clear example of defence supplies being acquired without a necessary plan to do so came in 2011 when China donated substantial quantity of AK 47 rifles, rocket grenade launchers, anti-aircraft guns and mortar, and a large quantity of their appropriate ammunition. There is a suggesting that it was an effort by China to exercise political influence in the country as they have been awarded several large construction contracts since 2011 rather than a procurement that was planned by RSLAF/MOD. According to the interviewee, other decisions, with the support of IMATT/ISAT, are part of annually constructed procurement plans and are based on analysis of where there is need.