Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor did not find evidence of any formal procedures for disposing assets with regard to the defence and security sector. The Malian defence sector has been constantly experiencing assets deficit: vehicles, communications devices, weapons, etc. (5). For that reason, it may be concluded that the state is more inclined to acquire assets rather than dispose of them; disposal of assets may not apply to the Malian context.

A French military trainer noted that &quoute;in 2006 800 pick-ups were ordered by the Malian army. Today there are almost none left&quoute; (1). This is unlikely to indicate disposals, it is more likely that they were stolen or destroyed in the course of of the 2012-2013 civil conflict in which armed anti-state actors targeted military vehicles while hundreds of soldiers deserted their posts leaving their equipment behind them (6).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor did not find evidence of any formal procedures for auditing of the disposal of assets with regard to the defence and security. The Malian defence sector has been constantly experiencing assets deficit: vehicles, communications devices, weapons, etc (1). For that reason, it may be concluded that the state is more inclined to acquire assets rather than dispose of them.

The researcher could not confirm whether scrutiny was within the purview of the parliamentary Defence Committee or the BVG. The budget does not contain information on disposal of assets.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year that is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services is not a publicly available figure.

As an indication of general lack of information, only total defence expenditure and defence expenditure as a % of GDP are available on third party platforms (SIPRI, 1). These are available from 1988 to 2011 (2012 saw a military coup and 2013 a civil war, thus there may be delays to providing information after 2011). The assessor found no website for the Malian intelligence services; the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance websites were not available at the time of researching (2, 3). According to members of the civil society that were interviewed, the defence budget is &quoute;opaque&quoute; (Interview 1). The assessor found no evidence that the government has made announcements on this subject.

It is likely that this information is classified under the Penal Code which provides for the classification of information on the grounds of protecting national security (5). It notes that the below should be deemed national defence secrets:

1. military, diplomatic or economic information which by their nature must be known only by the qualified individuals should, in the interest of national defence, be kept secret with regard to any other person.
2. The objects, materials, writings, drawings, plans, maps, photographs or other reproductions, and any other documents whatsoever, which by their nature should be known only people qualified to handle them or hold them and must be kept secret with regard to any other person, may lead to the discovery of information belonging to one of the categories referred to in paragraph precedent;
3. Military information of any kind not made public by the government and not included in the lists above, including, publication, dissemination, disclosure or reproduction has been prohibited by law or by a decree of the Council of Ministers;
4. Information on whether the measures taken to identify and arrest the perpetrators and complicit in crimes or crimes against state security.

The assessor was unable to find any significant information on the management of the Malian national intelligence organisation, the Direction Generale de la Sécurité d'Etat (DGSE), in the public domain. The DGSE also does not have a website. Media searches demonstrate (6-8) that the organisation is involved in counter-terrorism operations and is working with French intelligence services but no further information was found.

There is no standing parliamentary committee vested with any responsibility or power for overseeing DGSE operations, organisation, budget or activities (9). The budget and the size of its personnel are not known to the assessor after an extensive search of local media and third party reports referenced throughout this assessment. According to Laurent Touchard (10), the secret service in Mali has a poor reputation; it is alleged that officers are involved in trafficking with smugglers in the northern part of the country (11).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index 2010, the legislature is provided with information on secret items. (7) However, the assessor found no evidence to confirm this or to verify the level of detail provided. The defence budget itself is not publicly accessible. The assessor found no website for the Malian intelligence services; the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance websites were not available at the time of researching (2, 3). According to members of the civil society that were interviewed, the defence budget is &quoute;opaque&quoute; (Interview 1).

According to Sy Kadiatou Sow, president of the ADEMA association, who organised a forum &quoute;to improve the Malian army in the future&quoute;, the secret services in Mali are opaque and there is a dearth of information about them (1). Moreover, legislative involvement is limited as a result of the powers granted by the constitution to the executive (in state matters generally and for the security sector in particular). According to the constitution, legislators are able to discuss the military budget, but the executive can ignore their suggestions and is not bound by any amendments made.(3)

The Penal Code (2) also facilitates secrecy and confidentiality of defence issues by providing for the classification of information on the grounds of protecting national security. It notes that the below should be deemed national defence secrets:

1. military, diplomatic or economic information which by their nature must be known only by the qualified individuals should, in the interest of national defence, be kept secret with regard to any other person.
2. The objects, materials, writings, drawings, plans, maps, photographs or other reproductions, and any other documents whatsoever, which by their nature should be known only people qualified to handle them or hold them and must be kept secret with regard to any other person, may lead to the discovery of information belonging to one of the categories referred to in paragraph precedent;
3. Military information of any kind not made public by the government and not included in the lists above, including, publication, dissemination, disclosure or reproduction has been prohibited by law or by a decree of the Council of Ministers;
4. Information on whether the measures taken to identify and arrest the perpetrators and complicit in crimes or crimes against state security.

While the assessor found no reference to secret items, the following explain broadly the budget scrutiny for defence items. The National Assembly exercises control over budgets through its accounting division. If any irregularities are noted by the accounts team the National Assembly has the power to establish a commission of inquiry into the budget in question (4). When necessary, the National Assembly can invite witnesses, such as ministers, for oral and written questioning (4) Regular resort to extra-budgetary spending has left the National Assembly uninformed about true government financial operations (4). This information was detailed in a 2006 report, the assessor found no evidence to suggest that the information is no longer valid.

The various sources of off-budget income are beyond the reach of the legislators as they have little or no say in the management of the armed forces, including policy development (4). This is in part caused by a lack of expertise among legislators and by the absence of the resources needed to employ experts to support the National Assembly’s oversight work. Testifying to weaknesses in the National Assembly, in August 2014, Malian media reported that USD66,000 was embezzled from the parliament's budget in scheme that involved a presidential advisor (5).

While the assessor found no evidence of effectiveness, or of it being overruled, there is evidence that the National Assembly is consulted on defence budgets. For example, in February 2013, the National Assembly unanimously approved the Military Planning draft bill allowing a USD1.7bn investment plan to reform the national army between 2015-2019 (6).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index 2012, the annual accounts of the security sector and other secret programs are either not audited or they are audited but such reports are not presented to the legislature. (7) More generally, despite the existence of formal mechanisms of legislative scrutiny over state budgets, there is no indication that regular audits are conducted. In addition, there is no indication that secret programs or services are audited. There is generally no information available regarding audit outcomes, nor is there evidence of debate on this matter. (1)

According to a 2006 report which remains relevant in the absence of any evidence demonstrating changes, the National Assembly exercises control over budgets through its accounting division. If any irregularities are noted by the accounts team, the National Assembly has the power to establish a commission of inquiry into the budget in question (2). However, legislators have little or no say in the management of the armed forces (2). Furthermore, according to SIPRI, state budgeting has largely been a private affair of the executive, with limited room for accountability and detailed figures do not always appear in the armed forces budget that was made available to them (which includes only overall expenditures and % of GDP) (6).

This is in part caused by a lack of expertise among legislators and by the absence of the resources needed to employ experts to support the National Assembly’s oversight work. Testifying to weaknesses in the National Assembly, in August 2014 Malian media reported that USD66,000 was embezzled from the parliament's budget in scheme that involved a presidential advisor (3). More importantly, as a result of the powers granted by the constitution to the executive (in state matters generally and for the security sector in particular) legislators are able to discuss the military budget, but the executive can ignore their suggestions and is not bound by any amendments made. (3)

There is evidence that the National Assembly has been consulted in recent years: in 2013 an extraordinary session was called to allow for a additional finances to be cleared for the annual budget as a result of extra need due to securing the north and reforming the armed forces (4). This however, does not constitute evidence of audits of classified spending being provided to Parliament.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: All military expenditures are meant to be funded through the national budget, which has to be authorised by the National Assembly, after an extensive examination of its content, eventual amendments, debate, and finally the vote of a specific law (1). Expenditures that do not meet these legal requirements and follow this process are not permitted (1). In law, there may be some provisions relating to secrecy or confidentiality over some aspects of the defence (2). While all military expenditures (off budget or not) are meant to be included and authorised in the national budget, Mali's defence expenditures have also been consistently characterised by a lack of transparency and weak control by any formal oversight mechanism (1). No evidence was found pointing to off-budget expenditure or military budgets on the BVG website, for example.

It was not clear to the researcher if Mali has received any direct defence budget support from donor states, or if there is any way of telling whether donor assistance can be directly linked to defence expenditure. Budgetary support has previously been incorporated into the national budget with no apparent way of telling which source of income has funded which expenditure.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence of off-budget military expenditures, none were reported in the media, and a breakdown of defence budgets was not available. However, while there is no evidence to confirm whether the purchases noted below were made on or off budget, the following information does suggest that illicit economic activity does take place during military spending.

In September 2014, following allegations of corrupt practice by the IMF, the Ministry of Defence cancelled 10 defence contracts in which several private companies agreed to provide the Malian state with military equipment. One contract, with a Chinese supplier, according to Malian media involved supplies invoiced at CFA600million but budgeted at CFA 3 billion (1). As a result of the cancellations a Malian businessman was arrested and held for forgery. The incident demonstrates weakness in oversight of defence contracts. The corrupt contracts did lead to an announced review (1) of all defence contracts (largely equipment acquisitions) signed under the defence Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (April 2011 – March 2012). However, it is unclear which body undertook the review and what the results were.

A senior Malian army officer reported that the process of equipment procurement in the Armed Forces “was riddled with private deal making and profiteering” (Interview 3). Not only did he claim that servicemen and MoD personnel would routinely find ways of taking a private cut, either from the costs of a contract or through misappropriation of the resulting items, but he also pointed out that a series of middlemen routinely found ways to inflate prices as part of the arrangement of contracts (Interview 1).

According to a 2006 SIPRI assessment which remains relevant (the assessor found no more recent evidence to dispute its findings) frequent non-reporting of defence incomes and expenditures is a tolerated phenomenon despite being technically illegal. A key area where this takes place is off-budget income, notably from the public works, developmental missions and private enterprise - activities that are not considered to be cost-effective for profit-driven private companies but serve as revenue-generating ventures for the military (2). Their related income do not appear in the national budget (2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Article 36 of the 1961 Penal Code (amended in 2001) provides for the classification of information on the grounds of protecting national security. It notes that the below should be deemed national defence secrets:

1. military, diplomatic or economic information which by their nature must be known only by the qualified individuals should, in the interest of national defence, be kept secret with regard to any other person.
2. The objects, materials, writings, drawings, plans, maps, photographs or other reproductions, and any other documents whatsoever, which by their nature should be known only people qualified to handle them or hold them and must be kept secret with regard to any other person, may lead to the discovery of information belonging to one of the categories referred to in paragraph precedent;
3. Military information of any kind not made public by the government and not included in the lists above, including, publication, dissemination, disclosure or reproduction has been prohibited by law or by a decree of the Council of Ministers;
4. Information on whether the measures taken to identify and arrest the perpetrators and complicit in crimes or crimes against state security. (1)

Aside from this, however, there appears to be no specific legislation on classification of information. According to Freedom House (2015), there is also no access to information legislation, which could provide an additional verification mechanism if it was in place. (3)

According to the US State Department, the government prevented access information on the military during the civil conflict, 2012-2013, on the grounds that it is 'sensitive'. The report also noted that 'the government may refuse a request [for information] by citing national security'. (2)

No evidence was found to suggest that the application of the provisions for classifying information is regulated or scrutinised.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no legislation that explicitly outlawed engagement in private enterprise, however the 1961 Penal Code (amended 2001) provides for conflict of interest and mentions all civil service employees (including military personnel) in Article 130. (2)

There is evidence of top-level officials involvement in legal enterprises such as engineering, air services, repair shops, restaurants, leisure, sports centres (3). These enterprises are publicly declared (3) which indicates some scrutiny, although the details of their operations are not particularly transparent. These are privately owned, the assessor found no evidence of institutionally owned enterprises.

According to a 2006 SIPRI assessment which remains relevant (the assessor found no more recent evidence to dispute its findings) frequent non-reporting of defence incomes and expenditures is a tolerated phenomenon despite being technically illegal. A key area where this takes place is off-budget income, notably from the public works, developmental missions and private enterprise - activities that are not considered to be cost-effective for profit-driven private companies but serve as revenue-generating ventures for the military (3). Their related income do not appear in the national budget (3).

In addition to the legal, publicly-owned businesses, there is evidence of top-level officials involvement in illegal business activities such as drugs trafficking (1)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no legislation that explicitly outlawed engagement in private enterprise; however the 1961 Penal Code (amended 2001) provides for conflict of interest and mentions all civil service employees (including military personnel) in Article 130.

There is evidence of top-level officials involvement in illegal business activities such as drugs trafficking (1) as well as in legal enterprises such as engineering, air services, repair shops, restaurants, leisure, sports centres (3). These enterprises are publicly declared (3) which indicates some scrutiny. These are privately owned, the assessor found no evidence of institutionally owned enterprises.

According to a SIPRI assessment, frequent non-reporting of defence incomes and expenditures is a tolerated phenomenon despite being technically illegal. A key area where this takes place is off-budget income, notably from the public works, developmental missions and private enterprise - activities that are not considered to be cost-effective for profit-driven private companies but serve as revenue-generating ventures for the military (3). Their related income do not appear in the national budget (3).

Moreover, interviewees stated that military owned businesses are not subject to scrutiny in line with international standards (Interview 3).

The constitution requires the president (who is also head of the army), prime minister, and other cabinet members (includes defence, internal security and reconciliation ministers) to submit annually a financial statement and written declaration of their net worth to the Supreme Court, however there are no sanctions for noncompliance (4, 5). Furthermore, the Court of Accounts requires officials to identify all assets and liabilities when they start and complete their terms and provide yearly updates throughout their tenure; details of these filings were not made public (4, 5).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is evidence of top-level officials involvement in illegal business activities such as drugs trafficking (1) as well as in legal enterprises such as engineering, air services, repair shops, restaurants, leisure, sports centres (3 - while this evidence comes from 2006 the assessor found no evidence to suggest that this is no longer the case).

The constitution requires the president (who is also head of the army), prime minister, and other cabinet members (includes defence, internal security and reconciliation ministers) to submit annually a financial statement and written declaration of their net worth to the Supreme Court, however there are no sanctions for noncompliance (4, 5). Furthermore, the Court of Accounts requires officials to identify all assets and liabilities when they start and complete their terms and provide yearly updates throughout their tenure; details of these filings were not made public (4, 5).

The 1961 Penal Code (amended 2001) provides for conflict of interest and mentions all civil servants (including military personnel) in Article 130 (2). Article 121 states that 'Anyone in either the performance or the obtaining of an act or a benefit or favors, the use of violence or threats, promises, offers, gifts or presents, or acts tending to corruption will be subject to the measures included in article 130, 'five to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of twice the value of approved promises or things received or requested, without that fine be less than 100,000 francs person solicits or accepts offers or promises, solicited or received'.

In 2014, defence contracts signed under Defence Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (April 2011 – March 2012) were found to be irregular - according to Malian media, one contract, with a Chinese supplier involved supplies invoiced at CFA600 million but was budgeted at CFA 3 billion. (6, 7) As a result, the Ministry of Defence cancelled 10 defence contracts (in which several private companies agreed to provide the Malian state with military equipment) and the central court arrested Maïga - it is unclear whether he was tried, charged or fined. The incident does demonstrates that those suspected of breaching the penal code can be investigated, but it does not indicate to what extent. Precise examples of unauthorised enterprise being sanctioned could not be found so this example has been provided as a proxy.

Generally, the judiciary system in Mali is unable to efficiently deliver prosecutions as a result of internal corruption. For example, in December 2013, judicial representatives threatened to hold an indefinite strike due to state interference in arrest warrants against judges accused of corruption (8). The same month, four judges and a court clerk were arrested on suspicion of corruption (this incident also indicates that those in breach of the law can be arrested, however as with the Maiga case there is no evidence of them having been tried, charged or fined) (9). As US State Department report also noted that 'Corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts ... There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time.' (5)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The year 2014 was promoted as 'the year against corruption' by President IBK who is also head of the armed forces (1, 2). A symposium with civil society was organised to find solutions in the 'fight against corruption' (the January 2014 Forum sur la Corruption et la Délinquance Financière, 3). An interviewee was sceptical about this initiative and noted how the IMF's sanctions against the government during the summer 2014 demonstrated that, despite anti-corruption commitments, &quoute;nothing had changed&quoute; (6, Interview 1).

The assessor found no evidence of other army or MoD representatives making public statements of commitment to anti-corruption.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: In 2008, a World Bank report on corruption stated that general sanctions were taken against high civil servants or former ministers. The World Bank also stated that CEOs of public firms, directors of customs, prisons or post offices were sometimes imprisoned because of corruption. However, they also noticed cases where people were not prosecuted, even if proof of corruption was abundant. Continued examples of corruption since the report was published offered below indicate that the report is likely still an accurate depiction of the country.

Malian MPs voted in a law against &quoute;illegal enrichment&quoute; in 2014. This new law updates a previous one, adopted in 1982. In the new law,&quoute; elected representatives&quoute; are specifically mentioned and subject to prosecution in case of 'illicit enrichment&quoute;. However, MPs amended the text to prevent people &quoute;in charge of the state budget&quoute; from being prosecuted (in other words MPs are not concerned with this law as they vote for the state budget).

The 1961 (amended 2002) Penal Code also covers corruption:
Article 121 states that 'Anyone in either the performance or the obtaining of an act or a benefits or favors, the use of violence or threats, promises, offers, gifts or presents, or acts tending to corruption will be subject to the measures included in article 130, 'five to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of twice the value of approved promises or things received or requested, without that fine be less than 100,000 francs person solicits or accepts offers or promises, solicited or received'. (7)

In 2014, defence contracts signed under Defence Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (April 2011 – March 2012) were found to be irregular - one contract, with a Chinese supplier, according to Malian media involved supplies invpiced at CFA600million but budgeted at CFA 3 billion. (5, 6) As a result, the Ministry of Defence cancelled 10 defence contracts (in which several private companies agreed to provide the Malian state with military equipment) and the central court arrested Maïga - it is unclear whether he was tried, charged or fined. The incident does demonstrates that those found guilty of corruption can be investigated, but it does not indicate to what extent this is consistently applied.

The judiciary system in Mali is unable to efficiently deliver prosecutions as a result of internal corruption. For example, in December 2013, judicial representatives threatened to hold an indefinite strike due to state interference in arrest warrants against judges accused of corruption (2). The same month, four judges and a court clerk were arrested on suspicion of corruption (this incident also indicates that those suspected of corruption can be arrested, however as with the Maiga case there is no evidence of them having been charged, tried or fined) (3). As US State Deparment report also noted that 'Corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts ... There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time.'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: A World Bank report in 2008 noted that Malian legal system makes whistleblowing difficult, this is likely to still be the case given the provisions in the Penal Code below which remain unchanged (1, 2).

The penal code allows for the punishment of those deemed to share information unlawfully: Section 3, article 130 of 1961 Penal Code (amended 2001) states:
Anyone who, by position or profession had secrets entrusted to them, that they then revealed shall be punished by imprisonment of six months to two years and, optionally, a fine of 20 000 to 150 000 francs.
The penalties will apply in to members of all jurisdictions guilty of violating the code.
If the offender is a public officer or government official, he will be punished by three months to five years imprisonment and a fine from 20 000 to 240 000 francs. The culprit will become forbidden from any function or public employment for at least five to ten years.
Except as provided above, deletion, all correspondence opening addressed to third parties, in bad faith, shall incur the same penalties.
The attempt of the offence shall be punished as if the offence itself.

The article does however state that exemptions can be made when the defendant is obliged by the law to become an informer which indicates that there may be some legal loopholes to take place. (2)

Soldiers are allegedly requested by their superiors to engage in corrupt practices, generating a system where everybody is involved in the corruption process. For example, an officer stated in an interview that he was told to change figures in the report he was writing for the Malian MoD to hide proof of money diversion (Interview 3). The officer noted that, as the career progression system is not clear, those who want to report corruption may be ostracised or denied promotion. The same interviewee reported that a part of assistance programmes, the US attempted to establish a military Court of Justice. The project failed as officers hampered the creation of this institution (Interview 3).

The assessor found no examples of whistleblowing in Mali in recent years. Moreover, according to the international Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 'There are no reports on whistle-blowing in Mali or whether any mechanisms or institutions have been set up to administer complaints of corruption. Likewise, there is no information on whether whistleblowers reporting cases of corruption are protected by law or in practice from threats and acts of retaliation.' (3) In agreement a US Department of State Report noted, 'The [Malian] law provides no protection for public or private employees for lawfully disclosing evidence of illegality'. (4)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence that special attention is paid to the selection, time in post, or oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. Nor was any recognition that some positions may be more open to corruption that others found.

Several reports indicate that attention (that falls outside the TI definition) is paid to the family or political background of those in sensitive positions and that this was the key determinant of appointments:

- Firstly, a World Bank report on corruption (2008, the assessor found no evidence to indicate its findings are not still relevant) explains that directors of Mali's Administrative and Financial Department are not selected because of their competencies but because of their networks (in particular with the Minister). (1)

- Secondly, a SIPRI assessment showed that for example, unlike other public-sector accountants, military accountants are not appointed by or with the agreement of the Minister of Economy and Finance and do not take a professional oath (as is required by the 1996 public accounting act for all other public-sector accountants) (1). They are thus not accountable to the Minister of Economy and Finance. (2 - 2006 SIPRI report that the assessor found no indication to suggest its findings on this matter are outdated)

- Thirdly in January 2014, President IBK's son was appointed head of the Defence and Security Committee (DSC). It is unclear what procedures were followed in his appointment.

Response to peer reviewer 1:
Agreed, score lowered from 1 to 0.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The precise number of soldiers is not published by the government and is not clear from third party sources. In order to confirm the numbers, the EU has suggested introducing biometric cards in the Malian army (Interview 5).

According to a 2013 report, the Malian army is composed of fewer than 7 000 men. 90% of those soldiers are from the southern part of the country, limiting its ability to fight in the north. The Air Force has 1,000 soldiers as well as 4 helicopters (MI24), 3 MIG21 (mainly useless) and 15 other planes (troop transport aircraft, reconnaissance plane) (1). The National Guard consists of 3,500 troops; among them, 2,000 are from the southern part of the country (1). Troops established in the north are mainly northerners (Tuaregs and Arabs populations) (1).

For context, in 2006, Ayissi and Sangaré provide the following estimates: 'The total size of the armed forces is about 7350, including 400 personnel in the air force and 50 navy personnel. The security forces total 4800, including 1800 gendarmes and 2000 republican guards.' (2)

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Agreed, score lowered from 2 to 0.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is an established system for salaries and allowances for civil servants within the Malian administration, although no figures are released publicly (1).

According to a 2007 source, civilian and military personnel are also part of this system, which implies that their pay rates and allowances are not arbitrary (2). The assessor found no more recent evidence to supersede this information

The remuneration system, if not the different pay rates and allowances, is generally transparent (3). However, according to an interviewee, wages are not correctly paid on time and the system of payment is not well-established. According to an interviewee, a rank-and-file soldier earns about 55 000 CFA F (USD111) at the beginning of his career and chief-corporal earns about 130 000 CFA F/month (USD260) after thirteen years of service (Interview 3).

The question has been scored on the basis of what information is made public by the government/MOD/armed forces.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to a Malian officer, wages are not paid correctly or on time and the system of payments is not well-established (Interview 3). According to a journalist who surveyed the Malian army, during the conflict some bonuses were diverted by officers (1). Soldiers are under-paid and sometimes have to pay for their food or their health on the battlefield (1, 2).

According to an interviewee, a rank-and-file soldier earns about 55 000 CFA F (USD111) at the beginning of his career and chief-corporal earns about 130 000 CFA F/month (USD260) after thirteen years of service (Interview 3). Consequently, &quoute;temptation is high&quoute; to collude with drugs traffickers (Interview 3).

Demands for wage arrears for soldiers to be settled during peace talks in 2013 also indicate some issues with payments systems (4). However, officially, there is an established system for salaries and allowances for civil servants within the Malian administration, that applies to all civil servants (3).

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Agreed. Score lowered from 2 to 1.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence of an appointments and promotions system for military personnel. However, the media does frequently report (and comment on) high-level appointments and promotions - these seem to take place simultaneously with changes in government rather than as a result of a distinct promotions process (3, 5, 6).

A World Bank report described the situation in 2008 - military appointments in Mali are seen as an asset which generates “flows of illicit incomes” (wages, bonuses, indemnities, state budget diversion, and corruption)(1). This system creates a “secondary market” in which those who have the power to hire or to promote negotiate their influence (1). This secondary market has flourished because of the lack of internal controls, the lack of career path and deficiencies in human resources (1). This impression is equally accurate today as the evidence below supports.

Affiliation with a political party can assist with access to key positions in the army. According to Le Monde, the alleged 'Lobbo’s list' is an example of this system occurring at the heart of the political power (2). Lobbo Traoré was the wife of the former president Dioncounda Traoré (2012-2013) who used her network to place her children’s friends in key positions (2).

In another example of a politically motivated appointment, in mid-2013 and following a military coup he spearheaded, Captain Amadou Sanogo was promoted to 4-star general without any clear process of approval or oversight. This angered human rights groups who alleged that Sanogo at the time had a well documented history of 'arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearances' (3). Despite these clear breaches of the military code of conduct (which if enforced would presumably lead to his temporary removal from the military) his support within the military, and the governments need to ensure this support, enabled his promotion (Interview 6). Several officers who contested Sanogo's appointment/promotion were arrested for their comments (7).

In addition, as peer reviewer 2 notes, selection, appointments and promotion within the military have also been conducted along ethnic and regional lines (see Galy, La guerre au Mali, 2013, p6). Historically, Tuareg soldiers were integrated into the army either individually or, following peace agreements, collectively. The Malian army thus incorporated many former rebels into the army. Non-Tuareg members of the army denounced positive discrimination policy in favour of the Tuaregs.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence of an appointments and promotions system for military personnel. A World Bank report has also noted the lack of internal controls, the lack of career path and deficiencies in human resources with regard to the military. However, the media does frequently report (and comment on) high level appointments and promotions - these seem to take place simultaneous to changes in government rather than as a result of a distinct promotions process (3, 4, 5).

'There is no promotion without networks', alleged a former soldier who resigned from the army (Interview 3). According to one journalist, the hierarchy does not correspond to military competence and nine out of ten officers are sons of officers (8). A corporal alleged that aspiring young soldiers were hindered from promotion so as not 'to impede the promotion of privileged officers' (Interview 3). The interviewee suggested that the issue of internal promotion was one of the main issues of the Malian army (Interview 3).

One example of politically motivated appointment/promotion is that of Captain Amadou Sanogo. Following a military coup he spearheaded, Sanogo was promoted to 4-star general in mid-2013 without any clear process of approval or oversight. At the time, he had a well documented history of 'arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearances' (3). Despite these clear breaches of the military code of conduct (which if enforced would presumably lead to his temporary removal from the military) his support within the military, and the governments need to ensure this support, enabled his promotion (3). Several officers who contested Sanogo's appointment/promotion were arrested for their comments (7).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: In June 2014 the Malian government announced that national service for men and women aged 18-35 would be reintroduced, however, it did not confirm whether or not a timeline for its implementation had been agreed (2). Moreover, the assessor found no record of this announcement being followed up by a parliamentary vote or conscription drives - one can therefore conclude that either there is (as yet) no compulsory conscription, which an interviewee suggested (Interview 3), or that it is too early to tell how any planned conscription will be piloted with regards to guidelines etc. In June 2013 a national recruitment campaign resulted in the training of 4,078 new troops but there is no indication that this was done through compulsory conscription (3).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: In June 2014 the Malian government announced that national service for men and women aged 18-35 would be reintroduced however it did not confirm whether or not a timeline for its implemented had been agreed (1). Moreover, the assessor found no record of this announcement being followed up by a parliamentary vote or conscription drives - one can therefore conclude that either there is (as yet) no compulsory conscription, which the interviewee suggested, or that it is too early to tell how any planned conscription will be piloted with regards to guidelines etc.

In June 2013 a national recruitment campaign resulted in the training of 4,078 new troops but there is no indication that this was done through compulsory conscription (3). Given the set period of training for these recruits - 6 months - they fall under the definition of 'voluntary conscription', even though their total service period is not defined. According to military authorities, 'youth recruitment took place in total transparency' (2).

With regard to corruption in general recruitment, it has been reported that some corruption does take place among those interested in joining the army finding their chances of success to be hire if they are sponsored by a person of authority (Interview 3). This, according to the Penal Code (which covers bribery, corruption and influence peddling), is illegal. Despite the existence of regulations, bribery and corruption in the army, including in recruitment is a widespread practice (Interview 1). The assessor could find no open source to verify this with regards to soliciting postings explicitly.

While the Penal Code (3) also provides for sanctions against those who have broken the law (According to article 130, those found guilty of corruption are 'punishable by five to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of twice the value of approved promises or things received or requested, without that fine be less than 100,000 francs') the assessor found no evidence of these having been imposed in cases of corruption in soliciting army positions or postings.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The exact number of soldiers in the Malian army could not be confirmed - the website of the Ministry of Defence was also inaccessible at the time of research.

According to interviewees, within the framework of the restructuring of the Malian armed forces, the Malian authorities hope to manage armed forces personnel better; the absence of a reliable and centralised database allowing the exact number of servicemen to be determined hinders this. The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) was therefore working to promote the introduction of software to improve human resources management. At the time of research such a programme had not been implemented. President IBK has also committed to increasing civil service salaries in an effort to undermine corrupt practices by those illegally substituting their official income (Interview 5, 1).

In 2014, the DGSE arrested a group of 'fake security agents' who, with the complicity of local security agents were demanding facilitation fees from civilians (3). While it is not clear whether these 'fake security agents' were included on the local payroll, it does suggest a form of ghost employment that could be more widespread and under-reported - especially in the context of the weak management systems referred to above.

With regard to the payment system, there is some discrepancy over its efficiency which indicates there is room for ghost payments to occur. According to interviewees (Interview 3), wages not paid correctly or on time and the system of payments is not well-established. According to a journalist who surveyed the Malian army, during the conflict some bonuses were diverted by officers (5). Demands for wage arrears for soldiers to be settled during peace talks in 2013 also indicates some issues with payments systems (6). However, officially, there is an established system for salaries and allowances for civil servants within the Malian administration, that applies to all civil servants and clearly determine salary rates and allowances (7).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to the World Bank (1), in theory there is a separation between the chains of command and the chains of payment, This is, however, not a published policy. Moreover, the report highlights breaches in the principles which undermine this separation in that staff in both areas have personal ties that undermine their independence and that they can also act with impunity (pg. xiv). Despite being published in 2008, the assessor found no evidence to contradict the findings of the report.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is a Code of conduct for all Malian military and civilian personnel that addresses ethical issues and behaviour. It is separated into 4 parts -

- Duties of the Armed Forces and Security Towards The State
- Relations between the Armed and Security Forces and Civilians
- Relations between the Armed Forces and Security Forces
- Armed and Security Forces and Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

It was developed in 1997 with the UNDP and was disseminated in booklet form by the Malian government (1). It is available online through third parties (3). It does not, however, refer to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, or post-separation activities.

The Code does not refer to any formal oversight mechanism, moreover, Bryden comments that (along with broader reform efforts) it is largely ineffective. (2) However, broad standards of conduct related to bribery and corruption are established in legislation (see Q35).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There are some recent examples of prosecution of military personnel found guilty of breaching the Code of Conduct, such as the trial of former coup leader General Sanogo (2013-2014) and investigations into 21 missing soldiers (3, page 2).

However, according to a 2013 US State Department Report which remains relevant, 'Civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over the military ... There were many reports of impunity involving the security forces during the year' (3, page 6). In particular, the report notes 'Mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption by security forces generally were not effective' (3).

According to Bryden, 'despite much touted reform measures, including a pioneering-code of conduct for the armed forces, the security sector transformation Mali needs [as of 2010] never occurred'. (2) A 2013 report also noted that there was no systematic attempt to prosecute misconduct within the security and defence sector, particularly with regard to corruption practices. However, in terms of violation of human rights, it seems that the Malian MoD is more likely to prosecute soldiers (1).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence of anti-corruption training being instituted by the Malian military itself without international support.

According to Axel and Klaousen, schools to train soldiers exist across Mali and many of them have been instructed to develop curricula to include ethical teaching in line with European standards which might include at least a peripheral note on anti-corruption. The assessor found no evidence that such programmes have yet been implemented however (1).

For example, Belgian officers, deployed to train Malian personnel in 2014 were also charged with supporting the army in its fight against organised crime (2) but the assessor found no evidence that the training they provided explicitly addressed anti-corruption in relation to this. A US State Department official who had held responsibilities for engaging with the Malian government was also not aware of any specific anti-corruption training being conducted.

A US official with oversight of training for Malian soldiers similarly indicated that training on human rights issues was available to Malian soldiers. However, one researcher interviewed noted a lack of institutional support for this training and that while it covered ethics, the modules were not comprehensive and did not provide guidelines on anti-corruption.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to the interviewee, there was no known policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence service personnel for corrupt activities (Interview 4). There are sanctions in place to punish personnel who take part in such activity, these include dismissal and fines (see Penal Code, 6). While the assessor found evidence of arrests of personnel involved in corrupt activities, no example of prosecution specific to those in the defence sector for corrupt activities were found.

In 2014, defence contracts signed under Defence Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (April 2011 – March 2012) were found to be irregular - one contract, with a Chinese supplier, according to Malian media involved supplies invoiced at CFA 600million but budgeted at CFA 3 billion (1, 2). As a result, the Ministry of Defence cancelled 10 defence contracts (in which several private companies agreed to provide the Malian state with military equipment) and the central court arrested Maïga, this was publicised howerver - it is unclear whether he was tried, charged or fined.

The judicial system in Mali is unable to efficiently deliver prosecutions as a result of internal corruption. For example, in December 2013, judicial representatives threatened to hold an indefinite strike due to state interference in arrest warrants against judges accused of corruption (3). The same month, four judges and a court clerk were arrested on suspicion of corruption (this incident also indicates that those suspected of corruption can be arrested, however as with the Maiga case there is no evidence of them having been trialled, charged or fined) (4).

As US State Department report also noted, 'Corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts ... There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time.' (5)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: While the term 'facilitation payment' does not appear in the Penal Code (which covers all civil servants, including those working in the defence sector), it is likely to be covered by article 121 which provides for 'Anyone in either the performance or the obtaining of an act or a benefits or favours, the use of violence or threats, promises, offers, gifts or presents, or acts tending to corruption'. The mechanism to discourage facilitation payments as an example of corrupt activity are outlined in article 130, and include imprisonment of five to ten years,'and a fine of twice the value of approved promises or things received or requested, without that fine be less than 100,000 francs' (3).

The assessor found no evidence that the Penal Code had been applied to punish defence officials found guilty of paying or receiving a facilitation fee. This is partly explained by the weakness of the judiciary system. For example, in December 2013, judicial representatives threatened to hold an indefinite strike due to state interference in arrest warrants against judges accused of corruption (4). The same month, four judges and a court clerk were arrested on suspicion of corruption (this incident also indicates that those suspected of corruption can be arrested, however there is no evidence of them having been trialled, charged or fined) (5). As US State Department report also noted, 'Corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts ... There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time.' (6)

According to a World Bank report, corruption, including facilitation payments, are frequent among defence personnel (1). Indeed, a placement in the army is seen as an asset which generates 'flows of illicit income'. The report calls this system a 'secondary market' a notes that it is able to flourish due to a lack of internal control, career plan and deficiencies in human resources in the Malian army (1). The World Bank report was published in 2008 which indicates that the issue is historic and therefore increasingly likely to be highly prevalent.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to Malian officers interviewed, there is no military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations (Interview 3). Moreover, the assessor found no evidence of recognition that corruption on operations is a significant risk.

Indicating a lack of such guidance, a NOREF report notes that the Malian army lacks 'a unified national moral compass to underwrite its military operations' (3). The government is working on army reform, including tackling issues of poor training, lack of capability and decentralised loyalties. This might be a step towards limiting corruption across force deployments, although no explicit commitments have been made (1, 2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence to suggest that training on corruption issues takes place within the Malian army. Evidence from a number of sources indicates there has been widespread corruption in the Malian army for at least the last decade (Source 2; 3; Interview, 17 July 2014). According to a World Bank report, corruption is commonplace among defence personnel. Indeed, a placement in the army is seen as an asset which generates 'flows of illicit income' (2). A NOREF report notes that the Malian army lacks 'a unified national moral compass to underwrite its military operations' (3).

There are two Malian training schools for international missions: the Military Administration School (EMA) – Koulikoro (Mali), which provides training for officers from African contingents who carry out administrative or financial duties, and the Alioune Blondin Beye school of peacekeeping in Bamako, which trains officers from both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is clear that the latter offers some anti-corruption training as part of its standard UN peacekeeping modules. Their course on ethics includes teaching on the Code of Conduct, Trafficking and Discipline (1).

While anti-corruption is not explicitly referenced, it is included peripherally in these training courses; 'integrity and not soliciting or accepting material reward, honour or gifts' are for example mentioned in training texts (1; Interview, 7 July 2014). No evidence was found to indicate whether or how officers are examined on the training they receive however. No evidence was also found, such as course participants lists at Alioune Blondin Beye, to indicate what proportion of commanders in each rank bracket attend training.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, there has been evidence that officers engage in corrupt activities, especially in the North, where officers were involved with organized crime networks, and where governance, military structures and criminal organisations became intertwined (Galy, 2013, chap 1, p12).

Finally, no evidence was found to indicate the extent to which training is subsequently applied in the field, meaning it is inconclusive to judge its effectiveness.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence that that corruption monitors are deployed in the field. Speaking to the general state of the army, a NOREF report notes that the Malian army lacks 'a unified national moral compass to underwrite its military operations' (1). The government is working on army reform, including tackling issues of poor training, lack of capability and decentralised loyalties. This might be a step towards limiting corruption across force deployments, although no explicit commitments have been made (2, 3).

As part of their overhaul, the Malian army is working with US and French trainers to establish a code of conduct to guide military behaviour in regard to anti-corruption. Interviews revealed no indication that deploying staff to specifically monitor corruption risk in the field has been considered or might be prioritised at this stage.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Agreed. Score lowered from 1 to 0.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to interviewees, there is no indication that any guidelines exist or that any training has been provided that specifically addresses corruption risks in contracting when deployed to the field. (Interview 7)

However, some general guidance on contracting does exist. The Penal Code which applies to all Malian personnel outlaws the solicitation or accepting of gifts or presents during contracting (article 129). Specific to officers on peace-keeping missions, the Alioune Blondin Beye school of peacekeeping in Bamako offers an ethics course that includes teaching on 'integrity and not soliciting or accepting material reward, honour or gifts' (5).

Indicating a more general dearth of guidance, a NOREF report notes that the Malian army lacks 'a unified national moral compass to underwrite its military operations' (3). However, the government is working on army reform, including tackling issues of poor training, lack of capability and decentralised loyalties. This might be a step towards limiting corruption across force deployments, although no explicit commitments have been made (1, 2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no reports of PMCs being contracted by the Malian defence sector. In April 2002, the country ratified the 'International Convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries' (2). No associated domestic legislation was found.

There is evidence Private Security Companies operate in the country. For example, the French ERYS Group has been contracted to protect French commercial assets against political and terrorist risks in the country (3). In 2012, the group claimed to be the only foreign Private Security Company (PSC) in Mali (3).

Private security companies are regulated by the law N° 96-020 (February 1996) and Arrêté n° 2011-0569/MSIPC-SG (February 2011) (5). A number of local PSCs also specialise in the protection of people, cash-transport operation, surveillance and security. The assessor found no examples of corruption on the part of PSC's or of them having been found in contempt of the aforementioned international regulation code.

As peer reviewer 1 notes, in UN peacekeeping missions {including UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)}, PMCs have been used. It is unclear if extractive industries, local and international NGOs, and other industries in Mali use PMCs to ensure the safety and security of their staff.

Schildknecht, Darja. &quoute;Robust UN Peacekeeping and Private Military and Security Companies.&quoute; Human Security Center, 4 May 2015. Accessed 28 July 2015. http://www.hscentre.org/security-and-defence/robust-un-peacekeeping-private-military-security-companies/.
The assessor found no evidence that they are regulated beyond standard company operating laws. There is some media speculation that Mali may move towards the use of private contractors as a result of the collapse of the national armed forces in 2012 (1).

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Agreed, score lowered from 4 to 2.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is some general legislation on public procurement, however, it appears that most defence and security items are exempt from the regulations and the is little evidence of independent scrutiny.

In 2005 the government launched a plan to improve public finance management. In 2008, the Public Procurements Auditor (Direction Générale des Marchés Publics et des Délégations de Service Public - DGMP-DSP) was established. The same year a Code on Public Procurement was adopted; it provides guidelines on the tendering process, on procurement's execution, implementation, control, and regulation (Décret N°08-485 / P-RM August 2008). One of the stated aims of the Code was to make sure that public procurement is non-discriminatory and carried out in a transparent manner (2). Article 90.2 for example provides for punishment of corruption in public procurement.

Nevertheless, Article 8 of the Code stipulates that it does not apply to procurement or provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity. There is no provision in the Code to scrutinise these exemptions following a separate procedure. (1)

According to an interviewee (Interview 8) and to coverage in national media (1), the interpretation of 'national security' interests is quite broad and almost none defence procurement decisions are published. The IMF and the World Bank suspended budgetary support to Mali in 2014 as a result of the lack of transparency in the country's defence procurement (3). This means that, in reality, all but the most mundane defence items are likely to be exempted from the procurement laws.

According to a member of the civil society engaged in the fight against corruption, security procurement is very opaque in the country and well known to be highly corrupt. (Interview 1) A World Bank report noted that legislation on Public Procurement is ignored (i.e. bypassed) in Mali. (3)

The 1961 (amended 2002) Penal Code (4) covers procurement, providing a possibility of sanctions against offenders. Article 129 provides for punishment of, for example, 'persons responsible for the public procurement process who have solicited or accepted gifts or presents in order to undermine the freedom of access and equal treatment of candidates in public procurement. Article 130 provides for conflict of interest and applies to all civil service employees (including military personnel). Article 121 provides for 'Anyone in either the performance or the obtaining of an act or a benefits or favors, the use of violence or threats, promises, offers, gifts or presents, or acts tending to corruption', article 122 deals with influence peddling.

According to article 130, those found guilty of corruption are 'punishable by five to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of twice the value of approved promises or things received or requested, without that fine be less than 100,000 francs person solicits or accepts offers or promises, solicited or received'.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Unlike general public procurement process, defence and security contracts are explicitly excluded from complying with certain requirements, such as making the procurement cycle process (from assessment of needs, through procurement to asset disposal) available to the public; this is done under the blanket justification of national security (2). Article 8 of the Public Market Code stipulates that it does not apply to procurement, provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity (2).

According to an interviewee (Interview 8) and to coverage in national media (1), the interpretation of 'national security' interests is quite broad and almost none defence procurement decisions are published. The IMF and the World Bank suspended budgetary support to Mali in 2014 as a result of the lack of transparency in the country's defence procurement (3).

The assessor did not find evidence of any formal procedures for disposing assets with regard to the defence and security sector. The Malian defence sector has been constantly experiencing assets deficit: vehicles, communications devices, weapons, etc. (4). For that reason, it may be concluded that the state is more inclined to acquire assets rather than dispose of them; disposal of assets may not apply to the Malian context.

A French military trainer noted that &quoute;in 2006 800 pick-ups were ordered by the Malian army. Today there are almost none left&quoute; (5). This is unlikely to indicate disposals, it is more likely that they were stolen or destroyed in the course of of the 2012-2013 civil conflict in which armed anti-state actors targeted military vehicles while hundreds of soldiers deserted their posts leaving their equipment behind them (6).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is limited evidence of procurement oversight mechanisms. Unlike general public procurement process, defence and security contracts are explicitly excluded from complying with certain requirements, such as making the procurement cycle process available to the public; this is done under the blanket justification of national security (5). Availability of some reports on acquisition decisions (10) does indicate a degree of oversight, but it is overall unclear what how detailed and regular that is.

Article 8 of the Public Procurement Code stipulates that it does not apply to purchases and provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity (5). According to Interview 8 and coverage in national media (8), the interpretation of 'national security' interests is quite broad and almost no defence procurement decisions are published. The IMF and the World Bank suspended budgetary support to Mali in 2014 as a result of the lack of transparency in the country's defence procurement (9).

A member of civil society confirmed that equipment and weaponry contracts are protected by the 'Secret defence' seal (as stipulated the Public Procurement Act and in the Penal Code) and can bypass classic control procedures regarding public expenditures (Interview 1). According to Cissé, the DGMP audits public procurements worth more than FCFA 10 billion. However, Cissé's assessment also noted that public procurements are often divided into contracts contracts worth less than FCFA10 billions (for example FCFA 9.9billion) in order to avoid audit (1).

A Malian senior officer alleged that the process of equipment procurement in the Armed Forces “was riddled with private deal making and profiteering” (Interview 3). Not only did he claim that servicemen and MoD personnel would routinely find ways of taking a private cut, either from the costs of a contract or through misappropriation of the resulting items, but he also pointed out that a series of middlemen routinely found ways to inflate prices as part of the arrangement of contracts (Interview 3). Oversight mechanisms apparently failed to prevent this from happening.

For example, in September 2014, following allegations of corrupt practice by the IMF, the Ministry of Defence cancelled 10 defence contract (in which several private companies agreed to provide the Malian state with military equipment. One contract, with a Chinese supplier, according to Malian media (5) involved supplies invoiced at CFA600million but budgeted at CFA 3 billion. As a result of the revelations, a Malian businessmen was arrested and held for forgery. The incident demonstrates significant weakness in oversight of defence contracts indicating that they are either inactive or complicit. These incidences did lead to an announced review (3) of all defence contracts (largely equipment acquisitions) signed under the defence Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (April 2011 – March 2012). However, it is unclear which body undertook the review and what the results were.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Under article 8 of the Public Procurement Code the MoD is not obliged to make actual purchases public if publicity is seen as harmful to national security. This is also allowed under the Penal Code (3,7). This article has been invoked several times in the years following the 20132 coup and the reinstatement of civilian rule in 2013.

In 2014, a contract (known as the Kagnassi contract) with Guo-Star (reportedly worth between US$136-180 million) to provide the army with military material was not published and was later criticised by the IMF for being off-budget and its lack of transparency (1). Mali’s laws allow no-bid contracts for defence-related purchases to maintain secrecy, but as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found out in their routine evaluation of public accounts, the law was abused in this case: the vast majority of the contract was for the purchase of non-military items (e.g., trucks and open-bed 4x4s) (8). A number of articles state that Guo-Star is headed by Sidi Mohamed Kagnassi, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita's personal friend (later nominated as his personal advisor). To help him finance the deal, the state allegedly provided a loan guarantee worth 100 billion francs (approx. US$197 million). (9)

The same year, the Malian MoD used article 8 again to buy 81 military trucks from CIM (Commerce International pour le Mali, International Trade for Mali) society (2). According to local media, prices proposed by the CIM society were significantly higher than seems reasonable (2). While there is no evidence of planned procurement details being published, the government has announced forward-looking plans to purchase equipment. President IBK announced a 5 year reform plan for the army that involved buying new equipment in January 2014 (6).

While actual purchases are not made public, the lack of transparency around them and the speculation of procurement corruption draws attention to them - from media, civil society and international donors. Thus they become prominent in the public domain (4). Where deals have attracted enough international attention, audit reports have been conducted (4). In the 2014 Maiga case there is evidence that post purchase audits were acted upon when 10 defence procurement contracts were cancelled (5).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 2008 Code for Public Procurement consists of five parts (General Provisions, Bid Candidates, Award Procedure for Public Procurement, Specific Contract Provisions, Awards, Conclusions, Approval and Notification of Public Procurement) and is detailed in the administrative, technical, and financial requirements needed in order to bid for procurement contracts. (1)

According to article 15.2, companies in which people sitting on bodies administering the bidding process and those working for the beneficiary of the public procurement have financial or personal interests are excluded from tendering; this provision aims to avoid potential conflicts of interest by preventing those with an existing stake from bidding. Corruption is specifically addressed in article 90.2 which states: 'Notwithstanding other jurisdictions to which they are exposed, tenders found guilty of corruption [i.e. bidders found guilty of corruption], incitement to corruption or to commit or facilitate fraudulent acts against the contracting authority will incur the withdrawal of their accreditation and the consequent exclusion from participation [i.e. barring from bidding] in a call for competition or any negotiation of direct contracting.' They are also required to pay compensation for damage resulting from their actions.

The assessor found no explicit reference to the necessity for bidders to have a formal and publicly declared compliance programme or to show evidence that they insist on an ethical supply chain.

In addition, Article 8 of the Code stipulates that it does not apply to procurement or provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity. There is no provision in the Code to scrutinise these exemptions following a separate procedure.

In known defence contracts there is no suggestion that discrimination is made between companies on the grounds of integrity (2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Mali does not have an openly published national defence and security strategy (3). However, President IBK announced a five year reform plan for the army that involved buying new equipment in January 2014 (2). While this indicates that some procurement plans in the defence and security are preceded by some form of needs assessment, there is no indication as to whether one actually took place internally (the interviewee confirmed that a EUTM audit was carried out externally-Interview 5), whether it was comprehensive or publicly available. According to an interviewee, acquisitions of the past three years have been largely responsive as a result of Islamist militancy in northern Mali, the 2012 coup and the simultaneous collapse of the army. (Interview 8)

One interviewee (Interview 9) stated that the Malian army has 'no vision, no doctrine' and 'no strategic planning' and that material bought by the army does not correspond to its needs. Local media reiterated that purchases were not based on need (1). For example in 2014, the MoD bought Chinese trucks which were not suitable for desert terrain (which makes up over a third of Malian territory) (1).

Another interviewee (Interview 9) suggested that French military assistance (which IBK noted was of paramount importance when he unveiled his five year form plan - 2) resulted in biased purchasing. The source alleged that 'France attempts to sell French materials without considering if it is always relevant for the Malian army'. Moreover the same interviewee stressed, the 'Malian MoD may find cheaper and more suitable weapon on the international market'.

As peer reviewer 1 notes, the EU Training Mission in Mali aims to assist Mali's guidelines and arms procurement practices by improving the efficiency and transparency of Mali's arms procurement before the close of 2015.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Mali does not have an openly published formal procedure for defining purchase requirements; the assessor could not confirm that one exists. President IBK announced a five year reform plan for the army that involved buying new equipment in January 2014 (2).

While this indicates that some procurement plans in the defence and security are preceded by some form of needs assessment, there is no indication as to whether one actually took place internally (the interviewee confirmed that a EUTM audit was carried out externally-Interview 5), whether it was comprehensive or publicly available. According to an interviewee (Interview 8) acquisitions of the past three years have been largely responsive as a result of the emergency threats - Islamist militancy in northern Mali, the 2012 coup and the simultaneous collapse of the army.

One interviewee (Interview 9) confirmed that the Malian army has 'no vision, no doctrine' and 'no strategic planning' and that material bought by the army does not correspond to its needs. Local media reiterated that purchases were not based on need (1). For example in 2014, the MoD bought Chinese trucks which were not suitable for desert terrain (which makes up over a third of Malian land mass) (1).

Another interviewee (Interview 9) suggested that French military assistance (which IBK noted was of paramount importance when he unveiled his five year form plan - 2) resulted in biased purchasing. The source stated that 'France attempts to sell French materials without considering if it is always relevant for the Malian army'. Moreover the same interviewee stressed, the 'Malian MoD may find cheaper and more suitable weapon on the international market'.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: As article 8 (2) of the Public Procurement Code does not oblige military procurement decisions to be published in the interest of national security, it is unclear to what extent these are conducted in open competition. International media has speculated that Malian defence procurement is generally not conducted as open competition but instead relies on single-sourcing (1).

Given the substantial evidence of malpractice (3, 4) in defence purchases over the last few years it is likely that this is the case. However, single-sourcing does not seem to be advanced to the extent that the Malian government only uses one or two suppliers. Over the past few years they have been involved in contracts with several international and national firms (3, 4).

The case of former Minister of defence Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (April 2011-March 2012) demonstrates a clear lack of competition on the part of the defence sector in procurement (5, 6). The investigation into contracts signed during the 2011-2012 period is ongoing, as of late 2014, at least 10 contracts had been cancelled or part cancelled.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The Public Procurement Code provides for a broad host of regulations, auditing and anti-corruption (2). Tender boards responsible for assessing bids are requested to fulfill their missions with probity and in complete independence; conflict of interest is forbidden and if a board member has an interest in one of the bidders, they should declare it to the chair of the board and not take part in its work.

Audits on public procurement are conducted by the National Authority on Public Procurement (Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics et des Délégations de Service Public - ARMPDSP), a nominally independent public body. The institution is tasked with defining training policies, strategies, ensuring that good governance principles are upheld, providing all stakeholders with a framework for exchange and dialogue, and ensuring follow-up to the implementation of audits and decisions of reform. The assessor found at least two examples of audits being undertaken where cases had been contested (3, 4).

As article 8 (2) of the code does not oblige military procurements to be published in the interest of national security, it is unclear to what extent tender boards are in practice subject to scrutiny. International media has speculated that Malian defence procurement is generally not conducted as open competition but instead relies on single-sourcing (1). Given the considerable evidence of malpractice (3, 4) in defence purchases over the last few years, there is some probability that this is the case. Given its expansive mandate (6) the Auditor General is likely to offer an independent audit service for tenders, however, the assessor found no explicit details confirming what this would look like.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 2008 Code on Public Procurement formally identifies and forbids collusion between bidders as a way of undermining open and free competition (article 119); bidders found responsible for collusive practices are entitled to be excluded, either definitely or for a specific period, from tendering process (article 120). These articles are not specific to the defence sector. (2)

Nevertheless, Article 8 of the Code stipulates that it does not apply to procurement or provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity. It is therefore unclear to the articles above are enforced in the defence sector. International media has speculated that Malian defence procurement is generally not conducted as open competition but instead relies on single-sourcing (1).

There has been considerable evidence of malpractice (3) in defence purchases over the last few years that the Malian and international media has well documented. While corruption has been cited several times, the assessor found no explicit references to collusion.

It is not clear if the case of former Minister of defence Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (April 2011-March 2012) involved collusion (4, 5), as the investigation into contracts signed during his term is ongoing, as of late 2014, at least 10 contracts had been cancelled or part cancelled (4, 5). Details over the imposition of any further sanctions were not available.

The judiciary system in Mali is unable to efficiently deliver prosecutions as a result of internal corruption. As a result anti-collusion controls are likely to be weakly enforced. For example, in December 2013, judicial representatives threatened to hold an indefinite strike due to state interference in arrest warrants against judges accused of corruption (6). As US State Department report also noted that 'Corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts ... There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time.' (7)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The Regulatory Authority on Public Procurements (Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics et des Délégations des Services Publics- ARMDS) has been specifically tasked with elaborating training policies and strategies for actors involved in public procurement (Law 08-023 July the 23rd 2008). In that regard, the Authority has already organised several training sessions for public servants from different ministries. However, it is unclear whether the Authority has trained staff in charge of defence procurement. (1, 2). The assessor found no evidence to suggest that the office suffers from staff shortages.

While specific evidence of undue influence from higher grades could not be cited, a U4 report identifies Malian public procurement as one of two nationals sectors most vulnerable to corruption which suggests that the risks of it taking place are high. (3) Confirming the point a US State Department report noted that 'public procurement in Mali as very problematic and prone to corrupt practices'.(7) A 2014 AFK Insider report also highlighted 'dubious transactions and false invoicing in public procurement'. (5)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 2008 Code on Public Procurement provides bidders with non-jurisdictional and jurisdictional mechanisms for complaining about perceived malpractices or perceived infringement (articles 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116). If the bidder is not satisfied with the post-complaint ruling, it can submit the case to the Regulatory Authority on Public Procurement (article 116) . Once these non-jurisdictional mechanisms have been used without any agreement, cases can be brought in front of competent national jurisdictions or finally for arbitration under regulations within the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) (1). The assessor found no evidence of these mechanisms having been used or, equally, of companies believing they would be disadvantaged should they use them.

However, Article 8 of the Code stipulates that it does not apply to procurement or provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity. It is therefore unclear how far bidders for defence contracts are similarly protected. It is also unclear to what extent defence contracts are conducted in open competition, and whether there is actually a bidding process. International media has speculated that Malian defence procurement is generally not conducted as open competition but instead relies on single-sourcing (3).

In addition, the legal system in Mali is weak it is therefore likely that formal mechanisms such as these would be difficult to enforce or follow in practice. As US State Department report also noted that 'Corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts ... There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time.' (7)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Article 24 of 2008 Code on Public Procurement makes provisions preventing corruption. Bidders responsible for corruption attempts may be excluded, permanently or temporarily, from the public procurement process; in that case, the procurement process between a public entity and a supplier found responsible of corruption is simply cancelled (art. 90.2 of the 1995 Code on Public Procurement). (1) Despite the formal existence of this set of sanctions, no indication was found that cases of corruption were systematically and effectively investigated and prosecuted and that sanctions were therefore effectively applied and enforced. Art 120 Of the Penal Code punishes activities of corruption (5 to 10 years of imprisonment and a fine worth the double of the amount of money used to corrupt). (2)

However, Article 8 of the Code stipulates that it does not apply to procurement or provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity. It is therefore unclear how far suppliers for defence contracts are covered by these sanctions.

In 2014, defence contracts signed under Defence Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga (April 2011 – March 2012) were found to be irregular - one contract, with a Chinese supplier, according to Malian media (6, 7) involved supplies invoiced at CFA 600million but budgeted at CFA 3 billion. As a result, the Ministry of Defence cancelled 10 defence contracts (in which several private companies agreed to provide the Malian state with military equipment) and the central court arrested Maïga - it is unclear whether he was trialled, charged or fined. The assessor found no reports suggesting that the suppliers had been sanctioned beyond the cancellation of their contracts.

The judiciary system in Mali is unable to efficiently deliver prosecutions as a result of internal corruption. For example, in December 2013, judicial representatives threatened to hold an indefinite strike due to state interference in arrest warrants against judges accused of corruption (3). The same month, four judges and a court clerk were arrested on suspicion of corruption (this incident also indicates that those suspected of corruption can be arrested, however as with the Maiga case there is no evidence of them having been tried, charged or fined) (4). As US State Department report also noted that 'Corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts ... There were problems enforcing court orders. Sometimes judges were absent from their assigned areas for months at a time.' (5)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no indication that offset contracts exists in Mali. However, defence contracts in general are not transparent. Article 8 of the 2008 Code on Public Procurement stipulates that it does not apply to procurement or provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity. Contracts are therefore not published, so it's impossible to tell whether they are associated with offsets deals.

International media has speculated that Malian defence procurement is generally not conducted as open competition but instead relies on single-sourcing (2). There is therefore little scrutiny in general, and it seems unlikely that offset contracts would be subject to tougher procedures. Due to the lack of due diligence and auditing in general procurement, a low score has been selected.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no indication that offset contracts exists in Mali. However, defence contracts in general are not transparent. Article 8 of the 2008 Code on Public Procurement stipulates that it does not apply to procurement or provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity. Contracts are therefore not published, and neither are any offsets contracts that they might be associated with.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no indication that offset contracts exists in Mali. However, defence contracts in general are not transparent. Article 8 of the 2008 Code on Public Procurement stipulates that it does not apply to procurement or provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity. Contracts are therefore not published, so it's impossible to tell whether they are associated with offsets deals.

International media has speculated that Malian defence procurement is generally not conducted as open competition but instead relies on single-sourcing (2). It seems unlikely that offset contracts would be subject to tougher procedures.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Research found some evidence of existing controls, however the assessor was unable to interpret how well these provisions apply to the defence sector. In particular, the assessor was unable to judge the extent to which these regulate the public institutions, or the contracting companies', use of intermediaries.

With regards to agents, the Public Procurement Code states the following (89.2, 89.3): &quoute;The officials and agents, public institutions and public authorities are required to submit to the Contracting Authority periodic reports with respect to the implementation schedule, benefits and failures of the contractor.
89.3 Without prejudice, officials and agents, public institutions and public authorities, are subject to serious misconduct proceedings should they break the law, they would also be required to pay damages resulting from their actions.

Article 70 also states that the Contracting Authority may make advance payments to any holder of a contract either to the holder directly or though a subcontractor. Agents would be required to submit regular reports, indicating that there is some regulation over their use. (6) According to article 15.2, companies in which people sitting on bodies administering the bidding process and those working for the beneficiary of the public procurement have financial or personal interests are excluded from tendering; this provision aims to prevent potential conflicts of interest by preventing those with an existing stake from bidding.

Corruption is specifically addressed in article 90.2 which states: 'Notwithstanding other jurisdictions to which they are exposed, tenders found guilty of corruption [i.e. bidders found guilty of corruption], incitement to corruption or to commit or facilitate fraudulent acts against the contracting authority will incur the withdrawal of their accreditation and the consequent exclusion from participation [i.e. barring from bidding] in a call for competition or any negotiation of direct contracting.' They are also required to pay compensation for damage resulting from their actions.

Nevertheless, Article 8 of the Code stipulates that it does not apply to procurement or provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity. There is no provision in the Code to scrutinise these exemptions following a separate procedure. (6)

In addition, given the general weakness of the procurement system it is questionable whether these provisions are enforced. A U4 report identifies Malian public procurement as one of two national sectors most vulnerable to corruption. (3) Confirming the point, a US State Department report noted that 'public procurement in Mali is very problematic and prone to corrupt practices'. (7) A 2014 AFK Insider report also highlighted 'dubious transactions and false invoicing in public procurement'. Cisse estimates that 80% of contracts are signed outside formal public procurement processes. (5)

In 2014, the MoD signed a procurement contract with Guo-Star and the special advisor to the President was alleged to have acted as an intermediary in the deal (1). Because the Presidential advisor was not independent, his position giving him a conflict of interest (against the procurement and the penal code) made his participation, if proven (the case is ongoing) technically illegal.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: For general public procurement, the 2008 Code provides for some financial elements to be published. These include conditions and modalities of the payment. (2)

Nevertheless, unlike general public procurement, defence and security contracts are explicitly excluded from complying with certain requirements, such as making the procurement cycle process available to the public prior to signing under the blanket justification of national security (2). Article 8 of the Code stipulates that it does not apply to procurement, provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity (2). According to an interviewee and to national media (1, Interview 8), the interpretation of 'national security' interests is quite broad and almost all defence procurement before or after completion is not published.

While there is no evidence of planned procurement details being published, the government has announced forward looking plans to purchase equipment. President IBK announced a five year reform plan for the army that involved buying new equipment in January 2014 (3).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Article 89.3 of the Public Procurement Code states that, without prejudice, officials and agents, public institutions and public authorities, are subject to serious misconduct proceedings should they break the law; they would also be required to pay damages resulting from their actions.

Corruption is specifically addressed in article 90.2 which states: 'Notwithstanding other jurisdictions to which they are exposed, tenders found guilty of corruption, incitement to corruption or to commit or facilitate fraudulent acts against the contracting authority will incur the withdrawal of their accreditation and the consequent exclusion from participation [i.e. barring from bidding] in a call for competition or any negotiation of direct contracting.' They are also required to pay compensation for damage resulting from their actions. (1)

Nevertheless, Article 8 of the Code stipulates that it does not apply to procurement or provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs that require secrecy or for which the protection of State is incompatible with publicity. There is no provision in the Code to scrutinise these exemptions following a separate procedure. (1)

In addition, the assessor found no explicit reference to the necessity for main contractors to ensure that subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes; or that they themselves adopt them.

The strength of the general provisions is undermined by the general procurement climate in Mali: a U4 report identifies Malian public procurement as one of two nationals sectors most vulnerable to corruption. Confirming the point a US State Department report noted that 'public procurement in Mali as very problematic and prone to corrupt practices'. A 2014 AFK Insider report also highlighted 'dubious transactions and false invoicing in public procurement'. (2, 3, 4)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: France is Mali's foremost security and military partner. For decades it has been active in providing materials and support to the Malian army. In March 2015 for example, in response to a Bamako shootout, the French Embassy reinforced its local security operations (1). In September 2014, Mali's MoD acquired military equipment from France, including a command vehicle for President IBK (3); this acquisition was part of an agreement signed in November 2013 covering the period from December 2013 to December 2016 to acquire, among other things, military uniforms and military command vehicles (3).

In July 2014, France and Mali signed a new treaty for military cooperation (the agreement is not publicly available) (2). It is fair to state that this relation is likely to significantly influence decisions that will be taken with regard to defence acquisition. According to an interviewee, 'France attempts to sell French materials without considering if it is always relevant for the Malian army ... the Malian MoD may find cheaper and less sophisticated weapons on the international market'. (Interview 8)

Mali does not have an openly published national defence and security strategy beyond loose guidance advocated by the code of conduct (5). President IBK announced a five year reform plan for the army that involved buying new equipment in January 2014 (4). While this indicates that procurement plans in the defence and security are preceded by a needs assessment there is no indication as to whether one actually took place internally (interviewees confirmed that a EUTM audit was carried out externally- Interview 5), whether it was comprehensive or publicly available.

According to an interviewee (Interview 8) acquisitions of the past three years have been largely responsive as a result of Islamist militancy in northern Mali, the 2012 coup and the simultaneous collapse of the army. There is no evidence that the government justifies its military procurement to the public by referring to military need.