Thailand

With regard to this subject, very little has changed from that which was published in the 2013 GI report on Thailand. Regulations still exist in the Defence Ministry and the Office of the Prime Minister concerning military and governmental asset disposal. The process is controlled by the national defence industry and energy committee, headed by the minister of defence. Particularly for the sale of assets, the department responsible must announce the sale to the public if the asset worth is more than 100,000 baht.

However, with regard to transparency, as all processes are done internally and the criteria for choosing buyers and the meeting conclusions of the committee are not publicly available, there is a high risk of corruption.

Since the May 2014 military coup, according to one interview, any partial transparency in the disposal of assets has become totally opaque. Any rules governing such asset disposals are now completely under the purview of the ruling military junta.

As stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, within the military bureaucracy of the Defence Ministry, there are codified rules in place regulating the sale, exchange, transfer, and demolition of military assets. Meanwhile, a Ministry of Defence Committee chaired by the Minister of Defence has been set up to control military assets disposals. Yet no external, independent entity outside the military exists to monitor the process.

Thus, scrutiny exists only within the military, and information about this process is not publicly available.
The military coup of May 2014 has only made such lack of transparency regarding this subject even more opaque. Such a conclusion is likely (though it is speculative) given that the Constitution of 2007 was voided in 2014 and there is no independent scrutiny of asset disposal.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, the secret budget on items related to national security council and national intelligence agency combined accounted for 15.53% of the overall national security budget of the office of the prime minister. But this number excluded military/defence budget and secret budget within it.

The secret budget of the Ministry of Defence, Navy, Air Force, the Royal Guard, and the Armed Forces headquarters (excluding the army) combined accounts of only 0.21% of the military/defence budget. The army was excluded because under the army's budget, the secret budget was not specified like the other forces for some unknown reason. The secret budget accounted for 0.29% of the overall national security and military/defence budget. (excluding the army). Whether the army has a much higher secret budget than its official budget is unknown.

The media has often stated that the secret military budget is often reported by media to be higher than the official budget. Since the May, 2014 military coup, Thailand's entire military budget remains accessible, and indeed the publicly-stated defence portion of the 2014-2015 budget has grown 5 percent from last year's allocation for defence (LaFevre, 2014). While there most certainly is a &quoute;secret&quoute; additional allocation for the military, the exact amount of this is unknown given the opaque nature of the NCPO junta.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, every national security and military/defence budget (including much of the secret budget) was required to be publicly revealed in the annual report by the Bureau of the Budget (BB). The BB could also scrutinize the budget. Moreover, the budget plan could be scrutinized by parliament and there were times when MPs criticized the size of the military budget. Yet, generally speaking, there was little transparency on the precise amount of money existing in the secret military budget. In addition, where the BB or parliament sought to diminish the secret budget (if they did), the military could simply utilize off-budget military expenditures to get back the lost funding.

Since the military coup of May 2014, there has been no elected legislature and no legislative committees which scrutinize the military.

Under the 2014 interim constitution, the National Legislative Assembly (members of which must be endorsed by the military junta) has no power to scrutinize the military budget though it can see the non-secret portions of the budget.

Even prior to the May 2014 military coup, the process of legislative oversight of the military in Thailand was superficial. Though legislators on the defence Committees of the Lower and Upper Houses were allowed to see very basic versions of internal military audit reports, there were many omissions. In addition there was no parliamentary criticism of this limited access which hampered accountability of the military.

As the 2013 GI for Thailand made clear, there were internal audit departments within each of the armed forces, who oversaw budgets. Moreover, the budget plan was then again audited by the Bureau of Budget before its submission to the parliament. Yet this process was often ineffective because of the secrecy surrounding the military budget. There is nevertheless evidence of effectiveness of the Bureau of Budget in reducing the military secret budget. Reports in the media indicated that the actual secret budget contained more money than the official budget. Political parties in parliament often accused the military of having a secret budget but the military leadership continuously denied it.

Since the May 2014 military coup, there is no elected legislature that provides oversight, and, according to an interviewee, the appointed National Legislative Assembly is not provided audit reports on secret items. However, auditing internal to the armed forces apparently continues.

Even before the May 2014 military coup, Thailand permitted off-budget military expenditures. Prior to the coup, as stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, Thai Ministry of Defence guidelines defined such expenditures as (1) money that the department must be responsible for according to the law or regulation by the cabinet, office of the prime minister, or Finance Ministry; (2) money that the department must be responsible for according to the regulation of the Ministry of Defence. Indeed, before the coup, the off-budget military expenditures were also clearly recorded in the defence budget. The disbursement of this budget was regulated by the entities mentioned above in (1) and (2).

An example of the use of off-budget expenditure before the coup was emergency money spent during the flooding problems of late 2011. According to the Ministry of Defence announcement on their Natural Disaster Relief Plan (2004), any military department could request off-budget expenditure for their operations.

After the 2006 military coup, a trend had evolved whereby the military used off-budget military expenses to increase the funding available to it, previously inaccessible through the general military budget. Since the May 2014 military coup, the 2007 constitution has been voided and there is no longer an elected government. Thus, since the coup, the military has gained much more freedom to decide for itself the extent of expenditures it should receive. As a result, there is no longer a need to declare off-budget expenditures.

Yet according to one interviewee, as a rule, since the coup, the military has had a declared budget as well as a much-enhanced line of off-budget military expenditures. The recording of these latter expenditures is only recorded within the military itself and thus inaccessible, meaning that any declared and publicly available budget information is only partial.

Off-budget expenditures are permitted by law and not regarded as back-door expenditure. The use of this budget is limited to special circumstances. For example, any military department is allowed to request for off-budget expenditure to assist victims in the case of natural disaster.

Nevertheless, off-budget military expenditures have been used with frequency by the Thai military since the coup of 2006, wherein military budgets have soared and there has been constant military pressure on the legislature to increase armed forces budgets even further. Off-budget expenditures have provided the military with a means of getting around the national budget and acquiring some military items. Some of this off-budget expenditure may involve illicit economic activity but the extent to which it does is unclear. That said, it is highly possible it could go towards the military's support of government-sponsored militias in southern Thailand.

The May 2014 military coup has severely diminished budget transparency and accountability with the result that there is a greater opportunity to have off-budget military expenditures and the possibility of using these for illicit economic activities. Yet again, the extent of this occurring is unclear.


Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Comments and source added.

Section 15 of the 1997 Official Information Act states that officials can prohibit disclosure of information in cases of national security. This is the provision that the military generally uses to avoid disclosure of military information. However, Section 18 states that in the case where a State official issues an order prohibiting the disclosure of any information under section 14 or section 15 or dismissing the objection of the interested person under section 17, such person may appeal through the Board to the Information Disclosure Tribunal within fifteen days as from the date of the receipt of such order.

Finally, Section 35 states that there shall be Information Disclosure Tribunals in appropriate fields, which are appointed by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Board, having the power and duty to consider and decide an appeal against an order prohibiting the disclosure of information under section 14 or section 15, order dismissing an objection under section 17 and order refusing the correction, alteration or deletion of personal information under section 25.


Theoretically, the Information Act still applies in the post-coup environment, or if it has been voided, this information is not available in the public domain. The interim constitution indicates that information may be classified at the discretion of the individuals, parties, or groups in power with no specific or clearly defined legal basis. It does so in part by exonerating NCPO members and ensuring institutional impunity but also by allowing the head of the NCPO to undertake any act deemed &quoute;necessary for the benefit of reforms in any field, or to strengthen public unity and harmony, or for the prevention, disruption or suppression of any act that undermines public peace and order or national security, the monarchy, national economics or administration of State affairs.&quoute; (section 44).

Until the May 2014 military coup, there were parliamentary military committees in the Lower and Upper Houses which could scrutinize such military matters on behalf of the public. But these committees tended to be rather ineffective partly because committee members did not seek to critically investigate the military (preferring to remain on good terms with them), thus diminishing the possibility of effective scrutiny.

Since the 2014 military coup there are no longer parliamentary committees. The newly appointed National Legislative Assembly lacks the power to scrutinize the military and it is unlikely how effective this scrutiny would be given half of the NLA members are military officers and all members are close to the military. Today the armed forces can easily use the excuse of &quoute;national security&quoute; to prevent any disclosures of information and indeed the NLA would never seek such disclosures anyway.

Score 1 has been selected given that while there are formal mechanisms in place for the classification of information, it is unclear where they stand in the present scenario, given the powers afforded by the interim constitution to the NCPO.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Comments added.

Since 1992, military involvement in commercial businesses has declined markedly.

Prior to the 2014 military coup, the Army owned television channel 5 and was a partly owner of television channel 7, as well as the army radio. The army also owned 1.37 percent of Thai Military Bank. This percentage ownership in Thai Military Bank was worth around 1 billion baht, higher than the annual budget for defence. Besides the Thai veterans foundation which was linked to the military, the military also had a share in the national lottery quota. Finally there was evidence of individual military men owning commercial businesses or stakes in them.

Another manner in which the military exerted influence was the practice whereby individual senior active-duty military officers could sit on the Board of Directors of various state corporations. The army commander, for instance, sat on the board of the Thai Military Bank, while his deputy was a board member of a Thai energy corporation. There were other such examples too.

If anything, the 2014 military coup enhanced military control over the economy. Under the NCPO military junta, in late June 2008, a super-board was set up to control all state corporations, headed up by NCPO junta leader Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha. Under the NCPO, this super-board is wholly non-transparent. In addition, since the coup there is no constitutional requirement in place to publicly scrutinize organisations with military connections, such as the Thai Military Bank and Channel 5.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, Thai businesses formally owned or partially owned by the military (as mentioned in the answer to question 30), were subject to independent scrutiny. This is especially true in the case of the Thai Military Bank. However, other military businesses such as Thai television 5 were not as subject to independent scrutiny, and the enterprises of individual military officers were subject to little scrutiny.

Since the recent coup, given that the military is in control, there is little scrutiny attached to their activities.

As stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, there is evidence of unauthorized private enterprises among mostly senior level military officials. Indeed, military officers manage the Rajadamnern and Lumpinee Thai boxing stadiums in Bangkok, which counts as an unauthorised private enterprise. However, even the pre-coup elected government did not tackle this as an issue of concern.

Beyond the information stated in the 2013 report, there have also been more recent (late 2013) allegations of navy officials involved in illegal human trafficking of Rohingya refugees. In May 2013, evidence came to light that an army general and police general possess private interests in Tongkah Harbour Public Company Limited. This company has intimidated local villagers in Loei Province, forcibly evicting them for access to mining interests. Beyond these examples, there are also instances of drug trafficking activities, illegal logging, and prostitution which involve military officials, all unauthorized and illegal.

Since the May 2014 military coup, nothing has been done to control these operations, and it is unlikely that the NCPO military junta will prosecute illicit business behavior of security sector officials. One of the generals holding a position in the aforementioned Tongkah Harbour Public Company has just been elevated to become Thailand's Police Chief and according to media reports, is believed to be close to the current military dictator of Thailand. For this reason, despite attempts by Asian Human Rights Commission to prevent illicit mining activities by Tongkah, the NCPO is unlikely to react in support of action to help Loei province villagers any time soon.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, as stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, the public commitment of the armed forces to anti-corruption and integrity measures consisted of the following: Thailand's Ministers of Defence would make occasional speeches which involved anti-corruption statements both in speeches and media interviews.

With regard to the issue of anti-corruption, service chiefs subtly followed the lead of the Minister of Defence while the Permanent Secretary of Defence was much more vocal. According to interviewed sources, Gen. Nipat Thonglek (Permanent Defence Minister until May 2014) was a principal, public advocate for reducing corruption and reforming Thailand's security sector. One rationale for the May 2014 military coup was corruption within the elected Yingluck Shinawatra-led government. On August 25, 2014, newly appointed Prime Minister (coup leader, junta leader and Army Commander) Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha publicly vowed to clean up corruption in Thailand.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, certain regulations existed. As stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) was authorized to enforce these measures for the high rank officials, with the office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) for low ranking officials. According to the corruption prevention and suppression organic act (1999), the NACC could submit the concluded case to the attorney general for prosecution, if possible, or to the agencies where the convicted personnel was working for punishment. Cases of the enforcement of these measures were reported in the annual report by the NACC and PACC. However, their efficiency and effectiveness were questionable, especially with regard to military corruption.

Generally, the NACC did not intervene with the military since the military was a national security agency and the NACC did not want to intervene in national security issues. In addition, since military affairs were involved with national security, they tended to be less transparent. As such, the NACC had less access to the non-transparent aspects of the military, making the NACC less willing to investigate the military. In reality, only one high ranking military official has ever been scrutinized and punished by the NACC.

Since the May 2014 coup, both the NACC and PACC have remained active and formally endorsed by the NCPO. Indeed, the NACC has played a crucial role in the junta's legal proceedings against former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and other members of the Pheu Thai party. However, the NACC is not seen as completely objective and independent from political influence. The cases pursued against Yingluck and other members of the Pheu Thai party appear to be politically motivated.


In response to Peer Reviewer 2: While evidence suggests that the NACC is largely politicized and ineffective, its formal existence merits a score change from 1 to 2.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, as stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, protections for whistleblowers were offered by the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). Indeed, the NACC offered witness protection to protect witnesses in corruption cases. Similarly, the Public Sector Anti Corruption Commission (PACC) offered witness protection for lower level corruption cases. Both the NACC and the PACC encouraged whistleblowing for alleged corruption in the military, as well as in other sectors.

The NACC and PACC were also equipped with regulations on rewarding whistleblowers. Yet, within the military itself, there has been no drive to encourage such whistleblowing. Moreover, according to both the Discipline of Military Personnel Act (1933) and the Police Discipline Act (1934), any act that causes disunity in the military or misconduct to the customs of the military is subject to punishment. This rule hinders whistleblowing in military. Ultimately, it is important to remember that the bureaucratic culture of military unity whereby whistleblowing is considered shameful to the image of the corps often prevents whistleblowing to occur in the first place.

With the May 2014 coup, the 2007 constitution was voided. This constitution had formed the legal basis on which the PACC and NACC existed. Since July 2014, an interim constitution has existed, which will be applied until a new permanent constitution is enacted. Section 35 of the interim constitution calls for the drawing up of an &quoute;effective mechanism for preventing, detecting and eliminating corruption and misconduct in public and private sectors.&quoute; Until this &quoute;effective mechanism&quoute; is created (as a part of the next permanent constitution), both the PACC and NACC continue to exist. That said, there have been no cases brought against senior military officials since the coup in 2014. Prayuth has called on the media and members of the public to expose corrupt military officers. However, no cases have been brought against members of the military. Previous whistleblowers, or those who have made allegations of corrupt practices by military personnel, have been subject to legal retaliation from the government. In April 2015, the Thai Navy began criminal proceedings against two journalists for publishing a 2013 Reuters report that raised allegations of the Navy's participation in trafficking Rohingya from Myanmar through southern Thailand. The Navy claims that the publication is in violation of the Computer Crimes Act and was meant to damage the reputation of the Thai military.

Response to Peer Reviewer Two: While evidence suggests that the NACC has been largely politicized, the interim constitution of Thailand has permitted the continuation of the PACC and the NACC. Given the protections for whistleblowers formally afforded by the NACC, however hollow in the practice, score changed from 0 to 1.

Since the May 2014 military coup, all decisions regarding the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions have become opaque and internal to the armed forces itself. This is because the recent coup overthrew the 2007 constitution which allowed for an elected legislature, within which the aforementioned committees existed.

Before the May 2014 military coup, according to the 2013 GI for Thailand, the Military Official Act B.E.2521 (1978), section 11 stated that the appointment of any military officials must be accorded to the Ministry of Defence regulation on the Appointment of Military Rank B.E.2507 (1964). However, the laws did not offer any specifics for ranks or positions, and there was no statement suggesting that special attention be shown to sensitive posts.

Prior to the adoption of the 2008 Defence act (which gave greater insulation to the armed forces in its decision-making about annual reshuffles), governments (e.g. Thaksin Shinawatra) were able to influence military promotion decisions during the reshuffles, which happen twice a year.

Since 2008, a committee composed of the Commanders of the Armed Forces, Army, Air Force, and Navy as well as the Permanent Secretary for Defence (an active-duty position) and the Defence Minister (and optionally the Deputy Defence Minister), met during each reshuffle to decide on promotions for the levels of Major-General (and equivalents in other services) and higher.

For lower level positions, the military had gained greater control over these positions. As a result, there was now less civilian oversight over these positions (including special positions) since 2008 than during the period from 1992 to 2006.

After 2006, the military was increasingly in charge of paying special attention to personnel in sensitive positions, but this monitoring was internal to the military and not publicly available. Only the two Lower and Upper House Committees of the Armed Forces could offer outside scrutiny but they have few powers and in general did not seek to engage in investigations of the military.

As stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, It is difficult to ascertain the true number of Thai military personnel. While the numbers are publicly available, there is no way to check the authenticity of this number given that military personnel are spread into many different departments, some of them secret. Officially, it is indicated that the active military personnel in each force are 71,000 for the navy, 45,000 for the air force, and 190,000 for the army. There are in total 306,000 active military personnel in Thai armed forces.

There are also military reserved forces, as well as the paramilitary Tahan Prahan (Rangers) who are under the army's command. There are other more decentralized paramilitaries, who number 113,000. These paramilitaries are not generally counted when considering the size of the armed forces. Finally, outside sources' statistics on the Thai military sometimes disagree with Thai military statistics. Hence, it is difficult to clearly ascertain the true number. There is no evidence that these numbers have changed since the military coup of 2014.

As stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, pay rates and allowances are openly published. The Military Personnel Regulation Act (1979), which was most recently amended by The Royal Decree on Payrates for military officials, active military personnel, and cadets (2011), indicates all payrates for each level of military personnel.

For civilian personnel, allowances and benefits must all be according to the Ministry of Defence Regulation on Civilian Personnel (2004), which is also publicly available. The most recent pay rate announcement occurred in August 2014, three months after the military coup on May 22. The August salary increase amounted to a roughly US$180 monthly increase in salary for senior military officials. Despite the coup, pay rates and allowances for military and civilian bureaucrats continue to be openly published.

As stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, no evidence exists that payments do not come on time, at least in general. The finance departments in each of the defence services are required to make accurate, timely salary payments. The disbursement of salary payments themselves are scrutinized by internal monitors and general inspectors from the respective defence service from which the payment comes. Though this process is intended to ensure transparency and efficiency, it is not publicly accessible outside of the armed forces and defence ministry.

Payments for soldiers in combat areas have been known to take extra time or be delayed (e.g. soldiers fighting insurgency in Thailand's deep South) - there is no evidence that this state of affairs has changed since the military coup of May 2014.

Before 2008, decisions concerning senior level military appointments would be made by the civilian Prime Minister and civilian Defence Minister and then be endorsed by the Palace, upon the advice of the Chair of the Royal Privy Council. This changed in 2008 when civilians lost some of the power in the appointments process.

With the enactment of the 2008 Defence Act, decisions on appointments by Army Major Generals and higher (and their rank equivalents in the Air Force, Navy, Royal Thai Armed Forces and Defence Ministry) had to be made by a committee or board composed of the Armed Forces Commander, Army Commander, Navy Commander, Air Force Commander, Permanent Secretary of the Defence Ministry (an active duty military official), as well as the Minister of Defence and (potentially) the Deputy Defence Minister.

Strategically, civilian authority diminished during this time as, if a vote was taken on appointments, the military members of the board could vote unitedly and outvote the Minister of Defence. This system of reshuffles and appointments has, since 2008, allowed much less civilian oversight over military affairs - hence, this board cannot be considered independent, transparent or objective, although it is established. Since the board was created, its selections are generally seen as rubber-stamping pre-approved and pre-selected individuals.

Below the rank of army major general (or its equivalent in other defence services), each military service chief decides internally on the new appointments each year, with no independent, transparent or objective scrutiny from outsiders. Only the Committees of the Armed Forces, one in each of the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament, could scrutinize these appointments, before its dissolution during the coup. However, even before the coup, there is no evidence this power of scrutiny had been exercised, as the parliamentarians had no power to alter the reshuffle. In fact the reshuffle could only have been altered if the Palace had refused to endorse it, a situation that would have been very unlikely. Appointments deriving from the reshuffles tend to be political rather than merit-based.

Despite the May 2014 military coup and the changes it brought to oversight, the larger system of reshuffles and appointments has not changed.

A military promotions board exists but only for military personnel at the rank of general and above (see question 41 above). Although decisions are said to be based upon merit, the selections can be seen as quite political.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, only the Committees on the Armed Forces in the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament could scrutinize the merits of the selections. However, they never exercised this power, and had they done so, it is doubtful that these committees would have had the power to alter selections or promote another candidate.

Since the May 2014 military coup, there have been no legislative committees due to the voiding of the 2007 constitution and the disbanding of the elected legislature. The interim constitution of 2014 does not allow for oversight over military promotions by the newly appointed (but not elected) National Legislative Assembly. Indeed, since the most recent coup, there has been no independent oversight of security officials' appointments whatsoever.

There is no guideline in the Military Registrar Department against the taking of bribes to avoid conscription in Thailand. Alternatively, a young man can volunteer for the military, in which case he only has to serve for six months of active service. Finally, a young man can be selected to enter the Reserve Officer Training Corps program and avoid service altogether. There have been reports that young men have resorted to bribery to ensure acceptance in the Reserve Officer Training Corps.

Though the practice is officially discouraged, bribing military officials to either avoid drawing the red card (which necessitates military service for two years) or being guaranteed a position outside of conflict are actually quite common. In one case in 2013, a young man who drew a red card (but wanted to avoid conscription) was informed that he would have to pay 30,000 baht to avoid it. He eventually found enough money and was issued a document stating that he was exempt from military service.

Despite the military coup of May 2014, there remains no law forbidding bribery in connection with conscription. As such, such incidents of bribery are probably continuing.

Broader rules relating to corruption and bribery, as covered in Questions 35 and 50, would apply here, however, and the score has been selected accordingly.

In Thailand, conscription is compulsory for all males for a period of two years, but there is no official policy forbidding the taking of bribes in exchange for a preferred position following conscription. Though the practice is officially discouraged, bribing military officials to either avoid drawing the red card (which necessitates military service for two years) or being guaranteed a position outside of conflict are actually quite common.

Sometime sons with influential parents can sway the military to give them a preferred position. In 2012, the Minister of Defence accused the then Thai opposition leader Abhisit Vechachiwa with having used his family's considerable influence to get a teaching job at the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy and be put on reserve status instead of having to serve in the regular military--when he had been subjected to conscription. The judiciary dismissed the case on a technicality and Abhisit sued the Minister of Defence for defamation.

Following the May 2014 military coup, there is no evidence of any changes in official procedures regarding the use of bribery to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process. Ultimately, bribery is formally discouraged but it informally continues to exist amidst lax enforcement against it.

Broader rules relating to corruption and bribery, as covered in Questions 35 and 50, would apply here, however, and the score has been selected accordingly.

Rumours have abounded about the existence of ghost soldiers in the Thai military. Yet in 2014, there have still been no concrete steps to deal with this issue. Thus, nothing has changed since the 2013 GI report for Thailand, which stated that in 2011, Army Commander Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha even admitted that ghost soldiers had existed at Tanarath military camp. He also guaranteed that personnel responsible for the ghost soldiers would be punished according to military law. Nevertheless, there was no mention of reforming the payment policies such that no ghost soldiers could be introduced into the payrolls in future. Instead, he simply stated that &quoute;there is already regulation and processes of investigation and punishment for this activity&quoute;.

Ghost soldiers have been reported present in the far south where the counter-insurgency is going on. This appears to be because soldiers are afraid of being posted in the conflict zone. Indeed, Division 15 of Igkayuthaborikarn military camp in Pattani province has occasionally been reported to have fewer soldiers than are on the official list.

Despite the May 2014 military coup, little has changed regarding salary chain since publication of the 2013 GI for Thailand. As that report stated, in Thailand, the receipt of salary is strictly separated from the chain of command, at any level, according to the Royal Decree on Payment of Salary, Annual Payment, Pension, and Other Types of Payment (1992).

The finance departments of each of the armed forces, and the Ministry of Defence must write up a request form with an attached detailed list of its personnel being paid with this budget, and submit to the Comptroller General's Department for approval through the Government Fiscal Management Information System (GFMIS). Once the request is approved, the budget will be allowed to be used for payments.

Then, according to the Ministry of Finance Regulation on the Disbursement of Salary, Annual Payment, Pension, and Other Types of Payment (1990), all payments to individual personnel must be done by the finance department, which is separated from the chain of command. The payment is made in one of three ways: bank transfer, cheque payment, and cash payment. However, in practice, there may or may not be actions that violate the regulations. This state of affairs continues past the coup, according to an anonymous academic who was interviewed.

It is not clear whether Thailand has a separate or unified code of conduct for both the military and civilian administration.

As noted in the 2013 GI for Thailand, there is a code of conduct for all military and civilian personnel, written by the coordination centre for transparency of office of the permanent secretary for defence. This code does not specifically include the terms &quoute;bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities&quoute; however.

Even after the May 2014 military coup, there have been no changes to any evidence of breaches of the Code of Conduct (according to an anonymous interview), so the findings of the 2013 GI for Thailand remain accurate.

The report stated that in light of 1) the code of conduct that exists for military and civilian personnel, 2) the concrete measures implemented by the office of the permanent secretary for defence, and 3) the corruption prevention and suppression plans of the army, it can be implied that that all three have together contributed to a certain level of effectiveness in reducing and controlling corruption in the military. However, this code of conduct does not provide any measures for punishing corrupt personnel. There are guidelines for corrupt crime addressed in the Organic Act on corruption prevention and suppression (1999), in its amendment in 2011, with punishments being carried out by the Military Judge Advocate General's Department.

The 1999 code itself is not effective because it is very ambiguous in the measures for punishing corrupt personnel. The reports are unlikely to be made public.

As stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, no regular anti-corruption training exists in the action plans of the coordination centre for transparency of the office of the permanent secretary for defence and the army. However, there is a program that most of the high ranking officers participate in, taught through the national defence college, in which corruption is one of the topics. Almost all military commanders must pass this program before being promoted to higher ranks.

Since the May 2014 military coup there has been no change in this situation. According to an anonymous security official, anti-corruption training continues to be conducted irregularly, partially, and to a limited number of personnel.

Unlike prosecutions of civilian bureaucrats, there is no explicit policy to make public the outcomes of prosecutions of military and defence officials. This is true for both cases involving and not involving corruption. Before the May 2014 military coup, as stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) and the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) monitored most corruption cases, as applied to politicians and civilian bureaucrats alike.

Virtually all military cases of corruption are overseen by military regulations and military courts. None of convictions by these courts are publicly available. The jurisdiction of each entity is clear and there are regulations for the NACC and PACC to avoid conflict as per the Corruption Prevention and Suppression Organic Act (1999). Information is only available about one defence official who was prosecuted by the NACC, but even in this case, no information is available about the results of his trial.

Since the May 2014 military coup, Thailand remains under the Martial Law Act of 1914. As such, Thailand is under martial law, with only military courts allowed to remain operational. Military courts do not make transparent the proceedings of cases while few military court decisions are made public, meaning that ultimately, judicial decisions involving corruption issues remain quite opaque in Thailand.

As stated in the 2013 for Thailand, measures for discouraging facilitation payments do exist but are vague. Bureaucrats who were found guilty of taking bribes could be punished, and witnesses to such corruption could report it to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) for high level officials, and to the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission for lower level officials. But these agencies are often overworked which made them slow and sometimes inefficient. The two most recent regulations for witness protection and rewarding whistleblowers are claimed to be helpful in discouraging bribery.

However, there needs to be much more education in the country regarding the existence and effectiveness of regulations on facilitation payments as well as about the NACC and PACC. There also needs to be more budgeting for both of the two agencies and more cooperation in witness protection with law enforcement personnel.

Since the May 2014 military coup, the situation regarding Thai state policies discouraging facilitation payments has changed very little.

As emphasized in the 2013 GI for Thailand, no specific doctrine addressing corruption exists for Thailand's armed forces. General Inspectorate Departments do exist in every service of the armed forces as well as in the Ministry of Defence, and there are internal auditing departments in each of the defence services. In their missions, emphasis is placed on efficiency, yet no mention is made of corruption, although the army mission does mention the need for transparency.

The Department of Defence budget does have an annual operations budget which is supposed to address corruption in budgeting processes. Meanwhile, the Office of the Permanent Secretary of Defence has a web-board for private citizens to report corruption cases. The army has a coordination centre for transparency, which receives complaints from private citizens and its employees. But none of these methods in itself is transparent because when the Defence Ministry and military address specific cases of alleged corruption, none of them are made public. They only become public when revealed by the media or very occasionally when the National Anti-Corruption Commission looks into military corruption, which rarely happens.

It is possible that the military's own anti-corruption actions are conducted only to gain credibility among other militaries around the world, or with international and domestic public opinion which is in favour of anti-corruption initiatives. Military corruption cases only seem to go public when the media reveals them, also a rare occurrence. No evidence exists of specific doctrines or guidelines for armed forces being deployed in conflict zones, or during peacekeeping missions.

As stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, no comprehensive and compulsory training exists which explicitly works on corruption issues for commanders at all levels. Nevertheless, a program on corruption for high ranking officers at the National Defence College does exist, which almost all military commanders must pass before being promoted to even higher ranks. But, as stated in Chambers (2013), this program is only for senior officers. No specific training program on corruption exists for commanders deployed in conflict zones or who are on peacekeeping operations.

Nothing has changed on this issue since the publication of the 2013 GI for Thailand, which found that no evidence exists that any trained professionals are deployed to monitor corruption in the field.

According to an interview with an anonymous security official, especially since the 2014 military coup, it is unclear whether or not trained professionals are regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions).

No guidelines exist which specific relate to corruption that occurs on peacekeeping operations.

In an interview after the 2014 military coup, an anonymous political scientist knowledgeable about Thailand's security forces affirmed that any guidelines relating to corruption risks in contracting have been loose, highly incomplete, very general, or applied very selectively or irregularly.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: While loose guidelines exist with respect to corruption risk in the military, they do not pertain to peacekeeping operations. Score changed to 0.

PMC firms are regularly employed in Thailand. Several international security firms operate for commercial interests in Thailand, as well as many local PMCs who provide a variety of services such as protection of commercial assets and security for political demonstrations or other events.

Currently, regulation of PMCs in Thailand is not comprehensive or effective. The Royal Thai Police announced in September 2014 that they would be setting up a PMC screening and monitoring center. The primary focus of the center will be preventive measures such as screening PMC personnel for history of criminal activity and ensuring that they have received adequate training.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Sources and comments added. Score changed to 1.

Laws regulating defence procurement in Thailand have not changed since the 2013 GI report for Thailand, which highlighted the fact that Thailand's defence and security sector are divided into two parts: the Ministry of Defence and the Office of the Prime Minister.

The Ministry of Defence takes care of all military issues and the Office of the Prime Minister oversees the National Security Council and National Intelligence agencies. Thus, there are two procurement regulations: one each for the Defence Ministry and the Office of the Prime Minister. These disbursements are covered under the Ministry of Defence's regulation on procurement, sale of asset, disbursement power for national defence industry (2011), and the Office of the Prime Minister's regulation on procurement (1992) / 5th amendment (1999). Both regulations contain special items exempt from normal procurement processes.

For example, the regulations allow any authorized military/national security department to purchase &quoute;secret&quoute; items by a &quoute;special&quoute; procurement process, which is faster and requires much less scrutiny by as many committees in comparison with non-secret items going through the normal procurement process. There is, however, an ad hoc committee which monitors the special procurement process, but its decisions are not disclosed and as the members of the committee are often employees of the department making the purchase, there is a possibility of conflict of interest and the likelihood that ad hoc committee members will turn a blind eye to any irregularities in the special procurement process.

Such a situation tends to enhance the risk of corruption. As a result of this, complaints have grown in Thai civil society about the secretive nature of the special process procurement. But such complaints have been squelched given that, since the May 2014 military coup, there is a fear in Thailand that any public protests could result in being detained by the military. Since the coup also, most of the laws mentioned above have been squelched as well. There are procurement regulations. But since the military junta dominates Thailand, it can supercede any such regulations.

Before the May 2014 military coup, Thai law specified that government unit making military purchases must publicly reveal the procurement plan to anyone interested in competing to make the sale (except for secret military goods).... According to an interviewee, since the May 2014 military coup, many more defence purchases than previously are being withheld from the public. The military junta rationalizes this withholding of information on account of the martial law act of 1914, which is currently in place across the country. Moreover, independent auditing of procurements does not exist in post-coup Thailand. With no external audits, there is a greater chance since the 2014 military coup (rather than before it) that procurement of arms could increasingly be based upon opportunistic motives rather than simply national security imperatives.

Response to Peer Reviewers: While robust legislation formally exists with respect to the procurement process, evidence suggests that the junta has withheld more purchases from the public that permitted by law. Furthermore, there are no external audits taking place. Score lowered from 3 to 1.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, the defence procurement cycle process was as follows.

As the 2013 GI for Thailand explains, Thai law mandates that the purchasing unit is required to publicly announce the procurement plan to all sellers interested in competing as bidders. Afterwards, the purchasing unit must publicly disclose its purchase. However, the purchasing unit does not have to disclose why it selected the purchased item.

In special procurement processes (which consider secret items for purchase), the purchasing unit does not need to make any public announcement at all, and if the purchase falls under information which may not be disclosed according to the Official Information Act,(1997), no disclosure on the purchase is made. Actual purchases required to be disclosed are in the annual report of the finance department in the ministry of defence.

Since the May 2014 military coup, according to one interviewee, there has been less disclosure of the defence procurement cycle with most of it being in a very abbreviated or general way.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, as elaborated upon in the 2013 GI for Thailand, the Thai defence procurement sector had several temporary appointed committees, whose members were charged with selecting the seller and monitoring the purchases. There was also a senior committee chaired by the Minister of Defence, charged with approving the purchases and monitoring the purchasing process, with internal audits of military purchases being carried out within the Ministry of Defence. Finally, the Committees on Defence in both the Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament could summon personnel to come before their Committee to explain military purchases.

However, the internal defence Ministry committee did not monitor every purchase, the internal audits were rarely revealed to the public and the Committees of Defence rarely exercised their power to summon defence personnel. This was firstly because military officers could cite &quoute;national security&quoute; as a reason not to appear before the panel and publicly explain their decisions, secondly, because most civilian members of the committees did not have enough expertise on military issues to ask probing questions; and thirdly, because parliamentary committee members with a military background would most likely choose not to criticize military procurement.

Since the 2014 military coup, as one interviewee has stated, the Committees of Defence in both the Upper and Lower Houses have been set aside given that there is no longer an elected legislature. A National Legislative Assembly has temporarily been appointed to work alongside the NCPO coup group. But this NLA has no authority to monitor defence procurement through committees or other methods.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Source provided does not demonstrate transparency on behalf of Thailand-- but rather Sweden. Seeing as there is no longer an elected legislature to oversee procurement decisions, score changed to 0.

On the basis of open source desk research conducted in Thai and English, no evidence of a policy to disclose actual and potential defence purchases could be found.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, Thai law specified that a government unit making military purchases must publicly reveal the procurement plan to anyone interested in competing to make the sale (except for secret military goods). Following the purchase, the unit which made the purchase had to furthermore publicly reveal its purchase.

Actual purchases required to be disclosed were even in the annual report of the Finance Department in the Ministry of Defence. Announcements for potential sellers were posted on the websites of the various military services, although it is impossible to know for sure if all purchases were announced and reported. There was sometimes scrutiny by the media on this issue but it was ignored by the military.

According to an interviewee, since the May 2014 military coup, many more defence purchases than previously are being withheld from the public. The military junta rationalizes this withholding of information on account of the Martial Law act of 1914, which is currently in place across the country.

In the post-coup environment, the government has continued to disclose some information on defence procurement, including plans for future purchases. However, this is primarily limited to major initiatives that would be considered a significant development in capability. These include plans to develop a submarine fleet, purchasing fighter jet trainers and helicopters.

The level of detail released so far consists of information about the companies whose products are being considered, the models and other information on the type of item being sought and primary capability features that the purchasing committee is looking for.

Smaller procurement initiatives, such as small arms, food and fuel have not been made public. Furthermore, the government has the authority to restrict the disclosure of procurement proceedings if it feels that doing so would jeopardize national security.

Response to Peers Reviewers: Comments added.

Despite the May 2014 military coup, it appears that nothing has changed with regard to bidding for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces.

As the 2013 GI for Thailand emphasised, there are no requirements, formal procedures or guidelines existing for companies who want to bid to do work for the Ministry of Defence or Armed Forces. Standard requirements for companies willing to bid for work for the MoD or the armed forces differs from contract to contract. According to the office of the prime minister's regulation on procurement (1992) / under the 5th amendment) (1999), the purchasing department must write a report on the standard requirements it wants for company bidders and submit to the head of the procurement unit for approval. This report must include (1) reasons justifying the auction/bidding, (2) detail of the goods/services it wants to purchase, (3) reasons justifying the standard requirement it sets, (4) criteria for selecting the winner.

However, there are loopholes which promote corruption. Indeed, it is common that companies pay bribes to the official tasked with writing the requirements or to the head of the procurement unit who approves the standard requirements. Bribes can even lead to a situation where requirements may be set to benefit a specific company in particular.

In Thailand, prior to the May 2014 military coup, as stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, the majority of military procurement requirements were derived from objectives set forth in national defence and security budget plan. These were openly monitored and approved by the Bureau of the Budget, as well as the parliamentary committees in the Lower and Upper House. Secret portions of the military procurement requirements were approved by these bodies as well. Nevertheless, there were other secret procurements which were not specified or vaguely specified in the budget plans. With regard to these, the Commander of each military service had the authority to purchase any items necessary if approved by the head of the prospective service's procurement unit. Such procurement could be done under special procurement processes that required little or no scrutiny from non-military bodies and did not have to be disclosed to outside actors.

Since the 2014 military coup, the parliamentary committees in the Lower and Upper House are no longer functioning, given that the elected legislature is non-existent. The new appointed National Legislative Assembly does not have committees which oversee and monitor military procurements.

The Defence Ministry's annual White Paper could be another important source for rationalizing the requirements of defence procurement. The White Paper summarizes security threats facing Thailand and legitimizes the role of the military in meeting those threats. The publication of White Papers however appears to have been stopped since the 2014 coup. Procurement requirements can thus be stated in the White Paper, though secret procurement needs will not be. With no external audits, there is a greater chance since the 2014 military coup (rather than before it) that procurement of arms could increasingly be based upon opportunistic motives rather than simply national security imperatives.

The score has been selected on the basis that it is unclear whether the aforementioned processes are still followed, there is minimal to no oversight and the expansion of powers of the military to conceal information regarding procurement in the interest of national security further adds to the risk of opportunism.

There is no evidence that requirements governing defence purchases have noticeably changed since the May 2014 military coup. This is verified by an interview with an anonymous security official.

It is stated in the MoD's procurement regulation that to make any procurement, the head of the department responsible for that procurement must submit a proposal identifying and quantifying the requirements to the head of procurement unit. And as stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, only when the request is approved can the procurement process begin. However, in practice, most heads of department are in higher positions than the head of the procurement unit; hence it is difficult and rare for the proposal to be rejected unless there is an obvious flaw or clear misconduct. Therefore, in this case, the identification and quantification of requirements may not be consistent with the actual procurement.

Prior to the May 2014 military coup, the 2013 GI for Thailand stated that according to Thai procurement law, the procurement plan must be publicly revealed so that anyone can compete in the contract bidding process.

With regard to secret purchases, special procurement processes are established which tend to use a single source, and where procurement information does not have to be publicly revealed. In case of, for example, secret items, urgently needed items, directly imported items, technically specific items, the procurement information need not be disclosed publicly. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet also have the authority to allow any procurement deals to go through this special process. As the information on special procurement is not disclosed, there is no way to know what percentage of all procurement are considered as special procurement.

Moreover, according to an interview with an anonymous security official, since the 2014 coup, there is no way for external actors (civilians) to ensure that the currently ruling military junta conducts its competition for defence procurement openly and without favouritism. As a result, the possibility looms in Thailand that defence procurement will increasingly become single-sourced.

Score changed from 2 to 1 in response to TI comments.

As laid out in the 2013 GI for Thailand, prior to the May 2014 military coup, the tender board was the National Defence Industry and Energy Committee. This committee was chaired by the Minister of Defence and regulated by the Ministry of Defence's regulation on the working capital of national defence industry (1986), as amended in 2011. This committee was empowered to monitor all military procurement.

However, according to an interview with an anonymous security official, since this board was composed of senior generals, most of whom had other and numerous duties, the board was not always stringent in its oversight functions. The committee that monitored each individual procurement was called the temporary procurement committee, an ad hoc committee which was appointed for each procurement and was subject to procurement law. However, this committee was not fully independent as each of its members was selected by the department making the procurement.

According to the interviewee, conflicts of interest and corruption thus became easy since it would be simple to nominate someone to the committee who would not report on malpractice or who would be willing to take a bribe to look the other way. Ultimately, before the 2014 coup, tender boards were subject to regulations and codes of conduct, though these were not publicly available. Audits of tender board decisions were not routinely undertaken.

Since the May 2014 military coup, tender board procedure and practice have become less and less transparent with audits not normally undertaken of tender boards

As stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, there is a 1999 Government Act aimed at discouraging and punishing collusion among bidders for all governmental contracts, not only defence and security contracts. However, the enforcement of such law has been ineffective, with collusion between bidders having become very common for governmental contracts. The media occasionally reports cases of collusion in military procurement, but this does not occur as often in other sectors as it does in procurement, potentially due to higher secrecy levels surrounding military procurement processes.

Since the May 2014 military coup, Thailand's constitution of 2007 (which subsumes all Thai law) has been voided by the military while a new constitution is being written by the military and others. There is thus currently a vacuum in law which could (temporarily at least) provide a greater opportunity for legal collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts.

t appears that defence procurement staff are organized into a professional staff department. Nevertheless there is not enough evidence to ascertain the extent to which there are staff shortages, staff rotations (limiting staff abilities) or whether staff are sometimes able to hold defence contractors to account on their obligations. There is no evidence available about undue influence from higher grades, although it is likely given the powers afforded to senior officials and the lack of associated oversight.

No special training courses exist for procurement staff in the defence/security sector; instead the staff are expected to learn their tasks through on-the-job training. Many courses exist on procurement in external governmental units, however, a situation which has not changed since the 2013 GI for Thailand.

Indeed, there have not been any new procurement workshops held since the last assessment, according to an interview with an anonymous security official. I

According to an anonymous security official, nothing has changed regarding this issue since the May 2014 military coup, and so the 2013 GI for Thailand remains accurate.

The report (as supported by a great many sources) highlighted that many laws exist which permit companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. These regulations include the Procurement Regulation, the Governmental Bidding Act (1999), the Rewarding of Whistle-blowers Regulation of the National Anti Corruption Commission (NACC) and the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC), and the Witness Protection Regulation of the NACC and PACC. Alleged wrongdoers, if found guilty, were to be investigated and removed from the procurement process, and could even face punishment.

Though these laws appear to be superficially effective, the reality is that officials on the procurement committee tend to be biased against companies who make complaints, as committee officials and department officials charged with making purchases were often not acting independently, especially given that members of the ad hoc procurement committee are usually proposed by the department making the purchases. In addition, they are likely to nominate individuals from the department who can make the procurement process faster and easier, even if this undermines their independence. All of this means that bias tends to exist among officials toward any complaining companies.

Finally, witness protection is generally ineffective given a lack of sufficient funding and insufficient cooperation from law enforcement personnel.

Very little has changed in Thailand since the May 2014 military coup regarding this subject, meaning that the findings of the 2013 GI for Thailand are still relevant.

This report stated that when a supplier is found to have engaged in corruption, he/she can be penalized in various ways. For example, Section 4 of the Governmental Bidding Act of 1999 states that any supplier found to have engaged in collusion can be imprisoned for 1-3 years and/or be fined for up to 50% of the highest bid price. Section 12 goes on to say that any bureaucrat found guilty of malpractice in procurement can face 5-20 years or life imprisonment and/or be fined from 100,000-400,000 baht. The act has a variety of other rigorous punishments related to supplier malpractices. Yet despite the stiff penalties, there is really no way to ensure that the act is effectively enforced. Still, there has been some evidence of the NACC punishing some suppliers, according to a recent NACC work report. In September 2014, the NACC proposed a legal amendment to allow the body to investigate private enterprises suspected of being involved with corruption in the public sector. This would enable the NACC to prosecute private sector executives, thereby significantly expanding the scope of sanctions which may be applied to private sector employees and firms, including the private defence sector. It could not be conclusively verified whether this amendment had indeed been promulgated by the time of this review.

There is no evidence in the public domain, in Thai or English, that the sanctions are applied consistently in practice. There is also not enough evidence of individual cases, which might have been compared and assessed for consistency over time, to warrant this conclusion.

Since the 2014 coup, there have been no cases of defence contractors facing sanctions outlined in the Government Bidding Act.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Comments added.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: The case mentioned, while interesting, is not relevant here.

Despite the May 2014 military coup in Thailand, the issue of offset contracts has not changed. Indeed, as stated in the 2013 GI for Thailand, the country has no official policies regarding offset contracts.

Nevertheless, the existence of such a Thai policy is mentioned in an Australian Department of defence paper, the only source which makes mention of any Thai offset policy. However, a single and foreign source is not reliable enough as evidence of such a policy's existence.

Based on open-source desk-based research conducted in Thai and English, it was not possible to find a list of offset contracts, made publicly by the government or otherwise. It could therefore not be ascertained whether the government makes public copies of offset contracts themselves, nor whether planned offsets contracts are made publicly available to enable public and civil society comment before contract award. It was similarly not possible to find evidence that the government makes public details of the current performance of offset programmes.

Despite the 2014 military coup nothing has changed regarding the issue of making public the details, contracts, or performance of offset programs. The 2013 GI for Thailand therefore remains an accurate source. The report stated that in Thailand, there is no official offset policy, even though such a Thai policy is mentioned in an Australian Department of defence paper. This is the only source which makes mention of any Thai offset policy. However, a single foreign source is not reliable enough as evidence of such a policy's existence.

Despite the May 2014 military coup in Thailand, nothing has changed regarding the subject of this question. As such what was stated in Transparency International's 2013 report about Thailand still holds true today. According to the report,in Thailand, there is no official offset policy. Nevertheless, there us a mention of the existence of such a Thai policy is mentioned in an Australian Department of defence paper. This is the only source which makes mention of any Thai offset policy.

However, a single and foreign source is not reliable enough as evidence of such a policy's existence.

Agents and intermediaries are commonly used in Thai military procurement, but procurement regulations do not mention any restrictions or control measures regarding agents and intermediaries.

Prior to the military coup of May 2014 in Thailand,the NACC and other Thai monitoring agencies tended to ignore the use of such agents in defence or national security matters. As a result, there was no oversight over the activities of such agents.

Since the 2014 coup, the NACC has lost its legal foundation (though it still informally exists), given that the coup voided the 2007 constitution. The new 2014 interim constitution gives no legitimacy to the NACC, though eventually the next permanent constitution is supposed to create a new NACC structure.

Prior to Thailand's May 2014 military coup, the 2013 GI for Thailand was accurate in stating that procurement regulations of both the Ministry of Defence and the Office of the Prime Minister compelled defence and national security departments to propose a financing package for each procurement. This included payment timelines, and the manner of payment. This financing package was included in the procurement proposal to be approved and publicly announced by the procurement unit. However, if the procurement was made though special process (e.g. involving a secret budget), the information need not have been made public. Nevertheless, the disclosure of such information could have been obtained via the Official Information Act.

Since the 2014 military coup, there has been no legal requirement to publicize procurements as in the past, given the voiding of the 2007 constitution by the NCPO military junta. Since the coup, according to an interviewee, the military junta does not have to publicly report financing packages on the grounds of national security since Thailand is under martial law.

As the 2013 GI for Thailand stated, sometimes intermediaries and sub-contractors are used by contractors but when this happens, it is something informal, outside the purview of state monitoring. None of these intermediaries and sub-contractors follow anti-corruption programmes and the government does not appear to encourage this informally. The coup of May 2014 did not change this situation.

According to an interview with an anonymous political scientist, there is no formal policy or legislative provisions from the government formally requiring that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes.

It is certainly not uncommon for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations. In general, nothing has changed since the publication of the 2013 GI for Thailand. That report stated that one fairly recent case of seller influence in defence procurement was the air-force purchase of 12 JAS-39C/D Gripen multirole fighters from Sweden. At first the air-force was considering the Swedish Gripen, the Russian Sukhoi Su-30, or the US F-16C/D. However, the US, which has a policy not to sell any military items to a coup government, refused to sell the F-16C/D to the Thai government. The air-force then considered the Russian Sukhoi Su-30 but these aircraft were considered fuel inefficient. Finally it was decided to purchase the Swedish Gripen because of a suitable price and because of efficiency. However, there was speculation that there may have been irregularities which figured into the purchasing of the Gripen.

Since the May 2014 military coup, a military junta has controlled Thailand. It is thus feasible to assume that Thailand will witness more defence acquisitions decisions based upon political deals between the junta and selling nation(s) rather than simple military necessity. There is evidence that the seller nation's political motivation has influence over the procurement process. While this has not been evident in any purchases made since the May 2014 coup, it is clear that these influences are present in ongoing negotiations. For example, in April 2015, the Russian trade minister said that Russia would consider selling planes and other military equipment to the Thai military because of the US' decreased engagement with Thailand. Russia has also offered to purchase 80,000 tonnes of rubber from Thailand's excess reserves.
Since the Gripen case, in early 2015, the Royal Thai Navy has made public plans to purchase 'Kilo' submarine vessels from the a Russian exporter, Rosoboronexport Company. Reference was made publicly to the Royal Thai Navy's need to enhance Thailand's maritime security and to balance military capabilities with those of neighbouring states, which have also upgraded their capacity over the past few years.

Response to Peer Reviewers: Comments and sources added.