This country is placed in Band E

Recommendations Unavailable

Policy recommendations not available for this country's assessment

Leadership 30
01.
score
2

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The Nigerien National Assembly (NA) is constitutionally vested with formal rights to carry out oversight over all government actions; it can vote on all legislation including for example, defence budgets (article 114 of the Constitution). The Constitution allows for parliamentary controls through the oversight of legislation related to security (see below). The Constitution also allows for a defence committee and a defence council (article 30, articles 63-65), to consult on defence policies - these bodies act as advisory units to the President (who is the Supreme Head of the Armed Forces).

While the assessor found no provision for veto, the National Assembly can in theory oppose the legislation as its authority is needed in order for it to be passed. For example the National Assembly authorises declarations of war and the dispatch of troops abroad (1). The NA exercised this right on 9 February 2015 when they authorised the deployment of troops to Nigeria (7). By an absolute majority, the National Assembly evaluates the length of time during which extraordinary powers may be exercised and can put an end to such powers in case of abuse (1). In cases of martial law, for which the decision is taken in the council of ministers, the National Assembly must provide an opinion and the period of martial law may not last longer than 15 days without parliamentary authorisation (1). This function was exercised in February 2015, when the NA authorised the extension of the State of Emergency in the Diffa region (7). Through its powers in the area of the budget law and program, the National Assembly also exercises a security budget approval function and a budget execution control function (1).

There is evidence that debates over new legislation do take place in Niger, it is therefore likely that when bills related to security are proposed, these too are debated (6). However, according to the National Democratic Institute, (a non-profit organisation), 'members of the National Assembly still have limited experience in drafting laws and legislative amendments, analysing the national budget and providing government oversight' limiting the effectiveness of the scrutiny. This indicates that the legislature has a low level of influence over military policy. The assessor found no evidence that the legislature is unduly influenced by the executive or undermined by a presence of military officials.

COMMENTS -+

1. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

2. The National Democratic Institute, 'democratic institutions in Niger', 2011: https://www.ndi.org/niger

3. Interview with interviewee 1, NGO member, by phone February 2015 - no quote used but supported the content of the answer.

4. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015 - no quote used but supported the content of the answer.

5. World Bank, 'Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review', 23 December 2013

6. ActuNiger, 'Niger: L'Opposition signe sa reddition, ainsi soit-il!', 31 March 2014: http://www.actuniger.com/tribune-opinions/8096-niger-l-opposition-signe-sa-reddition-ainsi-soit-il.html

7. Niamey.com, 'Le Parlement nigérien autorise la prorogation de l’état d’urgence de trois mois dans la Région de Diffa', 28 February 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/31203.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The High Authority to Fight Corruption and Similar Infractions (HALCIA) was also established by presidential decree in 2011. It includes members of the government, civil society, and private sector. However, it is seen to lack authority, capacity, and has been hindered by internal frictions (see http://www.tamtaminfo.com/niger-fonctionnement-de-la-halcia-la-guerre-est-ouverte/ for example). defence issues does not appear to be a part of its mandate.

Parliament recently (May 2015) voted to amend the country's budget to allow for higher defence spending, indicating legislative involvement in defence policy.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
2

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The NA has a Security and Defence Committee (La Commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité) - a standing Committee that according to the National Assembly's Internal Rules (Art. 30), has to be set up at the beginning of each legislative cycle.

Consisting of 17 members from the various political parties represented in parliament, the committee is assisted by two civilian technical advisers and one military advisor responsible for relations with the security forces (1). Consulted on all legal provisions relating to security, the committee reports to the plenary session of the NA and acts as the contact point for the Ministry of defence and the Interior ( for example, during the preparation phase of the annual budget process) (1). The Committee has the authority hold hearings with members of the technical staff of government departments, can make visits to military camps and facilities throughout Niger and can also refer any budgetary matters to the Audit Office (1).

The Committee is responsible for issues relating to national defence, military cooperation, civilian protection, military service and military justice (1). In practice, the powers of the defence and security committee remain limited to examining the budget when the finance law is to be passed and to monitor military facilities (3). Interviewees (3, 4, 5) agreed that the commission does not have enough money to make visits to military camps.

According to the Constitution there are also two Defence Councils (the National Defence Council and the Superior National Defence Council) vested with assisting the President who is also Supreme Head of the Armed Forces (article 63, 6). The Superior Council advises on the nomination of high level military nominations and grade promotions of officers alongside 'all other questions within the military domain' (article 64). The National Defence Council advises on all questions relevant to national security and strategy as well as foreign affairs (article 65, 6). As advisory units, their effectiveness is at the the discretion of the president.

The assessor found no published documents from either the Committee or the Councils suggesting that they are not publicly available should they exist.

Response to Peer Reviewer: Disagree. Given that several bodies exist, with thorough formal rights, this definitely warrants a score of 2. There are some concerns over effectiveness but no evidence to suggest that these are considerable.

COMMENTS -+

1. Internal rules of the National Assembly, art.1 and Chapitre VIII : Les Commissions, art.30, April 2011 http://www.assemblee.ne/images/stories/2so2012/ojcal/rian_2012.pdf

2. Union Interparlementaire (UPI), Contrôle parlementaire au Niger, Contrôle de la politique de défense nationale, (2010): http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/CtrlParlementaire/Niger_F.htm

3. Interview with interviewee 3, government employee, Niger, January 2015

4. Interview with interviewee 1, NGO member, by phone February 2015

5. Interview with Interviewee 5, NGO personnel, Niamey, Niger, January 2015

6. Nigerien Constitution (VII République), 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I agree with the written material but think this warrants a 1 rather than a 2, as there is concern over the committee's effectiveness.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
2

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The National Assembly (NA) is active in carrying out its legal duties with regard to defence issues. For example, the NA exercised its right to authorise the dispatch of troops abroad (1) on 9 February 2015 when they authorised the deployment of troops to Nigeria. Later that month the NA also authorised the extension of the State of Emergency in the Diffa region - another indication of its activity. The assessor did not find published evidence that these issues were debated before they were voted upon, however, there is evidence that debates over new legislation do take place in Niger, it is therefore likely that when bills related to security are also subject to debate (3).

According to the National Democratic Institute, (11), 'members of the National Assembly still have limited experience in drafting laws and legislative amendments, analysing the national budget and providing government oversight' limiting the effectiveness of the scrutiny. This indicates that the legislature has a low level of influence over military policy.

The interviewees agreed that defence policy is publicly discussed when it deals with foreign intervention (such as in Mali 2013 and Nigeria 2015) but remains otherwise the government's prerogative. There is however no formal consultation process.

The overall defence objectives are stated in the Constitution which is publicly available (article 66, 7): the Nigerian Armed Forces assure the defence of the integrity of the national territory against all external aggressors, it is charged with maintaining peace and security and upholding all the laws of the country. More specific defence objectives are available in the public domain via development and security policy documentation (12) media articles such as an extended interview with the defence minister Karidio Mahamadou which also shows how objectives are updated to meet evolving threats (8) and reporting on army offensives (9, 10).

Response to Peer Reviewers: Agreed, score changed to 2, and sources added.

There is public debate around major threats as indicated by the reference to deployments in Mali and Nigeria. The example that the second reviewer provides could be substituted as a 'defence policy document', showing that it has been updated, and justifying a score change to 2. The document is government authorised, but it is unclear if the report was distributed widely inside Niger, nor whether it sparked great debate.

COMMENTS -+

1. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

2. Niamey.com, 'Le Parlement nigérien autorise la prorogation de l’état d’urgence de trois mois dans la Région de Diffa', 28 February 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/31203.html

3. ActuNiger, 'Niger: L'Opposition signe sa reddition, ainsi soit-il!', 31 March 2014: http://www.actuniger.com/tribune-opinions/8096-niger-l-opposition-signe-sa-reddition-ainsi-soit-il.html

4. Interview with interviewee 1, NGO member, by phone February 2015

5. Interview with interviewee 3, government employee, Niger, January 2015

6. Interview with Interviewee 5, NGO personnel, Niamey, Niger, January 2015

7. Nigerien Constitution (VII République), 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

8. Office National d'Edition et de Presse, 'Le ministre de la Défense Nationale, M. Karidio Mahamadou', (undated but post 2011): http://www.lesahel.org/index.php/le-niger-en-bref/item/2814-le-ministre-de-la-d%C3%A9fense-nationale-m-karidio-mahamadou-tire-le-bilan-des-deux-ans-dactions-de-son-d%C3%A9partement-minist%C3%A9riel--je-voudrais-rendre-hommage--au-pr%C3%A9sident-de-la-r%C3%A9publique-chef-supr%C3%AAme-des-arm%C3%A9es-qui-sest-personnellement-inves

9. ENCA, 'We killed 260 Boko Haram militants since last week: Niger forces', 12 February 2015: http://www.enca.com/africa/niger-forces-killed-260-boko-haram-militants-last-week

10. tamtaminfo, 'Niger: mesures de sécurité renforcées à Zinder contre Boko Haram', 12 February 2015: http://www.tamtaminfo.com/niger-mesures-de-securite-renforcees-a-zinder-contre-boko-haram/

11. The National Democratic Institute, 'democratic institutions in Niger', 2011: https://www.ndi.org/niger

12. Prime Ministers Office, Strategy for Development and Security in the Sahel-Saharan Areas of Niger', October 2011: http://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/pdfs_sds_version_english.pdf

13. International Peace Institute, 'Republic of Niger Strategy for Development and Security in Sahel-Saharan Areas of the Country', April 2013, http://www.ipinst.org/2013/04/republic-of-niger-strategy-for-development-and-security-in-sahel-saharan-areas-of-the-country

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Agree, public debate generally occurs around specific actions, both foreign deployments and actions in the north. There is no indication of regularly updated defence policy.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: A broad defence and security policy document is publicly available in French and English. This policy is subservient to ministerial-level policies, but does remain the clearest public statement of the country's defence policy and direction.

http://www.ipinst.org/2013/04/republic-of-niger-strategy-for-development-and-security-in-sahel-saharan-areas-of-the-country

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
1

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no clearly stated strategy in place regarding anti-corruption in the defence and security (assessing or addressing it), there is consequently no dialogue with the civil society on this issue (interview 5). The defence sector has no policy towards CSOs. However, according to ICG, 'security forces are notorious for repeated violence against the civilian population' (4, p.19) including protectors and peaceful CSO marches on issues unrelated to defence (5).

According to the interviewees, cooperation between parliamentarians and CSOs on the development of legislation and advocacy strategies for more transparency has advanced tentatively since the transition to democratic rule (2010-11). This indicates that there is some engagement on issues related to anti-corruption. The High Authority to Fight Corruption and Similar Infractions (HALCIA) was also established by presidential decree in 2011. It includes members of the government, civil society, and private sector. However, it is funded by the government.

An ICG report noted that civil society groups are largely represented by 'leaders such as Amadou Marou, justice minister and government spokesperson since 2011' which indicates a level of co-option (4 p.18). Moreover, the report adds, some [opposition and dialogue] institutions seem to be too dependent on the government or their effectiveness is reduced by politicking (4. p.21). It is therefore likely that most discussion on issues related to anti-corruption have funding links to the government. The strategy for development and security (7) does make provision for engagement and cooperation with NGOs in Niger at municipal and national level. In practice, however, this is likely to be a rare occurrence.

In December 2013, tens of thousands of citizens joined an opposition protest march against President Issoufou in Niamey, citing corruption and poor governance (6). That so many people resorted to protest action can be explained by a lack of formal mechanisms to engage with government on issues of corruption.


Response to Peer Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed to 1, and sources and commentary ammended.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 5, NGO personnel, Niamey, Niger, January 2015

2. National Democratic Institute, 'Niger’s democratic institutions', 2011: https://www.ndi.org/niger

3. Interview with interviewee 1, NGO member, by phone February 2015

4. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?': http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf, 2013

5. Jeune Afrique, 'Tensions politiques et arrestations de manifestants au Niger', 22 May 2014: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140522100125/politique-niger-manifestation-hama-amadou-niger-tensions-politiques-et-arrestations-de-manifestants-au-niger.html

6. Afriqueinfos, 'Niger : Manifestation contre le président Issoufou qui sera candidat en 2016', 28 December 2013: http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2013/12/28/niger-manifestation-contre-president-issoufou-sera-candidat-2016-240756.asp, 2013

7. Prime Minister's Office, Strategy for Development and Security in the Sahel-Saharan Areas of Niger', October 2011: http://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/pdfs_sds_version_english.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The High Authority to Fight Corruption and Similar Infractions (HALCIA) was also established by presidential decree in 2011. It includes members of the government, civil society, and private sector. However, it is funded by the government.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The strategy for development and security does make provision for engagement and cooperation with NGOs in Niger at municipal and national level. In practice, however, this is likely to be a rare occurrence.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
2

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Niger ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption on 11 August 2008. The country also signed up to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2006. As a possible indication that Niger has not complied with all aspects of these conventions, the government has not ratified the Protocol A/P3/12/01 on the Fight against Corruption (ECOWAS) and did not take part in the African Peer Review Initiative.

President Issoufou's post-2010 government set up the High Authority Against Corruption and Similar Crimes (HALCIA) and the Information and Complaints Office in the Fight Against Corruption and the Trafficking of Influence in the Judiciary in 2011 at the request of international donors seeking to enforce international anti-corruption norms on the country (ICG, p.23). However, their operation and lack of independence have been criticised, in April 2013 for example, 'the opposition criticised HALCIA and questioned its constitutionality, independence and usefulness' (ICG p.23 footnotes).

COMMENTS -+

1. UNODC, United Nations Convention against Corruption website: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/fr/treaties/CAC/signatories.html

2. African Union Convention on preventing and combating corruption website: http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Corruption_0.pdf

3. African Peer review Initiative website: http://aprm-au.org/aprm-map

4. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Niger appears not to have been covered in an UNCAC implementation review.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
0

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to a DCAF report that an interviewee confirmed remained relevant (1, 2), 'issues of security sector governance are generally not discussed publicly - defence and security issues are sensitive matters that are so shrouded in secrecy and confidentiality that it is commonly accepted that these can only be discussed publicly if the aim is to undermine cohesion and national security'. Nigeriens generally still consider that it is dangerous to talk about defence and security matters, and it is not unusual for a room to empty when the discussion turns to security or ‘military matters’, for fear of reprisals.' (p.191).

Other than a few media articles discussing the increase in defence spending in recent years (7, 8, 9) the assessor found no evidence of public debate on security issues to dispute this. However, defence objectives are available in the public domain via media articles such as an extended interview with the defence minister Karidio Mahamadou which also shows how objectives are updated to meet evolving threats (4) and reporting on army offensives (5, 6). These are likely to stimulate some private debate.

Response to Peer Reviewers: Disagree. Media and official documentation has already been accounted for in this response. Moreover, there is no evidence of public consultation; a key requirement for score 1. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, (DCAF), Report on Niger: 2010:
http://www.dcaf.ch/Chapter-Section/Ch.8-Niger

2. Interview with interviewee 1, NGO member, by phone February 2015

3. Interview with Interviewee 5, NGO personnel, Niamey, Niger, January 2015 - not quoted but the discussion confirmed the assessment below.

4. Office National d'Edition et de Presse, 'Le ministre de la Défense Nationale, M. Karidio Mahamadou', (undated but post 2011): http://www.lesahel.org/index.php/le-niger-en-bref/item/2814-le-ministre-de-la-d%C3%A9fense-nationale-m-karidio-mahamadou-tire-le-bilan-des-deux-ans-dactions-de-son-d%C3%A9partement-minist%C3%A9riel--je-voudrais-rendre-hommage--au-pr%C3%A9sident-de-la-r%C3%A9publique-chef-supr%C3%AAme-des-arm%C3%A9es-qui-sest-personnellement-inves

5. ENCA, 'We killed 260 Boko Haram militants since last week: Niger forces', 12 February 2015: http://www.enca.com/africa/niger-forces-killed-260-boko-haram-militants-last-week

6. tamtaminfo, 'Niger: mesures de sécurité renforcées à Zinder contre Boko Haram', 12 February 2015: http://www.tamtaminfo.com/niger-mesures-de-securite-renforcees-a-zinder-contre-boko-haram/

7. Jeune Afrique, 'Les defis de la politique de defence du Niger', 2 February 2014: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140217110808/

8. Niamey.com, '25 Milliards de plus pour l’armée: l’effort de guerre se poursuit', 8 May 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/1294.html

9. Afriqueinfo, 2012, Niger : Le budget en hausse de 139 milliards de franc CFA après deux modifications
http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2012/7/26/niger-budget-hausse-milliards-franc-apres-deux-modifications-207206.asp

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is some public debate in the media over defence issues such as foreign interventions and occasionally actions in the north. Mostly recently, there has been increasing public attention on the effects of the state of emergency in Diffa. However, criticism by the public is discouraged and at times punished. For example, see the arrest (May 2015) of activist and journalist Moussa Tchangari following his criticisms of the state of emergency in Diffa.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Nigerien Strategy for Security and Development clearly indicates some manner of open, published and therefore up-for-scrutiny material. While the specific defence policy details are likely hidden from the public eye, the overall strategy and legislative path of Niger's defence ministry are not a complete mystery.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
0

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no sign of an anti-corruption policy in existence. According to an interviewee, there is no clearly stated strategy in place regarding anti-corruption in the defence and security (assessing or addressing it) nor is there likely to be one in existence soon. There is also no public evidence of such a strategy.

The 2003 Military Penal Code provides for a judiciary military police that report to Ministry of Defence however (article 46). They are charged with finding and following up all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (article 48). The Code briefly addresses corruption in article 228, which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned.

Section 8 of the Public Penal Code (applicable to all civil servants) also states that:

- Article 130: &quoute;Corruption and Influence Peddling will be punished with imprisonment of two to ten years and a fine of Fr 50,000-1,000,000 francs. The law extends to persons soliciting or accepting offers, promises, gifts or presents including being invested of an elective office, an administrative, judicial, military public officials or agent or employee of the government public&quoute;

- Article 131: &quoute;Any person who has requested or approved bids or promises, solicited or accepted gifts or presents, to obtain or attempt to to get decorations, medals, honors or awards, squares, functions
or jobs or favors granted by any public authority, markets, companies or other benefits arising from treaties with the public authority or, generally favorable decision of such authority or administration, and will and abused a real or supposed influence shall be punished with imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of 50000-1000000 francs.&quoute;

Broad government anti-corruption efforts were also reinforced by the creation of the High Authority Against Corruption and Similar Crimes (HALCIA) and the Information and Complaints Office in the Fight Against Corruption and the Trafficking of Influence in the Judiciary in 2011 (ICG, p.23). However, their operation and lack of independence have been criticised, in April 2013 for example, 'the opposition criticised HALCIA and questioned its constitutionality, independence and usefulness' (ICG p.23 footnotes).

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 5, NGO personnel, Niamey, Niger, January 2015

2. Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

3. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

4. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf; http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Niger/NE_Code_Justice_Militaire.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
1

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence of an institution or department within the defence and security sector tasked with building integrity and countering corruption. There are other government institutions that share this wider mandate however their engagement with defence is unclear. The score has been awarded on basis of this, coupled with the limited available evidence of these institutions' effectiveness and independence.

The 2010 constitution contains provisions for greater transparency in government reporting of revenues from the extractive industries, as well as the declaration of personal assets by government officials, including the president (1).

There are several institutions tasked with countering corruption (2):
- The 2004 National Financial Information Unit (CENTIF)
- The 2011 High Authority Against Corruption and Similar Crimes (HALCIA)
- The 2011 Information and Complaints Office in the Fight Against Corruption and the Trafficking of Influence in the Judiciary (BIR/LCTI)
- In 2011 a hotline for reporting corruption was also established (4)

According to ICG, 'these institutions still play an uncertain and contested role as safeguards for democracy and good governance' (p.23). For example, the CENTIF's activities depend on the statements of transfers made by banks (which are irregular) while it does not have the resources to monitor informal economy channels used by criminal financial networks. Furthermore, in 2013, the opposition questioned the 'independence and usefulness' of HALCIA (ICG, p.23).

COMMENTS -+

1. Nigerien Constitution, 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

2. Freedom House, Niger, 2012: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/niger#.VA7nF_l_spo

3. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?': http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf, 2013

4. Borderless, 'Niger launches hotline to recieve corruption complaints', 18 August 2011: http://www.borderlesswa.com/news/niger-launches-hotline-receive-corruption-complaints

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There has been some evidence of these organizations' effectiveness. HALCIA has referred several cases of corruption and fraud involving civil servants, judges, and security forces to state prosecutors (See 2012 US State Department Human Rights Report). The IMF 2013 Poverty Reduction Strategy paper assesses that the HALCIA needs more funding and authority to effectively complete its mission.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Niger appears to be actively involved in at least appearing to target corruption. HALCIA is active and regularly hosts events and conferences for regional and international actors.

In addition to the above-mentioned organisations, Niger is also a member of the National Anti Corruption Institutions of West Africa (NACIWA) and the International Association of Anti Corruption Authorities (IAACA). Regionaly cooperation furthermore seems to run along the same regional lines as its defence cooperation.

One major caveat here, however, is that there is little, if any, explicit mention of defence and security anti-corruption measures. This could indicate a deliberate obfuscation of defence procurement and other corrupt activities. The global trend would suggest this (this being roughly 40% rate of corruption or fraudulent activities in global defence procurements).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
2

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: No evidence could be found with regard to the public’s perception of the defence establishment’s stance on corruption and bribery, however, a few examples serving as proxies of perception of corruption and the government are below.

According to a 2013 Afrobarometer report, 7/10 respondents said that they had not encountered corruption in the country. According to TI's 2014 Corruptions Perceptions Index, Niger ranked 35/100 (0 = perceived by citizens to be highly corrupt, 100 = perceived to be very clean).

Nevertheless, opposition activists have openly questioned the 'independence and usefulness' of Nigerien institutions tasked with countering corruption (ICG, p.23). Moreover, opposition activists as well as more mainstream protesters have demonstrated in their tens of thousands to denounce corruption within the Nigerien government (2) which would indicate that there is a relatively widespread perception of corruption among Nigerien officials, and a feeling that current measures are insufficient.

COMMENTS -+

1. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?': http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

2. Afrqueinfos, 'Niger : Manifestation contre le président Issoufou qui sera candidat en 2016', 28 December 2013: http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2013/12/28/niger-manifestation-contre-president-issoufou-sera-candidat-2016-240756.asp

3. Afrombarometer, Niger 2013 results: http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-n-z/niger

4. TI CPI 2014, Niger: http://www.transparency.org/country#NER

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
1

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no evidence or indication that any assessment of corruption risks within the defence sector has been effectively carried out or is to be carried out in order to identify potential weaknesses in preventing corruption. The interviewee confirmed that there is no clearly stated strategy in place regarding anti-corruption in the defence and security (assessing or addressing it).

There is some awareness of some risk areas such as defence financing. In 2011 with the inauguration of a new government the State Inspectorate launched an investigation, 'Operation Clean Hands' in the management of military funds under the previous administration who was suspected of embezzling several billion francs (2). Several senior financial managers were dismissed as a result (2). The investigation fell short of a full audit because, according to ICG, 'President Issoufou has to tread carefully when managing the armed forces, which overthrew the preceding government and perhaps, as some would have it, even facilitated his election. He has at no point questioned the[ir] immunity and benefits' (pg 20). Moreover, 'The president has also granted benefits to military personnel in the form of increased bonuses and social housing' (ICG, p.21).

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 5, NGO personnel, Niamey, Niger, January 2015

2. Jeune Afrique, 'Niger: la junte militaire à l'heure des comptes', 2011: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2634p034-035.xml2/niger-corruption-mamadou-tandja-union-europeenneniger-la-junte-militaire-a-l-heure-des-comptes.html

3. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
1

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The government has a process for acquisition planning as a result of its broader military spending plans. In 2005, the government adopted a Multiyear Military Estimates Law which provided for 5-year plans concerning budgets and expenditure - which includes acquisitions/purchases (2). This law established a specific realistic framework broken down by segment of the armed forces, focusing on a strategic ambition (2). This does 'not include a detailed breakdown of spending that would have improved transparency and execution of appropriations' (1). It is not clear what the official oversight mechanisms were but it is likely that they, like all budget executions would be subject to legislative scrutiny and vote (4). However, according to a World Bank employee, budget executions have been disrupted by political and security crises affecting Niger since 2009, this law has therefore not been applied systematically in recent years.

Article 48 of the 2013 Code for Public Procurements specifically excludes the Defence and Interior Ministries and any other administrations directly involved in activities relating to national defence and security from the obligation to publish, disclose or make available to the public any information relating to procurement plans.

It is worth noting that all Niger's military drones, acquired since 2013, have been as a result of foreign military planning. In 2014, France announced that it would acquire around two dozen drones, at least two of these have subsequently be deployed to Niger (5, 6). Any scrutiny of their planning and purchasing will lie with French domestic law, not Niger's policy.

Response to Peer Reviewer: Niger's acquisition process is documented in the World Bank report which is publicly available. The 5 year plan can be considered as documentation of Niger's acquisition process even if it is not explicitly labelled as such.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

2. World Bank, 'Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review', 23 December 2013

3. Interview with interviewee 4, member of French military, Niger, January 2014

4. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

5. leblogfinance, 'Niger : après l’Africom US, la France déploie des drones pour lutter contre le terrorisme au Sahel', January 2014: http://www.leblogfinance.com/2014/01/niger-apres-lafricom-us-la-france-deploie-des-drones-pour-lutter-contre-le-terrorisme-au-sahel.html

6. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

7. Code of Public Procurement, 2013: http://www.marchespublics-uemoa.net/documents/3223121944fa999b2758b5.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Niger's acquisition process is not publicly available.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
1

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: An aggregate figure for Nigerien defence expenditure is published every year by the government (1994-2012) and available in international reports (SIPRI, World Bank). Approved figures for subsequent years have been published in the media (4, 5). Under the first Multiyear Military Report, 2007-2011 (3), 'defence, order and security' expenditures was broken down into:
- Salaries and wages (17.7%)
- Operations and maintenance (14.6%)
- Subsidies and transfers (0.3%)
- Investment (0.8%)
- Special accounts (78.1%)
According to the same report, this total expenditure in this period was all approved (3, p.38).
The assessor found no comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions or disposal of assets. The Open Budget Survey commented in 2012 that the government provides insufficient data to the public on budgetary activities (3, pg 2).

The NA is responsible for analysing the national budget and providing government oversight when it comes to drafting budgetary legislation (8) which is passed annually. The NA has a Security and Defence Committee (La Commission de la Défense et de la Sécurité) - a standing Committee that according to the National Assembly's Internal Rules (Art. 30), has to be set up at the beginning of each legislative cycle. Consulted on all legal provisions relating to security, the committee reports to the plenary session of the NA and acts as the contact point for the Ministry of defence and the Interior, for example, during the preparation phase of the annual budget process (6). The Committee has the authority to examine budgets and refer any budgetary matters to the Audit Office (6, 7). Given these provisions it is likely that Parliament has access to a detailed budget before it approves it.

COMMENTS -+

1. Open Budget Survey, Niger, 2012: http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-NigerCS-French.pdf

2. Tcherno, 'Le Niger: encore mauvais élève', 2013: http://www.alternativeniger.org/spip.php?article622

3. SIPRI Database, Niger: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

3. World Bank, 'Republic of Niger, 2012 Public Expenditure Review', 2013: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/23/000442464_20140123102404/Rendered/PDF/76851N0ESW0P120in0imagebank0already.pdf

4. Jeune Afrique, 'Les defis de la politique de defence du Niger', 2 February 2014: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140217110808/

5. Niamey.com, '25 Milliards de plus pour l’armée: l’effort de guerre se poursuit', 8 May 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/1294.html

6. Internal rules of the National Assembly, art.1 and Chapitre VIII : Les Commissions, art.30, April 2011 http://www.assemblee.ne/images/stories/2so2012/ojcal/rian_2012.pdf
de la politique de défense nationale, (2010): http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/CtrlParlementaire/Niger_F.htm

7. Interview with interviewee 3, government employee, Niger, January 2015

8. The National Democratic Institute, 'democratic institutions in Niger', 2011: https://www.ndi.org/niger

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Important to note here is that acquisitions are made public by the exporting nation rather than Niger itself. This is how SIPRI and other organisations are able to keep track of exports to the country.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
1

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The Nigerien National Assembly (NA) is constitutionally vested with formal rights to carry out oversight over all government actions; it can vote on all legislation including for example, defence budgets (article 114 of the Constitution). It also exercises a security budget approval function and a budget execution control function - however the executive is not bound by any suggestions or amendments made (1). There is evidence that the NA has been active in approving defence budgets in recent years (6) - however the assessor was not able to confirm the level of detail in the information that was provided on proposed defence expenditures to the legislature. There are no examples known to the assessor since 2010 (inauguration of a new Constitution) of an NA vote on defence budgets having been overruled.

According to the National Democratic Institute, 'members of the National Assembly still have limited experience in drafting laws and legislative amendments, analysing the national budget [by extension, the defence budget] and providing government oversight' limiting the effectiveness of the scrutiny. Moreover according to an ICG report, 'President Issoufou has to tread carefully when managing the armed forces' he has refrained from conducting 'a financial audit of the [military] transition as the opposition requested', has 'substantially increase[d] the defence budget' and has 'granted benefits to military personnel in the form of increased bonuses and social housing' (p.20-12).

COMMENTS -+

1. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

2. The National Democratic Institute, 'democratic institutions in Niger', 2011: https://www.ndi.org/niger

3. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel, 2013:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

4. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin, 'Gouvernance du secteur de la sécurité
en Afrique de l’Ouest', Chaoter 13: 'les défis à relevern Niger', 2011: http://www.dcaf.ch/Chapter-Section/Ch.8-Niger

5. Niger, National Assembly Budgetary Measures (undated): http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/CtrlParlementaire/Niger_F.htm#conbudgt

6. Niamey.com, '25 Milliards de plus pour l’armée: l’effort de guerre se poursuit', 8 May 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/1294.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no immediately-accessible institution or committee that can be sourced from an OSINT search. The scrutiny of defence budget and appropriation is likely conducted within the Nigerien military itself, given its dominance over the political sphere in the country.

The ability for Niger's military to experience significant budget increases year on year is an indication of its ability to influence decision making. That said, Niger's strategic challenges in the region do merit a significant budget for such security tasks, but whether this is subject to civilian or government oversight in any meaningful way is unlikely, and not publicly accessible (it appears).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
2

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: An aggregate figure for Nigerien defence expenditure is published every year (1994-2012) and available in international reports (SIPRI, World Bank). Approved figures for subsequent years have been published in the media (4, 5, 6). Under the first Multiyear Military Report, 2007-2011 (4), 'defence, order and security' expenditures was broken down into:
- Salaries and wages (17.7%)
- Operations and maintenance (14.6%)
- Subsidies and transfers (0.3%)
- Investment (0.8%)
- Special accounts (78.1%)
The Open Budget Survey commented in 2012 that the government provides insufficient data to the public on budgetary activities (pg 2).

According to the Constitution, 'all citizens have the right to information held by public services' (article 31). As noted by the US State Department 'Requesters can also obtain many documents from individual ministries and the National Archives.' (p.15) Administrative documents are separated into “communicable” and “non-communicable” (defined in the 2011 Ordonnance) documents which implies a level of state secrecy. Officials are required to provide the legal grounds for denial of a request which must be notified in writing; requesters are able to appeal' (8). There is no evidence to suggest that accessibility varies according to the identity of the individual or organisation requesting information.

COMMENTS -+

1. Open Budget Survey, Niger, 2012: http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-NigerCS-French.pdf

2. Tcherno, 'Le Niger: encore mauvais élève', 2013: http://www.alternativeniger.org/spip.php?article622

3. SIPRI Database, Niger: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

3. World Bank, 'Republic of Niger, 2012 Public Expenditure Review', 2013: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/23/000442464_20140123102404/Rendered/PDF/76851N0ESW0P120in0imagebank0already.pdf

4. Jeune Afrique, 'Les defis de la politique de defence du Niger', 2 February 2014: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140217110808/ (Includes Multiyear Military Report 2007 - 2011)

5. Niamey.com, '25 Milliards de plus pour l’armée: l’effort de guerre se poursuit', 8 May 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/1294.html

6. Afriqueinfo, 2012, Niger : Le budget en hausse de 139 milliards de franc CFA après deux modifications
http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2012/7/26/niger-budget-hausse-milliards-franc-apres-deux-modifications-207206.asp

7. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

8. US State Department, Niger 2013 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

9. Ordonnance N° 2011-22, February 2011: http://freedominfo.org/documents/niger2011march.doc

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Parliament recently (May 2015) voted to amend the country's budget to approve higher defence spending, allowing for 33 billion CFA towards security. This change was publicly available. (see http://news.yahoo.com/niger-revises-2015-budget-higher-defence-spending-064655101--business.html)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
0

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no publication of non-central government sources of funding, although one interviewee noted there is no defence industry in Niger and the military does not own any property managed by the defence that could provide it with additional income or revenue (3).

According to the Multiyear Military Report, 2007-2011, 'defence, order and security', all total expenditure was approved in this period (1, p.38) and 'around 90%' of it was sourced from the 'government's own resources' (1, p.40). The final 10% was not accounted for but it is likely to come from international military support such as that of long time ally, France (2). The next Multiyear Military Report is due 2017.

COMMENTS -+

1. World Bank, 'Republic of Niger, 2012 Public Expenditure Review', 2013: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/23/000442464_20140123102404/Rendered/PDF/76851N0ESW0P120in0imagebank0already.pdf

2. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

3. Interview with interviewee 3, government employee, Niger, January 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There will be other sources of income declared from external nations. This includes USA IMET funding, amongst other potential streams. They will not be accounted for in the budget given that the specific amounts are subject to the USA's budget cycle, not Niger's.

Moreover, there will always be a discretionary portion of a defence budget for ad hoc acquisitions for classified or secret units. This is particularly the case for intelligence and Special Forces units, who are generally not subjected to government audit. A president guard unit or other unorthodox military unit would also be included in this. Thus the portions unaccounted for could be a part of this. That said, the ability for states to funnel funding through these non-audited channels provides ample room for fraud and corruption.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
2

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The Defence Ministry's internal oversight body is called the the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA) (1). It is charged with ensuring that all relevant administrative, financial and budgetary rules and standards are applied and respected, and that public resources are managed in a transparent, efficient and cost-effective manner (1). Inspectors work under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence and are staffed from officers (1). Inspectors are also in charge of reviewing complaints made by soldiers (1).

Internal reviews are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The national assembly’s standing committee on defence and security may launch investigations and address written or oral questions to members of government, including the prime minister and/or the minister of defence, on general issues of defence and security policy, or on specific and targeted problems related to defence and security (4). According to the National Democratic Institute, (a non-profit organisation), 'members of the National Assembly still have limited experience in drafting laws and legislative amendments, analysing the national budget and providing government oversight' limiting the effectiveness of the scrutiny. This indicates that the legislature has a low level of influence over defence scrutiny.

The assessor found no evidence to suggest that internal reviews are published or that they are acted upon by the government.

COMMENTS -+

1. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, (DCAF), Report on Niger, 2010:
http://www.dcaf.ch/Chapter-Section/Ch.8-Niger

2. World Bank, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, 2013: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/23/000442464_20140123102404/Rendered/PDF/76851N0ESW0P120in0imagebank0already.pdf

3. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

4. Internal rules of the National Assembly, art.1 and Chapitre VIII : Les Commissions, art.30, April 2011 http://www.assemblee.ne/images/stories/2so2012/ojcal/rian_2012.pdf

5. The National Democratic Institute, 'democratic institutions in Niger', 2011: https://www.ndi.org/niger

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
1

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: External auditing falls to the national Audit Office whose mandate includes security spending reviews, particularly to verify respect of the accounting nomenclature and fiscal discipline (2). The Directorate General of Finance Inspection (DGIF) exists to manage the upstream control of nonwage expenditure (2). The DGIF reportedly is under-resourced and has been ineffective since 2013 (1). Owing to a lack of resources, the DGIF has not been able to conduct any spending audits of the Ministries of defence and Security (1). Before this, the interviewee noted, the coverage and quality of internal audits was limited'. (1).

Despite this there is evidence of one external audit into military finances having taken place. This was undertaken by the State Inspectorate in 2011 with the inauguration of a new government. Named, 'Operation Clean Hands' the review looked into the previous administration suspected of embezzling several billion francs (2). Its findings were not published in full but several stories were reported in the press and several senior financial managers were dismissed as a result (5). The investigation fell short of a full audit because, according to ICG, 'President Issoufou has to tread carefully when managing the armed forces, which overthrew the preceding government and perhaps, as some would have it, even facilitated his election. He has at no point questioned the[ir] immunity and benefits' (pg 20). Moreover, 'The president has also granted benefits to military personnel in the form of increased bonuses and social housing' (ICG, p.21).

Formally, following an audit report, the national assembly’s standing committee on defence and security can launch investigations and address written or oral questions to members of government, including the prime minister and/or the minister of defence, on general issues of defence and security policy, or on specific and targeted problems related to defence and security (3). According to the National Democratic Institute, (a non-profit organisation), 'members of the National Assembly still have limited experience in drafting laws and legislative amendments, analysing the national budget and providing government oversight' limiting the effectiveness of the scrutiny. This indicates that the legislature has a low level of influence over defence scrutiny.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

2. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, (DCAF), Report on Niger, 2010:
http://www.dcaf.ch/Chapter-Section/Ch.8-Niger

3. Internal rules of the National Assembly, art.1 and Chapitre VIII : Les Commissions, art.30, April 2011 http://www.assemblee.ne/images/stories/2so2012/ojcal/rian_2012.pdf

4. The National Democratic Institute, 'democratic institutions in Niger', 2011: https://www.ndi.org/niger

5. Jeune Afrique, 'Niger: la junte militaire à l'heure des comptes', 2011: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2634p034-035.xml2/niger-corruption-mamadou-tandja-union-europeenneniger-la-junte-militaire-a-l-heure-des-comptes.html

6. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The fact that the only audit came at the beginning of a new administration, to examine abuses of a past administration suggests a lack of consistency, independence and/or effectiveness.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Independence of these bodies are not truly challenged, due in part to the inexperience of Niger's policy makers as mentioned by the assessor. There would also likely be implicit pressure not to overtly scrutinise Nigerien military affairs at all, regardless of agency, which can lead to disincentives in making written or oral challenges in public.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
3

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There does not seem to be any instrument that directly prevents defence institutions from controlling interests in the country's natural resources, however the 2010 constitution provides for full transparency of contracts for the exploration and production of natural resources (article 150) in Niger. It also provides for the sharing of revenues from mineral resources between the central government and local authorities (article 152).

The mining industry in dominated by French firm Areva and the Chinese firm the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) - these operate through state owned firm Societé de Patrimoine des Mines du Niger (SOPAMIN). Stakeholders of each of the Niger's uranium sites are listed on the SOPAMIN's website, there is nothing in the list that indicates impropriety or military ownership.

COMMENTS -+

1. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

2. SOPAMIN website: http://www.sopamin-sa.com/?q=node/48

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
2

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to ICG, the extent of the penetration of organised crime into the Nigerien defence and security sector is difficult to determine, but given the scale of trafficking that occurs across the territory it is likely that some security officers are complicit (1).

The government is however cooperating with international organisation such as ECOWAS and EUCAP (mission civile de l’Union européenne au Niger) in order to fight organised crime across the Sahel region demonstrating that it has an awareness of the risks (2, 3). For example, the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa held a training workshop in Niamey in September 2014 to train Nigerian authorities in how to register and trace arms (5).

The assessor found no examples of defence personnel being prosecuted. A US State Department speaks generally to the lack of punitive measures taken against military personnel and their general impunity (p5.).


Response to Peer Reviewer: The reviewer's comments are interesting; however, there is no evidence that the incident in question was an example of 'organised crime' as opposed to corruption and opportunism among security force members. Because the evidence so far suggests that the Nigerien situation as the latter I think a score of 2 is most appropriate. The lack of prosecutions and government attempts to address organised crime in general support this score.

COMMENTS -+

1. ICG, Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

2. Agence de Press Senegalaise, 'Afrique-Securite-Commerce', 3 December 2014

3. Sudinfo, 'Un policier belge à la tête de la mission civile de l'UE au Niger', 6 May 2014: http://www.sudinfo.be/1000317/article/2014-05-06/un-policier-belge-a-la-tete-de-la-mission-civile-de-l-ue-au-niger

4. US State Department, Niger 2012 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

5. UNODC website, 'UNODC and its partners facilitate the process of marking and registration of small arms and light weapons in Niger', (undated posted after 2013): http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/marking-and-registration-of-small-arms-in-niger.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Suspicions of security links to organized crime was heightened in 2013 following a suspicious jail break of a prominent jihadist and smuggler (along with 21 others) in Niamey. See Africa Confidential 'Attack Dents Niger's Image', June 19, 2013.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
0

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 2003 Military Penal Code provides for a judiciary military police that report to Ministry of Defence (article 46). They are charged with finding and following up all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (article 48). The Code addresses corruption in article 228 which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. In practice, it is unclear if the Military Police have a strong enough mandate or the capacity to conduct investigations into corruption and organised crime however.

Broader institutions such as the National Financial Information Unit (CENTIF), the High Authority Against Corruption and Similar Crimes (HALCIA), and the Information and Complaints Office in the Fight Against Corruption and the Trafficking of Influence in the Judiciary (BIR/LCTI) have been tasked with countering corruption across government offices (1). According to an ICG report, 'these institutions still play an uncertain and contested role as safeguards for democracy and good governance' (p.23). For example, the CENTIF's activities depend on the statements of transfers made by banks (which are irregular) while it does not have the resources to monitor informal economic channels used by criminal financial networks. Furthermore, in 2013, the opposition questioned the 'independence and usefulness' of HALCIA (ICG, p.23).

In 2013, HALCIA investigated several corruption and fraud cases involving security forces, notably customs officers (2). The cases were referred the cases to state prosecutors although no sentences were handed out for corruption (2). HALCIA's mandate is not specific to serving as a policing function for the security forces however.

According to ICG, 'President Issoufou has to tread carefully when managing the armed forces, which overthrew the preceding government and perhaps, as some would have it, even facilitated his election. He has at no point questioned the[ir] immunity and benefits' (pg 20).

Score 0 is awarded on the basis that there is insufficient evidence that a policing function exists that can reasonably be expected to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services.

Response to Peer Reviewer: Because the arrests the reviewer mentioned where specific to the transition period (i.e. in 2011, so not within the last three years and specific to a particular political climate) they were not originally included in the answer. However, they could indeed be useful here to provide a wider historical context, noting that the investigations were carried out under the Inspector General.

COMMENTS -+

1. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

2. US State Department, Niger 2013 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

3. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There have been investigations and arrests of military personnel for corruption. However, these were specific to the transition period (see http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2634p034-035.xml2/niger-corruption-mamadou-tandja-union-europeenneniger-la-junte-militaire-a-l-heure-des-comptes.html).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
N/A

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Niger does not have a formalised intelligence service. Some security intelligence is provided under the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, headed by Hassoumi Massoudou (1) however there are no explicit details of this in the public domain. Most of the country's intelligence gathering is conducted by US and French officials, both countries have surveillance drones based in the country that are subject to their own domestic oversight measures and bilateral defence agreements (2, 3).

COMMENTS -+

1. Afriqueinfos, 'Sahel : ouverture à Niamey d'une réunion des chefs des services de renseignements et de sécurité de la région', 17 February 2014: http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2014/2/17/sahel-ouverture-niamey-dune-reunion-chefs-services-renseignements-securite-region-245316.asp

2. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

3. Niamey.com, 'Niamey confirme l’arrivée de drones américains sur son sol pour « sécuriser les frontières »', 27 February 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/346.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are intelligence professionals within the Nigerien military. Nigerien military intelligence has received training from AFRICOM through the MINOC (Military Intelligence Non-Commissioned Officers Course) programme. However oversight of these professionals is unclear.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I concur with the assessor. Intelligence services are generated almost exclusively by American and French counterparts. Any local intelligence is likely limited to that of basic tactical military intelligence capabilities, and thus subject to no particular scrutiny.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
N/A

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Niger does not have a formalised intelligence service. Some security intelligence is provided under the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, headed by Hassoumi Massoudou (1) however there are no explicit details of this in the public domain. Most of the country's intelligence gathering is conducted by US and French officials, both countries have surveillance drones based in the country that are subject to their own domestic oversight measures and bilateral defence agreements (2, 3).

Massoudou was appointed in 2013. As a founding member of the ruling PNDS party he can be considered a member of the 'old guard'. According to an ICG report, the Nigerien 'old guard' which includes several powerful ruling party members 'holds significant power in a country where appointments at every level of government are extremely politicised' (pg 18).

With a extensive career in politics and history of outspoken support for democracy (4) Massoudou can be considered qualified for his position. However, ministers are appointed by the President according to the constitution (5) and it is unclear if there is any external oversight of this.

COMMENTS -+

1. Afriqueinfos, 'Sahel : ouverture à Niamey d'une réunion des chefs des services de renseignements et de sécurité de la région', 17 February 2014: http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2014/2/17/sahel-ouverture-niamey-dune-reunion-chefs-services-renseignements-securite-region-245316.asp

2. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

3. Niamey.com, 'Niamey confirme l’arrivée de drones américains sur son sol pour « sécuriser les frontières »', 27 February 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/346.html

4. AFP, 'Niger president in 'dangerous' bid to keep power', June 2009: http://www.brusearch.com/news/43826

5. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pd

6. ICG, 'Sahel: another weak link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are intelligence professionals within the Nigerien military. Nigerien military intelligence has received training from AFRICOM through the MINOC (Military Intelligence Non-Commissioned Officers Course) programme. However oversight of these professionals is unclear, as are the criteria for appointment.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Recruitment information for senior intelligence posts cannot be sourced since, as the assessor noted, there is no formal state intelligence agency. The absence of such, let alone a direct government website portal for it, indicates that any potential intelligence role is not subject to a full suitability investigation and that the entire process, if a 'process' exists at all, is ad hoc and secretive.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
2

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Niger ratified the Arms Trade Treaty on 24 July 2015. Niger has no domestic arms manufacturers and SIPRI has no record of arms exports from Niger (1, 2) - it is the researcher's assessment that it is unlikely that they occur. Evidence indicates Niger faces practical challenges in tackling illicit arms transfers within the country and the associated corruption however: one key security challenge is the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) due to recent crises in Mali, Libya and Nigeria (3). Weapons enter the country through traffickers and illegal networks. Niger has taken some steps to address this. It has signed and ratified the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, Light Weapons, in 2006 (3). The Nigerien government has also been working with several regional and international partners in order to better control the movement of SALW (4, 5). For example, the government is working to mark small and light arms as an anti-circulation measure (5). The Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa also held a training workshop in Niamey in September 2014 to demonstrate to Nigerien authorities how to register and trace arms (5).

COMMENTS -+

1. ATT website, 'Tracking Universalisation of the ATT', 2014: http://armstreaty.org/issue/tracking-the-universalisation-of-the-att/

2. SIPRI website, Niger 2013 Arms Exports: http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers

3. ECOWAS website, SALW Convention: http://www.panapress.com/Entree-en-vigueur-de-la-Convention-de-la-CEDEAO-sur-les-armes-legeres--12-668270-99-lang4-index.html

4. European Union External Action, 'Common Security and Defence Policy: The EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission', September 2014: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf

5. UNODC website, 'UNODC and its partners facilitate the process of marking and registration of small arms and light weapons in Niger', (undated posted after 2013): http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/marking-and-registration-of-small-arms-in-niger.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Niger has not yet ratified the ATT.

Niger has signed the Seabed Arms Treaty and ratified.
Biological Weapons Convention
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Chemical Weapons Convention
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict

Arms exports are generally not debated, though a lack of precedent may be the cause of this, given Niger's lack of indigenous arms industry.

There appears little evidence indicating steps made since signing the ATT and implementing the above-mentioned steps.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
0

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to interviewee 2, the procedure for disposing weapons and vehicles is subject to controls including external ministry supervision. For example, the disposal and decommissioning of vehicles is controlled by the Ministry of Finance which organises public auctions from which revenues go to the Treasury (2). The interviewee also confirmed that decommissioning of weapons is often undertaken under the ECOWAS' Commission on Illegal arms which has the powers and capacity at the regional level to procure and dispose of such weapons (2, 4). UNODC training on sorting and tracing weapons supports this initiative (6). Some decommissioned arms can be used for training purposes and for military parades (2).

The assessor found no public evidence to suggest that Niger has a set policy for disposing of defence and security assets however (4). The 2007-2011 Multiyear military budget made several references to developing equipment stocks - a central priority given the low capacity of the Nigerien armed forces - including vehicle acquisition, the building of new air bases, and the procurement of aircraft (2, 3).

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with interviewee 4, member of French military, Niger, January 2014 - no quote used but consulted to confirm the content of the response below.

2. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

3. World Bank, 'Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review', 2013

4. Media / reports searched: Niamey.com, tamtaminfo, Jeune Afrique, Afriqueinfo, ICG, World Bank, US State Department

5. ECOWAS website, SALW Convention: http://www.panapress.com/Entree-en-vigueur-de-la-Convention-de-la-CEDEAO-sur-les-armes-legeres--12-668270-99-lang4-index.html

6. UNODC website, 'UNODC and its partners facilitate the process of marking and registration of small arms and light weapons in Niger', (undated posted after 2013): http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/marking-and-registration-of-small-arms-in-niger.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
0

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to interviewee 2, the procedure for disposing weapons and vehicles is subject to controls including external ministry supervision. For example, the disposal and decommissioning of vehicles is controlled by the Ministry of Finance which organises public auctions from which revenues go to the Treasury (2). The interviewee also confirmed that the decommissioning of weapons is often undertaken under the ECOWAS Commission on Illegal Arms which has the powers and capacity at the regional level to procure and dispose of such weapons (2, 4)*. UNODC training on sorting and tracing weapons supports this initiative (6). Some decommissioned arms can be used for training purposes and for military parades (2).

The assessor found no public evidence to suggest that Niger has a set policy for scrutinising the disposal of defence and security assets (4). The 2007-2011 Multiyear military budget made several references to developing equipment stocks - a central priority given the low capacity of the Nigerien armed forces - including vehicle acquisition, the building of new air bases, and the procurement of aircraft (2, 3).

* To my knowledge ECOWAS does not have powers to scrutinise national asset disposal, but it's trainers may well advise informally on this. Unfortunately, I was unable to confirm this with the interviewee.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with interviewee 4, member of French military, Niger, January 2014 - no quote used but consulted to confirm the content of the response below.

2. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

3. World Bank, 'Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review', 2013

4. Media / reports searched: Niamey.com, tamtaminfo, Jeune Afrique, Afriqueinfo, ICG, World Bank, US State Department

5. ECOWAS website, SALW Convention: http://www.panapress.com/Entree-en-vigueur-de-la-Convention-de-la-CEDEAO-sur-les-armes-legeres--12-668270-99-lang4-index.html

6. UNODC website, 'UNODC and its partners facilitate the process of marking and registration of small arms and light weapons in Niger', (undated posted after 2013): http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/marking-and-registration-of-small-arms-in-niger.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
0

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: An aggregate figure for Nigerien defence expenditure is published every year (1994-2012) and available in international reports (SIPRI, World Bank). Approved figures for subsequent years have been published in the media (4, 5). Under the first Multiyear Military Report, 2007-2011 (3), 'defence, order and security' expenditures was broken down into:
- Salaries and wages (17.7%)
- Operations and maintenance (14.6%)
- Subsidies and transfers (0.3%)
- Investment (0.8%)
- Special accounts (78.1%)

According to the same report, this total expenditure in this period was all approved (3, p.38). The report, defence expenditure platforms and local media make no reference to 'secret spending'. The assessor found no government announcements on such spending. Given the broad nature of the term 'Special accounts' it could be that 'secret spending', if it does exist, is accounted for under this rubric, however this could not be confirmed.

COMMENTS -+

1. Open Budget Survey, Niger, 2012: http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-NigerCS-French.pdf

2. Tcherno, 'Le Niger: encore mauvais élève', 2013: http://www.alternativeniger.org/spip.php?article622

3. SIPRI Database, Niger: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

3. World Bank, 'Republic of Niger, 2012 Public Expenditure Review', 2013: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/23/000442464_20140123102404/Rendered/PDF/76851N0ESW0P120in0imagebank0already.pdf

4. Jeune Afrique, 'Les defis de la politique de defence du Niger', 2 February 2014: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140217110808/

5. Niamey.com, '25 Milliards de plus pour l’armée: l’effort de guerre se poursuit', 8 May 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/1294.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
1

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Niger does not have a formalised intelligence service. Some security intelligence is provided under the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, headed by Hassoumi Massoudou (1) however there are no explicit details of this in the public domain. Most of the country's intelligence gathering is conducted by US and French officials, both countries have surveillance drones based in the country that are subject to their own domestic oversight measures and bilateral defence agreeements (2, 3).

The Nigerien National Assembly (NA) is constitutionally vested with formal rights to carry out oversight of defence budgets (article 114 of the Constitution). There is evidence that the NA has been active in approving defence budgets in recent years (6) - however the assessor was not able to confirm if this includes 'secret items' or the level of detail in the information that was provided on proposed defence expenditures to the legislature. However, there is nothing to suggest it is not comprehensive.

According to the National Democratic Institute, 'members of the National Assembly still have limited experience in ... analysing the national budget [by extension, the defence budget] and providing government oversight' limiting the effectiveness of the scrutiny. Moreover according to an ICG report, 'President Issoufou has to tread carefully when managing the armed forces' he has refrained from conducting 'a financial audit of the [military] transition as the opposition requested', has 'substantially increase[d] the defence budget' and has 'granted benefits to military personnel in the form of increased bonuses and social housing' (p.20-12).

There was no other information regarding whether there are any legal provisions for the legislative oversight of spending of secret items; the score of 1 is based on an informed judgement.

COMMENTS -+

1. Afriqueinfos, 'Sahel : ouverture à Niamey d'une réunion des chefs des services de renseignements et de sécurité de la région', 17 February 2014: http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2014/2/17/sahel-ouverture-niamey-dune-reunion-chefs-services-renseignements-securite-region-245316.asp

2. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

3. Niamey.com, 'Niamey confirme l’arrivée de drones américains sur son sol pour « sécuriser les frontières »', 27 February 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/346.html

4. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel, 2013:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

5. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf
See also: Niger, National Assembly Budgetary Measures (undated): http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/CtrlParlementaire/Niger_F.htm#conbudgt

6. Niamey.com, '25 Milliards de plus pour l’armée: l’effort de guerre se poursuit', 8 May 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/1294.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although the defence budget was recently (May 2015) approved by parliament, it is unclear what level of information was provided concerning secret items.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The level of detail requested is simply not available through OSINT means. Therefore, it is unlikely that any significant information provisions are given at all.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
1

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Several formal audit mechanisms for defence and security accounts exist in Niger including the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces and the Office of the Inspector General in the Ministry of defence (1). These bodies would be responsible for auditing military budgets. The assessor found no evidence that they publish audits (one interviewee confirmed that they do not, 2) and therefore if they review 'secret programmes'.

Niger does not have a formalised intelligence service that would be responsible for 'secret programmes'. Some security intelligence is provided under the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, headed by Hassoumi Massoudou (3) however there are no explicit details of this in the public domain. Most of the country's intelligence gathering and large scale projects are conducted by US and French forces illustrated by the surveillance drones that both countries have in Niger - these would be subject to their US and French domestic oversight measures and bilateral defence agreements (4, 5).

According to the National Democratic Institute, 'members of the National Assembly still have limited experience in ... analysing the national budget [by extension, the defence budget] and providing government oversight' limiting the effectiveness of the scrutiny. Moreover according to an ICG report, 'President Issoufou has to tread carefully when managing the armed forces' he has refrained from conducting 'a financial audit of the [military] transition as the opposition requested', has 'substantially increase[d] the defence budget' and has 'granted benefits to military personnel in the form of increased bonuses and social housing' (p.20-12).

Audits are assessed as likely to be available to parliament. It is therefore the assessor's judgement that there is enough evidence available to merit a score of 1 - otherwise differentiating between places that have no audit functions and those that do, a distinction worth making, would not be possible.

COMMENTS -+

1. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, (DCAF), Report on Niger, 2010:
http://www.dcaf.ch/Chapter-Section/Ch.8-Niger

2. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

3. Afriqueinfos, 'Sahel : ouverture à Niamey d'une réunion des chefs des services de renseignements et de sécurité de la région', 17 February 2014: http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2014/2/17/sahel-ouverture-niamey-dune-reunion-chefs-services-renseignements-securite-region-245316.asp

4. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

5. Niamey.com, 'Niamey confirme l’arrivée de drones américains sur son sol pour « sécuriser les frontières »', 27 February 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/346.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
4

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: All military expenditures are normally meant to be funded through the national budget, which has to be authorised by the National Assembly, after an extensive examination of its content, eventual amendments, debate, and finally the vote of a specific law (1, 2). Expenditures that do not meet these legal requirements and follow this process are generally not allowed by law (1, 2).

An aggregate figure for Nigerien defence expenditure is published every year (1994-2012) and available in international reports (SIPRI, World Bank). Approved figures for subsequent years have been published in the media (4, 5). Under the first Multiyear Military Report, 2007-2011 (4), 'defence, order and security' expenditures was broken down into:
- Salaries and wages (17.7%)
- Operations and maintenance (14.6%)
- Subsidies and transfers (0.3%)
- Investment (0.8%)
- Special accounts (78.1%)

According to the same report, this total expenditure in this period was all approved (4, p.38). This indicates that off-budget expenditures do not take place in Niger.

It is also worth noting that international military assistance, which predominantly provides training opportunities to Nigerien personnel rather than direct military funding, is not considered as national defence expenditure and is therefore not listed under in the area of the budget detailed above. International military funding to Niger can be found in reports by donor countries (e.g. US State Department and USAID official websites for example).

COMMENTS -+

1. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

2. Niger, National Assembly Budgetary Measures (undated): http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/CtrlParlementaire/Niger_F.htm#conbudgt

3. SIPRI Database, Niger: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

3. World Bank, 'Republic of Niger, 2012 Public Expenditure Review', 2013: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/23/000442464_20140123102404/Rendered/PDF/76851N0ESW0P120in0imagebank0already.pdf

4. Jeune Afrique, 'Les defis de la politique de defence du Niger', 2 February 2014: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140217110808/

5. Niamey.com, '25 Milliards de plus pour l’armée: l’effort de guerre se poursuit', 8 May 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/1294.html

6. US State Department, &quoute;Budget by Year - International Military Education and Training to FY2015&quoute;. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The assessor's references provide sufficient evidence to indicate that off-budget military expenditure is NOT permitted. Likewise, any amendments, be they additions or otherwise, to the budget cannot be allowed without substantial justification and a commensurate plan to offset the cost.

Special expenditure would accounted for in the special accounts section of the defence budget, as previously mentioned. That means any clandestine or ad hoc Special Forces-esque expenditure would fall within these constraints.

International military assistance in the form of IMET funding and others, however, would fall outside of this budget, but would be strictly controlled by the donor nation itself.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
4

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: All military expenditures are normally meant to be funded through the national budget, which has to be authorised by the National Assembly, after an extensive examination of its content, eventual amendments, debate, and finally the vote of a specific law (1, 2). Expenditures that do not meet these legal requirements and follow this process are generally not allowed by law (1, 2)

An aggregate figure for Nigerien defence expenditure is published every year (1994-2012) and available in international reports (SIPRI, World Bank). Approved figures for subsequent years have been published in the media (4, 5). Under the first Multiyear Military Report, 2007-2011 (4), 'defence, order and security' expenditures was broken down into:

- Salaries and wages (17.7%)
- Operations and maintenance (14.6%)
- Subsidies and transfers (0.3%)
- Investment (0.8%)
- Special accounts (78.1%)

According to the same report, this total expenditure in this period was all approved (4, p.38). This indicates that off-budget expenditures do not take place in Niger.

Response to Peer Reviewer: Disagree. There has been no evidence presented that explains how international military assistance leads to or even implies off-budget expenditure, noting that evidence indicates the majority of allocated funding has been provided through grants to access training. If further international assistance is provided after an annual budget has been passed it would be impossible for it to have been included in the initial budget - I don't think it is reasonable to lower a score on this basis particularly as, and the reviewer agrees, it does not point to corrupt or fraudulent activities. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

2. Niger, National Assembly Budgetary Measures (undated): http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/CtrlParlementaire/Niger_F.htm#conbudgt

3. SIPRI Database, Niger: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

3. World Bank, 'Republic of Niger, 2012 Public Expenditure Review', 2013: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/23/000442464_20140123102404/Rendered/PDF/76851N0ESW0P120in0imagebank0already.pdf

4. Jeune Afrique, 'Les defis de la politique de defence du Niger', 2 February 2014: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140217110808/

5. Niamey.com, '25 Milliards de plus pour l’armée: l’effort de guerre se poursuit', 8 May 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/1294.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Off-budget expenditure may be incurred in the case of international military funding. French and United States' IMET funding, for example, are regular contributors to African states' military budgets, generally for peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations. Niger in 2014 and 2015 was allocated $300 000 per year in USA IMET funding, for example.

It is important to note that these off-budget amounts do not necessarily point to corrupt or fraudulent activities.

Suggested score: 3

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
3

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Classification is regulated by the 2011 Ordannance on information and security, administrative documents are classified as 'communicable' and 'non-communicable'. The latter is defined as 'those documents that by their nature could compromise the proper functioning of the administration, could violate privacies including secret industrial and commercial matters' (5). Furthermore 'documents whose disclosure could harm:

- secrecy of decision making within government and the executive;
- secrecy of national defence;
- implementation of Nigerian foreign policy;
- state security and public and individuals safety
- public finances
- and court proceedings
cannot be disclosed without special authority (5). The law therefore justifies access to information on grounds of avoiding 'harm' to state functions.

According to the Constitution, 'all citizens have the right to information held by public services' (article 31). As noted by the US State Department 'Requesters can also obtain many documents from individual ministries and the National Archives.' (p.15). Oversight is provided in the same law as officials are required to provide the legal grounds for denial of a request which must be notified in writing; requesters are able to appeal' (2). The 2011 Ordannance also grants the government authorisation to imprison anyone who releases information considered damaging to the State under sanctions included in articles 67, 68, 69 of the Penal Code. The assessor found no reports of regulations being bypassed or of individuals or agencies influencing decisions.

The Centre for Law and Democracy rates Nigerien right to information at 74/150 and notes that the independent oversight body has partial power to review classified documents.

COMMENTS -+

1. Ordonnace N° 2011-22, February 2011: http://freedominfo.org/documents/niger2011march.doc

2. US State Department, Niger 2013 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

3. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

4. ICRC, Code Pénal du Niger: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/3e747f82e6028e32c1257084002f7245/$FILE/Niger%20-%20Criminal%20Code%202008%20fr.pdf, 2008

5. Issoufou Yahaya, 'Sécurité nationale et Droit à l’information: Enjeux et Contexte', April 2013: http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/pretoria-finalization-meeting-april-2013-documents/national-security-and-rti-au-niger

6. Global Right to Information Rating, Niger, http://www.rti-rating.org/view_country?country_name=Niger

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
4

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor did not find evidence of any military involvement in private enterprise, the interviewee agreed that this was unlikely.

With regard to the extractives industry, stakeholders of each of the Niger's uranium sites are listed on state-owned Societé de Patrimoine des Mines du Niger's (SOPAMIN) website, there is nothing in the list that indicates military ownership (1). Niger is also one of the worlds least developed countries which significantly limits the opportunities for business industry (6).

Neither the Constitution or the Military Penal Code remove defence institutions from beneficial ownership of commercial businesses. Section 6 of the Public Penal Code does provide strict regulations around which public officials can be involved in private business (p.27) it does not however outlaw it outright.

COMMENTS -+

1. SOPAMIN website: http://www.sopamin-sa.com/?q=node/48

2. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

3. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

4. Public Penal Code 2004/2011: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

5. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

6. World Vision, Niger country profile, 2012: http://www.worldvision.com.au/Libraries/3_1_2_Country_Profiles_-_Africa/Niger.sflb.ashx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no indication that defence institutions own commercial businesses.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no publicly available information that can be sourced. Any non-public domain information that I possess is not useful in this question (and sourcing such would be unethical as per the TI guidelines), and I would defer judgement to the assessor, who appears to have conducted primary research into this.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
N/A

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor did not find evidence of any military involvement in private enterprise, the interviewee agreed that this was unlikely.

Neither the Constitution or the Military Penal Code remove defence institutions from beneficial ownership of commercial businesses. Section 6 of the Public Penal Code does provide strict regulations around which public officials can be involved in private business (p.27) it does not however outlaw it outright.

With regard to the extractives industry, stakeholders of each of the Niger's uranium sites are listed on state-owned Societé de Patrimoine des Mines du Niger's (SOPAMIN) website, there is nothing in the list that indicates military ownership (1). Niger is also one of the worlds least developed countries which significantly limits the opportunities for business industry (6).

COMMENTS -+

1. SOPAMIN website: http://www.sopamin-sa.com/?q=node/48

2. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

3. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

4. Public Penal Code 2004/2011: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

5. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

6. World Vision, Niger country profile, 2012: http://www.worldvision.com.au/Libraries/3_1_2_Country_Profiles_-_Africa/Niger.sflb.ashx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
2

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor did not find evidence of any military involvement in private enterprise, the interviewee agreed that this was unlikely.

With regard to the extractives industry, stakeholders of each of the Niger's uranium sites are listed on state-owned Societé de Patrimoine des Mines du Niger's (SOPAMIN) website, there is nothing in the list that indicates military ownership (1). Niger is also one of the worlds least developed countries which significantly limits the opportunities for business industry (6).

Neither the Constitution or the Military Penal Code remove defence institutions from beneficial ownership of commercial businesses. Section 6 of the Public Penal Code does provide strict regulations around which public officials can be involved in private business (p.27) it does not however outlaw it outright.

COMMENTS -+

1. SOPAMIN website: http://www.sopamin-sa.com/?q=node/48

2. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

3. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

4. Public Penal Code 2004/2011: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

5. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

6. World Vision, Niger country profile, 2012: http://www.worldvision.com.au/Libraries/3_1_2_Country_Profiles_-_Africa/Niger.sflb.ashx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
0

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence of public commitment (through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates) to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry or representatives such as the Defence Minister, the Chief of Defence, Single Service Chiefs and senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers.

There have been some commitments expressed at the wider political level by individuals who also hold some influence over defence however. The President, who is also the Supreme Head of the Armed Forces, has voiced his commitment to countering corruption during attempts to reduce corruption in public institutions (1, 2). The Prime Minister, who is charged with aiding the implementation of the defence policy, has backed the creation of anti-corruption institutions (3). The head of the justice sector (which resides over military prosecutions) has also publicly denounced corruption (4).

COMMENTS -+

1. The New Age, 'Talks on improving Niger's 'corrupt' judiciary begin', 26 November 2012: http://www.thenewage.co.za/71693-1019-53-Talks_on_improving_Nigers_corrupt_judiciary_begin

2. Afrik.com, 'Niger : le président Issoufou réclame la levée de l’immunité des Députés soupçonnés de détournements', 20 December 2011: http://www.afrik.com/breve37614.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+afrikfr+%28Afrik+VF%29

3 .niamey.com, 'Interview de SEM. Brigi Rafini, Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement', 2013:
http://news.aniamey.com/h/851.html

4. niamey.com, 'Interview de M. Marou Amadou, ministre de la Justice, Garde des Sceaux, Porte-Parole du gouvernement', 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/865.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 2003 Military Penal Code addresses corruption in article 228 which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code provides for a judiciary military police that report to Ministry of Defence (article 46). They are charged with finding and following up all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (article 48).

Section 8 of the Public Penal Code (applicable to all civil servants) also states that:
Article 130: Corruption and Influence Peddling will be punished with imprisonment of two to ten years and a fine of Fr 50,000-1,000,000 francs. The law extends to persons soliciting or accepting offers, promises, gifts or presents including being invested of an elective office, an administrative, judicial, military public officials or agent or employee of the government public
Article 131: Any person who has requested or approved bids or promises, solicited or accepted gifts or presents, to obtain or attempt to to get decorations, medals, honors or awards, squares, functions
or jobs or favors granted by any public authority, markets, companies or other benefits arising from treaties with the public authority or, generally favorable decision of such authority or administration, and will and abused a real or supposed influence shall be punished with imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of 50000-1000000 francs.

There is public evidence that these measures have been enforced, such as in 2011 when the State Inspectorate launched 'Operation Clean Hands' to investigate corruption among senior military leaders of the previous administration (3). While several officials were dismissed, the investigation fell short of using all legal measures against officers because, according to ICG, 'President Issoufou has to tread carefully when managing the armed forces, which overthrew the preceding government and perhaps, as some would have it, even facilitated his election. He has at no point questioned the[ir] immunity and benefits' (pg 20). Moreover, 'The president has also granted benefits to military personnel in the form of increased bonuses and social housing' (ICG, p.21).

According to a 2013 US State Department Report, 'There were no reports of punitive measures taken against the suspected military personnel. Impunity for armed forces’ members was a problem during the year' (pg. 5). Adding that 'Although the law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity' (pg.13).

COMMENTS -+

1. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

2. Public Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

3. Jeune Afrique, 'Niger: la junte militaire à l'heure des comptes', 2011: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2634p034-035.xml2/niger-corruption-mamadou-tandja-union-europeenneniger-la-junte-militaire-a-l-heure-des-comptes.html

4. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

5. US State Department, Niger 2013 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
1

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 1992 law on illicit enrichment provide for the protection of witnesses, including whistle-blowers (6, 3) while the Defence Ministry's internal oversight body, the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA) is in charge of reviewing complaints made by soldiers (1). Soldiers can also complain to the judiciary military police who operate under the Ministry of Defence (article 46, 2). There is also (as of 2011) a national hotline on which citizens can file complaints and denounce acts of corruption which indicates that the government has encouraged and taken seriously the need to report corruption.

The assessor found no known cases of whistleblowing in defence and security institutions or the government more broadly. There is no evidence to suggest how much trust exists amongst officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.

COMMENTS -+

1. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, (DCAF), Report on Niger, 2010:
http://www.dcaf.ch/Chapter-Section/Ch.8-Niger

2. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

3. US State Department, Niger 2013 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

4. Borderless, 'Niger launches hotline to recieve corruption complaints', 18 August 2011: http://www.borderlesswa.com/news/niger-launches-hotline-receive-corruption-complaints

5. Ordonnance n° 92-024 du 18 juin 1992 portant répression de l'enrichissement illicite: http://www.justice.gouv.ne/sites/default/files/lois_reglements/Ordonnance-n-92-024.doc
http://www.justice.gouv.ne/?q=node/40

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Given the culture of disincentivising opposition politics, it follows that whistle-blowing is at least equally discouraged, however tacitly.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
1

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Within the Defence Ministry's internal oversight body, the Office of the Inspector General of the Armed Forces (IGA) inspectors are staffed from officers and work under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence (1). This demonstrates that a procedure is in place for those in sensitive budgeting positions even if one is not clearly defined in publicly available documents.

According to the Constitution there are two Defence Councils (the National Defence Council and the Superior National Defence Council) is vested with assisting the President who is also Supreme Head of the Armed Forces (article 63-64). The Superior Council advises on the nomination of high level military nominations and grade promotions of officers alongside 'all other questions within the military domain'. This indicates a level of oversight for those in sensitive positions which all high level military positions necessarily are.

On general personnel selection, according to a World Bank report, the security sector human resources management is characterised by clearly defined personnel regulation, competitive and transparent recruitment systems, merit-based promotion and a in house training. Processes include physical and written tests which are adapted to each level of recruitment, followed by an oral examination and a medical examination (1). Some roles require a leadership test that places them in an actual professional situation (1).

Despite this, according to an ICG report, the Nigerien 'old guard' which includes several powerful ruling party members 'holds significant power in a country where appointments at every level of government are extremely politicised' (pg 18). 'The military hierarchy allegedly prefers to recruit from the Djerma ethnic group' (pg 19) while 'more than anything, personal connections within the army strongly distort the procedure for promotion and provoke imbalances' (pg 20).

All positions within the military are subject to the Military Penal Code which provides for rules of conduct for all personnel.

COMMENTS -+

1. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, (DCAF), Report on Niger, 2010:
http://www.dcaf.ch/Chapter-Section/Ch.8-Niger

2. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

3. World Bank - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management – Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, December 23, 2013

4. ICG, 'Sahel: another weak link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

5. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no indication of special attention paid to personnel in sensitive positions.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
0

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Estimates of the Nigerien defence forces are only available in third party reports (Niger does not have an army or defence ministry website).

The main security forces are the Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN) and the National Gendarmerie under the Ministry of defence, and the National Guard. The FAN is made up of the Army and the Air Force, and has a strength of about 15,000. There is no evidence to suggest that these estimates are inaccurate. The Gendarmerie numbers about 5,675. The National Guard numbers 7,776.

The metrics for this question suggest that if these figures are not made available through official channels, a score of 0 must be awarded here. It should be noted that it is likely that the WB's figures are obtained from the MoD however, given the specificity of the numbers available in the context of the poor communication facilities available in the one of the poorest countries in the world.

COMMENTS -+

1. Perspective Monde, Niger 2014: http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays?langue=fr&codePays=NER&codeStat=MS.MIL.TOTL.P1&codeStat2=x

2. World Bank, 'Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review', December 2013: http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/projects/operational-documents?qterm=&lang_exact=English&teratopic_exact=Finance+and+Financial+Sector+Development&docty_exact=Public+Expenditure+Review

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Civil service (civilians) were estimated at 34,682 in 2009 (Sebastian Elischer, GIGA working paper 231, 2013)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: These ORBAT strength figures are rough estimates. Paid-for ORBATs will include similar but slightly different numbers. The numbers are suitable for the purposes of this study, however.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
3

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is an established a system for salaries and allowances for civil servants within the Nigerien administration. Salary rates and allowances are clearly determined (3, 5), either on the basis of the category to which the civil servant belongs or on that of his/her longevity in office (1, 2). Allowances are also well-defined and based on clearly stated realities (familial allowance, number of years in office, etc.) (1, 2). Salary increases since the army was reformed in 2011 have also been openly published (3, 4).

While these sources are a few years old, there was no more recent information available regarding this subject - the country is in a state of conflict (with one of the largest regions in a state of emergency), and the provision of administrative details such as this has not been prioritised.

COMMENTS -+

1. National statistics, 'Grille de salaire de la fonction publique', 2011: http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/Annuaires_Statistiques/Annuaire_ins_2011/salaire.pdf

2. National statistics, 'Ministère de la fonction Publique et du travail', (not dated):
http://seynimoussa.tripod.com/

3. Ouestaf.com, 'Communiqué du Conseil des Ministres' on the reformation of the army, 2011:
http://www.ouestaf.com/Conseil-des-ministres-du-Niger-du-jeudi-6-janvier-2011-Le-Communique_a3426.html

4. Panapress, 'Augmentation de 10 pour cent des salaires des agents de la Fonction publique du Niger', 2011: http://www.panapress.com/Augmentation-de-10-pour-cent-des-salaires-des-agents-de-la-Fonction-publique-du-Niger--15-751822-4-lang4-index.html

6. Panapress, ’La solde d'un soldat au Niger ne dépasse guère 24.000 FCFA', 2002: http://www.panapress.com/La-solde-d-un-soldat-au-Niger-ne-depasse-guere-24.000-FCFA--13-602109-17-lang4-index.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
4

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The Payroll Directorate of the Ministry of defence pays military wages. According to the interviewee, 'control of the payment procedure is minimal' and impeded by the fact that 'the file of the software that manages the payroll is not linked to the human resources file. All Gendarmerie personnel and officers in the armed forces are paid by bank transfer, while some non-commissioned members are paid in cash'.

The interviewee added that each month, a list of paid military personnel is prepared by payroll then checked by the audit/legal sub-directorate before being sent to the Treasury. This demonstrates that there is no direct link between the management of human resources and the actual payment of wages.

There is an established a system for salaries and allowances for civil servants within the Nigerien administration. Salary rates and allowances are clearly determined (3, 5), either on the basis of the category to which the civil servant belongs or on that of its/her longevity in office (1, 2). Allowances are also well-defined and based on clearly stated realities (familial, number of year in office, etc.) (1, 2). Salary increases since the army reformed in 2011 have also been openly published (3, 4).

The assessor found no examples of wages having been delayed, unpaid or subject to discretionary adjustments.

The interview's comments are multi-purpose: on the one hand it highlights that a relatively sophisticated system exists and that a transition to direct transfer payments has been completed which is very positive. However, like any large bureaucratic payment system there are of course discrepancies.

What seems to be most important here is that there is no evidence of discretionary payments and that personnel receive automatic (i.e. on time) payments. Thus a score of 4 is most accurate.

COMMENTS -+

1. National statistics, 'Grille de salaire de la fonction publique', 2011: http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/Annuaires_Statistiques/Annuaire_ins_2011/salaire.pdf

2. National statistics, 'Ministère de la fonction Publique et du travail', (not dated):
http://seynimoussa.tripod.com/

3. Ouestaf.com, 'Communiqué du Conseil des Ministres' on the reformation of the army, 2011:
http://www.ouestaf.com/Conseil-des-ministres-du-Niger-du-jeudi-6-janvier-2011-Le-Communique_a3426.html

4. Panapress, 'Augmentation de 10 pour cent des salaires des agents de la Fonction publique du Niger', 2011: http://www.panapress.com/Augmentation-de-10-pour-cent-des-salaires-des-agents-de-la-Fonction-publique-du-Niger--15-751822-4-lang4-index.html

6. Panapress, ’La solde d'un soldat au Niger ne dépasse guère 24.000 FCFA', 2002: http://www.panapress.com/La-solde-d-un-soldat-au-Niger-ne-depasse-guere-24.000-FCFA--13-602109-17-lang4-index.html

7. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: This is a vast improvement from previous years when military revolts over non-payment or delays in payment were regular.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
2

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: On general personnel selection, according to a World Bank report, the security sector human resources management is characterised by clearly defined personnel regulation, competitive and transparent recruitment systems, merit-based promotion and a in house training. Processes include physical and written tests which are adapted to each level of recruitment, followed by an oral examination and a medical examination (1). Some roles require a leadership test that places them in an actual professional situation (1).

According to the Constitution there are also two Defence Councils (the National Defence Council and the Superior National Defence Council) is vested with assisting the President who is also Supreme Head of the Armed Forces (article 63-64). The Superior Council advises on the nomination of high level military nominations and grade promotions of officers alongside 'all other questions within the military domain'.

Despite this, according to an ICG report, the Nigerien 'old guard' which includes several powerful ruling party members 'holds significant power in a country where appointments at every level of government are extremely politicised' (pg 18). 'The military hierarchy allegedly prefers to recruit from the Djerma ethnic group' (pg 19) while 'more than anything, personal connections within the army strongly distort the procedure for promotion and provoke imbalances' (pg 20).

COMMENTS -+

1. World Bank - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management – Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, December 23, 2013

2. Niger's Constitution:http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

3. ICG, 'Sahel: another weak link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I am unaware of any published military assessment system. In previous years senior military officials and select units were awarded with material benefits (villas, higher allowances, etc.). This was seen to create a divide in the military and was a contributing factor to the 2010 coup (see Baudais and Chauzal 'The 2010 Coup d'etat in Niger,' African Affairs, 2011). It is likely that much of these practices were reduced/eliminated under the current leadership.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
2

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to the interviewee, personnel regulations, career management, and training are governed by complete regulatory texts specific to each of the forces (these are not available on-line but may be accessed on request) (1). The legal instrument concerning the armed forces personnel regulations (including rules on merits and promotions) is clear and its scope is comprehensive (1).

Each of the national forces has a directorate responsible for human resources management, which also reports, within each supervisory ministry, to a central human resources directorate (1).

There are two methods of promotion: by level and by grade. Level promotion within the same grade is automatic and linked to the length of service within a level, the duration of which is usually two years. It entails a pay raise (1). Grade promotion is from one grade to another within a corps, subject to the specified distribution of personnel by corps and by grade. Grade promotion is conditional upon obtaining diplomas and accumulating a number of years of service (1). Within the officer corps, promotion requires studying at certain schools such as the Staff School (commander) or the War School (colonel) (3).

There is evidence of some oversight. According to the Constitution there are also two Defence Councils (the National Defence Council and the Superior National Defence Council) is vested with assisting the President who is also Supreme Head of the Armed Forces (article 63-64). The Superior Council advises on the nomination of high level military nominations and grade promotions of officers alongside 'all other questions within the military domain'.

Despite this, according to an ICG report, the Nigerien 'old guard' which includes several powerful ruling party members 'holds significant power in a country where appointments at every level of government are extremely politicised' (pg 18). 'The military hierarchy allegedly prefers to recruit from the Djerma ethnic group' (pg 19) while 'more than anything, personal connections within the army strongly distort the procedure for promotion and provoke imbalances' (pg 20). The report also asserted that 'when making promotions to the most senior ranks in the military in June 2011, President Issoufou visibly sought a compromise between his own preferences and the need to maintain good relations with former ... [junta]. In the following months, he sidelined senior officers by appointing them to embassy posts abroad.' (pg.21). This could not be verified by an independent source.

On balance therefore, there is indication of formal processes, boards and oversight of the promotions process. While the interviewee heard no first hand or indisputable examples of corruption or other inappropriate conduct in the promotions process, there may be some potential for it.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

2. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

3. ICG, 'Sahel: another weak link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
N/A

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to article 80 of the Constitution, military service is obligatory in Niger (2). All unmarried Nigeriens over 18 must serve for 2 years (1). Military service for women is not allowed but national service is mandatory for all young women who have completed university studies or professional training. Women may serve as teachers, health service workers, or technical specialists from between 18 months to two years. However, given the small size of the army (around 15,000), it is unlikely that this practice is enforced.

According to the World Bank, the recruitment procedures are organised and transparent. Generally, recruitment occurs once a year; openings are announced publicly on television or radio and notices are published in the Journal Officiel (7). This process concludes with the issuance of a decree announcing the results and the list of candidates selected (7).

According to an ICG report, 'The military hierarchy allegedly prefers to recruit from the Djerma ethnic group' (pg 19) however the assessor found no other source to support this. Nor was any evidence of bribery during recruitment found. However, a US State Department does note the lack of punitive measures taken against military personnel and their general impunity in Niger which would indicate the measures mentioned above may not be enforced (p5.).

There is no specific policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription but all there is a Military Penal Code which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned (article 228). Section 8 of the Public Penal Code (applicable to all civil servants) also states that:
Article 130: Corruption and Influence Peddling will be punished with imprisonment of two to ten years and a fine of Fr 50,000-1,000,000 francs. The law extends to persons soliciting or accepting offers, promises, gifts or presents including being invested of an elective office, an administrative, judicial, military public officials or agent or employee of the government public

Article 131: Any person who has requested or approved bids or promises, solicited or accepted gifts or presents, to obtain or attempt to to get decorations, medals, honors or awards, squares, functions
or jobs or favors granted by any public authority, markets, companies or other benefits arising from treaties with the public authority or, generally favorable decision of such authority or administration, and will and abused a real or supposed influence shall be punished with imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of 50000-1000000 francs.

Response to Peer Reviewer: I agree with the peer reviewer and have added a line in the first paragraph to that affect - i.e. it is unlikely that the practise occurs. However, as conscription is still protected in the Nigerien constitution, it must be noted this risk will exist if it is enforced in future. Score changed to N/A.

COMMENTS -+

1. The World fact Book, CIA , 2012, Niger,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html

2. Nigerien Constitution (VII République): http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

3. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

4. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

5. Public Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

6. World Bank - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management – Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, December 23, 2013

7. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

8. US State Department, Niger 2012 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although conscription may be in the constitution, I have never seen indication of this being acted upon. 2 years obligatory service is not enforced. This can be seen in the small size of the military compared to the eligible population. Recruitment into the armed forces is competitive. It is more likely that bribery would occur to get a position in the armed forces rather than to avoid it.

Suggested score: N/A

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
N/A

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to article 80 of the Constitution, military service is obligatory in Niger (2). All unmarried Nigeriens over 18 must serve for 2 years (1). Military service for women is not allowed but national service is mandatory for all young women who have completed university studies or professional training. Women may serve as teachers, health service workers, or technical specialists from between 18 months to two years.

Given the size of the military (about 15,000) it is unlikely that this occurs in practice. According to the World Bank, the recruitment procedures are organised and transparent. Generally, recruitment occurs once a year; openings are announced publicly on television or radio and notices are published in the Journal Officiel (7). This process concludes with the issuance of a decree announcing the results and the list of candidates selected (7).

There is no specific policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription but the Military Penal Code states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned (article 228). Section 8 of the Public Penal Code (applicable to all civil servants) also states that:

- Article 130: Corruption and Influence Peddling will be punished with imprisonment of two to ten years and a fine of Fr 50,000-1,000,000 francs. The law extends to persons soliciting or accepting offers, promises, gifts or presents including being invested of an elective office, an administrative, judicial, military public officials or agent or employee of the government public

- Article 131: Any person who has requested or approved bids or promises, solicited or accepted gifts or presents, to obtain or attempt to to get decorations, medals, honors or awards, squares, functions
or jobs or favors granted by any public authority, markets, companies or other benefits arising from treaties with the public authority or, generally favorable decision of such authority or administration, and will and abused a real or supposed influence shall be punished with imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of 50000-1000000 francs.

According to an ICG report, 'The military hierarchy allegedly prefers to recruit from the Djerma ethnic group' (pg 19) however the assessor found no other source to support this. Nor was any evidence of bribery during recruitment found. However, a US State Department does note the lack of punitive measures taken against military personnel and their general impunity in Niger which would indicate the measures mentioned above may not be enforced (p5.).

Response to Peer Reviewers: Comments accepted. Final score changed to N/A in line with previous question.

COMMENTS -+

1. The World fact Book, CIA , 2012, Niger,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html

2. Nigerien Constitution (VII République): http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

3. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

4. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

5. Public Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

6. World Bank - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management – Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, December 23, 2013

7. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

8. US State Department, Niger 2012 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The listed corruption code would apply to bribes for preferred postings. It is unlikely that it is strictly enforced.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I am unaware of policies of refusing bribes to gain postings.
Effective procedures would be the same as mentioned by the assessor.
Actions and punishments would be accessible only through access to physical archives in Niger itself, as far as I'm aware.
It is possible bribery may occur, as it is a common practice in the region. That said, the stringent penalties in law will discourage widespread practice.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
4

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence of ‘ghost soldiers’, or non-existent soldiers on the payroll. Niger generally has a strong and transparent payment system with some oversight (see below), it is therefore unlikely that this phenomenon occurs.

The Payroll Directorate of the Ministry of defence pays military wages. According to the interviewee there is a software system to manage payroll which is strong indicator of efficiency. The interviewee did however caution that control of the payment procedure was impeded by the fact that 'the file of the software that manages the payroll is not linked to the human resources file'.

All Gendarmerie personnel and officers in the armed forces are paid by bank transfer, while some non-commissioned members are paid in cash (interviewee). The interviewee added that each month, a list of paid military personnel is prepared by payroll then checked by the audit/legal sub-directorate before being sent to the Treasury. This demonstrates that there is no direct link between the management of human resources and the actual payment of wages.

There is an established a system for salaries and allowances for civil servants within the Nigerien administration. Salary rates and allowances are clearly determined (3, 5), either on the basis of the category to which the civil servant belongs or on that of its/her longevity in office (1, 2). Allowances are also well-defined and based on clearly stated realities (familial, number of year in office, etc.) (1, 2). Salary increases since the army reformed in 2011 have also been openly published (3, 4).

COMMENTS -+

1. National statistics, 'Grille de salaire de la fonction publique', 2011: http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/Annuaires_Statistiques/Annuaire_ins_2011/salaire.pdf

2. National statistics, 'Ministère de la fonction Publique et du travail', (not dated):
http://seynimoussa.tripod.com/

3. Ouestaf.com, 'Communiqué du Conseil des Ministres' on the reformation of the army, 2011:
http://www.ouestaf.com/Conseil-des-ministres-du-Niger-du-jeudi-6-janvier-2011-Le-Communique_a3426.html

4. Panapress, 'Augmentation de 10 pour cent des salaires des agents de la Fonction publique du Niger', 2011: http://www.panapress.com/Augmentation-de-10-pour-cent-des-salaires-des-agents-de-la-Fonction-publique-du-Niger--15-751822-4-lang4-index.html

6. Panapress, ’La solde d'un soldat au Niger ne dépasse guère 24.000 FCFA', 2002: http://www.panapress.com/La-solde-d-un-soldat-au-Niger-ne-depasse-guere-24.000-FCFA--13-602109-17-lang4-index.html

7. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
3

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Yes chains of command are separate from chains of payment. Payment of military wages is managed by the Payroll Directorate and then the Treasury - this is a published procedure (1).

According to an interviewee, 'all Gendarmerie personnel and officers in the armed forces are paid by bank transfer, while some non-commissioned members are paid in cash', the latter are the minority. The Ministry of defence does however provide oversight which indicates that chains are not entirely distinct (2).

COMMENTS -+

1. Government statistics, 'Salaires de la fonction publique', 2011:
http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/Annuaires_Statistiques/Annuaire_ins_2011/salaire.pdf

2. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
2

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The publicly available 2003 Military Penal Code provides for corruption in article 228 which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. It also provides for a judiciary military police that reports to the Ministry of Defence (article 46). They are charged with finding and following up all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (article 48). A military tribunal provides oversight to the code; it is subject to the Supreme Court and made up of civilian judges and military assessors and has relatively limited jurisdiction in peacetime (1).

More specific types of corruption are addressed in the Public Penal Code to which officers are also subject:
- Article 130: Corruption and Influence Peddling will be punished with imprisonment of two to ten years and a fine of Fr 50,000-1,000,000 francs. The law extends to persons soliciting or accepting offers, promises, gifts or presents including being invested of an elective office, an administrative, judicial, military public officials or agent or employee of the government public
- Article 131: Any person who has requested or approved bids or promises, solicited or accepted gifts or presents, to obtain or attempt to to get decorations, medals, honors or awards, squares, functions
or jobs or favors granted by any public authority, markets, companies or other benefits arising from treaties with the public authority or, generally favorable decision of such authority or administration, and will and abused a real or supposed influence shall be punished with imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of 50000-1000000 francs.

The assessor found no evidence of the Military Penal Code having been applied in the last few years. According to a 2013 US State Department Report, 'There were no reports of punitive measures taken against the suspected military personnel. Impunity for armed forces’ members was a problem during the year' (pg. 5). Adding that 'Although the law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity' (pg.13).

COMMENTS -+

1. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

2. US State Department, Niger 2013 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

3. Public Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
1

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to a 2013 US State Department Report, 'There were no reports of punitive measures taken against the suspected military personnel. Impunity for armed forces’ members was a problem during the year' (pg. 5). Adding that 'Although the law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity' (pg.13).

However, as an example of when measures have been taken, in 2011 the governments 'Operation Clean Hands' dismissed several officers accused of corrutpion (2). The investigation fell short of a full audit because, according to ICG, 'President Issoufou has to tread carefully when managing the armed forces, which overthrew the preceding government and perhaps, as some would have it, even facilitated his election. He has at no point questioned the[ir] immunity and benefits' (pg 20). Moreover, 'The president has also granted benefits to military personnel in the form of increased bonuses and social housing' (ICG, p.21).

COMMENTS -+

1. US State Department, Niger 2013 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

2. Jeune Afrique, 'Niger: la junte militaire à l'heure des comptes', 2011: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2634p034-035.xml2/niger-corruption-mamadou-tandja-union-europeenneniger-la-junte-militaire-a-l-heure-des-comptes.html

3. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
1

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: According to a World Bank report the security sector human resources management is characterised by, among other things clearly defined personnel regulation and in house training. While the report does not elaborate on this training one interview stated that officers are trained in general ethics. These are likely to be in line with the Military Penal Code which specifically addresses corruption (article 228).

The European Union is also involved with training Nigerien troops. Their Sahel mission launched in 2012, 'gives advice and training to support the Nigerien authorities' efforts to strengthen their security capabilities. More than 50 international experts, the majority of whom are from European security forces and justice departments, are permanently deployed in Niamey' (4). While their mandate does not address corruption specifically there are several references to fighting organised crime, and helping the Nigerien forces improve their own training facilities.

COMMENTS -+

1. World Bank - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management – Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, December 23, 2013

2. Interview with interviewee 3, government employee, Niger, January 2015

3. Public Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

4. European Union, 'Common Security and Defence Policy: The EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission', September 2014: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: HALCIA also conducts training with police (see http://www.halcia.ne/). Last iteration was May 2015. It is unclear how often this occurs or at what scale.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
1

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence of a formal policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities.

According to a 2013 US State Department Report, 'There were no reports of punitive measures taken against the suspected military personnel. Impunity for armed forces’ members was a problem during the year' (pg. 5). Adding that 'Although the law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity' (pg.13).

However, as an example of when measures have been taken, in 2011 the governments 'Operation Clean Hands' dismissed several officers accused of corrutpion (2). The investigation fell short of a full audit because, according to ICG, 'President Issoufou has to tread carefully when managing the armed forces, which overthrew the preceding government and perhaps, as some would have it, even facilitated his election. He has at no point questioned the[ir] immunity and benefits' (pg 20). Moreover, 'The president has also granted benefits to military personnel in the form of increased bonuses and social housing' (ICG, p.21). This suggest that attempted prosecutions have been suppressed or inappropriately sanctioned

COMMENTS -+

1. US State Department, Niger 2013 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

2. Jeune Afrique, 'Niger: la junte militaire à l'heure des comptes', 2011: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2634p034-035.xml2/niger-corruption-mamadou-tandja-union-europeenneniger-la-junte-militaire-a-l-heure-des-comptes.html

3. ICG, 'Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
1

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no examples of accusation of officers having paid facilitation fees however a US State Department report states that general corruption among officials is pervasive. Neither the Military Penal Code or the Public Penal Code mention facilitation fees explicitly but both include measures that would likely include these.

The 2003 Military Penal Code addresses corruption in article 228 which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code provides for a judiciary military police that report to Ministry of Defence (article 46). They are charged with finding and following up all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (article 48).

Section 8 of the Public Penal Code (applicable to all civil servants) also states that:
Article 130: Corruption and Influence Peddling will be punished with imprisonment of two to ten years and a fine of Fr 50,000-1,000,000 francs. The law extends to persons soliciting or accepting offers, promises, gifts or presents including being invested of an elective office, an administrative, judicial, military public officials or agent or employee of the government public
Article 131: Any person who has requested or approved bids or promises, solicited or accepted gifts or presents, to obtain or attempt to to get decorations, medals, honors or awards, squares, functions
or jobs or favors granted by any public authority, markets, companies or other benefits arising from treaties with the public authority or, generally favorable decision of such authority or administration, and will and abused a real or supposed influence shall be punished with imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of 50000-1000000 francs.

COMMENTS -+

1. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

2. Public Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

3. US State Department, Niger 2013 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
0

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no evidence that corruption is addressed as a strategic issue on operations.

Corruption in the defence sector it is not approached in a systematic or comprehensive way; rather some punctual or ad hoc measures are taken. For example, the 2003 Military Penal Code addresses corruption in article 228 which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code provides for a judiciary military police that report to Ministry of Defence (article 46). They are charged with finding and following up all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (article 48).

With regards to training, according to a World Bank report the security sector human resources management is characterised by, among other things clearly defined personnel regulation and in house training. While the report does not elaborate on this training one interview stated that officers are trained in general ethics. These are likely to be in line with the Military Penal Code which specifically addresses corruption (article 228).

The European Union is also involved with training Nigerien troops. Their Sahel mission launched in 2012, 'gives advice and training to support the Nigerien authorities' efforts to strengthen their security capabilities. More than 50 international experts, the majority of whom are from European security forces and justice departments, are permanently deployed in Niamey' (4). While their mandate does not address corruption specifically there are several references to fighting organised crime, and helping the Nigerien forces improve their own training facilities.

COMMENTS -+

1. World Bank - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management – Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, December 23, 2013

2. Interview with interviewee 3, government employee, Niger, January 2015

3. Public Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

4. European Union, 'Common Security and Defence Policy: The EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission', September 2014: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf

5. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Doctrine is only available in public in the form of the development security strategy paper, and not in a precise counter-corruption role.

If this exists, it would be in a military instructional role rather than up for public scrutiny.

The armed forces likely do not treat corruption as a major strategic issue, given the major threats that currently exist in the Sahel region (Boko Haram and Tuareg militants, for example.)

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
0

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no evidence that training on corruption issues is offered to commanders on the corruption issues they may face during deployment.

Corruption in the defence sector it is not approached in a systematic or comprehensive way; rather some punctual or ad hoc measures are taken. For example, the 2003 Military Penal Code addresses corruption in article 228 which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code provides for a judiciary military police that report to Ministry of Defence (article 46). They are charged with finding and following up all infractions of the law (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (article 48). While recruited personnel are examined in their physical ability, writing and arithmetic (World Bank report), there is no evidence that they are examined on their comprehension of the penal code.

With regards to training, according to a World Bank report the security sector human resources management is characterised by, among other things clearly defined personnel regulation and in house training. While the report does not elaborate on this training one interview stated that officers are trained in general ethics. These are likely to be in line with the Military Penal Code which specifically addresses corruption (article 228).

The European Union is also involved with training Nigerien troops. Their Sahel mission launched in 2012, 'gives advice and training to support the Nigerien authorities' efforts to strengthen their security capabilities. More than 50 international experts, the majority of whom are from European security forces and justice departments, are permanently deployed in Niamey' (4). While their mandate does not address corruption specifically there are several references to fighting organised crime, and helping the Nigerien forces improve their own training facilities.

According to a 2013 US State Department Report, 'There were no reports of punitive measures taken against the suspected military personnel. Impunity for armed forces’ members was a problem during the year' (pg. 5). Adding that 'Although the law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity' (pg.13). This indicates that corruption cases are mishandled and that a blind eye is turned to corrupt activities of military officers.

COMMENTS -+

1. World Bank - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management – Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, December 23, 2013

2. Interview with interviewee 3, government employee, Niger, January 2015

3. Public Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

4. European Union, 'Common Security and Defence Policy: The EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission', September 2014: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf

5. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

6. US State Department, Niger 2013 Human Rights Report: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220356.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
1

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 2003 Military Penal Code provides for a judiciary military police charged with finding and following up all infractions of the law including corruption, theft or general crime (article 47) at all levels of the armed forces (article 48). There is however no evidence to confirm whether or they are in practice deployed in the field, nor is there any evidence of them filing public reports on their general findings.

The European Union 'gives advice and training to support the Nigerien authorities' efforts to strengthen their security capabilities. More than 50 international experts, the majority of whom are from European security forces and justice departments, are permanently deployed in Niamey' (2). They make several references to fighting organised crime, and helping the Nigerien forces improve their own training facilities however their official mandate does not extend to deploying corruption monitors to the field (2).

COMMENTS -+

1. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

2. European Union, 'Common Security and Defence Policy: The EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission', September 2014: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
0

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no evidence that guidelines on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions exist in Niger. The assessor found no evidence of staff training on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.

Corruption in the defence sector it is not approached in a systematic or comprehensive way; rather some punctual or ad hoc measures are taken. For example, the 2003 Military Penal Code addresses corruption in article 228 which states that officers found guilty of corruption, theft or general crime can be dismissed, demoted or imprisoned. The Code does not provide for corruption risks in contracting or corruption risks while on deployment.

With regards to staff training, according to a World Bank report the security sector human resources management is characterised by, among other things clearly defined personnel regulation and in house training. While the report does not elaborate on this training one interview stated that officers are trained in general ethics. These are likely to be in line with the Military Penal Code's references to corruption (article 228).

The European Union is also involved with training Nigerien troops. Their Sahel mission launched in 2012, 'gives advice and training to support the Nigerien authorities' efforts to strengthen their security capabilities. More than 50 international experts, the majority of whom are from European security forces and justice departments, are permanently deployed in Niamey' (4). Their mandate does not however extend to training or drafting guidelines on corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.

COMMENTS -+

1. World Bank - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management – Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, December 23, 2013

2. Interview with interviewee 3, government employee, Niger, January 2015

3. Public Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

4. European Union, 'Common Security and Defence Policy: The EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission', September 2014: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
2

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no evidence of the defence sector hiring private security contractors however it is not outlawed in either the Constitution or the Military Penal Code. Niger ratified the African Convention on Mercenarism in 1988 which indicates a general non tolerance of illegal activities on the part of private security contractors. Beyond this, Niger has no specific legislation regulating private security firms, they are not banned.

Security at key mining sites is provided by both Nigerien forces and private companies (4). The latter often employ former French military personnel and former Tuareg rebels (4). According to another interviewee (5) Nigerien urban centres, particularly Niamey, have seen a rise in the number of private security firms. The security officers are responsible for protecting restaurants, businesses, hotels and other locations (5). A World Bank employee confirmed that there are more than 40 security firms in Niger.

COMMENTS -+

1. Military Penal Code, 2003: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2f73e4fff4abe110c1257084003385ba/$FILE/Code%20de%20Justice%20Militaire%202004.pdf

2. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

3. ICRC, 'OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa', (undated):
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/485?OpenDocument

4. Interview with interviewee 4, member of French military, Niger, January 2014

5. Interview with interviewee 3, government employee, Niger, January 2015

6. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
0

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is a general 2011 Code on Public Procurement providing guidelines on the tendering process, on procurement's execution, implementation, control, and regulation. Article 181 and 182 provides for corruption defined as 'the action of the one offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another person or entity'.

Defence procurement is specifically exempted however. Article 7 of the Code clearly stipulates that procurement, the provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence have needs requiring secrecy and that the protection of State essential interests is incompatible with publicity and is exempt. The Code does not make reference to any other legal framework organising defence and security procurements, indicating that the country does not have separate specific legislation or other sets of rules covering them.

COMMENTS -+

1. Code on Public Procurements, 2011: http://www.armp-niger.org/workspace/uploads/reglementation/decret-2013-569-du-20-decembre-2013_1.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
0

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 2011 Code on Public Procurement requires procurement cycles to be made available to the public. However Article 7 of the Code clearly stipulates that it does not apply to procurement, provision of equipment and services relating to national security or defence. Furthermore article 48 of the Code for Public Procurements specifically excludes the Defence and Interior Ministries and any other administrations directly involved in activities relating to national defence and security from the obligation to publish, disclose or make available to the public any information relating to procurement plans.

The fact that the Code does not make reference to any other legal framework organising defence and security procurements indicates that the country doesn't have a specific legislation or set of rules covering them.

In 2013 however, the Minister of Defence detailed armaments purchased by the army since 2011 in an interview published in Le Sahel (4).

Some procurement plans are made public through international media. For example, in 2014 Tangent published an article stating that Niger has ordered an ISR Cessna 208B Grand Caravan aircraft (2). Details of the expected purchase price and delivery dates were not disclosed.

Actual purchases have also been published in the media. French press reported that Niger purchased planes and military vehicles from Ukraine in 2013 (3).

Much of Niger's more sophisticated equipment has been acquired not as a result of procurements but from bilateral military agreements. In 2013, for example France donated three Gazelle helicopters to Niger (5). The same year the US donated two Cessna 208 transport aircraft to Niger (7).

COMMENTS -+

1. Code of Public Procurement, 2011: http://www.marchespublics-uemoa.net/documents/3223121944fa999b2758b5.pdf

2. Tangent , 'Kenya, Mauritania and Niger order ISR Cessna 208B Grand Caravans', September 2014: http://tangentlink.com/2014/09/23/kenya-mauritania-and-niger-order-isr-cessna-208b-grand-caravans/

3. Enderi, 'Des SU-25 pour le Niger', 2013: http://www.enderi.fr/Des-SU-25-pour-le-Niger_a103.html

4. Le Sahel, 'Bilan de deux ans à la tête du Ministère de la défense, entretien avec le ministre de la défense', 2013:
http://www.lesahel.org/index.php/le-niger-en-bref/item/2814-le-ministre-de-la-d%C3%A9fense-nationale-m-karidio-mahamadou-tire-le-bilan-des-deux-ans-dactions-de-son-d%C3%A9partement-minist%C3%A9riel--je-voudrais-rendre-hommage--au-pr%C3%A9sident-de-la-r%C3%A9publique-chef-supr%C3%AAme-des-arm%C3%A9es-qui-sest-personnellement-inves

5. leblogfinance, 'Niger : après l’Africom US, la France déploie des drones pour lutter contre le terrorisme au Sahel', January 2014: http://www.leblogfinance.com/2014/01/niger-apres-lafricom-us-la-france-deploie-des-drones-pour-lutter-contre-le-terrorisme-au-sahel.html

6. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

7. Niamey.com, 'Niamey confirme l’arrivée de drones américains sur son sol pour « sécuriser les frontières »', 27 February 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/346.html

8. Tekre.net, 'Niger: 44 milliards pour acheter des armes de guerre', 2012: http://www.tekre.net/spip.php?article250

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
2

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Since the inauguration of civilian rule in 2011 there have been formal mechanisms in place to oversee defence procurements, as for all public procurement. There is within the Defence Ministry an Inspectorate tasked with controlling the usage of public finds (1). Both the armed forces and the police have an inspectorate division, but the National Guard does not (1). The independent General Inspectorate of State then exercises oversight over all public and state entities (1). It was this body that undertook 'Operation Clean Hands' in 2011 which demonstrates that it has been active, the results of this operation were only part published in the media (4). The Court of Accounts can also investigate any irregularities in the reporting of the aforementioned bodies (2). Due to lack of funding and experience, one interviewee noted that they effectiveness of these bodies is limited (3).

COMMENTS -+

1. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, (DCAF), Report on Niger, 2010:
http://www.dcaf.ch/Chapter-Section/Ch.8-Niger

2. Cour des Comptes website: http://www.courdescomptes.ne/

3. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

4. Jeune Afrique, 'Niger: la junte militaire à l'heure des comptes', 2011: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2634p034-035.xml2/niger-corruption-mamadou-tandja-union-europeenneniger-la-junte-militaire-a-l-heure-des-comptes.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The processes are not independent and appear to be regulated within the military itself. In as much as the military can self-regulate itself, this means that the activities are neither transparent nor consistent. That said, the military appears to maintain cohesion through government transitions, which can broadly be inferred to affect this process as well.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
2

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Article 48 of the Code for Public Procurements specifically excludes the Defence and Interior Ministries and any other administrations directly involved in activities relating to national defence and security from the obligation to publish, disclose or make available to the public any information relating to procurement plans. The Code clearly stipulates that this is to allow for the protection of State's essential interests. Given that Niger is facing several terrorist threats (Boko Haram and the Movement for Jihad and Oneness in West Africa have attacked inside Niger several times 2014-2015) this can be deemed credible.

In 2013 however, the Minister of Defence detailed armaments purchased by the army since 2011 in an interview published in Le Sahel (4). However there was no breakdown in costs, timelines or contracts.

Some procurement plans are made public through international media. For example, in 2014 Tangent published an article stating that Niger has ordered an ISR Cessna 208B Grand Caravan aircraft (2). Details of the expected purchase price and delivery dates were not disclosed.

Actual purchases have also been published in the media. French press reported that Niger purchased planes and military vehicles from Ukraine in 2013 (3).

Much of Niger's more sophisticated equipment has been acquired not as a result of procurements but from bilateral military agreements. In 2013, for example France donated three Gazelle helicopters to Niger (5). The same year the US donated two Cessna 208 transport aircraft to Niger (7).

COMMENTS -+

1. Code of Public Procurement, 2011: http://www.marchespublics-uemoa.net/documents/3223121944fa999b2758b5.pdf

2. Tangent , 'Kenya, Mauritania and Niger order ISR Cessna 208B Grand Caravans', September 2014: http://tangentlink.com/2014/09/23/kenya-mauritania-and-niger-order-isr-cessna-208b-grand-caravans/

3. Enderi, 'Des SU-25 pour le Niger', 2013: http://www.enderi.fr/Des-SU-25-pour-le-Niger_a103.html

4. Le Sahel, 'Bilan de deux ans à la tête du Ministère de la défense, entretien avec le ministre de la défense', 2013:
http://www.lesahel.org/index.php/le-niger-en-bref/item/2814-le-ministre-de-la-d%C3%A9fense-nationale-m-karidio-mahamadou-tire-le-bilan-des-deux-ans-dactions-de-son-d%C3%A9partement-minist%C3%A9riel--je-voudrais-rendre-hommage--au-pr%C3%A9sident-de-la-r%C3%A9publique-chef-supr%C3%AAme-des-arm%C3%A9es-qui-sest-personnellement-inves

5. leblogfinance, 'Niger : après l’Africom US, la France déploie des drones pour lutter contre le terrorisme au Sahel', January 2014: http://www.leblogfinance.com/2014/01/niger-apres-lafricom-us-la-france-deploie-des-drones-pour-lutter-contre-le-terrorisme-au-sahel.html

6. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

7. Niamey.com, 'Niamey confirme l’arrivée de drones américains sur son sol pour « sécuriser les frontières »', 27 February 2013: http://news.aniamey.com/h/346.html

8. Tekre.net, 'Niger: 44 milliards pour acheter des armes de guerre', 2012: http://www.tekre.net/spip.php?article250

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Defence procurements, while not disclosed by Niger, will generally be disclosed by the other party. The longstanding defence procurement relationship held with France, for example, means that any French exports are subject to international and domestic (French) arms control legislation and scrutiny.

The exception to this may be in the case where cross-border arms smuggling takes place, such as from Libya into Niger following the collapse of the Ghaddafi regime. In this case arms entering Niger and the hands of the military are unlikely to be fully accounted for, but used nonetheless.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
0

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 2011 Code for Public Procurements obliges companies to meet comprehensive administrative, technical, and financial requirements to bid for contracts (article 79, 80) these include proving experience and expertise in tendering process (article 17). Section three of the code details with corruption stating under article 181 that 'any attempt to influence the evaluation of bids or awarding of contracts' will result in the 'the rejection of an offer' and the 'exclusion from future competition for a fixed period'. Article 182 states that 'any attempt to influence an official' is grounds for 'termination of contract and the cost of the owner', 'a fine to be enforced in compensation for the injury to the contracting authority', and 'exclusion from future competition for a fixed period as well as appropriate criminal sanctions'. However, defence and security sector contracts can be made exempt from the public procurement code.

Criminal sanctions are provided for in the Penal code: Article 130: Corruption and Influence Peddling will be punished with imprisonment of two to ten years and a fine of Fr 50,000-1,000,000 francs. The law extends to persons soliciting or accepting offers, promises, gifts or presents including being invested of an elective office, an administrative, judicial, military public officials or agent or employee of the government public
Article 131: Any person who has requested or approved bids or promises, solicited or accepted gifts or presents, to obtain or attempt to to get decorations, medals, honors or awards, squares, functions
or jobs or favors granted by any public authority, markets, companies or other benefits arising from treaties with the public authority or, generally favorable decision of such authority or administration, and will and abused a real or supposed influence shall be punished with imprisonment of one to five years and a fine of 50000-1000000 francs.

Neither code require companies to have a formal and publicly declared compliance programme, an evidenced ethical supply chain or a separately signed no-corruption clause. The assessor found no evidence of discrimination being made between companies on the grounds of integrity (beyond what is stated above).

COMMENTS -+

1. Code of Public Procurement, 2011: http://www.marchespublics-uemoa.net/documents/3223121944fa999b2758b5.pdf

2. Penal Code, 2004/2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fb8e642.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
2

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The assessor found no specific document outlining procurement requirements in line with security strategy referred to by third parties, in the media or on-line. However this does not indicate that one does not exist. It is not clear what the official auditing mechanisms exist but it is likely procurements, like all budget executions would be subject to legislative scrutiny and vote (1).

The overall defence objectives are stated in the Constitution which is publicly available (article 66, 7): the Nigerian Armed Forces assure the defence of the integrity of the national territory against all external aggressors, it is charged with maintaining peace and security and upholding all the laws of the country. More specific defence objectives are available in the public domain via media articles such as an extended interview with the defence minister Karidio Mahamadou which also shows how objectives are updated to meet evolving threats (2) and reporting on army offensives (3, 4). Third party analysis such as that by French think tank GRIP (5) or ICG (6) also provides analysis on the Nigerien security strategy. They comment for example that in 2012-13 Niger established three priorities to prevent spillover of conflicts in neighbouring Mali, Libya, Nigeria:

1) strengthening of the armed forces (including higher wages, better training via partners such as EUCAP, acquiring equipment for better intelligence, mobility and communication),
2) participation in the fight against the jihadists (such as in Mali),
3) and participation in diplomatic efforts to bring regional peace.

There is also evidence of logical flow down from strategy to individual procurements. For example, Niger also purchased equipment, such as surveillance craft and quick response vehicles that can be used in counter-terrorism campaigns against Malian, Nigerian and Libyan based armed groups that operate in Niger (7, 8). The assessor found no evidence of procurement likely to fall outside of the assessed national strategy.

Score 2 awarded on the strength of secondary evidence.

COMMENTS -+

1. Nigerien Constitution (VII République) 2010: http://cour-constitutionnelle-niger.org/documents/constitution_7eme_rep.pdf

2. Office National d'Edition et de Presse, 'Le ministre de la Défense Nationale, M. Karidio Mahamadou', (undated but post 2011): http://www.lesahel.org/index.php/le-niger-en-bref/item/2814-le-ministre-de-la-d%C3%A9fense-nationale-m-karidio-mahamadou-tire-le-bilan-des-deux-ans-dactions-de-son-d%C3%A9partement-minist%C3%A9riel--je-voudrais-rendre-hommage--au-pr%C3%A9sident-de-la-r%C3%A9publique-chef-supr%C3%AAme-des-arm%C3%A9es-qui-sest-personnellement-inves

3. ENCA, 'We killed 260 Boko Haram militants since last week: Niger forces', 12 February 2015: http://www.enca.com/africa/niger-forces-killed-260-boko-haram-militants-last-week

4. tamtaminfo, 'Niger: mesures de sécurité renforcées à Zinder contre Boko Haram', 12 February 2015: http://www.tamtaminfo.com/niger-mesures-de-securite-renforcees-a-zinder-contre-boko-haram/

5. GRIP, 'Niger: du coup d’État à l’engagement international', July 2013: http://www.grip.org/fr/node/937

6. ICG, Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

7. Tangent , 'Kenya, Mauritania and Niger order ISR Cessna 208B Grand Caravans', September 2014: http://tangentlink.com/2014/09/23/kenya-mauritania-and-niger-order-isr-cessna-208b-grand-caravans/

8. Enderi, 'Des SU-25 pour le Niger', 2013: http://www.enderi.fr/Des-SU-25-pour-le-Niger_a103.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It is important to bear in mind that Niger's defence budget for new equipment is somewhat limited. Combined with the light infantry posture of the military, this means that procurements are unlikely to include much room for sophisticated, classified systems. Small arms and general light infantry weapons and equipment such as assault rifles, technical trucks, anti-aircraft machine guns and the like are all commonly used and require almost no reason for fraudulently hiding their purchase.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
1

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no primary evidence of a formal procedure in place for defining purchase requirements. Secondary evidence suggests that there is likely to be some form of process followed that aligns with a national strategy.

In 2012-13 Niger established three priorities to prevent spillover of conflicts in neighbouring Mali, Libya, Nigeria (1, 2):
1) strengthening of the armed forces (including higher wages, better training via partners such as EUCAP, acquiring equipment for better intelligence, mobility and communication),
2) participation in the fight against the jihadists (such as in Mali),
3) and participation in diplomatic efforts to bring regional peace.

It is assessed likely that work was undertaken to define and quantify the need for all significant purchases as part of this but that this would not be made public under article 48 of the Public Procurement that also for secrecy in protection of the State.

There is evidence that the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces are likely to have based their purchases on these identified requirements. For example, Niger also purchased equipment, such as surveillance craft and quick response vehicles that can be used in counter-terrorism campaigns against Malian, Nigerian and Libyan based armed groups that operate in Niger (3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). Given the rapidly evolving nature of the conflicts in the region purchases may be relatively unplanned in order to best respond to threats. However there is no evidence of unapproved expenditures being made in the defence sector (5). The assessor found no evidence of procurement likely to fall outside of the assessed national strategy.

Score 1 awarded on the lack of evidence to confirm the extent to which any formal analysis of requirements occurs.

COMMENTS -+

1. GRIP, 'Niger: du coup d’État à l’engagement international', July 2013: http://www.grip.org/fr/node/937

2. ICG, Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

3. Tangent , 'Kenya, Mauritania and Niger order ISR Cessna 208B Grand Caravans', September 2014: http://tangentlink.com/2014/09/23/kenya-mauritania-and-niger-order-isr-cessna-208b-grand-caravans/

4. Enderi, 'Des SU-25 pour le Niger', 2013: http://www.enderi.fr/Des-SU-25-pour-le-Niger_a103.html

5. World Bank, 'Republic of Niger, 2012 Public Expenditure Review', 2013: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/23/000442464_20140123102404/Rendered/PDF/76851N0ESW0P120in0imagebank0already.pdf

6. Le Matin, 'La France arme le Niger pour lutter contre Aqmi': http://www.lematindz.net/news/6115-la-france-arme-le-niger-pour-lutter-contre-aqmi.html

7. NigerDiaspora, 'Réception de matériels à l’Intendance Militaire: 1,5 milliard de FCFA de matériels aux Forces de Défense et de Sécurité', 2011: http://nigerdiaspora.net/index.php/component/content/article/14-politique/politique/8707-reception-de-materiels-a-lintendance-militaire-15-milliard-de-fcfa-de-materiels-aux-forces-de-defence-et-de-securite-

8. Jeune Afrique, 'Le Niger déploie ses premiers avions à réaction,', 2013: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20130501130724/

9. RFI, 'Le Niger veut de l'aide face aux conséquences du conflit libyen', 2011 http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20110920-libye-dissemination-armes/

10. FrontierIndia, 'Niger buys DA42 MPP Surveillance Aircraft', 2008: http://frontierindia.net/niger-buys-da42-mpp-surveillance-aircraft

11. Code on Public Procurements, 2011: http://www.armp-niger.org/workspace/uploads/reglementation/decret-2013-569-du-20-decembre-2013_1.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Nigerien defence sector does not have a history of excessive spending nor is there evidence of large, unnecessary purchases.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Niger's procurements are not sophisticated, nor are they unusual for the technical requirements as laid out in their defence and security development strategy. Counter-terrorism, border patrol and the need for a light and mobile force means a priority is place on small arms, vehicles, infantry communications equipment, and general inventory items that relate to this manner of warfare.

There is generally no need to make these kinds of procurements further defined, but there is ample evidence that the equipment listed in virtually any ORBAT of the Nigerien Army matches the tactical and strategic requirements stated.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
1

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The Public Procurement Code provides for open competition and includes penalties against those attempting to undermine this. However procurement, provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence needs are exempt from the code.

According to the government procurement agency (1) there is a certain degree of openness and competition in defence procurements. However, no supporting information or explicit detail could be found to substantiate this most likely because under article 48 of the Public Procurement defence procurements are not obliged to be published. In the absence of information on such procurements, it is not possible to estimate the percentages of the entire defence procurements competitive bids represent.

There is evidence that France has secured several defence contracts from Niger (3, 4, 5), however these are are guided by security cooperation agreements which may not technically be considered single sourcing.

COMMENTS -+

1. Agence de Régulation des Marchés Publics, http://www.armp-niger.org/

2. Code on Public Procurements, 2011: http://www.armp-niger.org/workspace/uploads/reglementation/decret-2013-569-du-20-decembre-2013_1.pdf

3. Le Matin, 'La France arme le Niger pour lutter contre Aqmi': http://www.lematindz.net/news/6115-la-france-arme-le-niger-pour-lutter-contre-aqmi.html

4. Jeune Afrique, 'Armement quel est le meilleur client africain de la France', 2014: http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140911145220/

5. Egalite et Reconciliaiton, 'L’opération Serval, étendue à la bande sahélo-saharienne, va changer de nom', May 2014: http://www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/L-operation-Serval-etendue-a-la-bande-sahelo-saharienne-va-changer-de-nom-25175.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
0

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The Public Procurement Code provides for competitive tenders and includes penalties (akin to a code of conduct) against those attempting to undermine this. Audits on public procurements are conducted by the Regulatory Agency on Public Procurements (article 179), an independent public body tasked ensuring good governance principles are upheld. Procurement, the provision of equipment and services relating to national security and defence are exempt from the Public Procurement Code however.

According to the government procurement agency audit bodies are active however the assessor found no evidence testifying to their frequency or results.

COMMENTS -+

1. Code on Public Procurements, 2011: http://www.armp-niger.com/workspace/uploads/reglementation/decret-2013-569-du-20-decembre-2013_1.pdf

2. Agence de Régulation des Marchés Publics, http://www.armp-niger.org/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
1

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 2011 Code on Public procurements formally identifies and forbids collusion between bidders as a way of undermining open and free competition (art. 181); bidders found responsible for collusive practices are entitled to be excluded, either definitively or for a specific period, from tendering process (art. 182). Those found in contravention are also subject to anti-corruption sanctions in the Penal Code including imprisonment of two to ten years and a fine of Fr 50,000-1,000,000 francs (article 130-131).

As discussed in Q57 however, defence and security contracts can be exempted from the Code on grounds of secrecy. Further, neither legislation is specific to defence although the relevant articles in the Penal Code do identify military officials.

The assessor found no evidence of collusion having taken place in defence procurement or more broadly in public procurement in recent years.

COMMENTS -+

Code of Public Procurements, 2011, Niger,
http://www.marchespublics-uemoa.net/documents/3223121944fa999b2758b5.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
1

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The Regulatory Agency on Public Procurements has been specifically tasked with defining training strategies, and holding training sessions for actors involved in public procurement - which also indicates that they are organised into a professional staff department. A World Bank report also generally comments on the existence of appropriate training for civil servants (2).

While the Agency website demonstrates that training has taken place, the substance of the courses is not publicly available so it is not clear what their ability would be to hold defence contractors to account on their obligations on reporting and delivery, or whether they are trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations

The assessor found no evidence of staff shortages and staff rotations which could limit their ability to perform effective oversight of defence contractors, or of evidence of undue influence from higher grades within the organisation. However, one interviewee commented on limitations in other government institutions generally due to poor government financing (3) which is likely to extend to the procurement division. The politicised appointment of civil servants (as commented on by ICG - the Nigerien 'old guard' which includes several powerful ruling party members 'holds significant power in a country where appointments at every level of government are extremely politicised' p.18) is also an indicator that there is room for influence.

COMMENTS -+

1. Agence de Régulation des Marchés Publics webiste: http://www.armp-niger.org/

2. World Bank - Poverty Reduction and Economic Management – Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, December 23, 2013

3. Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

4. ICG, 'Sahel: another weak link in the Sahel?', 2013: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
2

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: The 2011 Code on Public Procurement provides bidders with non-jurisdictional and jurisdictional mechanisms for complaining about perceived malpractices or perceived infringement (arts 166, 167, 168, 170 and 171). They can complain before the authority that responsible for the contested decision. If the bidder is not satisfied with their ruling by, it can then submit the case to the Regulatory Agency on Public Procurements (Agence de Règlements des Marchés Publics - ARMP).

The Code makes no reference to additional protection mechanisms for complaining parties. Once these non-jurisdictional mechanisms have been used without any agreement, cases can be brought to a national court under regulations provided by the Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). The assessor found no evidence of these mechanisms having been used in the four years since their implementation. There is therefore no evidence of companies that have attempted to complain being unfairly disadvantaged or debarred from future procurements nor is there any evidence to suggest that they would be.

COMMENTS -+

1. Code on Public Procurements, 2011:
http://www.armp-niger.com/workspace/uploads/reglementation/decret-2013-569-du-20-decembre-2013_1.pdf

2. Agence de Règlements des Marchés Publics website:
http://www.armp-niger.com/statistiques/sanctions/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
2

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Articles 181,182, 183 and 184 of the 2011 Code on Public Procurement make provisions preventing corruption and provide sanctions for corruption. Bidders or suppliers who get involved in corruption behaviours are, reliable to a pecuniary, disciplinary or criminal sanction provided for by the law. Article 183 of the 2011 Code provides that any attempt by a bidder to influence the result of the evaluation of a tender and the decision attributing the bid, by proposing gifts or any advantage, leads to the cancellation of the bidding process and the confiscation of the financial guarantee any bidder are required to provide while submitting an offer.

Bidders responsible for corruption attempts may also be excluded, definitely or temporarily, from public procurements process; in that case, the procurement between a public entity and a supplier found responsible of corruption is simply cancelled. Despite the formal existence of this set of sanctions, no indication was found that cases of corruption have occurred, been effectively investigated or prosecuted and therefore no evidence that sanctions have been effectively enforced since their inauguration in 2011.

It is worth noting that although defence is an area that can be made exempt from the public procurement code, there was no evidence of examples of this flexibility being applied in practice. Therefore in theory, defence would be covered by these procurement codes, until a case is made that they should be exempted.

COMMENTS -+

1. Code of Public Procurements, 2011: http://www.armp-niger.com/workspace/uploads/reglementation/decret-2013-569-du-20-decembre-2013_1.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
0

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no indication that such contracts or arrangements of this nature were negotiated in the country. Most often procurements, including in the defence and security sector, consist of orders for delivering goods (vehicles, uniforms, arms, communication equipments, etc.- 3, 4), services (including technical assistance - 1) or conducting construction or rehabilitation works (2). The nature and dimension of these orders or procurements do not necessarily require offsets arrangements.

However, no existing legal framework or any provision evoking such type of arrangements was found in the existing Code for Public Procurement.

COMMENTS -+

1. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

2. Niamey.com. 'Niger : construction prochaine de la Route du Nord', 8 June 2014: http://news.aniamey.com/h/16914.html

3. Nigerdiasporam 'Niger : prêt chinois d'environ 50 milliards de FCFA pour le financement de la fibre optique', 5 October 2014: http://nigerdiaspora.net/les-infos-du-pays/economie/item/68258-niger-pret-chinois-d-environ-50-milliards-de-fcfa-pour-le-financement-de-la-fibre-optique

4. Niamey.com, 'Le Niger renforce les capacités d’intervention de la Garde nationale', 24 July 2014: http://news.aniamey.com/h/18945.html

5. Code on Public Procurements, 2011: http://www.armp-niger.org/workspace/uploads/reglementation/decret-2013-569-du-20-decembre-2013_1.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
0

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no indication that such contracts or arrangements of this nature were negotiated in the country. Most often procurements, including in the defence and security sector, consist of orders for delivering goods (vehicles, uniforms, arms, communication equipments, etc.- 3, 4), services (including technical assistance - 1) or conducting construction or rehabilitation works (2). The nature and dimension of these orders or procurements do not necessarily require offsets arrangements. However, no existing legal framework or any provision evoking such type of arrangements was found in the existing Code for Public Procurement.

COMMENTS -+

1. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

2. Niamey.com. 'Niger : construction prochaine de la Route du Nord', 8 June 2014: http://news.aniamey.com/h/16914.html

3. Nigerdiasporam 'Niger : prêt chinois d'environ 50 milliards de FCFA pour le financement de la fibre optique', 5 October 2014: http://nigerdiaspora.net/les-infos-du-pays/economie/item/68258-niger-pret-chinois-d-environ-50-milliards-de-fcfa-pour-le-financement-de-la-fibre-optique

4. Niamey.com, 'Le Niger renforce les capacités d’intervention de la Garde nationale', 24 July 2014: http://news.aniamey.com/h/18945.html

5. Code on Public Procurements, 2011: http://www.armp-niger.org/workspace/uploads/reglementation/decret-2013-569-du-20-decembre-2013_1.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
0

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no indication that such contracts or arrangements of this nature were negotiated in the country. Most often procurements, including in the defence and security sector, consist of orders for delivering goods (vehicles, uniforms, arms, communication equipments, etc.- 3, 4), services (including technical assistance - 1) or conducting construction or rehabilitation works (2). The nature and dimension of these orders or procurements do not necessarily require offsets arrangements. However, no existing legal framework or any provision evoking such type of arrangements was found in the existing Code for Public Procurement.

COMMENTS -+

1. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

2. Niamey.com. 'Niger : construction prochaine de la Route du Nord', 8 June 2014: http://news.aniamey.com/h/16914.html

3. Nigerdiasporam 'Niger : prêt chinois d'environ 50 milliards de FCFA pour le financement de la fibre optique', 5 October 2014: http://nigerdiaspora.net/les-infos-du-pays/economie/item/68258-niger-pret-chinois-d-environ-50-milliards-de-fcfa-pour-le-financement-de-la-fibre-optique

4. Niamey.com, 'Le Niger renforce les capacités d’intervention de la Garde nationale', 24 July 2014: http://news.aniamey.com/h/18945.html

5. Code on Public Procurements, 2011: http://www.armp-niger.org/workspace/uploads/reglementation/decret-2013-569-du-20-decembre-2013_1.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
0

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no indication that the government exerts any control over the use of agents or intermediaries. No relevant provision was found in the legislation covering public procurement.

COMMENTS -+

1. Code of Public Procurements, 2011, Niger,
http://www.armp-niger.com/workspace/uploads/reglementation/decret-2013-569-du-20-decembre-2013_1.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

74.
score
0

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: Article 48 of the Code for Public Procurements specifically excludes the Defence and Interior Ministries and any other administrations directly involved in activities relating to national defence and security from the obligation to publish, disclose or make available to the public any information relating to procurement plans. The Code clearly stipulates that this is to allow for the protection of State's essential interests. Given that Niger is facing several terrorist threats (Boko Haram and the Movement for Jihad and Oneness in West Africa have attacked inside Niger several times 2014-2015) this can be deemed credible.

In 2005, the government adopted a Multiyear Military Estimates Law (4) which provided for 5-year plans concerning budgets and expenditure - which includes acquisitions/purchases in the planning, i.e. pre signing stage. This law established a specific realistic framework broken down by segment of the armed forces, focusing on a strategic ambition (4). This does not 'not include a detailed breakdown of spending that would have improved transparency and execution of appropriations' (4).

In general, there is no evidence that the existence of a financing package and the identity of the provider are normally made public; however, some procurement plans are made public through international media after contracts have been signed. For example, in 2014 Tangent published an article stating that Niger has ordered an ISR Cessna 208B Grand Caravan aircraft (2). Details of the expected purchase price and delivery dates were not disclosed. French press reported that Niger purchased planes and military vehicles from Ukraine in 2013 (3).

COMMENTS -+

1. Code of Public Procurement, 2011: http://www.marchespublics-uemoa.net/documents/3223121944fa999b2758b5.pdf

2. Tangent , 'Kenya, Mauritania and Niger order ISR Cessna 208B Grand Caravans', September 2014: http://tangentlink.com/2014/09/23/kenya-mauritania-and-niger-order-isr-cessna-208b-grand-caravans/

3. Enderi, 'Des SU-25 pour le Niger', 2013: http://www.enderi.fr/Des-SU-25-pour-le-Niger_a103.html

4. World Bank, 'Niger, report No.: 83526 – NE, Niger Security Sector Public Expenditure Review', 23 December 2013 and Interview with interviewee 2, World Bank employee, Niger, January 2015

5. leblogfinance, 'Niger : après l’Africom US, la France déploie des drones pour lutter contre le terrorisme au Sahel', January 2014: http://www.leblogfinance.com/2014/01/niger-apres-lafricom-us-la-france-deploie-des-drones-pour-lutter-contre-le-terrorisme-au-sahel.html

6. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
0

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: There is no evidence that any specific requirement that the main contractor force sub-contractors to adopt anti-corruption programmes in the Public Procurement Code. Defence contracts can be made exempt from the code.

COMMENTS -+

1. Code on Public Procurement, 2011, Niger
http://www.marchespublics-uemoa.net/documents/3223121944fa999b2758b5.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
3

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4317: France has a military cooperation agreement with Niger that allows it to establish military installations in Niger and priority over the country's raw materials (2, 3). This has lead to several defence contracts in recent years (1, 2, 3) The French government and French mining company AREVA have also provided budget aid (USD64million in 2012 and USD34million respectively) (3). The US has also strengthened military cooperation in the Sahel through the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI - 6) and the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI - 7).

However in terms of defence acquisition France and the USA are more likely to donate materials to Niger rather than selling them. In 2013, for instance, France donated three Gazelle helicopters (8), the US donated two Cessna 208 transport aircraft (9).

Acquisitions can be justified by the military need to prevent spillover of conflicts in neighbouring Mali, Libya, Nigeria (1).

COMMENTS -+

1. International Crisis Group, 2013, Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/niger/208-niger-another-weak-link-in-the-sahel-english.pdf

2. Jeune Afrique, 2014, Armement quel est le meilleur client africain de la France, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140911145220/

3. Afriqueinfos, 'Niger : L'aide budgétaire de 17 milliards de FCFA d'Areva fait polémique', 4 December 2012: http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2012/12/4/niger-laide-budgetaire-milliards-fcfa-dareva-fait-polemique-214078.asp

4. leblogfinance, 'Niger : après l’Africom US, la France déploie des drones pour lutter contre le terrorisme au Sahel', January 2014: http://www.leblogfinance.com/2014/01/niger-apres-lafricom-us-la-france-deploie-des-drones-pour-lutter-contre-le-terrorisme-au-sahel.html

5. Niamey.com, 'Le drone, nouvelle arme fatale dans la lutte contre les jihadistes', 3 January 2015: http://news.aniamey.com/h/25340.html

6. Global Security, 'Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI)', (undated):http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pan-sahel.htm

7. The National Interest, 'Catch-22 in the Sahel', 3 April 2014: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/catch-22-the-sahel-10176

(8) Africa Intelligence, 'French helicopters grounded', 3 December 2014: http://www.africaintelligence.com/LCE/court-circular/2014/12/03/french-helicopters-grounded,108050896-BRE?CXT=CANP&country=NIGER

(9) US African Command, 'Niger Gets New Planes and Trucks Through U.S. Security Cooperation Programs', 16 July 2013: http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/11021/niger-gets-new-planes-and-trucks-through-us-security-cooperation-programs

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+