Iran, Islamic Rep.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Chapter VII of the Armed Forces Penal Code covers the illegal sale and transfer of military objects and property of the armed forces (articles 81-7). The legislation provides for punishment; however there is no evidence to suggest that the legislation is enforced. There is speculation in the media about alterations at Iran's Parchin military complex, for instance.

Some tenders and asset disposals are carried out publicly (advertised in newspapers and internet portals). However, there are no mechanisms for the public to ascertain that related procedures are taken in all instances and in accordance with the law.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The Armed Forces Penal Code does not provide for any specific organ to scrutinize asset disposals despite having sanctions in place for fraud and embezzlement in tenders and asset disposal sales. There is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinized.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The source provided by the Peer Review includes details of the military budget released by Tasnim News Agency which shows the budget break down between: 1) the defence ministry 2) Army Forces 3) IRGC 4) Basij Resistance Force and 5) Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, apart from a total aggregate figure for each, no further breakdown is available. The percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year that is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services is not available.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: According to an interviewee, the Iranian Majles' National Security and Foreign Policy Committee can look at classified information and try to influence policy. No further information on their activities is available from media reports.

According to a Pentagon report, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security is not required to submit its budget to Parliament for approval, which corresponds to the logic that organisations under the Supreme Leader are not answerable to Parliament.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The Supreme Audit Court must submit an annual report to the Parliament, but there is no specific evidence pointing to auditing of the security sector nor secret programs, even if it has the authority to detail how all government bodies spend their budget. As indicated under Q.25, the intelligence budget is not overseen by the Parliament.

The Supreme Audit Court is itself linked to the Parliament, with a member required to be present during the deliberations over the annual national budget. And, according to the Supreme Audit Court, the previous year's Supreme Audit Court report plays a role in ratifying the next year's national budget.

There is no evidence to indicate a change from the last GI assessment: &quoute;Iran's armed forces are under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader. According to the By-Law of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) which regulates its activities, the parliament does not have the right or authority to scrutinise any of the state bodies and organisations that are under Supreme Leader's supervision without his consent and permission. There is no evidence that any such permission has ever been granted to the parliament.

Although the parliament doesn't have such rights, the Assembly of Experts has formal rights to scrutinise bodies under Supreme Leader's supervision. This body, however, has never published any reports related to defence policy, armed forces or any other organisations overseen by the Supreme Leader.&quoute;

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: No sources reporting on whether off-budget military expenditures exist in law or practice were found. Article 52 of the constitution maintains: &quoute;The annual budget of the country will be drawn up by the government, in the manner specified by law, and submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for discussion and approval. Any change in the figures contained in the budget will be in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law.&quoute;

Majles members have complained that Iran’s nuclear facilities have been funded outside the normal budgetary process. Indicating that they may or may not be permitted by law but are not reported on.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: There is not enough publicly available information to state with certainty. Media reports include allegations that a significant amount of Iran's military expenditure occurs off-budget including spending on the defence industry, missile programs, support of foreign non-state actors, nuclear capability and intelligence activity.

Support for Hezbollah, the Shi’ite Lebanese group, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization for example is reported to come mainly from private religious foundations in Iran. In a 2010 report to Congress on Iran’s military power, the Department of defence said that Iran “provides roughly $100-$200 million per year in funding to support Hezbollah.” The State Department’s most recent terrorism report calls Hezbollah Iran’s “primary beneficiary, and says Tehran in 2014 continued to provide the group “with training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid.” “Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Lebanese Hezbollah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran,” it states. Previous State Department terrorism reports have noted that, until the al-Qaeda attacks on 9/11, Hezbollah was “responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist group.” The exact sources of funding in Iran are not clear from publicly available information.

As noted previously, Majles members have complained that Iran’s nuclear facilities have been funded outside normal budgetary channels. The US Treasury maintains that Iran's off-budget military expenditures involves illicit economic activity. In view of the IRGC's widespread and opaque economic and military activities, such conclusions seem valid.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Article 13 of the Penal Code of the Armed Forces provides for the classification of documents and the protection of classified documents. Punishment depends on the length of the document and whether it is marked as confidential or private.

&quoute;According to Note 4 of Article 13 of the Armed Forces Penal Code, defence- related information classification has to be done according to the by-laws of separate defence bodies. These by-laws are not publicly available.

Article 505 of the Penal Code makes it illegal &quoute;to disrupt national security, gathers information through any means under the cover of State authorities or government officials&quoute; with the intention of providing the information to others. Article 506 of the Penal Code provides &quoute;If, due to their negligence and disregarding security protocols, government officials who are responsible for classified security and intelligence affairs and have received the required training reveal information to enemies, they shall be sentenced to one to six months’ imprisonment.&quoute; Article 648 also provides for punishment for revealing professional secrets. There is no indication that such provisions are subject to scrutiny.

Information on defence matters is only ever announced to very senior military and political personnel. Individual agencies are often accused at least of having undue influence over decisions, which can be determined from numerous instances including decision making on the nuclear program and the controversy surrounding the ongoing detention of an American journalist by the Iranian judiciary.

A bill for &quoute;Free Publication and Access to information&quoute; seems to have been granted some attention under Rouhani, but it does not seem to have been adopted by the Parliament. Rouhani has maintained the bill would cover all organisations running on the state budget.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The IRGC has ownership of huge numbers of companies either directly or indirectly. Its business network goes beyond the military organisation to include foundations, cooperatives and entities owned by former IRGC commanders. Brigadier General Sayyed Mohammad Hejazi, deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, maintained in December 2010 that IRGC payments to and receipts from the Treasury are &quoute;not classified information; anyone can study it.”

Khatam al-Anbia (a construction headquarters established by the IRGC in 1990) and its subsidiary firms span the fields of agriculture, industry, mining, transportation, oil and gas, road construction, and import and export sectors. The former Deputy Director, Abdolreza Abedzade, has maintained that &quoute;Our difference with private companies is that we do not get to spend our profits&quoute;. Khatam al-Albia is viewed as the IRGC's engineering arm, and is one of Iran's largest contracting companies. In the natural resource sector, the company has been awarded contracts related to dams, water diversion systems, water supply systems, and gas and oil pipelines. Some examples of works being performed by Khatam al-Anbia and its affiliated companies include the Karkheh dam, a $2.5 billion no-bid contract to complete phases 15 and 16 of the South Pars gas field, a $1 billion a no-bid contract to develop the Halegan and Sefid Baghoun gas fields, and a 900-km gas pipeline from Asaluye to Iranshahr.

Interests are publicly stated and subject to some scrutiny by the Iranian press, but not subject to public audit. Upon questioning, Khatam al-Anbia's former Deputy Director Abdolreza Abedzadeh has previously maintained that the IRGC's military activities and Khatam's construction activities are kept &quoute;completely separate&quoute;, but he has admitted that profits from Khatam's construction projects are used to fund defence initiatives.

The IRGC has also benefited from the country's privatisation process, which the Supreme Leader sought to speed up by issuing an executive order in 2006. One aspect of the privatisation process saw state-owned enterprises transferred to semi-governmental institutions such as foundations over which the IRGC either controls or has indirect influence. Foundations (bonyads) are classified as non-governmental organisations, and according to Article 44 of the Constitution do not fall under the national budget. As pointed out by one academic, &quoute;The privatization process of article 44 was audited/scrutinized by the majles, but much of that information was not made public at the firm level, just at the macro-data level.&quoute; The IRGC Foundation bought 51% of the shares in Iran's telecommunication's company, the biggest deal to date on the Tehran Stock Exchange, which has been described as 'opaque', and reported as 'illegal' by Iran's Majles.

All IRGC businesses would not be publicly declared however, it is likely that a number are shell companies.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Iran has a Supreme Audit Court whose remit is to examine or audit the revenue and expenditure of the Ministries, organisations, institutions, government companies, and other organizations that benefit from the state budget and in general any executive organisation which according to articles 44 and 45 of the Constitution public ownership is applied to. Most of the IRGC's businesses fall outside this ambit because they are considered as private or non-government public sector. Anything owned by the military is currently not subject to annual public audit. According to one academic, &quoute;The privatization process of article 44 itself was audited/scrutinized by the Majles, but much of that information was not made public at the firm level, just at the macro-data level.&quoute;

Currently, there is no explicit evidence of scrutiny or auditing of military owned businesses. However, in December 2014, the Majles passed a resolution to tax organisations overseen by the Supreme leader, which would include the SETAD, foundations, and potentially IRGC companies - but this has yet to become law and is currently under review by the Guardian Council, a body that reviews all bills passed by the Parliament and that has veto power. The move by the Parliament is indicative of some level of scrutiny/criticism, however it is viewed by Iran analysts as a result of dwindling budget revenues in the face of lower oil prices and continued sanctions, rather than out of concern for corruption risk.

There is no evidence that military-owned businesses are subject to any scrutiny or auditing processes. While some public officials are beginning to publicly admit that the system is plagued by massive corruption, others are reluctant to publicly reveal the full extent. Gholamali Jafarzadeh, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s special investigate committee warned against public disclosure of the ongoing investigation into corruption saying that &quoute;making the details of the violations public could harm the country and public trust.” Jafarzadeh said the “corruption is so big that we are scared it could cause social shock”.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Chapter 10, notably Article 109, of the Penal Code of the Armed Forces prohibits armed forces personnel from accepting gifts, grants, property, payment, or financial documents under any title directly or indirectly and including internal and external transactions. The same article provides for sanctions. Chapter 11 of the Penal Code of the Armed Forces outlaws bribery, embezzlement and extortion and provides for sanctions. Security and defence personnel are not known to be explicitly prohibited from owning businesses. Apart from privately-owned businesses, there are many semi-state entities. The private sector has been severely impacted by sanctions leading to subsequent state capture by IRGC linked companies.

There is evidence of unauthorised private enterprise. There are reports of IRGC employees suspected of smuggling alcohol, cigarettes, oil, and other contraband goods into and out of the country via hidden jetties, ports, airports, and land borders, in order to bypass customs control. Although the latter is a widespread allegation, the best source for this is Former President Ahmadinejad, a former Basij member, who had granted a number of ministerial portfolios to IRGC officers and subsequently went on to refer to them in a conference speech about ways to prevent and tackle the smuggling of goods and currencies, as &quoute;our smuggling brothers&quoute;. Ahmadinejad sought to close illegal border checkpoints.

The Iranian Guards Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari has denied that smuggling occurs through IRGC piers. However, an economics professor at Widener University has maintained that Iran's border police have played a role in the increase of smuggling, a reported fivefold increase between 2007 and 2013. With the exception of the 1,500 police sacked in 2010, more recent cases are unknown.

The Reuters Investigates article listed in the sources maintains that an organisation called SETAD, reportedly one of the most powerful organisations in Iran which is under the control of the Supreme Leader - who is also the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces - has a giant portfolio spanning property, corporate investments, and charitable foundations. The Reuters report calls it &quoute;a business juggernaut worth tens of billions of dollars&quoute;. Reuters' $95 billion &quoute;estimate is based on an analysis of statements by Setad officials, data from the Tehran Stock Exchange and company websites, and information from the U.S. Treasury Department.&quoute; SETAD is also reported as seizing properties belonging to Iranian citizens.

The charitable foundations (Bonyads) under the government in Iran redistribute wealth to the poor and the Iran-Iraq war veterans. The article hints at a link between SETAD and the Bonyad Mostazafan, wherein personnel running the Bonyad Mostazafan have links to the IRGC. For example, a previous director is also a former Defence Minister.

In 2002, the Supreme leader issued an order establishing the Central Task Force to Combat Smuggling of Commodities and Currency, which is affiliated to the Office of the President, although its effectiveness in view of the latter is perhaps doubtful. Recently, the chief of the taskforce announced that $25 billion worth of contraband was smuggled into the country between March 2013 and March 2014, although defence personnel's involvement in that is not explicit.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: While there is now official acknowledgement that corruption exists in Iran, as well as accusations/acknowledgement by some politicians that the IRGC is involved in smuggling, the Commander of the IRGC, Mohammad Ali Jafari, has always denied that smuggling takes place through IRGC piers.

Since President Rouhani came to power, he has attempted to tackle the issue head on. At the &quoute;Conference for the promotion of healthy administration and the fight against corruption&quoute; on December 8, in a seeming reference to the IRGC companies dominating the private sphere, Rouhani called for the elimination of monopolies. He said “when weapons, wealth, and media are in control of a single institution, an inevitable result is corruption”. Thus, it appears that he is attempting to push the IRGC out of the economy. Khatam al Anbia, the engineering arm of the IRGC has since maintained it would only take on large scale projects with a minimum value of $43 million.

The head of the Basij militia, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, challenged Rouhani saying that unlike what some politicians say, the Basij and Revolutionary Guard need to be present on all grounds including the “defensive economy”. He counters that it is only this way that corruption can be eradicated.

At the same conference in December, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for “decisive action” to rid the country of corruption rather than merely convening seminars or discussion sessions - possibly a veiled criticism of Rouhani. Khamenei has also maintained that without exception, the Iranian authorities should act against corruption. He has called the recent unveiling of $25 billion of goods smuggled into Iran between March 2013 and March 2014 as &quoute;mind boggling&quoute; (according to US and Iranian officials, at least $1 billion in US bank notes has been smuggled to get around the sanctions).

Other MPs have maintained that “fighting corruption has to start from the President’s office”. The Judiciary has maintained it would support attempts by the government to fight corruption.

Thus, at present, there is an open debate taking place about how best to tackle the corruption problem. Local media has now adopted the term &quoute;the anti-corruption campaign&quoute;. No specific anti-corruption and integrity measures have yet been adopted, and defence officials have yet to explicitly acknowledge a problem exists within their institutions. There is no evidence of any commitment by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs, and there is no evidence that any such commitments are made by senior ministry of defence or armed forces staff.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Bribery, Fraud, Embezzlement, and Extortion are outlawed under Chapter XI of the Armed Forces Penal Code of 2004, as well as in Chapter 13 of the Islamic Penal Code and sanctions are provided for. Article 507 of the Penal Code maintains: Anyone who is a member of corrupt groups or among those who act against national security, provided that he is not in a leading position and before being prosecuted, reports the plot and names of those engaged in the conspiracy and corruption to the officials, or cooperates effectively with the officials after he is prosecuted, shall be exempted from punishment; and if he has personally committed another crime, he shall be only sentenced for that crime.

Articles 598, 599, 600 of the Penal Code also cover corruption explicitly in the armed forces. Article 599 for example prohibits conclusion of contracts or constructing anything or ordering or supervising its construction for a government entity with a view to taking advantage of it for himself or someone else through deception.

In relation to accusations of IRGC smuggling, importing alcoholic beverages is considered as smuggling under Article 703 of Penal Code and importing and exporting any kind of narcotics is considered as a crime under the Anti-narcotics Drug Law.

However, no recent publicly available evidence of punishment been seen against defence and security personnel in the case of bribery, corruption, or smuggling and there is no evidence that these sanctions are effective or consistent. There is no recent public knowledge of defence and security personnel been brought before the courts taking into consideration that Article 172 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of military courts of which little information is publicly available.

As stated in Q.36, charges which are made are not made known to the public, therefore it cannot be known whether or not they involve defence and security personnel. Those cases that are known publicly do not involve defence and security personnel.

During demonstrations in Iranian Kurdistan in May 2015, a number of protesters were been arrested. The cited article alleges that Iranian authorities demanded money for their release. A local resident whose brother was detained during the protests told BasNews, “When we visited the Mahabad Central Prison to find out about my brother, the prison officials asked for 50, 000 Iranian Rial (15, 000 USD) to release him. During the protests an employee of a local hotel jumped out of a window in the hotel. She was allegedly escaping her rapist, reportedly an agent of the intelligence ministry. According to the article, there are unconfirmed reports that the hotel owner had intentionally placed the employee in the room to be raped by the senior agent who, in return, would ensure the hotel would obtain a five star rating.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The main law regarding whistle-blowing is article 648 of the Islamic Penal Code. Obligations of confidentiality are applied. The law specifies to whom it applies and the penalties. There appears to be some discussion about exceptions to article 648.

Article 13 of the Penal Code of the Armed Forces provides for the classification of documents and the protection of classified documents. Punishment for disclosure depends on the length of the document and whether it is marked as confidential or private.

Article 505 of the Penal Code makes it illegal &quoute;to disrupt national security, gathers information through any means under the cover of State authorities or government officials&quoute; with the intention of providing the information to others. Article 506 of the Penal Code provides &quoute;If, due to their negligence and disregarding security protocols, government officials who are responsible for classified security and intelligence affairs and have received the required training reveal information to enemies, they shall be sentenced to one to six months’ imprisonment.&quoute; Article 648 also provides for punishment for revealing professional secrets. There is no indication that such provisions are subject to scrutiny.&quoute;

Article 507 of the Penal Code maintains: Anyone who is a member of corrupt groups or among those who act against national security, provided that he is not in a leading position and before being prosecuted, reports the plot and names of those engaged in the conspiracy and corruption to the officials, or cooperates effectively with the officials after he is prosecuted, shall be exempted from punishment; and if he has personally committed another crime, he shall be only sentenced for that crime. Although this article seems to provide a level of protection, there is no explicit reference to defence and security personnel.

Whistleblowing is not actively encouraged. An atmosphere of distrust prevails amongst the political elite in general as can be determined from the accusations and denials of corruption currently been aired and from the current debate on whether corruption cases should be publicly aired. The current atmosphere emerged from an investigation by the Special Investigations Committee into the Social Security Organisation. The Head of that Committee maintained that, &quoute;The dimensions of corruption in the cases at the investigation committee are so high that we are scared that if they become public it would cause trauma to the system.” As it stands now, cases, including the charges involved, are not made public. Iran's vice President, Eshaq Jahangiri, maintains that solving the corruption problem can't be done behind such closed doors.

There is no evidence that whistle-blowing is actively encouraged. While legislation applicable to military and official personnel may exist to report corruption, there is no evidence that they are implemented, nor is whistle-blowing actively encouraged. There is little trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: There is no publicly available evidence that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions, nor evidence of a recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others such as personnel in sensitive positions including procurement, contracting, financial management and commercial management. The Ministry of Defence and Armed Logistics (MODALF) is supplied by a network of sub-companies grouped under the defence Industry Organisation. Management is not transparent on this issue.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: No. Numbers are not published publicly. There are estimated figures published in think tank reports published outside of Iran.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Payment rates for civilian and military personnel are published in the Revolutionary Guards Employment Law of 1991. It covers the Corps General Staff, the Center of the Valiye Faqih’s Representative in the Corps, the Corps’s Organization for the Protection of Intelligence, the land, air, sea, Basij resistance forces, the Qods Force, and the organizations connected thereto. Civilian staff are referred to as employees (they may form part of the General Staff) meaning they do not wear military insignia or uniform and their salary is calculated on the basis of the number of &quoute;degrees&quoute; acquired whereas military personnel are ranked according to Sergeant, First Sergeant, etc.

The law states that pay is the product of the rial (i.e. the local currency) factor by a constant factor of 300. The rial factor is equal to the rial factor of the salaries covered by the National Employment Law. The law specifies a minimum wage and salary increments depending on the employment grade, education, and/or training. Pension benefits, position benefits (e.g. physical or dangerous nature of the job), leave, travel and mission expenses, and deductions are specified. Numerous other allowances are provided for.

Iran's Direct Tax Law of 2005 states that salaries of the armed forces and the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) are exempt from taxation. Given the age of the sources it is not clear how accurate this information is.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: There are no reports that Iran's armed forces have received late payment. The IRGC Employment Law specifies that payment occurs on a monthly basis. Pension benefits, bonuses such as action bonuses on mission can be considered as salaries subject to discretionary payments. In 2011, there were reports of delays in payments for retirement pensions or special allowances (for example, in the article cited in sources).

The IRGC Employment Law specifies in detail how pay is calculated. Ansar Bank pays IRGC salaries and Mehr Bank provides financial services to the Basij, a volunteer militia. In the case of conscripts, it seems that the Military Service Organisation may be involved.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The appointment process is laid out in the Revolutionary Guards Employment Law, October 18, 1992 within which there is a classification of positions. This legislation specifies the qualifications and training to be completed before appointment to a specific rank including mid and senior personnel from captains to generals. However, it does not contain job descriptions. Appointments are not overseen by an independent body. As pointed to by the interviewee, in the Iranian defence establishment, there is no such thing as independent oversight in such functions and appointments at the middle and top levels take place to create loyalty to the Supreme Leader.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The promotions process and criteria for promotion are laid out in the Guards Employment Regulations 1992 (see for example Chapter 3 and Article 220). There is no provision for a promotion board. Formally, promotions are tied to education, ongoing training, seniority (length of service) and are approved by the Commander in Chief. The assessments to be passed for each position is listed in the law. The law lists the training courses to be passed for the permanent cadre and the Special Basij. The law does not specify the course contents, but it specifies the duration, the necessary pre-requisite qualifications and/or rank, and in which academy the course is issued. Little is known about the contents of a particular course, although defence officials might make occasional reference to the syllabus in the media. Commissions to review personnel performance exist.

How personnel are promoted in practical terms remains opaque because information is not made public. In the case of top personnel, as pointed to in Q.41, we might know a member of personnel's former position only in the case that they have reached a level of seniority. Therefore, they will be visible in the media. Consequently, some career history (background information) is likely to come to light. According to interviewee, there is no such thing as independent oversight in such matters in Iran.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Compulsory conscription has existed in Iran since 1925. Strong opposition and protests emerged, particularly in the countryside and led by Iran's clerics who were supposedly concerned about the secularising impact of military service. Corruption followed as recruiters began convincing former soldiers to return to duty, paying bribes so that people would enlist, and entering false ages to allow middle-aged men enlist or help younger men avoid service. Others bribed their way out of military service.

The present legal basis of conscription is the 1984 Military Service Act, plus various decrees issued since then. Those living outside the country upon meeting certain criteria previously have had the option of purchasing exemption, which was not illegal per se. In the last few years, Iran's birth-rate has dropped significantly, which has brought the military to claim they are unable to secure an adequate number of recruits. In December 2013, Iran's chief conscription officer, Gen. Moussa Kamali said “Because of its discriminatory nature, paying off military service was never desired by the armed forces, and that option has been closed.”

He also said that the option of paying off military service for those who live outside of the country had been cancelled earlier in the year, and that for those who live in the country, paying to avoid military service has not always been offered. But in the 2015 budget, military exemptions have been reintroduced. So as part of legislation, they are sold. Some men of military age have indicated they will pay for the exemption. The change came following the fall in the oil price, which added to Iran's economic woes from the sanctions.

The right to conscientious objection is not legally recognized. Attempting to evade being drafted or desertion from the military is punishable under the 1992 Law on Punishment of Crimes Concerning the Armed Forces. Drafting and desertion is monitored. Bribery related to conscription is outlawed in Article 79 of the Armed Forces Penal Code of 2004. This law mentions procedures in place. All who have completed military service receive a certificate, which is required to obtain a passport, driving license, or a government job. All men must, on certain occasions, be able to prove they have performed military service. Exemptions are granted in certain circumstances.

The procedures seeking exemption on the basis of medical grounds are known to be very strict, and the procedures for those seeking exemption on the basis of homosexuality involve physical and psychological examinations and have been described as degrading, humiliating, and stressful. If an exemption is granted, the corresponding legal provision is marked on the certificate.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: In the words of one conscript: &quoute;Almost everybody needs a favor, and if you can scratch their backs, yours will be scratched in turn. I haven't directly bribed anyone but I have provided my commander with free insurance for his car and now I have it easier. He even helped me to get a transfer -- I am being sent to a unit in my hometown for the rest of my service.&quoute;

There is widely documented evidence of bribes being paid to gain preferred postings. Bribery is in somewhat general and vague terms outlawed by the Armed Forces Penal Code, although no provision outlawing this specific type of bribery was found. Although, article 590 of the Penal Code defines bribery to include non-cash forms of bribery such as conveying goods or property to judicial or administrative civil servants.&quoute; Article 592 of the Penal Code prohibits bribery in order to carry out or refrain from carrying out one's duty, and provides for punishment. Article 3 of the Penal Code specifies that the Code applies to all on the territory of the Islamic Republic unless otherwise specified.

There is no publicly available evidence of such practices within the armed forces been punished.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The research did not find evidence of ghost soldiers, if they do exist it is unlikely that it is widespread practice. While payment systems are considered to be strong, it it not possible to state that the strength of oversight and lack of corruption mean that the phenomenon is unlikely to occur. As per Q38 - there is no published information on the numbers of soldiers which creates an added risk.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Within the IRGC (and the Basij), there are two lines of organisational structure. There is one command chain and one ministerial chain. Article 15 of the IRGC Constitution specifies that the Commander-in-Chief is responsible for personnel, military, ideological and political training, propaganda and publications, provisions, logistics, intelligence, planning operations, and for matters related to the Basij of the Abased.

Article 16 specifies that the Ministry of the Guards is responsible for the administrative, financial, legal, parliamentary, and provisioning fields. Notably, the responsibilities of the administrative and financial consultation inter alia are balancing credit, organising the budget, communicating the budget ratified to the sectors, implementing the budget (including distributing credit and keeping records), accounting, and supervision and control over expenditures

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: I did not find a Code of Conduct or a Code of Ethics. Some standards are however codified in law. The Armed Forces Penal Code applies to all staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Affiliated Organisations, as specified by Article 1 of the Code. There is also the Islamic Penal Code which applies to anyone who commits a crime on Iranian territory. Both codes are generally clear, specific, and publicly available, however are in some respects inadequate.

The Penal Code of the Armed Forces addresses gifts, hospitality, and the topics of fraud, bribery, embezzlement, and extortion and prescribes the punishment. It does not contain guidance such as how to react if faced with a bribe. It does not address post-separation activities. It addresses desertion in peace time and war time.

Although gain for personal interest is addressed in the Penal Code of the Armed Forces, and gain for personal interest and taking advantage of one's position as a civil servant of the state is addressed in the Islamic Penal Code, the concept of conflict of interest is not specified. The latter is a concern because conflict of interest is one of the major issues in the Iranian security sector.

Chapter 13 of the Islamic Penal Code also outlaws bribery, fraud, embezzlement, and abuse of funds by the armed forces, and imposes reporting obligations with respect to these activities on Directors and Chairpersons in the armed forces.

While both Codes may be widely distributed (perhaps orally) or at least the regulations known of, there is no evidence to indicate that they are applied within the armed forces as such cases are not made known to the public.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: There is no evidence that breaches of either the Armed Forces Penal Code or of the Islamic Penal Code by the armed forces personnel are addressed. There is no publicly available evidence that prosecutions of Armed Forces Personnel have taken place under the Penal Code in recent years.

Results of prosecutions of military crimes are not made publicly available, therefore, it cannot be determined whether breaches are addressed or not in view of the nature of Iran's defence and security sector and the current position of the country.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Anti-corruption training may take place, but it is unlikely, if it does occur it is not conducted regularly. A UNODC press release from 2012, announced, &quoute;The First Regional Computer Based Training On Anti-Money Laundering, Illegal Financial Flows And Suspect Cash Transactions,&quoute; but it appears to be targeted only at a very small number of civilian personnel. I did not find instances of anti-corruption training specific to the defence sector. As highlighted under Q. 34, there is an open debate taking place among Iran's political elite at present about how best to tackle the corruption problem, which indicates that there is a clear need for training.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: It is unknown if there is a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. And, there no evidence of effective prosecutions of defence services personnel for corrupt activities despite accusations levelled by the current and former Presidents against the IRGC.

Corruption in relation to the defence sector is not discussed in the public domain. Hence there is no public evidence that the measures specified in the Penal Code of the Armed Forces and the Islamic Penal Code are being applied in the defence sector.

There are no publicly available evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years either. According to the cited media article, prosecutors were themselves accused of corruption. No known cases of high level defence officials been prosecuted for corruption. Apart from the apparent dismissal of 1,500 police officers in 2010, though this cannot be counted as recent.

There have been recent prosecutions of high level officials in sectors other than defence. For example, according to Reuters, Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani, the son of Iran's former president Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, was sentenced to 15 years in jail by the Tehran Revolutionary Courton corruption and security charges according to a public statement by Iran's chief prosecutor.

Rafsanjani, who is known Iran mainly as Mehdi Hashemi, is a 45-year-old businessman and has previously been detained on corruption charges, including last year and in 2012, according to media reports. His father is the chairman of the Expediency Council, a powerful unelected body, and served two terms as president from 1989 to 1997. He supported President Hassan Rouhani's election campaign in 2013, and is also a close confidant of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Rouhani has vowed to tackle corruption in Iran and has announced a campaign to eradicate it. Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani is the second high-profile figure to be jailed on corruption charges this year.
Mohammad Reza Rahimi, a vice-president under former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was sentenced to five years in jail in January in connection with a billion-dollar money laundering scheme.
Hashemi was also handed down a fine, ordered to return unspecified assets, and barred from holding political office, Mohseni-Ejei said.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Facilitation payments are outlawed for public servants and armed forces personnel in the Islamic Penal Code (See Chapter 11 and Chapter 13). There are also outlawed for Armed Forces personnel in Article 118 of the Armed Forces Penal Code.

At the time of a series of high profile corruption scandals in 2013, reports emerged that large amounts of facilitation payments were been requested by people close to the highest levels of the government, although these are not publicly known to have emanated from the defence establishment. As mentioned in Q35, during demonstrations in Iranian Kurdistan in May 2015, a number of protesters were been arrested. The cited article alleges that Iranian authorities demanded money for their release. A local resident whose brother was detained during the protests told BasNews, “When we visited the Mahabad Central Prison to find out about my brother, the prison officials asked for 50, 000 Iranian Rial (15, 000 USD) to release him. During the protests an employee of a local hotel jumped out of a window in the hotel. She was allegedly escaping her rapist, reportedly an agent of the intelligence ministry. According to the article, there are unconfirmed reports that the hotel owner had intentionally placed the employee in the room to be raped by the senior agent who, in return, would ensure the hotel would obtain a five star rating.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: There is no publicly known military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict. What is known about Iran's military doctrine relates to defence postures.

That said, there may be some awareness of corruption as a strategic issue affecting operations. In the Armed Forces Penal Code, there is some reference to abuses such as counterfeiting military science, misusing (sale or transfer) the symbols of the Armed Forces, misusing weapons or other materials of the military such as vehicles in an unauthorised place, without permission, and against the rules.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The only known potential training in corruption issues for commanders is the ethics training, which the Basij must follow. There is a course in economic ethics and the ethics of military management, not corruption issues. More detailed information about the contents of these courses is not available. The general objective of the Basij training is to instil ideological beliefs creating a common ideology to protect the regime. There is no indication that this training could equip a participant with the relevant or comprehensive knowledge on corruption issues. There is no indication that commanders are objectively clear on the corruption issues they face during deployment. There is no recent evidence that commanders apply anti-corruption knowledge in the field.

Accusations of systematic corruption, indicating mismanagement, have been levelled against the Basij, particularly where it has investments in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE), although the Iranian authorities have denied corruption affected the TSE, which could indicate that they are willing to turn a blind eye to such activities.

The Iranian Parliament introduced a bill in December called the &quoute;Plan to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice&quoute;, which may have an indirect focus on issues of corruption. However, the Plan mainly enables the Basij militia to deploy to the streets as vigilante groups to combat non-respect for strict Islamic values, which could include corruption issues. There is, however, no indication that they will be fighting corruption within their own ranks, and the bill has been criticized by the President and Human Rights groups as an attack on human rights and particularly women's rights.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Iranian officials make a lot of comments in relation to monitoring defence operations, but not in relation to specifically addressing corruption on its own while in defence or security operations.

The deployment of the Basij on the streets are not known to play any sort of credible monitoring role or to involve adequately trained anti-corruption professionals. There is no evidence to suggest that the ethics training they receive equips them with the professional skills to monitor corruption risk.

The regularity of these deployments is not clear. It appears such groups/individuals are permitted to take matters into their own hands.

Response to Peer Reviewer: Herasat is not part of the security apparatus, until recently the group was classified as a terrorist organisation by the US state department.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Iran is not currently contributing any troops to peacekeeping missions. In terms of overseas operations, there is no indication of guidelines or staff training to address corruption issues in contracting.

There is a course in the ethics of military management. However, more detailed information about the contents of this course is not available. The general objective of the Basij training is to instil ideological beliefs creating a common ideology to protect the regime, which makes it likely that any such guidelines are incomplete or general.

Additionally, armed forces personnel other than the Basij would not receive such training.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: No existence of PMCs can be seen in the context of Iran. It seems that the idea of private security is only beginning to emerge in Iran. There is no known oversight in place for PMCs.There is no legislation covering the use of PMCs.

In the defence sector, there is not a distinction between how the public and private companies operate, which can be determined from the presence of military owned businesses acting as parastatal entities. All defence issues are nationalised to the highest levels of the political spectrum.

Score 3 awarded because there are no regulations forbidding or regulating their employment.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Iran's armed forces have their own tendering and procurement law, however there is no real indication that this legislation is followed. In the legislation, Article 3 classifies between public tenders and limited tenders. Article 26 refers to a restricted tender limiting the need for publication when there is a list of competent bidders.

Exemptions are provided for in Article 29. It states that in cases such as &quoute;classified deals&quoute; and when the vendor is the government, there is no need to hold tenders at all. Other exemptions mentioned relate to the purchase of certain types of property and services of an exclusive nature; the purchase, rent or lease of property where the opinion of the board and 3 judicial experts is sought; the purchase of property goods and services with a set price or where rates have been designated by the competent legal authorities; the repair of equipment to continue production in manufacturing units if it affects the development of the unit; consulting services ranging from technical advice and engineering business including the study, design and project management and execution or supervision or any type of consulting services.

Article 7 provides for a Board of complaints and article 8 specifies its duties. Article 25 specifies how to handle complaints. It's not clear whether cases under Article 29 can be subject to complaints. There is no evidence of the legislation having been enforced nor that the judiciary or other authority scrutinise exempt items due to the lack of transparency.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: There is no evidence that the defence procurement cycle is disclosed. Information about defence procurement is occasionally provided by senior officials in an abbreviated manner through the media. For example, discussions of an air-defence S-300 system provided by Russia were aired publicly by the political leadership until the deal fell through. Refurbishments have also been announced.

There is no public disclosure of procurement efforts for other items such as fuel, food, or property. Domestic procurement of materials for the domestic production of military equipment is not publicly disclosed. Generally, issues surrounding defence procurement are an extremely taboo topic in Iran. The issue is somewhat complicated by an international arms embargo and broader trade embargo on Iran. For example, until now, Iran has not been able to procure spare parts for its civilian airlines.
Occasionally, attempts to procure material on the international marketplace are heard of in the media. Despite the Iran Nuclear deal the arms procurement sanctions are still in place.

According to article 23 of the Armed forces Tender Regulations, defence bodies &quoute;can&quoute; provide information on tenders to the public through the National Database Portal of Iran Tender's Information in coordination with (i.e. with the permission of) relevant security departments. An examination of the portal yielded no information about military procurement.&quoute;

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: A tender committee and a Board for Complaints, and their respective duties are provided for in the Tenders Law for the Armed Forces of 2007. The personnel on the tender committee and the board of complaints are drawn from the same administrative body. It is not known whether these are active.

Within the General Inspectorate Organisation (GIO), there is the General directorate for supervision and inspection of military, police and security affairs. There is no evidence that this mechanism is active and is entirely non-transparent. The GIO is not independent as it works under the judiciary. In the past, the Head of the Judiciary has shown a lack of concern for transparency on corruption issues, although recently, he said he would support the government's efforts on corruption.

According to Article 55 of the Constitution that the Supreme Audit Court is responsible for supervision on budget expenditures, but anything owed by the military is not subject to audit.

The parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy commission and the Defence Committee play a role in defence procurement. These are active. However, the effectiveness of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission has been limited.

Thus, a number of bodies exist playing a potential oversight role, but there is a lack of clear evidence that they actually monitor defence procurement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: There is no known policy to disclose defence purchases. Iran has retained a long-term defensive posture and national security concerns have been continuously raised by Iranian officials, including as an attempt to justify the secrecy surrounding its industrial defence base. The justification for a pattern of secrecy has in the past been framed with respect to a broader long-term framework of sanctions imposed on Iran in response to non-compliance with its safeguard agreement with the IAEA.

Research showed that the amount of money invested in specific defence items, whether purchased or produced by domestic state own industries, has not been released to the public. No specific security justification for the secrecy of such purchases has been provided.

External purchases, such as the initial S-300 missile defence system deal with Russia - which was subsequently scrapped due to the arms embargo - have occasionally been mentioned in the national media, although the widely cited value here appears to have emerged from outside estimates.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The companies supplying the Armed forces would generally fall under the Ministry of Defence due to the arms embargo from foreign suppliers. The tenders regulation for the armed forces refers to a quality assessment. It is necessary to consider whether the companies have a license or a certificate of competence. No reference was found regarding the need to avoid corruption by these firms. No requirements are placed on companies beyond what is generally in company law; no discrimination is made between companies on the grounds of integrity.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: In October 2014, Iran's Armed Forces Chief of Staff announced a Civil defence National Strategy document. However, the contents of the document have not been made public. At the time of announcing the existence of a Civil defence National Strategy, the the Head of Iran's Civil defence Organization, who was present at the ceremony announcing the strategy, stated that Iran had formulated a plan to change the use of arms in a bid to increase military capability.

There is not enough publicly available information regarding the national strategy to state whether it guides guides the formulation of procurement requirements.

In terms of defence requirements, due to the embargo, until now, Iran has not even been able to acquire spare parts for its civilian airlines. Evidence suggests that procurement is often opportunistic.

There is no explicit evidence that the Supreme Audit Court, the General Directorate for supervision and inspection of military, police and security affairs within the General Inspectorate Organisation, or the inspection unit within the Ministry of Defence and Armed Logistics audits the national strategy document, although a member of the Expediency Council at least attended the ceremony announcing the strategy.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: There is insufficient evidence to state that purchases are based on a formal quantification of requirements. Evidence suggests that they are often opportunistic in nature. According to the cited articles, the Iranian MOD presented presented a &quoute;wish list&quoute; to the South African ambassador in Tehran. The former South African ambassador in Tehran reported, &quoute;They want everything from the earth to the sea, and everything that is in the sea and everything that flies.&quoute; The Iranians had a wish list that included radar systems, armoured personnel carriers, long-range cannons and the Rooivalk attack helicopter.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: The tender law allows for procurement to be conducted as an open competition on the basis of small, average, and large transactions according to Article 3 where each type of transaction is specified a value. Types of purchases that are exempt are provided for in Article 29. The exemptions mentioned relate to the purchase of certain types of property and services of an exclusive nature; the purchase, rent or lease of property where the opinion of the board and 3 judicial experts is sought; the purchase of property goods and services with a set price or where rates have been designated by the competent legal authorities; the repair of equipment to continue production in manufacturing units if it affects the development of the unit; consulting services ranging from technical advice and engineering business including the study, design and project management and execution or supervision or any type of consulting services.

Article 29 also provides that in cases such as classified deals and when the vendor is the government, there is no need to hold tenders at all.

There is insufficiently publicly available evidence to estimate what percentage of defence procurement is conducted as an open competition. The affiliate network of companies of the defence Industries Organization where each company has its own area of expertise supplies the MOD. Other IRGC linked companies are also likely to secure contracts. Components may be sourced externally. However Iran is under an international arms embargo.

As discussed previously, Article 29 states that in cases such as &quoute;classified deals&quoute; and when the vendor is the government, there is no need to hold tenders at all, thus making an estimate harder to calculate.

Response to Peer Review: Agree with comments.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Tender boards are subject to the terms of the law, Tenders of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran of 2007. No. 47/2512 / S 1386/4/24. These regulations are publicly available. The tender committee is composed a financial and a technical agent. (Article 5). The regulation also provides for a Complaints Committee (Article 8).

The General Inspection Organisation can supervise and inspect the administrations of the armed forces. Iran also has a parliament committee known as the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission and the Supreme Audit Court has the remit to audit all the Ministries, organisations, institutions, government companies. However, there are no indications that audits of tender boards decisions in the defence sector are undertaken. There is also no indication that a code of conduct has been adopted within these boards.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Article 2 of the Tender regulations of the Armed Forces provides for a competitive bidding process, while Article 11 provides that the supplier cannot be the purchasing agent. Article 86 of the Armed Forces Penal Code meanwhile, has provisions for punishment of collusion. There is no publicly available evidence, however, of either discouragement by the government or enforcement of the legislation.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Procurement staff are not known to be organised into a single professional staff department. Rather a number of institutions seem to be involved. Within the Department of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODALF), there is a Director of Planning and International Affairs, which may be of relevance, as some of its former staff have been linked as leading figures in Iran's procurement efforts for the nuclear and missiles projects.

There is also the defence Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC), which reportedly procures most of the material for Iran's defence Industries Organisation under the Ministry of defence and Armed Logistics (MODALF).

It is possible that higher grades carry undue influence because staff can simultaneously be defence officials and industry workers. The level of oversight is unclear.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Article 7 of the tender regulations of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran of 2007 provides for a complaints committee. It is not known whether companies complain, noting that Iran's defence production companies fall under the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODALF), and that Iran's defence sector is not transparent.

It is also not clear whether cases under Article 29, which provides for exemptions of the tender regulations, can be subject to complaints. The personnel on the tender committee and the board of complaints can be drawn from the same administrative body. Moreover, is not known whether the tender committee and the board of complaints are active.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Articles 108, 109, 110, 111 of the Armed Forces Penal Code of 2004 specify sanctions including imprisonment related to fraud, such as price modifications, in conducting transactions. There is a sanctions provision for foreigners, therefore both local and foreign suppliers are regulated.

As Iran does not divulge the any criminal investigations or prosecutions of armed forces members, there is no publicly available evidence, whether official or media-based, which implies that sanctions are applied to punish the corrupt activities of suppliers to the armed forces.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: There is insufficiently publicly available evidence to state whether current offset contracts exist. But there is no evidence of the government imposing due diligence or audit requirements on offset contractors if they exist or were to be negotiated. Nor did I find any legal provision banning offsets.

It is likely that the government may enter into offset agreements, if one considers the case of Iranian officials attempting to procure arms by offering a South African telephone company access to the Iranian telecommunications market, and Chinese companies' local partnerships with electronic companies serving Iran's defence industries, while China is suspected of providing under the counter weapons to Iran. These business dealings are not transparent.

In other sectors, an oil for goods barter agreement between Russia and Iran was negotiated but not signed, and weapons were not reported as being involved in the agreement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: As before, no information is available on offset contracts and programmes.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: As before, no details on the existence of offset contracts and programmes are available nor if offset contracts are subject to any level of competition regulation or are simply not competed.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: There is evidence that agents and intermediaries are used in the procurement cycle, and that on occasion this involves illicit procurement; however, no evidence was found of a government policy against their usage. The political leadership in Iran does not deny that it has attempted to bypass sanctions on arms procurement, denouncing the sanctions as illegal. The level of government control over these agents and intermediaries is unclear.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Iran has made few major arms deals over the last decade as a result of the international arms embargo.

No official figures were disclosed for an anti-aircraft missile deal with the Russians in 2005. For arms deals prior to 2010, some details of the financing package including sums involved and the time frame were made publicly available. For example, in 2001, the report released by Moscow on a Russian-Iranian military-technical accord stated it would include arms sales valued at $300 million annually over the following five years. The press reports released by Iran on the other hand gave widely different values.

For the S-300 deal, an initial down payment was announced in the media after Russia decided not to proceed with delivery of the system, and reference was made at that stage by Iran to damages it could claim for cancellation of the deal by Russia.

No interest rates, commercial loans, or export credit guarantees for any of the deals are made publicly available.

No information about the financing of domestic arms production is made public. The expected timeline for delivery is sometimes revealed, noting that delivery times do fall short of ambitions and mixed messages do come across.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425: Iran has a number of defence companies, which are accused of running a number of &quoute;front-companies&quoute; often to hide the activity of a main defence company because Iran's defence companies are usually under sanctions. If we were to consider such activity as sub-contracting, it is non-transparent. For what we know about these companies and sub-companies, there is no publicly known anti-corruption programme.

There is no evidence of the government formally requiring the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, nor is there evidence of the government encouraging this informally.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4425:

Although the government may sometimes justify purchases by referring to military need, this need is not always obvious, and justification for expenditure may not be provided at all. For example, Iranian officials have put forward a needs argument about its nuclear program, but this needs argument is disputed, and the entire program is the subject of an internationalised dispute involving the five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.

Iran's military purchase needs have also been questioned by the former South African Ambassador to Tehran, who stated: &quoute;They want everything from the earth to the sea, and everything that is in the sea and everything that flies.&quoute; The Iranians reportedly had a purchasing wish list inclusive of radar systems, armored personnel carriers, long-range cannons and the Rooivalk attack helicopter. South Africa's apparently failed to deliver military radios to Iran that it had purchased in 2003.

In an allegedly corrupt procurement deal, an official from Sairan (an arms manufacturer at the Ministry of Defence) told an official from South Africa's telecommunications company with whom the Iranians were negotiating: &quoute;You should push your government to sell these things to us&quoute;. However, there is no known reference to need, publication of the amount spent, or justification for the spending.

Evidence does suggest that purchases are at times driven by political influence by seller nations. The S-300 missile defence system deal with Russia worth a reported $800 million is another case in point. It was cancelled to fall in line with UN sanctions and certain states apparently feared it could be used to defend the atomic installations in the event of an air strike. Iran filed a legal case against Russia, but negotiations have recently restarted with an offer from Russia awaiting decision in Tehran, as it simultaneously pursues a nuclear deal.