Lebanon

The researcher did not find any information on any recent asset disposals, including any financial results, and research and interviews similarly have not uncovered any information available to the public regarding military assets.

General Lebanese law, financial law regarding assets, their securitization and disposal is extensive and frequently free to view, however. The academic literature on corruption in Lebanon argues that it is clientelist and personal rather than political and that politicians control assets rather than institutions.

There is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinised by an audit body, nor of any other forms of scrutiny.

Research uncovered no publicly available information on defence establishment asset disposals. An interview source also stated that no information would be forthcoming. Such disposals are likely to be minimal given the low budget of the Army and the high demands placed upon it.

The percentage of secret spending was not made available to the public for the current year. Source 1 stated that secret spending within the LAF is unlikely to be above 1%, given only around 18-25% of the Army budget is not spent on wages (see Q12). Maintenance, ammunition and other running costs are likely to account for the majority of this remaining figure.

The Open Budget Survey 2012 assesses that total secret expenditure is between 1-3% of GDP, divided between the military, ISF, and General Security. The amount totals approximately 1% of the Army's $1.2bn budget for that year. A separate report by al Akhbar reported a secret budget of $11.3m (0.94%) of the budget for the same year.

The Ministry of Finance has not broken down army spending in its 2013 defence budget publications beyond the army, military courts, inspectorate and management. The score reflects publicly available information for the current financial year (last checked June 2014); for this reason, the score differs from the research and score provided in the 2013 GI for Lebanon.

There is no evidence to show what information the legislature is provided with on spending on secret items in practice.

Information on secret items is limited by law to the defence committee and President. The law does not appear to provide any more specific instructions regarding how detailed this information should be or what may/may not be excluded, and there is no evidence to suggest what kind of information is actually presented to them.

The 2013 GI for Lebanon scored this higher; however, looking at the evidence available, a score of 1 appears to be the most accurate reflection of the current situation.

There is no evidence of secret items going through the standard audit/parliamentary scrutiny process in Lebanon. Sources 1 and 2 both agreed with this. No recent audit reports were found, or evidence that they have been conducted since 2013.

Meeting descriptions on the website of the Higher Defence Council clearly show that decision making has regularly occurred in secret under protection of the law. The text of the precise legislation governing this is not freely available, although it may be possible to access through paid subscription to a legal publisher.

This indicator scored a higher mark in the 2013 GI for Lebanon; however, given the complete lack of transparency surrounding the security sector, a score of 0 is most appropriate here.

Off-budget expenditure is the norm due to Lebanon's problems with official budgeting. It appears to be legally permitted, but it is unclear whether or how off-budget expenditures have been recorded for the respective budget years. It is also unclear if any permitted expenditures have been classified as state secrets, or if adequate and well-established legal processes exist to oversee this.

As Nerguizian's report indicates, with military aid to Lebanon totalling $1.16bn over the period 2006-2013, coming from over 12 different nations and often providing only for basic needs, spending on urgent operational requirements is the norm. A recent example is the operation against militants in the Nahr el Bard Camp in 2007, which saw the Army reliant upon off-budget expenditure and foreign donations after running critically low on ammunition (for more details see Nerguizian). The 2013 Capabilities Plan demonstrates an initial effort to reduce the ad-hoc nature of defence spending. All interview sources agreed with these findings.

Off budget expenditures have continued since 2013 in a period which has seen the army constantly &quoute;out of barracks&quoute; (i.e., where troops are constantly deployed), in a context of budget deadlock. Off-budget expenditure, largely involving military aid from the US, makes up a significant proportion of spending. There is no evidence that this involves illicit economic activity, however.

Some analysts have expressed concern at the lack of clarity regarding how the large amount of funds being offered to the LAF by the ISG for spending over 2014-17 will be utilized.

Research found there is evidence of more substantial off budget expenditure than in 2013, hence the lower score in this year's GI for Lebanon.

The Lebanese Parliament approved a draft access to information law in July 2013, four years after the initial draft was submitted, however this had still to be passed into law at the time of writing.

Research and interviews indicate that there are some legal provisions made for the classification of information but that little control is exercised in practice. Theoretically, the Lebanese Constitution guarantees the right of access to information. As per Article 35 to the Lebanese Constitution, the Chamber of Deputies may meet in secret sessions under certain circumstances. The Supreme Defence Council, LAF and other defence and security institutions are also permitted by law to classify information on national security grounds. No publicly available laws relating to defence were found during research, however a statement on the website of the Presidency confirms that this confidentiality is used by these stakeholders in practice.

No further details could be found on what any of these processes entail, or what provisions exist for the oversight of these regulations. It is assessed to be very likely that the regulations have been bypassed or influenced by individuals or agencies on a regular basis in the context of Lebanon's long-term political deadlock.

The sources interviewed were not aware of any defence/security ownership of commercial business, nor did any such evidence emerge during the assessment research process. No evidence suggesting commercial business ownership is apparent in any recent defence spending breakdowns, although this could be accounted for within the secret budget or non-operational budget allocations such as that of the 'Directorate General for Management'.

Given the lack of legislation against this, and the high amount of off-budget spending that occurs (as specified in Q28), there is still a possibility that defence institutions do have financial interests which are kept out of public view. Sources nonetheless indicate this is highly unlikely and would be prevented by internal discipline as opposed to formal processes.

No public information information exists, making the response and scoring reliant upon interview sources and inference from what budget materials are available.

As identified in Q30 it is uncertain whether any military-owned businesses exist, or the scrutiny that they may subject to if they do. Sources indicated this situation would be likely to be prevented by internal discipline as opposed to formal processes. All evidence indicates that if any such business does occur, it is likely to be of a small scale, mitigating the risk in this area.

There is no evidence of any unauthorised private enterprise by Army staff and defence officials appear to be prohibited from having business interests whilst serving (sources 2/3). The specific laws are not accessible without a paid subscription to a legal publisher however so it is unclear what provisions exist (Source 3). Any offences of this nature are likely to be dealt with internally and the Army is understood to be strict about this, according to multiple interview sources (sources 2/3).

Whilst there is no evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by Army staff, military courts are not transparent. In addition, whilst there is no clear legislation or policy in relation to this, there is no indication that the government considers it to be an issue. No reports of prosecution of employees for such behaviour are publicly available, although research indicated it is certainly possible given the lack of transparency of the military court system and evidence of conflict of interest laws being flouted in other sections of government.

The Head of the Army, General Kahwagi, has stated that maintaining the Army's integrity is vital to national security and that “more transparency is needed as well as the culture of eradicating corruption.” This is the only recent example of an official commitment being made by a senior Army source, although similar statements have come from other sectors of government.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agree with comments. However score changed to 1 to reflect criteria that: There is no apparent commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry as an institution, but there is some evidence that a commitment is made by senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers.

Lebanon’s penal code (art. 351) makes corruption and related misconduct a criminal offence. In addition, the “Illicit Wealth Law” (Legislative Decree 18 February 1953) obliges ministers and senior public servants to declare their personal wealth prior to taking up and immediately after leaving office. The Lebanese Constitution (article 80) allows for establishing a supreme court, composed of MPs and senior judges that can strip anyone of their political immunity. It seems particularly unlikely that any senior military figures would be prosecuted in such a way however, given security concerns and ongoing circumventions by other public officials via loopholes, political interference and judicial corruption (Leenders, 2014; Source 2).

The Lebanese military judiciary is believed to be very strict in enforcing corruption, with the result that the army does not have the reputation for corruption and being subject to political influence that the gendarmeries and ISF have (Source 2). There are few public disclosures of such measures being carried out to preserve the reputation of the army, however. For example, a colonel in Zahle was accused in a press investigation of abusing links to the local finance ministry. The army does not comment on specific cases however, and there is no evidence any action was taken despite the evidence of corruption that was submitted. One notable exception has been the very public Puma helicopter scandal, although this was likely to be in a large part due to political motivations on account of the prominence of the figures being accused.

Research and interviews suggest that while whistleblowing may be encouraged by the government through public statements that corruption is not tolerated, there is little evidence regarding whistleblowing in the Lebanese defence sector in practice. It is assessed as likely that lack of formal legislation and impunity for zu'ama would create little trust amongst officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.

In 2010 a draft law regarding whistle blower protection in the public and private sectors was presented to parliament. It is yet to come into force despite strong CSO lobbying, nor has any other concrete legislation been enacted.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agree with comments. Discussion amended.

The 2013 GI for Lebanon scored this question at '2'; however, given that there is as of yet no evidence suggesting the draft law is being implemented, the most recent score is lower.

An interview with source 3 discussed how procurement, contracting and financial management is conducted through a J4 office, led by an officer of Brigadier General ranking (although there is no further information available about how this officer is selected, or the oversight exercised over his job).

The 1979 Defence Law states that the commander of the armed forces is appointed by the Council of Ministers from among staff officers nominated by the Minister for Defence. More generally, senior personnel being appointed require a consensus among Lebanon's elite politicians although, since 2006, such appointments have frequently been made as part of political trade-offs due to the &quoute;stalemate politics&quoute; between the March 8 and March 14 blocs of politicians.

Sources indicate that military officers are prevented from having conflicting business interests whilst in post, although no post-retirement restrictions appear to exist. No evidence was found that staff are subject to specific vetting requirements before taking up posts where there is increased financial sensitivity or risk of corruption, nor that any rotation of post is required after a limited number of years.

Given the evidence above, and the extra information provided by interviewees, a higher score than that in the 2013 GI for Lebanon has been awarded here.

Interested parties such as journalists appear to be generally able to access this information, although precise recent figures do not seem to be actively made available to the general public through outlets such as the official LAF website. Sources indicate the total number of LAF military personnel in June 2014 was approximately 57,000-65,000.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1 - Agree, and discussion has been updated to reflect additional sources.

This score has decreased since the 2013 GI for Lebanon, due to the fact that the level and detail of information that was publicly available is no longer made so.

Pay rates are published in job advertisements for soldiers and officers, whilst salaries for senior government ministers are also in the public domain (the most recent pay increase was publicly discussed in parliament and debated in the media). The Ministry of Finance has in the past published pay scales for Army, ISF and General Security personnel. At the time of writing, ongoing political deadlock over public sector pay across all departments has become a highly prominent issue and is widely discussed in media and amongst civil society.

This score has decreased since the 2013 GI for Lebanon. The reason for this is twofold - the 2013 assessment did not take allowances into account, and secondly, the Lebanese political situation has deteriorated into political deadlock.

Law number 665 (Military Service - Rights of the Recruit) is available to the public and discusses recruits' rights regarding payment.

There is little further detail that is publicly available on the actual payment mechanisms, however research did not discover any media coverage or anecdotal evidence suggesting regular late payment of soldiers occurs.

The Lebanese Army has actively attempted since 1990 to become a non-sectarian institution. As with all senior positions in the Lebanese public sector however, political considerations and the imperative to maintain confessional balance comes into play, meaning that merit is never the sole determinant of top level employment. The confessional system stipulates that all high-ranking positions in the army must be distributed 50-50 between Christians and Muslims.

Interviews suggest that, in times such as the present where high levels of operational effectiveness are vital, the appointment of senior figures based upon merit is more likely. The Army is said to be &quoute;actually trying to get somewhere&quoute; (Source 3).

Interviews indicate that soldiers can steadily progress through the ranks, based upon length of service and merit. The processes and internal criteria regarding promotion are not, however, available to the public, although there is consensus that a strong awareness exists amongst the Army of the need to be perceived as neutral and representing the whole of Lebanon.

As per Q38, at higher levels sectarian quotas are balanced with pressing needs for operational effectiveness when promoting soldiers. At the lower ranks, the Army is non-sectarian, although tabs are kept upon the relative sectarian balance of the Army. According to Interviewee 3, evidence of meritocratic promotion could be seen in the increasing Sunni component of elite units through promotion from lower ranks, noting recruitment is especially high in economically deprived areas of largely Sunni North Lebanon.

Meritocratic promotion is far from guaranteed however: according to an article in al-Akhbar &quoute;in 2010 and 2011, 30 officers were transferred from the army to State Security...on the basis of personal and political merits.&quoute;

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed, and discussion updated following comments.

Compulsory conscription ended in 2007 in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 665, issued on February 2005.

Lebanon has been an all-volunteer force since 2007.

Research shows no evidence of ghost soldiers, although the lack of transparency with regard to military accounting at this level means that this cannot be assumed as fact. Lebanese defence law addresses the termination of salary at the end of service.

Although this is not published as policy, there is no evidence available to suggest that the two chains are not separate. This response is reliant upon interview/anecdotal sources.

Lebanon’s penal code (article 351) makes corruption and related misconduct a criminal offence. There appears to be no similar regulations specific to the army made public, although interviews suggest that the military judiciary and military police uphold the law to this regard strictly.

Regarding security forces, the code of conduct for law enforcement (article 7) ensures that law enforcement officials are obliged to report gifts and promises of favours, with the possibility of termination of employment or a prison sentence. As the LTA note, &quoute;Regulations regarding gifts and hospitality exist in most sectors, as for example the Civil Servants Regulation, but they are not consistently applied.&quoute;

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1 - Agree, and comments updated accordingly.

Lebanon's military judiciary is understood to actively prosecute breaches of the law but is not transparent, especially in relation to mid- to low-level misdemeanors (source 2). Not for lack of legislation, Leenders describes the standard Lebanese judiciary as &quoute;largely defunct&quoute;, with little confidence in a fair trial.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1 - Agreed, and sources added and discussion updated accordingly.

This indicator scored higher in the 2013 GI for Lebanon. However, based on the most recent research and public evidence, the current score is lower.

There is evidence that anti-corruption trainings take place but the regularity of such trainings is debatable.

In May 2014, the Commander-in-Chief of the LAF requested that TI’s International Defence & Security Program host a Commander’s Anti-Corruption Workshop with TI’s Lebanese Chapter and 20 senior officers, funded by SIDA to discuss corruption risks and the results of the GI Lebanon 2013.

The Lebanese Army has a very low annual small budget for training courses, understood to be around $150,000. Little other information on army training is available, however the LAF do appear to be open to training courses that are likely to address anti-corruption as part of foreign partnerships. EU funded projects have provided training aiming at boosting the &quoute;professionalism&quoute; of the ISF and bring practices more in line with international standards. The US Army also trains Lebanese officers in US military academies, which likely to instil US anti-corruption best practice, in addition to conducting training in Lebanon itself. The last is &quoute;tailored specifically to the LAF's operational and technical needs&quoute; and unlikely to focus on anti-corruption however.

The US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) runs a regional anti-corruption programme aimed to 'strengthen financial disclosure enforcement, build anti-corruption capacity, and help countries adopt better anti-corruption standards and practices'.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1 - Agreed. Score modified to reflect criteria that anti-corruption training takes place. Training is given to selected personnel in more sensitive positions but there is no evidence that this is regularly repeated.

There appears to be no legal requirement for details of corruption involving defence services personnel to be made public and no policy that they should be. There have been very few recent public cases outcomes regarding corruption in the Lebanese Army besides the Puma scandal (see Q35). Allegations in the press regarding Army misconduct certainly exist; recently, a colonel in Zahle was accused in a press investigation of abusing links to the local finance ministry. The army does not comment on specific cases however.

Commentators and interviewees have argued that corruption or misconduct cases involving the Army are protected from the public eye in order to avoid embarrassment so as not to undermine the LAF's role as an emblem of national unity and security.

Facilitation payments are illegal. It is worth noting that the army is seen as the least likely institution to be susceptible to this. The Carnegie Endowment's assessment of Lebanon shows that it is a criminal act under Lebanese law to give or accept a bribe, as is bribing a government official. Bribery is punishable by up to three years imprisonment, hard labor in certain cases, and a fine equal to at least three times the value of the bribe.

The military courts, as aforementioned, are more rudimentary than the standard Lebanese justice system. This means that offenders can be potentially pursued more rigorously when it is in the Army's interests to do so, but also that there is no transparency regarding to process or outcome (Source 2). Interviewees indicate that the military is relatively effective at discouraging these payments relative to other Lebanese institutions, there is no publicly available information to support this. It is not clear how effectively these mechanisms and laws are applied.

It is likely that facilitation payments happen on a very minor scale at the lowest ranks, but nevertheless soldiers will always refuse bribes at checkpoints etc.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Given the politics of Syrian/Palestinian refugees in Lebanon I am not sure that the refugee's bribe being declined can be used as evidence of successful anticorruption efforts, as the situation is more nuanced.

This indicator's score has increased since the 2013 GI for Lebanon, as 1 the sources cited here indicated that the military does enforce measures against these offences, albeit in an opaque manner.

The LAF has long been criticised by commentators for the absence of a clearly defined doctrine. Outgoing President Suleiman has sought to kickstart the development of one, which has been stalled by questions of the role the resistance plays in relation to army and state. Although Law no. 665 (Military Service) indicates that the army aims 'to develop and sharpen the intellect, senses and concentration [of soldiers] thus immunising them from corruption and collapse', there does not seem to be a clear and known military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in operations.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1 - Discussion and sources amended following comments.

In May 2014, the Commander-in-Chief of the LAF requested that TI’s International Defence & Security Program host a Commander’s Anti-Corruption Workshop with TI’s Lebanese Chapter and 20 senior officers, funded by SIDA to discuss corruption risks and the results of the GI Lebanon 2013.

As previously mentioned (Q49), the budget for special training is low and the extent and regularity of anti-corruption training commanders receive is unclear, both in Lebanon and in any training courses undertaken in the US, UK or elsewhere. EU funded training courses are more likely to address such issues.

Additional spending by the LAF on training, as part of the Capabilities Development Plan, is expected to be between $10-11 million over 2015-2017. One agreed tenet of Army doctrine that is actively instilled is loyalty to the Army and nation above other sectarian or local allegiances.

Anecdotal evidence from interview sources suggest that commanders do apply corruption training in the field, although not uniformly (Source 3).

Interview sources were unaware of any specific professionals deployed for corruption monitoring.

The remit of the Military Police includes pursuing corruption in the field, although there is no evidence to suggest trained professionals monitor corruption risk specifically.

Research and interviews indicate no evidence of this. It appears that contractors are not extensively used on deployment. There are no relevant guidelines or training in place.

Interview sources have indicated it is not Lebanese Army policy to employ PMCs for operational purposes and that none are employed for more static security operations. Research only indicates one unverified report of a Russian PMC that was involved with the military in Lebanon.

Lebanon is a regional hub for PMCs who operate in the region however, and security contractors are used in the private sector.

There is no evidence that they are subject to scrutiny.

The LAF and ISF are exempt from laws that insist upon public tender for all procurement over $500. The UNDP's review of Lebanon's public procurement legal framework indicates that Decree No. 11573 of 30 December 1968 provides extensive stipulations regarding the army and ISF's procurement processes (p34). Although the defence and security institutions hold special status under Lebanon's procurement laws, such as the Public Accounting Law, much legislation does apply. However, the Army and ISF are not covered by the Central Inspection Commission, which supervises all other public works tenders.

As the 'Public Sector Transparency and Accountability in Selected Arab Countries' report indicates: &quoute;There is no one specific law regulating all aspects of government procurement in Lebanon, and transparency has never been strong.&quoute;

This score has decreased since the publication of the 2013 GI for Lebanon - the 2013 report implied that the army was covered by Lebanese procurement legislation whereas it has now been clarified that it is in fact exempt.

There is no legal requirement for disclosure, although significant procurements are normally disclosed on an ad-hoc basis. The LAF and ISF are exempt from laws that insist upon public tender for all procurement over $500, and an interview source has indicated that there is no disclosure of the whole cycle, particularly in the case of more mundane purchases. The disclosure of procurements made following the Saudi donation is the best example. The process is well publicised although the details of the entire process, i.e. contract negotiations, detail etc are not forthcoming, more often only the headline figures i.e. what material, from who for how much is available.

The Army and ISF are not covered by the Central Inspection Commission, which supervises all other public works tenders. The LAF and ISF are exempt from laws that insist upon public tender for all procurement over $500. The UNDP's review of Lebanon's public procurement legal framework indicates that Decree No. 11573 of 30 December 1968 provides extensive stipulations regarding the army and ISF's procurement processes (p34). Although the defence and security institutions hold special status under Lebanon's procurement laws, such as the Public Accounting Law, much legislation does apply.

As the 'Public Sector Transparency and Accountability in Selected Arab Countries' report indicates: &quoute;There is no one specific law regulating all aspects of government procurement in Lebanon, and transparency has never been strong.&quoute;

Whilst internal formal mechanisms should exist, according to Source 3, there is little transparency regarding the oversight of defence procurement.

There is public information on significant purchases that are not made from secret budgets. Donations, which supply the majority of the LAF's weapons and vehicles rather than procurement, are also made public, although full details are not always disclosed. There is no formal disclosure of potential purchases/donations, although the process of the recent $3bn Saudi pledge and the related ISG is taking place with a relatively high level of disclosure.

Source 1 indicates the LAF does not have a written policy to disclose purchases, but almost always does so, with most significant procurements receiving media coverage that includes a comment from a senior official. Indications are that the necessity for public confidence in the Army's capability is highly apparent given Lebanon's current political climate.

Research indicates no evidence that the government makes any reference during the bidding process to the need for companies to avoid corruption, or prove that they have an ethical supply chain. Companies with prosecutions for corrupt activities could potentially be partially or totally barred from bidding, but there is no evidence that this happens in practice (personal experience)

The UNDP's legal framework review indicates the terms of pre-qualification of Contractors Decree No. 3688 dated 25/01/1966 and Decree No. 9333 dated 26/12/2002 set criteria based on years of experience, previous achievements, human resources/organisational structure, equipment, financial situation and field inspection.

The Army and ISF are also exempt from the main public procurement law, which is over 40 years old in any case, but there is some discrimination made on the basis of integrity, as can be seen from example tenders.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1 - Agreed, and commentary updated.

The 2013 GI for Lebanon scored this more highly; however, given that there is no evidence of strict requirements placed upon companies, this lower score most befits the most recent research.

While there is no official 'strategy', since 2013 the army's procurement aims have been clear - increase the ability of the army to maintain stability and guarantee the integrity of Lebanon's borders in association with international partners.

The LAF is attempting to overhaul procurement procedures and instigate a more long-term strategy, although this in its early stages and an open, well audited strategy is still a while off. Interviewees indicate that the Lebanese Army accepts donations of equipment from a variety of sources, and &quoute;take what they can get&quoute;, with donor nation strategy and LAF strategy rarely aligning fully.

The political aim of providing a new clear national defence strategy is currently thwarted by deadlock over Hezbollah's role vis-à-vis the state. This is significant, since if Lebanon's 'army, people, resistance' defence formula was to be ended at Hezbollah's expense, it would require the LAF to procure significant artillery, missiles and air defence capabilities.

Interviews and available commentary indicates most defence purchases are for maintenance and resupply and appear to be based upon identified and considered requirements, although urgent operational requirements also seem to drive most purchases (according to Source 3, unplanned purchases are a regular occurrence). There is some sign of improvement in this area.

The LAF's 5 year Capabilities Development Plan is an attempt to identify and quantify requirements more formally, although the fiscal and cost breakdown of the plan at this stage is &quoute;anecdotal at best&quoute; (Nerguizian, p39).

LAF purchases are announced by the government, although details of the contract competition are not publicly available. The LAF's largely opportunistic way of sourcing items to maximise its limited resources also means insufficient information is available on specific contracts to conduct quantitative analysis. Moreover, much of the equipment and weapons come in the form of donations. Due to this fact, efforts are being made to integrate more effectively with external donors on issues such as sourcing according to interviewees.

There is evidence of some competitive tenders for minor projects (see 'Tendersinfo'), but this does not seem to apply for the larger scale procurement of weapons systems, vehicles, and so forth. Preferred suppliers are likely to win contracts, but competition is open in principle.

It is also worth noting that in the case of the Lebanese Army, urgent operational requirements are currently likely to account for more than 10% of procurements. Additionally, not all its sources of foreign funding have open bidding systems, such as under US Section 1206 for counter-terrorism rapid response.

This indicator scores between a 1 and 2 but there is not enough information released by the government to quantify how many procurements are single or competitively sourced.

LAF and ISF tendering is not inspected by the general tender board although in theory parliamentary committees can call ministers to explain non-secret budgeting decisions, and there is a framework specifying their behaviour and powers (see above).

Recent CSO reports critique parliament for not playing a strong enough role in budgeting and the Court of Audit for a lack of capacity. The Defence Council is sat on by a variety of figures from both within and outside of the military, although no audit is fully independent.

Transparency regarding the extent to which regulations are enforced is extremely limited (Sources 1 and 2), and it remains unclear whether the defence sector is audited at all, given that it is exempt from the general legislation.

There is no evidence that tender information is published, either.

As discussed in Q15, Lebanon has had an audit court for government expenditure since 1951 and the military judiciary is able to set up administrative courts, although there is no evidence for how active or effective these mechanisms have been in the defence sector. No evidence of external auditing was found, with interviewees indicating that this was unlikely to exist. According to the Open Budget Survey 2012, &quoute;the SAI does not employ designated staff for auditing&quoute;, based upon the assessors conversations with the audit court. According to one interviewee (Source 3) JPTs are increasingly being undertaken by the LAF and its donors, increasing the potential for external audit.

There is very little information regarding defence and security contracts and how oversight authorities deal with collusion.

Even though some of the legislation is available in Arabic, it is not freely available and there is no public information regarding its contents. Contracts themselves are published but without details of the tender process. Enforcement is not transparent although interviews suggest that a form of this procedure takes place within the military.

There appears to be no legislation specific to the defence sector, nor wider national legislation, that outlaws collusion.

There is no information publicly available about the practice or training of staff involved in procurement, nor about the organisation of the department. Relevant regulations/practices are also not widely known or available to the public. Interviews do not suggest that such training exists, although ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency of LAF procurement are said to be taking place within the context of increased aid flows and threat levels.

Direct procurement of material, in contrast to receiving donations, does not currently take place on a large enough scale to warrant an extensive procurement staff. The current LAF five-year plan, and the ongoing efforts to co-ordinate more closely with the UN International Support Group for Lebanon, suggests that procurement decisions will be made at the highest levels of government through the defence councils.

It does not appear that defence procurement staff are organised into a professional staff department. There is little control or oversight of defence contractors by procurement staff. This makes creates a higher risk of undue influence from higher grades within the organisation.

There do not appear to be any existing mechanisms for companies to complain about malpractice in procurement, and the LAF are not obliged to disclose such information to the public.

Literature on government tender reform has focused on improving the government side, and not on the creation mechanisms that promote fairer competition between countries. As a result, this finding is reliant on interview sources. The increased incidence of Joint Project Implementation Teams (JPTs) shows the potential to facilitate complaints via the partner nations however (see link above).

There is no evidence to state whether companies that have attempted to complain are subsequently unfairly disadvantaged or debarred from future procurements.

There appears to be no published or anecdotal evidence of an instance when a supplier was penalised or set policy or law for corrupt practices. Payment of bribes in Lebanon is illegal, however, and punishable by a fine equal to up to three times the value of the bribe or a prison sentence.

Past behaviour of companies is supposed to be taken into account when firms are considered for a list of pre-qualified suppliers. There is no evidence of a range of sanctions being available, from procurement executive-imposed debarment to legal sanctions, heavy fines or imprisonment.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed, and sources added.

Research has not uncovered any Lebanese policy dealing with offset contracts, and there is insufficient evidence to state whether such contracts are in place. Lebanon does not possess a fledgling defence industry nor is it involved in the large scale, non-of the shelf, weapons deals comparable in the Gulf States, features typically associated with offset agreements.
Insufficient evidence to state whether the government imposes due diligence or auditing requirements on offset contracts, though it is unlikely.

Insufficient evidence to state whether the MoD is involved in offset contracts and programmes, if it is it does not make any details of them transparent.

Insufficient evidence to state whether offset contracts are active and if so if they are subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract.

It is difficult to assess whether the government controls companies' use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle. There is little available information available on this matter and the Army is not obliged to disclose it. The score is therefore based solely upon interviewees, who were not aware of any such practice.

No evidence available to state whether the government imposes restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries, there is no evidence that controls, if they exist, are active.

There appears to be no obligation to disclose such information prior to the signing of contracts, although most major arms deals (although still very small by regional standards) are disclosed upon agreement of the contract. For example, a recent US FMS agreement for Advanced Technology Systems co. to provide TETRA radios to the Lebanese army saw disclosure of value, nature (fixed price) and the length of the contract. In many cases details of the financing package are not publicly available. There may be no information on whether a financing package exists at all.

There is no evidence of the government formally requiring the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, nor is there evidence of the government encouraging this informally, generally or in the defence sector.
Lebanon has received donations and/or purchased from a large list of private and state-owned companies however, many of which are not signed up to anti-corruption programmes.

Defence procurement comes from a variety of sources. It is also not controlled by any one particular faction in Lebanon (such as the pro-Western/Saudi Arabia 'March 14 Alliance' or the pro-Syria/Iran 'March 8 Alliance').

Decisions regarding the content of donations of equipment to Lebanon are often the result of calculations of donor nations as to what political influence they can achieve.

There are currently allegations that Saudi Arabia is freezing supply due to political differences with pro-Houthi members of the government. Political influence is an important factor, given that Lebanon is reliant upon foreign money, notably a $4bn fund from Saudi Arabia, for defence acquisitions. It is difficult to prove influence being a bigger factor than need given the current acquisition spree following the Saudi fund that has seen Lebanon acquire material from a diverse array of nations including the US, UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Brazil, Russia, Syria, Iran and China.

As the LAf website states it: “The assistance received from Syria, the USA, and other friendly countries has played a basic role in bridging the gap between needs and available means.” This is a hard metric to measure and compare on the information available.