Researcher4230: The sales and disposals of assets go through a process that is centralised in a department called DGAG (Directeur Général de l'Administration et Gestion). A Committee is in charge of developing tenders to be publicised in the government newspaper “Le renouveau”. An advertisement campaign takes place and buyers pay and receive the assets through a transparent procedure. The profit from these sales goes to the Ministry of Defence’s account. The public does not have access to information on how these profits are then used; reports are sent only by the Committee to the DGA, which analyses it and then sends it back to the MoD.

In practice, there are a lot of shortcomings throughout this process. One good example is the concession of active disposal of assets. Land in Burundi becomes rarer and is of increasing interest to the military. Procedures regarding the transfers to the domain of the military are neither clear nor planned.

Researcher4230: The control of assets disposals is made by the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defence, a department in charge of controlling all services within the ministry, as well as the general staff of National Defence Forces. Officially, the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of National Defence is the high command for the promotion of transparency and accountability. However, it is difficult to know the degree of independence of this department, as it is an internal body within the MoD, and its reports are not made public.

Researcher4230: The National Intelligence Service (SNR) budget is separated from the MoD’s budget. For 2015, the allocated budget to the National Intelligence Service was 3 730 497 653 BIF, which constitutes 3.46 per cent of the total defence and security budget (interpreted here as the defence budget and the SNR budget combined).

Researcher4230: The law is not clear about the extent to which Parliament may exert control over the Ministry of Defence. The law does not distinguish between the Ministry of Defence and other ministries. However, the purchase of classified goods is never a subject of debate in Parliament and is never scrutinised by parliamentary committees. In addition, civil society organisations have been denouncing the delay for budget delivery to the Parliament for many years. The Constitution stipulates in its article 176 that the budget should be scrutinized for three months. However the executive usually sends it to Parliament in December, which does not leave enough time for analysis ( 3 days in 2013 and 4 days in 2014). Parliamentary control over the defence budget is therefore very limited. According to Faustin N, President of PARCEM, &quoute;the Finance Minister shows up at the Assembly, and then reads a summary of budget proposals by the different ministries.&quoute; The situation helps maintain obscure areas within the budget. There is no transparency on secret items. According to Faustin N. every year there is a “tacit renewal of some topics within ministries, without however checking their usefulness&quoute;.

Researcher4230: The Ministry of Defence does not report to Parliament on its secret programmes. Expenditure in connection with the purchases of secret materials are authorised by a Special Commission which only reports to the Office of the President. The programme is not subject to audits by the General Inspectorate of the State. There is no reporting to Parliament, despite the fact that the constitution authorises the Parliament and the Senate to control the action of the defence and security institutions.

Researcher4230: Off-budget expenditures are allowed and are directed by internal procedures from within the Defence Ministry. They do not appear in the annual MoD budget. That said, income from off-budget expenditures is probably insignificant. Internal regulations allow military units to sell some products coming from the production units but the income from their sale is very low. Money comes from business units, such as military canteens and agriculture (palm trees, vegetables as well as wood sale). Off-budget expenditures are used for plumbing or electric fixing and other similar small expenses. There is a tradition of justifying financial inputs and outputs to the Defence Ministry. Military camp commanders produce reports on the use of off-budget funds.

According to interviewees, off-budgetary spendings are easy to embezzle, as commanders only have to report without proper control. General Inspection from the MoD does not travel to military field camps to check reports’ liability. The absence of control is justified by the lack of financial means.

Researcher4230: In practice, off-budget expenditures exists in all troop units. These expenses are used to meet the needs uncovered by the MoD’s budget. They represent only small amounts of money, supporting the proper functioning of military structures and units, such as plumbing fixing, light bulbs, electric wires, etc. Off-budget expenditures involve licit economic activities, such as the sale of out-of-order military goods, agricultural products, and the sale of beverages within military camps.

Researcher4230: There is no clearly defined legal basis for the classification of information. However, there are internal regulation mechanisms within the Ministry of Defence. Those mechanisms provide evidence of the circulation of information and access to information for each unit, according to their ranking and needs. Accordingly, there is a channel gathering all information related to army activities. This channel follows the chain of command and information transmission is always encrypted (with military codes). No classified information is released by the MoD’s spokesperson to the public.

Score changed from 0 to 1 given that there does seem to be some internal regulation mechanisms for the classification of information.

Researcher4230: Defence bodies administer several institutions which can generate incomes: the Military Hospital of Kamenge (which is autonomous), the Caisse d’Entraide Coopérative pour l’Auto-Développement (CECAD) (a military bank, which functions through micro-financing), and the Muzinda civil engineering battalion (whose vehicles are sometimes used to generate incomes). These companies' financial transactions are sometimes published on the website of the Ministry of Defence but without full transparency; there are no details on their activities.

Moreover, the Decree No 100/125 of 19 April 2012 (revising Decree No 100/323 of 27 December 2011) relating to the structure, functioning, and missions of the Burundian government allows the Ministry of Defence to contribute to the country’s economic development in the framework of training and production.

Researcher4230: There are no businesses belonging to the Burundian military, other than a military bank (CECAD, Caisse d’Entraide Coopérative pour l’Auto-Développement) and a military hospital. Both institutions are subject to independent control, such as the Central Bank control (for CECAD) and the supervision of the Ministry of health (for the military hospital). Results monitoring are carried out according to international standards. Violation is punished by state institutions in charge of inspections, audit and repression of corruption. According to the law, a bank in Burundi must undergo three audits: an internal audit, an external audit, and the audit of the Central Bank. In line with the Bank Act which prohibits Central Bank to release sensitive data on Banks, results of these controls are not made public.

Researcher4230: Any private enterprise is supposedly incompatible with public service and military functions. However, agriculture, farming and teaching have been authorised by the government. Since the embargo imposed by the international community in 1997, the government (which was in financial difficulty) became very permissive, allowing soldiers to have small businesses to compensate for their low salaries. These small businesses are not punished unless they create a conflict of interest with military functions. Some high-level officers appear to have personal interests in private companies under their own names or assumed names.

Researcher4230: defence Minister Gaciyubwenge Pontient has expressed his will to fight corruption within the Ministry of Defence, during his speech on the awareness day for fighting corruption and strengthening integrity within the MoD and Defence Forces. This event was organised for senior executives.

Defence bodies are generally requested to be disciplined and upstanding. The DSS programme supports capacity-building activities on ethics and integrity. Through speeches, military authorities have committed themselves to respect the policy on good governance and on the fight against corruption. Whenever media and CSOs denounce corruption acts, the High Commander declares that he will not tolerate that the integrity of the defence bodies be compromised.

Researcher4230: The anti-corruption law punishes all kind of bribery and corruption. Article 28 of the law mentions that its provisions are applicable to the military. Articles 42 to 63 establish measures for prevention and punishment in cases of corruption. Prison terms from 5 to 10 years and a fine (ranging from simple to double the value of the acquired illicit profit) may apply in case of an offence.

Military officers have been prosecuted for stealing fuel and many non-commissioned officers are currently in jail for taking part in corruption. However, those measures are not applied consistently. Ties between offenders and senior army officers and/or influential politicians may hamper the enforcement of the law, avoiding sanctions or simply generating appointments to new positions for offenders.

Researcher4230: There is a legislation relating to whistleblowing, including protection for whistleblowers, as stipulated within the anti-corruption law. According to article 13 (establishing measures to prevent and repress corruption and related offences), whistleblowers are encouraged by getting grants as a premium for exposure. Although it is true that anti-corruption law encourages denunciation, article 14 of this same law restrains and discourages to a large extent whistle-blowers from doing so by envisaging sanctions (up to 10 years in prison) for false declarations. Civil Society Organisations advocate for the removal of this article. In practice, whistleblowers may face serious consequences.

Score changed from 2 to 1 to reflect in-text comments.

Researcher4230: There are requirements for sensitive posts, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial and commercial management, and the Ministry of Defence. Those requirements consider criminal records, ethical behaviour, and expertise. Generally, non-commissioned officers have a public affairs, management, or accounting background. They also receive training throughout their career.

There is no mandate as such, but at the Command´s discretion, the leadership can decide on the assignment of other functions or other localities. Hence, vacancies are not made public and there is no system in place to compete for the assignment of sensitive positions. In the current transitory phase of the reform of the defence forces, appointments are made at the Command’s discretion who usually takes ethnic balance and competence into account. The Minister of defence recognises that there are certain positions within the MoD which may be more open to corruption opportunities such as recruitment, supplying, resource management and inspectorate. However, there have been no concrete measure to eradicate corruption within those units.

Researcher4230: It is difficult to find reliable information on the number of civilian and military personnel from the Ministry of Defence in 2015. The general director in charge of Human Resources has not been on duty since May 2015, following the aborted coup. There have been no recent reports on the number of civilian and military personnel. According to older publications, the army is composed of 27 000 civilian and military personnel.

Score changed from 4 to 1 given the lack of recent reports .

Researcher4230: The pay rate and allowance for military and non military personnel are published. The lowest monthly pay rate is 16 113 BIF (£6) and the highest one is 504.486 BIF (£200). Allowances, premiums, and various staff benefits are discussed in Parliament. However, the level of detail is low, generally given by non-official sources.

Salaries are statutory and allocated according to ranking. Allowances are granted according to the role and bonuses according to according to the expertise or specialised technicalities recognised through a certificate. Regulations govern how these benefits are granted and the same regulations apply to any other possible benefit. Pay lists are verified by agents from the Social Security Departments (INSS et Mutuelle de la Fonction Publique) to verify social contributions. Hence, there is transparency in the determination of salaries, premiums and allowances for military staff, and those granted are accessible to the public.

Researcher4230: Since the creation of the CECAD, procedures for the payment of Ministry of Defence’s personnel are the same as any other State officials. Salaries go through the CECAD Bank, on a monthly basis, in a timely manner. Before the creation of the CECAD, officers had accounts in commercial banks while subordinates were paid in cash.

Researcher4230: Military personnel are appointed on the base of ranking. Moreover, according to the 2005 constitution and Arusha agreements, appointments to senior posts of command must respect an ethnic balance. Yet, the Cabinet keeps a discretionary power for nomination. The same applies to the appointments at the rank level of generals, where the selection system is not necessarily independent or transparent.

Since 2009, there have been complaints at the Ministry of Defence because promotion no longer follows established rules. Promotions are now politicised; the party at power is a former armed movement and former combatants of the CNDD-FDD movement are privileged, generating frustrations and injustices. Four promotions from the Military Academy, from 34th to 37th promotion are stuck to the rank of captain while those who came from the rebellion continue to advance in the ranks. Interviewed officers believe that this exclusion is made to award former rebels and to marginalise officers from the old regime.

Researcher4230: Officially, promotions within the army follow a legal standard process, in line with the National Defence Forces Statutes. Statutes stipulate that promotions reflect annual notation bulletins. Annual notations show officer’s proficiency, according to direct supervisor’s valuation and the unit’s Commander. It should be based on objective criteria. In practice, favoritism based on ethnic and political criteria is observed since 2009 in the military promotion process. According to the interviewee, the current Chief of Staff, Major General Prime NIYONGABO, is accused by the military of being the instigator of a double standard policy. The military accuse him of instigating division and favoritism, bypassing the law to promote his former colleagues from the CNDD-FDD movement.

Score changed from 2 to 1 in line with the CA's comments.

Researcher4230: Since 2005 mandatory conscription no longer exists in Burundi, so there are no rules or measures against corruption in this area.

Researcher4230: Transparency is guaranteed on advertisements, calls for applications and selection criteria. We note that the procedure to conclude the final list is sometimes subject to political influence, which has been criticised by the media. However, the enrollment is voluntary and there is no substantial risk of corruption.

Researcher4230: Since the creation of the CECAD in 2006, the presence of ghost soldiers on the payroll is very unlikely. Money no longer passes through the hands of unit commanders - salaries go directly into the accounts of the military. However, the staff of the CECAD state that deaths and desertions are not reported quickly, which can lead to salaries still being paid into the respective employee's account. The bureaucratic procedures at the Ministry of Defence can be slow.

Researcher4230: The chain of command is clearly different from the payment chain, although this does not appear to be a published policy. The salaries of the military personnel of Burundi go through the CECAD Bank. Wages are sent by the Ministry of Finance to the Central Bank and the Central Bank transfers them to the personal accounts of military personnel to the CECAD. The chain of command provides only the information necessary for the preparation of payroll. The Central Processing Department uses information coming from the chain of command, especially when it comes to the suspension of salary payments due to disciplinary sanctions.

Sanctions are usually taken objectively, but cases occur when hostility between a soldier and his/her superior can lead to unjust sanctions which have an impact on their salary and potential promotions.

Researcher4230: The military has its own code of conduct (which is not public) and its special court (Auditorat Militaire). The National Defence Forces Statutes contains topics relating to the code of conduct for military personnel. In particular, Article 26 stipulates that officers shall formally refrain from accepting or demanding gifts or any other benefit in relation to their position. Military regulations also established rules framing behavior during private life. (Chapter 1, title 10). Application of these regulations is strict and military officers are strictly controlled; reports are regularly delivered internally.

Media coverage regarding corruption within the military is not extensive. Nevertheless, some senior officers are sometimes cited in suspicious cases such as for weapons or mineral smuggling from East Congo.

Researcher4230: Code of conduct violations are treated internally in case of simple violations, and brought before the military prosecutor's office in case of serious violations. These cases are not made public. The head of each unit is responsible for compliance with the code of conduct, and he/she is in charge of alerting superiors in the case of any violations. Civil society organisation, such as OLUCOME, often denounce the fact that high ranking officers are never prosecuted for corruption cases.

Researcher4230: The DSS Programme (The development program for the Security Sector) organises training on good governance, especially for military and police staff. However, these training sessions are not specifically on anti-corruption. Sporadic trainings are also organised by the Ministry of Good Governance. A military officer from the armed forces staff explained that the Ministry of Defence does include many civilians in his staff and they do not occupy important positions. Civilians working within the Ministry of the Defence are simple technicians called military civil technicians (MCT).

Researcher4230: The anti-corruption court has no effective policy to publish its activities but some cases are reported in local media. For example, former vice president of the Republic Frederic BAMVUGINYUMVIRA was sentenced to five years in jail for bribery following a sex scandal in 2013 that he claims was created to block him from running for president. Bamvuginyumvira, credited in some media reports as being a highly respected leader with a reputation for being tough on graft, was Burundi's vice president from 1998 to 2001. He had been touted as one of the most serious potential opposition presidential candidates.

In other cases there is a lack of willingness from the Government and the Court to release information regarding corruption cases involving senior army officers. Ad hoc press conferences are given by the anti-corruption court, in particular to announce annual assessments on its activities. Non-Governmental Organisation OLUCOME has accused this Court of dealing with too little cases in comparison with the number of cases that have been sent to it.

Researcher4230: The use of facilitation payments is illegal according to the anti-corruption law and military code of conduct. According to the National Defence Forces Statutes, it is strictly forbidden for military troops (article 29) and senior officers (article 19d) to demand gifts or advantages based on their position. Facilitation payments are also considered as an act of bribery by the special anti-corruption brigade and the prosecution service. The Anti-Corruption Court prosecutes people suspected of facilitation payments. There have been numerous facilitation payment cases.

Researcher4230: The concept of the fight against corruption is still new for the Ministry of Defence. In the military regulations in force, the word corruption does not appear, but the regulation emphasises the military's ethical behavior in relation to citizens, and the concepts of integrity and loyalty. Regulations prohibit gifts which soldiers may receive in exchange for services, but corruption is not mentioned. However, since 2009, the DSS Programme organises training on ethics within the MoD. As such, corruption appears to be recognised as an aspect of governance, but not specifically as a strategic issue during operations.

Researcher4230: There is no special programme of training on corruption issues that can be faced during deployment. The only training that the military receive before their deployment to peacekeeping missions is given by the U.S. Army, and it is based on leadership and ethical behavior on the ground and at the commander level. The reputation of Burundian soldiers involved in international peacekeeping operations is generally good.

Researcher4230: No one is deployed in the field to monitor corruption.

Researcher4230: According to the research done and the interviewee, there are no guidelines on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions.

Researcher4230: The Burundian Constitution, article 254, states: “all recourse to foreign forces is prohibited, except in the case of authorization by the President of the Republic”.

Burundi had approached the company Bancroft in 2008 to receive expertise on the challenges of urban warfare in the context of AMISOM. Another article states that Burundi and Uganda have been paying Bancroft in 2013 but that they have then be reimbursed by the U.S. State Department: &quoute;The governments of Uganda and Burundi pay Bancroft millions of dollars to train their soldiers for counterinsurgency missions in Somalia under an African Union banner, money that the State Department then reimburses to the two African nations. Since 2010, Bancroft has apparently received about $7 million through this arrangement.&quoute;

Researcher4230: In Burundi, there is no specific legislation for defence and security markets. Law N° 1/01 of 4 February 2008 on procurement covers all aspects for public procurement. The Ministry is governed by the law on public procurement, like any other Ministry. A procurement cell has been set up within the Ministry of Defence whose work is supervised by the National Directorate on Public Procurement Control (DNMP), which is integrated within the Ministry of Finance and Planning of Economic Development. The legislation is established and enforced.

However, the State struggles to respect the new rules on procurement. According to a study done by the regulatory authority of public procurement on the award of public procurement on the fiscal 2011 and 2012, several cases of violation of the Act on public procurement were observed. Cases of non-compliance with the law emerged, such as invoices including overloads, or non-registered vouchers. The problem is not new, in 2010 a letter from the NGO Olucome already denounced procurement frauds within the MoD.

Researcher4230: Supplies for the Ministry of Defence are divided into secret and non-secret items. For non-secret items, the law requires that the procurement process shall be made public; this is not mandatory for secret items. Tenders are advertised in the Official Journal and on radio stations. The selection process should be transparent. In practice, procurement procedures for non-secret items are often treated with opacity; according to an NGO report from the OAG (Observatoire de l’action gouvernementale), some public procurement tenders are not made public, and applicants complain about procurements already allocated before the tender is announced.

Researcher4230: An oversight mechanism for defence procurement exists. A procurement management cell has been created according to the decree No 100/123 of July 11, 2013 regarding the creation, organisation and functioning of the Procurement Management Cell. There is also independent oversight through the Procurement Regulation Authority and National Direction of Procurement Control. However, there are still gaps in the control of the procurement.

In a 2014 audit of the Defence Forces by the Public Procurement Regulation Authority (Autorité de regulation des marchés publics), several irregularities within public procurements from the Defence Ministry have been found, such as an awarded contract for rice by mutual agreement for the sum of 700 million BIF (ref. DNCMP183 F-2011), while such procurement should be open to competition.

An independent review of Burundi's defence procurement oversight mechanisms by the Business System Consulting Group shows that despite the existence of a proper institutional framework, these mechanisms are undermined by the existence of derogatory clauses and ad hoc commisions which limits their effectiveness and independence.

Researcher4230: In its policy against corruption, the Government recommended that all public purchases shall be brought to the attention of the public. An exception is made for the purchase of secret items. In practice, purchases are not sufficiently disclosed. Purchases are not published on the website of the Ministry of Defence or on the website of the Government. Audits within the Ministry of Defence revealed that, for the fiscal years 2011 and 2012, the Ministry failed to systematically publish public procurement.

Researcher4230: Public procurement of the Ministry of Defence is subject to the same standards and rules than public bid for other State institutions. These standards are defined by the Burundian law on public procurement. Public procurement are of two kinds, OTC markets (gré à gré) and public markets with competition. For public procurement with competition, it is open to any company. To be selected, a company must prove its technical and financial capacity. The bidding company shall also be in order with the Treasury, which is verified through its tax accountability certification. The law exclude applicants from competition in case of penal records. OTC markets, that is to say public procurement awarded to companies without competitions, are awarded only for products requiring a special patent or a licence, or exclusive rights. In 2010, President of Burundi has set up a Special Commission to give exemptions for OTC procurement for secret items. This law may lead to potential corruption, as no control is possible for secret items’ procurement.

Researcher4230: There is a national defence policy and a sectoral policy; both documents are publicly available. However, those documents do not give comprehensive details on strategic acquisitions. According to the interviewee, acquisitions’ strategy is included in an internal regulation document; it is not publicly available and it is kept within the DGAG (Direction generale d’approvisionnement et de gestion, General Department for provisions and stock management). Following public procurement law, provisions should be planned annually.

According to the interviewee, shortfalls within supplies caused by a budget shortage generates embezzlments; military officers are sometimes forced to pay bribes in order to receive equipment, such as clothing or shoes.

Following the failed coup on May 13th 2015, several DGAG positions remained vacant, as several officers are suspected to have taken part in the coup. As a consequence, offices are closed and there has been no official supply to the Ministry of Defence - supplies continue, but not through legal channels.

Overall, the strategy is not transparent and certain acquisitions are not necessarily part of the planning, as their contracts can be negotiated on a higher level and in the greatest secrecy, allocated in an opaque process. Some contracts can indeed be negotiated at high level and granted according to an obscure process. This is the case of the trucks purchase and communication equipment (Letter of 25 January 2012, reference 14/OLUCOME/01/2012, Bujumbura, consulted 5 December 2013, Iwacu, 7 September 2011).

Researcher4230: Non secret items are acquired by the Ministry of defence following the law on public procurement. Purchases are planned annually and a commission is set up to study and quantify purchases before the launch of procurement procedures. Military regional departments express their needs and transmit their clearly identified requests to the State’s General Major who collates them and in turn transmits them to the General Directorate on Acquisitions and Management. Overall the General Major understands the needs of the regional military departments, according to the recognised norms based on numbers, efficiency and the vision that military personnel and politicians share on national defence. For secret items, there is a special commission in charge of provisions. Opportunistic purchases may take place for secret equipment, as a special procurement commission do not publish report on its activities.

In a 2014 audit on defence Forces from the Public Procurement Regulation Authority (Autorité de regulation des marchés publics), several irregularities within public procurements from the Defence ministry have been found, such as an awarded contract for rice by mutual agreement for the sum of 700 million BIF (ref. DNCMP183 F-2011) while such procurement should be open to competition. However, these irregularities do not prove that the MoD does not respect clearly identified and quantified requirements.

Researcher4230: In principle all MoD purchases go through open competition. However, secret materials are exempt from entering contests. New mechanisms instituted through the law on Public Procurement and the possibility for companies to resort to legal means in case of fraud may have diminished corruption risks. Yet, procurement rules do not seem to be well respected within the Ministry of Defence. Several cases of procedures violations have been reported during audits, for fiscal year 2012 and 2013. Urgent needs and off-budget resources for operations or secret missions can be subject to corruption, not undergoing a transparent procurement process on the basis of objective and fair evaluation criteria. It is difficult to estimate the exact amount of these exceptions compared to the total budget because this budget is excluded from budgetary law.

Researcher4230: Article 47 from the law on public procurement requires that any procurement shall go through tender’s advertisement. There is a public procurement regulatory authority which oversees all public procurements. Its members are state and civil society representatives. The Ministry of defence is subject to the same rules as other public entities. A Committee of regulation on public procurement has also been put in place within the MoD, which supports the branch on acquisitions and management.

In 2013, the public procurement regulatory authority was accused by OLUCOME of improper decision making while awarding a contract to the company ASSYST for the delivery of an integrated management and monitoring system to the Ministry of Finance. Following that case, OLUCOME, which represented civil society, stopped working this body.

Researcher4230: The Law on Public Procurement formally prohibits any collusion between bidders (such as the destruction of competition, price fixing, results of fixing or collusion in procurement). There are no special measures for the defence sector. In case a bidder is caught in a situation of collusion, he/she is excluded from the competition and he loses the possibility to participate to any other contest for public procurement.

Cases of collusion between bidders can happen at the MoD – especially with regard to dry food – as there are no concrete measures to discourage collusion.

Researcher4230: Procurement staff is usually trained and technically competent. They generally have expertise on public procurement procedures. Moreover, they must follow principles of ethic, principles of public procurement and the anti-corruption law. Since 2009, they benefit from training within the framework of the Development of the Security Sector Programme. There are several internal levels of control, which play a deterrent role and oblige procurement staff to respect contractual obligations. The delivery is done in the military regions and units and the suppliers must comply strictly with their obligations as payment depends on the quality and quantity received by regional military departments. Suppliers can apparently escape the control for certain items of procurement, such as secret items.

Researcher4230: The Law on Public Procurement provides mechanisms for complaint in case of a procedural violation. An Authority of Public Procurement Regulation has been established as an independent organ, which is supposed to be financially independent to be able to carry out its missions of regulation, audit and legal resort in cases of contestations by companies.

In practice, some suppliers decide not to use the mechanisms to complain in order to avoid any disputes with the MoD and to be able to continue to work with them. In Burundi, most cases of corruption or injustice are not revealed by the judicial system but rather by the media and CSOs. According to one interviewee, citizens and companies do not have confidence in the judicial system because it is the most corrupt sector.

Researcher4230: Articles 48 and 49 of the anti-corruption law establishes that any person who is caught while attempting to corrupt an agent of the State is punishable by a fine and imprisonment of up to 10 years. Yet punishments are not frequent.

According to an International Crisis Group’s report on corruption in Burundi only petty corruption is punished while grand corruption is totally ignored. According to a U.S. State Department report, this impunity is due to the interference of the Executive in judicial services. According to the same report, in 2011, Supreme court judges received death threats while dealing with corruption cases involving high-level military officers.

Researcher4230: At the national level, there is a Commission in charge of offset contracts. A Public Security Minister is acting as president, the National Defence Minister as vice president, the Finance Minister as a member and the National Director of Procurement Control as another member. Within the Ministry of defence, offset contracts are managed by the High Commander, in their acceptance as well as in their execution. Negotiators and agents in charge of the reception, circulation and modalities of offset contracts, are exposed to a terrain that is prone to corruption.

We have not found any concrete cases because offset contracts are part of the secret domain. There is no evidence of due diligence or audit requirements.

Researcher4230: According to public procurement law, all public contracts should be published (including offset programmes and contracts), allowing civil society to monitor public procurement cycles. However, in practice the law is not respected. For example, in 2014, a market awarded by the public procurement entity created a conflict with the NGO Olucome, which preferred to withdraw from the process. Reports on public procurements, such as one from the OAG (Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale) show that the current Government has difficulties to respect transparency principles within public procurements.

Researcher4230: There are no specific rules within the Ministry of Defence for the award of public contracts. As a consequence, internal reports from the Ministry of Defence reveal that procedures may be violated during procurements. The lack of transparency has also been highlighted.

Researcher4230: Public procurement law does not allow agents and intermediaries. Controls should be done by the regulating council from the public procurement entity. According to information by civil society, such as reports published by the OAG (Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale) or OLUCOME, government controls are not done effectively to prevent potential infringement of the law within the procurement cycle. Controls should be exercised by various organs of control of public procurement, including the public procurement authority.

Researcher4230: The financing packages surrounding major arms deals are not made public. Only members of the Special OTC procurement Committee for secret items are aware of this package. Members of this Committee are the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Security, the Minister of Finance and the Advisor of the Presidency as well as the Director of the National Intelligence Service.

Other procurement items, which do not necessarily have a secret character, can be inserted into this niche and can be covered by the law No 100/35 of 26/10/2010.

Researcher4230: The Government does not clearly specify how anti-corruption policies should be implemented by potential contractors or their subcontractors to become a public contractor. Generally, the Government only requires that the company does respect contract terms, in fulfilment of the law.

Researcher4230: China is the only weapons’ seller to Burundi. In 2012 and 2013, China sold weapons to Burundi for about 5 USD million per year. Cost is the main criterion for purchasing these weapons from China. As China is not a prime economic partner of Burundi, China's ability to exert pressure is nonetheless limited.

In general, acquisition decisions are not based on the political influence of selling nations. The MoD plans its needs, specifies the technical characteristics, and elaborates on the conditions of the acquisition. However, some nations (especially those that have a bilateral relationship with Burundi) can have an interest in influencing Burundi by suggesting flexible conditions on reimbursement.

Some commentators indicated that this is the case of China and Russia. To support the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the U.S. has also provided equipment and transport, but the conditions of these acquisitions have not been made public. Given that the procedures for capability gap assessments and technical requirement specifications are poor, political influence cannot be ruled out in arms purchases, although there is no solid evidence.