United Arab Emirates

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The UAE transfers weapons in order to further its own regional interests, which are often at odds with the stated goals of the major arms-exporting countries (US and Europe) that supply the UAE with its major weapons systems. As such, public accountability or transparency regarding such activities is unlikely, as it would complicate bilateral relations with these countries. For example, the UAE [allegedly] supplied weapons to anti-government rebels in Libya and Syria, but intercepted a huge shipment of arms most likely bound for anti-government rebels in Yemen [and manufactured illicitly in Turkey]. The UAE has also expressed interest in transferring some of its French-made mirage jets to President Sisi’s government in Egypt, which it has also supported with large grants and loans.

Intelligence Online. October 23 2013. Al Kaabi family profile.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to the 2012 assessment, under the 1976 State Audit Institution Law there was a process in place for ministers to attest to the presence of confidential and secret spending within their ministries, though they had to submit a signed statement to that effect, in essence creating a paper trail. This conflicted with the language of the Armed Forces Law, according to which the budget was &quoute;not subject to confidential expense,&quoute; meaning the relevant ministers (Defence and Interior) were not able to make confidential expenditures.

Perhaps this was to prevent members of the ruling family from purchasing defence material without notifying the executive office in Abu Dhabi - which suggests it was about maintaining centralized control and preventing the formation of a rival power center, and not related to concerns over transparency or accountability. Indeed the very concept of &quoute;secret&quoute; budgetary items in this context is nonsensical, as the entire defence and security budget is secret.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to the SAI its Annual General Report, which includes &quoute;the main and the most significant findings result[ing] from the SAI audit&quoute; is presented to the President of the UAE and &quoute;reported&quoute; to both the Cabinet and the FNC. The SAI also claims to complete more detailed annual reports on &quoute;authorities and companies subject to the SAI audit&quoute; which are delivered by SAI to the &quoute;competent authority&quoute; (tasked with approving the audit findings and final account statements) in addition to the Ministry of Finance, the Cabinet and the FNC.

However, according to a US State Department cable dated 2004, officials from the Ministry of Finance admitted to US diplomatic personnel that they did not know how the military budget was spent or what proportion went to fund weapons acquisitions. This would suggest that there are no effective audits of defence or security spending.

&quoute;Reports issued by the SAI.&quoute; http://saiuae.gov.ae/English/News/Pages/22052012.aspx

&quoute;Security Dominates the UAE Federal Budget.&quoute; US State Department Cable. 30 August 2004. https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI2930_a.html

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to a US State Department cable dated 2004, the majority of UAE defence spending is &quoute;off-budget&quoute; as it comes directly from Abu Dhabi, and does not pass through the UAE Federal Government. The SAI most likely has more complete access to these federal budgets, but not the complete budgets of the individual Emirates. The federal budget is primarily used for paying salaries for military personnel and civilian defence and security employees, which is responsible for only a modest portion of overall defence and security expenditure. It is unclear whether this has changed significantly since 2004.

&quoute;Security Dominates the UAE Federal Budget.&quoute; US State Department Cable. 30 August 2004. https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI2930_a.html

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Difficult to score when even the on-budget items are not transparent.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would suggest a score of &quoute;1&quoute; because the vast majority of the UAE's overall defence and security spending is on military equipment, which is the part of the spending that is &quoute;off-budget.&quoute;

Suggested score: 1

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would suggest a score of &quoute;0&quoute; - as there is no clear policy on document classification according to national security imperatives - and that even gaining access to non-security related information appears to be difficult.

In terms of general public access to government information, the U.S. State Department reports that, although the law officially provides for public access to such information, most requests go unanswered. I was unable to get any information on security-related document classification regulations, despite multiple requests for interviews which were rejected.


United States Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012: United Arab Emirates.” http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204387

Suggested score: 0

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The MOD does not yet have a proper classification system that balances the need for security with the need for usability. Everything is kept secret by default, without applying rigorous controls. I suspect this reflects practice across the defence sector.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Many military-industrial enterprises are state-owned, and many retired military officials have beneficial ownership of companies that were established with some form of initial state-support (often as part of an offset agreement); one prominent example is General Khaled Abu-Ainnain (see article listed below). Many more retired military officers sit on the corporate boards of military-industrial enterprises – though this is by no means a phenomenon unique to the UAE. However, there is no evidence that official defence and security institutions themselves have ownership of commercial businesses (military-industrial or otherwise) either directly or through the UAE Armed Forces pension fund or other investment vehicles. The fact that there is no publicly available information regarding audits of the revenues of the UAE’s many state-owned military-industrial enterprises means it is possible these revenues accrue to defence or security institutions, but there is no firm evidence either way.

I would suggest a score of 2 for a number of reasons. Although the value of these companies is probably quite limited in comparison to the UAE’s estimated $14 billion annual defence budget (which would suggest a score of 4) this is more a reflection of the absolute size of the budget rather than the value of the commercial enterprises that might be ‘owned’ by the military or security establishment. And because the details of military revenues and spending are not reported, it is impossible to determine whether some of these enterprises are in fact operated for the benefit of the military/security establishment or not (which would suggest a score of 1). The fact that retired officers and individuals retired from high-ranking positions in military procurement and related bureaucracies are sole-owners, executives, or shareholders in a range of military-industrial enterprises that benefit from various forms of state investment and support also argues for a lower score, which is why I suggest a “2.”


Ivan Gale. 27 April 2010. &quoute;Pledge to build fighter jets in capital.&quoute; The National (UAE). Previous link (removed from site): http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100427/BUSINESS/704279882&SearchID=73388980945725

Suggested score: 2

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no evidence that official defence and security institutions themselves have ownership of commercial businesses (military-industrial or otherwise) either directly or through the UAE Armed Forces pension fund or other investment vehicles. However, many military-industrial enterprises are state-owned, and many retired military officials have beneficial ownership of companies that were established with some form of initial state-support (often as part of an offset agreement). Many more retired military officers sit on the corporate boards of military-industrial enterprises – though this is by no means a phenomenon unique to the UAE.

The fact that there is no publicly available information regarding audits of the revenues of the UAE’s many state-owned military-industrial enterprises means it is possible these revenues accrue to defence or security institutions, but there is no firm evidence either way. It is very unlikely that the State Audit Institution (SAI) carries out oversight of the enterprises owned by individuals affiliated with military and security institutions (retired officers or individuals retired from high-ranking positions in military procurement and related bureaucracies) – to include those that have received some form of state support.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The issue here is not so much unauthorized private enterprise by currently enlisted military/security personnel, so much as retired personnel exploiting their privileged access and contacts to profit from private enterprise.

According to a confidential interview with a member of the business community based in the United States, in the mid-2000s the government made a concerted effort to establish a small number of domestic military-industrial companies designed to compete with eachother to supply small and basic items to the UAE Armed Forces – and to produce parts for the global supply chains of large foreign defence firms. (Most of these companies were established under the auspices of the UAE’s offset program, which was quite successful at attracting technology and capital investment from foreign defence firms). However, these enterprises essentially functioned as foreign companies (with foreign technologies and foreign staff) that only served to generate profits for a handful of well-connected Emirati businessmen – including many with long military careers – who served as their titular owners and executives. This interviewee also cited “graft” as another prominent feature of these companies. In response, the government has begun taking over the companies and consolidating them. Initially these firms were subsidiaries of large investment vehicles (primarily Tawazun and Mubadala) which were partially capitalized through offset agreements signed with foreign defence firms. They are being spun off from these investment vehicles and put under a new umbrella organization called EDIC (Emirates defence Industrial Corporation). This interviewee confirmed that this move was done in large part to address issues of corruption, but also for predicted gains in efficiency and to create a single coherent local partner organization for foreign firms.

Furthermore, there appears to be a loophole in the law regarding private enterprise by enlisted officers. Article 48 of the Federal Armed Forces Law prohibits an officer from having any interest, whether personally or through an intermediary, in any works or contracts related to the armed forces. However, there is an exception for the lease of property owned by that officer, which is not prohibited by law. I am not sure on what practical grounds such a narrow exception would exist unless it is explicitly to undermine the spirit of the law. I do believe there are some well-connected elites (including military officers) that act as local partners for foreign companies wishing to do business in the UAE, which has for many decades imposed restrictions on the ability of foreign companies to do business in the absence of a local partner. I imagine these well-connected elites could register in their name the property or equipment of foreign companies, which not only gives the foreign company a powerful advocate with high-level government connections and a vested interest in their success, but allows the individual himself to profit from the lease of property that he owns in name only.


Interview 2 – Interview with member of advocacy organisation, 9th February via telephone

“Emirates Defence Industries Company Joined by Further Five Companies.” 24 February 2015. Emirates News Agency. http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/Emirates-Defence-Industries-Company-joined-by-further-five-companies/66831.htm

Charles Laubach (Afridi & Angell). 2014. “Getting the Deal Through – Anti Corruption Regulation 2014: United Arab Emirates.” Law Business Research Ltd.

Suggested score: 2

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Though they might not make public statements on such issues, I do not think it accurate to say that the defence leadership is not committed to countering corruption. UAE culture requires this to be done discreetly, by putting culturally appropriate systems in place, by paying their people well, and through application of severe punishments for transgressors. I think a score of 2 might be a more accurate reflection of these realities.

Suggested score: 2

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although there is relevant law – as cited by the assessor – I could not find any evidence that defence personnel had been prosecuted or punished for any offence.

The only mentions of legal action taken against anyone for charges of corruption or bribery in the context of the defence or security establishment concern non-Emirati citizens who are not themselves military officers or civilian defence bureaucrats. In one instance, a Jordanian engineer was sentenced to fines and two years in prison for taking bribes from a firm that was competing for a tender with the UAE Armed Forces. The engineer, who worked for another firm that handled contracts for the UAE Armed Forces, claimed he confessed under torture, but these allegations were dismissed. The case was initially heard in a military court, but was subsequently transferred to criminal court.


“Engineer took bribe to help firm secure army contract bid.” http://7daysinabudhabi.com/2014/12/21/engineer-took-bribe-to-help-firm-secure-army-contract-bid/

Suggested score: 2

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I was unable to get any information on personnel appointment or promotion, despite multiple requests for interviews which were rejected. It is clear that there are firms staffed by foreign defence-acquisition professionals that advise the official defence establishment on procurement and financial management, including a company called Knowledge Point, which is a subsidiary of the state-owned Emirates Advanced Investments. Judging by the LinkedIn profiles of employees of Knowledge Point, many of them have decades of experience in public sector acquisition planning and oversight of major weapons systems, and currently work with the UAE Armed Forces on similar issues. (Many are retired U.S. Military).

https://www.linkedin.com/pub/kenneth-copeland/67/669/4b

Whether or not these personnel advise on administrative oversight, promotion policies and general management issues is unclear – but their presence might suggest that the current arrangement lacked the regulations necessary for the efficient functioning of procurement.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As highlighted in an earlier question, I have anecdotal evidence of cases where senior military officers involved in significant procurement decisions and controlling significant expenditure have been subject to heightened security & background checks. I suggest a score of 1 is probably more accurate than a 0.

Suggested score: 1

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Again this is an area where GHQ currently has the lead not MOD. GHQ will have a good grasp on the number of personnel on the payroll but chooses not to make this information public deeming it to be sensitive for national security purposes.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would give a score of 3, for the reasons the assessor gives above, mainly that official sources are not readily available, and allowances (which can account for a substantial portion of overall remuneration) are unclear. However, salaries related to the new national service (draft/conscription) law are quite transparent. The transparency of conscript salaries may make salaries and allowances more transparent for all members of the Armed Forces, as it will become an issue of interest to a broader segment of society. The new law requires that private employers continue to pay half the salary of an employee that takes a leave of absence to perform his/her national service (the armed forces picks up the other half). There is bound to be pushback on this from the private sector, which will likely put pressure on the government to justify this policy and cite overall costs, average costs to employers, etc. Additionally, the law states that a monthly bonus will be provided for those enlistees who are entrepreneurs and skilled workers – and clarification on which individuals fit into these categories is likely to elicit the same sort of pushback and necessitate a government response. The new law also states that those who complete their national service will have priority in job placements, promotions, access to loans for marriage and the purchase of land, and that the Armed Forces will fund their continued education. The provision of such benefits to such a large portion of the population will certainly make the range of benefits available to regular enlisted personnel much clearer.

As of now, the basic pay rates for conscripts are clear and publicly-available (although the classification of individuals for the above categories is less clear). The following text is taken from the official government website handling public communication regarding the new policy:

“President His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan has issued Federal Decree No. 117 of 2014 on remuneration of recruits on national service and those called to reserve service. According to the first article of the new decree, national service recruits who are self-employed professionals and owners of personal enterprises will receive remuneration of Dh3000 a month. Recruits who are not employees of ministries and government departments and federal and local institutions and the private sector will receive remuneration of Dh3000 a month…..[R]emuneration of those on reserve service will be the following: For servicemen and employees who completed their service at the institutions defined by Article 6 of Federal Law No. 6 of 2014 which states that military service may be completed at the UAE Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior, the State Security Service and other institutions part of the military system, and others identified by the Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces. In case the duration of service for a serviceman or employee is three months or less, they will receive remuneration for the whole period as follows: rank of brigadier or equivalent: Dh21,000; ranks of lieutenant colonel and major or equivalent: Dh19,000; ranks of lieutenant up to captain or equivalent: Dh17,000; other ranks: Dh15,000. In case the duration of the serviceman or employee is more than three month, he will receive a monthly salary based on the last total salary (for the rank in the military service or employment grade) which will be equivalent to the salary for the previous rank or grade….According to the decree which will be published in the Official Gazette, the Deputy Supreme Commander of The Armed Forces may make any amendments to the value of the abovementioned remunerations at his discretion of the public interest.”


Ola Salem. 4 March 2014. “Benefits await Emiratis who complete military service.” The National (UAE).

“UAE President issues decree on remuneration of national service, reserve service recruits.” 23 December 2014. http://www.uaeinteract.com/french/news/default.asp?ID=489

Suggested score: 3

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In answer to the question posed, I'm not aware of any publicly available information on the various allowances that are paid.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: My understanding from talking to Emirate officers is that promotion upto Col is broadly automatic, in line with seniority in rank, time served, and a measure of ongoing competence. Promotion to Brig is not automatic and much more tied to merit. Promotion to Maj Gen requires personal approval of HH the deputy supreme commander and so is much more political. Of note, it is common practice for officers get promoted just prior to retirement in order to bump up their pensions.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would suggest a score of &quoute;2&quoute; - as there are clear penalties for those seeking to avoid conscription.

The new national service (draft/conscription) law includes many highly-subjective elements that would seem to make it ripe for bribery. Not only are there exemptions if the male is the sole breadwinner for his mother; sister; or other ‘dependents,’ the law also states that a monthly bonus will be provided for those enlistees who qualify as “entrepreneurs and skilled workers.” Clarification on which individuals fit into these categories is likely to generate considerable differentials in pay, which could easily be manipulated.

Ola Salem. 4 March 2014. “Benefits await Emiratis who complete military service.” The National (UAE).

Suggested score: 2

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Its very early days, with the procedures for national service only just being established. The sons of the ruling families are leading by example and no exceptions are being made for them - at least publicly. It may be that the current regional threat environment and linked desire by the UAE to harness its small citizenry to best effect will create a strong state-moral incentive for young people to do their bit and share this common coming-of-age experience together.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to an unpublished manuscript on the cultural challenges encountered by foreign contractors working to train Emirati soldiers, enlisted men often attempt to use their personal connections or gifts to earn better marks, which probably suggests the same behavior occurs with regard to postings. The author interviewed several trainers, who reported that, “In the past, some students have used “Wasta” to attempt to circumvent being tested on skills in which they know they are lacking …. [o]n the first day of the Maritime Course, we do a swimming assessment on every student for safety reasons. They have to be able to swim long enough to be rescued if they fall overboard, so they cannot be allowed to go out in boats if they cannot swim. Sometimes we would get students who would pull us aside before the test and give us a letter from the Sheik of their tribe, or a relative with high military rank, that would say something like ‘I have seen this man swim before, he is an excellent swimmer.’ The expectation was that we would then excuse him from the swimming test. It caused a lot of tension with the students and the staff, because we were essentially calling their Sheik a liar if we still tested them,” p11-12.


Eric Maudsley. Fall 2012. “Teaching Bedouin to swim: Cultural barriers to training in the Abu Dhabi Critical National Infrastructure Authority.” unpublished manuscript. https://www.academia.edu/2515764/Teaching_Bedouin_to_swim_Cultural_barriers_to_training_in_the_Abu_Dhabi_Critical_National_Infrastructure_Authority

Suggested score:

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would suggest a score of &quoute;2,&quoute; as the Armed Forces Laws (Nos. 6 and 7 of 2004) do read as a code of conduct, although they are not comprehensive and certainly lack in application and distribution. They do, however, clearly prohibit officers and enlisted personnel from accepting any gift (whether given directly or indirectly) without exception. However, there is no policy related to conflicts of interest (indeed, no public officials are required to report on their personal holdings, which is a major shortcoming in existing anti-corruption legislation) or post-separation activities (ie, &quoute;cooling off periods&quoute;).

Suggested score: 2

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I have certainly not come across any such code of conduct. The giving & receiving of gifts and provision of often extravagant official hospitality is an important part of Emirati and Arab business culture, so I suspect this provides fertile ground for added incentives and deal-making sweeteners.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to an unpublished manuscript on the cultural challenges encountered by foreign contractors working to train Emirati soldiers, enlisted men often attempt to use their personal connections to earn better marks, which comes close to violating the spirit of the code of conduct contained in the Armed Forces Law. The author of the paper does not mention any sanctions or disciplinary actions, instead conceding that these practices are typical of personnel working in any institution/organization, and that they are not generally seen (even by foreign training staff) as evidence of corruption. Instead they are treated as cultural norms that are – at worst – an obstacle to the efficiency and efficacy of the Armed Forces, but do not rise to the label of corruption or bribery.

In the paper, the author interviewed several trainers, who reported that, “In the past, some students have used “Wasta” to attempt to circumvent being tested on skills in which they know they are lacking …. [o]n the first day of the Maritime Course, we do a swimming assessment on every student for safety reasons. They have to be able to swim long enough to be rescued if they fall overboard, so they cannot be allowed to go out in boats if they cannot swim. Sometimes we would get students who would pull us aside before the test and give us a letter from the Sheik of their tribe, or a relative with high military rank, that would say something like ‘I have seen this man swim before, he is an excellent swimmer.’ The expectation was that we would then excuse him from the swimming test. It caused a lot of tension with the students and the staff, because we were essentially calling their Sheik a liar if we still tested them,” p11-12.

- Eric Maudsley. Fall 2012. “Teaching Bedouin to swim; Cultural barriers to training in the Abu Dhabi Critical National Infrastructure Authority.” unpublished manuscript. https://www.academia.edu/2515764/Teaching_Bedouin_to_swim_Cultural_barriers_to_training_in_the_Abu_Dhabi_Critical_National_Infrastructure_Authority

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: With the passage of the UK Bribery Act in 2011 and increasing prosecutions under the US FCPA since the early 2000s, anti-corruption training in the UAE is increasing. However, this seems largely restricted to the private sector, which is much more likely to come under the jurisdiction of the US and UK anti-bribery laws. This training appears to have included personnel from parastatal firms like Etisalat, in which the government is the single largest shareholder. However, there is no evidence of any similar training for individuals in the defence and security establishment.

John Henzell. May 23, 2013. “Bribery laws go beyond borders.” http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/bribery-laws-go-beyond-borders#full

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Making public knowledge such training would be a sensitive issue to the defence sector, for fear of creating a perception that a problem existed in the first place. It is worth pointing out here that most UAE senior military officers will have attended UK, US and other western military academies at various points in there careers and so will have been exposed to international norms & best practices in this area - albeit indirectly.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In the case of private individuals and members of the police, the identities of individuals - including those who are tried, convicted, and sentenced on corruption offences - is kept secret. They are only identified by their first and last initial (and their nationality).

According to a 2008 report from the US Department of State, the State Audit Institution recovered approximately 300 million dirhams (approximately $82 million) that had been embezzled by public employees that year, but no information on the prosecution or punishment of these employees was released. The report further states that, although the law provides for public access to such information, most requests go unanswered.


United States Department of State. Untitled Document. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160079.pdf

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In a contract signed between the Armed Forces GHQ (General Headquarters in Abu Dhabi) and a US-based private military contractor (Reflex Responses Management LLC) obtained by the New York Times, there is a clause regarding facilitation payments, which may (or may not) be present in all Armed Forces contracts. The clause reads,

“The two parties hereto understand that no commission, remuneration or fees have been or shall be paid by way of tips, gifts, or personal payments granted directly or indirectly or otherwise by [the firm/contractor] to any officer, individual, civilian or UAE Armed Forces member, or any of the UAE governmental employees working within or outside the UAE representing a bribe or commission to ensure the signature of this contract.” Additional language in the contract specifies that the agreement can be canceled in the event that bribery or fraud is uncovered or if the contractor has collaborated with an “employee” of the government in a way that is prejudicial to the government. This language seems only to apply to the bribery of government officials, not private citizens, although the so-called Khalifa Directive (of 1985) bans the use of ‘commissions agents’ – which would be the role of a private citizen in this exchange – in any contract for ‘lethal equipment.’ The specificity of lethal equipment here also leaves open a great deal of defence and security procurement that would qualify as non-lethal (or service related). Furthermore, in at least one previous instance where the legitimacy of the directive was contested by a domestic agent seeking the payment of commissions, the directive was found NOT to have the force of law, thus mandating that the defence contractor pay commissions to the agent. (Civil Case No. 812/90, heard in the Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance).

Many of the services contracts signed between private military contractors and the UAE GHQ appear to have been cancelled, not renewed, or otherwise terminated – which is not generally the norm for these types of contracts. Whether this was due to corruption or just dissatisfaction with contractor performance is unclear.

Law firms that advise UAE businesses have paid a great deal of attention to the UK Anti-Bribery Act, which bans all forms of facilitation payments. (This was not the case for the FCPA, which allows facilitation payments in certain cases, the most oft-cited example being a payment made to speed-up the unloading of perishable goods from a commercial vessel). The attention paid to this new law in the UAE would seem to suggest that facilitation payments are quite common, but whether they are present to the same degree in defence and security contracts is unclear.

Mark Mazzetti and Emily B. Hager. May 14, 2011 “Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder.” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Contract copy available here: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/CONTRACT.pdf?ref=middleeast, p13

Gulf States Newsletter. “As attitudes change, Gulf governments walk thin line on arms deals.” 17 October 2003, Volume 27 (Number 720), p20.
http://www.gsn-online.com/sites/default/files/GSN%20720-Oct2003.pdf

For an overview of case 812/90 see: Middle East Commercial Law Review. January-February 1995. Volume 1 (Issue 1): pA-10. Cited in Abdulhay Sayed (ed). 2004. Corruption in International Trade and Commercial Arbitration, fn 549.&quoute;

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is a National Military Doctrine, but to the best of my knowledge it does not specifically address corruption issues in this way.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I believe Emirati troops were deployed during the examination period in a few locations, including Somalia (where they are building training and healthcare infrastructure for the Somali army); Jordan (from where the UAE Air Force launches strikes against ISIS); Afghanistan (where they participate in NATO-led airstrikes and engage in reconstruction efforts); and Libya. Certainly this is a sufficient number of deployments to merit the presence of monitors, though there is no evidence they were present.

&quoute;UAE Armed Forces particpate in UN peace keeping missions.&quoute; 3 July 2012. Gulf News. http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/uae-armed-forces-particpate-in-un-peace-keeping-missions-1.1043759

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: UAE has proven an increasing willingness to deploy forces as part of international coalitions - Bahrain in 2011, Iraq in 2014, Yemen 2015. They are regarded as operationally competent professionals by international coalition partners.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I believe Emirati troops were deployed during the examination period in a few locations, including Somalia (where they are building training and healthcare infrastructure for the Somali army); Jordan (from where the UAE Air Force launches strikes against ISIS); Afghanistan (where they participate in NATO-led airstrikes and engage in reconstruction efforts); and Libya. Certainly this is a sufficient number of deployments to merit the presence of monitors, though there is no evidence they were present.

&quoute;UAE Armed Forces particpate in UN peace keeping missions.&quoute; 3 July 2012. Gulf News. http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/uae-armed-forces-particpate-in-un-peace-keeping-missions-1.1043759

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would suggest a score of &quoute;1&quoute; - or at most a &quoute;2.&quoute; The so-called Khalifa Directive (of 1985), which pertains directly to defence and security procurement, bans the use of ‘commissions agents,’ but only in contracts for ‘lethal equipment.’

The specificity of lethal equipment here exempts a great deal of defence and security procurement that would qualify as non-lethal or service related. Similarly, members of the Armed Forces are prohibited (under Decision No. 12 of 1986 and Federal Laws No. 6 and No. 7 of 2004) from having any interests in contracts related to the Armed Forces, though there are exceptions here also, for the lease of property owned by the individual and for building tenancy contracts.

Furthermore, there is no indication that any procurement (exempt or otherwise) is subject to any form of independent scrutiny. Although some contracts could conceivably be conducted under competitive conditions, there is no legislative guarantee of this, and procurement decisions are not subject to review by auditors or oversight bodies.

Gulf States Newsletter. “As attitudes change, Gulf governments walk thin line on arms deals.” 17 October 2003, Volume 27 (Number 720), p20.
http://www.gsn-online.com/sites/default/files/GSN%20720-Oct2003.pdf

Charles Laubach (Afridi & Angell). 2014. “Getting the Deal Through – Anti Corruption Regulation 2014: United Arab Emirates.” Law Business Research Ltd.

Suggested score: 1

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although the government in Abu Dhabi does have an eGovernment procurement portal (which is often part of the list of recommendations made by international agencies to increase government transparency) this does not include tenders for the armed forces. According to a market research publication from Strategic defence Intelligence, competitive procurements are conducted through an e-procurement portal, but this portal is not publicly accessible. Presumably it is a closed program only accessible to companies that are pre-qualified to bid on defence contracts.

There is a link to register to submit tenders for the Abu Dhabi Police Directorate’s Engineering Department, which is the entity’s main procurement arm (see above).

The Department of Finance publishes a Government Procurement Manual [in Arabic only], which does reference “competitiveness” and “transparency,” but makes no mention of the Armed Forces, the military, or the Ministry of Defence. (http://am.abudhabi.ae/UserFiles/Tenders/RegisterationDocuments/RegDocsEN/RegDocsEN_7.pdf)

These eGovernment procurement pages make repeated references to the operation of tender boards and other common features of government procurement. According to an interviewee, the board members typically consist of representatives from GHQ, the Presidential Guard, and a high-ranking officer from the Armed Forces procurement authority. The decision of this board moves up to the Diwan (the Crown Prince’s Court in Abu Dhabi), then to Executive Affairs Authority. This interviewee did not believe this process/decision was subject to the authority of the State Audit Institution. None of this process is publicly disclosed.

Fee-based business intelligence publications are likely the only reliable source of information on defence and security procurements, and subscriptions to these are often very expensive, as their primary market is large multinational defence and security firms.


&quoute;Abu Dhabi eGovernment Gateway.&quoute; https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/business/doing_business_with_abu_dhabi_government/tenders/gen_info88?docName=ADEGP_DF_156044_EN&_adf.ctrl-state=n01ifig10_4&_afrLoop=12638756598802864

Department of Finance Government Procurement Manual [in Arabic only]. http://am.abudhabi.ae/UserFiles/Tenders/RegisterationDocuments/RegDocsEN/RegDocsEN_7.pdf

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Some good work is being done behind the scenes in the MOD to learn from best international practice in procurement and capability management. Much of this may be implemented increasingly over the next 2-3 years, though GHQ will take some years to come on board. Such processes are likely to remain within the purview of 'national security' mandated secrecy, however.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Department of Finance publishes a Government Procurement Manual [in Arabic only], which does reference “competitiveness” and “transparency,” in relation to government tenders, but makes no mention of the Armed Forces, the military, or the Ministry of Defence, so it is unclear whether these principles are applied to these bodies. http://am.abudhabi.ae/UserFiles/Tenders/RegisterationDocuments/RegDocsEN/RegDocsEN_7.pdf

According to an interviewee, decisions on military procurement are taken by a board whose membership consists of representatives from GHQ, the Presidential Guard, and a high-ranking officer from the Armed Forces procurement authority. The decision of this board moves up to the Diwan (the Crown Prince’s Court in Abu Dhabi), then to the Executive Affairs Authority. This interviewee did not believe this process/decision is subject to the monitoring or oversight of the State Audit Institution. None of this process is publicly disclosed.


Interview 2 – Interview with member of advocacy organisation, 9th February via telephone

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Because the UAE spends so much money on hardware acquisition, its purchases (and potential purchases) are frequently reported in defence-industry publications like Janes, defenceNews.com, and similar outlets. When the government procures equipment from domestic (Emirati-owned/operated) companies, these acquisitions are often reported in the media and in promotional materials produced on behalf of the government. Fee-based business intelligence publications are likely the only reliable source of consistent information on defence and security procurements, and subscriptions to these are often very expensive, as their primary market is large multinational defence and security firms. There is no official effort to see that such information is systematically disclosed to the public.

Dania Saadi and Shereen El Gazzar. February 23, 2015. “Idex 2015: UAE armed forces sign Dh9.5 billion worth of defence contracts.” The National (UAE). http://www.thenational.ae/business/technology/idex-2015-uae-armed-forces-sign-dh95-billion-worth-of-defence-contracts

“UAE signs defence contracts worth Dh 9.5 billion.” 24 February 2015. UAEinteract. http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/UAE_signs_defence_contracts_worth_Dh_9.5_billion_/66839.htm

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The government is in the habit of announcing big defence procurement contracts. For example, a whole string of procurement decisions were announced at IDEX in February 2015. See e.g. http://www.uaeinteract.com/news/default3.asp?ID=473 or http://www.janes.com/article/49603/idex-2015-uae-announces-contracts-worth-5-billion

This level of transparency justifies a higher score.

Suggested score: 2

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would suggest a score of at least &quoute;1&quoute; - if not &quoute;2.&quoute;

An explicit anti-bribery clause does appear in the only major armed forces contract I know of that is publicly available (and is therefore probably also present in at least a portion of such contracts). The contract, signed between the Armed Forces GHQ (General Headquarters in Abu Dhabi) and a US-based private military contractor (Reflex Responses Management LLC) and obtained by the New York Times, reads: “The two parties hereto understand that no commission, remuneration or fees have been or shall be paid by way of tips, gifts, or personal payments granted directly or indirectly or otherwise by [the firm/contractor] to any officer, individual, civilian or UAE Armed Forces member, or any of the UAE governmental employees working within or outside the UAE representing a bribe or commission to ensure the signature of this contract.”

The Department of Finance publishes a Government Procurement Manual [in Arabic only], which does reference “competitiveness” and “transparency,” in relation to government tenders, as well as labor and environmental standards, but makes no mention of the Armed Forces, the military, or the Ministry of Defence, so it is unclear whether such principles are applied to these bodies. I could not find any information contained in this manual about compliance programs, corporate responsibility, (internal) due diligence, or other similar language. http://am.abudhabi.ae/UserFiles/Tenders/RegisterationDocuments/RegDocsEN/RegDocsEN_7.pdf

In an interview with a member of a US-UAE business association, this individual was unfamiliar with any specific standards required of companies to bid on government business – including the non-collusion clauses typically required to bid on government tenders.

Mark Mazzetti and Emily B. Hager. May 14, 2011 “Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder.” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Contract copy available here: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/CONTRACT.pdf?ref=middleeast, p13

Department of Finance Government Procurement Manual [in Arabic only]. http://am.abudhabi.ae/UserFiles/Tenders/RegisterationDocuments/RegDocsEN/RegDocsEN_7.pdf

Interview 2 – Interview with member of advocacy organisation, 9th February via telephone

Suggested score: 2

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The MOD is currently developing a national defence policy that will provide this guidance. The policy is still in an advanced draft stage but should be complete by the end of 2015. A national military doctrine has already been produced by GHQ, so perhaps this is an area that will show improvement soon.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The process through which procurement decisions are taken is completely opaque. Issues such as interoperability and weapons capabilities are clearly taken into consideration – but how such considerations are institutionalized is unclear. Certainly the UAE is guilty of purchasing redundant systems in order to solidify its diplomatic and political-military ties with multiple Western allies (primarily the US, UK, and France). Historically, this has been a way of solidifying regional security agreements and maintaining close diplomatic and military ties.

There are a number of foreign defence-acquisition professionals working with in the Emirates, primarily within a company called Knowledge Point, which is a subsidiary of the state-owned Emirates Advanced Investments. Judging by the LinkedIn profiles of employees of Knowledge Point, many of them have decades of experience in public sector acquisition planning and oversight of major weapons systems, and currently work with the UAE Armed Forces on similar issues. (Many are retired U.S. Military). However, the exact relationship between Knowledge Point and the Ministry of Defence is unclear, and to what degree this is part of a formal planning mechanism is also unclear.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would suggest a score of &quoute;1,&quoute; since there is at least some evidence that a portion of tenders are conducted under competitive conditions. According to a market research publication from Strategic defence Intelligence, defence procurement is conducted through both direct negotiation with the federal Ministry of Defence and through competitive bidding, with the latter facilitated by an e-procurement portal. Once a firm has secured a local presence (through one of three methods: incorporating a limited liability company; establishing a branch office; or appointing a commercial agent) it can register its bid on the federal e-procurement site. [I was unable to find any evidence of such a portal – presumably this is a closed program only accessible to companies that are pre-qualified to bid]. There is no information on the frequency or prevalence of either method.

The fact that the UAE has been able to leverage its military procurement budget to generate substantial technology transfer from foreign defence firms suggests that there is competition between potential suppliers, though this competition may be conducted according to side-benefits (such as offsets) and not on issues related to product specifications, price, and other features that are more akin to a genuinely competitive process.


“The United Arab Emirates defence Sector - Market Opportunities and Entry Strategies, Analyses and Forecasts to 2015.” April 2010. Strategic Defence Intelligence. http://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/aff0a7/the_united_arab_em [subscription required].

Suggested score: 1

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is a definite and well understood UAE defence procurement strategy to diversify supply internationally wherever possible so as not to be overly dependent on any one country or company for supplies. There is also genuine and related intention to get the best services for the best prices. Recent major equipment purchases bear this out. I think a score of 3 is potentially justifiable.

Suggested score: 3

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would suggest a score of “0,” as the regulations cited above make no claims about the accountability of tender boards. Federal Decree No. 12 only states that the “appropriate procurement committee” will cancel a contract via registered letter if the contractor is found to have engaged in an act of bribery. It says nothing of the actual decision-making process that determines awards. (Sayed, 2004; p196).

According to an interviewee, decisions on military procurement are indeed taken by a board; the membership consists of representatives from GHQ, the Presidential Guard, and a high-ranking officer from the Armed Forces procurement authority. The decision of this board moves up to the Diwan (the Crown Prince’s Court in Abu Dhabi), then to the Executive Affairs Authority. The membership of the board (primarily high-ranking, well-connected and influential officers) precludes the possibility of genuine accountability or oversight. According to this same interviewee, the losing company almost never contests the decision because to do so would make the details of the competition public [which is highly problematic from the government’s perspective] and thus would put them at a disadvantage in subsequent negotiations.

This interviewee did not believe the tender process/decision is subject to the monitoring or oversight of the State Audit Institution. None of this process is publicly disclosed.

Interview 2 – Interview with member of advocacy organisation, 9th February via telephone

Suggested score: 0

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It is nearly impossible to answer this question, as there is no relevant information available on the defence procurement bureaucracy (such as organisational charts) beyond the titles of a few germane departments and their titular heads.

These would include the Purchasing Department inside the UAE Armed Forces General Headquarters (GHQ), which is typically headed by a very senior official with ties throughout the royal family and private sector business community. At least one contract expert (in this case a representative specializing in contract finance) is brought in from the GHQ on talks related to defence offset agreements (alongside personnel from the offset bureaucracy and representatives from the defence contractor), though the degree of authority or oversight this individual has on either the underlying contract or the related offset contract is unclear.

[Name removed]. (LinkedIn profile). According to [name removed] profile, this employee works for Musanada, a public agency that oversees public works contracts on behalf of the Abu Dhabi government. According to the job history the employee helped develop and oversee the development of so-called 'blacklists' of suppliers found responsible for bribery and other forms of malfeasance.

Legal Briefing. December 2010. “United Arab Emirates Offset Program Bureau Adopts New Policy Guidelines.” White & Case. http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/4379b60a-df36-4041-a22a-674fa437b18b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ba0fa536-c62d-4317-adab-6e8990a0b79c/UAE_Offset_Program_Bureau_Adopts_New_Policy_Guidelines-v2.pdf

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would suggest a score of &quoute;1,&quoute; since there are at least some (even symbolic) mechanisms in place. There is a site for reporting complaints to the government agencies that issue contracts, but whether this is used is unclear. For example, here is the link to the Police GHQ’s engineering authority: (http://epa.adpolice.gov.ae/siteHTML/frmStrategicPartner.aspx)

The Abu Dhabi government tender website reads, “For disqualified bidders, envelopes will be returned along with an official letter clarifying the reason for rejection. In case of any irregularities or suspicions in awarding contracts, suppliers and contractors dealing with the concerned entity may lodge a complaint with the tenders committee, or the head of the concerned entity or his designee.” (https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/business/doing_business_with_abu_dhabi_government/vendors_and_contractors/gen_info86?docName=ADEGP_DF_284186_EN&_adf.ctrl-state=n01ifig10_4&_afrLoop=12639445359690407)

However, in practice (at least in defence and security procurement) such formal institutional channels for complaints are not used. According to an interview with a member of a prominent US-UAE business association, firms bring complaints directly to a contact in the Armed Forces General Headquarters (GHQ), to the Crown Prince, or to their own governments, which direct visiting cabinet officials to take up the issue with their UAE counterparts during official visits. Typically, an official from the ministry calls the losing bidder and gives them an informal briefing on why they lost (typically this is based on either price or the amount of technology transfer); the losing company almost never contests the decision because to do so would make the details of the competition public and put them at a disadvantage in subsequent negotiations.

This is certainly evidence of the fear of retaliation, but still does not merit a score of &quoute;0&quoute;.

Suggested score: 1

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Under UAE law, sanctioning of a corrupt supplier is according to the discretion of the prosecutorial authority. Thus, a contract MAY be canceled in the event that bribery or fraud is uncovered or if the contractor has collaborated with an employee of the government in a way that is prejudicial to the government. (Most other regional states have laws specifying that the contract MUST be canceled in the event that bribery is uncovered; many states also specify that the government will keep any deposit or bond issued by the contractor, but the UAE law does not include either of these elements). Language is contained in (articles 83(f) and 85(b) of UAE Federal Decree No. 12 (aka the Federal Armed Forces Tenders and Auctions Law of 1986).

There are no other sanctions (such as financial penalties or blacklisting) contained in the Armed Forces Law – nor is information available about such penalties having been used against suppliers in the defence sector. (Though individuals have been prosecuted under the penal code, per the case of the Jordanian engineer working for a firm with contracts with the UAE Armed Forces, see source below). Public agencies that manage non-defence procurement for the government seem to have such traditional sanctions in place.

[Name removed]. (LinkedIn profile). According to [name removed] profile, this employee works for Musanada, a public agency that oversees public works contracts on behalf of the Abu Dhabi government. According to the job history the employee helped develop and oversee the development of so-called 'blacklists' of suppliers found responsible for bribery and other forms of malfeasance.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to a confidential interview with a member of the business community based in the United States, in the mid-2000s the government leveraged the offset obligations of foreign defence firms to establish a small number of domestic military-industrial companies designed to compete with each other to supply small and basic items to the UAE Armed Forces – and to produce parts for the global supply chains of large foreign defence firms.

However, these enterprises essentially functioned as foreign companies (with foreign technologies and foreign staff) that only served to generate profits for a handful of well-connected Emirati businessmen – including many with long military careers – who served as their titular owners and executives. This interviewee cited “graft” as a prominent feature of these companies. In response, the government has begun taking over the companies and consolidating them. Initially these firms were subsidiaries of large investment vehicles (primarily Tawazun and Mubadala) that were partially capitalized through offset agreements signed with foreign defence firms. They are being spun off from these investment vehicles and put under a new umbrella organization called EDIC (Emirates defence Industrial Corporation). This interviewee confirmed that this move was done in large part to address issues of corruption, but also for predicted gains in efficiency and to create a single coherent local partner organization for foreign firms to discharge their offset obligations and set up joint ventures with domestic firms.

Interview 2 – Interview with member of advocacy organisation, 9th February via telephone

“Emirates Defence Industries Company Joined by Further Five Companies.” 24 February 2015. Emirates News Agency. http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/Emirates-Defence-Industries-Company-joined-by-further-five-companies/66831.htm

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The rules and procedures governing defence offsets are public and well-developed, however, their application to any actual cases (ie, the projects undertaken by specific firms; the results of performance audits; the application of penalties for non-performance to specific firms) is not publicly disclosed. There is promotional material produced by (or on behalf of) the government that highlights certain successful cases of technology transfer or inward capital investment, but this is not comprehensive. There is also significant media coverage available in domestic sources (including the independent newspaper, The National, see below). Often foreign defence firms with offset obligations are the biggest obstacles to meaningful disclosure, as they consider such projects (and the financial sums and technology they involve) to be proprietary information.

Ivan Gale. 10 June 2008. &quoute;Fishing for fighter jets.&quoute; The National (UAE).

Ivan Gale. 28 April 2010. “New Rules Expected for Offsets.” The National (UAE).

Ivan Gale. 1 July 2008. “Oil fuels fledgling defence industry.” The National (UAE).

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to a market report produced by Strategic defence Intelligence, “In order to bid for defence contracts in the UAE, foreign OEMs [original equipment manufacturers] must be represented by commercial agents, who are contracted by the supplier to represent company interests, or by a UAE national company.” However, the report continues, stating “Foreign OEMs are prohibited from using any sales agent or intermediary when they bid for defence contracts initiated by the Ministry of defence.” I take these two statements to imply that defence companies must have a permanent, long-term relationship with an established agent or national firm in order to qualify to bid on defence contracts, but that these agents are not technically acting as intermediaries on any particular bid or sale. This distinction seems rather superficial and difficult to enforce in practice.

In addition to being represented by a commercial agent, the OEM can also qualify to bid on government contracts by incorporating a limited liability company (LLC) or establishing a branch office in the UAE. In the case of an LLC, at least 51% of the equity must be owned by UAE nationals; in the case of a branch office, the OEM is still obliged to appoint a UAE national as a proxy agent, who, according to the above-cited report, “assists in communicating with government departments and facilitates domestic administrative matters.”

The report also notes that the prohibition on using agents when OEMs bid on contracts does not apply to contracts initiated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

“Future of the UAE defence Industry – Market Attractiveness, Competitive Landscape and Forecasts to 2019.” April 2010. Strategic defence Intelligence. http://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/aff0a7/the_united_arab_em [subscription required].

Suggested score:

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The entire defence budget is secret, so absolutely no details on arms purchases are made public by the government.

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It is not so much the political influence of the selling nation that is notable in the case of the UAE. Because the UAE has such significant purchasing power, it can leverage its status as a major buyer to exert political influence on arms exporting nations to achieve regional foreign policy goals. This is especially true for mid-range arms exporters like those in East Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.

For example, it appears that the UAE has leveraged its military trade relationship with South Korea in order to secure the latter’s support for the military government of President Sisi in Egypt, which is a major recipient of financial and political support from the UAE (see New York Times article below). Egypt was recently visited by a delegation of diplomats and businessmen from the UAE and South Korea to discuss a trilateral agreement to boost trade and industrial cooperation to support economic growth in Egypt.

It is likely that such efforts on behalf of the South Korean government are done with an eye toward influencing military sales to the UAE. Being a relatively small-scale weapons exporter, deals with the UAE are politically important to South Korea. Military sales from South Korea to the UAE includes surveillance robots, unmanned aerial vehicles, rocket launchers, and a 2011 contract for South Korean troops to train special operations forces in the UAE, as well as ongoing negotiations to build a joint flight training center and supply T-50 training jets to the UAE. Even negotiations over such an aircraft sale are a powerful market signal, as this is South Korea’s first domestically developed super sonic jet, and it has secured only limited export orders to date. Indeed, South Korea recently secured its second export sale of the jets with a contract to supply 50 planes to the Iraqi military.

This discussion is not to say that major military acquisition decisions taken by the UAE are not influenced by the power of the major arms exporting countries (notably the US and UK) – only that such influence is a two-way street, especially in the case of importers with large budgets such as the UAE.



David Kirkpatrick. 1 March 2015. “Recordings Suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi.” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middleeast/recordings-suggest-emirates-and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html?_r=0

Rania Yehia. “30 South Korean officials, businessmen to attend Economic Summit.” 10 March 2015. Daily News Egypt. http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/03/10/30-south-korean-officials-businessmen-to-attend-economic-summit/

“Korea pushes to sell T-50 training jets to UAE's flight training center.” 1 November 2012. The Korea Times. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/01/205_123716.html

Suggested score:

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I think the UAE is in a buyers market. As one of the worlds largest procurers of international defence equipment, at a time of shrinking defence budgets in the West, they can afford to be fussy. They deliberately seek to balance international political dynamics in their decision-making but my sense is that they are not pushed around by anyone.

Suggested score: 2