Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Armaments Control Act of 1991, amended in 2007, provides for a National Armaments Control Advisory Board that is mandated to ‘supervise and regulate the manufacture, importation, conveyance and disposal of armaments.’ The Arms and Ammunition Act of 1991 stipulates that all arms and ammunition must be disposed of by the Arms Authority or an authorized officer under the direction of the Minister responsible for home affairs.

A report on the implementation of the United Nations programme of action on small arms and light weapons of December 2009 indicated that public awareness of the danger of small arms is significant in Tanzania, leading to weapons still being surrendered for appropriate disposal by the authorities.

The government is providing financial assistance to help train officials in the appropriate handling of illicit small arms, collect statistics on them and raising awareness of the subject (REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME OF ACTIONS (UNPoA) ON SALW, JANUARY – DECEMBER 2009, Page 6, The United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Home Affairs, accessed August 2014). Nevertheless, the Public Procurement Act of 2011 stipulates that disposal of all defence assets must be conducted in accordance with a dual list, suggesting information is restricted.

The Public Finance Act of 2001 stipulates that the Controller and Auditor General is responsible for ensuring the proper disposal of all public assets, though this does not specifically pertain to the defence sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement Act of 2011 stipulates that each public body must establish a tender board for the disposal of public assets by tender. The defence sector is also required to comply with this. Moreover, the Controller and Auditor General is mandated to ensure the proper disposal of all public assets according to law, suggesting some scrutiny takes place. Although the Auditor General displays some level of independence, occasionally uncovering corruption in public service and making recommendations for reform, these recommendations are rarely followed.

In practice this is unlikely to apply to the defence sector in all cases, however. The Act goes on to say that the defence and national security bodies must manage their asset disposal on the basis of a dual list, meaning asset disposal in these sectors is at least partially shrouded from transparent scrutiny, while the results of these are not made publicly available.

There is no specific evidence of scrutiny in writing, but it appears there are measures in place to facilitate it.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Tanzania’s Open Budget Index report for 2012 recommends the percentage of secret expenditure be made available to the public, suggesting it is currently classified. There has been no mention in the media of government plans to release that information in the near future. Although the government releases some details on the defence budget in the year following its disbursement, there is no mention of percentages of secret budgets.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The constitution provides for a Defence and Security Committee to consider and review expenditure estimates, among other things. However, this does not require the committee to be made aware of specific budget details. Moreover, there have been known instances where information on secret budgets are not reviewed by or made known to the committee, suggesting limited legislative overview. For example, the sale of military air-traffic control equipment to Tanzania by British company BAE systems – was not reviewed by the committee.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The 2013/13 report by the Controller and Auditor General revealed that the defence forces failed to provide sufficient information for the carrying out of the audit despite government reports that this information is available for scrutiny. This suggests that while the report does cover the defence forces, and it is submitted to the legislature, information provided within it are incomplete. Moreover, even where defence or security budget information is provided to the auditors or legislative scrutiny, portions of these budgets are frequently disguised under re-allocations from different government departments (Source 2, section 4.2.1). Source 3 indicates that the legislature has appeared wary of openly debating military spending matters, preferring to leave that responsibility to internal defence mechanisms.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Research found no mention within the Finance Act, constitution, or other relevant laws of the legality/illegality of off-budget defence expenditures. Reports of secretive military procurement deals – including the purchase of air-traffic control systems from BAE, which were not reviewed by the legislature or Defence and Security Committee, and the purchase of military equipment from China over the past several years – suggest off-budget military expenditures may occur with some regularity.

Given that specific expenditures are not publicised, it cannot be confirmed whether these purchases were funded according to prior budget allocations. However, the lack of transparency surrounding them suggests they were not formally authorised.

Moreover, the Overseas Development Institute further reports that Tanzania supplements its military budget after the official one has already been reviewed by parliament. Supplements come primarily from re-allocations from other departments, suggesting a lack of legislative oversight and other controls on off-budget expenditures.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is evidence of some history of off-budget military expenditures and that these have encountered allegations of corruption. However, the extent of this practice remains unclear, as information regarding off-budget expenditure is not available to the public.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The National Security Act of 1970 stipulates provisions for the protection of classified information for the purposes of national security, including through the prosecution of those who disclose such information.
The Intelligence and Security Service Act of 1996 further stipulates that all intelligence and information acquired by servicemen in relation to their duties not be disclosed, except in accordance with the Act. The intelligence services may disclose information if required for the carrying out of official duties such as for the investigation or prosecution of an offence or where the release of information is deemed by the Minister of Home Affairs as necessary to public interest. Intelligence officers are required to not disclose any information that would compromise the identity of any other officer or informant.

According to the Public Procurement Act of 2011, defence and national security organs, whose budgets are partially classified, are mandated to agree with the Public Procurement Authority on which category of items are to be classified, though this does not refer to details of classified items, suggesting information on these is not properly scrutinized. Moreover, the difficulty of accessing defence-related information for both the public and parliamentary committee members - information that is often restricted by the National Security Act of 1970, section 5, for example - suggests authorities err on the side of caution when deciding whether to release information. For example, 2015 Access to Information Act Bill Supplement (Section 6(3)) appears to provide some clarity in what categories of defence information can be released to the public, but what the Act constitutes as national security matters is relatively broad, leaving room for denial of information based on individual discretion.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agree with comments. The criteria for score 3 require evidence that suitable control is exercised and only occasional evidence of rules being bypassed however. It is difficult to state this is the case given the available evidence. Score therefore maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Tanzania’s National Service, a military training service, has a commercial wing known as SUMA JKT that is involved in numerous commercial activities from the procurement of tractors for the government to private security ventures. SUMA JKT does not publish transparent information about its finances. It is a public organization that is required to follow the Public Procurement Act of 2011 when purchasing materials, although media reports suggest this has not always adhered to.

In 2013 the company branched into the private security business despite reports that this contravened fair competition rules. A number of other more established and reputable security companies – of which there are an estimated 800 – have reportedly lost out to SUMA JKT despite its small size and limited experience in the private security sector. In one case, where a bank chose SUMA JKT over another company despite offering a lower salary to guards, media coverage indicates that information regarding the transaction was not made available to the public despite Tanzania’s Security Industry Association’s assertions to the contrary.

SUMA JKT was implicated in an incident where seven defence officers were charged with abuse of office for failing to follow proper procurement procedures. The charges were dropped in April for lack of evidence, though the incident highlighted the extent of the involvement of the defence forces in commercial businesses and the limited oversight of their activities.

Whilst the government as a whole is involved in state-owned businesses, there is no further evidence of any other significant commercial businesses associated with the defence sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Military owned businesses including SUMA JKT are required to adhere to the Public Procurement Act of 2011 when purchasing equipment. However, media reports suggest companies may have attempted to circumvent this scrutiny.

The effectiveness of private auditors, the controller and auditor general may be limited by the information made available to them. For example, the 2010 controller and auditor general report indicates that the Defence ministry entered into a contract with SUMA JKT, but that the company did not make the contract documents available for verification. Similarly, a private audit report conducted for the 2003-04 financial year raises multiple irregularities, including delays in preparing accounting books ahead of audits. Without access to proper information, auditors are unlikely to have the ability to conduct independent and reliable scrutiny to an international standard.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The government does not outlaw private enterprise by members of the defence forces, though as of October 2014 it is drafting a new law that would ban all public officials from holding private sector jobs. At present, according to the National Defence Act of 1966, a defence officer can be ‘attached or, with his consent, seconded to any department or agency of the government, any public or private institution, private industry or any other body.’ Section 45 of the Act stipulates that the pay and allowances of seconded officers are to be determined by the Defence Forces Regulations, though these do not specify whether the officer would be permitted to benefit financially from the arrangement.

Lack of clarity over these regulations was highlighted in March 2014 by reports (Govt to offer private security services, The Citizen, http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Govt-to-offer-private-security-services/-/1840392/2261664/-/v07hyk/-/index.html, published March 2014, accessed August 2014) that the commercial branch of the National Service Wing of the Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (SUMA JKT), launched a unit to provide private security services. Although the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act of 1995 stipulates that public leaders, including the chief of defence forces, shall &quoute;not have private interests other than those permitted by the Code&quoute; (para 6.d), the document does not specify further what is permitted. Moreover, the Code does not require officers to disclose their personal assets for legislative scrutiny, suggesting there is no oversight to ensure that defence employees involved in private security ventures do not engage in private activities or draw additional private salaries.

SUMA JKT's profits are nontransparent and their accounting is not available to the public, so it is not possible to determine whether profits are returned to the government or to private individuals.

Although the Code of Ethics is due to be strengthened in the coming year to require officers’ assets to be declared, this has yet to take effect.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Former Defence Minister Shamsi Vuai Nahodha was dismissed in December 2013 following allegations of his involvement in organized crime and human rights abuses related to illegal poaching. The new Defence Minister, Hussein Mwinyi, has yet to make any public pronouncement on anti-corruption matters. An extensive media search also reveals no public statements against corruption by the Chief of Defence Forces Davis Mwamunyange. This highlights a lack of leadership on anti-corruption, to the point where retired permanent secretary Patrick Rutabanzibwa stated in December 2013 that corruption among public servants is so rampant it is seen as a right (source 2). Without this leadership the rest of the department of defence or other sectors are unlikely to have publicly committed to anti-corruption measures.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Disagree. The first and third sources provided are from 2011, and the second does not appear to mention defence personnel. This does not really provide suitable evidence of any expression of commitment, particularly as corruption remains a significant ongoing issue for Tanzania. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Paragraph C.65.-(1) of the National Defence Act of 1966 states that every officer who commits an offence is liable for prosecution and punishment according to the relevant ordinance, including the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act, which provides for prosecution of corruption offenses. Moreover, the constitution states that all public leaders are required to refrain from all activities that would promote or condone corrupt practices. However, there is no mention in these or other public documents of what specifically constitutes corruption, raising the risk of PCCA measures being applied arbitrarily, undermining its effectiveness.

The Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act further appears to condone certain forms of corruption by allowing public officials to accept ‘incidental gifts’ or other benefits of ‘nominal value’. Although small gifts are commonly allowed in most countries' conflict of interest rules, the Act does not specify an upward value for each gift, suggesting the provision can be abused through arbitrary classification of what constitutes 'nominal' or 'incidental'.

The lack of clarity on what constitutes nominal value leaves a loophole whereby officials can solicit bribes or other benefits of unlimited value. Moreover, while members of the defence forces are known to have solicited bribes from the public, there have been no known convictions. Sources 2 and 3 suggest the military takes its own disciplinary action against any cases of corruption (rather than going through the PCCA or other independent bodies), meaning instances of corruption or their prosecution are rarely made public.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Agree with Reviewer 1 and to an extent, Reviewer 2. To award score 3 there would need to be some evidence that effective measures have been or are being carried out. The evidence indicates the president's moves to sack ministers appear to have mostly been cosmetic efforts to appease donors while shuffling people around to other ministries, rather than a genuine attempt at discipline. Score changed from 1 to 2.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (PCCA) stipulates that all informers, which includes whistleblowers, have the right to protection including when reporting on public officials. According to Part 1 of the Act, public officials include members of the military (p7).

Reports suggest the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) has taken action against reprisals committed against whistleblowers in the past. However, while the act does not require witnesses to disclose the name of their informers, it does not specifically prohibit this practice, leaving whistleblowers vulnerable to the discretion of individual witnesses in a case.

Moreover, the PCCB’s ability to protect whistleblowers remains limited as the PCCA and criminal procedure code lack significant authority in this respect. According to a 2014 UN report, investigations into the implementation of the PCCA have revealed that despite whistleblower protection existing on paper, there are few measures in place to ensure it is enacted in practice, with cases of reprisals against whistleblowers – including for example dismissals from employment – being reported. Whistleblower protection is currently only extended to those reporting to the PCCB, though legislation is currently under consideration to expand that protection to all whistleblowers.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: This information was not publicly available at the time of research. There may be special attention paid to personnel in sensitive positions, but even in the event that this is paid, media reports suggest that oversight for the appointment and employment of all public officials - including those with positions of increased financial risk - is highly secretive.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: The comments and source provided by Reviewer 1 do not provide conclusive evidence against there being special attention, while the evidence of broader reform frameworks such as NACSAP indicates this could reasonably be possible. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The approximate number of military personnel is publicly available (on government sites), with 28,000 active military personnel and 80,000 in reserve. However, there is no publicly available information on the total number of civilian defence personnel, while the exact numbers of military personnel are not published by the defence ministry annually for example. In 2013 the military expressed a desire to expand troop numbers, but did not indicate by how much.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The National Defence Act stipulates that pay and allowances must be at rates set out by the Defence Forces Regulations, which are not public. A source in Tanzania reported that the military does not release reports on payments or allowances to its officers, and an extensive search yielded no information on them.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The system of payments is not published or made available to the public. There is no evidence to suggest that payment to the defence forces experiences delays however. No recent media reports are available indicating payment delays, while lack of military unrest – a common indication of significant or severe salary payment delays – suggests military personnel receives due remuneration.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Disagree. Lack of information available suggests considerable shortcomings in clarity and transparency. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: According to section 16 of the National Defence Act of 1966, defence forces appointments of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel or above are to be made by the President following consultation with the Chief of Defence Forces. According to the Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service Act of 1996 the Director-General of Intelligence and Security is appointed by the President. Reports suggest the President also appoints the Deputy Director-General of Intelligence. There is no evidence to suggest the appointments are politically motivated, but the Acts reveal that appointments are likely to be strongly influenced by the executive as they have few checks and balances from the other two branches. Moreover, as a civil society representative in Tanzania stated, there is limited transparency in the process of appointments, with the public only being made aware of them after they have been carried out. Further media searches yielded no results in terms of public announcements prior to military appointments.

The Public Leadership Code of Ethnic Act of 1995 and the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Amendment Act of 2001 classifies a public leader as anyone holding high public office including that of Chief of Defence Forces, Director-General of Intelligence and Inspector-General of Police. They stipulate that these officials must maintain integrity. The ethics secretariat, an independent government agency, is mandated to enforce these principles. There is no mention in the code of ethics of defence sector members below the upper leadership however, while the provisions themselves remain vague.

Though there seems to be a system for the appointment of military personnel, and part of it is published in the Acts, it is not transparent and may not be firmly established given the limited checks and balances.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Disagree. Firstly, the National Defence Act provisions are not specific enough to constitute &quoute;independent, transparent and objective&quoute;. Secondly, the suggested score requires more detailed evidence of an established appointment system, which requires the use of objective job descriptions and assessment processes for appointments, and oversight by independent personnel. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Although there is an indication of formal promotion processes as stipulated by the National Defence Act, research found no evidence of these taking place through external boards or other external oversight mechanisms. According to the National Defence Act of 1966 promotions must be recommended by the Defence Forces Committee, an internal organ to the defence forces, or appointed by a board approved by the Defence Forces regulations and recommended by the President. No evidence was found to suggest these appointments are not meritocratic or objective, although political factors may also play a role in decisions given how few checks and balances there are on the process. In fact, there appears to be no independent oversight mechanisms, with appointment and promotion decisions being carried out almost entirely within the defence forces or ministry.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Disagree. The fact that &quoute;three sons of presidents have failed to reach commissioned ranks&quoute; is not relevant enough or sufficient enough evidence of an meritocratic and objective promotions process. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no compulsory conscription in Tanzania. Those wishing to enter higher learning institutions must first carry out a one-year training programme with the National Service however, after which they are placed into the reserve force.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Tanzania National Service (JKT) programme would fall under the category of voluntary conscription. Though there are no guidelines in place to prevent national service applicants (to conscript programmes or other) from soliciting specific posts specifically, anti-bribery guidelines stipulated in the Code of Ethics Act cover all acts of bribery, presumably including in the recruitment process.

The Public Leadership Code of Ethnic Act of 1995 and the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Amendment Act of 2001 stipulate officials must maintain integrity by not putting themselves in a position where personal interest would trump his or her responsibilities, by not soliciting or accepting ‘transfers of economic benefit other than incidental gifts, customary hospitality, or other benefits of nominal value’, and by not using government property in such a way as to gain personal economic benefits among other things. The ethics secretariat, an independent body, is mandated to enforce these principles. However, there is no mention in the code of ethics of defence sector members below upper leadership, while the provisions themselves remain vague and are not specific to bribery or corruption to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process. In particular, references to ‘incidental gifts’ and ‘other benefits of nominal value’ suggest there are a number of loopholes that corrupt officials could exploit, though there is no evidence to suggest they do so on a widespread basis.

According to sources 2 and 3, measures in place to address any cases of bribery or corruption are dealt with internally in the Ministry of Defence or within the defence forces, and results are not made public. However, it is unclear how effective they are as source 3 - and a review of local media - suggest there have been no known convictions on corruption offences within the defence forces.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no evidence of ghost soldiers existing within the military, while according to Source 3, the Defence and Security committee within the legislature is relatively effective at reviewing military salaries and other human resources issues.

There have been widespread reports over the years of ghost workers existing in various other government ministries however. Although it is unclear whether any of these include the defence ministry, a general failure to uncover the problem and investigate or prosecute anyone responsible suggests the phenomenon could occur in the defence sector as well.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Sources added.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is evidence that chains of payment may not be entirely separate from chains of command. The Labour Institute Act of 2004 is responsible for deciding on minimum wages for each sector. According to this Act, the Minister of Public Service appoints wage boards – whose members’ identities are made public – in each sector responsible for investigating payments and terms of employment. However, the Employment and Labour Relations Act of 2004 is responsible for stipulating the modes, formula and timing of wage payments, but this Act does not apply to the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), suggesting the forces conduct payments internally.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Media reports (TPDF Urges Soldiers to Stick to Principles, Avoid Crime, The Citizen, http://allafrica.com/stories/201108180213.html, published August 2011, accessed February 2015) mention the existence of a military code of conduct covering all members of the defence forces, though this does not appear to be publicly available.

The Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act of 1995 and the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Amendment Act of 2001 classify a public leader as anyone holding high public office including that of Chief of Defence Forces, Director-General of Intelligence and Inspector-General of Police. They stipulate that these officials must maintain integrity by not putting themselves in a position where personal interest would trump his or her responsibility as leader, by not soliciting or accepting ‘transfers of economic benefit other than incidental gifts, customary hospitality, or other benefits of nominal value’, and by not using government property in such a way as to gain personal economic benefits among other things.

In relation to post-separation activities and conflict of interest, public leaders who leave office are required to not act in a manner that would bring ridicule on the office and to avoid taking advantage of their previous positions for personal gain. The Ethics Secretariat, an independent body, is mandated to enforce these principles.

There is no mention of defence sector members below upper leadership in the code of ethics. Moreover, the code does not require officials to declare their assets publicly, though this is likely to change in the coming year after the government in September 2013 announced plans to strengthen the powers of its Ethics Commissioner. The changes would also empower the Commissioner to take punitive action against those who fail to comply with ethical guidelines.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Disagree. The existence (and possible content) of the military's code of conduct is unclear, whilst the Public Leadership Code of Ethics only applies to senior leaders such as the Chief of Defence Force. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: At least one media report (TPDF Urges Soldiers to Stick to Principles, Avoid Crime, The Citizen, http://allafrica.com/stories/201108180213.html, published August 2011, accessed February 2015) mentions the existence of a military code of conduct covering all members of the defence forces, though this does not appear to be publicly available. The Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act of 1995 and the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Amendment Act of 2001 function like a code of conduct for senior defence leaders.

Civil society sources in Tanzania indicate that there is limited to no public information available on corruption cases or other breaches of conduct within the defence forces. While it is known that corruption prosecutions do occur, suggesting that breaches of the code are addressed, sanctions and reprimands are carried out internally and results are not made available to the public. Moreover, it is not clear how often and to what extent breaches are addressed, as there have been no known convictions on corruption charges. Although the Ethics Secretariat is mandated by the constitution and the Leadership Code to conduct preliminary investigations into corruption allegations, it is not authorised to prosecute. This is likely to change in the coming year after the government in September 2013 announced plans to strengthen the powers of its Ethics Commissioner. The changes would also empower the Commissioner to take punitive action against those who fail to comply with ethical guidelines.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The National Service programme, which is a one year military training programme open to all Tanzanians fit for service, carries out anti-corruption training (Sabahi Online). There is also evidence of training of public service officers and members of the tender boards from the Ministry of Defence. For example training on ethics, integrity and accountability for public service officers, including defence staff, was carried out in June 2013, while the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) trained Ministry of Defence Tender Board members on the Public Procurement Act 2004, Corruption and Ethics Infrastructure in March 2010. The training was part of the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategic and Action Plan (NACSAP II), whose goal was to strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms in all areas of government. However, NACSAP II has since terminated, and it is unclear when the new framework will be implemented, though a new version is currently under development. Moreover, although training sessions have occurred, it remains unclear how regularly they are held.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Disagree. There is evidence formal anti-corruption training has taken place for selected personnel in more sensitive positions, although there is no evidence that this has been regularly repeated. This is in line with the criteria for score 2. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There have been no known effective prosecutions of defence force personnel for corrupt activity in recent years. Sources 2 and 3 have reported that where corruption trials in defence have occurred, these have been internally dealt with and the results not made public. Even where allegations of malpractice in defence deals have reached the public – as in the case of the sale by BAE of military air-traffic control systems in 1999 – no Tanzanian officials were subsequently fined or put on trial though some British MPs and other public figures called on Tanzania to initiate prosecutions for bribery. The eventual settlement reached with the SFO and BAE enabled BAE to avoid prosecution. If BAE were to ultimately have been found guilty of corruption or bribery, it may have debarred the company from doing business in Europe.

Leaked sources from Wikileaks state that the leading Tanzanian investigator into the case reportedly feared for his life, he claimed the deal involved officials from the Ministry of Defence and at least one senior level military officer, but reported that he was powerless to bring them to prosecution as top-level officials were protected by the presidency.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Several pieces of legislation discourage corruption, including the Public Procurement Act and the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act. Section 23(1) of the Act states that an offense is committed when a person &quoute;solicits, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any advantage without lawful consideration or for a lawful consideration which he knows or has reason to believe to be inadequate.&quoute; Section 33(1) also states that &quoute;Any person who promises, offers or gives to a public official or any other person directly or indirectly, an undue advantage in order that the public official or that other person to abuse his real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from the administration or a public authority an undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person, commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding three million shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both.&quoute; The Act pertains to all government ministries, including defence.

The Public Leadership Code of Ethnic Act of 1995 classifies a public leader as anyone holding high public office including that of Chief of Defence Forces, Director-General of Intelligence and Inspector-General of Police. They stipulate that these officials must maintain integrity by not putting themselves in a position where personal interest would trump his or her responsibility as leader, by not soliciting or accepting ‘transfers of economic benefit other than incidental gifts, customary hospitality, or other benefits of nominal value’, and by not using government property in such a way as to gain personal economic benefits among other things.

The ethics secretariat, an independent body, is mandated to enforce these principles. However, there is no mention in the code of ethics of defence sector members below upper leadership, while the provisions themselves remain vague. In particular, references to ‘incidental gifts’ and ‘other benefits of nominal value’ indicate a number of loopholes that corrupt officials could exploit. Since there is no specific upward value given to these items, enforcement of this provision is likely to be applied arbitrarily. Moreover, media and anecdotal reports continue to suggest that bribery remains rife throughout all sectors in Tanzania. While there are no specific publicly known incidents of this occurring in the defence sector in recent years, the general lack of political will to tackle corruption - as highlighted by continued reports of incidents and general impunity for those who accept bribes - suggests facilitation payments occur regularly in the defence sector.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Disagree. As discussed above, there are clear holes or insufficiencies in the laws designed to discourage facilitation payments. There is also clear evidence that the occurrence of facilitation payments is common across all sectors. This is in line with the criteria for score 1.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The National Defence Act of 1966, section C(54) stipulates that any serviceman who ‘improperly demands or accepts compensation, consideration or personal advantage in respect of the performance of any military duty’, or ‘receives directly or indirectly…any gift, loan promise, compensation or consideration, either in money or otherwise, from any person…in the transaction of any business relating to the Defence Forces’ or ‘improperly demands or gives directions for the provision of any materiel’ is guilty of an offence and liable for imprisonment. Mention of military duty and activities done in relation to activities carried out on behalf of the Defence Forces suggest these provisions apply corruption during operations. There is no indication in the Act that corruption is seen as a strategic issue however.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is evidence of training of public service officers. For example training on ethics, integrity and accountability for public service officers was carried out in June 2013. However, there is no specific mention of anti-corruption training for commanders deployed to field missions. Despite this, there is no significant evidence of corruption being mishandled during deployment

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no evidence to suggest that rained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk on domestic operations.

Tanzania has so far deployed over 2,200 defence forces troops to peacekeeping missions in Sudan (African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur – UNAMID), Lebanon (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon – UNFIL), Abyei (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei – UNISFA), South Sudan (United Nations Mission in South Sudan - UNMISS) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in Congo – MONUSCO). There is no evidence that defence forces undergo anti-corruption training before being deployed, nor that anti-corruption monitors are deployed alongside with them. Although the United Nations mission provide some anti-corruption training for peacekeepers, this does not include how to identify or address corruption risks.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Reports indicate that United Nations peacekeeping missions do not provide clear guidance on corruption, while there is little evidence to suggest Tanzania provides such guidelines prior to deployment. Tanzania is currently not involved in any non-UN peacekeeping missions. The National Defence Act of 1966 Section C(54) stipulates that no serviceman shall accept or demand undue payments while carrying out any duties for the Defence Forces. However, there appear to be no publicly available guidelines on how to identify or respond to potential for corruption, while the Act itself does not specifically refer to contracting or deployment abroad. While there is some evidence of members of the defence forces receiving some training for foreign deployments, it is not clear whether any of it is specific to contracting in or corruption risks.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: A thorough search of open source material revealed no evidence to indicate that Private Military Contractors are employed to any significant extent.

However, in 2013 SUMA JKT, the commercial branch of the defence sector, expanded into the private security (source 1) business despite reports that this contravened fair competition rules. A number of other more established and reputable security companies – of which there are an estimated 800 – have reportedly lost out to SUMA JKT despite its small size and limited experience in the private security sector.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Agree with comments, however please note that score 2 is awarded for all countries in the 2015 GI where 1) PMCs are not employed; and 2) there are no regulations forbidding their employment.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) – established under the Public Procurement Act of 2011 – is in place to oversee all public procurement activities in mainland Tanzania with the aim of ensuring ‘fair, competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and value for money procurement standards and practices’ among other things. The Defence and National Security organs also fall under this authority. However, according to the Public Procurement Act of 2011, Part I, Section 2(3), they are also mandated to organize procurement under a dual list, meaning information on a number of acquisitions is to remain classified according to a list to be agreed upon each year between the PPRA and the defence sector. It is not possible to determine what proportion of defence procurement was exempted under the dual list. A source also reported that parliament prefers to avoid open debate on defence procurement, suggesting limited opportunities for oversight and transparency, and many for by-passing legislation.

Procurement practices have been somewhat strengthened in recent years - including through the strengthening of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau through a series of National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plans (NACSAP) and plans announced in 2013 to close procurement loopholes that can be used for corruption in all sectors. The PPRA in fact, suspended 19 procurement firms in October 2014 after finding that they had engaged in corrupt practices. However, incidents of corruption in government procurement continue to be reported, with legislation on violations not being enforced or respected. Though reports do not specifically mention the defence sector, given the overall preponderance of corrupt practices in government procurement it is likely that procurement legislation in defence is often by-passed. Common ways in which this is done is by the government awarding preferential treatment to well-connected companies, or by diverting public funds. According to the Public Procurement Act of 2011 Part I section 2(4), &quoute;The Defence and National Security Organs shall agree annually with the Authority on the category of items to be included in the restricted list and on restricted procurement methods set out in this Act or regulations made under this Act which applies to each category of item on the restricted list.&quoute; However, it does not specify how or by whom scrutiny of restricted items is to be carried out.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: While the defence ministry appears to openly call for tenders, little else appears to be publicly available in terms of the procurement cycle process. No detail has been disclosed in recent procurements prior to their taking place. The cycle is disclosed in only a very general way.

Source 3 indicates that the legislature does not openly debate defence needs, meaning anything pertaining to these, including needs assessments and asset disposal, are not made public. While some procurement processes are discussed by the Security and Defence Committee, the defence forces operate under a dual list, one of which is covered by the National Security Act and whose contents are not made public.

The Public Procurement Act of 2011 similarly stipulates that each public body must establish a tender board for the disposal of public assets by tender. However, this is unlikely to apply to the defence sector in all cases. The Act goes on to say that the defence and national security bodies must manage their asset disposal on the basis of a dual list as well, meaning asset disposal in these sectors is at least partially shrouded from transparent scrutiny, while the results of these are not made publicly available.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Agree with comments. Score changed from 1 to 0 in line with this, and noting there is no clear evidence that a formalized process exists.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Defence procurement oversight mechanisms are in place in the form of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA), which is responsible for ensuring that the defence committee performs its oversight function on procurement matters in the defence sector. However, these mechanisms and the extent to which they are enforced lack transparency. The PPRA is mandated to ensure that all public bodies, including the defence forces, adhere to the Public Procurement Act of 2011, and its regulations of 2013, in terms of managing their procurement and disposal of public assets. The defence forces are also required to prepare a dual list, however, one of which is classified. Although the defence forces are required to discuss methods of procurement of classified items with the public procurement authority, this information remains restricted.

While there is evidence that the PPRA has been active in recent years in terms of exercising its oversight mechanisms - including through the suspension in October 2014 of 19 procurement firms over corruption - it is unclear whether it is able to exercise this level of activity in the defence sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Defence purchases are typically not made public until after they have been purchased, and in some cases not even then. More recently, in April 2014 the government revealed that it had completed the purchase of military equipment from China, including Type 63A amphibious tanks. The purchasing had been going on for several years before it was made public (source 3).

Nevertheless, in some cases security concerns are likely to be genuine, particularly given the rising threat of terrorism in East Africa, alongside the rise of Somalia-based Islamist extremist group al-Shabab. Although the group has not carried out an attack in Tanzania to date, its operatives are believed to have infiltrated Tanzania.

In 2012 the TPDF indicated a desire to acquire more hardware and plans to spend more on defence procurement in the face of rising security threats such as piracy and terrorism (Source 7). It has not indicated specifically where the increased budget will be used, nor the specific tasks for which the equipment will be used.

A June 2014 speech by Finance Minister Saluum mentioned unspecified challenges facing defence organs, for which there is a need to continue to purchase necessary equipment in line with the available budget (Source 8).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no mention in the Companies Act of 2002 or the Public Procurement Act of 2011 of companies being required to have compliance or any form of anti-corruption programmes. Each tendering process requires companies to submit tendering documents, though there is no specific law that stipulates that these must contain anti-corruption policies. The 7th Schedule of the Procurement Act Regulations contains an Anticorruption Memorandum setting out procedures for anti-corruption pledges as part of the tendering procedure however. Companies are also required to fulfil other requirements such as to prove registration and performance history, use standard tender documents and use neutral specifications as stipulated in the Procurement Act.

According to the Public Procurement Act 2011, Part I, sections 2(3) and 2(4), the Defence forces are required to prepare a dual list for procurement, one which is open for tendering and competitive bidding, and the other – a restricted one – which is not. The defence forces are required to agree with the Public Procurement Authority on the proper methods of procurement for the restricted list each year. The Authority is responsible for monitoring public procurement in all government bodies including the defence forces. However, studies have shown that this framework is not always effective. For example, a 2007 study conducted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that there are not enough mechanisms for reporting corrupt behaviour in procurement, while no specific ethical code of conduct exists for procurement officers.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Agree. Discussion updated and source added. Score changed from 0 to 1.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: A local source and the lack of publicly available information on the subject suggests that procurement requirements are not openly discussed in parliament, despite the constitutional provisions that state that a Security and Defence Committee within parliament is mandated to review military expenditure estimates. Given this dynamic, and the fact that the Public Procurement Act requires the defence forces to conduct procurement according to a dual list, one of which is restricted, the needs of the defence forces are unlikely to be subject to an open and well-audited strategy, leaving likely opportunities for procurement to take place outside the national strategy.

For example, the purchase of military air-traffic control equipment from BAE systems occurred (source 4) despite the fact that Tanzania did not have an air force, suggesting the deal had either not been subject to a needs assessment or such an assessment had been ignored. There is no evidence to suggest that changes have been made to prevent this since.

Nevertheless, the rising terrorism threat in East Africa, along with the widening of Somali pirates' areas of operations, which are believed to be able to reach the seas off the coast of Tanzania, appear to have prompted significant increases in defence expenditure, including a strengthening of the naval forces through purchases of amphibious tanks from China (source 8). This suggests that at least some procurement requirements are determined by a (not publicly available) national defence and security strategy. The assessor could not determine to what extent procurement falls outside of the national strategy.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agree with comments, however it is not clear how this would support a rise in score, noting that the national strategy is not made publicly available and it is thus not possible to verify the extent to which defence procurement has been formally derived from it. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The purchases of the defence forces are unlikely to be clearly identified or quantified in all cases. However, there is evidence that in some cases purchases are made based on observable requirements. For example, the defence minister in 2013 asked for the purchase of equipment that would help clearly survey and define land belonging to the defence forces and land belonging to the public. The request was made in response to the 80 land conflicts going on at the time between the public and the defence forces, particularly in the island of Zanzibar (source 2 and 3).

In 2012 the TPDF indicated a desire to acquire more hardware and plans to spend more on defence procurement in the face of rising security threats such as piracy and terrorism. It did not indicate specifically where the increased budget will be used, nor the specific tasks for which the equipment will be used. Nevertheless, the rising terrorism threat in East Africa, along with the widening of Somali pirates' areas of operations, which are believed to be able to reach the seas off the coast of Tanzania, appear to have prompted significant increases in defence expenditure, including a strengthening of the naval forces through purchases of amphibious tanks from China (source 2). This suggests that at least some procurement requirements are determined by identified requirements.

There is evidence some defence procurement has been linked to other support that seller nations give to Tanzania. For example, in 2014 Tanzania purchased A-100 multiple rocket launchers from China that are capable of transporting erector launch vehicles carrying 300m 800kg rockets. Each of those rockets has a 200 kg warhead which can strike targets up to 120 km away. The purchase was carried out despite Tanzania facing no clear external threat or other strategic requirement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no public information detailing the percentage of the value of single source contracts in the defence sector in particular. There is no evidence to suggest that the majority of defence contracts, or even several of them, are single sourced however.

The Public Procurement Act of 2011 gives equal opportunity to all prospective suppliers, contractors, consultants and service providers. It ensures fairness of treatment to all parties in order to obtain the value for money in the procurement process. In section 33(1) of the Public Procurement Act of 2001, &quoute;The procuring entity shall include in the record required under section 30 a statement of the grounds for its decision and the circumstances on which it relied to justify the restriction to procurement from a single source.&quoute; However, this aspect of the Act only applies to non-classified items of the dual list, part of which is not open to regular tendering. The method of procurement for the defence forces is to be agreed upon with the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) each year. However, it is not always clear why certain procurement items are placed on the restricted list. According to a PPRA study conducted in 2007, 12% of procurement contracts for the government as a whole were single sourced.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Ministry of Defence tender boards are subject to a code of conduct. Under the Public Procurement Act of 2011, Part X, section 102, all public officials involved in the tendering process must subscribe to the Code of Ethical Conduct, which includes the requirement to declare personal interest in any tender being discussed. Tender boards are also required to ascribe to the general Code of Ethics for Public Servants and the Public Leadership Code of Ethics and often, to individual company codes of ethics. Nevertheless, there is no single Code of Ethical Conduct issued by the government to tender boards, and an examination of codes of conduct in relation to tender boards in the Public Procurement Act suggest they are vague, incomplete and their application is non-transparent.

Oversight of this is not always successful. There is evidence of training of members of the tender boards from the Ministry of Defence. For example the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) trained Ministry of Defence Tender Board members on the Public Procurement Act 2004, Corruption and Ethics Infrastructure in March 2010. The training was part of the implementation of the Nation Anti-Corruption Strategic and Action Plan (NACSAP II), whose goal was to strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms in all areas of government. However, NACSAP II has since terminated, and it is unclear when the new framework will be implemented, though a new version is currently under development. Although training sessions have occurred, it also remains unclear how regularly they are held, and information may be outdated now that the Public Procurement Act was updated in 2011.

The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) is mandated to audit tender boards according to Part IV, sections 31-32 of the Public Procurement Act of 2011. This includes working with local government authorities to determine the composition of a tender board and its members' qualifications. However, evidence suggests oversight is uneven, with cases of tender board controversies emerging after contracts have already been awarded. For example, it emerged in October 2014 that a member of the tender board for the state electricity company (TANESCO) failed to declare that a particular tender was being submitted by his wife, in breach of the Public Procurement Act of 2011, Part IV Section 31(6), that states that &quoute;A member of the tender board or committee thereof, who is a member of a company, firm or other body or is a partner or is in the employment of a person or a company or other body or is married to a person who has submitted an offer for the supply of goods or for the provision of services, execution of works or acquisition of public assets by tender in connection therewith which is the subject of consideration by the tender board, shall disclose the fact.&quoute; Although this case does not specifically relate to the defence sector, it highlights inconsistencies in the PPRA's auditing process. The 2013/13 report by the Controller and Auditor General revealed that the defence forces failed to provide sufficient information for the carrying out of the audit despite government reports that this information is available for scrutiny. This suggests that while the report does cover the defence forces, and it is submitted to the legislature, information provided within it are incomplete.

Moreover, a controversy arising with the tender board of SUMA JKT, the commercial arm of the National Service, highlights that regulations are not always followed or enforced (source 3). Military owned businesses including SUMA JKT are required to adhere to the Public procurement Act of 2011 when purchasing equipment.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement Act of 2011, Part VIII section 83(2), prohibits collusive practices when competing for a tender, including in the defence forces or ministry. Anyone guilty of this behaviour can face rejection of the proposal, and ineligibility to compete for further contracts for a period of 10 years or more. The tenderer may also be required to reimburse a portion of any funds paid. The Public Procurement Authority is responsible for enforcing these provisions. However, there is evidence that corruption in general in defence tenders is not always pursued.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is evidence that procurement staff have been trained in anti-corruption strategies. For example, Crown Agents, an international development company, in 2007 trained Prevention of Corruption Bureau officers on weaknesses and indicators of corruption and on anti-corruption strategies and techniques including prevention and awareness. However, it is not clear whether any training was specifically conducted for the defence sector, where more secretive dynamics are at play for reasons of national security. Moreover, training started from a very low base, suggesting it will take years for procurement staff to be fully qualified to international standards. Most of the officers in the 2007 training sessions admitted having limited or no knowledge of public procurement laws. A 2003 review found that training for procurement staff, including management, was not practical enough or related to specific sector job requirements, making it ineffective. Tanzania has since requested the help of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to strengthen the capabilities of the Public Procurement Authority, but it is unclear whether this has applied to the defence sector or whether training has been updated after the new Public Procurement Act was released in 2011.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement Act of 2011 stipulates mechanisms by which companies can make complaints to the Public Procurement Authority, though there is no mention of refraining from future discrimination over the use of such mechanisms. However, a 2007 study conducted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2007 found that there are not enough mechanisms for reporting corrupt behaviour in procurement, while many companies are not aware of the procedure for complaints. It is unclear whether these deficiencies have been addressed, suggesting mechanisms are likely to remain rudimentary. Moreover, reports suggest that companies often fail to report corruption for fear of losing future contracts, suggesting protection against discrimination for reporting corruption remains limited. Though these reports do not specifically refer to the defence sector, given overall failure to enforce mechanisms, concerns are likely to also apply to defence and security.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Link given by reviewer 1 does not work. Sources given by reviewer 2, as has often been the case, are already included.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement Act of 2011, Part VIII Section 83(5), prohibits corrupt practices, including in the defence forces or ministry. Anyone guilty of this behaviour can face rejection of the proposal, and ineligibility to compete for further contracts for a period of 10 years or more. The tenderer may also be required to reimburse a portion of any funds paid. The Public Procurement Authority is responsible for enforcing these provisions. However, there is evidence that sanctions are not always applied, as with the case of the sale of air-traffic military equipment sold by BAE (see source 1). In this instance, despite evidence that a Tanzanian national received payments that were unaccounted for, no Tanzanians faced trial over the deal. Moreover, media searches reveal that there have been no known prosecutions of corrupt suppliers in the defence sector in Tanzania, suggesting sanctions are rarely applied.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Agree that there is evidence of positive action in Tanzania's wider public sector, however this does not yet appear to have extended to defence suppliers. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no mention of guidelines governing offset agreements for the defence or any other sector in the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act of 2007, the Public Procurement Act of 2011 or the National Defence Act of 1966, suggesting Tanzania has a limited regulatory and legislative capacity to manage offset contracts. Moreover, it is not clear whether Tanzania has to date engaged in offset contracts.

However, there is mention of due diligence requirements and guidelines for contracts and tendering in general. In terms of auditing, evidence shows that current bodies in place to oversee corrupt practices in government ministries – such as the auditor general and the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau – are often ignored by the executive. The 2012/13 Controller and Auditor General report revealed that the defence forces and ministry payments lacked enough information to establish their validity to be charged against public funds. It also highlighted a number of instances in several regions where procurement was made without proper approval, suggesting due diligence is not consistently applied.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Although some broader due diligence and auditing requirements exist, there are no formal provisions made for offset contracting. There is little evidence that these provisions could apply effectively to offset contracting and clear evidence that they are not being applied effectively in standard public contracting. Other sales (see Q76, for example) indicate that there is clear potential for Tanzania to negotiate indirect offsets with seller countries. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no mention in legislation of regulations governing offset contracts, nor is there public information indicating that the government engages in them.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no mention in the Public Procurement Act 2011 or any other publicly available document of a requirement that offset contracts undergo competitive tendering. With a portion of defence spending and procurement being classified, it remains unclear whether any offset contracts are in fact subject to the same level of competition as a main contract.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no specific policy or law regulating the activities of arms brokers or intermediaries, suggesting limited or no government control over them.

The Public Procurement Regulations of 2013, Part II, section 79(1), stipulates that ‘any commission or remuneration paid to any agent, consultant or other intermediary represents no more than appropriate compensation for legitimate services, and that no part of any such payment is passed on by an agent, tenderer or other intermediary as an improper inducement in contravention of these Regulations’. It further states that ‘procuring entities, approving authorities and tenderers shall take appropriate measures to ensure that agents, consultants and other intermediaries are not employed to gain any improper influence in connection with obtaining or retaining any business’. However, these regulations remain vague, incomplete and appear to be ineffective. For example, there is no specification as to what constitute 'appropriate measures'.

Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that sub-contractors or other intermediaries are used to circumvent anti-corruption legislation in the procurement cycle and that cases of this activity are not punished. For example, UK arms company BAE in 2010 admitted to failing to keep proper accounting records and relating to the use of an agent (see source 4). The agent never faced prosecution, suggesting limited, if any, measures have been enacted since then to prevent new cases from taking place.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: No evidence was found of any specific policy or law regulating the activities of arms brokers or intermediaries, suggesting limited or no government control over them. Other factors like the prevalence of facilitation payments (see Q51) show there is a clear wider risk here. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement Regulations of 2013 stipulates that a tendering entity must submit records to the Public Procurement Authority regarding various aspects of the procurement cycle, including financing. The information must also be submitted for publication in the Journal and Tenders Portal.

However, it is not clear how detailed these publications are required to be, while a search through the Tenders Portal revealed no recent information on awarded arms contracts in the defence ministry, though information on non-sensitive items such as medial supplies and fuel can be found.

Precedent suggests information regarding finance packages is not subject to stringent requirements.

Details of financing packages regarding major arms deals since then do not appear to be publicly available. However, their existence is alluded to in the form of reports on loans from China and the identity of providers have been announced, at least in some instances such as when Tanzania purchased amphibious tanks and other military hardware from China in May 2014 (source 5).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement Regulations of 2013, which covers the defence sector as a public institution, section 78, stipulates that each tenderer is required to submit a statement addressing corruption and bribery as part of the tendering documents. The tenderer must issue guidelines for compliance which are to be followed by all third parties working on a contract, including subcontractors. While there is no specific evidence that these measures are flouted, the general environment of corruption in procurement, and reports that at least 18 Chinese multinationals with subsidiaries in Tanzania performed poorly in anti-corruption measures, suggest anti-corruption provisions among subsidiaries and subcontractors in the defence sector are not enforced (source 2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is evidence to suggest defence acquisition decisions can be based on political influence by seller nations. For example, China has been increasingly offering loans in the defence sector and military assistance in the form of training and logistics, suggesting that the sale of arms, such as one completed in April 2014 that included amphibious tanks (source 6 and 7), may be subject to political influence (i.e. encouraged by their aid donations).

Although there is likely to be some military need for these purchases given the rising threat of off (and on) shore terrorism in the region and the need to secure Tanzania's impending oil and gas production sites, the threat does not explain the rate at which Tanzania's defence spending has grown over the past several years - at a higher percentage than any other country in the region. Some degree of influence from selling nations may provide an alternate explanation but without transparent details of acquisitions an 'political influence' argument cannot be asserted.

In another example, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was implicated in the BAE systems sale of air-traffic control radars to Tanzania in 1999. Blair was accused by British media of pushing through the deal despite being aware of suspicions regarding the propriety of the deal, suggesting a certain degree of political influence on the acquisition. Although the deal was initially touted as necessary for the civil aviation sector, there was no military need for the radars given that Tanzania did not have an air force at the time.