Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: It is unclear whether asset disposal is subject to oversight or public scrutiny or which bodies would be responsible for this. Research provides no indications of incidents of asset disposal and interviews conducted for this research were also not able to elaborate on this. Instead, it appears from media reports, as listed in the sources above, that Mozambique's security forces are more likely to hold on to their assets and refurbish or service them. This is a cost-cutting exercise because the defence budget does not generally allow for purchases of newer and more sophisticated equipment.

The only information on asset disposal that is publicly available relates to the ongoing disarmament programmes for former civil war belligerent RENAMO. Numerous international organisations, including Norwegian People's Aid and The HALO trust, support disarmament and the destruction of weapons. The government has also signed a number of disarmament MoU's with RENAMO which are supposed to also involve the destruction of weapons. However, academic reports on previous disarmament programmes showed they were lacklustre, and the destruction of weapons was not controlled, allowing for a significant number of illegal smalls arms within the country.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: It is unclear whether asset disposal is subject to oversight or public scrutiny or which bodies would be responsible for this. Research provides no indications of incidents of asset disposal and interviews conducted for this research were also not able to elaborate on this.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is no secret spending in the budget according to the IMF (2015) and the Open Budget Initiative (2012). Both organisations have indicated that the government reports even spending on national security and intelligence (although this is not necessarily itemised, but reported in general terms) in the annual budget law. The budget law can be accessed online at www.dno.gov.mz. The amount (as % of GDP) spent on the military, including the SISE intelligence service, is also published in the national media at the time of the budget announcements.

Mozambique's budget follows the budget framework process, with oversight provided by parliament and through publicly-available national plans. While there has been controversy around the EMATUM bond, this speaks more to deceit in terms of how funds raised would have been spent, rather than budget items being necessarily secret.

Interviewees are of the opinion that secret spending does not take place, or if so takes places at a very low rate. This is because of comparatively low spending in the defence sector, and while information around the intelligence services is not publicly obtainable, the view seems to be that this sub-sector has not been afforded all that much importance.

Score 0 has been selected as ainformation around specific expenditure within the defence sector (including intelligence and national security) is not published. The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database has not even been able to obtain the sum of the defence budget since 2011.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Spending related to national security and intelligence is listed in general terms on the budget, but further details should be made available to the legislature on demand. However, there are no public reports of this occurring. Macuácua notes that audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector are prepared internally within the ministry, with reports detailing revenue and expenditure relevant to the budget are made available to parliament periodically for scrutiny and debate. Additional to the internal review, spending is subject to external audit by the Administrative Tribunal and the Inspector General; internet searches could not confirm if these institutions had reviewed the defence ministry, and national security and intelligence spending in particular.

Further, while details of the total sum of the budget, the proportion of GDP this constitutes, and other macro-type data such as particularly large portions of expenditure may be obtainable from year to year, internet searches reveal no results for more detailed and itemised information surrounding the budget. Macuácua notes that greater detail about exact allocations is simply not available. Thus, information around specific expenditure within the defence sector (including intelligence and national security) is not published. What is more, the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database has not even been able to obtain the sum of the defence budget since 2011.

Score 2 is selected as the legislature is provided with some information on spending related to national security and intelligence, but categories are presented in an aggregated manner.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Allocations to national security and intelligence are not itemised, but listed as overall totals.

Macuácua notes that audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector are prepared internally within the ministry, with reports detailing revenue and expenditure relevant to the budget are made available to parliament periodically for scrutiny and debate. Publicly available budgetary information in this sector does tend to be aggregated in nature and does not provide specific breakdowns of expenditure for various bodies in the security sector (military, police, intelligence services), although this detail may or may not be provided to parliament.

The Inspector General also conducts audits of government ministries, with input from the Administrative Court. Public searches cannot confirm whether or not they have conducted an audit of the intelligence services. The Administrative Court has been praised as independent and the IMF reported in 2015 that the court would soon be implementing policies to ensure it is in line with International Standards for Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAI). It's audits are not made public, but submitted to the Inspector General, who in turn submits findings to the relevant minister.

Despite the inclusion of more opposition in the new parliament, FRELIMO still dominates. Due its close connections to the military, stemming from the civil war history, FRELIMO MPs are unlikely to challenge the military, expect in the cases of major scandals such as EMATUM.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Off-budget military expenditure is permitted by law, but tends not to take place, except for instances where donor contributions have resulted in off-plan spending. It is clear that there is assistance provided by the group of donors on budgeting, and this is likely to take place in the context of general influence through their engagement rather than intervention on specific items of expenditure, or in the case of the latter, this has not always been specified.

Aside from this, there have been limited public indications of off-budget expenditure, and this information would be difficult to find as it would require the ability to obtain reports from defence bodies and the ministry, as well as the defence budget, which could then in theory be cross-checked; but access to such information is limited. One notable exception was the EMATUM scandal, spending on which was not reported to parliament but the loan was later included in the official budget, after donor pressure.

Organisations reporting on budgetary issues in Mozambique, including the IMF and the World Bank, have reported improvements in the level of off-spending in the last decade.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Aside from the general off-plan spending that may take place as a result of donor involvement in the budget process (where donors place pressure on government to direct particular expenditure that might not be listed within the budget), off-budget military spending does not tend to take place, according to an academic expert on Mozambique. The 2013 EMATUM bond scandal appears to be an exception rather than the rule, but part of this has now been brought on budget, including the expenditure in the 2014 budget. This involved a US$850 million state-backed bond that was advertised as being intended for purchasing fishing trawlers, but concern had been raised by the International Monetary Fund that government was planning on using part of the funds raised for the purchase of vessels for the navy that could be equipped as war ships with the installation of cannons, for example.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: It appears to the interviewee from inferences that there is law in place that allows for the classification of information. The law is 12/79 and dates back to the one-party state and the revolution, and has been criticised by observers (Tomás Vieira Mário ) for needing modernisation.

Law 12/79 defines classified documents as those that contain data or information on military, political, economic or trade, the disclosure of which would jeopardize or harm the Security of the State and People, or the national economy. With this vague wording, the law is therefore much a question of interpretation. It does not set guidelines for classifying information or provide details of exemptions. It sets levels of classification - from 'confidential' to 'State Secret' - that carry varying prison terms if information is disclosed; the maximum term is 12 years.

There is no indication of what controls may be in place to monitor and govern nor how this provision is being used. It is likely that powers here are concentrated to Ministers and Presidency, given the dominance of FRELIMO, and the powers of the executive within the party political culture.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: A Mozambique expert notes that the country is increasingly following a Vietnamese model where defence institutions have companies. One company where this relationship is clear is the case of Monte Binga, founded and owned some two decades ago by the Minister of Defence, and has interests in sectors ranging from mine clearance to manufacturing explosives, but also has interests in the natural resource sector; the company also reportedly secured a tender to produce police uniforms. The company has a website but lists no information about its government connections or its balance sheets, nor of its internal processes. Thus, it does not appear that there are any oversight mechanisms in place. While news reports indicate that its interests are public, further information on its operations and finances are not obtainable, and do not appear on the company website.

Another example is GIPS(Management of Investments, Holdings and Services), which was set up in January 2012 (see source 6). It was originally 70% owned by the State Intelligence and Security Agency (SISE), with 30% owned by a minority shareholder; the shareholder sold his 30% share to GIPS in March 2013. GIPS was involved in the EMATUM scandal - it owned 33% of EMATUM - and was highly likely to have been given this position due to its connections to the SISE. Internet searches yielded no information on the company's financial details.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Military-owned business is not subject to public or independent scrutiny. Details surrounding financial interests, profits and losses, etc are being withheld from the public. Major projects, acquisitions or partnerships are likely to be announced via statements to the media, but in these instances only the most basic information is made available - the total value of a particular project and a general statement about what is being acquired (like number of aircraft, for example). Internet research reveals no further information about Monte Binga's financial position, nor full details of its commercial interests, partnerships, and other financial relationships.

The EMATUM scandal revealed how military-owned businesses could be utilised for corrupt practices by the government. EMATUM was set up, ostensibly as a private company, but its shareholders were government-owned companies, including GIPS (wholly owned by the intelligence services). In February 2015, the IMF reported that GIPS was not recorded on the inventory of the state's holdings (IGEPE) and therefore public information and oversight of the company is incredibly sparse. Internet searches were unable to ascertain details of the company's set up, oversight, or profit usage/reportage.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: The Public Probity law of November 2012 bars public servants from profiting privately in areas where they have decision making powers. However, it does not totally ban their involvement in private enterprises. Since its passage, the law has been poorly enforced with media reporting on numerous MPs who should be considered in violation of the law, although most have since resigned from their positions at private enterprises.

Where private security services are concerned (an area where military or defence officials provide unauthorised services), government has strict regulations in place, issuing only temporary licenses to operators, which require them to report to the Interior Ministry during the frequent renewal periods where their business and operations are assessed for the re-issuing of licenses. These companies are required to operate under a full and up to date license along with registration documentation. If any company is found to be operating without these, they face sizable financial fines, exact sums of which are not disclosed. No examples were found through internet searches of instances where these fines were applied.


Response to Peer Reviewer 1: agree. Although I was unable to confirm the example of the demining companies, I found numerous media stories - sources 3-6 - which demonstrated the issues relating to the public probity law. Given these issues and those raised by Peer Reviewer 1, it is evident that some unauthorised enterprise does take place. The lack of evidence related to fines or sanctions on the issue also contributed to the decision to lower the score. Score changed from 4 to 2.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Since his election in October 2014, President Nyusi has repeatedly stated his intention to tackle corruption within state institutions. To this end, he has appointed a cabinet that is smaller and more technocratic than his predecessor. However, the former president remains head of FRELIMO structures until 2017, which IHS analysts stated will hinder Nyusi's ability to make dramatic changes in the short term. This would include the military and the defence sector, which is intrinsically linked to FRELIMO due to the civil war history.

A review of news items and press releases in both English and Portuguese reveal no public statements made by either the Minister of Defence or senior officials and high-ranking officers with respect to a commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures in the defence sector. This again underscores the omission of the defence sector from the country's anti-corruption efforts. Even in the instance of the controversial EMATUM bond, when the group of 19 donors made requests for greater financial transparency, responses came from the Minister for Planning and Development (not from the defence ministry) who noted that he was working with the Minister of Finance to bring clarity on the matter.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is no evidence that such measures are in place for the defence sector beyond the more general provisions under the 2004 Anti-Corruption Act and Chapter IX of the Penal Code detailed in Q7. These include expulsion from their profession, payment of damages and being barred from working as a subcontractor for the state.

Given the absence of a defence-specific anti-corruption policy, it is unlikely that specific policy would be in place, and further the Act and Penal Code are considered to lack effectiveness. A review of news reports does not indicate any recent public evidence of measures being taken. However, there are reports of bribery or facilitation payments within the police force in particular (reports on the misconduct of the army are less forthcoming, but this is likely to be due to the frequency of civilian interaction with the police, not due to the lack of corruption in the army). Therefore, score 1 has been selected.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: While, Article 13 (1) of Law 6 of 2004 provides for the protection of witnesses and holds that they may not face disciplinary action or punitive measures, nor harassment, as a result of reporting corruption; the Centre for Public Integrity in 2008 noted that contrary to international conventions, Mozambique's legal mechanisms offering protection to whistle-blowers and witnesses were not concrete. According to the Code of Conduct, the Ethics Commission is responsible for ensuring whistleblower protection, but no details on how this should be achieved are given.
As of 2013, JonesDay reported continued inadequate protection for whistleblowers. There is no witness protection programme or agency in place, and there seems to be inadequate appreciation of why this is necessary as part of a robust anti-corruption strategy.

These measures apply generally and there is no evidence that the defence sector offers specialised or particular protection to whistle-blowers or informants. There is no evidence of previous whistleblowers within the military.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is no clear evidence that any special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions, and while it is likely that there may be some oversight through FRELIMO structures and the government executive, this is not publicly available. These positions are not known to be openly declared during the recruitment phase, but media reports can be found on senior appointments.

It stands to reason given the Mozambican political landscape that appointment of personnel in sensitive positions is, however, likely to take place on a strategic basis with FRELIMO members with a history of party loyalty (and perhaps even personal loyalties to the leadership in place) being likely selected for these posts; and this is confirmed by the interviewee. On this basis, oversight is more likely to come from FRELIMO as opposed to from neutral government institutions.

Sources were not able to further elucidate on oversight mechanisms. More recent sources that provide the level of detail required were not available. In fact, there are precious few that have reviewed the inner workings of the defence sector, including Lalá, Macuacua, and Macaringue.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Publicly available figures for the exact number of personnel varies from source to source; so, while a rough idea may be available, this is not exactly accurate. Moreover, available figures relate to force strength, and do therefore not necessarily include technical and administrative staff. A DefenceWeb article indicates a total force strength of 14,200 (13,000 in the army, 200 in the navy, and 1000 in the airforce), while both GlobalFirePower and the World Bank put the number of active frontline personnel at 11,200. The government does not release official statements on the size of the armed forces.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Reports from April 2014 indicate that the minimum wage for sector of public administration, defence and security was raised by 8 per cent to 3,002 MT (US$95), valid until the end of April 2015.
A full list of pay rates at various grades was not obtainable, although a review of news reports indicates that the salaries of more senior officials are publicly known, as these are compared against the minimum wage. Information about allowances was not available.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: While there are occasional indications of late payment, there are also indications that the amounts paid are incorrect, and fall short of agreed wages. This is said to occur across the civil service, although the education and healthcare sectors are worst affected, but those conscripted to military service have made similar reports. Some of this has been attributed to backlogs in and updates to the Electronic System of State Financial Management (Sistafe). Further it is noted that retroactive payments are also slow. While information about the payment system appears to be available, there are shortcomings in its functioning.

As of 2014, the IMF reported that Sistafe and its accompanying wage payment system e-Folha was not used for the defence and police sectors. However, there were plans to roll out e-Fohla to these sectors (no timeframe indicated). The use of Sistafe and e-Folha have led to improvements in other public sector salary payments, including reducing delays and inaccuracies. If rolled out to the defence and police sectors, they could be expected to have the same impact, while also improving transparency of the system (few details are currently available on how the payment system operates).

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: disagree. According to the IMF, Sistafe has not been used in the defence sector. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is an established system in place for the appointment and promotion of military personnel that is considered professional; however, it appears that this may form part of internal policies that are not available to the public. Appointment and promotions are often based on merit due to the importance of the military during the civil war, which has resulted in a number of well-qualified and well-experienced officers within the armed forces, notes Macaringue. However, given also the dominance of FRELIMO within government and the defence sector, there are occasions when appointments and promotions do not take place strictly on the basis of merit, but rather on the basis of party loyalty, suggests the interviewee.

More recent sources that provide the level of detail required are not available. In fact, there are very few that have reviewed the inner workings of the defence sector, including Lalá, Macuacua, and Macaringue. Macaringue (himself having had a career in the Mozambican military) does not further elaborate on legal provisions within his text, and this was also information the interviewee or internet research did not provide.

Score 1 has been selected as the system for the appointment that is said to exist is not published, and given some evidence of appointment and promotion that is not purely based on merit.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: The promotion of personnel in the defence sector is generally based on merit and subject to formal processes, according to the interview respondent, although the constitution or policy employed by promotion boards is not publicly available. This is a dividend of history, given the importance of the military in the context of the liberation struggle and civil war, and the post-war dominance of FRELIMO in the political landscape. This one party dominance in Mozambique has meant that while appointees may be affiliated with the ruling party, they also tend to have many years of military service, making them experienced hires who are likely to fulfil requirements for promotion. Having said this, however, members of the erstwhile guerilla movement, RENAMO, were also absorbed into the defence sector in the post-war dispensation. Of course, while all members of the defence forces are not necessarily politically aligned, it goes without saying that balance of power in the defence sector mirrors that seen elsewhere in Mozambique's body politic - a strong FRELIMO dominance.

Beyond this, political motivations for appointments can not be ruled out. A key demand of RENAMO in peace talks has been that their members will fill 50% of the senior positions of the armed forces. Although the government is unlikely to apply a 50% quota, opposition members will be promoted/included for the sake of opposition representation, as opposed to their skills and experience.

There are also numerous cases reported of political appointments favouring those close to the former president . Although the new president has appointed a more technocratic cabinet, according to analysts at IHS, he has allegedly positioned his loyalists from northern regions in positions of power. It is likely that he will also be keen to place his loyalists at the top of the security forces. There were media reports in June 2015 that the president was looking to replace the police chief. While this was reported as being due to failings of the police service, notably related to the spate of kidnapping of businessmen, a story by Africa Confidential also speculated that it is also driven in part by the fact t hat the police chief is loyal to the former president.

Response to peer reviewer 1: disagree with suggested score. Score 1 maintained as there are formal processes in place, but evidence suggests that these are undermined for political reasons.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Mozambique made conscription compulsory after its independence in 1975. Conscription became a requirement for men and women over the age of 18, for a period of two years at least. The presentation of a military service card was then required for obtaining a driver's license and passport.

In 2009, however, the law on conscription was amended, and while conscription may technically be required, it is not regularly enforced, with evidence that women are rarely conscripted. In 2013 there were a number of youth protests following reports that the military were going door to door and forcibly conscripting youths in order to bolster force strength as the military battled with RENAMO's insurgency. The military denied this.

A study conducted by Mozambique's Youth Parliament, funded by OSISA, also found that only poor African youths were routinely conscripted as they were unable to bribe their way out of conscription. Beyond this implication that the wealthier sector of society, which is very small, may bribe officials to avoid conscription, there is no evidence that this does take place. There is also no clear evidence that specific measures or mechanisms are in place to prevent bribery specific to the defence sector, aside from any general penalties contained under the 2004 Anti-Corruption Act and Chapter IX of the Penal Code.

In January 2014 it was announced that the government was launching a month-long nationwide conscription campaign, requiring those between 18 and 35 to register. Conscription would be compulsory for both men and women for a period of two years, once formalities were completed. There has been little reportage on the matter since that announcement, however, this may serve to change the incidence of bribery to avoid conscription.

There is no known policy relating to bribery for the defence sector which would be applicable here.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: A study conducted by Mozambique's Youth Parliament, funded by OSISA, also found that only poor African youths were routinely conscripted as they were unable to bribe their way out of conscription. Beyond this implication that the wealthier sector of society, which is very small, may bribe officials to avoid conscription, there is no evidence that this does take place. There is also no clear evidence that specific measures or mechanisms are in place to prevent bribery specific to the defence sector, aside from any general penalties contained under the 2004 Anti-Corruption Act and Chapter IX of the Penal Code.

In January 2014 it was announced that the government was launching a month-long nationwide conscription campaign, requiring those between 18 and 35 to register. Conscription would be compulsory for both men and women for a period of two years, once formalities were completed. There has been little reportage on the matter since that announcement, however, this may serve to change the incidence of bribery to avoid conscription.

There is no known policy relating to bribery for the defence sector which would be applicable here, nor is there specific evidence of bribery taking place for preferred postings although there is a strong risk.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: According to a Mozambique expert, there are no reports or evidence of ghost soldiers in Mozambique, though ghost teachers have been a problem. This is evidenced by media reports. However, the introduction of an electronic payment system has improved the situation across the public sector. As of 2014, this electronic payment system is not used by the defence and police, but was scheduled to be rolled out in the future.

In theory, however, it is not inconceivable that the phenomenon could occur. Further, given the number of military and civilian personnel are not accurately known and the payment system is weak (see also Questions 38 and 40). Further, given the high levels of corruption in the country, the dominance of FRELIMO within government and in parliament, and capacity issues where financial management is concerned are also to be considered as adding to the risk.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Chains of payment would be separate from chains of command if and when the payments are made via the Electronic System of State Financial Management, abbreviated as SISTAFE, an integrated system, which is regulated under the law, particularly under Law no.9/2002 (dealing with the state financial administration system), and Decree no.23/2004 (which approves SISTAFE regulations). While this system involves central institutions, detailed control of expenditure is conducted within central line ministries, under a decentralised system, and it is unclear where chains on payment reside within the ministries themselves. The separation of chains of payment and chains of command would exist due to this way in which the state functions have been organised, and not due to published policy. Additionally, given sources that confirm that SISTAFE has not yet been rolled out in the defence sector until at least 2014, a lower score of 1 has been selected.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is a military code of conduct, which was passed by the Assembly as part of a parcel of laws specific to the military between 1995 and 1998. By 2012 there were indications that it is or was under revision, but it is unclear whether or not the revision process has been completed. The actual document itself does not appear to be available online, nor did searches yield references to its content elsewhere, and it is thus unclear whether the document deals explicitly with corruption and bribery. Conduct standards for the same are however covered in legislation such as the Anti-Corruption Act and the Penal Code (as discussed in Question 35).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Internet research and interview with one expert in Mozambique shed no light on if or how the Code of Conduct is implemented. According to one respondent, details on its content is limited, and there are no references in news reportage, for example, of instances where breaches of the Code have been dealt with or any prosecutions specific to breaches of the Code.

The government has signed up to the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs' Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO), which in 2001 adopted a Code of Conduct for the police force. This includes provisions on respect for human rights, use of force and non-discrimination. The country has also signed up to relevant UN conventions, such as the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. Despite this, in 2008, Amnesty International reported multiple breaches of these codes, which went unpunished. There is no indication that since 2008 there has been any reform that would prevent a repeat of such issues. As discussed in Question 35, conduct standards defined in legislation are in place but there is minimal evidence of enforcement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Evidence that anti-corruption training takes place is limited, although relevant experts (interviewees) believe that this may take place, but is likely to do so in a sporadic and informal manner. The government publishes sporadic information about training courses attended by military and civilian personnel within the defence sector. The training courses attended are in line with statements by the former president and senior officials within the armed forces for the need to increase the professionalization of the forces. While this should in theory tackle corruption issues within the defence sector, there is no recorded evidence of this including anti-corruption training.

UNODC has supported the Mozambican government with several initiatives, including strengthening the judicial system. As of early 2015, they were placing an Anti-Corruption expert in-country to support the adherence to UNCAC. It is not clear if this role will include provisions related to the defence sector.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: disagree. There is no evidence that the UNODC programme has resulted in anti-corruption training for the armed forces.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is no indication on whether a policy exists on making public details of prosecutions of defence services personnel for corruption, and internet research and discussion with experts in Mozambique reveal no evidence of recent prosecutions related to corruption in the defence sector. Having said this, corruption in the defence sector is not thought to be a particular problem in Mozambique by the government and does not exist as a priority area in this regard, a sentiment reiterated by the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

A report by OSISA in 2012 indicated that the public perceive defence institutions to be corrupt, particularly the police force. Although the report also acknowledges that this perception likely comes from the frequency of interactions between the public and the police.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: The line between facilitation payments and bribery in Mozambique is very much blurred. This is because processes and procedures related to government institutions are often lengthy and complicated, taking a significant time to complete. The US Department of State notes that legal regulations tend not to be enforced, or are enforced for the purposes of generating revenue through fines and bribes.

Bribery is so commonplace that it is routinely required for a wide variety of daily personal and business actives including passing through roadblocks, receiving basic services and to speed up the provision of services, bribing court officials, facilitating inspections or regulatory processes etc. as noted by the US Department of State and Democracy & Society. Furthermore, civil servants may threaten to impose outdated regulations and requirements in order to solicit bribes, according to the US Department of State.

The government is aware of these problems (as is indicated through the passage of laws) and has had its donor aid cut as a result of the prevalence of corruption, as reported in the Mail and the Guardian.The official position is that legal provisions outlaw corruption and bribery, specifically through Article 318, Chapter IX of the Penal Code. However, accountability mechanisms remain weak with few mechanisms in place to prevent or punish such behaviour, and there is little clarity around exactly what these constitute. The respect of the rule of law is limited and corruption occurs across sectors with impunity.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Despite a series of anti-corruption initiatives over the last few years, donors and international anti-corruption organisations have questioned the government's full commitment to these initiatives, noting several major shortcomings. These include concerns over the lack of legislation over access to information. Despite these concerns being repeatedly raised since 2012, no effort has been made to address them, implying that anti-corruption initiatives are not considered a strategic priority for the government.
There is no indication that there is a specific appreciation within the defence sector of the need for considering corruption a risk, and inhibiting that risk through training, risk assessment or inclusion as a strategic issue in military doctrine. Furthermore, deployments mostly take place as a foreign policy tool to assist in continental peacekeeping operations, and there is no evidence to suggest that corruption issues are considered ahead of deployment

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is no clear indication that commanders receive specific training on corruption issues, and it is likely that mention of corruption in training is cursory at best, according to the interview respondents cited. Having said this, risk of corruption in the defence sector in Mozambique is considered low by government (and which is reiterated by the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre), and there is little public evidence of corrupt activity within the sector. These factors offer some explanation as to why there is no evidence of such training, as this likely not deemed expressly necessary in the Mozambican context by its government.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is no clear indication whether or not corruption monitors are deployed in the field. It is however deemed unlikely given the absence of defence sector specific anti-corruption strategy. The perception of corruption risk in this sector is also lower than that in priority areas for anti-corruption for government, which is reiterated by the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: disagree. The UNODC position was advertised as an individual who would be placed within the government to support the implementation of UNCAC. There is no indication that this individual will be looking at the defence sector, and nothing to lead us to believe they will be deployed out in the field. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Training is believed to take place specific to the particular contours of a mission that troops may be deployed on, but there is no evidence that this necessarily includes training on corruption, nor that there are any particular guidelines for soldiers to follow in terms of corrupt activities and practices in contracting. This may be due to the apparent low rates of corruption within Mozambique's defence sector, as has been highlighted by the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, and confirmed by a review of media articles conducted for this research.

However, given that Mozambican troops would be deployed to contribute to larger peacekeeping missions, they may receive some warning against corruption at induction from the African Union / United Nations, although further details on this is not available. Nevertheless, a respect for control of corruption within these organisations is also deemed insufficient by Interviewee 6, with responsibility for this kind of training falling to the home force.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: disagree. There is no evidence that the UNODC programme has resulted in guidelines and defence staff training on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: In 2004, there were known to be 31 registered private security companies active in Mozambique. In the decade since then, the market is thought to have grown and the number of active private security companies with it, according to Berg.

Security companies are regulated by the 1990 decree on Private Security Companies. The Overseas Security Advisory Council however noted that regulation and enforcement may be insufficient where arms control is concerned. According to the Council, the decree requires registers be provided to the Ministry of the Interior but it has been highlighted that &quoute;private security contractors continue to be caught up in murky customs laws and regulations regarding the importation of firearms&quoute;, and indication that guards are competent to handle firearms has not been required.

Two police officers are tasked with conducting monthly checks on all these organisations - a major task for only two people, which therefore suggests inadequacy and this process may thus also be subject to irregularity (for which oversight does not appear to exist). Companies found to violate the regulations should face heavy fines, although no public reports of such fines were found.

Given the problem with trade in small arms in Mozambique, as well as outdated firearms legislation and limited and difficult enforcement, it is possible that private security companies may be linked to this, but there is no clear evidence of corrupt activities or involvement in organised criminal activity. It is unclear to what extent such companies are employed by the armed forces.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Mozambique has regulations on public service contracts and procurement in place that offer three defined statutory schemes for public procurement:

1) the general scheme through which public tenders are the standard means of procurement,
2) the special scheme based on procurement treaties or international agreements and with respect to projects funded by foreign agencies and multilateral institutions, and
3) the exceptional regime where on the basis of public interest this may be enforced through which procurement may take place by one of six modalities (tender with pre-qualification, limited tender, two-stage tender, tender bids, small-scale tender, and direct contracting).

The regulation on procurement addresses defence issues only in two instances, which also constitute the exemptions to the general tender process:

1) direct contracting may take place when dealing with confidential military construction or in wartime, for example, and
2) that under direct contracting sustainability parameters to ensure the 'best conditions in the market' should be undertaken.

There is no evidence that there is independent oversight of procurement taking place in the above listed exemptions.

This gives reasonable leeway for preferred providers to be used for military contracts, particularly as no specific legislation addressing defence and security procurement is in place. The legal framework on procurement - Decree Nr 15/2010 of 24 May - continues to allow the classification of details of military procurement contracts (Art 33) and the use of direct tendering for military related expenditure (Art 113). There is some indication that the government has provisions to keep procurement confidential if necessary, something that a local observer has noted given the recent hostilities from RENAMO, which saw numerous skirmishes between RENAMO and government forces in 2013.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Defence procurement is often reported in the news but this reporting does not disclose exact and complete details throughout the procurement process. It tends to involve major rather than minor procurement, i.e. 'big-ticket' purchases, such as the controversial purchase of patrol vessels and their weapons in 2013. While the group of foreign donors providing budget support to Mozambique require that purchases are made available, news coverage often only begins when a contract has been negotiated or signed. Similarly, when available, reports from donors do not necessarily report on line items within various ministerial budgets. As a result detailed information on needs assessment, contract implementation and sign-off is not published or made available fully, but rather in an abbreviated fashion.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Oversight is formally provided through the Ministry of Defence's auditing process, as well as through the parliamentary process for budget approval and periodic review of progress on expenditure relevant to approved budgets. Any procurement would be included in the audits carried out by the Administrative Court. There is limited information on the audits produced by the court and how they have been received by government.

Ruling-party dominance however impacts the degree to which parliamentary oversight may be considered neutral and effective, as must the ability of the government to keep some details privileged, according to Interviewee 4 and research by international organisations (such as AfriMAP). This comes as FRELIMO has been in power since the advent of democracy in 1994, which has served to blur the separation between party and state.

These are the only mechanisms in place to provide oversight for defence procurement, and Meyer describes these as being insufficient. In this regard she notes that &quoute;there is little protection from abuse of discretion and there is a real risk of incompetence in implementing the regulations... (and) there is no provision for monitoring the system and no clear mechanisms of control.&quoute;

Further, the response of civil society organisations to published procurement information also plays an indirect role in oversight, particularly as the regulations in place for public work contracts and procurement does not follow a clear institutional process, and this provides a further indication of institutional shortcomings.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: News reports indicate that defence purchases are made public, especially for donor funded items, but only once they have been completed, or are near completion. In 2013, the navy purchased six patrol boats along with a fishing fleet from a French company. Such purchases are reported in the media, often with a confirmation from senior officials within the Ministry of Defence.

Further, Mozambique has often received assistance in defence procurement, equipment donations as well as assistance in financing purchases. This has been the case with the three fighter jets held in Germany ostensibly donated by Brazil, which also helped Mozambique buy three more jets in 2014. In 2007 South Africa donated 150 tons of military surplus equipment. Britain has also supplied numerous combat vehicles, which were believed to be army surplus.

There has recently been a controversy in 2013 over US$850 million state-backed EMATUM bond intended to pay for fishing trawlers, with the International Monetary Fund expressing concern that government had misled investors and would in part be used to make military purchases of boats that could be equipped with artillery cannons, machine guns and even aerial drones. The IMF does not have a report on this and only mentioned it in a press statement. Donors have raised concern but there are no reports immediately available on this.

There is no public information available on forward purchase plans. Therefore, score 2 has been selected.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: There are reasons to doubt the credibility of the news story as it is written in an opposition publication. It is not possible to confirm either way.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There are no specific requirements of companies bidding for work in the defence ministry or armed forces beyond what is stipulated in the general framework and policy governing public works contracts and procurement applicable to government institutions in Mozambique. This was decreed in 2005 and requires companies to adhere generally to the laws of the state, and should comply with the following criteria: reasonableness, proportionality, public interest, transparency, equality and publicity. According to both sources listed, it is also not clear whether companies are specifically required to avoid corruption, or whether the government discriminates between companies on the basis of integrity.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: there is no publicly available information that I have come across that collaborates the details you provided. Therefore, the comment has not been updated to reflect the information you provided.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: It is unclear whether Mozambique has a national strategy guiding the formulation of procurement requirements in place. Searches for such document proved fruitless. Nonetheless, according to Interviewee 5 there has been mention of the development of a white paper for defence by the ministry in the late 1990s but it is unclear whether this process was completed or how far it came. There are certain instances when the government has discussed procurement in terms of specific defence aims. For example, the purchase of patrol vessels in 2013 to improve security for offshore natural gas discoveries. However, there are also examples of opportunistic purchases, such as the purchase of eight re-conditioned MiG fighter jets from Romania in 2013.

There is limited oversight of defence procurement, and the sector is granted exemptions from the public procurement regulations (i.e. information can be classified to protect national security, and direct tendering can be used).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is evidence that suggests that some of Mozambique's defence purchases are made on the basis of need and within the parameters of the annual budget as approved by parliament. However, these are not clearly published so as to constitute 'official requirements' but would likely differ by each annual budget. If such a list of official requirements exists, it would be classified due to its implications on national security.

Interviewee 4 notes that the case of the EMATUM bond has, however, provided an example of an opportunistic purchase, under conditions that were not transparent, but instead potentially misleading. The reasoning behind the purchase of MiG fighter jets in 2013 is also unclear. It is likely that these 'big ticket' purchases are opportunistic.

The ministry has access to privileged information relevant to some purchases on the basis of national security, according to Interviewee 5. However, since this will not be made public, it is therefore impossible to establish if the purchases were based on an established needs assessment.

Score 1 has been selected given the above evidence of opportunistic and unplanned purchases.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: agree. Comment modified and score changed from 3 to 1.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Direct tendering is authorised in particular circumstances by Article 113 of the regulations on public procurement. This includes contracts related to weapons repair or maintenance, uniforms and accessories, or specialist services/goods for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces. Although it has not been reported in the case of defence contracts, there are reports from leading civil society organisation CIP of preferential treatment in other sectors where direct tendering is authorised.

Given the limits to its defence budget (approximately 2.7% of the total budget in 2010 - the last date at which information on the defence budget is available according to SIPRI), Mozambique is generally more likely to acquire larger defence procurement items through second-hand purchases or refurbished items and donations, than it is to buy equipment through a tendering process.

Where tendering does occur, some are made public after the purchase, and oversight is formally provided through the Ministry of Defence's auditing process, as well as through the parliamentary process for budget approval and periodic review of progress on expenditure relevant to approved budgets. However, this oversight is considered insufficient by Meyer. In this regard she notes that &quoute;there is little protection from abuse of discretion and there is a real risk of incompetence in implementing the regulations... (and) there is no provision for monitoring the system and no clear mechanisms of control&quoute;.

Details on procurement remain vague and it is not required that a full record be kept or published (as noted by Meyer), and it is likely that restrictions imposed are limited, based on the inadequate standards the defence ministry holds generally, as well as poor conditions of transparency, according to Interviewee 5. In 2014, the US State Department reported on the lack of checks and balances in the procurement process, confirming that Meyer's concerns, written in 2004, remain the case. Therefore, score 1 has been selected.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Based on the regulations governing the award process of public works contracts and procurement, it is not clear whether audits of the decisions of tender boards take place. Direct tendering is authorised for a significant amount of defence purchases (Article 113 Decree 15/2010). The regulation on procurement addresses defence issues only in two instances, where it discusses their exemptions to the general tender process:

1) direct contracting may take place when dealing with confidential military construction or in wartime, for example, and
2) that under direct contracting sustainability parameters to ensure the 'best conditions in the market' should be undertaken.

There is no evidence that there is independent oversight of procurement taking place in the above listed exemptions. A set of rules and regulations exists but procedure remains unclear, standards laid out are vague, and there seems to be some discretion at ministerial level on the decision making process regarding the awarding of tenders, but further information on this is not made available.

However, the procurement regulations do require that officials provide written justification for the decisions, implying that they may be held accountable for their decisions, but searches for these documents prove fruitless.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Under Article 145 of the Regulation on Contracting Public Works, Goods and Services (Decree no.15 of 2010), illegal activity is described as unethical practices which includes corruption, fraud, collusion, and coercive practices. Sanctions against this action include fines and prison time, as well as the possibility of being barred from future tendering. This legislation applies generally and is not specific to the defence sector. Moreover, a report by the U4 advocacy group in 2012 reported that breaches of the regulation were common (although it did not mention the defence sector specifically). These included the use of kick-backs, collusion and conflicts of interests.

The regulation on procurement addresses defence issues only in two instances, which also constitute the exemptions to the general tender process:

1) direct contracting may take place when dealing with confidential military construction or in wartime, for example, and
2) that under direct contracting sustainability parameters to ensure the 'best conditions in the market' should be undertaken.

There is no evidence that there is independent oversight of procurement taking place in the above listed exemptions.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: It is unclear how procurement staff are organised relevant to defence procurement. Moreover, given the lack of defence-specific anti-corruption and procurement policies, as well as weakness of the existing procurement regulations, it is unlikely that staff receive significant training to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery.

Nonetheless, the procurement regulations do promote good process and require honesty and transparency. Ways in which this is promoted is by:

- barring officials who have a conflict of interest from participating (although definitions of what this constitutes are considered limited by Meyer);
- requiring contracts be written and confirm certain terms; and
- by having sanctions in place for offences or improbity (but Meyer notes that there is not a clear provision here for enforcement of sanctions).

That said, anti-corruption group U4 reported in 2012 that significant lapses occur in the application of the procurement regulations, including regular kick-backs and gifts, collusion and conflict of interests. In 2012, leading civil society organisation CIP also released a report detailing the preferential treatment of bidders connected to the upper echelons of FRELIMO. This is likely to be facilitated by the upper echelons of the procurement office staff due to either corrupt practices or internal bias.

A 2008 report by the World Bank mentions training for public procurement officials by Unidade Funcional de Supervisão das Aquisições (UFSA). A DFID report planning for public procurement support in Mozambique suggests that training efforts by the UFSA had little impact on compliance with the established procurement framework and planned for more specialised training between 2013 and 2016, which suggests some level of training. While there is no information specific to defence, it is assumed that defence was covered within such training efforts (by DFID and UFSA) as well.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in the procurement process. Bidders are offered the right to appeal decisions. But it appears that this is as far as such mechanisms go, and Meyer states that &quoute;the provisions for appeal fail to satisfy fundamental standards of fairness and due process&quoute;. Although this comment was made in 2004, there have been no indications of reform since then.
There is no information available publicly on companies that have used the appeal process. However, there have been reports of preferential treatment in tendering and is therefore a high possibility that any company involved in a previous complaint would be disadvantaged in future procurement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Under Article 145 of the Regulation on Contracting Public Works, Goods and Services (Decree no.15 of 2010), illegal activity is described as unethical practices which includes corruption, fraud, collusion, and coercive practices. Sanctions against this action include fines and prison time, as well as the possibility of being barred from future tendering. This legislation applies generally and is not specific to the defence sector.

There is a significant lack of clarity around the implementation of sanctions in place to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier.

While procurement regulations promote honesty, fairness and transparency, and sanction any illegal activities on the part of bidders, it is not clear how violations are dealt with. Despite the intentions of the regulations, transparency around defence procurement can be limited because it is not required that a complete record be kept for procurement.

However, according to Lalbahadur and Otto, the press remains vibrant (which is clear from the nature of the reporting including, for example, around the EMATUM bond) and it is likely that they would come out in fierce opposition against any corrupt activity of suppliers if they were aware of them. The same is true of civil society, such as the CIP organisation, which has previously reported on preferential treatment for bidders connected to the ruling FRELIMO party.

Score 1 has been selected as although sanctions such as prosecution or debarment formally exist, there is no evidence of their implementation in the defence sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is no publicly available evidence on the government's position on offset contracts, nor any evidence specifically that these are taking place. The lack of procurement and anti-corruption policies specific to the defence ministry makes it unlikely that offsets are regulated, while the significant discretion allowed to awarding bodies would further hamper regulation.

This is compounded by the vagueness of published procurement procedures, and a lack of transparency surrounding the finer details of procurement generally. There is publication at the macro-level in procurement (often after the fact), but none of these suggest offset agreements have taken place.The general procurement regulations do outlaw illegal activity of bidders, but does not make clear how such instances are punished.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: It is not known whether the government is involved in offset programmes as there is a dearth of information publicly available on the matter of offset programmes and contracts (and therefore also performance) as a whole. This comes as a result of minimal transparency, particularly at a micro-level, around details on defence procurement, as well as deficiencies related to procurement policy and regulatory frameworks in general.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: It is not known whether the government is involved in offset contracts as there is a dearth of information publicly available on the matter of offset programmes and contracts as a whole, nor is it required for a full record of procurement to be kept or published. This is compounded by minimal transparency, particularly at a micro-level, around details on defence procurement, as well as inadequacies related to procurement policy in general.

Further, the awarding bodies have a high degree of discretion in the awarding of contracts, which in itself impedes competition. Awarding bodies are able to limit market access to foreign firms and are also described as having too much control over the qualification process.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: It is not clear whether and to what degree government in Mozambique controls the use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle. This is not clearly stipulated in legislation.

Details on procurement remain vague and it is not required that a full record be kept or published (as noted by Meyer), and it is likely that restrictions imposed are limited, based on the inadequate standards the defence ministry holds generally, as well as poor conditions of transparency, according to Interviewee 5. In 2014, the US State Department reported on the lack of checks and balances in the procurement process, confirming that Meyer's concerns, written in 2004, remain the case.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: The principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals are most often made public once the deal is already underway.

While information of the financier, the sum financed, and the items to be procured are likely to be made available to the media after the purchase, further information surrounding the exact details of the deal, pertaining to interest rates and the intricacies of the financial undertaking are less likely to be publicly available.

However, there have been instances such as the issue of the EMATUM bond that show some secretive procurement. Here, numerous media outlets reported that there was evidence that government has taken secret decisions in this regard, and allegations that the government intended to use funds meant for purchasing fishing vessels for substantial defence acquisitions.

It is worth noting that since elections in October 2014, the government now includes more opposition members who are likely to challenge the executive and ruling party FRELIMO. This should reduce the possibility of a repeat of a scandal similar to the EMATUM issue.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: agree. Comment amended.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: There is no evidence of government specifically requiring subsidiaries and sub-contractors to adopt anti-corruption programmes. It is highly unlikely that such measures are in place given that anti-corruption measures in Mozambique tend to be general, with no specific policies in place within the defence ministry, even at a broader level, to combat corruption. The general procurement regulations do however sanction illegal acts, but do not make clear how these sanctions will be enforced with regards to subsidiaries and sub-contractors under the law. There is no public evidence of any such sanctions being implemented.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: details regarding the UNODC programme are limited. It would likely take several years to have any significant impact - however, as mentioned, this is an estimation as information regarding the details is limited.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4106: Recent large-scale procurement has shown that Mozambique mostly acquires refurbished equipment, or and services existing equipment. As a result, most of the procurement is likely to be based more on availability. If they are carried out, needs assessments are not made public, meaning there is scope for political influence and corruption within arms procurement. For example, refurbished MiG fighter jets were purchased from Romania in 2014. Although Romania has no particular political influence in Mozambique, the airforce does not have a clear need for the MiGs. Procurement regulations do however encourage fairness through a formal bidding process, but this can be circumvented if items are deemed crucial for national security.

Beyond this, while there are no indications of political influence in procurement, it is difficult to rule this out entirely, particularly given Mozambique's relationship with its group of donors, which, because they provide direct budget support, often expect and require being involved in budgeting and other administrative processes, which they have some influence over. There are no reports of this stretching to the defence sector, and is far more common in the social security sector, which includes issues directly related to the aid that is being given. The fact that tender boards are required to provide written justification for their decisions may provide some safeguard against political influence.