Botswana

Researcher4103: PPADB is the official asset disposal organ in Botswana. There is evidence that the Defence Institutions are involved in asset disposal. However, the manner in which these assets are disposed is unclear. Legally and in line with the mandate of PPADB, the asset disposals should be done by public auction and all the procedures of public auctions such as advertising should be followed. In the case of Botswana, there is no evidence available from the PPADB or media reports whether planned disposals are conducted. While all major newspapers publish online, none of them published advertisements for notices of defence asset disposal. Similarly,the Botswana Government Gazette does not carry any information on the Defence disposal. On the contrary, information on the disposal by other government departments is easily available.

One of the reasons why the disposal information is not publicised could be linked to that most military equipment is not of commercial value as noted by Mompati.

Researcher4103: There is no evidence of an internal body within the BDF that oversees asset disposal.

The Office of the Auditor General states that the purpose of the PPADB with regards to the disposal of assets is to ensure that government assets are disposed of in an efficient, effective and economic manner. The Works Division of the PPADB is the only body that is tasked with the management and execution of asset disposal in Botswana. Where government departments have internal asset disposal units, these units have to comply with the rules and regulations of the PPADB.

As far as the BDF is concerned, there is no evidence of such an internal body nor does the PPADB Works Division have any information or evidence that such scrutiny exists. PPADB's annual reports make reference to the disposal of BDF assets, however no figures or details of the disposed assets are included.

Researcher4103: In the 2014/2015 budget announced by the Minister of Finance and Development Planning, the MDJS received the fourth largest share of the budget amounting to P4.18 billion. There is no indication of how much is allocated to the BDF, and how much of that budget goes to the secret defence and security expenditure. During the minister's question time in Parliament on budget allocations held in 2014, this question was not discussed. This could be due to the fact that the defence and security operations are run from the president's office. It seems as if it has been the culture of the office of the president to be secretive in the manner these budgets are handled. Another possibility is that if such budgets are made public it can be argued that they can be prejudicial to the security of the state.

In his speech on the administration of justice, the minister gave a detailed breakdown of the budget of the Department of Justice which is available to the public. However, he did not provide this information for the budget of defence and security he seems not to do the same. The former commander of the Botswana defence Force General Matshwenyego Fisher, who is now a lecturer at the University of Botswana stated: &quoute;I am afraid in this instance secrecy is the worst ally of the defence force. This undermines support for the defence budget and it is not good for the development of healthy robust civil-military relations. Therefore, transparency should be the most preferred route. It is simple logic. How do you expect people to support your budgetary request if they do not know what you need?&quoute; defence experts say that a culture of transparency should be built&quoute;.

Additional information post-review:

The DIS is responsible for procuring secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services. The budget of the DIS is not known or publicly available. It follows that one cannot determine the percentage that goes to the procuring of secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services.

Researcher4103: The PCIS is the legislative body that is mandated with ultimate oversight of the operations of national security agencies as well military intelligence agencies. However, the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence Service has resulted in the PCIS losing control of national security and military intelligence in Botswana. Effectively, this means that issues of spending or all secret items relating to national security are now being held by the DIS as well the Botswana Defence Council which is located in the Office of the President.

It has been observed by Bule that:
&quoute; While intelligence organ is necessary Saleshando notes that, 'The DIS was set in a manner that does not comply with international best practices. It is only accountable to the President. We do not get to scrutinize their expenditure. That is why there is a rumor that the DIS has purchased a jet for its operations and yet Parliament is in the dark about this. If indeed they have purchased a jet, why was Parliament not informed when the funds were allocated for the jet?' he asks. The ministry is not, however worried about criticisms against defence and security expenditure. 'This is a democratic country therefore anyone can make an observation or opinion depending on where they are looking at the issues from,' stated the ministry&quoute;

In addition, Reasentse notes that:

&quoute;What needs to be understood is the budget of intelligence, their operations, assessments are secret thus the structure of the intelligence and security architecture with the president at the apex makes it, let alone the issue of appointment, completely answerable to the president and seals the absence of political neutrality, he is virtually the head of the intelligence&quoute;.

This demonstrates that the DIS budget is not available to parliamentarians let alone to the PCIS because the DIS is administered from the Office of the President.

Assessor response:
I have reviewed the comment. I have added more sources. Score reduced to 0.

Researcher4103: The BDF is divided into two main security sectors, the Botswana Defence Forces and Botswana Police Services. Evidence of auditing of the BDF and the BPS is hardly available. The 2006/2007 &quoute;Performance Audit Report of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB)&quoute;, presented by the Office of the Auditor General referred to lack of compliance by the government departments of which the BDF is one. It warned that failure to comply with existing procedures may result in corruption.

The lack of full information regarding the BDF budget as well as the BPS budget may hinder objective Parliament debate. Botswana does conduct Parliamentary debates on different aspects of the budget as given to them either by the Ministry of Finance or the respective minister for a particular ministry. There is no evidence to support that military and security budget audits are presented to Parliament.

Assessor response to reviewers:
I have reviewed the score to 0. No additional sources could be found.

Researcher4103: The Finance and Audit Act 8 of 2006 permits off-budget expenditure but also places a limit on this kind of expenditure. Off-budget expenditure has to be approved by a public officer (section 6) or the Permanent Secretary (section 7). Given that the actual military budget itself is not publicly available in detail, obtaining and analysing information about off-budget military expenditures is difficult. Furthermore, since the main operations of the military are controlled by the defence council in the President's office, accessing information on military off-budget expenditure is even more challenging.

There is, though, no evidence of off-budget military expenditure which suggests that there either is not any, or that off-budget expenditure is concealed from the public. There are no media reports of military off-budget expenditure. Botsalo Ntuane, an opposition leader who is also a Member of Parliament, queried why the defence expenditure was increasing without justification or reasonable explanation. He demanded an honest dialogue in order for the Minister of DJS and the Minister of Finance and Development Planning to explain the strategic considerations that underpin the country's defence and security. It is not reported that an honest dialogue took place.

Researcher4103: While there is no direct evidence of military off-budget expenditure, there has been one case of potential off-budget expenditure which was the the occupation of office space that exceeded the allocated budget of P25 million per annum. The Ministry of DJS signed a lease agreement amounting to P33.9 million without going to tender or following the rules as they are laid down by the PPADB. The ministry did not seek the authorisation of the Ministerial Tender Board. The rental exceeded the allocated budget by P8.9 million. After the contract was signed and sealed, the Ministry of DJS applied for the retrospective approval of this expenditure. The PPADB heavily criticised the manner in which the Ministry of DJS had acted. Furthermore, evidence indicates the office space remained unoccupied for the entire year resulting in wasteful expenditure, as the PAC pointed out: &quoute;The Ministry is running two parallel lease agreements for more than 12 months and Government is going to pay in excess of P30million for unoccupied office premises&quoute;. This may also indicate corruption, with the PAC further stating that the &quoute;Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime should investigate this matter and if any malpractices are detected, culprits should be prosecuted&quoute;. Although no allegations of illicit economic activity have so far been reported, this case exposed the weakness of the current system when it comes to military expenditure and how it can be controlled.

There is, though, no evidence of off-budget military expenditure which suggests that there either is not any, or that off-budget expenditure is concealed from the public. There are no media reports of military off-budget expenditure.

Researcher4103: Botswana has legislation that attempts to regulate the classification of what amounts to national security. Section 2(1) of the National Security Act, defines a classified matter as any information that is declared confidential or classified by an authorised officer. This legislation is used to justify why certain information with regards to expenditures of defence and security that is considered a threat to national security cannot be publicised. Since the definition of classified information is so wide, there is a risk of it being abused to cover anything that the state may wish to withhold from the public domain. In addition, the authorised officer is given a very wide discretion to classify information as issues or matters of national security.

Evidence suggests that the BDF has used this legislation in order to avoid accountability as noted by Mokhawa. In addition, classifying information as a matter of national security seems to be hardly challenged in court or in any other forum, although media reports have occasionally tried to bring this matter into the public domain.

Researcher4103: There is no evidence of the BDF having beneficial ownership of commercial businesses. According to Malebeswa, although the people of Botswana are proud of their army, there is concern that the level of secrecy that surrounds it is too high. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether or not the national defence is involved in commercial business.

The relationship between the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Botswana has been viewed as partly commercial with the BDF participating in some commercial enterprises. Evidence to substantiate these claims is not available however and information on the nature of the commercial enterprises is not available.

Researcher4103: Research found no evidence of military-owned businesses, however the level of opacity in the Botswana Defence Force means it is difficult to assess this question.

There is no evidence that military owned businesses might be subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard however. At domestic level, it is difficult to tell whether Botswana's National Defence complies with the principles of public expenditure management as stated by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (comprehensiveness, discipline, legitimacy, flexibility, accountability, predictability, contestability, honest, information, transparency and accountability).

Assessor response to reviewers:

Legislation is silent on whether the military can own businesses.

Though no information could be found on defence institutions having business interests, it is worth noting that there is evidence that President Khama, the commander in chief, having business interests: &quoute;Khama has used state power to privatize previously public resources and bolster his business interests and those of his associates.&quoute; (source 2).

Researcher4103: A fund was set up in 1991 by BDF employees, meaning that it belongs to the employees of BDF. The responsibility of the BDF was to facilitate administration and investment of the fund on behalf of BDF employees. The purpose of the fund was to encourage the BDF employees to save money and to have access to money when needed. After subscribing to the fund, employees would regularly pay money to contribute to its volume. This money was withdrawn from their accounts. Borrowed money would have to be paid back within three years at 10 per cent interest. The fund was later turned into a trust.

They were allegations of misappropriation of funds. The government reacted by intervening in order to ensure that allegations of fraud were properly investigated in order to safeguard the reputation and integrity of the BDF. While new loans could no longer be taken, soldiers continued to have money deducted from their salaries and from their bank accounts.

The creation of the fund within the military was legal which supports the argument that the government does not explicitly outlaw private enterprises owned by the BDF. It is only discouraged in instances where the business enterprises is being used to defraud military employees or where the integrity of the military is brought into disrepute.

Assessor addition following review:

There is evidence that some especially the high ranking BDF employees own private companies, and that some of the employees have controlling stakes in private companies through their relatives or friends.

A case in 2010 saw the Defence Minister investigated, and later acquitted, following allegations he owned shares in a company that was awarded defence contracts. The company (RFT Botswana Pty Ltd.) is run by his wife.

Score lowered.

Researcher4103: The BDF has been involved in a case of missing spying equipment. Allegations of corruption have been brought against high-ranking military officials. These officials have been investigated and brought before the court. In response to these allegations, the BDF issued a press statement emphasising that the matter was sub judice and that the BDF strongly opposes corruption or any misappropriation of funds by its members or any of its associates.

The case has revealed some power struggles within the BDF as well as a lack of harmonisation between the DCEC, the anti-corruption fighting unit, Botswana Revenue Service and the DISS because it was not clear which institution had to handle such a sensitive case of alleged corruption.

Following allegations of corruption, the Minister of Defence Seretse resigned for about two years but was later reinstated after being acquitted. No official statements by Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs to publicly commit to fighting corruption have been reported.

Assessor response to reviewer comments: score changed to 0.

Researcher4103: There are criminal measures as contained in the Penal Code, including Section 99 of the Penal Code which deals with official corruption; Section 100 which deals with extortion by public officers; and Section 101 which penalises receipt of property by public officers in order to show favour. There are penalties specified in the Corruption and Economic Crime Act, 1994. Section 36 provides that: &quoute;Any person who is guilty of corruption or cheating the revenue under this Part shall, upon conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to a fine not exceeding P500 000, or to both.&quoute;

There is no evidence that the measures are being applied effectively. Instead, it appears as if measures against personnel involved directly or allegedly linked to some corrupt activities is selectively applied. Evidence indicates that personnel who may be engaged in corrupt activities but who are close to the presidency may not be held accountable for their actions.

For instance, there were media reports alleging that President Khama's twin brothers and other members of his family had illegally benefited from defence tenders. Defence officers involved in the entire procurement process were not held accountable, allegedly by virtue of their positions and due to their closeness to Khama's brothers. Evidence suggests that personnel that are under suspicion of being corrupt but who are at the same time close to the president, his family or his allies, remain largely unaffected by anti-corruption measures. To date, it seems as if no investigation has been carried out as far as this allegation is concerned.

Researcher4103: Botswana has legislation that protects whistle-blowers across the entire country (Section 45A of the Amended Corruption and Economic Crime Act of 2013). There is no legislation that specifically protects whistleblowers in the defence and security sector however. Whistle-blowers within the military or any other security institution have to rely on the DCEC Act for their protection. The effect of this is that the informers within these national security organisations may feel inadequately protected by the current legislation, thereby making them vulnerable to abuse or intimidation should they report any corruption within their departments.

The extent of victimisation of whistleblowers in Botswana appears to be on the rise and it has prompted DCEC to publicly issue a stern warning that: &quoute;Section 45A of the Amended Corruption and Economic Crime Act of 2013 criminalizes any act or threat sanctioned or shown to a DCEC informer, and any person convicted under this Section will be liable to a fine of P10 000 or five years imprisonment or to both&quoute;.

For this reason at the Fifth Session of the Review Implementation of the UNCAC held in 2014 it was recommended inter alia that Botswana should strengthen its whistleblower protection mechanisms by implementing a proper Whistleblower Act.

Researcher4103: Some special attention is likely to be paid to the appointment of personnel in specialised and sensitive positions. Depending on the position, a vetting and background check is carried by the intelligence department. The degree and depth of the background and security check depend on the degree of sensitiveness and influence, as well as access to state secrets and other confidential information. Procurement officers or managers in the defence portfolio appear to be vetted according to what they are tasked to procure and the department they will be working in.

Sensitive defence procurement is done by the Special Procurement and Asset Disposal Committee. It is comprised of three full time members and one part-time member. This committee is chaired by the Executive Chairperson of the Board and it meets once a week.

Assessor response to reviewers: Agree with comments. Score changed to 2.

Researcher4103: No evidence could be found during research that the number of civilian and military personnel is available from the establishment or is accurately known. A number of studies have consistently indicated that the number of military personnel has been rising. The figures that have been stated vary slightly depending on the source. In 1977, when the BDF was established, the number was 600 men, in the 1980s there were 6000, in the 1990s there were 10000 and from 2000 onwards it stood at 12000. In addition, the number of personnel has slightly increased since incorporating women in the military in 2008. However, the number of civilians and military personnel working in the military is not accurately known.

The military also employs civil servants like doctors, lawyers who work as prosecutors or legal advisors, and physiotherapists.

Assessor response to reviewers:

Score changed to 0. I cannot find accurate detailed information on the number of civilians and military in the employ of BDF.

Researcher4103: Pay rates for the general military staff are publicly available. According to the new salary structure that was introduced in 2013, the salary depends on the rank and also the qualification of the military staff. A junior military staff who has an academic degree may earn more than their colleague on the same rank or even their superior if they have a higher qualification. For example, a BDF Private with a certificate earns P9,237 while a person with a similar post but additional high qualification earns P16,236.

The salary structure of the top military echelon is not publicly available. These salaries have remained a secret for years and the available figures appear to be more speculative and based on the salaries and grades of civil servants.

Most civilians working for the military, for example secretaries or clerks, are paid according to the grading system of the civil servants. Other professionals' (e.g. doctors and nurses) salaries and allowances are not ascertainable.

Salary increments do not generally happen across the board but are usually specific and targeted. For instance, in April 2014, certain cadres in the BDF received an increase of 4 percent to improve equitability, while 30 percent commuted overtime was extended to those cadres with nursing care.

According to the African defence:
&quoute;The commander of Botswana Defence Force (BDF) Gaolathe Galebotswe yesterday [March 12] lost with costs a case in which a soldier had taken him to court to review and set aside the decision to remove him from the de-linking exercise, thus reducing his salary.

Under the de-linking exercise, approved in 2011 via a Presidential directive, the salaries of professionals such as lawyers and computer analysts within the ranks of the BDF were removed and raised separately to curb high turnover.

Erasmus Dodo Ngubevana, who holds a Diploma in Accounting and Business Studies, had his salary adjusted from P5,178 to P13,245 in April 2012 as a result of the exercise.

The applicant was also paid P1,996.75 as housing allowance, P3,311.25 as scarce skill allowance and P1,291.92 as professional allowance.

In or around January 2013, the adjustment made to the applicant’s salary was reversed and he was removed from the de-linking exercise.

As a result, his housing allowance was also reduced to P777,70 and his professional allowance was also reduced to P694,84&quoute;.


Allowances are regulated in terms of the Subsidiary Legislation Defence Force Regular Force Other Ranks Regulations.

Researcher4103: There have been no reports of the defence and security personnel not receiving their correct pay on time. It seems as if the payment method is well established and there is no confusion on the method of payment, which is a direct bank transfer from the government into the bank account of the BDF personnel.

If an increase is reached as a result of collective bargaining then the increase is paid at the time when the collective bargaining is complete. Just like in most countries once these negotiations are done, the agreed salary increase is back-dated to the agreed period.

There have however been instances where salary increases have been erroneously paid to unqualified military personnel, which happened in 2013. Those who were erroneously paid were asked to pay back to the extent that they unduly benefited. The system of payment generally is routine and well published.

Assessor response to review:

Score amended to 3 in line with additional sources provided by the peer reviewer and source 4, which I added following further research. While payments do not appear to be late, the payment is not as well-run as it could be; as the peer reviewer's article related to ghost soldiers attests, soldiers sometimes continue to be paid after they are no longer in service.

Researcher4103: Chapter 21:05 of the &quoute;Botswana Defence Force: Subsidiary Legislation Defence Force Regular Force Officers Regulations&quoute; provides a clearly defined process of appointment for the selection of military personnel at the middle and top management.

Section 10 of part III of this chapter titled &quoute;Promotion, Seniority, Pay and General Allowances regs 1026&quoute; provides detailed information about the appointment to commissioned ranks and subsequent promotion in case of direct entries.

Despite these legal provisions, there have been controversial appointments in the BDF and National Security including of individuals close to the president accused of corruption.

assessor response: I have reviewed the score to 2.

Researcher4103: Promotion of military personnel is legally provided and the processes of promotion are statutorily provided. The appointment of junior personnel appears to be done objectively and free from controversy. This involves for instance the completion of physical tests which are done in the purview of the public. Evidence suggests that the degree of objectivity and transparency becomes less open when more influential posts are to be filled. For example, according to the BDF, the &quoute;Commander, Botswana Defence Force (BDF) has also announced promotions for senior officers from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to the rank of Brigadier. Four senior officers were promoted to the rank of Brigadier, twelve to the rank of Colonel and twenty-nine to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel&quoute;. However, the criteria these promotions were based on are unknown, indicating a lack of transparency.

There is no role that external boards, such as the Directorate of Public Service Management, play in the promotion of civilian personnel. Instead, the role of the Directorate of Public Service Management is limited to the recruitment of civilian personnel.

It has been reported that:
&quoute;The Monitor is informed that the new pay model, known as de-linking at the BDF, benefit soldiers who after attaining diploma qualifications could not be promoted because the BDF had no posts available for them. Information reaching The Monitor indicate that diploma holders, sent for training by the army, form the bulk of the BDF soldiers who started benefitting from the delinking exercise this past month end&quoute;.

In a related report it has been noted that:
&quoute;Major General Gaolathe Galebotswe has been appointed the Deputy Commander while Brigadier George Tlhalerwa has been appointed Commander, Defence Logistics Command.The promotions and appointments were effected on May 21, 2012, a statement from BDF&quoute;.

Appraisal may be done internally but evidence to that effect does not seem to be publicly available. Evidence indicates that there is no independent oversight, possibly due to the fact that the operations of the military are generally secretive.

Assessor response to reviewer comments: I have reviewed the score. I have reviewed the comment and added more sources.

Researcher4103: There is no compulsory conscription in Botswana. Botswana has a policy and rules that are meted out both on offeror and offeree of bribery. Both the BDF Act and other related legislation are applicable to BDF employees who give, ask for or accept bribes. Within the military, the BDF Act creates a special ad hoc court, called the Court Martial whose purpose, according to Nsereko, it is to enforce discipline in the military. Military offences including the act of bribery are tried in this court.

Researcher4103: There is no compulsory or voluntary conscription in Botswana. There are no known policies on refusing bribes to gain preferred postings. However, the BDF Act and other related legislation such as the DCEC Act and the Martial Court Act generally forbid and punish bribery for preferred postings. The application of these rules and mechanisms with regard bribery for preferred postings appears not to have been tested as there have not been any reported cases yet.

Researcher4103: Research found no confirmed reports of ghost workers or non-existent soldiers on the payroll over the last five years, however there is evidence of allegations being made within the last two years. The last recorded incident of ghost workers on the military's payroll was in 2004 when payments of BDF as well as BPS personnel were made using the Botswana National Identity Card (Omang) for identity verification. This system was manipulated to pay non-existing soldiers. Due to this manipulation the BDF decided to pay salaries directly into bank accounts of their employees.

Assessor response:
Sources and discussion updated.

Researcher4103: There is evidence to indicate the chains of commandment and chains of payment are formally separate. Research found the Ministry of Finance is responsible for salary payments to BDF staff, under the Government Payroll, Pensions and Passages (GPPP) system. Separately, it is noted from the media that one soldier who alleged that he was receiving incorrect payments referred to the finance department to resolve this in the first instance, rather than the chain of command.

Letswamotse also observes that Botswana's military has a clear chain of command which is followed conscientiously in line with international norms that are adhered to by professional armies. Evidence indicates that Botswana's military is considered one of the professional armies in Africa despite being small in size. The chain of command is strictly adhered to and there are no reports of insubordination.

Assessor response to reviewers: I have lowered the score by 1 point based on the peer reviewer's comments and sources, which is linked to opacity in the BDF and problems with the procurement system.

Researcher4103: There is a Code of Conduct that is applicable to all government personnel including military and civilian personnel in the BDF. The Code of Conduct deals with acts of misconduct which include offences such as bribery, unauthorised receiving of gifts or giving or receiving hospitality in unreasonable dimensions. In addition, the government has outlined its expectations under the following categories which are summarised below:

(i) Government requirements - Government requires its staff to behave ethically, and those involved in contractual and management processes must abide by written codes of behaviour;
(ii) Codes of Behaviour - Avoid situations where private interests conflict with public duty;
(iii) Expectations from the government workers - Refrain from offering organisations and individuals financial or other inducements in order to gain unfair advantage dealings; and
(iv) Specific Guidelines - There should be no expectation of any gift, and gifts should not be given to any person in the expectation of reciprocation or granting of favours.

The Code of Conduct is not comprehensive to cover corruption and its forms. Its distribution to the military is not stated, although it is available online. There is no robust oversight mechanism.

There is evidence that the code of conduct is enforced less for personnel that are under suspicion of being corrupt but who are close to the president, his family or his allies, and that they remain largely unaffected by anti-corruption measures (sources 3 and 4).

Researcher4103: Indications of breaches of the Code of Conduct have been widely reported, especially in areas of the awarding of tenders to those who are close to the president. One example is the allegation that the twin brothers of the president have been awarded BDF tenders consistently and unlawfully. Ditlhase states that &quoute;It is believed that Seleka Springs, which has now been deregistered, was awarded 33 of 35 multimillion-pula defence force tenders from 1998. Good also alleged that in 1997 the defence force bought vehicles, especially Land-Rovers, from Lobatse Delta, also under the directorship of the Khama twins&quoute;. This would imply that those members in the BDF who have awarded these tenders have violated the Code of Conduct. However, no BDF personnel involved in these tenders have been prosecuted.

Furthermore, allegations of corruption in awarding of BDF involving BDF top brass linked to the President have not been investigated by DCEC. Moreover, the Code was breached when it was reported that salaries were being paid to non-existing soldiers. No action has been reported to have been taken against those BDF staff that were involved in these scandals.

Researcher4103: The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) is the official body that is mandated to fight corruption. It uses a three-pronged approach comprising of (i) prevention (ii) investigation and (iii) education. There is no evidence of anti-corruption training to the military. The BDF has its own training department which focuses on military training and does not offer any programmes to its members on anti-corruption and integrity.

Researcher4103: No evidence was found during research of a policy that specifically mandates the publication of the defence prosecutions in BDF. If there have been any cases of corruption by members of the BDF, these also seem not to have been made public. The Segwabe case, which was about the unlawful crossing of a border by a soldier, seems to give some hint on that it is possible for prosecutions of the BDF to be made public however. Although this case has nothing to do with corruption, its importance is that it is exposes the process that cases in the BDF may spill into the public court if need be.

It may be that cases are kept secret in order to maintain an image of integrity of the BDF. In a recent speech the President reiterated the need for the BDF to be ethically sound in their counduct. In the words of the President &quoute;[i]ntegrity, discipline, good character and knowledge are guiding principles, which will always bring meaningful development to the BDF and nation at large&quoute;. According to Mabeleswa, however, &quoute;the question of the military’s accountability has been raised in various avenues&quoute;. This is an indication that if the BDF is not accountable, it will be difficult to find any wrong doing for there will be no evidence to support that. It can be inferred that a lot of effort is put in order to maintain or portray the BDF as an army that is above reproach and punish violations of its Code if necessary.

A WikiLeaks observation was made after it emerged that Khama, then-vice president of Botswana, interfered in investigations run by the DCEC involving his twin brothers Tshekedi and Anthony. Media reports have indicated that the Khama twins may not be prosecuted. According to the Sunday Standard &quoute;A few weeks after the DCEC called Kgosi for an interview to answer questions on the allegations of corruption leveled against him, President Khama moved swiftly and removed both the DCEC and the DIS from the Ministry of Defence, Justice and Security and placed them under the Office of the President. Soon thereafter the DCEC stopped its investigations against the DIS Director General and sat on the case docket, sparking speculations that there had been an instruction from above. A decision by the president to stop investigations would support apprehensions raised by WikiLeaks that Khama would turn a blind eye to corruption among his associates.

Freedom House also raises concerns about presidential interference in judicial processes involving the BDF, noting that &quoute;[i]n June 2012, Khama issued a “conditional” pardon to three members of the Botswana Defence Force—Gotshosamang Sechele, Ronny Matako, and Boitshoko Maifala—who had been convicted in 2011 of murdering alleged organized crime suspect John Kalafatis in 2009. The murder, which occurred amid a spate of extrajudicial killings by security forces in 2009, was reportedly ordered by the president’s Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS). Khama has denied any involvement in ordering Kalafatis’ execution, although the pardon revived the accusation by media outlets, civic groups, and opposition parties&quoute;.

Researcher4103: There is no history of facilitation payments in BDF. Botswana has in place laws that punish acts of facilitation payments in the BDF system. The current laws that are used to criminalise corruption equally apply in the criminalisation of facilitation payments. These laws include DCEC Act and Public Service Act. Corruption has been and continues to be prosecuted in Botswana and it appears likely that should facilitation payments be unearthed, prosecution will not be an exception.

Assessor comment post-review:

The Freedom House Report raises concerns about the independence and effectiveness of the judicial system in enforcing anti-corruption laws: &quoute; A number of high-profile officials have been cleared of corruption charges in recent years. Most notably, in 2011, the minister of justice, defence and security (and cousin of Khama), Ramadeluka Seretse—who had been charged with corruption in 2010 for failing to disclose his position as a shareholder in a company, owned by his wife, that won a massive defence contract in 2009—was acquitted of all charges. In 2012, the Directorate of Public Prosecution’s appeal of the acquittal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.&quoute; The score is lowered to 2 to reflect the wider concerns regarding the legal framework and that more careful examination is required to determine if it can be considered particularly effective in tackling facilitation payments.

Researcher4103: Reports and available information seem to show that the military does not have a doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. Botswana also does not have a comprehensive and publicly available policy that guides its military operations. However, Botswana's military has been involved in some key operations in the region as well as internationally. No reports of corruption have been levelled against the BDF in its international operations that the assessor could find evidence of.

Researcher4103: There is no evidence of Botswana commanders receiving occasional or frequent training on corruption as part of their service. According to Lombard this indicates that contributing factors could include that the BDF has not been audited for a long time and that issues of corruption which need the involvement and training of commanders have not been addressed adequately.

Researcher4103: Trained professionals are not regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions).Botswana's military has evolved and has been consistently growing and asserting its position in various operations and peacekeeping missions. No reports of corruption have been reported in its peacekeeping missions that I could find evidence of. In all its endeavours it has been led by different commanders under the auspices of SADC and UN as the case may be. In all these operations, there is no evidence that trained professionals are regularly deployed to monitor corruption or assess its risks in the field. Despite the lack of deployment of trained professionals, no reports of corruption against the BDF have been recorded.

DCEC is responsible for this kind of training but there is no indication that it has conducted such training.

Researcher4103: BDF has been involved in some of the following operations as documented by Henk:
1992 the BDF deployed for US-led peacekeeping operations in Somalia;
1993 the BDF troops were attached to a US Marine Battalion in Mogadishu;
March 1993 the US-led operation had transitioned into a UN operation;
14-member BDF observer team in Rwanda in 1993;
and two military officers to the National Peacekeeping Force deployed in South Africa (to facilitate the country’s first democratic multi-party elections in 1994) and in Lesotho 1998 (as part of SADC military intervention).
There is no evidence of staff training on addressing corruption during these missions, nor are there any guidelines addressing corruption risks.

Researcher4103: Botswana Defence Force Retired Members Association (BDFRMA) is a formation of BDF members who have retired. It is involved in private security operations and has been contracted to do some work for the BDF. Private security companies fall under the MDJS and the minister himself is a member of the BDFRMA. Private Security Companies are used and this was acknowledged by the Minster of DJS in a speech. There is no information available on what scrutiny these private companies are subjected to or the extent of this however.

With regard to private security firms, there have been allegations of corruption and conflict of interest against the minister. For example, Ontebetse notes that &quoute;Security Association of Botswana Chairman, Gaolatlhe Mudongo expressed concern as Minister of Defence, Justice and Security and a member of BDFRMA, Seretse is effectively conflicted”. In a similar accusation, it was stated that: “[A]llegations surfaced that security companies owned by former soldiers were favored over those owned by civilians” in BDF tenders. This evidence suggests that private security companies used by the BDF but owned by former BDF members receive less scrutiny than private security companies owned by civilians.

Researcher4103: The Office of the Auditor General states as follows:

&quoute;Special Procurement and Asset Disposal Committee (SPADC) Section 63 of the PPAD Act establishes SPADC. The SPADC is a special Committee that manages the procurement of highly sensitive works, supplies, services and properties or any combination thereof, for the disciplined services, namely; Botswana Defence Force (BDF), Botswana Police and Botswana Prisons. This committee comprises of two full-time Board members, one part time member and a member from the Office of the President.

Special Ministerial Tender Committee (SMTC) The SMTC is also a Special Committee that deals with non-sensitive procurement for disciplined forces (that is Botswana Defence Force and Botswana Police).
SMTC adjudicate tenders up to the tune of P1 million. The committee comprises of one full time Board member and three members from Botswana defence Force, Botswana Police and Office of the President&quoute;.

This is evidence that the country has legislation covering defence and security procurement. However, it is not clear which items exempt from these laws

Researcher4103: The defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, is not disclosed to the public.

What is disclosed is nature of procurement through tender invitations which are advertised publicly. For instance, for the purchasing of services,the BDF generally publishes its tender requirements via the PPADB. After the conclusion of the tender, the rest from the management of the contract up to termination of the contract, whether by performance or breach, is not disclosed.

For instance, the PPADB Board approved Tender No: STB 0/0/11/2007-2008 to be awarded to the Pre & Post Contract Consortium Consultancy Services for DCSC at Glen Valley BDF Camp to FMA Architects (Pty) Ltd at BWP2, 389,499.38. There is no record on how the contract was managed and eventually settled. Similarly, no information on the needs assessment and tender selection were provided regarding a tender for the Land Rover spares that was awarded to three different local suppliers.

However, efforts are made to keep the public informed. One such example was a report stating that the BDF intended to buy South Korea’s T-50 supersonic advanced trainer jets and FA-50 light combat aircraft worth 450 million US Dollars (about P3.9 billion).

Researcher4103: Formalised oversight mechanisms are in place and evidence indicates that they are active. The institutions in charge of oversight are the PPADB which has the following internal mechanisms: the PPADB whose function is laid out in PPADB Regulation 22 and which involves the management and implementation of the PPADB Act; the PCIS; the Auditor General; the DCEC and the Office of the Ombudsman.

These oversight mechanisms seem to have shown some results of transparency. The Auditor General has mainly reported on irregularities on BDF procurement via the PPADB Audit Report. However, the Portfolio Committee which includes Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice, and Security and Government Assurances scrutinises defence expenditure in an independent manner since it includes members of the opposition.

The opposition, including former Botswana Defence Force Ground Forces Commander Major General Pius Mokgware, has also been critical of BDF operations and has indicated it will not allow suspicions to go unchallenged. This means that is this committee lacks transparency then Major General Pius Mokgware has vowed to bring that into the public domain.

Furthermore, the increased number of corruption allegations in the BDF have not acted upon by these bodies except the DCEC which has tried to formally to prosecute some members of the BDF including the current Minister of JDS. This points to their ineffectiveness.

Researcher4103: The PPADB Act obliges all procurement to done through open tendering including that of the BDF subject to exceptions, such as sensitive security procurement. According to section 63 the Special Procurement and Asset Disposal Committee (SPADC) handles such procurement.

Both actual and potential defence purchases are made public depending on the nature of procurement. The PPADB publishes all the tenders that the BDF either has requested and that were approved or disapproved by the board. Although the PPADB does not frequently update its website, request for tenders are advertised in daily newspapers that also occasionally publish online.

This publication serves as a source of the nature and scope of purchases the BDF has been involved in. In addition, the names of the contractors are awarded the contracts are also published together with the amount that the particular supplier was contracted at. For example, under Tender No: STB 0/0/1/2006-2007, the BDF had requested directly appoint BHC for the Provision of Project Management Services for BDF Non Housing Infrastructure Development Projects. This request was rejected by the PPADB. Numerous other actual and potential defence purchases are available of the PPADB website.

Researcher4103: It seems as if for as long a as company is duly registered and its operations or directors are free from any legal encumbrances, they are free to bid for contracts awarded by the Ministry of Defence. Bidders should meet the Standardised Bidding Packages (SBPs) requirements. There are no special sessions held for companies that are bidding or have bid to work for the Ministry of Defence. Evidence suggests that when the bidders are called for further interactions with the defence procuring authorities, these interactions can be used as an opportunity to bring to attention that corruption will not be tolerated and should be avoided at all costs. There have been calls to incorporate an anti-corruption clause in all governments in Botswana in line with the SADC Protocol against Corruption, but no such clause has been implemented. The sole responsibility to fight corruption in the defence procurement lies with the individuals both from the government side and the private parties involved in the procurement process.

Researcher4103: Botswana does not appear to have a national and defence security strategy which is publicly available. Research found no evidence of a well-audited national defence and security strategy and it is possible none exists - Hendricks and Musavengana have stated that: &quoute;Botswana does not have a written policy on defence or a national integrated security strategy. These would go a long way towards providing a strategic framework for the development of the military and the security sector as a whole&quoute; for example. The Botswana national development vision (Vision 2016) and the vision and mission statements of the BDF suggest that this are at least recognized considerations.

It is also unclear whether procurement is open and audited, especially in the light of the fact that no audit reports have been published.

Researcher4103: Tenders that are requested by BDF that are published by the PPABD always indicate clearly the quantity that the BDF requires. Examples can be found in the following tenders that stipulate quantities: Botswana Defence Forces recommendation to award the tender for Supply of Land Rover Spares as follows;
a) Tulsma - items 29 and 39 offered at value BWP 448,405.42,
b) GeminEye Group awarded the following offered at value BWP 589,307.61.
Items 1,2,3,4,6,7,8 etc ;
Tender No: STB 47/2006-2007
Tender Title: Botswana Defence Forces recommendation to award the tender for Supply of DAF Spares as follows: 1. Tulsma (Pty) Ltd items 4,5,30,37,60,65,72,75 at the total value GBP 20,464.60
2. Zambezi Motors items 1-3, 6-29, 31-59, 61-64, 66-69, 71, 73,74 and 76-80 at a total value of BWP 1,041,479.43
Tender No: STB 0/0/12/2007-2008
Tender Title: Botswana defence Force’s request to purchase the following items from the suppliers as follows:-
• Two (2) Dozers valued at BWP 5, 935, 855.20 from Komatsu Botswana (Pty) Ltd,
• Two (2) Rigid trucks valued at BWP2,692, 022.30 from Commercial Motors (Pty) Ltd
• Four (4) Light recovery trucks valued at BWP2 961 842.40 from Continental Motors (Pty) Ltd.
These indicate that BDF follows a systematic process of purchasing that can easily be followed.

Researcher4103: The majority of the defence procurement appears to be conducted in an open competition, although the proportional value of restricted tenders or single-sourced contracts awarded could not be calculated from the available data. Records suggest that BDF appears to only opt for selective or restrictive tendering in very rare circumstances. If restrictive or selective tendering is the preferred option by BDF, justification of the choice of that process has to be made to the PPADB. The PPADB does not automatically grant permission to the BDF; evidence suggests that open tendering is the preferred and encouraged form of tendering, and that the PPADB it is likely to carefully examine the nature of the request and the reasons for the derogation from open tendering.

There are occasional examples of BDF tenders that have been granted requests to be exempted from open tendering, such as:
Tender No: STB 0/0/182/2006-2007
Tender Title: BDF Request for a waiver for direct appointment of BTC for upgrade of Bandwidth from 128Kbps to 2048Kbps - Botswana Telecommunications Corporation at BWP1 204 192.00.

Media reporting shows MPs have raised concerns with consecutive Ministers of Defence, Justice and Security about a series of BDF tenders awarded between 1990 and 2000 that were never advertised. MPs raised concerns that the selected suppliers were Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) members, and that it was unclear what selection criteria were used, or how the suppliers were identified given that the tenders were not advertised. The acting Minister in 2011 told Parliament that between 1990 and 2000, procurement in the BDF was conducted through a Special Tender Board (STB) set up under the auspices of the Central Tender Board (CTB). No evidence was found to indicate that oversight bodies have taken this matter for further investigation.

The assessor derives from this report that open tendering processes have not always been followed, though in principle it is the preferred option.

Researcher4103: Botswana has one tender board, the PPADB. In some cases, this board has the power to delegate some of its duties to other agencies. The PPADB is subject to a number of laws such as the PPADB Act, DCEC Act and the constitution as well as any other relevant legislation. The decisions of the PPADB can be reviewed by the Independent Complaints Review Committee, Office of the Auditor General, Office of the Ombudsman, Ministerial Tender Committee and Courts where necessary.

Researcher4103: According to ISS: Botswana Corruption Legislation, there are national laws outlawing collusion, but there is no evidence of legislation specific to defence. Wider media reports suggest that in practice, enforcement of measures to punish colluding companies is likely to be only weakly enforced.

Corruption and Economic Crime Act of 1994, Part 4 of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act, 1994 acts as the standard legal mechanism against illegal corrupt activities such as collusion. Sections 24–30, 32 and 33 of the Act specify offences relating to corruption in Botswana. Section 28 deals with corruption by and against agents of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). Section 29 deals with corruption in granting contracts and subcontracts in both public and private sectors.

Collusion in defence procurement can be considered a punishable offence in Botswana through the DCEC Act, Administrative Measures and Criminal Punishment. Measures such as suspensions or in some cases debarment can be invoked where collusion has been unearthed. Reports of collusion have been noted in the press especially where either the same supplier has been repeatedly awarded the same tender and then sub-contracts to the same sub-contractors. For instance, it was reported that the current president through different proxies has dominated the defence tenders. Research indicates the media has made efforts to investigate the awarding of these tenders but has only been able to write about part of the tender process due to the lack of full information. This resulted in the allegations being very difficult to prove and thus ended up just being speculation.

Sections 98–101 of the Botswana Penal Code also specify related offences relating to corruption. Section 99 of the Penal Code specifies similar types of corruption offences contained in section 24 of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act.

Researcher4103: There is no evidence of procurement staff or project or contract managers being specifically trained to ensure that contractors meet their obligations. Evidence suggests that the procurement staff rather rely on the expertise and guidance of the PPADB. In procurements that are technical in nature, it seems as if the BDF relies on external consultants both for project completion and the technical aspects.

Part II of the PPADB Act establishes procuring entities. According to the Act, the procuring entities are responsible for the management of all procurement activities within their jurisdiction. This means that from the needs assessment to the final payment, the whole contract is in the hands of the respective procuring entity. The procuring entities do not always possess all the skills involved in procurement, especially when it is of very technical nature, which is why consultants are sometimes hired to run specific projects as project managers, albeit without specific training as project managers or contractors. Given the quantity of procurement the BDF is involved in, this poses a significant corruption risk.

Sensitive defence procurement is done by the Special Procurement and Asset Disposal Committee. It is comprised of three full time members and one part-time member. This committee is chaired by the Executive Chairperson of the Board and it meets once a week. It is not clear whether the members of the Special Procurement and Asset Disposal Committee are qualified or have expertise to conduct defence procurement.

BDF has a procurement division. Renken and Moswetsi make reference to this division in their e-commerce research on BDF when they state inter alia that:

&quoute;The procurement officers were identified as respondents. As the researcher was a member of the organisation, he knew most of the respondents and therefore identification was easy. It also became clear during the first interviews that it was also important to interview the Director: Material Acquisition and Planning, as he happened to be the most senior person and the one most often referred to by most interviewees. It also emerged during the interviews that the organisational tender committee was cited as the body to which the entire procurement process was forwarded for scrutiny. Therefore the chairman of the tender committee was also included in the interviews&quoute;.

Reference is made to (i) procurement officers and (ii) Director: Material Acquisition and Planning which is evidence that BDF has a procurement division. No further information is available on the composition of this procurement division and its operations. To make it worse BDF does not make its Annual Reports publicly available which may have given some insight into the operations of this division.

Researcher4103: The Independent Complaints Review Committee (ICRC), established in terms of section 95 of the PPADB Act, is the main body tasked with receiving and adjudicating upon complaints from companies. Should a company be dissatisfied with the procurement procedure at any stage of the procurement process, the aggrieved company can file a complaint with the ICRC.

The ICRC is an independent body where aggrieved are free to lodge their complaints. The ICRC reviews the awarding of tenders by the PPADB and its various Tender Committees. Section 95 of the PPAD Act, states that there shall be “an established Independent Complaints Committee, which shall deal with the following:
- Challenges by Contractors arising at any point in the procurement and asset disposal process, that is, from the commencement of the process by the concerned entity to award the decision of the Board or its
Committees.
- Disciplinary process or decisions.
- Complaints by Contractors at any point in registration, reclassification or disputes and resolution of conflicts between concerned parties.
- Conflicts between the Board and employees of the Board: and
- Appeals against disciplinary measures of the Board

There is no evidence to the effect that ICRC has not executed its mandate properly. From its inception, the ICRC appears to have been fair in its dealings with both the PPADB and the companies. Reports suggest that cases of victimisation of companies that would have filed a complaint are almost zero. According to the 2011/2012 PPADB Annual Report, there were seven cases that were handled by the ICRC. However, the nature of the complaints and the decisions taken by the ICRC in these cases is not publicly available.

If a company feels victimised, it can file a further complaint against the ICRC with any of the following organs: the MTC, Office of the Auditor General, Office of the Ombudsman, DCEC and conventional courts. These mechanisms ensure the protection of companies that file complaints against the procurement process.There is no evidence to suggest that companies that have filed complaints have been victimised as a result of their complaint.

Researcher4103: DCEC defines sound business ethics by stating that &quoute;Business ethics is a form of applied ethics that examines ethical principles and moral or ethical problems that arise in a business environment&quoute;. For failure to comply with prudent business ethics and getting involved in conduct that is corrupt or deemed corrupt in nature, the DCEC Act identifies various offences which are punishable in law. These are provided in sections 23-38 and include bribery, receiving or offering gifts or receiving or offering of an advantage that is not legally due to anyone who is involved in the procurement process in BDF. Some of the sanctions include debarment, imprisonment, fines and suspensions either for the entire company or for individuals within the company. However, there is no evidence regarding the implementation of these sanctions within defence procurement. In general procurement, there is evidence that these measures have been implemented.

Researcher4103: There is no evidence that the government of Botswana, in so far as defence procurement is concerned, is involved in offset agreements. There is no such information either in the media or the Ministry of DJS. International reports do not make any reference as to whether the BDF has been or is involved any offset agreements. If such offset agreements do take place, it can be assumed that there are done secretly.

Researcher4103: Details of offset contracts are not made public and it is difficult to tell whether such contracts exist or not. If they do exist, there is no information available regarding their size and nature.

Researcher4103: There is no evidence of offset contracts. The score has been selected on the basis the risk that offset contracts are conducted in secret.

Researcher4103: The DCEC Act is the main legislation that regulates the use of agents. Section 2 of the DCEC Act defines an agent as any person employed by or acting for another. In terms of their responsibility and their liability section 28 provides that &quoute;[a]n agent is guilty of corruption if he corruptly accepts, or agrees or offers to accept from any person, for himself or for any other person any valuable consideration as an inducement
or reward for doing or forbearing to do&quoute;. In addition, the general company laws of Botswana are also applicable. There is no specific legislation that targets agents per se apart from what has been stated above.

The government does not strongly control the use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle. As long as the agents and the intermediaries comply with the legal procurement rules and regulations as provided, then they are free to conduct their work.

According to a report on the website of Africa's Public Procurement & Entrepreneurship Research Initiative (APPERI), &quoute;at one time in the history of the BDF, sources say, it was impossible to procure any major equipment for the local army without involving the then commander Ian Khama‘s brothers, Tshekedi and Anthony. The two brothers owned a company, Seleke Springs. The company dominated procurement by holding agency licences for major military suppliers from Israel to Europe at a point when the BDF procurement system was dominated by procurement from those regions&quoute;. This may indicate the use of agents in defence procurement. It may also indicate that the government does not strongly control the use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle.

Researcher4103: Generally, the identity of the provider, nature of the financing package, and major contractual details such as the quantity and the contractual amount are made public.

For instance in the Kasikili-Sedudu Island dispute between Botswana and Namibia, Botswana procured arms in preparation for a possible military confrontation with Namibia. In the process Botswana procured the following arms the details of which are public: The purchase included thirteen Canadian built F-5 Fighter bombers for the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). The cost of the deal was reported to be around US $50 million. Another purchase included fifty second-hand German Leopard II main battle tanks. Although these tanks were second-hand, they were more modern and more advanced than the South African Centurion-Olifant main battle tank. The BDF had negotiated for the purchase of thirty six British Scorpion tanks, some 200 troop transport carriers, and a quantity of artillery pieces at an estimated total cost of US $63 million (R315 million).

Last year it was reported that Botswana was in the process of buying South Koreas T-50 supersonic advanced trainer jets and FA-50 light combat aircraft worth US$450 million (about P3.9 billion). No information regarding payment lines or interest rates were or have been made public.

Researcher4103: There is no initial legal requirement that the main contractor adopt anti-corruption programmes. In the same context, there is no statutory requirement or policy that compels the main contractor to ensure that sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, either under the DCEC Act as the primary legislation for corruption, or within the MDJS as the ministry responsible for the procurement in question.

Research suggests there is no requirement for an anti-corruption clause in the main contract between the defence procuring entity and the main contractor. Furthermore, the contract between the main contractor and the sub-contractor(s) does not have such a requirement either. It seems as if the assumption is that both the main contractor and the sub-contractors bear the responsibility not to engage in corrupt activities in defence procurement.

Researcher4103: The Kasikili-Sedudu Island dispute Botswana and Namibia created a scenario that may be interpreted to have been influenced by the sellers. Initially, Botswana wanted to purchase its arms from Germany and Namibia objected to that transaction. Eventually, Austria sold the arms to Botswana. The circumstances of the transaction and the influence of Austria over Botswana with regards to the sale are not clear and not properly documented. This is just an indication of the possibility of the influence of the seller over the buying country. What is known is that Botswana's Parliament approved the payment of the arms and Botswana paid the required deposit. However, the circumstances or the line of credit extended to Botswana over this transaction is unknown.

BDF procures military equipment from different countries such as Russia, China, South Korea, Israel, South Africa and Canada. It is not clear how much of these acquisitions are granted as a result of political influence by seller nations.