Rwanda

Researcher4107: Law No 50/2008 of 09/09/2008 'Determining The Procedure for Disposal of State Private Assets', provides guidelines for the public asset disposal process. For example, there should be a public notice prior to the sale of state private assets. Tender committees shall be responsible for the sale of state private assets. State private assets shall be sold mainly by public auction but other methods of sale may be applied.

However, the existence of an independent body responsible for monitoring the disposal procedures of different ministries cannot be confirmed. It is also not clear whether tender committees have been set up or not, as there is no public information on this issue.

There is no public information on asset disposal and asset controls directly available from Rwanda's MOD. It is therefore not clear how far Law No 50/2008 applies to the defence sector.

In the case of Zigama CSS, its assets are meant to be controlled by its Executive Board and there are sporadic media reports on its assets. Zigama is a financial cooperative with a membership exclusively made of state security organs (the National Army and Police).

However, during discussions over whether to open up Zigama to full regulation and business practices as a commercial bank, the Chairman of the Board of Directors stated that : “we agreed that we will follow guidelines and regulations, but there would be some exceptions on what we are required to do,” going on to say that: “what they mainly request us is transparency, constant reporting. The principle we agreed on is that Zigama CSS remains a cooperative that sticks to its initial mission [members’ welfare]” (4). This goes some way to explaining why there is no publication of financial reports, except for headline profit figures reported by the media (4). It is therefore unclear whether they have a set process for asset disposals.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
While there may be an audit of security sector assets, this could not be verified. This question deals specifically with whether the process of disposals is public, and the evidence suggests that the process is not clear to the public. Score maintained.

Researcher4107: According to Law No 50/2008 of 09/09/2008, sales are the responsibility of tender committees. They are required to prepare and present a list of assets to be disposed in the same period with an annual budget procedure.

However, the existence of an independent body responsible for monitoring the disposal procedures of different ministries cannot be confirmed. It is also not clear whether tender committees have been set up or not, as there is no public information on this issue.

There is no public information on asset disposal and asset controls directly available from Rwanda's MOD. It is therefore not clear how far Law No 50/2008 applies to the defence sector.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
In the absence of any references to the Auditor General reports that you mention, I cannot verify whether asset disposals by defence institutions are contained. I was unable to find any of these reports myself. Score maintained.

Researcher4107: The defence budget is not available online, nor is the general budget. This creates challenges in assessing the level of detail that it contains. However, some information can be extrapolated from the budget execution report for the FY 2013/2014, which stated:

&quoute;The revised budget allocated RWF 55.3 billion for central defence spending and RWF 77 billion for Peace keeping Operations. In the case of central defence spending, an amount of RWF 56.6 billion was used in the Fiscal year 2013/2014. Of this amount, RWF 53.3 billion was used for the co-ordination of military services including wages and salaries and the remaining RWF 3.2 billion was spent on operational support whilst RWF 1.1 billion was used for the provision of health care. With regards to Peace-keeping Operations, total expenditure amounted to RWF 89 billion as the Government had to pre-finance some expenditures related to the CAR and Juba missions.&quoute;

This does not, however, cover any items that might fall under secret expenditure, and the last declaration by the Minister of Defence on the 2014-2015 budget for the Rwandan Defence Forces does not include this information either.

Researcher4107: The defence budget is not available online, nor is the general budget. This creates challenges in assessing the level of detail that it contains, or what information legislators have access to. However, some information can be extrapolated from the budget execution report for the FY 2013/2014, which stated:

&quoute;The revised budget allocated RWF 55.3 billion for central defence spending and RWF 77 billion for Peace keeping Operations. In the case of central defence spending, an amount of RWF 56.6 billion was used in the Fiscal year 2013/2014. Of this amount, RWF 53.3 billion was used for the co-ordination of military services including wages and salaries and the remaining RWF 3.2 billion was spent on operational support whilst RWF 1.1 billion was used for the provision of health care. With regards to Peace-keeping Operations, total expenditure amounted to RWF 89 billion as the Government had to pre-finance some expenditures related to the CAR and Juba missions.&quoute;

This does not, however, cover any items that might fall under secret expenditure, and the last declaration by the Minister of Defence on the 2014-2015 budget for the Rwandan Defence Forces does not include this information either. It is therefore unclear exactly to what extent parliament receives information on the spending of all secret items related to national security and military intelligence.

According to the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index 2010, the legislature is either provided with aggregated information on secret items or no information on secret items. There is no other recent public information to verify this.

According to the BTI 2014, “Deputies and senators – particularly those of the coalition parties – are under specific supervision. This means that political and parliamentary discussions on controversial issues are generally limited to technical questions. The political discourse tends to confine itself to the question of who most praises the president and the government.” This makes it unlikely that any real scrutiny of defence spending, let alone secret expenditure, would occur.

According to the Rwandan Parliament’s Self‐Assessment Exercise, &quoute;parliament had a number of opportunities to examine government and information was generally provided without complaint.&quoute; However, it lacks time to analyze documents, capacities, technical expertise, and political will, as MPs expect to continue their career at higher levels within the government, making them unwilling to be critical.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, there do not appear to be any legal provisions specifically aimed at legislative oversight of spending on secret items.

Researcher4107: The Ministerial Order No.02/09/10/GP/A of 12/2/2009 setting out Regulations for Internal Control and Internal Audit in Government outlines the regulatory framework for the conduct of internal audit in Government entities.

There should be audit committees to provide insights on public financial management, however, there is no evidence of parliamentary debates on the annual accounts for the security sector. As peer reviewer 2 notes, the last audit from the Auditor General on state fiances (for the year ending 30 June 2014) does mention the defence sector, but only to mention that it was included and that some minor, unspecified progress was made in reporting from the previous year.

Researcher4107: Exceptional expenditures seem to be allowed as they form part of the budget execution report for the FY 2012/2013. The term exceptional expenditure is used within Rwandan accounting documents, in particular Budget Execution Reports, but also International Monetary Fund's country reports. Exceptional expenditures are allowed, but are not recorded in any detail.

According to Bertelsmann Stiftung, “Expenditures for the large army and other security forces, as disclosed in the budget, are very low. There must be additional funding outside the budget. Part of it may come from the U.S. government, part from the United Nations as reimbursement for the participation by Rwandan contingents in African Union and U.N. peace missions.”

This suggests that records of exceptional expenditures are incomplete as well as highly aggregated.

Researcher4107: The budget execution report for the FY 2012/2013 mentions the existence of exceptional expenditures for defence issues. Those exceptional expenditures concern UN peace keeping operations. According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Africa, &quoute;there has been substantial off-budget defence expenditure throughout the DRC war, partly financed, it appears, by unrecorded mineral re-exports from the DRC&quoute;.

There is no evidence on the extent of those off budget expenditures since the end of the war. Yet, evidence indicates that there is still off budget expenditure as Rwanda Defence Forces continue to be present in DRC and some top army officers have even been recently arrested for smuggling in DRC. The UNSC gave evidence of the collaboration between M23 and RDF, while Rwanda activities in DRC have never been official. This indicates that there are off budget expenditures that are not publicised.

M23 was a rebel group made up of fighters who deserted from the Congolese army in April 2012 following a mutiny. They were mostly from the Tutsi ethnic group, a minority in eastern DR Congo but with ties to Rwanda's leaders.The unrest in eastern DR Congo goes back to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. After killing some 800,000 ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus, some of the militias fled into DR Congo (then called Zaire) as Tutsi rebels seized power in Kigali.

Ever since, the now Tutsi-dominated government in Rwanda has sought to wipe out the Hutu militias, accusing them of planning to destabilise Rwanda. The money spent on these endeavours is completely opaque.

In addition, there is evidence that revenue is being generated by military exploits in the extractives industry. For example, according to Global Witness, minerals are smuggled out of Congo into Rwanda and Burundi for export by military personnel. Tin and tantalum smuggled into Rwanda are allegedly laundered through the country’s domestic tagging system and exported as ‘clean’ Rwandan material. The government has denied its involvement:

&quoute;Allegations of abusive exploitation of resources were levelled against Rwandan officials in the eastern parts of the DRC. Such allegations have neither been tried by the Rwandan judiciary nor discussed in parliament, but instead have been sharply denied by the government&quoute; (BTI, 2010).

Response to peer reviewer 3:
The answer above illustrates how off-budget military expenditure is being used for illicit economic activity. Score maintained.

Researcher4107: A Presidential Order on Tender procedures mentions the existence of classified items, thus giving them a legal existence. According to law N° 73/2013 of 11/9/2013, &quoute;NISS shall have powers to classify intelligence and security reports and other materials of intelligence and security value within its custody. The Internal Rules and Regulations of NISS shall determine modalities of classification and declassification of confidential information.&quoute; NISS stands for National Intelligence and Security Service. However, the Internal Rules and Regulations of NISS are not publicly available.

A 2008 document from the MIFOTRA mentioned the fact “there is no policy on security and safety of the information system” within the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence has also recently announced its willingness to improve its cyber security department. A Presidential Order determining classified assets for the sake of the security and national sovereignty does include &quoute; Information and Telecommunication devices including, but not limited to radars, telephones, radios, cameras, computer software&quoute;.

This lack of policy and security for the information system is relevant. as the law is too vague and it is unclear which information systems are exactly classified; it makes effective scrutiny on regulatory mechanisms difficult.

The classification of information in Rwanda is also linked to the Law 04/2013 of 08//02/2013 on Right to Information. The law contains five exceptions. These cover disclosures that “may”: “destabilize national security; impede the enforcement of Law or justice; involve interference in the privacy of an individual when it is not of public interest; violate the legitimate protection of trade secrets or other intellectual property rights protected by the Law; and obstruct actual or contemplated legal proceedings against the management of public organ.” The law does not contain any time-frame within which requests need to be responded to, or the requirement for the government to provide justifications for not releasing information (6).

As peer reviewer 2 notes, there is no information available as to how these laws are put into practice.As such, the laws governing the classification of information do not have a clearly defined legal basis, and are likely conducted at the discretion of high-ranking defence and government officials.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
Agreed that the classification of information in Rwanda is also linked to the Law 04/2013 of 08//02/2013 on Right to Information, although it should be noted that they are not the same thing. Nevertheless, as defence and security information falls under the exemptions to this law, and there are no provisions made for who can request information to be classified on the grounds of protecting national security, a higher score cannot be awarded.

Researcher4107: According to Afrique Magazine, citing Christophe Boltanski, there is a Congo Desk within the Rwanda Defence Forces, supervising the extraction and the commerce of coltan in DRC. This commercial business is not transparent and its existence is denied by the Rwandan government.

In 1999, Rwanda Defence Forces inaugurated the Credit and Savings Scheme (CSS). CSS is now “a soldiers-own and professionally managed bank” (Mwenda). Zigama is listed as a financial cooperative with a membership exclusively made of state security organs (the National Army and Police). Zigama credit and savings bank does present its annual results at the RDF headquarters, but its financial reports are not published.

During discussions over whether to open up Zigama to full regulation and business practices as a commercial bank, the Chairman of the Board of Directors stated that : “we agreed that we will follow guidelines and regulations, but there would be some exceptions on what we are required to do,” going on to say that: “what they mainly request us is transparency, constant reporting. The principle we agreed on is that Zigama CSS remains a cooperative that sticks to its initial mission [members’ welfare]” (13). This goes some way to explaining why there is no publication of financial reports, except for headline profit figures reported by the media (13). It is unclear what the mechanisms for overseeing Zigama's operations are, although it is reported to hold an annual general assembly, during which it discusses its annual financial report, its accomplishments and its activities.

According to BTI, “investment groups, such as Crystal Ventures, Horizon and RIG, which are close to the ruling political circles and to the army, are combining investments by Rwandan funds and foreign private stakeholders with development funding. Generally speaking, Rwandan and foreign investors who want to establish businesses and access credit have to make deals with the ruling circle.” Accordingly, the army is restricting and controlling access to some markets.

The military does declare their interests in some of these businesses. However, details of their operations and finances are not transparent. As peer reviewer 1 notes, Horizon is entirely owned by the military and makes substantial profits although exact numbers and percentages are unclear. RIG, CVL and TriStar are partly-owned companies but it is not uncommon to see military officers as senior staff members given the military history of the RPF. Horizon Group is an army's holding company investing into coffee factories, logistics for peace keeping operations, etc.

There is no transparency at all with these companies and in collaboration with the Rwanda Revenue Authority they have been accused of muscling out more independent investors and monopolising certain sectors such as telecoms, construction and other areas.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Noted that the defence sector does not own Crystal Ventures, and derives no income from it. I've added source 14 to clarify the relationship between Horizon and the MoD and between Crystal Ventures and the RPF.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
There is evidence that, specifically to avoid being open to normal commercial responsibilities, the defence sector has chosen to classify Zigama as a financial cooperative rather than a commercial bank. There is significant evidence that details of their operations and finances are not transparent. The score should be between 0 and 1 given some businesses are declared. However, as some businesses appear to operate with no transparency, score 0 has been selected.

Researcher4107: The National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) regulates financial reporting of banks and non-bank financial institutions and the Companies Act 2009 sets out the framework for auditing in the country.

However, Zigama is not subject to the full weight of these regulations as it is listed as a financial cooperative with a membership exclusively made of state security organs (the National Army and Police). During discussions over whether to open up Zigama to full regulation and business practices as a commercial bank, the Chairman of the Board of Directors stated that : “we agreed that we will follow guidelines and regulations, but there would be some exceptions on what we are required to do,” going on to say that: “what they mainly request us is transparency, constant reporting. The principle we agreed on is that Zigama CSS remains a cooperative that sticks to its initial mission [members’ welfare]” (8).

Zigama credit and savings bank presents its annual results at the RDF headquarters, but its financial reports are not published. It is therefore unclear what the mechanisms for overseeing Zigama's operations are, although it is reported to hold an annual general assembly, during which it discusses its annual financial report, its accomplishments and its activities.

Horizon Group’s activities are even more opaque. In 2010, its director was arrested for alleged embezzlement of funds belonging to Horizon Group. However, in October 2013, an article only mentioned that the director had retired; nothing was published regarding a potential trial (6).

Results and activities for the Rwanda Investment Group are also very opaque. The company's website does not present any reports on its activities and it does not explain what are its ties with the state. There are no media reports on this company.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
There is evidence that, specifically to avoid being open to normal commercial responsibilities, the defence sector has chosen to classify Zigama as a financial cooperative rather than a commercial bank. There is evidence that details of their operations and finances do not fall under Rwandan company law.

I could find no evidence that audit reports are analyzed by their Board of Directors, as the only public reporting on this concerns the presentation of financial performance reports at RDF headquarters. I could find no evidence that audit reports were compiled. Score maintained. Further, as mentioned in Q30, there are allegations of a wholly non-transparent cotton business run by the RDF.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Many thanks for the additional source, I've added it to clarify the relationship between Horizon and the MoD and between Crystal Ventures and the RPF (9)

Researcher4107: There are examples of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees. In 2012, four senior army officials were arrested for smuggling minerals in DRC. According to the East African newspaper, the senior officials were retired as a result in 2013, along with 79 other military officers.

However, according to the 2014 BTI, the involvement of top officers in the illegal exploitation of mineral resources in provinces adjacent to the DRC was tolerated by the government, and that arrests were politically motivated:

&quoute;Recent legal proceedings against renegade top officers also revealed that their illegal business activities were known by the authorities and prosecuted only when the officers fled from Rwanda for political reasons.”

According to Global Witness, minerals are smuggled out of Congo into Rwanda and Burundi for export by military personnel. Tin and tantalum smuggled into Rwanda are allegedly laundered through the country’s domestic tagging system and exported as ‘clean’ Rwandan material. The government has denied its involvement:

&quoute;Allegations of abusive exploitation of resources were levelled against Rwandan officials in the eastern parts of the DRC. Such allegations have neither been tried by the Rwandan judiciary nor discussed in parliament, but instead have been sharply denied by the government&quoute; (BTI, 2010).

It is unclear whether private enterprise is specifically outlawed in Rwanda, and there are mixed reviews of sanctions that are in place. While some officials have been arrested in connection with mineral smuggling, these sanctions may be being used as a political tool rather than a means of discouraging private enterprise.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
While private companies may indeed by registered by the Rwanda Development Board, this question concerns unauthorised private enterprise. The incidences described above would not be registered with the Board, as they are not connected with businesses. Score maintained.

Researcher4107: In his speeches, Defence and Military spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Joseph Nzabamwita underlines
the priority for discipline, which is an “important pillar for the country’s development” (New Times). In an interview to Colette Braeckmans, Rwanda defence Minister James Kabarebe also underlines the discipline of Rwanda defence Forces and the fact that all army officers are under control. Discipline is then understood as “loyalty” to the regime, or as a proof of integrity. For General Kabarebe, Defence Minister, those who are lacking this loyalty can be considered “dogs”, as he considers General Karageya after his murder. Kabarebe considers Karageya as a dog because he betrayed the regime, accusing the leader of the regime to be a dictator. This information is relevant to show that integrity refers to loyalty to the regime, that is to say not divulgating information about its functioning and not criticizing it, but also respecting the rules, so not using corruption for individual interests.

The Law No 19/2002 of 17/05/2002 establishing the Rwanda Defence Force refers to integrity as one of its core values. In fact, to qualify for recruitment into the Rwanda Defence Forces, a candidate must have moral integrity and good conduct&quoute;. The webpage of the Rwanda Defence Force Command and Staff College also refers to integrity and loyalty.

Researcher4107: There appear to be formal measures in place for personnel found to have committed offences, although none specific to forms of bribery and corruption.

The Ministerial Order n° 004/05 of 22/12/2005 establishes rules relating to disciplinary conduct, disciplinary sanctions and procedure in the National Police. There is a Military Justice System dealing with “criminal offenses suspected to have been committed by military personnel in application of the Penal Code”. There is also a military prosecution department dealing with “investigating and prosecuting before the Military Courts all offences committed by persons subject to the jurisdiction of military courts.”

There is also a Military Tribunal which has the power of trying in the first instance all criminal offences except those reserved for the Military High Court. Finally, the Military High Court has the power of trying in the first instance all criminal offences constituting threat to national security and murder committed by military personnel.

However, Amnesty International have expressed doubt about the consistency and political neutrality within the military court. According to Human Rights Watch, &quoute;fewer than 40 RPF soldiers have been tried for these crimes, and most have received comparatively lenient sentences&quoute;.

Researcher4107: A law adopted in 2012 relates to the protection of whistle-blowers which provides that a whistle-blower may be a public servant, an employee of private institution or any other person having information on what he/she knows about crimes, acts and behaviour that are contrary to the law. There is no evidence that, in practice, this law offers enough protection against reprisal, however. According to the interviewee, intimidation and fear of reprisals are clear disincentives for whistle-blowers. (Interview 1, 20 June 2014).

According to an Anticorrp report, in Rwanda there are no vocal whistleblowers who publicly denounce wrong-doings and the emergence of such figures is very unlikely due to the fact that whistleblowers would be tolerated only if they denounced petty corruption not affecting the ruling party or the military. Moreover, while some interviewees stated that citizens increasingly report corruption cases, several surveys consistently show that few victims of corruption report the occurrence, mostly because they think that they might be harassed by the authorities.

This climate of fear, plus the fact that the military is not explicitly covered in this law, preclude a higher score.

Researcher4107: There is no public information related to the recruitment of officers at sensitive positions. Job opportunities advertised by the Ministry of Defence do not concern these positions.

According to the law, “recruitment into the Rwanda Defence Forces shall depend on the required number of officers and men. The number required per category shall be determined by a presidential order upon recommendation of the Minister holding the Rwanda Defence Forces in his attributions”. There is a recruitment test to enter Rwanda Defence Forces. Other requirements for hiring are specified in the law. candidates for Officer Cadet must hold at least A level certificate or its equivalent. This last aspect may be relevant to personnel in senstitive positions.

As peer reviewer 1 states, selection, recruitment and hiring of individuals in the RDF is based on merit and equality, except for senior positions. Senior defence policy makers tend to be regime insiders and are hand-picked by the president. Individuals tend to be Tutsis from Uganda who fought the RPA liberation war of 1990-94, although there are some exceptions (8).

Peer reviewer 2 adds that mechanisms for the selection and oversight of public service roles are not clear, prompting the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Social Affairs in January 2015 to call for a clarification of these procedures in law. The committee decried the lack of clarity on job requirements and irregularities in public tenders. Although the defence sector was not specifically mentioned in this call, there is no evidence to suggest it was exempt from these shortcomings.

Rules of conduct for sensitive positions are not made clear specifically for defence or intelligence professionals, but there are rules for general public servants, and these are stipulated in a number of laws, such as the Code of Ethics governing public agents involved in public procurement. For example, article 6 of the law stipulates that &quoute;public agents must abstain from any action which could be interpreted as bribery or act of corruption.&quoute; However, it does not appear that such rules of conduct are always adhered to in appointments in the military. For example, military officers accused of being involved in fomenting unrest in Congo (DRC), have not been prosecuted and most have retained their posts.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I could find no evidence to substantiate your statement that personnel in sensitive positions are regularly rotated, or that they declare their assets to the office of ombudsman. Score maintained.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Without evidence that the Code of Ethics applies to the defence sector, a higher score cannot be awarded.

Researcher4107: Numbers are available unofficially (such as through the US Department of State's database), but official figures are not published by Rwandan authorities. According to the US department of State, in 2011 Armed forces personnel in Rwanda amounted to 30 000.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Without the official release of figures from the Rwandan authorities, a higher score cannot be awarded.

Researcher4107: It is possible to find some public information on pay rates for military personnel.

According to the law, activity remuneration shall comprise of:
1. Initial remuneration relating to the conferred rank.
2. Eventual salary bonuses;
3. Annual remuneration increments;
4. Various allowances and indemnities.

The wages for military personnel is still low, about Rwf 38,000 ($60) per month for a basic soldier. Local Defence Forces are unpaid, according to the Law no 25/2004. Allowances from other sources of revenues are unknown.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, pay rates and benefits for a number of civilian positions of various rank are published online, including for permanent secretary, judicial officer and more.

Response to peer reviewers 2 and 3:
The poor coverage of each of these documents precludes a higher score. For the majority of positions, no information on salary is available.

Researcher4107: No information was found on systematic delays of payment.

According to the interviewee, payments seem to be generally delivered on time, directly to a bank account (Interview with Source 1, defence official, 20 June, 2014). Yet, information on the system of payment is not made public. According to an old article from Camken, &quoute;[t]en percent of the soldiers' salaries are deducted and used to finance the CSS.&quoute; (Camken 2005, p. 109).

As peer reviewer 2 notes, all soldiers have an account with a credit and savings society called Zigama-CSS, which disburses their salary each month into their accounts.

However, it is important to understand that Zigama's activities aren't always transparent and open to public scrutiny as peer reviewer 2 suggests. Zigama credit and savings bank does present its annual results at the RDF headquarters, but its financial reports are not published.

During discussions over whether to open up Zigama to full regulation and business practices as a commercial bank, the Chairman of the Board of Directors stated that : “we agreed that we will follow guidelines and regulations, but there would be some exceptions on what we are required to do,” going on to say that: “what they mainly request us is transparency, constant reporting. The principle we agreed on is that Zigama CSS remains a cooperative that sticks to its initial mission [members’ welfare]” (6). This goes some way to explaining why there is no publication of financial reports, except for headline profit figures reported by the media (6). It is unclear what the mechanisms for overseeing Zigama's operations are, although it is reported to hold an annual general assembly, during which it discusses its annual financial report, its accomplishments and its activities.

Response to peer reviewers 2 and 3:
As the payment system is not published, and there is no evidence that basic pay is non-discretionary, a higher score cannot be awarded.

Researcher4107: RDF has its own nomination and promotion system. According to the law, an officer's promotion shall depend on their ability to exercise higher functions in accordance with evaluation report, available posts and promotional exam where applicable. However, the President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief may promote any officer at any time. Accordingly, military officers may be appointed based on merit, but also their loyalty and vicinity to political power. There is no evidence of the appointment system being independent, transparent and objective.

Regarding appointment, the law says &quoute;General, Senior and Junior Officers shall be appointed by the President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief.&quoute;

Response to peer reviewer 3:
The process is not overseen by independent personnel, precluding a higher score.

Researcher4107: Appointments within the RDF are regulated through a nomination and promotion system, defined by Law Nº 32/01of 03/09/2012.

The President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief may promote any officer at any time. The promotion and appointment of junior officers within the military is overseen by the Office of the Prime Minister (a political entity). Any promotion is supposedly based on merit, but is effectively also based on the officers' loyalty and vicinity to political power. Evidence suggests that the appointment system is not independent, transparent or objective.

According to the law, there is a specific set of rules for the promotion at middle and top management level. &quoute; Officer’ promotion shall depend on ability to exercise higher functions, in accordance with
evaluation report, available posts and promotional exam where applicable.

The standard period required to be promoted to higher rank shall be:
1 º two (2) years from the rank of Second Lieutenant to the rank of Lieutenant;
2 º three (3) years from the rank of Lieutenant to the rank of Captain; 3 º three (3) years from the rank of
Captain to the rank of Major;
4 º four (4) years from the rank of Major to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel;
5 º four (4) years from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to the rank of Colonel;
6 º four (4) years from the rank of Colonel to the rank of Brigadier General;
7 º three (3) years from the rank of Brigadier General to the rank of Major General;
8 º three (3) years from the rank of Major General to the rank of Lieutenant General;
9 º three (3) years from the rank of Lieutenant General to the rank of General.

Promotion of Officers shall be made by the President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief on the approval of the Cabinet.&quoute; Regarding appointment, &quoute;General, Senior and Junior Officers shall be appointed by the President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief.&quoute;

There is no relevant information on the promotion of civil personnel within the Ministry of Defence. There are no boards or other oversight of the promotions process. As peer reviewer 1 notes, the military is highly politicised in the sense that the top echelons are part and parcel of the broader political elite in Rwanda as can be seen by ambassadorial, ministerial and many other senior government positions filled with ex- or current military officers.

Peer reviewer 2 adds that the president has repeatedly used a lack of oversight in the promotions and firing process to elevate his allies to influential positions, while dismissing those who might post a threat to his rule. Any promotion mechanisms such as the cabinet meeting are therefore likely to be cosmetic in nature, with Kagame himself making the majority of decisions, thereby undermining the process.

Researcher4107: Since 1999 there has been no military conscription in Rwanda. However, there are military training programmes called “Ingando” and “intorero“ to train young people to military activities, patriotism and discipline (Purdekova).

Researcher4107: There is no compulsory or voluntary conscription in Rwanda. There is no evidence of a policy particularly prohibiting giving and accepting bribery to gain preferred position in the recruitment process within the army.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, enlistment is entirely voluntary. There appear to be no specific measures in place to prevent bribery when soliciting positions. However, the country has a strong anti-corruption policy in general, which is espoused by the defence sector, and there is no evidence to suggest widespread bribery is practiced. Instances of bribery are widely prosecuted.

Researcher4107: The practice of &quoute;ghost soldiers&quoute; may have existed during post war period, as at that time salaries were paid in cash and transported by intermediaries from the Ministry of Defence to soldiers, which multiplied the opportunities for embezzlement and the creation of ‘ghost soldiers’.

Yet, there is no evidence of the existence of ghost soldiers now, but it is difficult to assess the strength and oversight of payment systems as they are not published.

In 1999, Rwanda Defence Forces inaugurated the Credit and Savings Scheme (CSS). CSS is now “a soldiers-own and professionally managed bank” (Mwenda). Zigama is listed as a financial cooperative with a membership exclusively made of state security organs (the National Army and Police). Soldiers are meant to have accounts with Zigama through which they are paid.

However, during discussions over whether to open up Zigama to full regulation and business practices as a commercial bank, the Chairman of the Board of Directors stated that : “we agreed that we will follow guidelines and regulations, but there would be some exceptions on what we are required to do,” going on to say that: “what they mainly request us is transparency, constant reporting. The principle we agreed on is that Zigama CSS remains a cooperative that sticks to its initial mission [members’ welfare]” (4). This goes some way to explaining why there is no publication of financial reports, except for headline profit figures reported by the media (4). It is unclear what the mechanisms for overseeing Zigama's operations are, although it is reported to hold an annual general assembly, during which it discusses its annual financial report, its accomplishments and its activities.

Researcher4107: In 2012, Rwanda introduced a new public sector pay and retention policy. One of the objectives was to achieve transparency in the establishment and management of salaries, wages, allowances and benefits. Nevertheless, currently, evidence indicates that there is a lack of transparency in the management of salaries within the public sector.

In 1999, Rwanda Defence Forces inaugurated the Credit and Savings Scheme (CSS). CSS is now “a soldiers-own and professionally managed bank” (Mwenda). Zigama is listed as a financial cooperative with a membership exclusively made of state security organs (the National Army and Police). Soldiers are meant to have accounts with Zigama through which they are paid. Superiors should therefore not have an influence on the payment of their subordinates. Yet, no information was found to testify the clear division between chain of command and chain of payment.

Indeed, during discussions over whether to open up Zigama to full regulation and business practices as a commercial bank, the Chairman of the Board of Directors stated that : “we agreed that we will follow guidelines and regulations, but there would be some exceptions on what we are required to do,” going on to say that: “what they mainly request us is transparency, constant reporting. The principle we agreed on is that Zigama CSS remains a cooperative that sticks to its initial mission [members’ welfare]” (4). This goes some way to explaining why there is no publication of financial reports, except for headline profit figures reported by the media (4). It is unclear what the mechanisms for overseeing Zigama's operations are, although it is reported to hold an annual general assembly, during which it discusses its annual financial report, its accomplishments and its activities.

Response to peer reviewers 2 and 3:
Agreed that the electronic payment system, although not transparent, does warrant a score of 3 rather than a score of 0. Score revised.

Researcher4107: According to the law determining missions, organisation and powers of the Rwanda Defence Forces, there is a general Code of Conduct for the armed forces.

Moreover, the oath of the Rwanda Defence Forces states “never use the powers conferred on me for personal ends”. Yet, there is no evidence of a proper Code of Conduct on corruption. Corruption could have been mentioned in the overall training of the forces, but no evidence was found to substantiate this.

Researcher4107: There is no published code of conduct for the armed forces, making this question difficult to assess. However, the Oath for Rwanda Defence Forces states that personnel should “never use the powers conferred on me for personal ends; Should I fail to honour this oath, may I face the rigours of the law&quoute;.

There is some indication that breaches of this are being addressed. For example, as part of its Gender Desk, the Rwandan Defence Forces has a free hotline (3945) for reporting abuse cases involving the military (UN Women). As stated above prosecutions are taking place when military officers are acting against the law.

However, there are concerns of consistency and political neutrality in the implementation of prosecutions. Concerns are voiced by NGO such as Human Rights Watch. For example, in its report &quoute;Rwanda: Justice After Genocide—20 Years On&quoute; the NGO stated that to &quoute;Human Rights Watch’s knowledge, fewer than 40 RPF soldiers have been tried for these crimes, and most have received comparatively lenient sentences&quoute;.

As it is explained within the East African article, many military officers can retire without prosecution. Results of prosecutions are not systematically made publicly available. As peer reviewer 2 notes, results of prosecutions for corruption within the defence forces are sometimes made available through the office of the Ombudsman (6).

Response to peer reviewer 2: The Q has been answered in the context of breaches of the code related to corruption only. As mentioned in Q47, the code in place is not comprehensive or credible as such, score of 1 has been awarded.

Researcher4107: A new training centre opened in Musanze in 2013. According to Rwanda Defence Forces Chief of Staff, Lt Gen. Ceaser Kayizari, military trainings were conducted: “The notion of security shifted from traditional state centric security to human security. In this sense, security means the achievement of freedom from fear…and entails establishment of democratic institutions and good governance’’(New Times).

Anti-corruption trainings are taking place for civil servants and traffic police (Ombudsman). However, the regularity of those trainings is unknown. Moreover, there is no evidence that those trainings are also taking place for military personnel.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I could find no evidence to substantiate your suggestion that training is given on an annual basis, and the fact that the training you reference is only offered to selected personnel would also preclude a higher score.

Researcher4107: There is no systematic information about the prosecution of defence personnel. The Ministry of Defence website presents the mission of the military prosecution department, but nothing is published on its activities.

Outcomes of prosecutions for corruption undertaken by the Ombudsman are made public, they are available on the website of the Ombudsman, and they include officers from the Rwanda Defence Forces. The list available indicates that only two officers from the Rwanda Defence Forces have been convicted, one in 2012 and one in 2013.

Outcomes of prosecution are sometimes communicated by local communication channels, but not on a systematic basis. There are evidence of recent convictions, such as the one of Lieutenant Joel Mutabazi, a former body guard of President Paul Kagame sentenced to life and stripped of his army rank, being accused with 15 other people accused of terror-related crime.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I could find no evidence to substantiate your suggestion that the Rwandan National Police regularly publishes information about people charged with corruption.

Researcher4107: The Rwandan government has shown efforts in tackling bribery through both international and national legal mechanisms. It is a signatory of OECD Convention of Combating Bribery, and national law strictly criminalises giving and accepting bribes (Investment Climate, Embassy of United States, Kagili).

However, as peer reviewer 2 notes, the limited information on outcome of prosecutions for corruption - which are among the measures in place to discourage facilitation payments - make it difficult to determine whether measures are always effectively applied.

The Leadership Code of Conduct, which applies to the entire public administration and as well for the Ministry of Defence, cover corruption issues such as bribery, although it has no text on facilitation payments specifically. Nevertheless, sanctions (art. 20) such as dismissal are in place, although this code does not apply to defence personnel more broadly.

Researcher4107: There is no evidence that Rwanda has a military doctrine addressing corruption issues as such, but anti-corruption laws apply to military officers as well. Moreover, the oath of the Rwanda Defence Forces states “never use the powers conferred on me for personal ends”.

There are allegations that corruption during the Rwandan war in the DRC would not have been possible without the support of high ranking officials (NUPI, 2005): &quoute;[...] the profits generated through mining, trade and smuggling in Congo have by and large benefited the state. This has been possible because of the highly disciplined nature of Rwandan forces and the economic agencies associated with it.&quoute;

Some officers have been prosecuted for those smuggling activities in DRC (BBC). Nevertheless, according to a former UN Secretary General, &quoute;the Governments of Rwanda and Zimbabwe, as well as powerful individuals in Uganda, have adopted other strategies for maintaining the mechanisms for revenue generation, many of which involve criminal activities, once their troops have departed.&quoute;

Researcher4107: A new training centre opened in Musanze in 2013.

According to the Rwandan Defence Forces Chief of Staff, Lt Gen. Ceaser Kayizari, military training has evolved: ““The notion of security shifted from traditional state centric security to human security. In this sense, security means the achievement of freedom from fear…and entails establishment of democratic institutions and good governance.’’(New Times). No specific mention of corruption is mentioned.

However, there is no evidence that this knowledge is applied in the field. Also, there have been allegations of corruption during Rwandan operations in Darfur peace keeping operations as well as during the war in DRC.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, it is not clear that the training facility in Musanze covers corruption and there is no other evidence of anti-corruption training for military officers. Occasional anti-corruption training does take place more generally, such as a 2-day event held in 2011 for civil servants. However, it is not clear whether this involved the defence or intelligence sector (5).

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I could find no evidence against which to verify your suggestion that anti-corruption forms part of the global programme designed for those commanders at all levels during their training.

Researcher4107: I could not find evidence of the deployment of trained anti-corruption professionals from Rwanda to monitor corruption risk in the field.

Peer reviewer 1 suggests that units do have political commissars which play an 'anti-corruption' role inasmuch as it applies to core issues of cohesion, discipline and control in the army. The newly created position of Inspector General of the RDF is intended to provide increased scrutiny to the RDF but mainly in terms of potential dissenters.

However, it is unclear whether these units would monitor corruption risk on deployment.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I could find no evidence that the Rwandan National Police deploys alongside the military to investigate corruption cases that occur in the field.

Researcher4107: There is no data on staff training addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations.

Researcher4107: There are 14 private security companies operating in Rwanda, some of which are employed by the Government of Rwanda. Clear problems of malpractice have been reported (Great Lakes Voice).

Training does sometimes take place for Private Security Companies to ensure better practices (Hope Magazine). A new law was passed earlier this year (New Times) to frame working conditions for Private Security Companies. Those companies shall now refer to the Police to get a licence to work, in an attempt to increase the level of scrutiny. This licence can also be withheld without notice by the Police; a decision by the Police shall be considered final and incontestable.

Risks of corruption are likely to emerge from this new legal framework. All those private security companies are focusing on internal security, working with the police. There are presently no private security companies working with the military.

As peer reviewer 2 states, private security companies were chastised in September 2014 for failing to respect traffic regulations. The Minister of Internal Security in 2013 dissolved a private security company for engaging in malpractices such as theft, absenteeism of guards from duty, failure to pay employees on time, accumulation of VAT arrears and forgery of financial statements. The incident was uncovered in a case heard by the High Court in January 2014, suggesting violations of regulations are occasionally being applied.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Without evidence of the consistent application of sanctions a higher score cannot be awarded. Score maintained.

Researcher4107: The 2007 Law on Public Procurement stipulates that the law is not applicable to defence bidders, as article 3 reads &quoute;this law shall not apply to procurement of classified items meant for national defence and security”. Moreover, there is no evidence that there is legislation covering defence and security procurement with clauses specific to corruption risks.

While there is limited scope for the law to apply to non-classified defence purchases, it is unclear what these might be, as there is no debate and information made public on the respect of procurement procedures within the defence sector.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, there is a Military Tender Board in place, and its functions are those of &quoute;organizing and managing procurement process in the most cost effective and efficient manner&quoute; in the defence sector. This function is supported by a tender committee. However, the roles of the board and of the committee are vague, or are not publicly defined, making it difficult to assess whether legislation is effective.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
While there is limited scope for the law to apply to non-classified defence purchases, it is unclear what these might be, as there is no debate and information made public on the respect of procurement procedures within the defence sector. Score maintained.

Researcher4107: Based on presidential Order No 19/07/2004 establishing public procurement procedures, the Ministry of Defence established a procurement organ referred to as the ‘Military Tender Board’ (MTB) on 03/03/2005.

The MTB's aim is to organise and manage the procurement process. It provides instructions for bidders and publishes the needs of the ministry. However, there is no publication of controls on tender procedures and most tenders, especially for defence procurements, are not available.

There is no information on assessment of needs, contract implementation, sign-off, asset disposal, neither by the ministry of defence nor the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority. As a result, the defence procurement cycle process is not made public.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
Without information on assessment of needs, contract implementation, sign-off, or asset disposals, a higher score cannot be awarded.

Researcher4107: The Military Tender Board, also called the Tender Committee, lacks transparency. There is no evidence of any reporting on its activity and no entity in charge of scrutinising the tender board. According to the Ministry of Defence, the tender committee is responsible for preparing a report on the bid evaluation comprising the evaluation process and comparison of bids that is signed by all committee members present. This report is not publicly available.

The Rwanda Public Procurement Authority (RPPA) is the only entity which performs audits, so there is an external oversight over defence tenders; yet only a brief quantitative summary of RPPA' activities within the defence sector is made publicly available. According to the RPPA Annual Activity Report 2012-2013, 54 tenders were audited, from the Ministry of Defence, for a value of 6,657,231,435 RwF.

Some military officials have been tried for corruption through tenders (Asimwe: “a total of 111 cases are also yet to be settled while nine others that implicate military officials were sent to the military tribunal.”), however, which indicates the presence of some form of oversight.

Researcher4107: Some tenders for 'mundane' goods (fuel, clothing, infrastructure) are in fact posted on the Ministry of Defence website. Rwandan military expenditure is made available through the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In 2013, Defence purchases represent 1,1% of 2013 GDP, that is to say 82.2 USD million.

However, defence procurement plans are not publicly available - only some tenders for 'mundane' goods (fuel, clothing, infrastructure) are posted on the Ministry of Defence website. The 2013 Budget Execution Report, submitted to parliament, does not provide details on defence purchases.

The Explanatory Note to the Budget Framework Paper gives details on spending within the defence sector (promotion of regional cooperation and peacekeeping , operational support) but no details are given on purchases.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, there is no known policy to disclose defence purchases.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
Although you state that the law on public procurement and regulations require public institutions to disclose all information on purchases they made, I was unable to find detailed (or aggregate) information about any military purchases. Score maintained.

Researcher4107: There is a blacklist for companies not allowed to compete for bids, available on the website of the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority (RPPA). Moreover, the RPPA has created a Public Procurement Guide explaining procedures to follow to be qualified for bids. There are no special requirements on integrity, only what is standard in company law. Law N° 12/2007 of 27/03/2007 relative to public tenders is very specific on procedures to follow, that is to say on public procurement organs (the Rwanda Public Procurement authority, the procurement unit and independent review panels) , procurement methods, contract execution and the penalties in case of rules' violation; yet, as it is stated in the law, &quoute;this law shall not apply to the procurement of classified items meant for national defence and security.&quoute; Accordingly, the law shall apply to non-classified items meant for national defence and security; it is on this base that the procurement unit has been established within the Ministry of Defence.

According to an explanatory note on a draft law governing private security services, “companies are governed by instructions issued by the Minister of Internal Security because there was no law governing them. This draft law is meant to remove this gap and improve on the functioning of these companies and their collaboration with security organs.” Private security companies now refer to the Police to get a licence to work and to be granted the certificate of good conduct, in the attempt to increase the level of scrutiny. This licence can also be withheld without notice by the Police; a decision by the Police is considered final and incontestable. Risks of corruption are likely to emerge from this new legal framework as there is no check and counter power against a police decision. Moreover, the police remains the most corrupt institution in Rwanda, according to Transparency International (6).

However, as peer reviewer 2 notes, according to the Code of Ethics bidders in all sectors must &quoute;conduct themselves with integrity and transparency in all transactions and relations with the procuring entity&quoute; and &quoute;desist from engaging in any corrupt, fraudulent, collusive or coercive practices.&quoute; If a bidder is found to have engaged in any of these activities, it will be disqualified or its contract will be terminated. Criminal activities conducted by bidders can also be prosecuted (7). As such, companies are expected to have some level of integrity in order to bid for contracts, although it is not clear how far this applies to defence contracts.

As peer reviewer 3 adds, the company also has to provide evidences that it fits the basic requirements to be eligible. Those are administrative requirements (complying with taxes, not being blacklisted ...)

Response to peer reviewers 2 and 3:
Agreed that there are some company law provisions that are likely to cover defence bidders and that some reference is made to integrity. However, I could find no evidence that companies are required to sign ‘no-corruption’ (or equivalent) clauses to bid for work, precluding a higher score. Score has been raised from 0 to 1.

Researcher4107: There is no public National Security Strategy which is why procurement requirements are decided on an ad-hoc basis. Procurement planning is entirely embedded under the procurement unit . No other sources have been found to answer this question.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I could find no evidence to suggest that procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy. In addition, you suggest that this would only apply to 'non-classified' defence expenditure, but I could not find any information about even mundane procurement being strategy-driven.

Researcher4107: The Procurement Unit from the Ministry of Defence is in charge of procurement planning and its publication. However, the procurement plan is not available to the public.

It is difficult to say if defence purchases are clearly identified and are based on quantified requirements. As there is no public National Security Strategy, procurement requirements are decided on an ad-hoc basis. Spending for armament is increasing, such as the purchase of surface-to-air missiles from China, while there is no clear requirements for it and no imminent threat justifying this spending.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I could find no evidence that the Ministry of defence and Armed Forces base their major purchases on clearly identified requirements. Score maintained.

Researcher4107: According to Article 52 in the law on public procurement, small-scale defence procurement is likely to be conducted via open competition: “Single source procurement shall not be justified on the grounds that only one bidder has the capacity or the exclusive right to manufacture or deliver goods, works or services if functionally equivalent goods, works or services from other bidders would meet the needs of the procuring entity.” The procuring entity, may engage in a single source procurement in case of force majeure, in case additional works cannot be technically separated from initial tender or in case procurement related to items are available only from a monopolist.

According to the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority (RPPA) Annual Report 2013 2014, 7.81% of tenders submitted to RPPA used the single sourcing contract method (percentage for defence tenders is unclear). In several cases mentionned and concerning non classified items, the Ministry of Defence did ask for the authorization to use the single source method. This shows that open competition may be respected regarding non classified items within the defence sector.

The fact that the army is involved into business and banking through private holdings (David Booth) may be harmful to open competition. Yet, there is no evidence that open competition has been harmed by military businesses or cases where defence contracts were going to the military business.

Nevertheless, the 2007 Law on Public Procurement stipulates that the law is not applicable to defence bidders, as article 3 reads &quoute;this law shall not apply to procurement of classified items meant for national defence and security”. This means that large-scale defence procurement is exempt from the clauses on single-sourcing. Moreover, there is no evidence that there is legislation covering defence and security procurement with clauses specific to corruption risks.

Researcher4107: The leadership code of conduct makes clear that public servants should respect values of accountability and transparency. Those values are also valid for tender committee members within the the Ministry of Defence. According to the Procurement Unit, &quoute;Transparency; competition; economy; efficiency; fairness and accountability are the fundamental principles governing the public procurement process.&quoute;

Regarding audit controls, “[t]he Secretary General who is the MOD Budget Manager is empowered by the law to approve reports of the Tender Committee and sign the awarded contracts” (MoD, procurement unit). Yet, the Office of the Auditor General never mention tenders from the Ministry of Defence in its reports, which indicates a lack or an omission of controls. According to the RPPA Annual Activity Report 2012-2013, 54 tenders from the Ministry of Defence were audited, for a value of 6,657,231,435 RwF; no more details are given on those audited tenders.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, there is a Military Tender Board in place, and its functions are those of &quoute;organizing and managing procurement process in the most cost effective and efficient manner&quoute; in the defence sector. This function is supported by a tender committee. However, the roles of the board and of the committee are vague, or are not publicly defined, making it difficult to assess whether legislation is effective.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Agreed that ministerial instruction N 001/11/10/TC of 24/01/2011 requires all agents involved in public procurement, including members of tender boards, to be subject to clear and publicly available codes of conduct that include &quoute;acting at all times in a manner that will bear the closest public scrutiny&quoute; and abstaining &quoute;from any action which could be interpreted as bribery or act of corruption.&quoute; However, it is unclear whether this law extends to tenders or agents working under the blanket exemption to the 2007 Law on Public Procurement: &quoute;this law shall not apply to procurement of classified items meant for national defence and security”

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I could find no evidence that the office of the auditor general carries out regular independent external audits of defence tender boards, not that it presents its findings to the parliament for further action.

Researcher4107: The country has a legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders. However, these laws do not apply to defence and security contracts.

The 2013 Law on Public Procurement stipulates that “a bidder who makes collusion with other bidders with the intention to interfere with the fair competition of competing bidders, who makes fraudulent over estimated prices, who makes collusion with public official concerning the preparation of bidding documents shall be debarred from participation in public procurement for four years.”

However, article 3 from law 2007 law on public procurement reads &quoute;this law shall not apply to procurement of classified items meant for national defence and security.&quoute; Accordingly, the law shall apply for non classified items regarding defence sector, so there is a legislation to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts, but not specific to the defence sector.

No information on enforcement cases could be found.

Law No 23/2003 Related to the Punishment Of Corruption does not mention collusion between bidders.

Response to peer reviewers 2 and 3:
Agreed that there are sanctions in place, but the fact remains that these are not applicable to defence procurement. A score of 1 is therefore the highest that can be awarded.

Researcher4107: It is the responsibility of the procurement unit to ensure &quoute;adequate contract execution in collaboration with the beneficiary department&quoute;. The Rwanda Public Procurement Authority organises training sessions for official institutions, like the Ministry of Defence.

However, no information was found on the training and qualifications of the personnel within the Ministry of Defence. The Rwanda defence force command and staff college provides courses to junior and high officers; in November 2014 there was a course on public procurement. It is not clear however if procurement staff followed the training.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, there is no evidence of defence procurement staff being organised into a professional staff department.

Researcher4107: Ministerial Order N 06 of 30/07/2007, following enactment of law N 12/2007, allows the creation of an Independent Panel Review on Public Procurement . The panel has the role of receiving, and analyzing the appeals presented by different bidders. To be acceptable, an appeal has to clarify a specific act of omissions or commissions contravening the law and regulations on public procurement” (NIRP annual report 2012-2013).

National Independent Review Panel members received and analysed 76 appeals during the fiscal year 2012-2013. Of those 82, 19 were admissible and founded. Two cases concern the Ministry of defence, one case was judged to be founded and the other not.

No media articles or report were found on the consequences of appealing. Evidence of special measures for the protection of concerned companies could not be found. As peer reviewer 2 notes, there is no evidence to suggest bidders who lodge complains are subsequently discriminated against. However, the laws do not go far enough to properly inform bidders of their rights, likely causing some confusion as to the level of their protection. The public procurement manual stipulates that the authority shall not discriminate against any potential bidder, but there appears to be no formal protection specifically for bidders who may have lodged a complaint.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
With only two cases concerning the Ministry of Defence, it can't be judged that formal mechanisms are being used frequently. Score maintained.

Researcher4107: The 2013 Law on Public Procurement stipulates that “a bidder who colludes with other bidders with the intention to interfere with the fair competition of competing bidders, who makes fraudulent over estimated prices, who colludes with public officials concerning the preparation of bidding documents&quoute; shall be debarred from participation in public procurement for four years.

However, the 2007 Law on Public Procurement stipulates that the law may not be applicable to defence and security bidders, as article 3 reads &quoute;this law shall not apply to procurement of classified items meant for national defence and security.&quoute; It should, however, apply to non classified items meant for national defence and security.

A 2004 Presidential Order establishing public procurement procedures stipulates that a supplier may be excluded, suspended or have their employment terminated in case of malpractices. A Ministerial Instruction N001/11/10/TC of 24/01/2011, 'Establishing the Professional Code of Ethics Governing Public Agents Involved in Public Procurement' states that: &quoute;If bidders have directly or through an agent engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive or coercive practices in competing for a contract, it shall lead to disqualification of the bidder or termination of the contract.&quoute;

There is evidence of applied sanctions, such as the black list from the RPPA. Some companies have been explicitly sanctioned due to &quoute;Forgery and use of forged documents&quoute;; in that case the sanction is an exclusion from public procurement from 1 to 3 years. Sanctions include imprisonment and fines. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether these have ever been applied to the defence sector.

Researcher4107: Given the lack of transparency associated with defence and security procurement, it cannot be ruled out that there are no offset contracts. The score has been selected accordingly.

Researcher4107: Given the lack of transparency associated with defence and security procurement, it cannot be ruled out that there are no offset contracts. The score has been selected accordingly.

Researcher4107: Given the lack of transparency associated with defence and security procurement, it cannot be ruled out that there are no offset contracts. The score has been selected accordingly.

Researcher4107: There is some control over intermediaries in the procurement cycle. The Procurement Authority's Standard Bidding Document stipulates that &quoute;[t]he Procurement Authority will reject a proposal for award if it determines that the bidder recommended for award has, directly or through an agent, engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, coercive or obstructive practices in competing for the contract in question&quoute;. It also states that &quoute;the Procurement Authority will sanction a firm or individual, including declaring ineligible, either indefinitely or for a stated period of time, to be awarded a contract if it at any time determines that the firm has, directly or through an agent, engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, coercive or obstructive practices in competing for, or in executing, a contract.&quoute;

In addition, given that &quoute;this law shall not apply to procurement of classified items meant for national defence and security” it is unclear how far this control extends to defence procurement.

Researcher4107: No information is available on major arms deals prior to the signing of the contract; principal aspects of financial package are never made public. For Rwanda's authorities, those contracts are meant to be secret and no media is allowed to publish anything on arms deals.

For example, while international media published information on an arms deal between China and Rwanda on TL-50 air defence missiles, the information was not confirmed by Rwandan media, and no further information could be found on financial aspects regarding this arms deal.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I could find no evidence that details of the financing package are made publicly available prior to the signing of the contract, even for small defence purchases.

Researcher4107: The Procurement Authority's Standard Bidding Documents for Goods and Related Services, states that &quoute;Rwanda public procurement policy requires that all bidders, suppliers, and contractors, their subcontractors and the procuring entities representatives, observe the highest standard of ethics during the procurement and execution of such contracts.” Yet, there is no evidence of anti-corruption programmes targeting subsidiaries and sub-contractors.

In addition, the 2007 Law on Public Procurement stipulates that the law is not applicable to defence bidders, as article 3 reads &quoute;this law shall not apply to procurement of classified items meant for national defence and security”.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I could find no evidence that there is a termination clause for contractors that sanctions corrupt behaviour.

Researcher4107: As peer reviewer 2 notes, the government does not disclose military procurement decisions, nor does it explain or justify these publicly. Given the secrecy surrounding defence acquisition decisions, it is difficult to determine whether political influence affects the decision making process.

According to the SIPRI database, main weapons suppliers to Rwanda are Israel (9 million USD), Turkey (5 million USD) and Ukraine (2 million USD).

According to a SIPRI policy paper on arms trade to sub-Saharan Africa, from 2006 to 2010 China has been a major arms supplier to Rwanda, as well as South Africa, Spain and Israel. “Some observers have argued that Chinese arms transfers to Nigeria, Rwanda and Zambia have been an instrument to improve relations in order to ensure China’s access to oil, tin and tantalum in these countries.”

According to the BTI 2014, the USA does have influence on Rwanda purchases.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Agreed, score lowered from 1 to 0.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
While all tenders are meant to be equally open to competitive bidders, classified tenders may be an exception. This means that there is no mechanism by which to extend the procurement law to the vast majority of defence procurement.