Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Searches indicate that since 2013, information available on the Ministry of Finance's website has considerably increased. The Treasury and Public Accounts Directorate publishes more detailed information as to public expenditures and revenues on its website.
There is no information on the website of the Ministry of Finance, or on the website of the treasury regarding controls of the disposal of assets in the Comoros.
The example cited below does not state directly that information relating to the disposal of assets is not publicly available but rather indicates that there is little transparency or information communicated to the public. No mention of corruption is made in articles relating to this case.
El Watan reports that the President called an extraordinary session of the Assembly on 3 March 2014 to examine twelve draft bills, one of which was focused on asset disposal. According to the article, the government already presented the bill regarding the disposal of public assets before the Assembly in 2012, but the bill was not passed because of disagreements over the privatisation of Comores Telecom, the national telecommunication company. There is no information to indicate that the bill was passed since and there is no further information regarding control over asset disposal.
Given the lack of equipment that seems to prevail in the Comorian army, it is likely that the defence would acquire assets rather that disposing of assets.
As a side note, there is a law legislating the concession or privatisation of public companies by the Comorian administration (Loi n°95-008).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no information available regarding asset disposal from the defence sector in the Comoros, but as stated in previous questions, given the scarcity of assets that seems to prevail in the defence sector, it is more likely for the defence sector to be acquiring assets rather than disposing of them.
Scarce information relating to the defence sector in the Comoros de facto suggests that there is little transparency in the sector. Searches of the World Bank's military spending for instance does not provide any data for the Union of the Comoros. Additionally, there is very limited information available on the Comoros' Ministry of Finance regarding the military and defence sector budget.

There is no information per se regarding the limited assets owned by the defence sector in the Comoros. This statement is a result of the amount of donations made by foreign power for material for the military in the Comoros.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The Ministry of Finance publishes on its website the Comorian budget for years 2009 until 2013. There is no information available as to secret items in the defence and security expenditure relating to national security and the intelligence services. There is, although limited, information regarding the budget allocated to national security and the intelligence services (Direction Nationale de la Sureté du Territoire - DNST) published by the government. Information available in the budget includes: office furniture, purchase of food, maintenance and other purchases of security related goods and services.
The government has not announced that spending on such item is zero, it has not made any statements on the subject. Although the budget is more detailed than previously, the headings in the 2013 budget are quite vague and are not detailed.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no evidence suggesting that the Assembly is provided with information regarding secret items in the defence budget.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no information available publicly indicating that the legislator is provided with audit reports on the military, the intelligence services, the police and other secret programs, or that such budgets are debated within the Assembly.

It is worth noting that the Ministry of Finance publishes on its website the Comorian budget for years 2009 until 2013. Although up until 2013 information was not very detailed, the 2013 budget provides a more broken down budget with a number of headings.

There is no information available as to secret items in the defence and security expenditure relating to national security and the intelligence services.

The broken down budget publicly available is limited in details and solely provides detail for the following items with regards to the spending of the national army (the Armee Nationale de defence (AND)): personnel remuneration, civil and national security related purchases of goods and services, sanitary evacuations, medical help and infrastructure spending. The budget also details civil related purchases of goods and services for the National Office of Documentation and State Protection (Direction Nationale de la Documentation et de la Protection de l'Etat -DNPPE).

Information as to the national security and the intelligence services (Direction Nationale de la Sureté du Territoire - DNST) lists its spending for: office furniture, food purchases, maintenance and purchases of goods and services for security. Information regarding aggregated salaries for 2011 is also available broken down monthly.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Accepted, score adjusted to 1.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no mention of off-budget expenditures in Comorian law. There is very limited information publicly available regarding off-budgets, and it is hence not possible to ascertain whether these are well-controlled and exceptional occurrences.

A 2014 World Bank report on the Comoros indicates that off-budget expenditures do exist without being specific to the defence sector. The World Bank report also indicates that the government acknowledges the problems off-budget expenditure represent to the government, and that the 2014 Budget Law includes &quoute;four previously off-budget accounts recorded in the accounts of the Treasury” in addition to having issued a decision (arreté) “containing a complete list of accounts of the administrative entities of the Comoros in the country's central bank.&quoute;

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Both the IMF and the World Bank have reported evidences of off-budget expenditures in the Comoros, but make no specific reference to the defence sector. As such, we can only speculate that off-budget expenditures occur in the defence sector.

A 2004 IMF country report provides the Comoros' consolidated expenditure for 1997-2002 which included &quoute;the expenditures of central government [...] as well as a statement of off-budget expenditure.&quoute;
A World Bank document published in March 2014 states that &quoute;Treasury management is [...] undermined by off-budget accounts held by sector ministries. There are currently no information declared to the Treasury or the Budget Department for four accounts of some revenue-collection ministries that send payments collected directly to the Central Bank or hold them in dedicated off-budget accounts.&quoute;
This World Bank report suggests that off-budget expenditures are common in the Comoros' budget, but does not provide specific information as to the defence sector in particular, and states that the Comoros has included in its 2014 Budget Law four previously off-budget accounts (comptes de régies) recorded in the accounts of the Treasury, and has issued a decision (arreté) containing a complete list of accounts of the administrative entities of the Comoros in the country's central bank.

There is no evidence that off-budget expenditure involves illicit economy activities, but that said, there is almost no information available on off-budgets in the Union of the Comoros

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The law on the status of military personnel status mentions provisions of the General Penal Code relating to the violation of classified information by military personnel. There does not appear to be a defined and formal legal system for the classification of information.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Given there appear to be no controls in place at all, score 0 would fit best as all classification would take place at the discretion of officials and given the lack of institutional controls in the defence establishment more broadly, there is high risk of abuse.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no public information available regarding the defence sector's ownership of commercial entities or military officials' ownership of assets. Given the lack of transparency in the sector in general, there is a risk there may be such ownership, but there is just no information available on the matter. The score has been selected to reflect this risk.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: No information was identified on the independent scrutiny or auditing of military-owned businesses.
There is no evidence suggesting that the defence sector has controlling or financial interests in commercial ventures. Given the lack of transparency in the sector in general, there is a risk there may be such ownership, but there is just no information available on the matter. The score has been selected to reflect this risk.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no publicly available information reporting the involvement of defence ministry employees in private enterprises, but given the tight control of the government over the media, this information would not be available in the public domain from this source.

Although there appear to be little oversight, law 082 P/A.F provides guidance and a framework for the involvement of members of the Comorian administration (including military personnel) into private ventures. The penalties and prison sentences are clearly defined in the law, but there is no concrete indication that the law is enforced.

It is noteworthy, although not specifically directed at the defence sector, that in September 2013 El Watan reported that Rijda - the political party of a French-Comorian lawyer - announced it had filed a court case against Comorian political leaders (not named) for embezzling public funds. This information is relayed in a number of local publications but the status of the court case is not clear which might explain why the outcomes are not yet available in the open source.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The assessor has not found any instances where the chief of staff in charge of Defence, the Chief of Staff of the AND (National Development Army - Armee Nationale de Developpement), the head of the Presidency military cabinet or the Captain of the Comorian Coast Guard made public commitments to anti-corruption and integrity measures. In 2012, the President Dhoinine's chief of staff in charge of Defence, gave an interview to a Comorian blog in which he refused to comment on the question of corruption.

However, there has been a push from the current administration to appear to tackle the issue of corruption which is widespread in the country and in its administration in particular.

President Ikililou Dhoinine, in his inaugural speech in 2011, expressed the government's intention to undertake a &quoute;zero tolerance&quoute; approach towards corruption. Consequently, he revoked &quoute;questionable contracts of the previous administration&quoute;, in particular that of the Moroni Port, as well as public contracts issued to foreigners without an open tender. He also created an anti-corruption watchdog, the National Commission for Prevention and fight against Corruption (CNPLC), which at the moment appears to be more of a lip service.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There are measures in place for military personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corrupt acts, as detailed in law 082 P/A.F. The law prohibits professional military officers from engaging in any commercial activities, accepting any form of payments and donations or embezzling funds, and details disciplinary and financial sanctions for such actions. For instance, these include 5 to 10 years in prison for embezzlement and of a fine of between 50,000 and 5 million Comorian Francs. In addition, to monitoring such actions, in 2011 the Comorian government put in place an anti-corruption watch-dog, the CNLPC. The CNLPC has been the subject of numerous criticisms over the past years for its inactivity, lack of qualification of its members, as well as its general inefficiency. Most recently, Le Mohelien published an article to this effect (see source 1).

In practice, accusations of corruption against senior defence officials are often politically motivated and are, in the vast majority of the cases, not followed by any legal actions. The current chief of staff in charge of Defence and former Ministry of Defence in a previous administration - was accused by members of the Comorian administration of having embezzled public funds given to the Comoros by Oman. The chief of staff however, (cited in reference 5) dismissed such allegations.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There does not appear to be any mechanisms in place for military personnel to facilitate the reporting of corrupt acts.

There is no evidence to suggest that whistle-blowing is encouraged by the government. There is no information either to suggest that whistle-blowers will be provided with sufficient protection should they report information. The assessor has not found any case of whistle-blowing in the defence sector or security institution, nor within the Comorian administration more broadly. There have been criticism of how corrupt the Comorian administration is in opposition blogs, local media and by local organisation however, but these do not seem to have been substantiated with hard evidences.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Military recruitment is governed by law 97- 006/AF but it does not address vetting, post retirement restrictions, time in post and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions such as procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management.

There have been some criticism in the local press about how members of the administration might not be selected based on their competencies but rather on their connections.This understanding is broadly targeted at the administration but does not suggest that some positions or department are more corrupt than others.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no clear information available regarding the number of civilian and military personnel. The government does not publish figures on civilian and military personnel. This however is not an indication of any illicit motives.

The International Business Publications gives a figure of 1,000 military personnel in 2013, although Jeune Afrique reported that military personnel amounted to 2,000. Figures for civilian personnel are not available.

The International Business Publications indicates that the &quoute;military resources of the Comoros consist of a small standing army and a 500-member police force, as well as a 500-member defence force. A defence treaty with France provides naval resources for protection of territorial waters, training of Comorian military personnel, and air surveillance. France maintains a small maritime base and a Foreign Legion contingent on Mayotte.&quoute; The IMF provides the following information: &quoute;600 military status gendarmes at the Union level, it is divided into three companies, one for each island, including ten judicial police brigades, four special brigades, and four squadrons, two of which are for the island of Grande Comores alone. Each of the special brigades has a specialized mission in a particular area: highway police, airport police, port police, and investigations police. On the island of Anjouan, there are about 180 gendarmes, and 120 of these are in the mobile squadron responsible for maintaining order, while the remaining 60 are divided into eight brigades, including the Judicial Police Officers for judicial investigations. On Mohéli, there are 80 gendarmes, divided between the judicial police and a mobile squadron.&quoute;

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: There is still no evidence of correct information readily provided by the government nor is there is a freedom of information law to facilitate this. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Military recruitment is governed by law 97- 006/AF, which does not address pay rates or allowances.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is a general lack of information regarding the Comorian administration’s payment processes. A Comorian legal blog suggests that in 2010 members of the Comorian administration received, in one go, a six months’ salary payment following EUR20 million of budgetary aid from Qatar.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Military advancement is governed by law 97- 006/AF which describes in detail the process for advancement for military personnel (chapter 3). The law does not provide objective job descriptions. The advancement becomes effective once it is published in the Comoros Official Journal. It is however very unlikely that the promotion process follows an independent, transparent, and objective process. There are speculations in the media of positions within government not being merely attributed on merit.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Military advancement is governed by law 97- 006/AF, which describes in detail the process for advancement for military personnel (chapter 3). The law refers to formal appraisal processes and promotions boards. The advancement becomes effective once published in the Comoros Official Journal. There does not appear to be an independent oversight and it is unlikely that the promotion process follows an independent, transparent, and objective process. For instance, the Indian Ocean Newsletter suggests that the AND Chief of Staff was appointed in October 2012 because of his long-standing relationship with President Dhoinine.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: According to the 2008 Child Soldiers Global Report, there is no conscription in the Comoros.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: As per the previous question, there is no conscription in the Comoros.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Although there is no direct evidence of ghost soldiers in the Comoros, it is likely that the phenomenon occurs. The government of the Comoros intended to tackle the fictitious government officials on its payroll in 2011 and 2012. In 2012, the government announced it was to carry out an exhaustive census of members of the administration. In addition, the state-owned newspaper El Watan indicated that the government had put a payment measures to control fictitious employees whereby employees had to collect their salaries in person.
There are no evidence that these measures have reduced fictitious personnel on the government payroll or that the census has yet been carried out. It is possible that these measures extended to the defence sector personnel but there are no evidences in the open source.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no information available in the public domain to address this question but the Indian Ocean Newsletter suggests that, in 2000, officers had been paid by the government to accept the Fomboni reconciliation agreement (which put an end to an institutional crisis on the islands and laid the ground for the current federal constitution of Comoros). Information available in this article suggests that there were informal chains of payments which were separated from the chains of command. More broadly however, it is not clear whether or not there is a separation between the chains of payment and the chains of command.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no evidence of a specific code of conduct for the military and civilian personnel in the Comoros. However law 082 P/A.F provides guidance as to military personnel conduct with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities. Aside from this, guidance detailed in this law covers, amongst other elements, corruption and influence peddling, embezzlement and financial or controlling interest in private companies. For each of those, the law clearly outlines prison time and amounts of the fines to be paid when breaching the law. For instance the law stipulates that any commercial activities, openly or covertly conducted by a member of the military, is reprehensible with a fine of between 100,000 and 500,000 francs. The military personnel will subsequently be stripped from this commercial activity.

The legislation does not provide information as to the authority which has oversight of such breaches for the military personnel.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Law 082 P/A.F provides guidance as to military personnel conduct with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities. The oversight of such behaviour is not clear and indications as to how these breaches are addressed are difficult to come by. In addition, there is no information relating to the outcome of prosecutions available.

By way of example, Bolero - President Dhoinine's current chief of staff in charge of Defence and Ministry of Defence in a previous administration - was accused by the Comorian administration of having embezzled public funds. According to media reports, these accusations were motivated by a statement Bolero made against the then administration. These accusations do not appear to have been followed up with and Bolero is currently a senior member of the administration attached to the cabinet of the Presidency.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no evidence that anti-corruption training takes place for military personnel. However the United States Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor indicates in a report that Comoros' police and security forces participated in training on civil-military relations, public health, and peacekeeping operations. This training included a section on the responsibilities of the police and security forces, which is likely to have included anti-corruption considerations. A training was also organised in May 2014 by the Cameroonian National Commission on Human Rights and Freedom and by the International Red Cross to the Comorian Gendarmerie. This training also included a section on the responsibilities of the Gendarmerie. Although details of the training are not fully available, aside for information relayed in source 3, it is possible that the training included anti-corruption considerations.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There are evidences of prosecutions of military personnel being reported and their outcomes being publicised, but such instances are limited. For instance, the former Chief of Staff of the AND and three senior military officials who were prosecuted in 2011 for the murder of Colonel Ayouba Combo were all found not guilty in 2012. Additionally in 2011, 15 members of the military, including the former Chief of Staff of the AND, were being prosecuted for acts of rebellion following an alleged coup against the regime at the time. There has been widespread speculation over the prosecution being inappropriately sanctioned.

Overall, there is a lack of transparency over such prosecutions and they often appear to be politically motivated (as an example consult source 5 which explains how the verdict of the trial for the assassination of Lieutenant Colonel Combo Ayuba was a &quoute;political gift to the CRC.&quoute; The CRC is an opposition party in the Comoros.) Highly politically connected senior officials in the military are in effect at little risk of being convicted.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The Penal Code (Law 082 P/A.F.) prohibits facilitation payments. These payments carry jail time of one to five years or more, but there are few concrete indications that this is effectively enforced.
There are no examples available in the open source of this statute being applied. It is very likely that facilitation payments take place in the Comoros but these instances are not prosecuted.
The provision of the law is detailed, and provides clear guidance as to associated jail time and fines

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no evidence of military doctrine addressing corruption issues. The Comorian Penal Code addresses briefly corruption and facilitation payments issues, but they are not detailed or specific to military operations and there are no concrete indications that this disposition is effectively enforced.
There is no evidence that armed forces factor in corruption in their operations or in any aspect of governance.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Sources have reported that some international actors working with the Comoros defence sector have provided capacity building measures to the army and police without more details. As such, there is no clarity as to whether commanders are trained on corruption issues.

In addition, the police and security forces participated in a training on civil-military relations, public health, and peacekeeping operations. In addition, members of the Gendarmerie (a body of soldiers serving as an armed police force for the maintenance of public order) received a training in May 2013 on Human Rights principles.

An Indian Ocean Newsletter article suggests in an article that in 2000, officers had been paid by the government to accept the Fomboni reconciliation agreement (which put an end to an institutional crisis on the islands and laid the ground for the current federal constitution of Comoros).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There are legal mechanism in place to prevent corruption in the public administration and in the military but nothing to suggest that the army, or the defence sector more widely, deploys trained personnel to monitor corruption in the field during operations.

Law 082 P/A.F provides guidance and a framework to members of the Comorian administration (including military personnel) into corrupt practices, involvement into private ventures, embezzlement,... The penalties and prison sentences are clearly defined in the law, but there is no concrete indication that the law is enforced.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no information available to suggest that there are guidelines and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.
Members of the Gendarmerie (a body of soldiers serving as an armed police force for the maintenance of public order) received a training in May 2013 regarding Human Rights principles. The training included a section on power and responsibilities of the members of the Gendarmerie.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: On 10 September 2014, the United Nation Human Rights Commissariat published a report on the use of mercenaries and private military companies in the Comoros. According to the report, there are no private military companies in the Comoros, but there are five private security companies (PSC) in the country. These PSCs offer services such as guarding and protection of official buildings such as Embassies, ministries or prisons. They do not appear to be employed by the armed forces. The report notes that, with the discovery of hydrocarbons in the Comoros, the number of PSCs could increase as exploration companies tend to use them for the protection of their assets.

There is no regulatory framework regarding private military companies or PSCs in the Comoros, but the UN report suggests that recently the government has been working on a draft bill. In addition, the UN group recommended to the government that any new PSC in the country should comply with the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, which suggests that PSCs are not required to adopt any code of conduct at present.

There is no evidence of corruption amongst the PMCs that are active in the Comoros in the open source. Score 2 has been selected on the basis that PMCs do not appear to be employed by defence institutions but they are not prohibited from this either.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: According to the PEFA report, the legislative and regulatory framework for public procurement considerably improved in the Comoros since 2009. The new public procurement Code was adopted by the Assembly on 29 December 2011 (Law 12-027/PR) and was elaborated with the PRCI (technical and financial assistance for the strengthening of institutional capacity project - projet de renforcement de capacités institutionnelles) to replace the 2005 Public procurement code (décret N°05 - 077 /PR 1 August 2005).

The Code provides guidelines on the tendering process, procurement's execution, implementation, control, regulation and sets a national procurement regulation agency. However, Article 11 of the law specifies that the disposition of the present law are not applicable to public work, supplies or services contracts when they are relevant to national defence or/and national security requiring secret, or for which publicity measures are not compatible with protection of the country's essential interests.

The Code does not provide any indications as to any other legal framework that would regulate public procurement in the defence sector, which suggests that there are no sets of rules regulating them. Aside from the aforementioned sensitive cases where publicity of tendering would compromise the State safety, it is safe to assume that the defence sector follows, to a certain extent, the rules provided in the Code.

The ARMP has officially oversight of public procurement. It is not clear however is this effectively takes place

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Most public procurement is made public through announcements on the CREF's website (website not available at the time of the research so it was not possible to verify this information) as well as on relevant ministries and organs (Ministry of Finance, Strengthening Institutional Capacity Project's website,...). The outcome of a public procurement tender is, according to the Public Procurement Code, supposed to be published on the public procurement bulletin (Bulletin Officiel des marchés publics). The Bulletin Officiel des Marches Publics is also not available online. There is very little transparency regarding the attribution of these public procurement contracts and there is no information publicly disclosed regarding public procurement in the defence sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no information of procurement oversight mechanism in the defence sector.

It is worth noting that most public procurement is made public through announcements on the CREF's website (website not available at the time of the research so it was not possible to verify this information) as well as on relevant ministries and organs (Ministry of Finance, Strengthening Institutional Capacity Project's website,...). The outcome of a public procurement tenders is, according to the Public Procurement Code, supposed to be published on the public procurement bulletin (Bulletin Officiel des marchés publics - this bulletin was not available online at the time of the research).

However, there is very little transparency regarding the attribution of these public procurement contracts and there is no information publicly disclosed regarding public procurement in the defence sector, or its oversight.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The government does not make its defence purchases public and has never commented in speeches or press releases on their policies over defence purchases. Additionally, there are no justification available for not releasing information on its defence purchases.

There are mentions in the media of military donations by other countries. For instance, in May 2014, El Watan reported that China had donated material to the Comoros' national security office worth 120 million Comorian Francs (USD 316,000).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The Public Procurement code specifies, for all general procurement contracts, that all public contracts obtained through corrupt means, or that have been undermined by an act of corruption, would be presented before the courts for cancellation. There are no dispositions for defence contracts in particular, but as per previous questions, aside from contracts where the publicity of these contracts would compromise the State safety, the rules provided in the Code do apply, and as such corruption acts in the tendering process are forbidden and punished.
There are no indications that companies are required to show their formal and publicly declared compliance programme or to sign a no-corruption clause.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There are elements in the open source which outline the government's defence strategy. For instance, El Watan reports that in January 2014 a technical commission in charge of preparing the national strategy of defence and security met at the military cabinet. During this preparatory meeting, the committee discussed possible changes in the law with regards to the national police and the army. The article also reports that the committee discussed at length questions of international security, amongst which the question of youth delinquency was the most discussed subject.
Despite evidences of a defence strategy, there is no evidence that procurement requirements derive from a well-audited national defence and security strategy. There might be such strategy but no evidence of it is available in the open source. In addition, there is no element in international reports and specialist databases that defence procurement is opportunistic in nature in the Comoros.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no information available to suggest that acquisitions in the defence sector are based on clearly identified and quantified requirements. Information regarding public procurement in the defence sector is very opaque and there is nothing available in the open source.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The public procurement law provides a detailed framework regarding the attribution of these contracts and their competitiveness. The existence of a legal framework does not guarantee competitiveness in the process and as an example recently, El Watan reported that a Swiss company, was awarded a contract to supply the Comorian Hydrocarbon National Company with oil products. However no tender had been published for the contract, which is a legal obligation as per Law N.12-027.

Article 53 of law N.12-027 stipulates that all procurement contracts of national defence and national security which are not confidential in nature, are to be submitted before the National Directorate of Public procurement. However, the law does not specify anything about open competition in the sector.
There is no information available about single sourcing in the defence sector in the Comoros

Regarding the defence sector, it is very hard to assess whether the contracts are awarded after a competitive process, or after being single-sourced, but it is very likely that there is little competitiveness in the award of these contracts. There is little transparency over the defence sector in the Comoros, with very limited information available. In addition, there is no information relating to public tendering for the defence sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: According to the PEFA report, the legislative and regulatory framework for public procurement has considerably improved in the Comoros since 2009. Law 12-027/PR required the creation of the autonomous body of regulation of public procurement (the Autorité de régulation des marchés publics - ARMP). Information regarding public contract are examined before the ARMP, but the audit process (if any) is not transparent. We note that in 2014, the African Development Bank (ADB) published a report as part of a programme on reforms of the energy sector and of financial governance. The ADB report states that transparency in public procurement in the Comoros has increased since 2011.

The ARMP is independant and active. The authority was implemented on 31 May 2012 and a March 2013 blogpost stated that at that time, only one case had been referred to the ARMP.

The country does conduct competitive tenders but there are no evidences of competitive tenders in the defence sector. Score 0 has been selected accordingly.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: Law N.12-027 on public procurement discourages collusion and there are provisions in the law for punishment of offending companies. The legal penalties are, amongst others, imprisonment for 5 to 10 years, a fine no lower than the amount of the procurement and no higher than twice the amount of the procurement and an exclusion from the list of public suppliers.

However, there is no evidence in practice that these dispositions are effectively enforced and there are no examples of prosecution or enforcement of these sanctions.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no information specific to procurement staff in the defence sector being trained, but there are evidences of training and awareness programmes for members of the administration in charge of public procurement (see source 2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The 2013 PEFA programme to Comoros notes that there is formally no independent administrative process in place for public procurement that allows companies to complain about malpractice in public procurement before the signature of a contract. However, the ARMP (which was created in May 2012) is in charge of monitoring the procurement process. One of the missions of the ARMP is to carry out - upon request by an interested party - an investigation on the transparency and regularities surrounding the public procurement (article 22 of the code of public procurement). There is, on the Ministry of Finance's website, a complaint submitted by a Comorian company named Entreprise Generale de Terrassement. The complaint, dated 12 November 2012 and addressed to the ARMP, states that winning company did not respect the code of public procurement for several reasons, including not respecting the publicity requirement as well as delays stated by law. It is not clear what the outcome of the complaint have been and there is no evidence of other complaints to the ARMP being published.
There is no evidence to suggest that companies would be either advantaged or disadvantaged by such complaint.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The Public Procurement code specifies, for all general procurement contracts, that all public contract obtain through corrupt means or that would have been undermined by an act of corruption could be presented before the court for cancellation. There are no dispositions for defence contracts in particular, but as per previous questions, aside for contracts where the publication of these contracts would compromise State safety, the rules provided in the Code apply, and as such corruption acts in the tendering process are forbidden and punished.

The sanctions applied for corrupt practices are as follows: 5 to 10 years in prison and a fine of ten times the value of the illicit profit. There is however no oversight and transparency over public procurement contracts in the context of the pervasive corruption in the Comoros.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There are no evidence or legal provisions in the public domain regarding the use of offset contracts in defence procurement in the Comoros. It is highly unlikely that the country engages in offset contracts given the small size of its defence budget.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no information available at all regarding offset contracts in the Comoros. It is highly unlikely that the country engages in offset contracts given the small size of its defence budget.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no information available at all regarding offset contracts in the Comoros. It is highly unlikely that the country engages in offset contracts given the small size of its defence budget.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The Comorian Code of Public Procurement states (article 180) that any relevant payments or benefits granted to any agent or intermediaries in the procurement process needs to be notified in writing to the contracting authority.

There are no evidences that the provisions for oversight and transparency are put in place and enforced.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: The tendering process in the defence sector is extremely opaque. It is very hard to assess any aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals as Article 53 of the Code of Procurement guarantees secrecy around such deals. In addition, there is very limited information available regarding the defence sector in general and procurement in the defence sector in particular.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is no requirement in the Code of Procurement, or any other evidence, that the government requires or encourages the main contractor of a defence procurement contract to ensure its subsidiaries of sub-contractors comply with anti-corruption requirement.

The Comorian Procurement Code however, requires a number of justifications on the part of contractors regarding their sub-contractors or co-contractors. For instance, bidders are required to justify the technical capacities, the financial health as well as the fulfillment of a number of legal requirements on the part of their sub-contractors. One of these obligations states that the no members of the Public Procurement department can be one of the sub-contractor's shareholders (art.75).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4423: There is a lot of opacity regarding the defence sector in general, and defence acquisitions in particular. It is however safe to assume that political motivations and interests are the driving force behind the country's military and defence acquisitions. Since the discoveries of oil deposits in 2007, and without any openly stated link between the two, countries such as Qatar (in 2010), China (in 2014), France (in 2010) or Libya (in 2012) have increased military donations and partnership with the archipelago.

The examples mentioned are either donations (China, Libya, Qatar) or agreements of cooperation and logistical or operational assistance (France). On one occasion - when China donated material worth 120 million comorian francs - the government justified the military need behind the donation by saying that it would be allocated to &quoute;the need for civil security.&quoute; In this instance, China's comment was - according to the newspaper - &quoute;this gesture is a sign of the existing friendship&quoute; between the two countries. Additionally, in the case of the Libyan donation, the donor or the government of the Comoros did not provide any justification.
There is no indication in the articles published around the donation that these acquisitions are not driven by political influence of the donor nations. However, it is unlikely that there is no political influence or expectations in return for the donations.