This country is placed in Band E

Afghanistan’s GI ranking in Band E places it in one of the highest risk categories for corruption in the defence and security sector. The highest risk area is Finance, which fell in Band F (critical risk of corruption).   Ineffective audit and prosecutorial authorities, a lack of civilian oversight over the defence and security sectors, and a challenging environment for civil society enable organised crime and the abuse of power by military and security personnel. At the same time, the current government has significantly stepped up oversight over procurement contracts and the development of anti-corruption training for select personnel. But serious risks remain; to reduce corruption risk and state fragility, reforms are urgently needed across the following areas:

Strengthen civilian control over the defence and security sector:

The Afghan government, together with international actors, is working to increase its cadre of external auditors, which has shown a nascent capability for auditing MOD funds, though implementation of audit findings has been weak to non-existent. However, a major issue facing auditors is that the majority of defence spending is still off-budget (i.e. external to central government allocation), and provided by the international community. Overall, the transparency and accountability of this off-budget international community funding, to the Afghan people, is less transparent than on-budget spending and because a large portion of aid is channelled through an off-budget system, the Afghan government, including auditors, the legislature and people have no control or oversight over these funds. At the same time, the Afghan government’s failure to provide parliament with detailed accounts of their defence on budget expenditure does not build confidence in donors that more on-budget spending will be wisely managed.

  • The MOD needs to demonstrate urgently that on-budget defence spending will be transparent and accountable to both national and international taxpayers. A detailed defence budget and acquisition plans should be available to the National Assembly, with as much information as possible made public.
  • The MOD should provide a public account of how they have addressed the findings of audits conducted by the Supreme Audit Organisation and make a clear commitment to acting upon all future audit findings. Defence and Finance Committees should be sufficiently resourced to review external audit results and a mechanism to allow dialogue between audited entities and the SAO should be created.  This might include in the short term increased support from international experts, training, or exchanges with equivalent institutions in other countries.
  • The Audit Law should be strengthened to ensure clear penalties for non-compliance.

With large spending by the executive on security and weak independent oversight capability, there is an urgent need for stronger more effective civil society oversight to ensure the defence sector is held to account.

  • The Afghan government should support an enabling environment by removing ambiguous and problematic terms from the new Access to Information Law. The MoD should take a proactive stance towards information disclosure, including establishing an effective Public Information Office to provide timely responses, especially to journalists.
  • The government should provide a clear political signal of support to civil society and their role in building a high integrity culture, including taking a strong stance against cases of intimidation, harassment and violence against journalists and CSOs.

Reduce military predation and build the integrity of the armed forces:

Commitments by the President to employ merit-based recruitment and the introduction of anti-corruption training are important first steps in addressing integrity challenges. However, a culture of impunity and a lack of merit-based appointments and promotions continue to weaken the ability of the ANDSF to respond effectively to insecurity.

  • The MoD should strengthen its internal audit capacity and investigative powers, including monitoring conduct violations, payroll and attendance (i.e. to tackle ghost soldiers), and field procurement.
  • Asset registration, verification, and publication, as required by Afghan law and UNCAC commitments, should be prioritised, especially for defence and security officials.
  • Stronger and more transparent responses to acts of corruption involving senior leadership and political figures are needed. The AGO should act and report on cases of defence corruption. A case tracking and public reporting system should be established. Assistance to the Major Crimes Task Force should be bolstered and its independence guaranteed.
  • Whistleblowing should be protected and encouraged, in law and in practice.
  • Progress on Train-the-Trainer courses at the National Defence University should be continued to ensure that integrity building and human rights are central to training and career progression.

The Role of the International Community

Addressing corruption in Afghanistan is essential to ensuring extremist groups do not increase their territorial reach or establish safe havens from which they can plan acts of global terrorism. In the last decade, the Taliban and now Daesh have repeatedly drawn attention to the Afghan government’s inability to control corruption and exploit this narrative in their recruitment. The country has some active political participation from among the youth, which needs to be effectively channeled.

At the same time, the President’s levels of public support are dropping significantly. Corruption, which reduces the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ANDSF, will be a major factor determining to what extent the ANDSF will be able to prevent the country from sliding back into full-scale conflict. To address desertion and defection of ANDSF to the Taliban, the government will need to show it is professionalising the ANDSF, tackling corruption, including at the political leadership level.

To reduce corruption risk and state fragility, we recommend that the international community address the following areas:

Incentivise Reform

There continues to be a lack of scrutiny over a large proportion of security spending by donor states. The US’s Special Inspectorate General for Afghanistan Reconstruction which provides oversight for US funding to Afghanistan has had a strong impact, but is by definition limited in scope. The effectiveness of SIGAR also raises questions about how this function will be sustained in the long term.  Any efforts to build the capability of Afghan security sector must be matched by strong efforts to build integrity and oversight capacity, with the aim of channelling as much as possible of expenditure through formal on budget processes.

In parallel to supporting capacity building efforts run by entities such as CTSC-A and RSM, donors could consider making greater use of conditionality of security and defence assistance to incentivise anti-corruption reforms within the relevant Ministries (notably the MoD and MoI but also the MoJ and AGO). This could include the following:

  • Explicitly tying specific programmes of assistance to the achievement of clear published benchmarks for defence reform and pushing the Afghan government harder on SMAF commitments and timelines - such as on the publication of assets senior officials within the MoD and MoI, or a published acquisition plan.
  • The drafting and publication of an agreed MOD anti-corruption action plan by the first half of 2016.
  • The involvement of the MEC, civil society and other oversight bodies to develop, report and review these benchmarks, accurately and objectively.

Provide political support and funding to oversight bodies like SIGAR and the MEC, as well as civil society, and government bodies that have performed well (such as the SAO) to build local capacity to monitor the defence sector. SIGAR to date has saved the US government over $2 billion through its audits and has assisted the Afghan government in uncovering incidents of large-scale corruption. The MEC reports regularly to the President, Parliament, and people of Afghanistan on corruption reforms.  These successes need to be embedded into domestic structures over time.

Ensure Accurate Reporting of Progress. Security assistance and training forces should focus on assisting the Afghan government to develop more realistic feedback systems and monitoring to ensure central government understands the capability of the ANSF on the ground - this is vital for preventing or anticipate operational failures such as in Kunduz.

Encourage the Development of Accountable Systems

The penetration of organised crime, a culture of impunity, and a lack of merit-based appointments and promotions are weakening responses to insecurity. There is an urgent need for the Afghan government and international actors to provide an environment that enables civil society oversight, so they can hold the defence sector to account.  

The international community should ensure every effort is directed at understanding the political environment into which security assistance is delivered. Due diligence should be conducted to ensure support is not directed towards malign actors who may thwart reform efforts.

Such an approach should complement ongoing work funded by development agencies and prioritise and reinforce existing law enforcement efforts. Continuing political and financial support for organisations such as the UK’s National Crime Agency and Serious Fraud Office, and the US Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation are necessary for creating political costs for those operating large scale corrupt networks - including the investigation, prosecution and sanction (e.g. through visa bans, freezing of assets, etc.) of corrupt officials who hold assets in financial centres such as London, New York and Dubai.

Continue support to integrity building training within defence and security institutions. Ensure sustainability in this approach and find a way to fill the gap that will be left by EUPOL’s training mission whose mandate will expire at the end of 2016.

Leadership 30
01.
score
1

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Researcher4693: Formal mechanisms to scrutinize defence policy exist, but they are rather unclear and chaotic. The parliament has the right to scrutinise government policy in general, though scrutiny of defence policy is not specifically mentioned in formal provisions. There is some evidence of it having influence over defence issues in the last year.

Defence Policy is shaped and developed by the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was established under the Presidential Ordinance and originally was not intended to have any executive powers but rather to act as a secretariat which supports the work of the National Security Advisor. The NSC consists of the President and representatives from several ministries but there is no constitutional basis for this body. Its aim is to advise the president on defence matters and draft National Security Policy (NSP) and National Security Strategy (NSS) (The Centre for International Governance Innovation: Strategic Support to..., 2012) However, there are other major stakeholders which also shape security policy such as the MoD and the National Directorate of Security (NDS). Other stakeholders involved in creation and oversight of defence policy are Loya Jirga and Parliament. Although the Loya Jirga does not have law-making or veto rights, significant security decisions (such as for example the Bilateral Security Agreement) have been put to the Loya Jirga for its approval. Its decisions are not binding and although the Loya Jirga might make recommendations, unless it is followed by presidential signature, it is not considered as valid. (NY Times: Elders Back Security..., 2013)

The Assessor could not locate a defence policy document through publicly available sources. However, a document by the Centre for International Governance Innovation from 2012 indicated the existence of a National Security Policy and National Security Strategy. The NATO Resolute Support Mission website has also posted a short summary of these documents albeit without any details. The Assessor presumes these documents exist in &quoute;working versions&quoute; though no such documents were available publicly through government sources. (NATO Resolute Support, 2015)

The Afghan constitution grants a wide range of competencies in regard to the law-making process to the parliamentary body, the National Assembly. According to Article 90 Ch. 5, Art. 10 of the Afghan Constitution, the National Assembly has the power to ratify, modify, or abrogate of laws and or legislative decrees. Furthermore, the Wolesi Jirga has special powers on deciding on the interpellation of each of the ministers (Article 91, Ch. 5, Art. 11) and approval of the national budget (Article 90, Ch. 5, Art. 10). According to Article 92 Ch. 5, Art. 12, if the responses offered by summoned officials given are not satisfactory, the Wolesi Jirga shall consider a vote of no confidence. The Wolesi Jirga has the right to break President’s veto and the bill will be considered endorsed and enforced. (Article 94, Ch. 5. Art. 1). There are several commissions (committees) which deal with defence and security issues in the parliament -- The defence Affairs and Territorial Integrity in the Wolesi Jirga and the Meshrano Jirga's Commission on Internal Security, defence and Local Organs (NDI, 2013). Based on Article 93 of the Afghan Constitution, the commissions of both WJ and Mesherano Jirga (MJ or House of Elders), &quoute;can question each of the Ministers about specific topics&quoute;. (The Constitution of Afghanistan, Art. 93, 2004). No information could be found indicating parliament's ability to review or approve major arms procurement.

Parliament's ability to influence defence issues was demonstrated in August 2012, when the Afghan Parliament voted “no-confidence” in the Ministers of Interior and defence, resulting in the resignation of the Minister of defence, and the eventual re-appointment of the Minister of the Interior to defence. The reappointment was subsequently approved by parliament. In the past, parliamentary votes of non-confidence have been ignored by the executive. (Asia-Plus, 2012; Rubin, 2012). Recently, the Parliament rejected a president’s nominee for Minister of Defence in the forming new government. (Turkish Weekly: Afghan government finally..., 2015). Despite failing to garner the required number of votes for approval President Ghani's nomination for defence minister Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai is serving as the acting defence minister as the post has not yet been filled at the time of writing. (Security Council Report, 2015)

There has been a fair amount of debate within parliament on defence issues such as appointments and security incidents. (Soadat, 2015; Ahmad, 2015)

However, how effectively the parliament leverages on its competencies is questionable because “the record shows that they (MPs) spend more of their time in political brinkmanship and follow the diktats of executive branch” than to represent people and pass laws. (Hedayat Sahel, Sayer Zaland: High hopes, high..., 2014). Furthermore, there have been cases when MPs have been offered payments to support the executive’s appointees as ministers. (Clark K.: The Cabinet and the Parliament..., 2015)

COMMENTS -+

1) Christian Dennys, Tom Hamilton-Baillie. &quoute;Strategic Support to Security Sector Reform
in Afghanistan, 2001–2010&quoute;. The Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2012. Available on [https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/ssr_issue_no6.pdf]

2) Rod Norland, &quoute;Elders Back Security Pact That Karzai Won’t Sign,&quoute; New York Times, November 24, 2013. Available on [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/afghan-council-approves-us-security-pact.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0]

3) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;The Constitution of Afghanistan,&quoute; January 3, 2004, accessed on April 6, 2015. Available on [http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html#chapterfive]

4) Hedayat Sahel, Sayer Zaland. &quoute;High hopes, high stakes for 2015 Afghan Parliamentary elections&quoute;, Afghan Zariza, November 15, 2014. Available on [http://www.afghanzariza.com/2014/11/16/high-hopes-high-stakes-for-2015-afghan-parliamentary-elections#sthash.rXy6wDnR.dpuf]

5) National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. &quoute;THE 2010-2015 WOLESI JIRGA DIRECTORY,&quoute; NDI, May, 2012. Available on [https://www.ndi.org/files/AFG-2010-2015-Wolesi-Jirga-Directory.pdf]

6) National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. &quoute;THE 2009-2014 MESHRANO JIRGA DIRECTORY,&quoute; NDI, March, 2013. Available on [https://www.ndi.org/files/Afghanistan-Meshrano-Jirga-Directory-2013.pdf]

7) Asia-Plus. &quoute;Afghan parliament approves candidates for the posts of power-wielding minister,&quoute; September 17, 2012. Available on [http://news.tj/en/news/afghan-parliament-approves-candidates-posts-power-wielding-ministers]

8) Consultative loya jirga. (n.d.). Consultative Loya Jirga. Accessed July 10, 2014, from http://jirga.gov.af/en

9) Rubin, A. J. . Afghan defence Minister Announces Resignation,&quoute; The New York Times, August 7, 2012, Available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/world/asia/afghan-defence-minister-announces-resignation.html]

10) &quoute;Afghan government finally presents new cabinet nominations,&quoute; Turkish Weekly, April 1, 2015. Available on [http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/182677/afghan-government-finally-presents-new-cabinet-nominations.html]

11) Clark K.&quoute;The Cabinet and the Parliament: Afghanistan’s government in trouble before it is formed&quoute;. Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 20, 2015. Available on [https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-cabinet-and-the-parliament-afghanistans-government-in-trouble-before-it-is-formed/]

12) NATO Resolute Support. &quoute;Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: National Security Documents,&quoute; last updated February, 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/20150204_national_strategy_final.pdf]

13) Security Council Report. &quoute;September 2015 Monthly Forecast: Afghanistan ,&quoute; August 31, 2015. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-09/afghanistan_14.php

14) Saleha Soadat. &quoute;MPs Pan Government Over Lack of defence Minister,&quoute; May 16, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19550--mps-pan-government-over-lack-of-defence-minister]

15) Khwaja Basir Ahmad. &quoute;WJ orders investigations into Jalrez incident,&quoute; Pajhwok Afghan News, July 4, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/07/04/wj-orders-investigations-jalrez-incident]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
1

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Researcher4693: There are several commissions (committees) which deal with defence and security issues in the parliament with some formal rights. However, there are considerable concerns over their effectiveness.

Both the upper and lower houses of the Afghan Parliament have a defence and security committee. The Wolesi Jirga's commission on defence Affairs and Territorial Integrity meets regularly and is active, as noted by their discussions which are publicly available, though only in summary form (“Lower House Commissions,” n.d.). The Meshrano Jirga also has a defence Commission, specifically Internal Security, defence and Local Organs (NDI, 2013), but no information on its activities could be found. A Commission on Internal Security, Border Control, National Security and Local Administration is also established in Wolesi Jirga (WJ or House of the People).(National Democratic Institute, 2012)

Each commission is allocated one administrative and one 'professional' staff member. (DCAF, 2010) At the beginning of each year, commissions elect leadership offices, including the position of chair, deputy chair and secretary. Commissions are assigned legislation according to their expertise by the respective administrative boards of each house. (National Assembly, 2008) Based on Article 93 of the Afghan Constitution, the commissions of both WJ and Mesherano Jirga (MJ or House of Elders), &quoute;can question each of the Ministers about specific topics&quoute;. (The Constitution of Afghanistan, Art. 93, 2004). Evidence suggests that the Commission on defensive affairs and territorial integrity discusses security related items in the draft national budget (Wolesi Jirga: Lower house commissions…) but it is unclear what their formal role is with regard to approval of the budget. According to Regulations governing the Meshrano Jirga, &quoute;commissions shall invite the social institutions including the National and International NGOs to their sessions for the purpose of hearing if it deems necessarily&quoute; (National Assembly, 2008). External representatives have been present at such meetings. For instance, in July 2015 a Kabul police chief and the chairman of the criminal investigation directorate of Kabul attended a session of the commission on national security and domestic affairs. (Commissions, 2015)

However, there is little additional public evidence that suggests defence committees in either chamber have been effective at influencing security or defence policy. According to Source 1, the members of the commissions are usually able to make effective decisions when dealing with specific security threats such as Taliban but their overall influence over security and defence policy is limited.

Moreover, Members of Parliament (MPs) have themselves faced accusations of corruption (see media sources) implying that the efficacy and integrity of parliamentary proceedings is questionable. Source 1 notes that only approximately 50 MPs could be considered to be clean from corruption, without ever having taken a bribe. (Interview with Source 1, 2015) The Afghanistan Analyst Network reports that during the recent nominations for cabinet (ministerial) posts, there were &quoute;allegations that money had changed hands to ‘persuade’ MPs to endorse candidates&quoute; (Clark, 2015). Other sources state that lawmakers often pass laws that benefit them directly and block the laws that might put their own private interests at a disadvantage. (Hedayat Sahel & Sayer Zaland. &quoute;High hopes, high..., 2014) Equally, corruption allegations have often been used as a means to marginalise political opponents (Katzman, 2015; Sahel & Zaland, 2014).This might significantly influence the ability of the commissions to provide an effective oversight of the defence and security sector.

Another body that is to some degree involved in exercising oversight over defence and security policy is the Loya Jirga. Although the Loya Jirga does not have law-making or veto rights, significant security decisions (such as for example Bilateral Security Agreement) have been put to it for its approval. Its decisions are not binding and although Loya Jirga might make recommendations, unless it is followed by presidential signature, it is not considered as valid. (NY Times: Elders Back Security..., 2013). A 2013 jirga was attended by parliamentarians and head of regional government, Muslim clerics, as well as representatives of the professions, members of parliament, merchants and nomads. (BBC, 2013)

The 2015 fuel contract scandal highlights the existence of an Oversight Committee for the Ministry of defence Agreements chaired by Hamidullah Farooqi. (Soadat, 2015) However, no further information could be found on this body to comment on its activity, resourcing, effectiveness or its role in legislative oversight.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agreed. There is a Defence Committee or similar institution with some (not minimal) formal rights. However, please note that this question inquires about the specific defence and security committees within parliament. It is not clear from your comments whether Annual Fiscal Accounting Reports are submitted to specific defence and security-related committees. This could not be verified through any publicly available sources. Whilst the Rules of Procedure for the Wolesi Jirga and the Meshrano Jirga outlines some rights, the Assessor could not locate any information within the Rules or elsewhere stipulating that committees can request audits. Given there are considerable concerns about the effectiveness of the Committee, score 1 has been selected.

COMMENTS -+

1) National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. &quoute;THE 2010-2015 WOLESI JIRGA DIRECTORY,&quoute; NDI, May, 2012. Available on [https://www.ndi.org/files/AFG-2010-2015-Wolesi-Jirga-Directory.pdf]

2) National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. &quoute;THE 2009-2014 MESHRANO JIRGA DIRECTORY,&quoute; NDI, March, 2013. Available on [https://www.ndi.org/files/Afghanistan-Meshrano-Jirga-Directory-2013.pdf]

3) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;The Constitution of Afghanistan&quoute;. Available on [http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html] Last modified on Jan 2004

4) Interview with Source 1, an anti-corruption policy advisor,18 Feb 2015

5) Commissions. (n.d.). Wolesi Jirga. Retrieved September 08, 2015. Available on [http://www.wolesi.com/pve/document.aspx?Cat=41]

6) Hedayat Sahel & Sayer Zaland. &quoute;High hopes, high stakes for 2015 Afghan Parliamentary elections&quoute;. Last modified on 16 Nov 2014. Available on [http://www.afghanzariza.com/2014/11/16/high-hopes-high-stakes-for-2015-afghan-parliamentary-elections#sthash.rXy6wDnR.dpuf]

7) New York Times. &quoute;Elders Back Security Pact That Karzai Won’t Sign&quoute;. Last modified on 24 Nov 2013. Available on [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/afghan-council-approves-us-security-pact.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0]

8) Wolesi Jirga. &quoute;Lower house commissions debated various issues&quoute;. 2014, accessed on 8 Apr 2015. Available on [http://www.wolesi.com/pve/showdoc.aspx?Id=2310]

9) Kenneth Katzman. &quoute;Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,&quoute; Congressional Research Service, January 12, 2015. Available from [https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf]

10) &quoute;5 Wolesi Jirga Members Put on ECL,&quoute; The Afghanistan Express Daily Newspaper, June 05, 2013, accessed April 30, 2015. Available from [http://theafghanistanexpress.com/5-wolesi-jirga-members-put-on-ecl/]

11) &quoute;Wolesi Jirga Speaker Accused of Corruption, Misuse of Authority,&quoute; Ariana News, November 01, 2014, accessed April 30, 2015. Available from [http://ariananews.af/latest-news/wolesi-jirga-speaker-accused-of-corruption-misuse-of-authority/]

12) Kate Clark. &quoute;Afghanistan (almost) has a cabinet: MPs confirm all candidate ministers,&quoute; Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 18, 2015, accessed April 30, 2015. Available from [https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistan-almost-has-a-cabinet-mps-confirm-all-candidate-ministers/]

13) DCAF. &quoute;Afghanistan Security Sector Governance Challenges.&quoute; December 2010. Available on [www.dcaf.ch/content/download/.../file/DCAF_RPS_Afghanistan.pdf]

14) National Assembly of Afghanistan. &quoute;Rules of Procedure of Meshrano Jerga,&quoute; February 2008. Available on [http://www.parliament.am/library/kanonakarger/afganistan.pdf]

15) National Assembly of Afghanistan. &quoute;Rules of Procedure of the Wolesi Jirga,&quoute; January 2006. Available on [https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/02098456680720b2c1257129003091cd/$FILE/Wolesi%20Jirga%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%202006.pdf]

16) Saleha Soadat. &quoute;$100 Million USD MoD Fuel Contract Scandal Revealed,&quoute; Tolo News, April 9, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18985-100-million-usd-mod-fuel-contract-scandal-revealed]

17) BBC. &quoute;Afghanistan's Loya Jirga: Q&A,&quoute; November 24, 2015. Available on [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25024163]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Annual Fiscal Accounting Reports are submitted to the Ministry of Finance and submitted to Parliament. Parliament can also request further documentation and also conduct audits when it comes across any discrepancies identified in the reports. These authorities are stipulated in the internal by-laws of the parliamentary committees.

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
1

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

Researcher4693: After consulting a range of sources, the Assessor found no evidence to indicate that a defence policy exists though there is some debate on defence policy issues in general.

The NATO RSM website and lists a number of national security documents and The Centre for International Governance Innovation references these documents but provides information in very abbreviated form. These documents also do not appear to be available on any Afghan government website. (RS:GIRoA: National Security..., 2015; The Center for..., 2012) It is also not clear to what extent the referenced strategies have actually been developed or what the policies cover in terms of content. Documents at the NATO RSM website suggest that The National Threat Assessment influences the National Security Policy (NSP) and National Security Strategy (NSS).

The National Police Strategy (2010) and National Defence Plan exist but they are classified and not publicly available. Both documents were reportedly drafted largely by international advisers (USIP, 2014). Whilst the Policing Strategy was not available online, the MoI's &quoute;Ten Year Vision for the Afghan Police&quoute; (2012) was available -- the latter may require the former strategy and plan to be updated. It is unclear to what extent these documents are connected to the aforementioned Threat Assessment, National Security Policy or the National Security Strategy.

In terms of debate of policy in the executive branch, the National Security Council, which consists of the President and representatives from several ministries advises the president on defence matters and draft the aforementioned National Security Policy and National Security Strategy, according to a 2012 report from The Centre for International Governance Innovation. However, there are other major stakeholders which also shape security policy such as the MoD and the National Directorate of Security (NDS).

US DoD sources note that work continued with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop a regional policy directive, which was due to be published in May 2014. However, there is no evidence of this in operation or any outputs. The US DoD report also notes that the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MoD Strategy and Policy departments had been reluctant to advocate a particular strategic direction until the new government is in place after the elections of 2014 (&quoute;Progress Towards..., 2014). However, as of the time of writing no further information was available on such a regional policy directive. Considering that another candidate for the Minister of Defence post was recently rejected by the parliament, (Sadat, 2015) the aforementioned policy directives will likely not be worked on or published for a while.

The Commission on defence Affairs and Territorial Integrity from the Wolesi Jirga regularly discusses defence issues and frequently summons the defence Minister for questioning. The Commission also makes summaries of their activities public (“Commissions,” n.d.). As mentioned earlier, however, the legislature's ability to debate policy and influence has been limited, according to one source: “the record shows that they (MPs) spend more of their time in political brinkmanship and follow the diktats of executive branch” than to represent people and pass laws. (Hedayat Sahel, Sayer Zaland: High hopes, high..., 2014). Moreover, Parliament's ability to influence defence issues has not been consistent, as can be seen in, for instance, in “no-confidence” votes which have alternated between being effectively implemented and disregarded by the executive. (Asia-Plus, 2012; Rubin, 2012; Turkish Weekly, 2015).

Major security issues have been publicly debated through the ad hoc Loya Jirgas, the process and results of which were widely discussed in the public and Afghan media (Ghanizada, 2013a; Ramin, 21 Nov 13). This is different however, from there being a meaningful public consultation process, which does not appear to exist. It is possible that the new Access to Information Law will mean policies, including those related to defence and security, will become available to the public and open to debate . However, implementation of the law will be a significant challenge, according to independent organisations (Danish Institute, 2014).

The score has been selected on the basis that while there appears to be no defence and security policy, there evidence of debate on major security issues (considered here as aspects of policy) through Loya Jirgas (which leads to wider discussion in the public) and (limited) debate in the legislature.

COMMENTS -+

1) NATO Resolute Support. &quoute;GIRoA: National Security documents&quoute; Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/20150204_national_strategy_final.pdf] Last modified on 4 Feb 2015

2) Interview: Source 1, an anti - corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015.

3) Commissions. (n.d.). Wolesi Jirga. Last modified April 29, 2015, accessed,April 30, 2015. Available on [http://www.wolesi.com/pve/document.aspx?Cat=41]

4) Ghanizada. (2013, November 24). Loya Jirga committees want security deal signed by end of 2013. Khaama Press. Retrieved July 10, 2014, from http://www.khaama.com/loya-jirga-committees-want-security-deal-signed-by-end-of-2013-2564

5) Ramin, A. (21 Nov 13). Afghan Citizens Reaction to Advisory Jirga. Tolo News. Retrieved July 10, 2014, from http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/12817-afghan-citizens-reaction-to-advisory-jirga

6) Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, National Security Documents. Last modified on 4 Feb 2015, accessed on August 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/20150204_national_strategy_final.pdf]

7) Danish Institute for Human Rights. &quoute;New Afghan law grants access to information&quoute; from http://www.humanrights.dk/news/new-afghan-law-grants-access-information, Last modified on 03 December 2014. Accessed 23 April 2015.

8) Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA). (2014, July 1). Approval of Access to Information Law is the biggest achievement towards transparency and accountability in Afghanistan. Integrity Watch Afghanistan. Retrieved July 10, 2014, from http://www.iwaweb.org/_news/news0010_approval_ati_law.html

9) Hedayat Sahel, Sayer Zaland. &quoute;High hopes, high stakes for 2015 Afghan Parliamentary elections&quoute;, Afghan Zariza. Available on [http://www.afghanzariza.com/2014/11/16/high-hopes-high-stakes-for-2015-afghan-parliamentary-elections#sthash.rXy6wDnR.dpuf] Last modified on 16 Nov 2014

10) Asia-Plus. (2012, September 17). Afghan parliament approves candidates for the posts of power-wielding minister. ASIA-Plus. Retrieved from http://news.tj/en/news/afghan-parliament-approves-candidates-posts-power-wielding-ministers

11) Rubin, A. J. (2012, August 7). Afghan defence Minister Announces Resignation. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/world/asia/afghan-defence-minister-announces-resignation.html

12) Turkish Weekly. &quoute;Afghan government finally presents new cabinet nominations&quoute;. Available on [http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/182677/afghan-government-finally-presents-new-cabinet-nominations.html] Last modified on 1 Apr 2015

13) Christian Dennys, Tom Hamilton-Baillie. &quoute;Strategic Support to Security Sector Reform
in Afghanistan, 2001–2010&quoute;. The Centre for International Governance Innovation. Available on [https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/ssr_issue_no6.pdf] Last modified on Jan 2012

14) &quoute;Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan,&quoute; Department of defence report to US Congress, October 2014. Available from [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf]

15) Ministry of Interior Affairs. &quoute;Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police: 1392-1402,&quoute; 2012, accessed April 30, 2014. Available on [https://ipcb.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/13-04-02-ten-year-vision-english-final-version.pdf]

16) Michelle Hughes. &quoute;The Afghan National Police in 2015 and Beyond,&quoute; May 2014, accessed April 30, 2014. Available on [http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR346_The_Afghan_National_Police_in_2015_and_Beyond.pdf]

17) Saleha Sadat. &quoute;Parliament Rejects Stanekzai as defence Minister,&quoute; Tolo News, July 4, 2015. [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20306-parliament-rejects-stanekzai-as-defence-minister]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
2

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

Researcher4693: There is very little evidence indicating that defence and security institutions have a general policy of openness towards (or working actively with) civil society organizations (CSOs). However, there are intermittent reports of engagement with civil society and the wider government is making attempts in some places to involve CSOs in anti-corruption activities.

The UK-based Transparency International Defence and Security Programme (TI-DSP) has been engaged in Afghanistan since 2009 (TI-DSP, 2015). The TI-DSP team has worked with the ANSF, with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and with Afghan civil society by training military and police officers to recognise the symptoms of corruption and how to tackle them, reviewing the effects of corruption in-country, and coordinating the activities of different groups. The MoD states that its Public Affairs Directorate is in touch with the media and takes part in civil society forums and seminars representing the MOD. However, whilst news stories indicate that the MoD disburses some degree of information regarding security incidents, no recent publicly available evidence could be found to indicate that the MoD takes part in Afghan civil society fora and seminars or that it has itself hosted such events. There is no further public evidence from recent years attesting to consistent or extensive engagement with Afghan civil society on the part of the ANSF or the MOD/MOI.

Local news reporting states that the Ministry of Interior has responded to civil society activity. For instance, in 2013, the MOI whilst denying illegal activity in mining had taken place, agreed to review the report that made these claims and that it would “take serious actions against those who are involved behind the illegal activities.” (Ghanizada, 2013) In 2015, CSO Integrity Watch Afghanistan, in close cooperation with EUPOL Afghanistan, organised a National Anti-Corruption Strategy Workshop which was attended by national and international bodies including the MoI and the Attorney General’s Office. (EUPOL, 2015) The Minister of Interior also reportedly chairs National Consultative Councils (NCCs) which convene civil society leaders to discuss policing matters with Ministry officials to inform MoI policy and improve police service delivery. (MoI, 2015) No recent publicly available sources, other than government reports, could be found to comment on these NCCs.

Examples of openness towards civil society involvement by the government at-large were visible in 2013 when the Asian Development Bank held a series of anti-corruption seminars targeted at cross-ministry staff and which were in part delivered by CSOs (“ADB,” 2013); The Afghan Justice Organization held an anti-corruption seminar attended by an official from the HOOAC (“International Anti-Corruption,” 2013). The HOOAC has a position for a Civil Society and Public Outreach Adviser listed, indicating some openness. However, this job posting dates back to 2011 and no more recent evidence could be found suggesting HOOAC engagement with CSOs (“Civil Society,” 2011). Further, the government has passed an Access to Information Law, which Integrity Watch Afghanistan calls &quoute;the biggest achievement towards transparency and accountability in Afghanistan&quoute; (IWA, 2014). President Ghani has also demonstrated his willingness to open his administration toward CSOs when he met with the heads and representatives of leading corruption watchdog organizations. (President Ghani Meets..., 2015)

According to Source 1, the government has been mostly ineffective in involving civil society on issues of corruption, stating that the HOOAC often gives lip service to CSO engagement but in fact they do not work with them at all (Interview: Source 1, 2015). Restrictions from government, such as cumbersome and costly CSO registration process, lack of funding or bribe soliciting by public officials to approve programs, represent major obstacles for civil society. (Mirahmadi H., Ziad W., Farooq M.: Afghanistan 2014 and Beyond..., 2014, p.44) “In October 2013, the MEC made a request for access to the Case Management System in an effort to enhance its monitoring of corruption cases, but the request was rejected by the Case Management System Steering Committee, which is comprised of officials from the AGO, HOOAC, MOI, MOJ, MOD, NDS, Supreme Court and AIBA.”(MEC, 2014) This incident is perhaps particularly troubling because the MEC, though independent, is a government committee.

The Chr. Michelsen Insititute notes that Afghan civil society also includes organisations that are perhaps not traditionally perceived as CSOs and can include community focused groups such as shuras/jirgas. Also included in CMI's understanding of Afghan civil society are Community Development Councils, which each village had to elect under the National Solidarity Programme. Although some of these CDCs were a governance structure (at the lowest level) in some cases these CDCs were an extension of the traditional village council, with more of a civil society function than a government body function. The extent of the government's engagement overall (outside of defence) with civil society at the local level is therefore not entirely absent. At the same time, independent sources state that there is still an &quoute;urgent need for the Afghan Unity Government and international actors to provide a better enabling and supportive environment for civil society action&quoute; (BAAG, 2012).

DSP Note: The MoD has engaged with TI-DSP regarding this assessment. TI-DSP can also confirm that in 2009 it held a joint MoD/MoI Leader's Day on Anti-Corruption which included 30+ people. However, since it took place more than 3 years ago it cannot be considered to be applicable here. TI-DSP also has visited Kabul numerous times in the past years and has held meetings with the MOD and the MOI. TI-DSP has also contributed to a Building Integrity (anti-corruption) course which was delivered to Afghan military leadership twice in 2014. At the time of writing, another such course had been scheduled to take place in late September 2015. TI-DSP has also had two Afghan officers on secondment to its offices in 2015. During this secondment the officers developed course material that was subsequently delivered at the National Defence University in Kabul in August 2015.


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: While the stated comments are relevant, no publicly available information could be found indicating that CSOs are legally protected. Engagement with CSOs has also been limited and the lack of publicly available evidence on the subject suggests that there is not an overall openness to working with Afghan CSOs within defence institutions. Your comment regarding the one-day conference have been incorporated; however, since this took place in 2009 it cannot be taken into account for this assessment which looks predominantly at the period between 2013-2015. Since NATO is not considered to be a civil society organisation, any engagement with them is not relevant to this question. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview: Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015

2)Asian Development Bank. &quoute;ADB’s Office of Anticorruption and Integrity Leads Anticorruption Seminars in Afghanistan&quoute;, 2013, accessed on July 10, 2015, Available on [http://www.adb.org/site/integrity/news/articles-case-studies/adb-leads-anticorruption-seminars-afghanistan]

2) Civil Society and Public Outreach Adviser. (2011, July 19). High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption. Retrieved July 10, 2014, from http://anti-corruption.gov.af/en/jobs/2290

3) Afghanistan Justice Organization. &quoute;International Anti-Corruption Day Dec&quoute;. 2013, accessed on Juny 10, 2015. Available on [http://afghanjustice.org/article/articledetail/international-anti-corruption-day-dec-2013]

4) Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA). &quoute;Approval of Access to Information Law is the biggest achievement towards transparency and accountability in Afghanistan&quoute; Integrity Watch Afghanistan. July 1, 2014, accessed on June 10, 2015. Available on [http://www.iwaweb.org/_news/news0010_approval_ati_law.html]

5) Mirahmadi H., Ziad W., Farooq M. &quoute;Afghanistan 2014 and Beyond: The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding and Countering Violent Extremism&quoute;, World Organization for Resource Development and Education, February 2014. Available on [http://www.worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WORDE-Afghanistan-2014-and-Beyond-The-Role-of-Civil-Society-in-Peacebuilding-and-CVE.pdf] , p.44

6) MEC. (2014). Fifth Six-Month Report. INDEPENDENT JOINT ANTI-CORRUPTION MONITORING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE. Avalable on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

7) TI-DSP. &quoute;Corruption: Lessons from the International Mission in Afghanistan,&quoute; Transparency International UK Defence & Security Programme, February, 2015, accessed May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/326-corruption-lessons-from-afghanistan.html]

8) British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group. &quoute;Support to Afghan Civil Society in the Decade of Transformation,&quoute; November 2014, accessed April 30, 2015. Available on [http://www.baag.org.uk/sites/www.baag.org.uk/files/resources/attachments/Support%20to%20Afghan%20Civil%20Society%20in%20Decade%20of%20Transformation.pdf]

9) Arne Strand. &quoute;Afghan civil society: Tradition facing the future,&quoute; Chr. Michelsen Institute, March 2015, accessed April 30, 2015. Available on [http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5420-afghan-civil-society-tradition-facing-the-future.pdf]

10) Office of the President. &quoute;President Ghani Meets Representatives of Corruption Watchdogs&quoute;, 16 June 2015. Available on [http://president.gov.af/en/news/president-ghani-meets-representatives-of-corruption-watchdogs]

11) Ghanizada. &quoute;MOI deny illegal extraction of Chromite by Afghan local police,&quoute; Khaama Press, November 11, 2013. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/moi-deny-illegal-extraction-of-chromite-by-afghan-local-police-3066]

12) EUPOL. &quoute;National Anti-Corruption Strategy Workshop,&quoute; May, 2015. Available on [http://www.eupol-afg.eu/taxonomy/term/70]

13) MoI. &quoute;MoI Consultative Councils,&quoute; July 22, 2015. Available on [http://moi.gov.af/en/page/3177/pcc]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In the review of anti-corruption policy in the year 1394 solar year, the MoD was noted to have had communication with civil society regarding the implementation of anti-corruption policy.There have also been consultations with Transparency International and NATO related to questionnaires on integrity’. The MOD has also conducted a one day conference on anti-corruption which included the participation of senior leadership from the MOD and 30 individuals from civil society.

The civil society representatives expressed such as initiative had been the most important event to date in terms of countering corruption.

The MOD has conducted many seminars where civil society organizations have been invited to participate and share their concerns. The MOD through its Public Affairs Directorate is in constant touch with the media and takes part in civil society forums and seminars representing the MOD.

The CSOs are included in the Loya Jirga as could be seen in many of the Loya Jirgas organized over the years on many national issues such as the Emergency Loya Jirga on the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement in 2014.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
2

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Researcher4693: Afghanistan has signed up to many relevant instruments but there has been no evidence of compliance.

Afghanistan signed the UNCAC on 20 Feb 2004 and ratified it on 25 Aug 2008 (UNODC, 2014).
UNCAC sources indicate that Afghanistan has been paired up with other countries to take part in the implementation review mechanism. A self-assessment checklist completed in 2013 is available on the UNCAC website though this was not found to be hosted on the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC) website. Although Afghanistan is in Year 3 of the UNCAC Implementation Review, it is unclear to what extent reviewing states have been able to assess compliance. Once this is complete there should a report detailing recommendations -- however, UNODC states that the report may remain confidential and is up to the state party to publish it or available to other state parties, based on their requests.

UNCAC articles 6 and 36 require the establishment of a body specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement and devoted to prevention. The HOOAC states on its website that one of the key responsibilities of its Oversight department includes ensuring compliance with UNCAC. As such this department is the main focal point to UNCAC and its representative agency in Afghanistan. In this regard, &quoute;it is responsible to regularly receive, review and disseminate UNCAC related updates, guidelines, information, and reports. It also periodically conducts reviews of the progress made in combating corruption and prepare reports such as the annual self-assessment check-list as required by UNCAC&quoute;.

However, the HOOAC does not appear to publish these self-assessments online and it is therefore not considered to be publicly accessible. However, though the HOOAC is the governmental body officially tasked with corruption prevention, some reports say it is largely ineffective as it &quoute;has no trained prosecutors and can only refer cases to the government; without the full backing of the politicians, it is effectively toothless.&quoute; (NATO JALLC: Counter and Anti-Corruption…, 2013). Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an Afghan NGO, states that the neither in law nor in practice does the HOOAC have the “necessary independence” and “necessary resources and specialized staff” required to fulfil its international obligations. (IWA, 2015)

In January 2014, the MEC criticized the HOOAC’s assessment of compliance with UNCAC as misleading and inaccurate, stating that the self-assessment failed to show that the HOOAC engaged in broad consultations, as required by the UNCAC. A MEC press release in February 2015 states that &quoute;In its current form, the self-assessment provides scant insight into the efficacy of Afghanistan’s anti-corruption regime. HOO’s superficial, incomplete, and often misleading report represents a missed opportunity for the Afghan government to evaluate its legal and institutional anti-corruption framework.&quoute; (MEC, 2015)

The Self-Assessment checklist seems to indicate some level of compliance as it states various legislative measures have been undertaken by the Afghan government. However, Source 1 also stated that the current legal framework is very limited and a clear anti-corruption strategy is practically non-existent as the current anti-corruption strategy is rather a list of problems in Afghanistan than a meaningful policy with key priorities and does not meet international standards. The lack of a robust legal framework causes inability to assign law enforcement duties or corruption prevention duties to any agency. (Interview with Source 1)

According to the MEC, &quoute;the assessment unrealistically asserts that Afghanistan is in compliance with UNCAC with respect to each and every provision of the Convention that is addressed in the assessment&quoute;. Source 1 also stated that Afghanistan does not fully comply with all parts of UNCAC. (Interview: Source 1, 2015) Asset registration for high officials, for instance, which should be conducted by the HOOAC (also required by the Afghan Constitution), for instance, is not routinely enforced and up-to-date information on high officials' assets are not available for the public. (IWA: Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan..., 2014). The latest asset declarations on the HOOAC website are from 2012.

Equally, the MEC state that there are places where the assessment fails to mention key substantial steps toward implementation that have already been taken, that are in process, or that are planned for, such as amendment of current Penal Code (MEC, 2014, p. 18).

Other relevant regional international anti-corruption instruments which Afghanistan has signed up to include the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime which was ratified on 24 September 2003 (“United Nations Convention,” 2014) as well as ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative’s Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific which Afghanistan formally endorsed in May 2013 (Ludin, 2013). The Assessor was unable to comment on evidence of compliance with the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as well as ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative’s Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific.

Afghanistan has not signed up to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD, 2014) as it is not a member.
Score 2 has been selected as there are no independent sources confirming compliance with the UNCAC to warrant award of score 3.

COMMENTS -+

1) Integrity Watch Afghanistan. &quoute;Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A Focus on Asset Registration and Access to Information,&quoute; May 2014. Available on [http://iwaweb.org/wp-content/uploads/iw_docs/policy_briefs/policy_brief_asset_registration_and_acees_to_information.pdf]

2) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption advisor, 18 Feb 2015.

3) UNODC. Signatories to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2014, accessed May 01, 2015, Available on [https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html]

4) MEC. &quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report,&quoute; Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, January 30, 2014, accessed May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

5) UN Treaty Collection. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, November 2000. Accessed May 01, 2015. Available on [http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&lang=en]

6) Ludin, J. &quoute;Endorsement of the Action Plan&quoute;. May 1, 2013, accessed May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/theinitiativesmembercountriesandeconomies.htm]

7) OECD.&quoute;OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014,&quoute; accessed May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus_May2014.pdf]

8) HOOAC. Oversight and Case Tracking Department. No date, accessed April 30, 2015. Available on [http://anti-corruption.gov.af/en/page/1745]

9) UNODC. &quoute;UNCAC Afghanistan Self-assessment Checklist&quoute;, March 18, 2013, accessed 01 May, 2015. Available on [http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/SA-Report/2013_11_28_Afghanistan_SACL.pdf]

10) UNODC.&quoute;Afghanistan&quoute;, no date, accessed May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CAC/country-profile/profiles/AFG.html]

11) HOOAC. &quoute;Asset Declaration&quoute;. December 22, 2012, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://anti-corruption.gov.af/en/page/test/7663]

12) MEC. &quoute;MEC Announces New Recommendations Aimed at Improving the Afghan Government’s UNCAC Self-Assessment ,&quoute; February, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/2015_02_15_UNCAC_Recommendations_Press_Release_(English).pdf]

13) Integrity Watch Afghanistan. &quoute;Taking on Corruption: Institutional Arrangement to Fight Corruption in Afghanistan,&quoute;  August 31, 2015. Available on [http://www.acbar.org/files/downloads/Policy%20Brief%20-%20Taking%20.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
1

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

Researcher4693: Consultation with the public on defence issues is infrequent. However there is free, and active debate on issues of defence within the media and public, as can be seen through newspaper editorial topics (Outlook Afghanistan, 2015; Wahidi, 2014; Pajhwok Afghan News, 2015), though the government participates infrequently in these discussions. As discussed in Question #3 major security issues have been publicly debated through the ad-hoc Loya Jirgas, the process and results of which were widely discussed in the public and Afghan media (Ghanizada, 2013a; Ramin, 2013).

A 2015 Washington Post article indicates that the Ministers for Defence and Interior reportedly held a news conference at the Afghan Government Media and Information Center in Kabul indicates that steps are being taken to provide more information. (Raghavan, 2015) The government reviewer for this assessment has also stated that the MoD Public Affairs Directorate is in touch with the media and takes part in civil society forums and seminars representing the MOD. However, whilst news stories indicate that the MoD disburses some degree of information regarding security incidents, no recent publicly available evidence could be found to support this claim that the MoD takes part in Afghan civil society fora and seminars or that it has itself hosted such events.

On the MOD's website, the information provided is focuses mainly on ANA's successful operations, a number of the &quoute;news bulletins&quoute; which simply replicate information on security incidents covered by mainstream media sources (MOD: News Bulletin, 2015). Source 1 also stated that the public affairs offices use media as a tool to promote their policy among Afghans. (Interview: Source 1, 2015) There are also no statements addressing public debate or critical comments directed at the MOD (MOD: Press releases, 2015).

At the same time, however, Freedom House's 2015 report states that while Afghan media continues to diversify, media workers continue to face major challenges, including physical attacks and intimidation&quoute;. Despite a 2007 media law intended to clarify press freedoms and limit government interference, &quoute;a growing number of journalists have been arrested, threatened, or harassed by politicians, security services, and others in positions of power.&quoute; (Freedom House, 2015) In addition to threats from the Taliban, the Afghan Journalists Safety Committee, a local media support and advocacy group, states that police (and also military and other government personnel) often target reporters for negative coverage, threatening prosecution or imprisonment. A spokesman for the MoI reportedly acknowledged that there are problems with the police and their treatment of journalists. (Raghavan, 2015) Journalists are also reportedly self-censoring out of security fears and that reporting on issues of corruption is particularly dangerous for journalists.

In 2013 the Asian Development Bank held a series of anti-corruption seminars targeted at ministry staff and which were in part delivered by CSOs (“ADB,” 2013) and the Afghan Justice Organization held an anti-corruption seminar attended by an official from the HOOAC (“International Anti-Corruption,” 2013) though there is no evidence that these types of events are regular or encouraged by the government.


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Whilst the debate on defence issues is vivid among civil society and academic sphere and within the international community, the question asks about the government's involvement in these debates. The assessor could not locate publicly-available evidence indicating the government engages in debate on defence issues with the public or think tanks.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015.

2) Ghanizada. &quoute;Loya Jirga committees want security deal signed by end of 2013,&quoute; Khaama Press, November 24, 2013, accessed May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/loya-jirga-committees-want-security-deal-signed-by-end-of-2013-2564]

3) Ahmad Ramin. &quoute;Afghan Citizens Reaction to Advisory Jirga,&quoute; Tolo News, November 21, 2013, accessed May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/12817-afghan-citizens-reaction-to-advisory-jirga]

4) MOD. &quoute;Press releases&quoute;. Accessed on 6 Apr 2015. Available on [http://mod.gov.af/en]

5) Interview: Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015.

6) ADB. &quoute;ADB’s Office of Anticorruption and Integrity Leads Anticorruption Seminars in Afghanistan,&quoute; Asian Development Bank, May 03, 2013, accessed May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.adb.org/site/integrity/activities]

7) &quoute;International Anti-Corruption Day Dec&quoute;. 2013. (2013). Afghanistan Justice Organization. Retrieved July 10, 2014, from http://afghanjustice.org/article/articledetail/international-anti-corruption-day-dec-2013

8) &quoute;Security must be prioritized,&quoute; Outlook Afghanistan, April 18, 2015, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=12002]

9) &quoute;Jalalabad Mass Massacre Uncovers Government Preparedness,&quoute; Outlook Afghanistan, April 19, 2015, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=12007]

10) &quoute;Public Support for Security Forces!&quoute; Outlook Afghanistan, January 19, 2015, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=11523]

11) Maisam Wahidi. &quoute;Can Afghanistan be the next Iraq?&quoute; Tolo News, June 28, 2014, accessed on May 01, 2015. Avaiable on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/blogs-a-opinion?start=14]

12) Pajhwok Afghan News. Accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/security-crime?page=0%2C1]

13) MOD. &quoute;News Bulletin,&quoute; Last Updated April 27, 2015, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://mod.gov.af/en/page/poblication/7920]

14) Sudarsan Raghavan. &quoute;With the US Withdrawal Looming, a Nascent Afghan Press is in Peril,&quoute; The Washington Post, August 23, 2015. Available on [http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/with-us-withdrawal-looming-a-nascent-afghan-press-is-in-peril/2015/08/22/541b30a2-361e-11e5-9739-170df8af8eb9_story.html]

15) MoI. &quoute;MoI Consultative Councils,&quoute; July 22, 2015. Available on [http://moi.gov.af/en/page/3177/pcc]

16) Freedom House. &quoute;Freedom in the World: Afghanistan,&quoute; 2015. Available on [https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/afghanistan#.VfAKoNLBzGc]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is strong public debate on security issues through TV channels and radio channels and news preparations. There are many local think tanks which discuss important defence issues with the government. MOD engages with all media and participates in public discussions through the parliamentary and public affairs directorate.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
2

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

Researcher4693: A National Anti-Corruption Strategy exists and is publicly available (Strategy and Policy for Anti-Corruption and Administrative Reform, 2008), though there is evidence that there is no serious action behind it. The strategy does specify activities for the defence sector. According to a report by the Afghan government from September 2015, some ministries are adopting anti-corruption action plans but this does not include the MoD at present. (GIRoA, 2015)

The strategy was adopted and the HOOAC was established in 2008 to implement this strategy but there is little evidence on its effective implementation. UNDP in its report notes that &quoute;the anti-corruption strategy of Afghanistan is so broad and encompassing that it is difficult to prioritise actions as well as identify roles and responsibilities for implementation.&quoute; (UNDP: Anti-corruption Strategies, 2014, p.13). According to an interviewee, the strategy does not meet international standards because it is rather a list of problems in Afghanistan rather than a meaningful policy with key priorities. (Interview: Source 1, 2015) According to HOO’s Planning Department, the aforementioned document is the only anti-corruption strategy for GIROA, but it has not always been fully understood or effectively implemented. (MEC, 2014)

The National Anti-Corruption Strategy requires ministries, including the MOD, to report on their implementation of the strategy, and although the MOD has submitted a report, it is not public and according to a statement by the MEC, the implementation report “had little relevance to the reforms required by the Strategy&quoute; (MEC, 2014, p. 71). Further media articles also highlight that although anti-corruption strategy and laws are in place, they lack implementation. (Goodman M.B., Sutton T.: Tackling Corruption in..., 2015; Rahi S.M.: Challenging Corruption in..., 2015). This was also complicated in 2012 when President Karzai issued Decree/Order No 61, tasking all state organs with certain duties to combat corruption. (Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, 2014)

A National Anti-Corruption Strategy Workshop was reportedly organised by civil society and the EU Police Mission in May 2015, reportedly attended by representatives from members of the Afghan parliament, Office of the President, civil society, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, AFCAC, EUPOL, European Union Delegation, Ministry of Interior and Attorney General’s Office. The workshop developed recommendations which would subsequently be presented to President Ghani to “support the Anti-Corruption Strategy”. (EUPOL, 2015) This indicates that either a strategy is in development or that the aforementioned strategy is undergoing revision. An op-ed from an Afghan media source in September 2015 stated that &quoute;the National Unity Government has not come up with a viable strategy to fight corruption and plans for establishment of a national agency to lead the ‘holy war’ against corruption.&quoute; (Timory, 2015)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Whilst your references to Constitutional Law provide interesting and useful context, this question inquiries into the existence and implementation of anti-corruption policy, complete with implementation plans, timelines, etc. Furthermore, the Assessor could not find the anti-corruption strategy that you reference. If the previously created anti-corruption strategy is the target of analysis, the score still remains 2 as there is no evidence surrounding effective implementation. Score maintained

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: While your comments are relevant to the issues of oversight, this question enquires about the existence and implementation of anti-corruption policy.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;Strategy and Policy for Anti Corruption and Administrative Reform,&quoute; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://anti-corruption.gov.af/Content/files/ANTI%20CURAPTION%20STRATIGY_Eng.pdf]

2) JALLC NATO. &quoute;COUNTER- AND ANTICORRUPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM NATO OPERATIONS,&quoute; NATO, June 27, 2013, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.jallc.nato.int/newsmedia/docs/jallc_report_corruption_releasable.pdf]

3) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, February 18, 2015.

4) UNDP. &quoute;Anti-corruption Strategies:Understanding What Works, What doesn’t and Why? Lessons learned from the Asia-Pacific region,&quoute; UNDP, 2014, accessed on May 01, 2015. p.13. Available on [http://anti-corruption.org/pmb321/pmb/opac_css/doc_num.php?explnum_id=764]

5) MEC. Fifth Six-Month Report. Independent Joint Anti-Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, January 30, 2014, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

6) Mary Beth Goodman & Trevor Sutton. &quoute;Tackling Corruption in Afghanistan: It’s Now or Never,&quoute; Center for American Progress, March 17, 2015, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2015/03/17/108613/tackling-corruption-in-afghanistan-its-now-or-never/]

7) Saeed Murad Rahi. &quoute;Challenging Corruption in Afghanistan – OpEd,&quoute; February 05, 2015, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.eurasiareview.com/05022015-challenging-corruption-afghanistan-oped/]

8) EUPOL. &quoute;National Anti-Corruption Strategy Workshop,&quoute; May, 2015. Available on [http://www.eupol-afg.eu/taxonomy/term/70]

9) Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis. &quoute;Operationalizing
Counter/AntiCorruption
Study,&quoute; US Department of defence, February 28, 2014. Available on [https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCEQFjAAahUKEwj_o9us7unHAhWFvhQKHV9nAh0&url=http%3A%2F%2Fnust.edu.pk%2FINSTITUTIONS%2FSchools%2FNIPCONS%2Fnipcons-institutions%2FCIPS%2FDownload%2520Section%2FJCOA%2520CAC%2520Final%2520Report_U.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEaR5JnRqadR9s_RjhGbZhavLxV3w&bvm=bv.102022582,d.bGg]

10) Naser Timory. &quoute;The imperative of institutionalising war on graft,&quoute; Pajhwok Afghan News, September 7, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/opinions/imperative-institutionalising-war-graft]

11) Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. “Afghanistan’s Road to Self-Reliance: The First Mile Progress Report,” September 05, 2015. Available on [http://www.acbar.org/files/downloads/SOM%20main%20paper%20with%20annexs%20final%203%20sep2015(1).pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The anti-corruption policy is stated in articles 7,50,56,143 and 75 of Afghanistan's Constitutional Law as well the 3rd paragraph of Article 3 of the Anti- Corruption Law of united nation (20 Feb 2004 ). Based on the London conference, the Afghanistan committed to prepare an anti-corruption strategy which was reviewed and approved by the government of Afghanistan in 2015 which was subsequently circulated and also implemented in the ANA.

Purpose of the policy:

1-tEssential objectives- counter all kinds of corruption, decrease the reason and negative effect of corruption in the ANA as well the most proper and practical steps for implementing the anti-corruption policy.

2-tImproving the transparency in all MoD affairs including financial affairs, administrative affairs as well the Tashkil (HR structures).

3-tImproving and establishing the capacity and planning to empower the MoD to counter corruption.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Ministry of defence has an oversight committee which reports to President Ghani which points to an attempt to tackle the problem as reported by Tolo News (9 June 2015), however, there is no official link to this committee through the HOOAC. The appointment of a Kabul University economics lecturer as an anti-corruption head of this committee was reportedly intended to address some concerns, however, implementation evidently remains piecemeal.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
2

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

Researcher4693: There are several institutions tasked with building integrity and countering corruption specifically within or focused on the MOD and the military - some are Afghan-run bodies, others are international bodies. A lack of publicly-available evidence surrounding the activities of these bodies suggest that current effectiveness is limited. It is also remains unclear how these bodies' respective mandates relate to one another are and how they coordinate, if at all.

The government response to this assessment indicates that there are bodies within the MoD tasked with countering corruption (Chief Legal, MoD Legal, GSIG, and MoD IG) and that these bodies have undertaken relevant activities. The Chief Legal Office reportedly &quoute;provides oversight, guidance, problem solving, and direction through legal advice and counsel throughout the Ministry&quoute; - it does this through ensuring legal compliance, conducting legal reviews of contracts, and engaging with relevant government bodies outside the MoD. (Ronna, no date) However, no evidence could be found indicating this is actually put into practice. With respect to the MoD IG, in 2013 international forces reportedly escorted the MoD IG Assessment and Plans team on a series of visits to conduct an inspection of certain brigades’ fuel management systems. (RSM, 2013) According to a US DoD report, however, the effectiveness of the organisations has been called into question: &quoute;As of December 2014, the MoD IG had not provided the [audit] reports we requested. CSTC-A officials need the MoD IG reports to gage the capacity and willingness of the IG offices to identify fraud, waste, and abuse.&quoute;

Transparency and Accountability Committees have been established at the MOD ANA Corps’ and Division Headquarters with aim to enact oversight of contracting, procurement, and budget execution at the corps (DOD, 2014, p. 80). The establishment of these organisations competent bodies is relatively new, and it remains to be seen how effective they are at fulfilling their mandates, in particular whether they result in changes to anti-corruption procedures within the security sector though, same as in a case of MOD’s Transparency and Accountability Working Group, Transparency and Accountability Committees are “marginally effective due to lack of direction and failure to expand the inspection and audit sections of the MOD Inspector General“. (SIGAR, 2014, p. 140) According to defence Department News Briefing from, there was the Office of National Security Council Transparency and Accountability Working Group, which was &quoute;an inter-ministerial working group that frames the problem of corruption and organized crime to find specific problems and then works with key leaders and key institutions to undertake necessary reforms.&quoute; (Full Transcript..., 2012) No further information was available regarding this specific working group.

The MOD’s Transparency and Accountability Working Group was established to “(1) develop and maintain a common understanding of the problems of corruption and organized crime, (2) identify obstacles to reducing the threat of corruption and organized crime, and (3) overcome those obstacles through coordinated action among Afghan government ministries and the international community “. (SIGAR, 2014, p. 140) Although in the past the Working Group has push for anti-corruption reforms within the MOD (SIGAR, 2013, p. 129)., recent reports are less optimistic stating that it is “marginally effective due to lack of direction and failure to expand the inspection and audit sections of the MOD Inspector General“. (SIGAR, 2014, p. 140)

The Ministry of defence reportedly has an oversight committee which reports to President Ghani which points to an attempt to tackle the problem as reported by Tolo News (9 June 2015), however, there is no official link to this committee through the HOOAC. (Soadat, 2015) The appointment of a Kabul University economics lecturer as the Chair of this Oversight Committee was intended to address some concerns, however, implementation evidently remains piecemeal. (AFP, 2015)

There are other anti-corruption bodies that may not focus solely on defence but that have a mandate that covers the defence ministry as well as other bodies. These are the HOOAC, Attorney General Office, Transparency Accountability and Oversight Enterprise Advisory Group, and the MoI’s Anti-Corruption Department.

The Supreme Audit Office (SAO) is the supreme audit institution in Afghanistan. The SAO examines and reviews the performance and expenditures of all entities that receive funds from public sources. (MEC: The Independent Joint …, 2015) An report by the Afghan government from September 2015 indicates that &quoute;35 trained staff has strengthened the Supreme Audit Office, which in 2015 carried out audits of four line ministries that together accounted for 60% of public expenditure. All four were found to be compliant with the World Bank’s Incentive Program benchmarks.&quoute; It is unknown whether the MoD was one of the ministries subject to this series of audits. However, government sources indicated the MoD was one of three ministries included in a compliance audit in 2015. An audit of defence expenditure was undertaken by the SAO in 2014. The website of the SAO notes that &quoute;Based on the expenditure pattern and significance of the agencies including their importance for sectors such as education, rural rehabilitation & development, national security, three ministries, namely, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development, the Ministry of Interiors Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence were selected for compliance audit in 1393.&quoute;

According to the 2013-2014 audit report, &quoute;an amount of Afs 5,604,352,691 was transferred from the Development Budget of Ministry of defence to its Operating Budget, for which not only no consultation was done with the Budget Committee but also the amended budget constitutes almost 33% of the total Development Budget and 8.89% of the total Operating Budget of the Ministry. This is in contradiction to the provisions of the PFEM law.&quoute; At the same time the audit notes that there are several projects that are neither recorded in the budget document nor have any expenditure, they have been reported in the Qatia statements without any budget fund or expenditure.

President Ghani has established National Procurement Commission to provide independent oversight of defence procurement. Sources shows that the National Procurement Commission is very active and chaired by the president at weekly meetings. (UNOPS, 2015) According to sources, all contract go through vigorous review process before the Commission gives final approval. Since its inception, it has rejected several contracts or recommended them for adjustments. (Soadat, 2015; Office of the President, 2015; Addeel, 2015) The Commission regularly states how much money has been saved thanks to the review process and information on which contracts have been approved. On the Office of the President website, the information on which contracts have been approved, are regularly updated. Also, it contains information on who attended the meeting. However, details of the review process are not known. As the Commission has been established only recently, it is not possible to predict whether its activity will span changes in government.

The HOOAC was established in 2008 and it supervises implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. As a corruption prevention body, its mandate is to &quoute;act as the focal point for overseeing policy development and implementation of anti-corruption strategies.&quoute; (Nijssen: Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Institutions, 2012, p.10) The effectiveness of HOOAC is questionable because it &quoute;has no trained prosecutors and can only refer cases to the government; without the full backing of the politicians, it is effectively toothless.&quoute; (NATO JALLC: Counter and Anti-Corruption…, 2013).

Under the Attorney General Office, the Military Anti-Corruption Unit has been established (Attorney General Office: Organisational Chart, 2015). Its specific procedures and activities are not well-known. Reported cases of corruption are often not prosecuted because of Attorney General's inactivity. In past years there has not been even one prosecution (Interview: Source 1, 2015).

The Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF)-Shafafiyat was a body consisting of IC representatives and its aim was to monitor how the Afghan government uses international funds (Schroeder, R. : Not too little but ..., 2014) and to lead the in-theatre UNCAC efforts. In July 2014, CJIATF-Shafafiyat was renamed as Transparency Accountability and Oversight Enterprise Advisory Group (TAO EAG) and it still exist as a part of Resolute Support Mission. TAO is concerned with providing third-party oversight of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process and to ensure transparency, accountability, and oversight over ANSF and Security Institutions’ financial and non-financial processes. (Essential Function 2 – TAO, 2015) TAO EAG is funded and staffed by international community through Resolute Support Mission.

At the MoI, the Anti-Corruption Department is established under the Inspector General (IG) Office. However, as Source 1 noted, the credibility of former IG is shaken by his connections with influential family members. This family network, among many others operating within MoI, is hampering any efforts to effectively leverage anti - corruption procedures and mechanisms in place (Interview: Source 1, 2015). A recent UN sponsored report states that “only nine out of more than 2,000 complaints referred to the inspector general’s office in the Afghan interior ministry over a year were forwarded for prosecution. [The report] concluded the chief of the agency, Hakim Nejrabi, and his senior staff were ignoring or blocking complaints.” (1TVNews: UN investigation finds…, 2015) TAO advisors also noted “a lack of leadership commitment and involvement in high level corruption.” (SIGAR. &quoute;Responses to SIGAR's…, 2014) In June 2015, a new Inspector general has been appointed and he has made strong statements about improving transparency and effectiveness of his office: &quoute;“I will not tolerate corruption in the inspector general [office],” If anyone in this office is caught conducting corrupt activities, I will take you directly to the Attorney General Office for prosecution.” (New Ministry of Interior inspector..., 2015; EUPOL Advisors meet the..., 2015) Whether these statements will transform in actions remains to be proved.


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Based on the sources listed, there are doubts concerning the effectiveness of the institutions referenced. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Stefanie Nijssen. &quoute;Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Institutions&quoute; in Corruption & Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan. NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre, February 2012, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC-Afghanistan-Corruption-Volume-Feb2012.pdf]

2) NATO JALLC. &quoute;Counter and Anti-Corruption: Theory and Practice from NATO Operations,&quoute; June 27, 2013, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.jallc.nato.int/newsmedia/docs/jallc_report_corruption_releasable.pdf]

3) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption advisor, 18 Feb 2015.

4) Attorney General Office. &quoute;Organisational Chart&quoute;, no date, accessed on February 22, 2015. Available on [http://ago.gov.af/en/documents]

5) Schroeder R. &quoute;Not too little but too late: ISAF Strategic Restart of 2010 in light of the coalition's previous mistakes&quoute; in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change: Adjusting Western Regional Policy
edited by Joachim Krause, Charles King Mallory, IV (New York: Routledge, 2014).

6) DOD. Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 2014, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf]

7) MEC. Fifth Six-Month Report. Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Comittee, January 30, 2014, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

8) MEC. &quoute;Home Page&quoute;. Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. Accessed July 10, 2014. Available on [http://www.mec.af/#main]

9) SIGAR. &quoute;Apr 2013 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,&quoute; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, April 2013, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-04-30qr.pdf]

10) SIGAR. &quoute;Jan 2014 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,&quoute; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Available on [www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014Jan30QR.pdf] Last modified on 30 Jan 2014

11) SIGAR. &quoute;Responses to SIGAR's 31 July 2014 Letter of Inquiry to Genera] Dunford, COMISAF,&quoute; accessed on April 06, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-14-88-SP.pdf]

11) 1TVNews. &quoute;UN investigation finds corruption in Afghan police oversight division&quoute;. Available on [http://1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/16201-un-investigation-finds-corruption-in-afghan-police-oversight-division] Last modified on 19 Apr 2015

12) &quoute;Essential Function 2 - TAO&quoute;, Afghan War News. Available on [http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/8EFs/EF2-TAO.htm] Accessed on 10 June 2015

13) &quoute;New Ministry of Interior inspector general committed to combatting corruption&quoute;, Resolute Support Mission, 13 July 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/article/rs-news/new-ministry-of-interior-inspector-general-committed-to-combatting-corruption.html]

14) &quoute;EUPOL Advisors meet the new Inspector General&quoute;, EUPOL, June 2015. Available on [http://www.eupol-afg.eu/node/616]

15) Ministry of Foreign Affairs. &quoute;Full transcript of defence Department News Briefing via Teleconference From Afghanistan Speakers: BG H.R McMaster, Janan Mosazai,&quoute; January 19, 2012. Available on [http://mfa.gov.af/en/page/3886/4207/5610]

16) Ronna. &quoute;Chapter 15: Ministry of defence, Chief of Legal Department ,&quoute; No date. Available on [https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CC4QFjACahUKEwjAz67w-enHAhXMWxQKHbMrDQI&url=https%3A%2F%2Fronna.apan.org%2FAD%2FEnglish%2520Library%2F17%2520-%2520Operations%2520and%2520Functions%2520Manual%2FNIURELGIROA_MOD_Org-Fctns_015_Chpt_15_MOD_Legal.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEAMfUGUfXKYIXGNeHhgtOVh5WTcw&bvm=bv.102022582,d.bGg]

17) Agence France-Presse. &quoute;Anti-graft academic leads Afghan push against 'economic mafia',&quoute; April 16, 2015. Available on [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3041558/Anti-graft-academic-leads-Afghan-push-against-economic-mafia.html]

18) Saleha Soadat. &quoute;$100 Million USD MoD Fuel Contract Scandal Revealed,&quoute; Tolo News, April 9, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18985-100-million-usd-mod-fuel-contract-scandal-revealed]

19) RSM. &quoute;MoD Inspector General - Countering Corruption, Making Progress,&quoute; March 22, 2013. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/mod-inspector-general-countering-corruption-making-progress.html]

20) Inspector General of the US Department of defence. &quoute;The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s Controls Over the Contract Management Process for U.S. Direct Assistance Need Improvement,&quoute; February 26, 2015. Available on [http://fas.org/man/eprint/ig-goira.pdf]

21) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Report of Auditor General: Audit Report on Qatia Accounts for the fiscal year ended 1392,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/Content/files/Qatia%20Audit%20Report%201392_English%20Final.pdf]

22) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Summary of Result of Compliance Audit for ARTF IP benchmark 1393,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/en/page/1568/summary-of-result-of-compliance-audit-for-artf-ip-benchmar-1393]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: MOD has the well-defined institutions to counter corruption including the Chief Legal, MOD Legal, GSIG and MoD IG departments, which have compared the affected entities and also established counter corruption framework activities in the MOD.

In 2007 MOD signed a joint commitment letter with NATO regarding establishing integrity within the defence institutions; this is still in the process of implementation.

CSTC-A has coordinate a structural review of MoD IG which led to the establishment of a deputy of transparency in MoDIG structures. This position fully covers activities in the field of transparency and coordinates reform in all MOD working procedures and entities activities’.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
2

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

Researcher4693: The public view is that bribery and corruption, though not officially acceptable to the defence establishment, is insufficiently addressed by the measures in place to tackle the problem. There is a widely-held belief that impunity abounds. There is also a lack of evidence to suggest that the public view there is a clear commitment from the defence establishment that bribery and corruption are not acceptable and that prosecution may be appropriate.

Integrity Watch’s 2014 Survey found that corruption is now the second biggest concern for Afghans, after security. With respect to the security sector specifically, the survey noted that “Respondents believed that there were improvements in addressing corruption in the National Directorate of Security, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of defence.” However, the report also noted that the MOI was perceived to be the second-most corrupt institution. The NDS ranked 6th, and the MOD 15th. Although only 14% of respondents indicated progress in tackling corruption, among that 14%, the NDS, MOI and MOD all rank within the top 5 for progress. (Isaqzadeh, 2014)

A 2014 poll by the Asia Foundation, a non-profit international development organization, recounted that a third (32.8%) of Afghans who reported coming into contact with the ANA say they experienced corruption. Of those who reported that corruption by the ANA this is a major problem in their daily lives: 2% reported it to be a problem “all of the time”; 7% reported “most of the time”; 10% “some of the time”; 38% none of the time; while 42% reported they “had no contact” with the ANA. With respect to the police, 45% of Afghans experienced corruption when in contact with the ANP -- 3% reported it to be a problem “all of the time”; 9% reported “most of the time”; 16% “some of the time”; 33% none of the time; while 38% reported they “had no contact” with the ANP. With respect to the judiciary, 54.7% Afghans who experienced corruption when had contact with judiciary system. (Warren, 2014, p. 95). Neither the ALP, the MOD nor the MOI were assessed for corruption indicators in this survey.

According to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB): 31% of respondents think that the Afghanistan government’s actions are effective in fighting corruption and 18 % say they are very effective. Whereas 12% state the government’s actions to be very ineffective and 18 % state ineffective. 21% say that the government’s actions are neither effective nor ineffective (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2013). The GCB also found that 21% of respondents found the military to be corrupt or very corrupt while 33 per cent found the police to be corrupt or very corrupt. Overall, twelve institutions were assessed. For instance, the judiciary in comparison was perceived to be corrupt or very corrupt by 60% of respondents.

According to media reports, with the election of President Ashraf Ghani, “many Afghans [had] high hopes that president Ghani will take necessary measures against corruption in the country and they approve of his performance so far”. (Muchan, 2014) Presidential Approval Rating Surveys conducted by Tolo News and ATR Consulting, however, showed that the number of people who expressed satisfaction with President Ghani's performance dipped over the first few months of 2015. In January the survey noted that 27.5% were very satisfied -- a stark fall from the 59.9% who reported being very satisfied following the President’s first month in office. Approximately 30.4% were moderately satisfied in January, and 32% were not satisfied with President Ghani's performance (Tolo & ATR, January 2015). In May's report, 25.5% were very satisfied with President Ghani's performance, 21.9% were moderately satisfied, 43.5% were not satisfied (Tolo & ATR, May 2015). Although the reports do not speculate on the reasons for the fall in popularity, the latest report suggests that the main reason behind the fall is the deteriorating economic situation and the consequent lack of job opportunities in the country (Noori Rateb: Experts Distressed About..., 2015)

There is also a lack of evidence to suggest that the public view there is a clear commitment from the defence establishment that bribery and corruption are not acceptable and that prosecution may be appropriate. For instance, according to the Afghanistan Analysts Network the country is marked with &quoute;pervasive impunity in Afghanistan for human rights violations, crimes and corruption that is caused, encouraged and sustained by weak State institutions, insecurity and lack of rule of law facilitated by decades of conflict.&quoute; (Clark, 2015) Numerous op-eds also seem to suggest that a sense of impunity continues to exist widely in Afghanistan. (Alizada, 2015; Hamdam, 2015; Pajhwok Afghan News, 2015)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: There is insufficient evidence to indicate that the public view the defence establishment’s efforts to tackle the problem positively. There is also evidence to suggest that a sense of impunity exists within society. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Zach Warren. &quoute;Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People,&quoute; The Asia Foundation, 18 November 2014, accessed on May 07, 2015. Available on [http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2014final.pdf] Last modified Novemeber 2014.

2) Gabriel Dominguez. &quoute;Survey finds Afghans increasingly pessimistic, still troubled by insecurity,&quoute; 18 November 2014, accessed on May 07, 2015. Available on [http://www.dw.de/survey-finds-afghans-increasingly-pessimistic-still-troubled-by-insecurity/a-18070377]

3) Mohammad Razaq Isaqzadeh. &quoute;National Corruption Survey 2014,&quoute; Integrity Watch Afghanistan, May 28, 2014, accessed May 07, 2015. Available on [http://www.iwaweb.org/ncs/_2014/docs/national_corruption_survey_2014_english.pdf]

4) Deborah Hardoon, Finn Heinrich. &quoute;Global Corruption Barometer-Afghanistan,&quoute; Transparency International, 2013, accessed May 07, 2015. Available on [http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=afghanistan]

5) Lauren Muchan. &quoute;President Ghani fosters hope with strong start,&quoute; Khaama News, November 27, 2014, accessed May 07, 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/president-ghani-fosters-hope-with-strong-start-8803]

6) Tolo News & ATR Consulting. &quoute;Presidential Approval Rating,&quoute; January 6, 2015, accessed May 07, 2015. Available on [http://atr-consulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Edited-Tolo-Version.pdf]

7) Tolo News & ATR Consulting. &quoute;Presidential Approval Rating,&quoute; May 5, 2014, accessed May 07, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/images/Results_Ghani_Survey_TOLOnews_ATR_May2015.pdf]

8) Noori Rateb. &quoute;Experts Distressed About Survey Results&quoute;. Tolo News, August 17, 2015, accessed August 31, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20947-experts-distressed-about-survey-results]

9) Kate Clark. &quoute;Because of Impunity: UN reports Afghan forces still torturing Afghans,&quoute; Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 25, 2015. Available on [https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/because-of-impunity-un-reports-afghan-forces-still-torturing-afghans/]

10) Nazifa Alizada. &quoute;Farkhunda’s Murder and the Imperative of Introspection,&quoute; Khaama Press, April 01 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/farkhundas-murder-and-the-imperative-of-introspection-9362]

11) Mohammad Shafiq Hamdam. &quoute;What else can go wrong?,&quoute; Khaama Press, April 16, 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/what-else-can-go-wrong-9388

12) Pajhwok Afghan News. &quoute;Afghan govt urged to prosecute rights abusers,&quoute; March 04, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/03/10/afghan-govt-urged-prosecute-rights-abusers]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Based on presented Score and comment concerning the public trust on ANA, MOD has fully agreed.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
2

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

Researcher4693: There has been at least one recent assessment of corruption risk in the sector.This assessment has fallen under the activities of NATO’s Building Integrity Programme (BIP), which was launched in 2007. NATO states that the BIP for Afghanistan consists of a tailored programme that is &quoute;focused on promoting good practices and developing capacity of the civilian and armed forces in Afghan Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Interior (MOI) to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in its efforts to build integrity and reduce the risk of corruption.” (NATO, 2012). It is not clear when Afghanistan became a member of the NATO BI programme, however, a press release from November 2010 noted that the programme would &quoute;soon include a programme tailored for Afghanistan&quoute; (NATO, 2010).

According to NATO, these tailored programmes are derived from an assessment know as &quoute;the BI Self Assessment/Peer Review Process&quoute; as well as other NATO reporting mechanisms and additional gap analyses undertaken with the support of nations (NATO, 2012). The BI Self-Assessment/Peer Review Process is designed to help nations to map current practice and procedures, and assess the overall integrity of the defence and security sector. In addition to research and interviews with national authorities, the needs analysis also reportedly draws on open source material. The Self-Assessment is conducted through a questionnaire which covers current business practice in the defence and security sector in areas such as: democratic control and engagement, national anti-corruption laws and policy, anti-corruption policy in defence and security, behaviour, policy, training and discipline, planning and budgeting, operations, procurement, engagement with defence companies and other suppliers, and also includes nation-specific questions. It is not entirely clear when the SAQ and Peer Review Process for Afghanistan was completed but the NATO website appears to denote that the Afghan MOD and MOI of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan agreed to the recommendations emanating from the BI process in October 2011. There is no evidence to suggest that the assessment has been repeated.

Recommendations emanating from the SAQ process included the development and the implementation of an action plan to build integrity, increase transparency and improve accountability in the ANSF through the development of processes and procedures. Although the competed questionnaire is not publicly available, the tailored agreed-upon recommendations identified leadership and specialized areas of the management of financial resources (budgeting, procurement, contracting) and human resources (including recruitment and merit-based promotion) as priorities within reducing defence and security sector corruption risk of the ANSF. Accordingly, the BI programme reportedly included &quoute;establishing and sustaining a Pilot BI Center in Kabul; and designing and delivering tailored BI education and training&quoute;.

The assessor could not locate many sources that could comment on the implementation of the SAG recommendations. However, a think tank report notes that five-day foundation courses at the OF5 level had started for both MoD and MoI officers and officials in 2011 though there is no evidence that these courses still run regularly (Konrad Adenaur, 2011). According to NATO, the MOD and MOI, the NATO SAQ and peer review process led to improved relations between the Afghan MOD and civil society, reportedly made evident by a conference on developing cooperation between the defence sector, other governmental entities and civil society. (NATO: Building Integrity Programme, 2015). The NATO BI program is planned to run until 2021 though there is no evidence stating that any assessment process is institutionalized as a regular practice.

There are audit departments that exist within the Inspector General Office at MOD and MOI but there are concerns that they do not have the technical capacity to conduct effective audits (SIGAR, 2014) and no information was found regarding any assessment of corruption risk. Any meaningful audit is conducted by IC (Interview: Source 1, 2015).


DSP Note: TI-DSP can confirm that the Afghan MOD has taken part in reviewing this assessment.


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The assessor could not find any publicly available sources indicating corruption risk assessments of the MoD are undertaken by the MEC. TI-DSP can confirm that the Afghan MOD has taken part in reviewing this (GI) assessment. However, please bear in mind that this question is scored based on the presence of corruption risk assessments led and institutionalized by national entities. Additionally, while the information you provide regarding the Internal Risk Evaluation Mechanism provides useful insight, it does not specify a corruption risk assessment as such but rather a series of oversight bodies. Moreover, the evaluation and monitoring of various departments by the Transparency and Accountability Committees could not be verified through publicly available sources and nor does it represent a comprehensive corruption risk assessment.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015

2) NATO. &quoute;Building Integrity Programme: Strengthening transparency, accountability and integrity and reducing the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector 2012-2014,&quoute; December 7, 2012, accessed May 08, 2015. Available on [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_93045.htm]

3) NATO. &quoute;Building Integrity Programme: Impact on Nations and Contributions to Capacity Building&quoute;. Accessed on 7 March 2015. Available on [http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_03/20150309_150309-bi-Impact-on-Nations.pdf]

4) NATO. &quoute;Afghanistan to be included in defence sector integrity-building initiative,&quoute; November 02, 2010, accessed May 07, 2015. Available on [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_68173.htm?selectedLocale=en]

5) Konrad Adenaur Stiftung, Royal United Services Institute, Transparency International UK Defence and Security. &quoute;Governance, Counter-Corruption and Development, Reshaping Priorities for 2015 and beyond,&quoute; May 13, 2011, accessed May 08, 2015. Available on [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_22834-1522-1-30.pdf?110531205417].

6) SIGAR. Letter to General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, and
Commander, International Security Assistance Force, July 31, 2014, accessed August 17, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-14-88-SP.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Based the corruption risk assessment, the MOD has conducted work in the two areas below:

1-tWork on developing internal mechanisms, in coordination with NATO RSM's TAO function.

2-tA government corruption risk assessment led by the MEC (which monitors counter-corruption efforts) and such an assessment by Transparency International. These assessment processes involve an anti-corruption oversight entity.

Internal risk evaluation mechanism:
•tSenior leader counter corruption board
•tCounter corruption high commission
•tCounter corruption coordination committee
•tAnd, joint transparency and accountability group

Joint transparency and accountability committee main activities:
•tEvaluating the procurement activities and process in MOD acquisition agency
•tEvaluation and monitoring the logistics system
•tEvaluation and monitoring the finance and budget department
•tEvaluation and monitoring the human resource department
•tEvaluation and monitoring of legal process in MOD
•tEvaluation and monitoring the information technology and communication

Mentioned processes are jointly established with the NATO transparency resolute support mission office, and are mainly focused on areas of highest corruption risk.

The group has also proposed corrective recommendations to enhance the accountability and transparency in the different areas for instance(in first report proposed 54 corrective recommendations and in the second report proposed 41 corrective recommendations ) . In addition, for implementing the development plan for year 2016 -2017, the CSTC-A and MOD has been committed to implement and establish internal control system to verify and evaluate the risk of corruption along with corrective recommendation from year 2014.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
1

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Researcher4693: No detailed information was found on a process for acquisition planning although there are indications that there are some attempts to generate requirements based upon military objectives and national strategic guidance” (DOD, 2014, p. 29). The three documents that reportedly form the basis of the National Military Strategy and the MoI Strategy (which should inform acquisition requirements) are said to &quoute;enable synchronized operations, plans, actions, and activities&quoute; with the former also providing &quoute;strategic, ministerial management guidance and intent for tactical military plans and operations&quoute; (&quoute;National Security Documents, 2015). The process of how any acquisition plans could be derived from these documents (which aren't public), however, is not publicly available, nor does clarity exist over accountability and oversight of this process.

The National Procurement Law (2008, amended 2009) applies to all government procurement including defence and security procurement, and therefore should also cover part of the defence acquisition planning process. The Procurement Law does cover tendering, contracting, contract management, performance review and surplus asset disposal, but it is not clear whether the law also covers the conceptualization, design, development, test and overall asset disposal phases of acquisition planning as well.

Presidential Decree 45, Art 2(1) orders the MOD to “Prepare and provide a revised, transparent and complete procurement mechanism for the ministry with the assistance of the MoF, MoEc and MoJ.” According to the MEC however, the resulting MOD policy “is vague and only reflects the Procurement Law, rather than the specific procurement needs of the MOD. Furthermore, the policy does not include an implementation plan” (MEC, 2014, p. 119). Exemption is related to procurement which &quoute;requires confidentiality to ensure the interest and protection of the nation&quoute; (Procurement Law, 2009, Art 4 (2)). Whether any mechanism exists to scrutinize procurement under such exemption, is unclear. Cases of procurement law violations have been discussed in media (Capaccio A.: Afghanistan Can’t Manage..., 2015; Soadat S.: $100 Million USD..., 2015)

A separate US DOD report also concludes that although a law allowing the Afghan officials to inspect and oversee procurement contracts exists (The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Procurement Law, 2008, Chapter VI, Articles 53; and The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement, November 19, 2009, Chapter IX – Contract Administration, Section A, Rules 149 and 151), not all the officials were willing or capable to execute such oversight. (DOD: Assessment of U.S. Government ..., 2014)

NATO RSM reportedly provides experts to help the Afghan authorities to improve their acquisition planning and to ensure transparency, accountability, and oversight (TAO) in ANSF's financial and non-financial processes. (Afghan War News, 2015), however, information detailing the number of these experts and when they have conducted their work is not publicly available. A lot of the work, which was formerly conducted under ISAF's various taskforces (e.g. Shafafyiat and TF 2010) has been now moved, renamed and delegated to experts working within Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a subordinate command of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan that works closely with Resolute Support.

CSTC-A supports the Afghan MOD and MOI in development of their internal capability and capacity in the area of acquisition planning. But in the DOD’s recent report it is stated that “CSTC-A has not fully developed the capacity of the ministries to operate effectively, independently, and transparently.” (DOD:The Government of Islamic..., 2015). Moreover, CSTC-A personnel indicated to the DOD that many of their MoD advisors did not have sufficient experience in the areas they were advising. For example, many of the MoD financial advisors were from career fields unassociated with finance and accounting (DOD, 2014).

The US-led Ministry of defence Advisors Program is another initiative to build ministerial capacity in areas related to acquisition planning. It has been active since 2010 (USIP, 2011) and is made up of DoD civilian employees who train and deploy to Afghanistan to serve as advisers (for approximately 14 months) within the Ministries of defence and Interior. The MODA website indicates this programme has deployed over 200 advisers to the MOD and MOI since its inception and currently includes 58 experts in various fields including but not limited to defence Policy and Strategy, Budget/Finance as well as Acquisitions and Procurement (MODA, 2015; DSCA, no date; GAO, 2015). DOD plans to deploy about 90 additional advisors to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2015. It is unclear how many advisers are dedicated to each workstream. In 2012, the effectiveness of this programme was reported questionable as the DOD inspector general noted that &quoute;MoDA program officials did not establish a performance management framework to include goals, objectives, and performance indicators necessary for assessing the effectiveness of the program&quoute;.


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: While the procurement law is in place the ministerial capacity in acquisition planning is very limited and requires substantial support from the international community. Also note that in this question acquisition refers to a much broader concept than procurement and covers the entire life cycle of acquired systems - conceptualization, design, development, test, contracting, production, deployment, logistics support, modification, and disposal of weapons and other systems, supplies, or services etc. for use or in support of military missions. Furthermore, the Assessor could not find the existence indicating effective, strong oversight mechanisms are in place.

COMMENTS -+

1) DOD.&quoute;Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army,&quoute; December 19, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2015-047.pdf]

2) DOD. &quoute;Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,&quoute; April, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf]

3) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Procurement Law,&quoute; 2008, updated Januar, 2009, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://mof.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/ProcurmentLawincoporatedJan2009762011102131268553325325.pdf]

4) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,&quoute; Ministry of Finance, April 12, 2007, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://ppu.gov.af/Documents/Circulars/English/Circular%205.pdf]

5) Afghan War News. &quoute;Essential Function 1 - PPBE: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution,&quoute; no date, accessed April 8, 2015. Available on [http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/8EFs/EF1-PPBE.htm]

6) DOD. &quoute;The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s Controls Over the Contract Management Process for U.S. Direct Assistance Need Improvement,&quoute; February 25, 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2015-082.pdf]

7) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;National Security Documents,&quoute; February 4, 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/20150204_national_strategy_final.pdf]

8) DOD. &quoute;Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency Over Direct Contributions,&quoute; August 29, 2014, accessed May 08, 2015. Available on [http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2014-102.pdf]

9) MODA. &quoute;MoDA is recruiting for Class 16,&quoute; no date, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [https://modaprogram.org/news-story/moda-recruiting-class-16]

10) MODA. &quoute;Afghanistan MoDA Position Description,&quoute; no date, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.cpms.osd.mil/expeditionary/pdf/MoDA-AFG-Post-CL14.pdf]

11) defence Security Cooperation Agency. &quoute;,&quoute; no date, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.dsca.mil/programs/ministry-defence-advisors]

12) USIP. &quoute;Training U.S. Advisers, Building Afghan Ministries,&quoute; April 7, 2011, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.usip.org/publications/training-us-advisers-building-afghan-ministries]

13) GAO. &quoute;BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY: DOD Should Improve Its Reporting to Congress on Challenges to
Expanding Ministry of defence Advisors Program,&quoute; February, 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [https://www.pksoi.org/document_repository/Report/GAO_BPC_MoDA_Reporting_(11-Feb-2015)-CDR-1230.pdf]

14) DOD. &quoute;Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed for the Ministry of defence
Advisors Program,&quoute; October 23, 2012, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-005.pdf]

15) Ministry of Finance. &quoute;Procurement Law,&quoute; 2008, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mof.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/ProcurmentLawincoporatedJan2009762011102131268553325325.pdf]

16) MEC. &quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report,&quoute; Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, January 30, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

17) Capaccio A. &quoute;Afghanistan Can’t Manage Billions in Aid, U.S. Inspector Finds&quoute;, March 10, 2015, accessed August 18, 2015. Available on [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-10/afghanistan-can-t-manage-billions-in-aid-u-s-inspector-finds]

18) Saleha Soadat. &quoute;$100 Million USD MoD Fuel Contract Scandal Revealed&quoute;, ToloNews, April 09, 2015, accessed July 03, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18985-100-million-usd-mod-fuel-contract-scandal-revealed]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: MOD has prepared the procurement plan based on the template which has been circulated by the Ministry of Finance's Public Procurement Unit (PPU). The PPU has defined all processes up to when a contract is concluded. The procurement plan has also been uploaded on the Procurement Management Information System which has been established by PPU authorities. This plan was also reviewed by the MOD acquisition agency based on their respective needs and priorities. The PPU has also introduced procurement specialists and controllers to all ministries to oversee projects and processes.

Source:
1-tAfghanistan procurement Law article 11,12,13 and 14and related rules and procedures
2-tPPU published circulars PPU /C001/1386 solar calendar
3-tPPU published circulars PPU /C039/1390 solar calendar
4-tPPU published circulars PPU /C031/1389 solar calendar

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
1

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

Researcher4693: A specific Ministry of defence budget is not publicly available, however Afghanistan's national budget for the year 1394 (2015) is publicly available on the Ministry of Finance Website. The national budget provides a highly aggregated breakdown of the Ministry of Defence’s expenditures noting only separate allocations of Salaries; Goods & Services; and Capital Expenditures (MOF, 2015). The budget divides allocations for Security based on the different relevant Ministries, whether it is donor-funded or government-funded, includes a new line for &quoute;Fund for Purchase and repair (of MOD military equipments)&quoute;, development vs operational budget lines as well as budget execution rates for the preceding year 1393. However the Assessor was unable to find any evidence of a detailed breakdown, either in the 1393 or in the 1394 budget. No other details on the defence budget are publicly available.

The NGO Equality for Peace and Democracy provides an aggregate version of the 1394 budget as well as an evaluation of certain components. The organisation states that this budget review provides details to the Afghan parliament so MPs are able to review and approve the national budget.

COMMENTS -+

1) DOD. &quoute;Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,&quoute; April, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf]

2) MOF. &quoute;1394 National Budget. Afghanistan Ministry of Finance,&quoute; 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1394/1394%20National%20Budget_English%20Version.pdf]

3) Equality for Peace and Democracy. &quoute;Independent Review of Afghanistan 1394 Draft National Budget,&quoute; November, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.epd-afg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/1394-Budget-Snapshot_English.pdf]

4) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption advisor, 18 Feb 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
2

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

Researcher4693: It does not appear that a detailed defence budget is presented to the parliamentary defence committees to scrutinize. However, the aggregated national budget is provided to both houses of parliament.

The budgeting process in the Ministry of Defence is based around the Ministry of Finance's budget calendar. (Ministry of Finance, no date) The budget calendar, which is distributed to all primary budgetary units/line ministries, details the process that ministries need to follow.

The Constitution states that the National Assembly shall have duties including &quoute;Approval of the state budget as well as permission to obtain or grant loans&quoute; (Constitution, 2004). The Wolesi Jirga's Finance Commission is responsible for scrutinization of the national budget, though both the upper and lower houses of parliament have the opportunity to scrutinize and analyze the national budget, according to the Constitution. The draft budget is sent first to the Meshrano Jirga for recommendations and afterward to the Wolesi Jirga. The MJ has the right to summon officials from Ministry of Finance to respond to the questions in regard to the budget. (The Constitution of Afghanistan, Art 98). In December 2014, Pajhwok reported that the budget &quoute;draft was approved by the Council of Ministers and then [the] Meshrano Jirga sent it to Wolesi Jirga with some recommendations on Dec 9&quoute;. However, the recommendations offered by the Meshrano Jirga are not publicly available.

Both the WJ and MJ are able to bear some degree of influence on the budget as demonstrated by their rejection of the 1393 (2014/15) budget draft, which required the Ministry of Finance to make changes. (Sadat, 2014) WJ and MJ also both exercised their powers through the rejection of the 1394 draft budget over what some lawmakers dubbed unfair allocations to the provinces. (Pajhwok, 2014; Khaama, 2015). According to Tolo News, the Wolesi Jirga also suspended the budget for the CEO and economic advisory offices pending Wolesi Jirga approval for the formations of the newly-established offices. Furthermore, the House also reportedly rejected former President Karzai's decree to pay the salaries of his advisers for five years after the end of their tenure. The Wolesi Jirga subsequently approved a revised budget which had allegedly incorporated changes from the Ministry of Finance. There are no further examples showing parliaments' ability to influence the budget beyond rejection/approval of the budget draft.

There is evidence that the Commission on defensive affairs and territorial integrity discusses security related items in the draft national budget (Wolesi Jirga: Lower house commissions…) although the level of details on the defence budget is limited and therefore it is fair to assume that discussions on the defence budget have limited impact and do not result in substantive change. If the Commission on defensive affairs and territorial integrity discusses the draft budget, it is reasonable to assume that there are other commissions doing the same. Evidence suggests that the Commission on defensive affairs and territorial integrity discusses security related items in the draft national budget (Wolesi Jirga: Lower house commissions…) but it is unclear what their formal role is with regard to approval of the budget.

Whether the parliament can effectively exercise oversight over the security services (NDS) budget or its policies remains unclear.(UNAMA: Update on the Treatment..., 2015, p. 43)


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Despite the progress made in standardisation of the budget process, the parliament is not provided with detailed information on proposed defence expenditures but rather receives an aggregated set of figures. The rejection of the 1393 budget draft does not indicate a trend in the ability of committees’ ability to seriously influence the drafting of the budget. Score remains.

COMMENTS -+

1) Pajhwok Afghan News.&quoute;Wolesi Jirga rejects draft budget,&quoute; December 24, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/2014/12/24/wolesi-jirga-rejects-draft-budget]

2) Ariana News. &quoute;Wolesi Jirga rejects draft budget for the next fiscal year,&quoute; December 24, 2014. Available on [http://ariananews.af/latest-news/wolesi-jirga-rejects-draft-budget-for-the-next-fiscal-year/]

3) Ariana News.&quoute;Senate Calls Afghanistan National Draft Budget as imbalanced,&quoute; December 8, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://ariananews.af/latest-news/afghanistan-national-draft-budget-is-imbalanced-senate/]

4) &quoute;The Constitution of Afghanistan&quoute;, January 26, 2004, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html]

5) Saleha Sadat. &quoute;2014 Budget Draft Rejected By Lower House,&quoute; Tolo News, January 4, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/13331-2014-budget-draft-rejected-by-lower-house]

6) Wolesi Jirga. &quoute;Lower house commissions debated various issues,&quoute; no date, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.wolesi.com/pve/showdoc.aspx?Id=2310]

7) UNAMA. &quoute;Update on the Treatment of ConflictRelated Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129,&quoute; p.43, February 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_OHCHR_Detention_Report_Feb2015.pdf]

8) Khaama Press. &quoute;Afghan parliament approves draft national budget,&quoute; January 28, 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/afghan-parliament-approves-draft-national-budget-9286]

9) Tolo News. &quoute;Parliament Approves National Budget,&quoute; January 28, 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17994-parliament-approves-national-budget]

10) Ministry of Finance. &quoute;Budget Process,&quoute; no date, accessed September 09, 2015. Available on [http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/index.php/en/2012-12-06-22-51-13/budget-process]

11) Wolesi Jirga. &quoute;Lower house commissions debated various issues&quoute;. 2014, accessed on 8 Apr 2015. Available on [http://www.wolesi.com/pve/showdoc.aspx?Id=2310]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The budgeting process in the Ministry of Defence is based around the Ministry of Finance's budget calendar (refer to http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/index.php/en/2012-12-06-22-51-13/budget-process for a copy of budget calendar). The budget calendar, which is distributed to all primary budgetary units/line ministries, details the process that ministries need to follow. This includes submission of BC-1 (preparing the need assessment files and proposed budget) by line ministries as well as the budget review of the budget committee and budget hearing session both of which are planned on a time line basis.

The budget process is well defined and the national budget is effectively provided and implemented. The budget calendar document binds all Afghan budgetary units to practice their budgetary processes based on a standard framework which is overseen by several Oversight & Coordination Bodies (OCBs) at both the Ambassador and working levels which report to and involve the donor and international communities. After the budget has been approved and donor/GIRoA commitments towards funding have been established, the financial plans are prepared and submitted to MoF for allocation and transfer of funds.

During budget execution and throughout the fiscal year the budget execution and performance is reviewed at MoD leadership level through monthly Program & Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) meetings. In these meetings the rate of expenditures towards the financial plan and fiscal budget is reviewed in detail by first deputy minister of MoD and justified by budgetary unit directors. A biweekly working level PBAC meeting is also held at the Finance Directorate level that discusses the problems and obstacles towards budget execution and the performance of each unit is reviewed.

Proposed budgets are never rejected by the MoF but returned for justification and necessary adjustments. However, national budgets are reviewed by parliament and sometimes rejected based on views regarding the political distribution of budget funding to different provinces.

Source and references:
tMinistry of Finance-budget directorate website - http://www.budgetmof.gov.af
tAfghan Parliament website - http://wj.parliament.af

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There has been a clear effort to standardise the budget process with the release of the 100 days plan by the Ministry of Finance in May 2015. This report indicates a clear effort to the streamline the process of developing the budget and outlines some of the shortfalls with the 1394 Budget. While implementation of these reforms are yet to bear fruit it does point to a clear effort to provide timely and regular budgetary guidance incorporating consultation. The current budget is set to run until March 2016 and the government has set a clear date on when the next Budget is to be tabled.
In line with the Assessor, the rejection of the 1393 budget draft does not indicate a trend in the ability of committees’ ability to seriously influence the drafting of the budget. Instead this seems to be done through departmental recommendation though the mechanisms by which this occurs remains unclear.


Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
1

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

Researcher4693: A Ministry of defence specific budget is not publicly available, however Afghanistan's national budget for the solar year 1394 (March 2015 – March 2016) is publicly available on the Ministry of Finance Website. The national budget provides a highly aggregated breakdown within the Ministry of Defence delineating only between Salaries; Goods & Services; and Capital Expenditures (MOF, 2015). The budget also shows how much funding is sourced from government revenues and how much is obtained from the donors. The budget document also details the past year's budget execution rates.

Although there is free, and active debate on issues of defence within the media and public, as can be seen through newspaper editorial topics (Outlook Afghanistan, 2015; Wahidi, 2014; Pajhwok Afghan News, 2015), the government participates infrequently in these discussions, let alone specific discussions surrounding the defence budget.

The access to approved defence budget detail (beyond what is provided through governmental websites showing the national budget) might improve with the recently enacted new Access to Information Law, which theoretically makes the budget available. However, there are doubts about how this law will work in practice, as &quoute;implementation of the law is one of the biggest challenges&quoute; (IWA: Approval of Access to Information..., 2014; The Danish Institute for Human Rights. &quoute;New Afghan law..., 2014 ) Though the MoF provides a phone number and a Contact Us form on its website for question, it is not clear whether more detailed information on defence budget has been provided based on the Access to Information Law. (MoF, &quoute;Contact Us&quoute;, 2015) Reportedly, a new commission on access to information would oversee implementation. (Freedom House, 2015). It is not clear to what extent the Access to Information Law will have any restrictions related to Requests of Information regarding defence and security matters. Advocacy groups welcomed the law but urged the President to enact amendments that will ensure the commission’s independence from government officials and clarify the definition of terms like “national security.” (Freedom House, 2015)

Moreover while the government has taken steps to providing more information through its website and news conferences, no evidence could be found indicating government institutions respond to requests for information on the defence budget. (Raghavan, 2015) The still extremely hostile environment within which civil society and the media operate signals that there may be considerable problems surrounding access to information. (Freedom House, 2015)

The majority of defence spending is off-budget, external to central government allocation, provided by the international community and this funding is reportedly less transparent than on-budget spending (Bizhan, 2012, p. 10).

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The impact of the new Access to Information Law is still to be seen and the likely impediments to its enforcement, within the backdrop of restrictions to civil society and the media, have been outlined above. Score maintained.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed. Sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1) MOF. &quoute;1394 Afghan National Budget. Ministry of Finance,&quoute; no date, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1394/1394%20National%20Budget_English%20Version.pdf]

2) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption advisor, 18 Feb 2015

3) Integrity Watch Afghanistan. &quoute;Approval of Access to Information Law is the biggest achievement towards transparency and accountability in Afghanistan,&quoute;. Integrity Watch Afghanistan,&quoute; July 1, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.iwaweb.org/_news/news0010_approval_ati_law.html]

4) The Danish Institute for Human Rights. &quoute;New Afghan law grants access to information&quoute;. Available on [http://www.humanrights.dk/news/new-afghan-law-grants-access-information] Last modified on 3 Dec 2014

5) MOF. &quoute;Contact Us,&quoute; no date, accessed September 09, 2015. Available on [http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/index.php/en/contact-us11]

6) &quoute;Security must be prioritized,&quoute; Outlook Afghanistan, April 18, 2015, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=12002]
&quoute;Jalalabad Mass Massacre Uncovers Government Preparedness,&quoute; Outlook Afghanistan, April 19, 2015, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=12007]

7) &quoute;Public Support for Security Forces!&quoute; Outlook Afghanistan, January 19, 2015, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=11523]

8) Maisam Wahidi. &quoute;Can Afghanistan be the next Iraq?&quoute; Tolo News, June 28, 2014, accessed on May 01, 2015. Avaiable on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/blogs-a-opinion?start=14]

9) Pajhwok Afghan News. Accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/security-crime?page=0%2C1]

10) Ahmad Ramin. &quoute;Afghan Citizens Reaction to Advisory Jirga,&quoute; Tolo News, November 21, 2013, accessed May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/12817-afghan-citizens-reaction-to-advisory-jirga]

11) Freedom House. &quoute;Freedom in the World: Afghanistan,&quoute; 2015. Available on [https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/afghanistan#.VfAKoNLBzGc]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Afghanistan's national budget for year 1394 is publicly available on the Ministry of Finance Website in which the defence budget is recorded in 3 major budget codes and multiple object codes. Afghan civilian advisors have prepared the 1393-1394 defence budgets reflecting the actual need assessment of regional corps and their sub units as well as central budgetary units. The confidentiality and classification of MoD financial information is critical; however, all the concerned internal and external parties have been provided with details of needs assessment and MoD budgets for their info and use.

There was not any specific request from citizens, civil society and the media organizations to access information on defence budget so it is not possible to say whether the MoD might have delayed in responding to such requests.

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Unable to find sufficient information as to whether improved access to information will make it easier to find budgetary information. Given previous trends outlined in the research thus far it seems likely that the identity of the individual or organization will likely dictate the ease and speed with which they are able to access the required information.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
1

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Researcher4693: There appears to be very limited publication of sources of defence income other than from central government allocation or dispersed information from the international community assistance (that is provided off-budget).

The majority of defence spending is off-budget, external to central government allocation, provided by the international community. According to Source 2, defence spending attributable to the international community is about 93 % of the total funding for the ANSF. This figure is roughly supported by a GAO report showing that the United States alone funded an estimated 90 percent of Afghanistan's total security expenditures between 2006-2010. There is a lack of more recent information supporting this exact figure though in February 2015 NATO noted nations committed more than $1 billion to the ANA Trust Fund alone (NATO, 2015). Overall, the transparency and accountability of this off-budget international community funding, to the Afghan people, is less transparent than on-budget spending (Bizhan, 2012, p. 10) and because a large portion of aid is channelled through an “off budget” system, the Afghan government, legislature and people have no control or oversight over these funds. According to Source 1, the information on off-budget funding for the defence sector is shared with the Office of President, MoD and NDS but it is not available for the parliament (Interview: Source 1, 2015). Presumably, this information will therefore also not be available to the public.

Currently, the US funds (for Afghanistan) that are off-budget are overseen and scrutinised by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) which was created by US Congress to provide independent and objective oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction projects and activities. In June 2014, this constituted approximately $104.10 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002 -- of this amount, $61.77 billion was for security (SIGAR, 2015). It is unclear how much of this funding has been used outside of Afghan central government channels. The Combined Security Transition Command -Afghanistan (CSTC-A) reportedly instituted an “Audit Throttle” process on direct contributions that incrementally incentivize Security Ministries to correct audit findings and address all audit recommendations&quoute; (DOD, 2014, p. 64). To what extent this initiative has had any impact is not known. It also unclear how other members of the IC oversee off-budget funding.

The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework advocates for more on-budget funding which would lead to greater visibility on the funds so long as the Afghan government meets a set of long-term governance progress indicators (Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, 2013). Although the IC has committed to increase on-budget aid, doubts exist that greater accountability is achievable because of uncertainty surrounding &quoute;the degree of genuine commitment by the Afghan government to improve governance and fight corruption&quoute;. (Byrd, W.: We Pretend To Work..., 2013).

The government response to this question indicates that there may be some income reported by the accounting department of the MoD on income received from rental properties such as shops and land under rent to public and private entities. However, no publicly available sources could comment on the existence of these properties. Part of the Ministry of Finance’s 100 Day Plan involves the registration of all public properties purchased from the national budget, indicating that in the future there may be increase information on these assets. The Plan also calls for Modernizing state property registration systems so as to enable the accurate collection of state property revenue. There is a line in the budget for “Other non-tax revenue” indicating that there may be revenues from state-owned assets. (Ministry of Finance, 2015) The Ministry of Finance shows records indicating some revenues are gathered from the MoD but this data does not appear to be regularly updated. (Ministry of Finance, 2014).

There is a state law prohibiting security actors from obtaining mineral rights and exploiting it for state or personal gain; however, the enforcement of this law is often ineffective (USIP, 2014) leading to questions of whether the proceeds from any potential illicit activity could find its way into defence income. Other reports of income outside of central government allocation primarily have to do with individual cases of illicit sales of surplus goods such as boots, food rations, fuel etc. (Guardian, 2014; Stars and Stripes, 2015). No further information on off-budget funding is publicly available.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Your comments provide interesting context. The assessor could only locate selective publication of income from the Ministry of Finance. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that what is published is either not accurate or incomplete. Score therefore holds at 1.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 2, anti-corruption defence consultant, 19 Feb 2015

2) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015

3) MoF. &quoute;Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. Senior Officials Meeting Joint Report,&quoute; July 3, 2013, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/TMAF_SOM_Report_Final_English.pdf]

4) Byrd W. &quoute;'We Pretend To Work, And They Pretend To Pay Us' Travails Of Mutual Accountability In Afghanistan&quoute;, US Insitute of Peace, May 22, 2013, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB148.pdf]

5) Nematullah Bizhan. &quoute;Budget Transparency in Afghanistan: A Pathway to Building Public Trust in the State. International Budget Partnership,&quoute; February 1, 2013, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI-case-study-Afghanistan.pdf]

6) Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. &quoute;Senior Officials Meeting Joint Report,&quoute; July 3, 2013, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/TMAF_SOM_Report_Final_English.pdf]

7) SIGAR. &quoute;Interactive Funding Tables,&quoute; June 30, 2014, accessed on May 11, 2015. Available on [http://sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/fundingtables/index.aspx?SSR=6&SubSSR=25&WP=Interactive%20Funding%20Tables]

8) William A. Byrd & Javed Noorani &quoute;Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Afghanistan Where Are the Government Revenues or Development Benefits?&quoute; United States Institute of Peace, December 1, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.usip.org/publications/exploitation-of-mineral-resources-in-afghanistan]

9) Global Witness. &quoute;Gaps in new Afghan mining law pose a threat to stability&quoute;, August 19, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.globalwitness.org/library/gaps-new-afghan-mining-law-pose-threat-stability]

10) GOA. &quoute;Budget & Spending: Afghanistan's Donor Dependency,&quoute; September 20, 2011, accessed May 11, 2015. Avaiable on [http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-948R]

11) May Jeong, &quoute;Kabul's Bush Bazaar dwindles as US troops withdraw from Afghanistan,&quoute; The Guardian, May 30, 2014, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on[http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/30/kabuls-bush-bazaar-dwindles-us-troops-withdraw-afghanistan]

12) Carlo Munoz. &quoute;2 soldiers convicted in fuel-selling scam in Afghanistan,&quoute; Stars and Stripes, February 18, 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghanistan/2-soldiers-convicted-in-fuel-selling-scam-in-afghanistan-1.330236]

13) NATO. &quoute;Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund: Status of Contributions Made February 2015&quoute;, February, 2015, Accessed August 17. 2015. Available on [http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_02/20150227_2015-02-ANA-TF.pdf]

14) Ministry of Finance. “Revenue Collection & Target Summary,” 2014. Available on [http://www.ard.gov.af/images/pdfs/weekly/weeklyreport.pdf ]

15) Ministry of Finance. &quoute;1394 National Budget. Afghanistan Ministry of Finance,&quoute; 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1394/1394%20National%20Budget_English%20Version.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Since the MoD does not deliver revenue generating operations and mainly works on security, stability and countering terrorism in the country, information in regards to income is limited. However there is small figure of income reported by the accounting department of MoD on income received for rental properties such as shops and land under rent to public and private sectors.

For more details please contact the MoF Customs and Revenue directorate.

It is not accurate to state that the majority of defence spending is off-budget while international allies and resolute support mission has gradually transitioned the supply of logistics and equipment to the MoD by funding the required budget. The off-budget expenditures are managed by donor communities for specific tactical/military equipment and ammunition which does not hold MoD accountable for transparency or corruption issues.

Source: AFSA advisory group – MoF website and officials

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As noted by the assessor, there is little information regarding government defence income and given that the majority of funding for Afghan forces is provided by the international community it is unlikely that any further information is disclosed by the government.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
1

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

Researcher4693: Within the MOD there is a lack of capacity in most financial areas, including procurement officers, programmers, requirements and budget analysts, accountants, and auditing personnel. (DOD, 2014, p. 27)

There is a dedicated internal audit department within the Ministry of Defence. However, whilst the government comment for this section states that audits are undertaken and staff are trained, this could not be verified through publicly available sources. It is therefore also uncertain whether it is effective. The MEC states that &quoute;Although internal oversight and investigative bodies exist in all ministries and independent directorates, they often do not have the capacity to implement their mandate or the support of their own ministries.&quoute; (MEC: Fifth Six-Month Report..., 2014, p. 84) The last statement has been also confirmed during the interview with Source 1 who stated that ministries' ability to conduct any kind of audit (at MOI and MOD these departments are reportedly situated within Inspector General's office) is very limited, and any effective auditing is conducted by IC bodies (Interview: Source 1, 2015).

The 2013-2014 compliance audit by the SAO also noted that the internal audit and control functions within the three ministries that were subject to the audit (including the MoD) were weak and recommended ministries and their agencies at the centre and the directorates in the provinces should strengthen their controls and monitoring systems.

Under the new Audit Law, internal audit departments must report to their line ministries as well as to the SAO, but in practice this often does not happen (MEC: Fifth Six-Month Report..., 2014, p. 84) .

The Transparency Accountability and Oversight Enterprise Advisory Group (TAO EAG) is concerned with providing third-party oversight of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process and to ensure transparency, accountability, and oversight over ANSF and Security Institutions’ financial and non-financial processes. (Essential Function 2 – TAO, 2015) TAO EAG is funded and staffed by international community through the Resolute Support Mission.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: While the information you provide would be very relevant here, it cannot be verified through publicly available sources that the Defence Internal Audit function is active. Further, the evidence above indicates it is weak, which implies limited effectiveness. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) MEC. &quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report. INDEPENDENT JOINT ANTI-CORRUPTION MONITORING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE&quoute; Available on[http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf] Last modified on 30 Jan 2014

2) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015.

3) DOD. Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 2014, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf]

4) Schroeder R. &quoute;Not too little but too late: ISAF Strategic Restart of 2010 in light of the coalition's previous mistakes&quoute; in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change: Adjusting Western Regional Policy
edited by Joachim Krause, Charles King Mallory, IV (New York: Routledge, 2014).

5) &quoute;Essential Function 2 - TAO&quoute;, Afghan War News. Available on [http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/8EFs/EF2-TAO.htm] Accessed on 10 June 2015

6) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Summary of Result of Compliance Audit for ARTF IP benchmark 1393,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/en/page/1568/summary-of-result-of-compliance-audit-for-artf-ip-benchmar-1393]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In order to build the desired capacities inside the MoD- IG , the deputy internal audit office has been established. This office bases its work on a specific annual plan which follows activity areas listed below.
•tImplementation of the annual plan in the areas of finance, materials , audit and education
•tOperational audits and on the spot audits
•tFollow up audits

To improve required capacities, audits personal received 3 months annually training program which will be conducted for 40 audit personals.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
2

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

Researcher4693: The Supreme Audit Office (SAO) is the supreme audit institution in Afghanistan. The SAO examines and reviews the performance and expenditures of all entities that receive funds from public sources. (MEC: The Independent Joint …, 2015)

Up-to-date reports of audits are not regularly published though the defence ministry has been included in audits.

An audit of defence expenditure was undertaken by the SAO in 2014. The website of the SAO notes that &quoute;Based on the expenditure pattern and significance of the agencies including their importance for sectors such as education, rural rehabilitation & development, national security, three ministries, namely, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development, the Ministry of Interiors Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence were selected for compliance audit in 1393.&quoute;

According to the 2013-2014 audit report, &quoute;an amount of Afs 5,604,352,691 was transferred from the Development Budget of Ministry of defence to its Operating Budget, for which not only no consultation was done with the Budget Committee but also the amended budget constitutes almost 33% of the total Development Budget and 8.89% of the total Operating Budget of the Ministry. This is in contradiction to the provisions of the PFEM law.&quoute; At the same time the audit notes that there are several projects that are neither recorded in the budget document nor have any expenditure, they have been reported in the Qatia statements without any budget fund or expenditure.

The MEC reports that the &quoute;SAO is the only audit office in the country mandated to conduct inspections and audits of governmental institutions. Audit reports are supposed to be shared with the respective institutions two months before being finalized to allow the institutions to make corrections and voice their comments. According to the MEC, the SAO Analysis Department typically follows up each audit with one or two monitoring visits to the relevant institutions within two months of the audit. However, whether these visits actually occur could not be verified. While SAO Audit teams reportedly share their audit findings with ministries and relevant institutions, the SAO claims that the relevant institutions do not give their reports proper consideration. Additionally, under the new Audit Law, the SAO has to send all audit reports to the President and Parliament every six months” (MEC, 2014, p. 93) though recent media stories highlighted the SAO criticising the parliament for not taking the SAO’s recommendations seriously (Ahmadi, 2015). The Audit Law is not publicly available. According to MEC, the “Audit Law lacks enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Supreme Audit Office’s recommendations” (MEC: The Independent Joint …, 2015).

An official report (from the Senior Official Meeting) by the Afghan government from September 2015 indicates that &quoute;35 trained staff have strengthened the Supreme Audit Office, which in 2015 carried out audits of four line ministries that together accounted for 60% of public expenditure. All four were found to be compliant with the World Bank’s Incentive Program benchmarks.&quoute; It is unknown whether the MoD was one of the ministries subject to this series of audits.

At President Ghani’s request, SIGAR are reportedly also working with the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions to facilitate the training of Afghan auditors. (SIGAR, 2015)

US funds used for Afghanistan security and reconstruction efforts are audited by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). US Congress created SIGAR to provide independent and objective oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction projects and activities. Their quarterly reports are all published online. In one report, John Sopko, SIGAR, noted that four years of financial records that the Department of defence was supposed to keep to track its spending of $475 million worth of oil either went missing or were so poorly kept that even gathering basic information, such as the location and size of fuel sites, was not possible (SIGAR, 2012). SIGAR’s staff consists of 42 deployed personnel—including 18 Audits and Inspections staff, 20 Investigations staff, and 4 Management and Support staff (SIGAR, 2015). It is unclear to what extent this auditing has any impact on building the capacity of the Afghan external auditing bodies.

An additional body involved in oversight from the IC is the Combined Security Transition Command -Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a component of NATO RSM which is tasked with the training and development of Afghan security forces. CSTC-A &quoute;stood up its own audit division to perform independent assessments and audits, placing greater scrutiny over the Afghan financial process. Reinforcing these efforts, CSTC-A instituted an “Audit Throttle” process on direct contributions that incrementally incentivizes the Security Ministries to correct audit findings and address all audit recommendations&quoute; (DOD, 2014, p. 64).CSTC-A's independent assessments and audit reports do not appear to be publicly available.

According to SIGAR, CSTC-A is also taking numerous steps to improve oversight and management of U.S. on-budget assistance for the ANSF, and the Afghan government’s ability to manage such funds. For example, CSTC-A’s commitment letter with MOI also requires the ministry to use EPS to track salary payments and stipulates that Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) funding, which pays the police, will be withheld from employees not authorized for EPS payments by April 1, 2015. However, capacity issues remain an issue for CSTC-A auditing personnel as the command notes it has “limited personnel to conduct needed ANA and ANP payroll audits”. Similarly, as funding for the reconstruction effort has been decreasing, audit and law enforcement agencies have substantially reduced the number of staff they have based in Afghanistan (SIGAR, 2015) thereby reducing the chances of transferring auditing capacities to Afghan counterparts.

The Assessor was unable to find any evidence that external audit recommendations made by IC/SAO are subsequently implemented.

NOTE TO REVIEWERS: Given it is unclear whether audit findings are taken into account by the government, the score was changed from 3 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

1) DOD. &quoute;Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan&quoute;, Department of defence,2014 USA. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf]

2) SIGAR. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/]

3) SIGAR. &quoute;Audit,&quoute; September, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2012-09-10audit-12-14.pdf]

4) MEC. &quoute;The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) considers further strengthening of the Supreme Audit Office (SAO) to be necessary&quoute;. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/BackgrounderSAO.pdf] Accessed on 8 Apr 2015

5) Nimatullah Ahmadi. &quoute;Parliament Should Take Budgeting Consumption As Serious: Supreme Audit Office&quoute;. Available on [http://ariananews.af/latest-news/parliament-should-take-budgeting-consumption-as-serious-supreme-audit-office/] Last modified on 28 Feb 2015

6) MEC. &quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report. INDEPENDENT JOINT ANTI-CORRUPTION MONITORING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE&quoute; Available on[http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf] Last modified on 30 Jan 2014

7) SIGAR. &quoute;Why ANSF Numbers Matter: Inaccurate and Unreliable Data, and Limited Oversight of On Budget Assistance Put Millions of U.S. Taxpayer Dollars at Risk,&quoute; Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, April 29, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015. Available on [http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/SIGAR-15-56-TY-ANSF-Data-Statement11.pdf]

8) GIRoA. &quoute;Afghanistan's Road to Self-Reliance: The First Mile Progress Report.&quoute; September 05, 2015. http://www.acbar.org/files/downloads/SOM%20main%20paper%20with%20annexs%20final%203%20sep2015(1).pdf

9) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” April 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-04-30qr.pdf]

10) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Report of Auditor General: Audit Report on Qatia Accounts for the fiscal year ended 1392,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/Content/files/Qatia%20Audit%20Report%201392_English%20Final.pdf]

11) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Summary of Result of Compliance Audit for ARTF IP benchmark 1393,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/en/page/1568/summary-of-result-of-compliance-audit-for-artf-ip-benchmar-1393]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
2

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

Researcher4693: The assessor could not obtain any immediate evidence explicitly denoting that Afghanistan’s defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation. However, given the weak level of oversight and transparency on budgets, policy and audits, there is increased risk that institutions could have such interests. It is possible that individuals from defence and security establishments also have financial interests in these businesses, and it is unlikely that these are subject to government oversight. Reporting suggests that this sector could be a significant cause for concern moving forward as increased exploitation of natural resources has previously been linked with an increase in corruption.

In August 2014, a new Mineral Law was signed by the president. However, there are still shortfalls in regard to transparency and anti - corruption; for instance, there is no provision &quoute;for publication of all mining contracts or of the real ‘beneficial’ ownership of mining companies, making it very difficult for Afghans to know what deals have been signed in their name or who has benefited.&quoute; (Global Witness: Gaps in..., 2014).

Despite the fact that &quoute;state security actors are prohibited from obtaining mineral rights under Afghanistan’s Minerals Law” (“Mineral Laws,” 2010, art. 14) the enforcement of this law is often ineffective. (United States Institute of Peace: Exploitation of..., 2014). Some projects have been marred by corruption, according to SIGAR, with allegations that small mining contracts have gone to warlords and members of Parliament in contravention of Afghan law. (SIGAR, 2015)

Because there are still significant shortfalls in the new Mineral Law and in its enforcement, there is a risk that defence institutions can engage in natural resources business. According to a 2015 report by SIGAR, the Afghan government “still lacks the technical capacity to research, award and manage new contracts without external support.” (SIGAR, 2015) A UN report notes that the Afghan Government, mindful of the potential impact of insecurity curbing mining investment has announced the creation of a 7,000-strong special Mines Protection Unit (MPU) as part of the ANSF. As such, the UN notes there are “a number of risks associated with mine security including the increased likelihood of mines becoming a target for attack and security forces becoming involved in human rights abuses or the illicit trade in conflict resources” (UN, 2013). According to some analysts, there are over 2,000 illicit mining sites in Afghanistan as of June 2015. (Mohammdi, 2015).

USIP notes that there are cases reported when senior politicians and their close relatives have beneficial interest in companies extracting minerals and received such interest through improper bidding procedures involving corrupt practices (Noorani, 2015). In some mines, companies have allegedly managed to get members of their militias recruited into the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) under the MoI, the body responsible for providing security at mine sites. This is a troubling development as it shows that “Elites appear to be increasingly using state institutions to distribute resource rents among themselves and their clients, and sometimes contest over them as well.” (Noorani, 2015).

In 2013 an Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander was permitted, illegally, to extract and process chromite in a project funded by the international community. (IWA, 2013; Global Witness, 2013). The report states: &quoute;The Task Force for Business Stability Operation (TFBSO) which is a wing of the Department of Defence of the US government has provided one of the commanders of the Afghan Local Police of the Akhonzadagan village in Khas Kunar, a chromite ore crusher to process chromite [...] without consulting government officials during the early stages of the project. The Task Force later made attempts to consult officials of the Ministry of Mines who declared the project to be in conflict with the existing law of the country.&quoute;

There have also been reports of smuggling of timber (Mohseni, 2015; Carberry & Faizy, 2013).

No other case has been found to prove involvement of defence personnel in illegal actions related to natural resources exploitation. In general, the parliament has limited oversight on mineral exploitation and there have been allegations that some Parliamentarians have their own financial interests in such natural resources (SIGAR, 2015). According to Mineral Law 2014, &quoute;With respect to Contracts involving a capital investment exceeding fifty (50) million United States Dollars, the Ministry (of Mines and Petroleum) shall, after the endorsement of the Council of Ministers and before the conclusion of the Contract and bidding process, provide the Houses of the National Assembly [House of Representatives and the Upper House] with a report on the eligibility/qualification, experience, expertise and the financial capability of the qualified bidder.&quoute; (Chapt.2, Art.7(5)) But the Law does not explicit mention the requirement of an endorsement by the Parliament for the implementation of such large-scale mining contracts, unless they fall under the category &quoute;restricted minerals&quoute; which typically include radio-active or rare earth metals. Any mineral can be deemed restricted by the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. (Chapt.3 Art 14 (2)).

Improvement has been achieved in regard to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Although Afghanistan has still status of a candidate country, the new mining law includes a provision making compliance with the EITI reporting requirements mandatory for companies operating in Afghanistan (EITI, 2014). However, it is unclear whether compliance with the EITI requires interests derived from natural resource exploitation to be publicly stated and subject to public and parliamentary scrutiny.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed that there is no oversight. Given that there is risk but no concrete evidence of the involvement of defence institutions in natural resource exploitation and some evidence of the involvement of individual personnel in such activities, score 2 has been selected.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Although the assessor could not obtain any immediate evidence explicitly denoting that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation, given the evidence presented above, there is evidence to suggest that this may be a major area of risk, given mineral wealth and the need for regulations through structures such as the EITI.

COMMENTS -+

1) United States Institute of Peace. &quoute;Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Afghanistan Where Are the Government Revenues or Development Benefits?&quoute;December 01, 2014. Available on [http://www.usip.org/publications/exploitation-of-mineral-resources-in-afghanistan]

2) Global Witness. &quoute;Gaps in new Afghan mining law pose a threat to stability,&quoute; August 19, 2014. Available on [http://www.globalwitness.org/library/gaps-new-afghan-mining-law-pose-threat-stability]

3) Global Witness. &quoute;A Shaky Foundation? Analysing Afghanistan's Draft Mining Law,&quoute; November 2013, accessed May 12, 2015. Available on [https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/SHAKEY_FOUNDATION_GW.pdf]

4) EITI. &quoute;Afghanistan&quoute;. Available on [https://eiti.org/Afghanistan/implementation], 2014

5) IWA. &quoute;Chromite Extraction in Kunar&quoute;. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2013 Available on [http://www.iwaweb.org/_docs/reports/eim/chromite_extraction_in_kunar_factor_of_instability.pdf]

6) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Mineral Laws,&quoute; February 14, 2010, accessed May 12, 2015. Available on [https://info.publicintelligence.net/AfghanMineralLaw.pdf]

7) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Minerals Law,&quoute; August 16, 2014, accessed May 12, 2015. Available on [http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan-%20Minerals%20Law-%20English%2003_09_2015.pdf]

8) UNEP. &quoute;Natural Resource Management and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,&quoute; May 31, 2013, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/portals/155/countries/Afghanistan/pdf/UNEP_Afghanistan_NRM.pdf]

9) Javed Noorani. &quoute;Afghanistan’s Emerging Mining Oligarchy&quoute; United States Institute of Peace, January 2015, accessed May 12, 2015. Available on: [http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR358-Afghanistan-s-Emerging-Mining-Oligarchy.pdf]

10) SIGAR. “Afghanistan’s Mineral, Oil, and Gas Industries: Unless U.S. Agencies Act Soon to Sustain Investments Made, $488 Million in Funding is at Risk,” April, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-55-AR.pdf]

11) Geeti Mohseni. “MPs Discuss Rise in Afghan Timber Smuggling,” Tolo News, May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19469-mps-discuss-rise-in-afghan-timber-smuggling]

12) Sean Carberry and Sultan Faizy. “Afghanistan’s Forests A Casualty Of Timber Smuggling,” NPR, March 18, 2013. Available on [http://www.npr.org/2013/03/18/174200911/afghanistans-forests-a-casualty-of-timber-smuggling]

13) Zarmina Mohammdi. &quoute;Analysts: Over 2,000 Illegal Mining Sites in Afghanistan,&quoute; Tolo News, June 24, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20176-analysts-over-2000-illegal-mining-sites-in-afghanistan]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment:

Suggested score: N/A

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no immediate evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling interests in businesses associated with natural resource exploitation. It is possible that members of these establishments have financial interests in these businesses however, and it is unlikely that these are subject to government oversight. Reporting suggests that this sector could be a significant cause for concern moving forward as increased exploitation of natural resources has previously been linked with an increase in corruption.

The EITI is relevant in that it is meant to increase publicly accessible information about the payments that mining companies make to governments. Afghanistan remains a candidate country with the possibility of accession later this year pending the outcome of the 2015 report. The EITI remains non-binding and is meant to enshrine best practices but nonetheless signals a desire to tackle corruption in this area.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
1

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

Researcher4693: There is strong evidence that organized crime has penetrated the security sector. Reports indicate that militant groups function like a broad network of criminal gangs, not just in terms of the activities in which they engage, but in the way they are organised, how funds flow through their command chains, and how they interact with each other. (Peters, 2011)

In Jan 2013, SIGAR reported: “The threat of “criminal capture,” or infiltration of the leadership of government institutions by criminal elements is particularly evident within some sections of the Afghan Air Force, some provincial police forces, and border police units. Corruption and organized crime at Afghanistan’s critical ports of entry also directly undermine the state’s security and sovereignty by enabling the trafficking of narcotics, precursor chemicals, and weapons, while facilitating insurgent freedom of movement (Sullivan & Forsberg, 2013).

Organised crime has also penetrated the ANP, as &quoute;most of the officials who are deeply involved in illicit drugs in key border provinces are attached to the Afghanistan Border Police, Afghanistan Customs Department, and provincial police headquarters.&quoute; (Gulabzoi N.: The Narco-State of..., 2015)

Another related issue is the infiltration of insurgents into the ANSF resulting in insider attacks. The Daily Outlook Afghanistan comments, &quoute;The insurgents claim to have infiltrated the ANSF ranks and there have been scores of incidents where Afghan soldiers have killed their foreign counterparts or their own colleagues.&quoute; (1392: A Bloody, 2014). A detailed log of fratricidal attacks is available at the Small Wars Journal (Roggio & Lundquist, 2014). SIGAR reports that the issue of infiltration is being address through several initiatives, including a more thorough vetting process for new recruits. They also indicate that this issue &quoute;is a top priority for ISAF and the Afghan government&quoute; (SIGAR, 2013a, pp. 71). It is unknown to what extent these efforts to fight infiltration have had a discernible impact.

The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) is reportedly the primary organisation working to identify and arrest criminal networks and assists in prosecuting corruption. While the FBI withdrew its personnel due to political interference by senior Afghan officials, the US and other international partners continue to provide training, advice and assistance to the MCTF under RSM. This assistance includes providing training on basic and advanced forensics techniques. (Afghan War News, no date) There are currently (as of Feb 2015) six U.S. advisors working with MCTF investigators; most of them are retired senior police officers and investigators. (Afghan War News, no date)

Although the MCTF has been stymied by government interference in the past, no more recent evidence could be found to comment on its effectiveness or whether this has changed under President Ghani. (Human Rights Watch, 2015) The MoI website states that the MCTF has been active in detecting and investigating cases related to kidnapping, administrative corruption, and organized crimes, resulting in the arrest of 180 suspects and submission of their cases to the country’s justice sector.“ (MoI, no date) A 2015 report from SIGAR also states that “MCTF referred seven corruption cases to the AGO for further investigation and prosecution [but that] [d]espite this increase in referrals, the MCTF has seen no improvement in case processing at the AGO.&quoute; (SIGAR, 2015)

The General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) is reportedly in charge of combatting insurgency, illegal narcotics and organized crime. GDPSU are highly trained police commando forces that perform counter-insurgency strikes against insurgents in high-risk hostile environments. The Criminal Investigations Departments (CID) also focuses on organised crime and other serious criminal activity such as human trafficking, major financial crimes, corruption and terrorism. (MoI, no date) It is unclear how the organisations above coordinate.

Evidence suggests that drug trafficking and the Afghan political systems are deeply entwined (Goodman and Sutton, 2015). A UN official told the New York Times in 2014 that opium cultivation again rose to historic levels in 2014 in Afghanistan, and attributed it to the protracted elections (Norland, 2014). While President Ghani had three judges accused of aiding the escape of a drug kingpin arrested, such evidence remains anecdotal and it is difficult to tell whether government efforts to stem the influence of organized crime are making any substantive impact.

COMMENTS -+

1) The Long War Journal.&quoute;Taliban assault Camp Bastion, storm foreign guest house in Kabul&quoute; Available on [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/taliban_assault_camp.php#ixzz3QX7NJRYc] Last modified on 29 Nov 2014

2) Daily Times. &quoute;Afghanistan: green on blue attacks display security lapse&quoute; Available on [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/region/11-Aug-2014/afghanistan-green-on-blue-attacks-display-security-lapse] Last modified on 11 Aug 2014

3) SIGAR. (2013a). Jan 2013 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Retrieved from http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-01-30qr.pdf

4) 1392: A Bloody Year for ANSF. (2014, March 29). The Daily Outlook Afghanistan. Retrieved from http://outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=9751

5) Roggio, B., & Lundquist, L. (2014, June 24). Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data. The Long War Journal. Retrieved July 9, 2014, from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php#

6) Gulabzoi N. &quoute;The Narco-State of Afghanistan&quoute;, The Diplomat. Available on [http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-narco-state-of-afghanistan/] Last modified on 12 Feb 2015

7) Tim Sullivan & Carl Forsberg. &quoute;Confronting the Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime in Afghanistan:
Implications for Future Armed Conflict,&quoute; Prism : a Journal of the Center for Complex Operations , Vol. 4, No. 4 , December 2013, accessed May 12, 2015. Available on [http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Confronting_the_threat_of_Corruption_corrected_II.pdf]

8) Rod Norland. &quoute;Afghan Opium Cultivation Rises to Record Levels,&quoute; New York Times, November 12, 2014. Available on [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/world/asia/afghan-elections-cited-as-factor-in-record-levels-of-opium-production.html?_r=0]

9) Mary Beth Goodman and Trevor Sutton. &quoute;How to Halt the Afghan Drug Trade: Follow the Money,&quoute; Newsweek, March 22, 2015, accessed May 12, 2015. Available on [http://www.newsweek.com/how-halt-afghan-drug-trade-follow-money-315631]

10) Minstry of Interior. “Deputy Ministry of Security,” no date, available on [http://moi.gov.af/en/page/dms/security]

11) Human Rights Watch. ““Today We Shall All Die”: Afghanistan’s Strongmen and the Legacy of Impunity,” March 3, 2015. Available on [https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/03/today-we-shall-all-die/afghanistans-strongmen-and-legacy-impunity]

12) Afghan War News. “Essential Function 3 – RoL & Gov,” no date, accessed September 10, 2015. Available on [http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/8EFs/EF3-RoL-Gov.htm]

13) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” July 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-07-30qr.pdf]

14) Gretchen Peters. &quoute;The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing in Inaction,&quoute; Edited by Whit Mason, June 2011. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/chapter.jsf?bid=CBO9780511760082&cid=CBO9780511760082A016

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
1

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

Researcher4693: The arrest of an Afghan Army General for trafficking heroin in July 2015 presents anecdotal evidence that there is a policing function which extends to the defence services. (RFERL, 2015) A review of various sources indicates however that there is very limited evidence to indicate that this policing is effective and consistent. Nor is it clear which governmental body leads on policing and investigation of corruption and organised crime within the defence services and to what extent such policing actually takes place and the degree of their independence.

The NATO RSM website indicates the existence of the Afghan National Army’s Military Police Guard Command (MPGC), though it’s unclear to what extent their mandate extends beyond security patrol and or includes investigations into corruption.

However, there are some institutional measures reportedly being put in place to address issues of organised crime. For instance, SIGAR reports that the issue of infiltration is being address through several initiatives, including a more thorough vetting process for new recruits. They also indicate that this issue &quoute;is a top priority for ISAF and the Afghan government&quoute; (SIGAR, 2013a, pp. 71). It is unknown to what extent these efforts to fight infiltration have had a discernible impact.

The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) is reportedly the primary organisation working to identify and arrest criminal networks and assists in prosecuting corruption though it's uncertain whether this also extends to the defence sphere. While the FBI withdrew its personnel due to political interference by senior Afghan officials, the US and other international partners continue to provide training, advise and assistance to the MCTF under RSM. This assistance includes providing training on basic and advanced forensics techniques. (Afghan War News, no date) There are currently (as of Feb 2015) six U.S. advisors working with MCTF investigators; most of them are retired senior police officers and investigators. (Afghan War News, no date) Although the MCTF has been stymied by government interference in the past, no more recent evidence could be found to comment on its effectiveness or whether this has changed under President Ghani. (Human Rights Watch, 2015) The MoI website states that the MCTF has been active in detecting and investigating cases related to kidnapping, administrative corruption, and organized crimes, resulting in the arrest of 180 suspects and submission of their cases to the country’s justice sector.“ (MoI, no date)

A 2015 report from SIGAR also states that “MCTF referred seven corruption cases to the AGO for further investigation and prosecution [but that] [d]espite this increase in referrals, the MCTF has seen no improvement in case processing at the AGO.&quoute; (SIGAR, 2015) Corruption cases handled by the MCTF must pass through at least two prosecution offices before reaching the AGO’s anticorruption prosecution units and cases therefore face potential derailment as they navigate each additional office. Moreover, SIGAR reporting also stated &quoute;MCTF senior leadership and line investigators continue to encounter resistance from senior Afghan government officials and members of parliament when investigating allegations of corruption against politically-connected targets.&quoute; (SIGAR, 2015)

The HOOAC is the highest office for the coordination and monitoring of the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy and for the implementation of administrative procedural reform in the country, is assumed to be independent and reports directly to the President (HOOAC, no date). Whilst this body focuses specifically on organized crime and corruption there is no particular focus on defence or security. The Attorney General’s Office Anti-Corruption unit is responsible for investigation and prosecution of corruption (AGO, 2011). The level of independence these organisations is regularly questioned. SIGAR's report is critical toward AGO's and HOOAC's effectiveness and independence in general. (SIGAR, Report to the..., 2014, p. 147-148)

Incidents of corruption have also been identified within the defence and security ministries and forces (e.g. ANA) though they are rarely followed through to completion when they reach the AGO. (MEC, 2014, p. 80). This widely reported issue is exemplified in the high profile corruption case at the National Military Hospital, where the MEC found:

&quoute;The AGO has indicted 10 individuals accused of misuse of power, negligence of duty and smuggling related to this case; these cases were sent to the anti-corruption court in March 2013. MEC is still concerned about the ineffectiveness of investigation, lack of cooperation between national and international institutions and unjustified prolonging of all phases of investigation. MEC was recently informed that the National Military Hospital case was dismissed following several court hearings and that all of the accused were released. The AGO and the court have both refused to provide the judgment to MEC. As far as MEC is aware, the investigation was closed when the case was sent to the court. Additionally, MEC has received no information about the seizure or freezing of assets during the investigation since the HOO and AGO have not cooperated with MEC. As of November 2013, the investigations are closed as there will be no further court hearings.&quoute;
Human Rights Watch produced a report on impunity of security forces and government members for human rights abuse, including killings, rapes, tortures, thefts, kidnappings… The report states: “the Attorney General’s Office—itself accused of corruption—has criticized the High Office for Oversight for being ineffective and open to or even facilitating corruption… The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) and Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), created with international assistance and designed to be well-resourced and isolated from corruption, have been stymied by government interference.” (Human Rights Watch: Today We Shall All Die, 2015)

The General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) is reportedly in charge of combatting insurgency, illegal narcotics and organized crime. GDPSU are highly trained police commando forces that perform counter-insurgency strikes against insurgents in high-risk hostile environments. The Criminal Investigations Departments (CID) also focuses on organised crime and other serious criminal activity such as human trafficking, major financial crimes, corruption and terrorism. (MoI, no date) It is unclear how the organisations above coordinate. It unknown whether these bodies' remit includes the defence sector.

Moreover, cases have been reported where police officers have been heavily involved in drug trafficking and smuggling. The bodies that are aimed at counter narcotics, such as Counter Narcotics Police, are not able to counter the police involvement in drug trafficking efficiently as they often face budget deficit and are infiltrated themselves by warlords’ and drug smugglers’ supporters. (Gulabzoi N.:The Narco-State of…, 2015) Within the security sector, the Afghan National Police Strategy states that the MOI anti-corruption strategy will be based on “continued anti-corruption focus on police personnel who manage public assets.” Some of the strategies priorities are “implementation of procedures to warn and punish those ANP personnel who misuse their authority, fail to fulfil their duties or meet the standards required of them under Afghan law” and to “reinforce accountability among police personnel at all levels.” (Afghan National Police Strategy) To which decree these priorities have been implemented is not clear.

In addition, under the ANP is set up Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP). One of AACP's tasks is to &quoute;conduct special investigations in fields which require professional expertise such as economic crime (computer crime, illegal investments, contract fraud, bribery, forgery, embezzlement, tax and customs fraud), smuggling (of goods or human trafficking), high level crimes against persons (complex homicides, sex crimes, etc.) or property, juvenile crime, child related crime and ethical crime.&quoute; (Afghan National Police Strategy) However, it seems that this is not aimed on investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services but outside.



RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The assessor could not locate publicly available information to suggest that a separate MoD legal system exists. Please also bear in mind that this question inquires about the policing function, its effectiveness and its independence.

COMMENTS -+

1) SIGAR.&quoute;Report to the United States Congress&quoute;. April 30, 2014, accessed August 17, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-04-30qr.pdf]

2) MEC. (2014). Fifth Six-Month Report. INDEPENDENT JOINT ANTI-CORRUPTION MONITORING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE. Retrieved from http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf

3) AGO. &quoute;Public Statement by Office of the Attorney General / 19 October 2011,&quoute; October 19, 2011, accessed May 12, 2015. Available on [http://ago.gov.af/en/page/4811]

4) HOOAC. &quoute;History of HOOAC,&quoute; no date, accessed May 12, 2015. Available on [http://anti-corruption.gov.af/en/page/8463]

5) Ministry of Interior. &quoute;Afghan National Police Strategy,&quoute; no date, accessed on June 09, 2015. Available on [http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5076]

6) Gulabzoi N. &quoute;The Narco-State of Afghanistan&quoute;, The Diplomat. Available on [http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-narco-state-of-afghanistan/] Last modified on 12 Feb 2015

7) SIGAR. (2013a). Jan 2013 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Retrieved from http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-01-30qr.pdf

8) Afghan War News. “Essential Function 3 – RoL & Gov,” no date, accessed September 10, 2015. Available on [http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/8EFs/EF3-RoL-Gov.htm]

9) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” July 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-07-30qr.pdf]

10) Minstry of Interior. “Deputy Ministry of Security,” no date, available on [http://moi.gov.af/en/page/dms/security]

11) RSM. “ANA Military Police Guard Command graduates 80 Afghan military police,” July 8, 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/article/press-releases/ana-military-police-guard-command-graduates-80-afghan-military-police.html]

12) RFERL. “Afghan Army General Arrested For Trafficking Heroin,” July 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.rferl.org/content/afghan-army-general-arrested-for-trafficking-heroin/27104640.html]

13) Human Rights Watch. &quoute;Today We Shall All Die,&quoute; March 03, 2015, accessed on September 12, 2015 Available on [https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/03/today-we-shall-all-die/afghanistans-strongmen-and-legacy-impunity]

14) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” October 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-10-30qr.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: MOD corruption cases have been investigated by the responsible institutions (mentioned in question 10) and have also been subject to other counter corruption mechanisms. The cases have been followed by a legal process and entered into a database that has recently been established (with funding from the US embassy). Upon completion of the necessary documentation, the case will be handed over to a special counter corruption attorney general.

The MOD legal system was established in 2005. It has a separate legal and prosecution department and includes criminal investigators, prosecutors, and defence lawyers as well as a preliminary court and a secondary court. The system basically follows the military justice rules and national justice rules including military criminal/penal law, military execution punishment, and the military court law.

Since its inception in 2005, the MOD legal system has investigated 12156 accused individuals (ensuring all their rights).

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
1

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

Researcher4693: The National Directorate of Security (NDS) is the country's domestic intelligence organization. Little information is publicly available on them, and it is unclear to what extent the oversight, monitoring, and auditing organizations and reports used in this report appear to extend to oversight of the NDS.

The NDS was included in a recent audit by the SAO:

&quoute;Even a comparison of the operative expenditure against the original approved opertive fund shows
that an amount Afs 80,000,000 by the General Directorate of National Security and Afs 7,000,000 by
the Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs have been paid in excess of the approved fund.&quoute;

However, the audit report does not comprehensively cover NDS in great detail and further audits of the NDS could not be found.

In 2010, the NDS reportedly established an internal oversight commission to examine allegations of mistreatment of detainees, due process issues and detention conditions (UNAMA, 2011). It is unclear whether or not the commission is still active today. According to UNAMA, the commission appears to have been ineffective in addressing torture, abuse and arbitrary detention as there were concerns regarding the scope and quality of its investigations. It is not evident to what extent allegations of corruption were explicated included within the commission’s investigations into torture.

In 2013 the US Department of State reported that monitoring, investigation and assessment of prison conditions were conducted by Afghan Ministry of Justice, the attorney general, and some governors but that they did not fully meet international standards. The report also notes a delegation comprising representatives from the Independent Commission on Oversight of the Implementation of the Constitution, legal academics from Kabul University, and legal advisors from the Office of the President, the Ministry of Interior, and the NDS visited prisons and detention centers in Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat as part of a “fact finding delegation on existence of torture and abuse in prisons, detention centers, and jails”. The delegation’s findings on torture in prisons and detention centres led President Karzai to issue Presidential Decree 129 which included measures targeted at accountability, prevention, legal safeguards, access to legal and medical services, greater transparency and access to detention facilities for external independent organizations and oversight mechanisms (Clark, 2013). However, in February 2015, UNAMA released an update to its initial 2011 report where it again observed that “NDS and Ministry of Interior internal accountability and oversight mechanisms including their human rights and inspections’ departments remained deeply inadequate lacking independence, authority, transparency and capacity” (UNAMA, 2015).

There have also been reports of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), UNAMA, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and ISAF conducted independent monitoring visits to Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, NDS, and Ministry of defence (MOD) detention facilities. However, security constraints and obstruction by some authorities occasionally prevented visits to some places of detention. In February 2013, two members of parliament investigating claims of torture at prisons in Kandahar were reportedly barred from access to prisons on the order of the provincial governor (US State Department, 2013). There is no evidence indicating how often such visits take place or whether they are part of a larger policy on NDS oversight.

According to media articles, it seems that the NDS director can be summoned for questioning by parliament (ToloNews: NDS Director Cites ..., 2014) but whether the parliament can provide effective oversight of NDS' detailed budget or its policies remains unclear.

The National Security Law governing NDS's functions, duties and responsibilities is unpublished and is not publicly accessible. (UNAMA, 2015, p. 43) Information on the Directorate of National Security's operating budget for 1394 can be found in the National Budget document which is presented to parliament for approval. However, the information is highly aggregated and the degree of debate in parliament on this particular element of defence and security spending (i.e. intelligence) is unknown.

The lack of information raises concerns about depth and effectiveness of the oversight.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that this question inquires about independent oversight; the bodies you refer to are situated within the government and therefore not deemed to be independent. Moreover, as per earlier questions, there have also been questions regarding the effectiveness of oversight exercised through the parliament's committees. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) UNAMA & OHCHR. &quoute; Update on the Treatment of Conflict Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129,&quoute; February 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/2015/Detention%20report%202015/25_Feb_2015-UNAMA-Detention-Report.pdf]

2) UNAMA. &quoute;Mistreatment of conflict-related detainees in Afghan facilities,&quoute; October 10, 2011, accessed May 14, 2015 . Available on [http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=12316&mid=15873&ItemID=34426]

3) Kate Clark. &quoute;Torture, Illegal Armed Groups: Signs of Possible Afghan Government Action?&quoute; Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 22, 2013, accessed on May 14, 2015. Available on [https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/torture-illegal-armed-groups-signs-of-possible-afghan-government-action/]

4) United States Department of State. &quoute;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Afghanistan,&quoute; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/2013_hr_report.pdf]

5) Tolo News. &quoute;NDS Director Cites Powerful Government Insiders As Source of Insecurity,&quoute; December 17, 2014, accessed on May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17510-nds-director-cites-powerful-government-insiders-as-source-of-insecurity]

6) MOF. &quoute;1394 National Budget. Afghanistan Ministry of Finance,&quoute; 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1394/1394%20National%20Budget_English%20Version.pdf]

7) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Report of Auditor General: Audit Report on Qatia Accounts for the fiscal year ended 1392,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/Content/files/Qatia%20Audit%20Report%201392_English%20Final.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Ministry of defence strictly controls and oversees the secret budget. This has been done by the Minister's Office. The ministry has the sole authority to move the secret budget based on mission requirements. As the secret budget is part of the larger MOD budget the Afghan parliament oversees this funding through its financial committee on a timely basis. There are provisions and procedures that authorize the use and expenditure of the secret fund and this is available for authorized entities and individuals within ministry of defence.

The payment for secret operations and intelligence activities are separate from the normal payments. Once the minister decides to spend money on any secret operations, the payment can be made in favor of trustee and or individual or unit to carry out the mission. The payment can be made quicker than the payments for vendors and or any other purposes.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
1

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Researcher4693: President Ghani has made statements in general that appointments will be made on the basis of merit (Sadat, 2014). However, no public information could be found on the objective selection criteria for senior positions within the intelligence services and at the time of this assessment the NDS website did not provide any information on such processes or procedures.

In the past, there had been some controversy in the media over the selection and appointment of the current NDS director’s predecessor, Asadullah Khalid, who served as NDS director September 2012 – August 2013. According to a number of sources, Khalid was accused of assassinations, torture, and drug-dealing as governor of Ghazni and Kandahar provinces (Latifi & Azimy, 2012; Ariosto, 2012; Georgy, 2012).

Prior to this, Rahmatullah Nabil (currently serving as NDS director) was appointed as NDS chief from 2010 to 2012. With the appointment of Khalid as NDS head by Karzai, Nabil became deputy head of the NDS. (Khetab, 2013) In September 2013, Nabil took over as acting director when Khalid had been injured in an attack. In January 2014, Nabil won vote of confidence in WJ and became the NDS director again. (SouthAsianMedia.: Rahmatullah Nabil approved..., 2014) It is not clear whether Nabil was subject to an investigation of his suitability for this appointment.

Furthermore, there are great concerns about &quoute;the influence of foreign intelligence agencies, warlords, war criminals and ethnic and sectarian leaders in Afghan intelligence&quoute;. (Musa Khan Jalalzai: Whose Army?..., 2014, p. 115 ) This raises further questions to what extent is appointees’ suitability merit based.

The score should be between 0 and 1; however it is unclear whether there may be procedures in place with the new government. Further, the parliamentary vote of confidence indicates there must be some level of control.

COMMENTS -+

1) Latifi, & Azimy. &quoute;The many faces of Afghanistan’s spy chief,&quoute; December 10, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Al Jazeera English. Available on [http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/12/2012129131931440995.html]

2) Muhammad Hassan Khetab. &quoute;Nabil appointed as acting head of NDS&quoute;, Pajwok Afghan News, August 31, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/08/31/nabil-appointed-acting-head-nds]

3) SouthAsianMedia. &quoute;Rahmatullah Nabil approved as intelligence chief by Afghan parliament&quoute;, January 28, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.southasianmedia.net/stories/afghanistan/english-language-media/rahmatullah-nabil-approved-as-intelligence-chief-by-afghan-parliament-story]

4) David Ariosto. &quoute;Karzai's choice for Afghan intelligence chief suspected of torture, trafficking,&quoute; CNN, September 5, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/04/world/asia/afghanistan-intelligence-chief/

5) Michael Georgy, &quoute;Bomber posing as peace envoy wounds Afghan spy chief,&quoute; Reuters, December 6, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/06/us-afghanistan-intelligencechief-bombing-idUSBRE8B50JX20121206]

6) Saleha Sadat. &quoute;Ghani: Appointments for Security Ministries Won't Be Politically Compromised&quoute;, Tolo News, December 14, 2014, accessed July 03, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17466-ghani-appointments-for-security-ministries-wont-be-politically-compromised]

7) Musa Khan Jalalzai. &quoute;Whose Army? Afghanistan s Future and the Blueprint for Civil War&quoute;. Algora Publishing, 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
0

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Researcher4693: Afghanistan has voted for the adoption of the Arms Treaty but it has not signed it yet (Arms Treaty: Afghanistan, 2014). There are no indications (no articles or studies published) that Afghanistan will sign the treaty any time soon.

The country exports very few arms and there does not appear to be any mechanism for parliamentary scrutiny of arms exports. However, there are reports of an illicit arms trade between the police forces and insurgency groups. (Khan, 2013; Rahmatullah, n.d.) The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database also does not contain any information on Afghan arms export, though GunPolicy seems to indicate that the level of licit arms exports from Afghanistan is very low and the main problem continues to be the uncontrolled flow of weapons into the country. (GunPolicy, no date)

Afghanistan has signed up to a number of international protocols related to arms control, including the Ottawa Convention on Land Mines, Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development as well as the Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty. (GunPolicy, no date; UNICEF, 2002; Arms Control Association, 2015)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Although Afghanistan exports very few arms, it still exports some. This, combined with the current state of the security sector, would lead one to conclude that the question still applies and therefore a N/A is not an appropriate score. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Arms Treaty. &quoute;Afghanistan&quoute;. February 4, 2013, accessed August 18, 2015. Available on [http://armstreaty.org/state/afghanistan/]

2) Khan, F. &quoute;NATO weapons readily available in Pakistan&quoute;. DW.DE, 2013, accessed on July 11, 2014. Available on [http://www.dw.de/nato-weapons-readily-available-in-pakistan/a-17069115]

3) Rahmatullah, S. (n.d.). &quoute;Afghan Police in Taleban Arms Sales&quoute;. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Accessed on July 11, 2014. Available on [http://iwpr.net/report-news/afghan-police-taleban-arms-sales]

4) UNICEF. “UNICEF praises Afghanistan for accepting treaty on land mines,” July 29, 2002. Available on [http://www.unicef.org/newsline/02pr50mine-treaty.htm]

5) Arms Control Association. “Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties,” February, 2015. Available on [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcsig]

6) GunPolicy.org. “Afghanistan — Gun Facts, Figures and the Law,” no date, accessed September 10, 2015. Available on [http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/Afghanistan]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment:

Suggested score: N/A

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Afghanistan has signed up to a number of international protocols related to arms control, in particular, the Ottawa Convention on Land Mines as well as the Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty. Afghanistan has not yet ratified the ATT and there is little to suggest this will happen soon. The level of licit arms exports from Afghanistan is very low and the main problem continues to be the uncontrolled flow of weapons into the country, particularly into the hands of the Taliban. While the government is cognizant of this issue, in order to address it effectively it would require a more serious response to corruption.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
1

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

Researcher4693: Very little Information specific to controls over asset disposal was found.

A policy/decree on assets/equipment disposal exists. (Decree 4.2, n.d.; Decree 4.9, 2010) According to SIGAR, the Policy, Regulation of ANA Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting requires the MOD to conduct personnel asset inventories. As of January 2015, only one personnel asset inventory was known to be available; this documented the Afghan Air Force’s (AAF) inventory of 268 AAF personnel in Nangarhar province and took place in January 2013. (SIGAR, 2015)

A US Department of defence report by the DoD Inspector General also states that CSTC–A, MoD, and MoI did not have controls in place to effectively manage accountability of the approximately 95,000 vehicles procured by DoD for the ANSF since 2005. The report also found that MoD and MoI did not consistently follow property accountability procedures and also lacked trained personnel to perform supply chain management. (DoD, 2015)

The Public Procurement Law does comment on asset control and disposal though it focuses primarily on the disposal of surplus property. The law states that immovable property must be sold or leased at market prices through auction and movable property may be sold by auction or other method, whichever is deemed “most advantageous to the State.” However, the information provided focuses primarily on process and offers little on oversight except a stipulation that “The Ministry of Finance will assess the funds obtained from the sale and lease of properties.” No evidence could be found to indicate that the law is enforced.

There is also speculation in the media about corruption in asset disposals, especially through theft. (Graham-Harrison, 2012) Evidence located suggests that controls over asset disposal (if there are any) are weak. For example, according to the AREU, '100 ANA soldiers' in Nuristan reportedly sold their weapons because they had not received their salaries.&quoute; (Afghanistan Research and Revaluation Unit, 2014; Jalalzai, 2015). SIGAR’s audit report of 2014 states that the ANA accounts for weapons provided and delivered by the USA through an automated inventory management system. However, according to SIGAR, the information contained in the automated inventory management system is not reliable and does not contain complete information.

Another high profile incident in Kandahar City indicates a lack of control over asset disposals: “Land usurpation is a serious problem throughout Kandahar, especially in the Aino Maina Township. Land in this township previously belonged to the MOD but was recently, and inexplicably, given to Kandahar Municipality. A commission comprising of the Provincial Governor and representatives of Kandahar Municipality, the courts, ARAZI, the Prosecutor’s Office, the NDS and the Legal Directorate has been created to investigate cases of land usurpation, including this one. Findings of this commission have not been shared with the Governmental Cases Department.” (MEC, 2014, p. 36) There are also a number of reports on the lack of control over disposal of arms -- &quoute;ANSF officials rarely take inventory of all the weapons they receive, and often by the time they do, many have already gone missing.&quoute; (Freeman W.: How Missing American.., 2014). This indicates there are few, if any, controls in place regarding asset disposals.

Since there is no detailed defence budget that is made public, as noted in Q12, this likely means that the budget is also not transparent in providing information on proceeds of asset disposals. There is no evidence indicating asset disposals are planned in advance nor is there publicly available information to confirm that planned disposals are known in advance or made public. The financial results of disposals are not publicly available nor are they detailed in the defence budget.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The relevant information and sources have been added. While there are controls over asset disposals, there is still evidence that these controls are weak and lack necessary enforcement. The score could be between 1 and 2; however score 1 has been selected to highlight cases of corruption which reflect on the strength of the process.

COMMENTS -+

1) MEC &quoute; Fifth Six-Month Report. INDEPENDENT JOINT ANTI-CORRUPTION MONITORING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE&quoute; Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf] Last modified on 30 January 2014

2) Freeman W. &quoute;How Missing American Guns Might Be Fueling Terrorists In Afghanistan&quoute;. Available on [http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/07/28/3464685/afghanistan-missing-weapons/] Last modified on 28 July 2014

3) MOF. &quoute;1394 National Budget. Afghanistan Ministry of Finance&quoute; Available on [http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1394/1394%20National%20Budget_English%20Version.pdf]

4) Afghanistan Research and Revaluation Unit.&quoute;The Afghan National Army: Sustainability Challenges beyond Financial Aspects,&quoute; February, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/ANA%20Issues%20Paper.pdf]

5) Musa Khan Jalalzai. &quoute;The Afghan army is joining IS&quoute;, Daily Times, March 10, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/10-Mar-2015/the-afghan-army-is-joining-is]

6) MoD. &quoute;Decree 4.9: Maintenance Management Policy and Procedures&quoute;, February 28, 2010, accessed September 3, 2015. Available on [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDUQFjADahUKEwil9Zfq1drHAhWDfxoKHWm5BhI&url=https%3A%2F%2Fronna.apan.org%2FAD%2FEnglish%2520Library%2F05%2520-%2520Doctrine%2520-%2520Branches%2520(ANATEC)%2FLogistics%2C%2520Supply%2C%2520and%2520Transportation%2FDecree%25204.9%2520Maintenance.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGRoiy96SE-W7v2dA8_MrLehxctrg&sig2=ssxtgEcMlBJzlazmb7vR7A]

7) MoD. &quoute;Decree 4.2: Materiel Accountability Policy and Procedures&quoute;. Accessed on September 3, 2015. Available on [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB0QFjAAahUKEwiJgrHW5trHAhXCORoKHSUsChE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fronna.apan.org%2FAD%2FEnglish%2520Library%2F05%2520-%2520Doctrine%2520-%2520Branches%2520(ANATEC)%2FLogistics%2C%2520Supply%2C%2520and%2520Transportation%2FDecree%25204.2%2520Accountability%2520English%2520(Signed%25201388).pdf&usg=AFQjCNGpi8wZJgiIn8C9bCzL2kIHSvl1hA&sig2=h090HzNmEIXrNh2VGoRlBQ&bvm=bv.101800829,d.d2s]

8) Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. “Procurement Law,” 2008, amended in 2009. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Documents/ProcurementLaw/English/Procurment%20Law%20incoporated%20Jan%202009.pdf]

9) SIGAR. “Afghan National Army: Millions of Dollars at Risk Due to Minimal Oversight of Personnel and Payroll Data,” April, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-54-AR.pdf]

10) US Department of defence. “Challenges Exist for Asset Accountability and Maintenance and Sustainment of Vehicles Within the Afghan National Security Forces,” April 17, 2015. Available on [http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2015-107.pdf]

11) Emma Graham-Harrison. “Afghanistan halts Helmand police fuel supplies after major theft,” The Guardian, November 13, 2012. Available on [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/13/afghanistan-helmand-police-fuel-theft]

12) SIGAR. &quoute;14-84 Audit Report,&quoute; July, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/Audits/SIGAR-14-84-AR.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The report detailing the sale of weapons sale by ANA soldiers in Noristan province is completely untrue since ANA wages are paid via direct deposit to the soldiers official bank account.

In the early stage of the ANA reforming process, the MoD faced many problems and gaps concerning the duplicated supply system whereby the asset inventory and control of vehicles, weapons and equipment were not recorded with the desired degree of accuracy. These gaps have since been corrected and the correct measures are now being taken by ANA authorities.

The policy on assets/equipment disposal exists and is implemented in the MoD (Policy series 4.7 and 4.9). This policy describes procedures on how to dispose/sell scrap assets that have passed their useful life and are fully depreciated. The Ministry of Finance and concerned government bodies are involved throughout the process to apply transparency and internal controls. The relevant ledger books and computerized system such as Core-IMS-E are being utilized to increase the control over the assets and logistic depots.

Source: MoD Policy 4.7 and 4..9

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
0

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

Researcher4693: There is no evidence of scrutiny or auditing of asset disposals. The lack of technical capacity is a significant weakness. The only evidence of such scrutiny is that provided by SIGAR.

While the SAO auditor general report notes the government has receipts totaling &quoute;20.1% non-tax revenue, 2.3% miscellaneous revenue and sale of non-current assets,&quoute;it does not reference in detail whether these &quoute;non-current assets&quoute; included defence assets.

There is a dedicated internal audit department within the Ministry of Defence. However, whilst the government comment for this section states that audits are undertaken and staff are trained, this could not be verified through publicly available sources. It is therefore also uncertain whether it is effective. The MEC states that &quoute;Although internal oversight and investigative bodies exist in all ministries and independent directorates, they often do not have the capacity to implement their mandate or the support of their own ministries.&quoute; (MEC: Fifth Six-Month Report..., 2014, p. 84) Within the MOD there is a lack of capacity in most financial areas, including procurement officers, programmers, requirements and budget analysts, accountants, and auditing personnel. (DOD, 2014, p. 27) As the Source 1 confirmed, the ability of MoD and MoI to conduct effective internal audit of their assets, is very limited. (Interview: Source 1, 2015)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that we will need further details as to what corrective measures were taken to be able to award a higher score. As it stands, there is no publicly available evidence to indicate that scrutiny or auditing of asset disposals currently takes place (by the Afghan authorities). Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) SIGAR. &quoute;14-84 Audit Report,&quoute; July, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/Audits/SIGAR-14-84-AR.pdf]

2) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015

3) MEC. &quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report. INDEPENDENT JOINT ANTI-CORRUPTION MONITORING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE&quoute; Available on[http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf] Last modified on 30 Jan 2014

4) DOD. Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 2014, accessed on May 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf]

5) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Report of Auditor General: Audit Report on Qatia Accounts for the fiscal year ended 1392,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/Content/files/Qatia%20Audit%20Report%201392_English%20Final.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In the essential phase of ANA reform processes the MoD faced serious challenges and did not have the means to accurately monitor ANA assets and equipment. These challenges rose due to duplicate supply systems as war continued. The challenges have since then been coordinated with CSTC-A and corrective measures has taken by MOD.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
0

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

Researcher4693: The possible outcome of the Open Budget Survey for 2014 assumes that three per cent or less, but more than one per cent, of the total budget is dedicated to secret items. (Open Budget Survey, 2014). However, the 2014 Open Budget Survey has not been released yet and the figure provided above (from the website) appears to be an assumption (it has not changed from 2012 Open Budget Survey). Further, it does not indicate the level of spending on secret items as a proportion of the defence and security budget. The Assessor could not find any other publicly available sources to answer this question, nor were interviewees able to provide any further information.

The government has not formally announced its spending on secret items. Information on the Directorate of National Security's operating budget for 1394 can be found in the National Budget document. However it does not provide any details on what percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services overall.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The figures you provided could not be verified through publicly available sources. As such this unfortunately cannot be considered a formal or informal public announcement. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Open Budget Survey. &quoute;Country Datasheet: Afghanistan&quoute;, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://survey.internationalbudget.org/#profile/AF]

2) MOF. &quoute;1394 National Budget. Afghanistan Ministry of Finance,&quoute; 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1394/1394%20National%20Budget_English%20Version.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The MoD holds a budget of AFS 12.5 Billion from GIRoA source fund. And the budget for intelligence and secret operations are anticipated AFS 400 Million. This makes 3.2 percent of overall GIRoA funding.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
1

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

Researcher4693: The legislature is provided with very limited or abbreviated information on secret items through the national budget lines.

The Open Budget Survey states that the legislature is not provided with specific information on secret spending. No further publicly available information could be found on this topic. Considering the lack of details in national budget it is unlikely that the legislature is provided with detailed information on spending on secret items.

The aggregated national budget is provided to both houses of parliament. This includes budget lines for the National Directorate of Security as well as other bodies from which funds can come for intelligence work or secret programs, such as the MoD. (GIRoA, &quoute;National Budget..., 2014) However, there is very little detail in the national budget nor is there publicly available evidence to indicate that this is comprehensive (i.e. that there isn't spending outside of what is state in the national budget).

Whether the parliament can effectively exercise oversight over the security services (NDS) budget or its policies remains unclear.(UNAMA: Update on the Treatment..., 2015, p. 43) The 2013 US State Department’s Human Rights Report on Afghanistan also state there is limited independent judicial, or external oversight of the NDS. (US Department of State, 2014)


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Whilst the legislature is provided with an aggregated national budget, there is very little detail in the national budget nor is there publicly available evidence to indicate that this is comprehensive (i.e. that there isn't spending outside of what is state in the national budget).

COMMENTS -+

1) Open Budget Survey. &quoute;Country Data Sheet: Afghanistan,&quoute; 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://survey.internationalbudget.org/#profile/AF]

2) UNAMA. &quoute;Update on the Treatment of ConflictRelated Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129,&quoute; p.43, February 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_OHCHR_Detention_Report_Feb2015.pdf]

3) US Department of State. “2013 Human Rights Reports: Afghanistan,” February 27, 2014. Available on [http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013/sca/220386.htm]

4) Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;National Budget Document: 1394,&quoute; . Available on [http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1394/1394%20National%20Budget_English%20Version.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is no secret item relating to national security and military intelligence except the budget allocated for security services and expensed through the MoD's General Staff Chief of Intelligence (GSG2). The use of this funding is approved only for intelligence matters and reports that results in enemy and terrorism defeat & detention.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
1

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

Researcher4693: The 2012 Open Budget Survey indicates that audit reports of secret items related to the security sector are not released to the legislature (“Country Data,” n.d., question 96). However, an external audit report for the year 1392 (2013-2014) notes that 10 budgetary units expended funds derived from the “Special Operative & Hidden Expenditure (code 21130)&quoute; line. They include among others Afs 195,000,000 by the Ministry of defence and Afs 700,000,000 by the General Directorate for National Security.

At the same time the audit notes that there are several projects that are neither recorded in the budget document nor have any expenditure, they have been reported in the Qatia statements without any budget fund or expenditure.

The MEC had recommended in 2014 that “Hidden or second accounts in ministries need to be identified and eliminated to prevent corruption and the misuse of funds.” The MEC indicates that this recommendation has been partially implemented: “In an official letter SAO informed MEC that they have included this recommendation in their working plan and will send a complete report to MEC about their findings once the evaluations are completed.” (MEC, 2014, p. 106).

The Audit Law is not publicly available and so it cannot be verified whether it is a legal requirement for audits of the security sector to take place and to be submitted to the legislature.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The aforementioned information indicates that parliamentarians (which receive these reports) are privy to some very basic information surrounding secret program funding but a lack of further evidence and lack of detail in the figures that are provided indicate that there may be considerable omissions. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Open Budget Survey. &quoute;Country Data Sheet: Afghanistan,&quoute; 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://survey.internationalbudget.org/#profile/AF]

2) MEC. &quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report,&quoute; Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, January 30, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

3) Auditor General. &quoute;Report of Auditor General: Audit Report on Qatia Accounts for the fiscal year ended 1392,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/Content/files/Qatia%20Audit%20Report%201392_English%20Final.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The annual MOD ordinary budget mostly includes strategic level programs( which includes applicable codes 21, 22 and 25) and are approved by parliament and by executive regulation.

In the specified operational budget of the MOD, intelligent service expenditures have been executed in line with existing regulation which, in turn, is fully controlled by the respective internal procedures’ and entities.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The 2012 Open Budget Survey indicates that audit reports related to the security sector and other secret programs are not released to the legislature (“Country Data,” n.d., question 96). - This appears to remain valid.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
0

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

Researcher4693: Off-budget military expenditure appears to be legally permitted. A report from Equality for Peace and Democracy noted that &quoute;donor controlled assistance streams flowing off-budget... and a large percentage of the core budget (66% of the development budget in FY 1393), remains under the discretionary authority of the international donors&quoute;, (Equality for Peace and Democracy .&quoute;A Snapshot of Resources..., 2014).

The majority of defence spending is off-budget, external to central government allocation, provided by the international community. According to Source 2, defence spending attributable to the international community is about 93 % of the total funding for the ANSF. This figure is roughly supported by a GAO report showing that the United States funded an estimated 90 percent of Afghanistan's total security expenditures between 2006-2010. There is a lack of more recent information supporting that this is still the case. Overall, the transparency and accountability of this off-budget international community funding, to the Afghan people, is less transparent than on-budget spending (Bizhan, 2012, p. 10) and because a large portion of aid is channelled through an “off budget” system, the Afghan government, legislature and people have no control or oversight over these funds. According to Source 1, the information on off-budget funding for the defence sector is shared with the Office of President, MoD and NDS but it is not available for the parliament (Interview: Source 1, 2015). Presumably, this information will therefore also not be available to the public.

No further publicly available information on off-budget military expenditure specifically was identified.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Thank you for your comments. Please do note that this question inquires about the legality of off-budget expenditures.

COMMENTS -+

1) Sources searched include the Ministry of defence Website (http://mod.gov.af/en) and other relevant government websites, Afghan local news (Tolo: http://tolonews.com/ and Pajhwok: http://tolonews.com/) Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law and all other documents specifically referenced throughout this assessment.

2) Equality for Peace and Democracy .&quoute;A Snapshot of Resources, Allocations, and Public Finance Management Performance,&quoute; November, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.epd-afg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/1394-Budget-Snapshot_English.pdf]

3) Interview with Source 1, an anti - corruption policy advisor,18 Feb 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Off-budget items have been provided by ISAF/NATO based on requirements. The requirements have been identified by ISAF and provided by ISAF.

The MOD Finance department does not have any information on off-budget expenditures. This includes weapons, ammunitions, clothing, communication items and fuel, however in last 2 years the fuel and clothing as major off-budget items have been transferred towards MOD control. As MOD finance is responsible for all ANA expenditures to Afghan Parliament, there should be more coordination and data exchange among ISAF finance units about ANA off-budget support and MODF, however this has not happened in past years. ISAF/NATO only reports off-budget expenditures for ANSF to presidential and defence leadership on a required basis. There have been negotiations to exchange required data and off-budget figures to compile and produce a document which includes all ANA expenditures.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As noted by the assessor while, apparently legal, there is significant oversight by the international community into these types of expenditures. The IMF has noted that a large percentage of Afghanistan’s GDP comes from donor financing.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
0

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

Researcher4693: The majority of international donor funding to Afghanistan, and thus the majority of the country’s military expenditures are off-budget. Recently, through the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (adopted in July 2012) there has been a push by the international community to make more international aid on-budget, however there is a reluctance due to the Afghan government’s lack of capacity.

Bizhan reports: “While the budget became a central tool for realizing national policies, it does not include all of the aid flows to the country because a large portion of aid is channelled through an “off - budget” system over which the Afghan government and legislature have no control or oversight. For example between 2001 and 2010 only US $ 10 billion out of a total US $ 65 billion of foreign assistance was channeled through the budget; the rest went directly from donors to implementing agencies through parallel mechanisms. Donors justified the use of “off - budget” mechanisms by pointing to the limited capacity of the government, to incidences of corruption, and to the fact that most of this spending was allocated to the security sector” (Bizhan, 2013, p. 4).

Through the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework the international community has pledged to route at least 50% of its aid through the National Budget. In 2012, 46% of disbursement was noted as on-budget. The Afghan Ministry of Finance (MoF) Treasury data, however, suggests a lower percentage of 36% (Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, 2013). The civil society organisation Equality for Peace and Democracy reports that &quoute;Despite the recent increase in on budget funding, a large percentage of the core budget (66% of the development budget in FY 1393), remains under the discretionary authority of the international donors&quoute; (Equality for Peace and Democracy: A Snapshot of Resources..., 2014) Although no information could be found on military related off-budget expenditure specifically, it can be assumed that a large portion of national off-budget expenditure is used in defence sector, considering the security situation in Afghanistan.

The Afghan government states that 41% of £7 billion of off-budget aid (including all sectors) have resulted in Financing Agreements which have been signed with the government. (GIRoA, 2015) The government will also reportedly work with donors to adopt a phased approach for the transfer of off-budget technical assistance into government positions.

Media and non-governmental organisations report on allegations of off-budget military expenditures being used for illicit activity, including the funding of illegal militias and payments to insurgents (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Trott, 2015; Mashal, Goldstein and Sukhanyar, 2015)

COMMENTS -+

1) Nematullah Bizhan. &quoute;Budget Transparency in Afghanistan: A Pathway to Building Public Trust in the State,&quoute; International Budget Partnership, February 1, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI-case-study-Afghanistan.pdf]

2) &quoute;Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework: Senior Officials Meeting,&quoute; Joint Report, July 3, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/TMAF_SOM_Report_Final_English.pdf]

3) Equality for Peace and Democracy .&quoute;A Snapshot of Resources, Allocations, and Public Finance Management Performance,&quoute; November, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.epd-afg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/1394-Budget-Snapshot_English.pdf]

4) IWA. &quoute;Chromite Extraction in Kunar,&quoute; November 2013, accessed May 14, 2015 . Available on [http://www.iwaweb.org/_docs/reports/eim/chromite_extraction_in_kunar_factor_of_instability.pdf]

5) Najibullah Gulabzoi. &quoute;The Narco-State of Afghanistan,&quoute; The Diplomat, February 12, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-narco-state-of-afghanistan/] Last modified on 12 Feb 2015

6) Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. “Afghanistan’s Road to Self-Reliance: The First Mile Progress Report,” September 05, 2015. Available on [http://www.acbar.org/files/downloads/SOM%20main%20paper%20with%20annexs%20final%203%20sep2015(1).pdf]

7) Human Rights Watch. “Afghanistan: Abusive Strongmen Escape Justice,” March 3, 2015. Available on [http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/03/afghanistan-abusive-strongmen-escape-justice]

8) Bill Trott. “$1m of CIA cash siphoned off from secret Afghan fund to pay al-Qaeda ransom demand,” The Independent, March 15, 2015. Available on [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/1m-of-cia-cash-siphoned-off-from-secret-afghan-fund-to-pay-alqaeda-ransom-demand-10109625.html]

9) Mujib Mashal, Joseph Goldstein and Jawad Sukhanyar. “Afghans Form Militias and Call on Warlords to Battle Taliban,” The New York Times, May 24, 2015. Available on [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/25/world/asia/as-taliban-advance-afghanistan-reluctantly-recruits-militias.html?_r=0]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As noted by the SIGAR (Audit report 15-68, July 2015), a significant amount of funds that have flowed into Afghanistan development projects with little accountability as to where the money invested has gone. As such these off-budget investments are easily funneled into corrupt enterprises and likely contributes to illicit activity.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
1

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

Researcher4693: No evidence was found that classification system is explicitly mentioned in law or is legally regulated. In praxis, the Afghan government leverages a classification system similar to the NATO classification system. This helps to keep sensitive information within smaller group of people and thus prevent misuse of the information. (Interview: Source 1, 2015) The success of these measures is questionable considering existence of family networks and practice of patronage inside Afghan Institutions. (Vlahos, 2014; 1TV, 2015)

The government has passed an Access to Information Law making it necessary for state entities to establish designated offices to provide information to the public on demand and proactively. While the Access to Information Law may be in place it can't be considered the basis for classification on the basis of national security as parts of it remain unclear as the law was reported by some watchdog organisations to create limitations for the media and research bodies rather than facilitate accessible information. (Tolo News, 2014)

Under the 2014 law, limitations on access to information are restricted to situations where disclosure poses legitimate harm to public or private interests. This include cases where national security is concerned, where a citizen’s rights may be violated, where the release of information would obstruct the detection or investigation of a crime, or where the life, property, honor, or prestige of a person would be endangered. This would indicate that there is still great risk that information related to defence will be classified at the discretion of the individuals, parties, or groups in power. Under the new law, people will gain access to state and public budgets and officials who violate the right to access to information are subject to disciplinary action, which can include salary deductions. (UNDP, n.d.; Outlook Afghanistan, 2015)

Civil society actors state however that there are still some loopholes and gaps within the legislation. For instance, there is no protection for civil servants who release information in good faith pursuant to the law or to expose wrongdoing. (IWA, 2015) There is also significant concern surrounding the implementation of this new law. According to an Afghan daily newspaper op-ed there appears to be “a great degree of confusion on working mechanism of flow of information from concerned department to journalists, particularly in the provinces.” (Outlook Afghanistan, 2015)

An oversight body will reportedly be set up to oversee implementation and enforcement of the law. This Monitoring Commission on Access to Information is to be made up of representatives from government and civil society and will handle cases of alleged violations. (UNDP, n.d.; Outlook Afghanistan, 2015) The chair position will rotate and the first round will be filled by a leader from civil society. The Monitoring Commission on Access to Information can only recommend disciplinary actions against violators of the act and no fines are specified if information is not provided.

Although Article 50 of the Afghan Constitution guarantees citizens the right to access information from state departments and Article 34 provides for freedom of expression, Afghanistan previously did not have a law on access to information.

The fact that the Access to Information Law is not public adds to the risk for it to be abused, therefore the score

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The Internal Confidentiality Law is not publicly available and therefore the information you provide cannot be verified. However, the introduction of the Access to Information Law is relevant here. Score changed from 0 to 1 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015

2) Kelley Vlahos. &quoute;Afghanistan’s Still-Broken Government,&quoute; The American Conservative, December 23, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/afghanistans-still-broken-government/]

3) 1TV. &quoute;Special Report: How patronage appointment prevails in Kabul police,&quoute; January 22, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/14885-special-report-how-patronage-appointment-prevails-in-kabul-police]

4) IWA. &quoute;Approval of Access to Information Law is the biggest achievement towards transparency and accountability in Afghanistan,&quoute; July 1, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.iwaweb.org/_news/news0010_approval_ati_law.html]

5) UNDP. “Enforcing Access to Information Law Improving Government Accountability,” no date, accessed September 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/successstories/AccesstoInformation.html]

6) Outlook Afghanistan. “Pros and Cons of Access to Information Law,” March 10, 2015. Available on [http://outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=11789]

7) Integrity Watch Afghanistan. “Right to Information: The foundation for transparent and responsive governance in Afghanistan,” August 31, 2015. Available on [http://www.acbar.org/files/downloads/Policy%20Brief%20-%20Right%20to%20Information.pdf]

8) Saleha Soadat. &quoute;Access to Info Law Creates Restrictions: IWA,&quoute; Tolo News, December 01, 2014. http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17314-access-to-info-law-creates-restrictions-iwa

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Ministry of defence has an Internal Confidentially Law which clearly classifies information based on clear benchmarks as well as the requesting bodies.

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
1

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

Researcher4693: Very little publicly available information was found on this topic. It does not seem likely that military owned business exist on a large scale, although the presence of informal, illicit military businesses are possible. Source 1 agreed with the assessment. (Interview: Source 1, 2015). The Assessor has been unable to identify any evidence that ownership is legally forbidden.

The government response to question #13 indicates that there may be some income reported by the accounting department of the MoD on income received from rental properties such as shops and land under rent to public and private entities, indicating a degree of ownership of commercial businesses.

However, no publicly available sources could comment on the existence of these properties. Part of the Ministry of Finance’s 100 Day Plan involves the registration of all public properties and calls for modernizing state property registration systems so as to increase accurate collection of state property revenue. There is also a line in the 1394 budget for “Other non-tax revenue” indicating that there may be revenues from state-owned assets. (Ministry of Finance, 2015) The Ministry of Finance shows records indicating some revenues are gathered from the MoD but this data does not appear to be regularly updated. (Ministry of Finance, 2014). The figures stated indicate the MoD obtained approximately a revenue around $3 million which accounts for roughly 0.18% of the 1394 MoD budget ($1.3 billion).

Even though there is limited related information available in the public domain, the low level of transparency and high secrecy in the sector may allow for the possibility that there are businesses owned by defence and security institutions which are not declared and revenues of which are not recorded. The score has been selected to highlight the risk that such businesses, which are not transparent, may be substantial.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that your comments could not be verified through publicly available sources nor could the assessor located legislation to indicate that beneficial ownership of commercial businesses by military and defence personnel is prohibited. Nor could the assessor locate information to indicate that these businesses are publicly declared.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015

2) Ministry of Finance. “Revenue Collection & Target Summary,” 2014. Available on [http://www.ard.gov.af/images/pdfs/weekly/weeklyreport.pdf ]

3) Ministry of Finance. &quoute;1394 National Budget. Afghanistan Ministry of Finance,&quoute; 2015, accessed May 11, 2015. Available on [http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1394/1394%20National%20Budget_English%20Version.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no military-owned business in MOD.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I was unable to find evidence to suggest that the defence and security institutions own commercial assets in Afghanistan. If this does exist it is likely not institutional, but rather informal and as such not disclosed to the government.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
0

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

Researcher4693: No publicly available information was found. Given the limited evidence surrounding oversight activity (through parliament or the Supreme Audit Office) it is unlikely that military-owned businesses are subject to scrutiny or auditing processes. Further, as mentioned in Question 30, it is likely that the true scale of military owned businesses is unknown.

While the SAO report for solar year 1393 (2014-2015) noted &quoute;20.1% non-tax revenue, 2.3% miscellaneous revenue and sale of non-current assets &quoute;, the source of this revenue remains unclear and it is unknown whether this would include asset disposal or proceeds from military owned businesses.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that your comments could not be verified through publicly available sources nor could the assessor located legislation to indicate that beneficial ownership of commercial businesses by military and defence personnel is prohibited. Nor could the assessor locate information to indicate that these businesses are publicly declared. As such, the question is still relevant and must be assessed based on the degree of transparent, independent scrutiny that is exercised over such companies.

COMMENTS -+

1) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Report of Auditor General: Audit Report on Qatia Accounts for the fiscal year ended 1392,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/Content/files/Qatia%20Audit%20Report%201392_English%20Final.pdf]

Sources searched include the Ministry of Interior Website (http://moi.gov.af/en) and other relevant government websites, Afghan local news (Tolo: http://tolonews.com/ and Pajhwok: http://www.pajhwok.com/),Interview with Source 1 and Source 2 and all other documents specifically referenced throughout this assessment.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: MOD still is not able to establish businesses activities.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
0

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

Researcher4693: No law explicitly outlaws private enterprise by military personnel. There have been many statements by the president on increasing accountability and transparency in cooperation with private sector, for example on the extractive sector, according to the Natural Resources Governance Institute. However, no evidence could be found indicating the Afghan government discourages unauthorised private enterprise by the military. (Kuai, 2014)

Presidential Decree 45 orders: “All state organizations and agencies are ordered to refrain from signing contracts for provision of services, with high ranking state officials and those appointed and supported by them. Such conduct would be considered a crime, and those committing it will be legally investigated by the office of the Attorney General.” (Office of the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2012, art. 15) The MEC has been monitoring this legal degree and indicates that it has been partially implemented. The MEC contacted various Ministries, including the MOD to evaluate the progress on the implementation of the legal degree. The MOD, as well as numerous other ministries, reportedly “claim that they are in full compliance, yet are unable to provide supporting documentation… MEC cannot determine to what extent governmental institutions are actually complying with the terms of the article.” (MEC, 2014, p. 118) Since the MEC report suggests that it is difficult to monitor compliance with the PD 45 therefore the Assessor assumes that private enterprise is not well regulated and controlled.

There is evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military and defence personnel and this extends to illicit mineral extraction and land grabbing -- as of 2014, “more than 50% of ANA soldiers are using drugs or have been involved in drug smuggling and fuel theft.&quoute; (Musa Khan Jalalzai: Whose Army?..., 2014, p. 156; Tolo, 2015) There have been some media reports that members of the ANA selling weapons and equipment to the Taliban (Carberry, 2012).

Reports indicate that many sub-national government officials, particularly law enforcement agents, are inextricably associated with “drug trafficking networks and transnational criminals [and] have been able to establish their own networks of protection and patronage at the epicenter of the Afghan government” (Gulabzoi, 2015; Goodman and Sutton, 2015; Shinkman, 2014)

In terms of possible sanctions for illicit private enterprise, the MEC states that &quoute;Several agencies – including HOO, MOI,SAO, ARAZI, and MOPH - have indicated that they referred hundreds of potential corruption cases to the AGO for further investigation, without receiving any information about the cases’ status or whether they have even been investigated.&quoute; (MEC Report, 2014, p.27) Whilst the MEC report does not discuss illicit private enterprise of military personnel, it may not be unreasonable to expect that such cases would fall under those complaints.

In adittion, the Afghan National Police Strategy states that the MOI anti-corruption strategy will be based on “continued anti-corruption focus on police personnel who manage public assets.” Some of the strategies priorities are “implementation of procedures to warn and punish those ANP personnel who misuse their authority, fail to fulfil their duties or meet the standards required of them under Afghan law” and to “reinforce accountability among police personnel at all levels.” (Afghan National Police Strategy) To which decree these priorities have been implemented is not clear.

COMMENTS -+

1) Musa Khan Jalalzai. &quoute;Whose Army? Afghanistan’s Future and the Blueprint for Civil War&quoute; (NY: Algora Publishing, 2014), p.156.

2) MEC.&quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report,&quoute; Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, January 30, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

3) Office of the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;The Office of the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Decree no. 45 of 5 Asad 1391 [26 July 2012] on the Execution of Content of the Historical Speech of 1 Saratan 1391 [21 June 2012] in the Special Session of National Assembly,&quoute; July 26, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2012/07/the-office-of-the-president-of-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-decree-on-the-execution-of-content-of-the-historical-speech-of-june-21-2012-in-the-special-session-of-national-assembly/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PermanentMissionOfAfghanistanToTheUnInNewYork+%28Permanent+Mission+of+Afghanistan+to+the+UN+in+New+York%29bestth]

4) Saleha Soadat. &quoute;UN Claim Top Afghan Officials Involved in Land Grabbing,&quoute; Tolo News , April 7, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18947-un-claim-top-afghan-officials-involved-in-land-grabbing]

5) Katarina Kuai. &quoute;Will Afghanistan's New President Depart from &quoute;Business as Usual&quoute; in the Extractives Sector?&quoute; Natural Resource Governance Institute, September 30, 2014, accessed July 03, 2015. Available on [http://www.resourcegovernance.org/news/blog/will-afghanistans-new-president-depart-business-usual-extractives-sector]

6) Sean Carberry. “Afghan Army Seeks Better Equipment, But Lacks Basic Skills,” NPR, October 28, 2012. Available on [http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/10/28/163826505/afghan-army-seeks-better-equipment-but-lacks-basic-skills]

10) Mary Beth Goodman and Trevor Sutton. “How to Halt the Afghan Drug Trade: Follow the Money
,” Newsweek, March 22, 2015. Available on [http://www.newsweek.com/how-halt-afghan-drug-trade-follow-money-315631]

11) Najibullah Gulabzoi. “The Narco-State of Afghanistan,” The Diplomat, February 12, 2015. Available on [http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-narco-state-of-afghanistan/]

12) Paul D. Shinkman. “New Opium Highs, Corruption Tear Apart Afghanistan,” US News, October 21, 2014. Available on [http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/10/21/inspector-general-new-opium-highs-corruption-tear-apart-afghanistan]

13) Ministry of Interior. &quoute;Afghan National Police Strategy,&quoute; no date, accessed on June 09, 2015. Available on [http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5076]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There have been some media reports that the ANA/MoD had engaged in unauthorised or misjudged private enterprise including selling newly bought transport planes for scrap (Washington Times, 9 Oct 2014) and members of the ANA selling weapons and equipment to the Taliban (NPR, 28 Oct 2012).

There is legislation discouraging this activity and little to suggest that the government profits from this.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
2

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

Researcher4693: There is some evidence that MoD officials publicly condemn corruption (Tolo News: Gen Karimi..., 2015)
Gen. Karimi, Chief of Army Staff in the Military of Afghanistan, claimed in his speech outlining his plans as a defence minister in front of the WJ that he would ensure accountability and pledged he would “keep the army out [of] politics and try to strengthen its transportation capability and eradicate corruption.&quoute; (Pajhwok, 2015). However, his nomination for Minister was rejected by parliament.

According to a 2013 SIGAR report, “The MOD continues to push anti-corruption reform measures. In March, it held a two-day conference that outlined the ministry’s approach to anti-corruption and provided detail on the way the Transparency and Accountability Working Group, set up to provide oversight for MOD, will work. Likewise, the MOD Inspector General is now demonstrating a more robust stance against corruption with a number of investigations and, more important, prosecutions” (SIGAR, 2013b, p. 137).

According to the US Department of defence, “The [Afghan] Minister of defence acknowledged the deficiencies and weaknesses within the MOD and made incremental modifications to the inherent and ingrained patronage networks that are the norm in Afghanistan. The transparency and accountability requirement to meet or exceed the international community’s counter - corruption expectations, tied to Chicago NATO Summit donations, is accepted within the MOD and it made progress in establishing appropriate structures to fight corruption. However, oversight mechanisms and counter- corruption lag significantly behind other areas of development” (DOD, 2014, p. 28).

Moreover, according to SIGAR, “The Minister of defence and the Transparency and Accountability Office unilaterally decided to begin holding Working Group sessions to push for anticorruption reforms within the MOD. Of particular note has been the fact that the MOD has held three senior-level anticorruption meetings this quarter, chaired by either the Minister or the First Deputy Minister” (SIGAR, 2014, p. 129).

In 2012, Major General Afzal Aman, the chief of staff for operations at the Ministry of defence (still at the position), stated that corruption prevents him from fulfilling his job. However, this type of statement seems to be more of the exception than the norm. (Huffington Post: Afghan Army..., 2012)

No additional statements by senior ministry staff or senior armed forces officers condemning corruption were found.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Thank you for your comment. While the government's review of this index is noted as a positive step, please note that a score of 3 denotes that there must be evidence that the stated commitments to anti-corruption is reflected throughout the defence ministry and armed forces by similar commitments from senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Syed Tariq Majidi. &quoute;Gen. Karimi Rallies Troops Ahead of Looming Push Against Insurgents,&quoute; Tolo News, January 5, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17723-gen-karimi-rallies-troops-ahead-of-looming-push-against-insurgents]

2) Khwaja Basir Ahmad. &quoute;If endorsed, Gen. Karimi to reform army&quoute; Pajhwok Afghan News, January 21, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/2015/01/21/if-endorsed-gen-karimi-reform-army]

3) Joshua Hersh. &quoute;Afghan Army General: Corruption Sometimes Makes It Impossible To Do Our Job,&quoute; Huffington Post, May 18, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/18/afghan-general-corruption_n_1527448.html]

4) DOD. &quoute;Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,&quoute; April, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf]

5) SIGAR. &quoute;Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,&quoute; July, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-07-30qr.pdf]

6) SIGAR. &quoute;Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,&quoute; April, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/index.aspx?SSR=6]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: MOD has highly committed to counter the corruption, as shown by the examples given in the evaluation.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Researcher4693: The existence of several anti-corruption institutions referenced in this assessment, both internal and external to the MoD, indicate that some measures are in place, or planned, to handle corruption within the defence sector. The Afghan Penal Code provides a legal framework for corruption-related offences and stipulates measures against offenders. For example it stipulates types of sanctions for bribery and embezzlement, such as imprisonment and financial fine (Penal Code, Book 2, Sec.1, Chapt. 3&4) SIGAR investigators and CSTC-A state that they are working closely with President Ghani’s advisors to investigate allegations of misconduct. A SIGAR interview with President Ghani also denotes that he retired 72 generals in the MoD in 2015.&quoute; (SIGAR, 2015)

However, there is widespread evidence of lack of effectiveness and consistency: “only about 18 per cent of reported bribery cases in Afghanistan actually lead to the initiation of a formal procedure against the implicated public official. In another 24 per cent of reported cases the problem is solved informally and the citizen has his or her money or gift returned. In almost half of cases there was either no follow-up whatsoever (30 per cent) or the reporting citizen was advised not to take the report any further (18 per cent). This demonstrates a clear need for stronger and more transparent responses to acts of corruption that come to the attention of the authorities.&quoute; (UNODC & HOO, 2012, p. 22) This trend still held in 2015 when a recent study by the MEC found that &quoute;poor inter-institutional coordination among government stakeholders and significant human resource capacity deficiencies [...] combined with lack of political will and interference from high- level officials, conspire to undermine the timely processing of corruption cases in Afghanistan.&quoute; (MEC, 2015)

There have been anecdotal reports where measures to address corruption by personnel have been put to use. In 2015, an army general was arrested for allegedly smuggling drugs. However, there has been no further information about the case nor is it known if the individual was prosecuted. (Tolo News,2015) However, in another case discussed in the media, “a drug dealer was released from jail after bribing several officers and judges”, though the article highlights that, “only junior-level judges involved were under investigation by an internal judicial disciplinary body. There is no evidence that prison officers involved in the incident are being investigated or prosecuted. (NY Times, 2014)

In 2015, according to media reports, the Afghan government reported that it had terminated a $200 million oil contract for the defence ministry and subsequently fired procurement officials with the MoD who are being investigated for fraud, though no reports of arrests emerged.

Lack of evidence shows that whilst there are consequences for defence personnel involved in corrupt activity there are no indications that prosecutions of the individuals takes place or is done so consistently. A 2015 report from SIGAR also states that despite many referrals reaching the Attorney General's Office, there has been no apparent improvement in case processing at the AGO&quoute; and that &quoute;corruption cases handled by the MCTF must pass through at least two prosecution offices before reaching the AGO’s anticorruption prosecution units. Cases face potential derailment as they navigate each additional office.&quoute;

Moreover, SIGAR reporting also stated &quoute;MCTF senior leadership and line investigators continue to encounter resistance from senior Afghan government officials and members of parliament when investigating allegations of corruption against politically-connected targets.&quoute; (SIGAR, 2015)

Earlier in 2012, the U.S. auditor for Afghanistan in a report stated that they were unable to account for $475 million worth of oil destined for Afghan National Army.

COMMENTS -+

1) Eltaf Najafizada. &quoute;Kabul Bank ‘Fraud’ to Be Probed Anew by Afghan Government,&quoute; Bloomberg, October 1, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-01/kabul-bank-fraud-to-be-probed-anew-by-afghan-government]

2) BBC. &quoute;Kabul Bank fraud: Afghan court increases jail terms,&quoute; November 11, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30011846]

3) Joseph Goldstein. &quoute;Bribery Frees a Drug Kingpin in Afghanistan, Where Cash Often Overrules Justice,&quoute; New York Times, December 31, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/01/world/asia/bribes-free-drug-kingpin-in-afghanistan-where-cash-often-overrules-justice.html] Last modified on 31 Dec 2014

4) 1TVNews. &quoute;Afghan MoD Oil Contract Cancelled Amid Fraud Allegations Measures Introduced&quoute;, February 2, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/15070-afghan-mod-oil-contract-cancelled-amid-fraud-allegations-measures-introduced]

5) UNODC, & HOO. &quoute;Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Trends and Patterns,&quoute; December 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf]

6) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Penal Code&quoute;. October 7, 1976, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/AF/Penal%20Code%20Eng.pdf/view]

7) MEC. &quoute;Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment on Corruption Case Processing in Afghanistan,&quoute; February, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/2015_02_Corruption_Case_VCA_(English).pdf]

8) Tolo News. &quoute;Army General Arrested For Drug Smuggling in Baghlan,&quoute; July 1, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20262-army-general-arrested-for-drug-smuggling-in-baghlan]

9) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” October 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-10-30qr.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: MOD is completely agreed.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is some evidence that some work has been done to try and address rampant corruption in the public sector, however, the consistency with which this is being addressed is inconsistent.

These measures do not appear to be consistent or necessarily effective. Rampant corruption is a crucial problem that has yet to be satisfactorily addressed.

There is little evidence suggesting punishment for bribery and corruption. While a recent case against the mayor of Logar (Khaama, 9 June 2015) suggests that some steps are being taken, the majority of cases remain unpunished.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
1

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

Researcher4693: Whistleblowing does not appear to be actively encouraged and no cases of whistle-blowers in the defence sector were identified in the media.

No evidence of military specific whistle blower protection was found. Even general legislation to protect whistle-blowers appears to be inadequate, as can be inferred from MEC's statement on the Kabul Bank fraud that the government has not responded to the MEC’s “key recommendations related to … whistle-blower protection.” (MEC, 2013) In this respect, the MEC had recommended that “The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan should ensure adoption of legislation that will enhance whistleblowing, protect whistle-blowers from adverse consequences of their disclosures, establish whistle-blower and witness protection programs, and protect public officials from criminal and civil liability or adverse employment action when conducting official duties in good faith.” (MEC, 2012) This was reinforced by a 2015 report from the NGO Integrity Watch Afghanistan which called for the drafting of a whistle-blower protection law. (IWA, 2015)

In terms of reporting corruption, the HOO provides information on how to report corruption, and provides the following interpretation/translation of The Law on Monitoring the Implementation of the Anti-Administrative Corruption Strategy:

Article 14 of the Law on Monitoring the Implementation of the Anti-Administrative Corruption Strategy states that:

&quoute;(1) Individuals who cooperate with good will with the discovery of administrative corruption cases as an informant or assist during the investigation or trial as a witness or provide proofing/admissible evidence and documents shall be immune from any type of pressure, intimidation and ill-treatment and according to the condition shall be rewarded.

(2) Disclosing the identity of the informant, witness, Intellectuals or the person who provides evidence and documents, without their consent, is prohibited.&quoute; (Law on Monitoring the Implementation..., 2008)

According to the MEC, the High Office of Oversight “receives and collects information through different sources such as hotline centre, complaints boxes, face-to-face interviews, and other governmental organizations and whistle-blowers. After an assessment, substantiated cases are reportedly forwarded to the Attorney General’s Office for proper investigation and prosecution.” (MEC, 2012)

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;Law on Monitoring the Implementation of the Anti-Administrative Corruption Strategy&quoute;, August, 2007, accessed May 15, 2015. Available on [http://publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Afghanistan_Law%20on%20Combating%20Corruption_2008_en.pdf]

2) MEC. &quoute;Report of the Public Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis,&quoute; November 15, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mec.af/files/knpir-final.pdf]

3) MEC. &quoute;Responses to the Kabul Bank public inquiry and other recent developments jeopardize the recovery of stolen money and the potential for systemic change,&quoute;Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitering and Evaluation Committee, March 17, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/Press_Release_Kabul_Bank_inquiry_March_17_2013.pdf]

4) &quoute;Submit Your Complaints,&quoute; High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, no date, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://anti-corruption.gov.af/en/page/8511]

5) IWA. &quoute;Taking on Corruption: Institutional Arrangement to Fight Corruption in Afghanistan,&quoute; August 31, 2015. Available on [http://www.acbar.org/files/downloads/Policy%20Brief%20-%20Taking%20.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: MOD is completely agreed.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is little to suggest that sufficient mechanisms are in place to protect or support whistleblowers and there is little to suggest that this type of accountability exists. There has been little to suggest the existence of whistleblowers within defence and security establishments and it remains unclear how they would be treated should they speak out.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
1

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Researcher4693: There is no evidence that any particular posts require more restrictions on time in post, selection or oversight. However, there are reports indicating that there may be special attention paid to personnel in sensitive positions, but this is not publicly available or cannot be verified.

President Ghani established National Procurement Commission to provide independent oversight of defence procurement. Sources shows that the National Procurement Commission is very active and chaired by the president at weekly meetings. (UNOPS, 2015) During a recent meeting, news sources reported that &quoute;At a recent NPC meeting, the President said that &quoute;the procurement system of the Ministry of defence should be civilianized in order to improve capacity of the procurement section in the Ministry. &quoute;

The president urged the creation of a separate framework to deal with logistic issues and equipment of security forces&quoute; and that The President also instructed the National Procurement Commission to look into all the evaluated contracts in light of the past meetings to determine their capacity and transparency as well as possible connections of officials with companies.&quoute; (Office of the President, 2015)

However, further details of the NPC review process are not known. As the Commission has been established only recently, it is not possible to predict whether its activity will span changes in government.

there are some institutional measures reportedly being put in place to address issues of organised crime. For instance, SIGAR reports that the issue of infiltration is being address through several initiatives, including a more thorough vetting process for new recruits. They also indicate that this issue &quoute;is a top priority for ISAF and the Afghan government&quoute; (SIGAR, 2013a, pp. 71). It is unknown to what extent these efforts to fight infiltration have had a discernible impact.

At the beginning of his term, President Ghani committed to implementing a merit - based recruitment system. Subsequently, Ghani has issued a presidential decree which forbid the Minister of Interior to &quoute;use of any kind of influence, connections [waseta] and personal relations” in promotion or transfers of higher-ranking personnel.&quoute; (Rutting, 2014). It is unclear whether this decree also applies to the defence ministry.

Although not specific for personnel in sensitive position, in general, appointments should follow the Civil Service Law. Chapter 4, Art. 15 of the law describes appointment procedures. Chapter 7, Article 23 of the law states &quoute;Civil Servants are appointed based on merit and professional skills...&quoute; (GIRoA, “Civil…, 2015) Article 10 of the Civil Servants Law stipulates &quoute;a person shall be selected on the basis of competency; professional skills (education, experience and other job qualifications) shall be identified, selected and appointed through open competition.&quoute;

However, there continues to be reporting that indicates nepotism continues to be widespread. (Derksen: All the President’s Strongmen, 2014; Katzman, 2015; MEC, 2015) The rules of conduct associated with recruitment are not clear with sources suggesting that selection process in general is not transparent (The Institute for War & Peace Reporting: Corruption Claimed in..., 2014)


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The information you provide could not be verified through publicly available sources. Moreover, the HOO who is supposed to lead on asset declaration, at the time of writing, has only published one set of asset declarations on its website from 2012. Score raised to 1 to indicate that there may be special attention given, but it was not possible to verify this.

COMMENTS -+

1) Thomas Rutting. &quoute;The Start into the Better Governance Marathon: Ghani’s first days&quoute;, Afghanistan Analysts Network, October 11, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-start-into-the-better-governance-marathon-ghanis-first-days/]

2) Deedee Derksen. &quoute;All the President’s Strongmen&quoute;, Foreign Policy, December 8, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/08/all-the-presidents-strongmen/]

3) Minister of Finance. &quoute;Presence of PPU Representative (Circular No. 38),&quoute; Ministry of Finance, April, 2011, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://ppu.gov.af/Documents/Circulars/English/Circular%2038.pdf]

4) The Institute for War & Peace Reporting. &quoute;Corruption Claimed in Afghan Civil Service Appointments&quoute;. December 31, 2014, accessed on September 8, 2015. Available on [https://iwpr.net/global-voices/corruption-claimed-afghan-civil-service-appointments]

5) GIRoA. &quoute;Civil Service Law&quoute;. Accessed on September 8, 2015. Available on [http://iarcsc.gov.af/en/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Civil-Service-Law.pdf]

6) MEC. “MEC Finds Widespread Irregular Hiring and Personnel Practices at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” June 3, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/2015_06_03_MOFA_Press_Release_(English).pdf]

7) Kenneth Katzman. “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” US Congressional Research Service, January 12, 2015. Available on [https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf]

8) UNOPS. &quoute;Press release: UNOPS Executive Director reaffirms key partnerships in Afghanistan&quoute;. August 5, 2015. Accessed on September 6, 2015. Available on [https://www.unops.org/english/News/Press-releases/Pages/UNOPS-Executive-Director-reaffirms-key-partnerships-in-Afghanistan.aspx#sthash.vzuUo76Y.dpuf]

9) Office of the President. &quoute;The Main Goal for Evaluation of MoD Contracts is to Provide Better Logistics Services and Facilities for Soldiers.&quoute; August 30, 2015. Accessed on July 11, 2015. Available on [http://president.gov.af/en/news/49386s]

10) SIGAR. (2013a). Jan 2013 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Retrieved from http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-01-30qr.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: MOD currently requires that officials in sensitive positions such as Procurement, Finance and Logistics declare all their wealth and belongings through a “wealth declaration” process. This will add the necessary scrutiny over these officials.

All positions are selected after scrutiny by leadership. The MOD is civilizing this position in the near future which will require public announcement and recruitment of these positions through the civil service commission of Afghanistan.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
0

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

Researcher4693: Information about the number of civilian and military personnel are not provided by the official authorities. The numbers are available from different sources such as SIGAR or NATO. However, these numbers might not be accurate as Afghan authorities have not always provided accurate information. (Ryan, 2015)
The Assessor was unable to find further information indicating that the number of civilian and military personnel is made publicly available by the government.

According to the Center for Public Integrity and SIGAR, layers of uncertainty undermine the reliability of existing troop strength data; &quoute;The NATO-led military command in Afghanistan relies on the Afghan army and police to collect it with oversight from the Interior and defence Ministries [...] But the army and police often use inconsistent handwritten records instead of electronic systems, and the ministries’ efforts to verify it consist only of occasional, informal visits to army units.&quoute;


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that this question inquires whether the number of civilian and military personnel are (i) accurately known and (ii) publicly available (accessible by the public). The assessor could not locate publicly available information to verify your statement that detailed statements are provided to parliament. Moreover a review of additional sources seems to indicate that whatever figures are known are likely to be inaccurate.

COMMENTS -+

1) NATO. &quoute;Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),&quoute; June, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_06/20130604_130604-mb-ansf.pdf]

2) NATO - Resolute Support. &quoute;MoD. Equipment,&quoute; February 4, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/20150204_mod_equipment_final.pdf]

3) Missy Ryan. &quoute;Watchdog: Afghanistan unable to properly track, pay police,&quoute; Washington Post, January 12, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/01/12/watchdog-afghanistan-unable-to-properly-track-pay-police/]

4) Center for Public Integrity. &quoute;Billions of dollars in U.S. assistance to Afghan soldiers and police is still based on ragged data,&quoute; April 29, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/04/29/17254/billions-dollars-us-assistance-afghan-soldiers-and-police-still-based-ragged-data]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Ministry of defence and Ministry of Interior have an active Human Resource Management Information System which has the complete database of all active and non-active personnel. This HRMIS database is fully accessible to Resolute Support and is the basis for all personnel-related decisions in the ministry.

There is a separate Database for civilian personnel which is connected to the Afghan Government’s Civil Service Commission controlling all government civil servants.

Detailed reports are generated through these systems and provided to the Parliament and other requesting bodies on a regular basis.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
3

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

Researcher4693: Military personnel pay rates and incentive pay are publicly available, with the most recent figures published by the NTM-A (NATO, 2011). ANA salaries are also published on the MoD website. The document is from 2007 and is available in Dari only. (MoD: ANA Salary Policy, 2007). Since the document stipulating ANA salaries is on the MOD website, it is reasonable to assume that these figures are still valid. Allowance information was not found.

Civil servants pay rates and salaries are public and provided in the Law on the Status and Condition of Government Employees and the Civil Service Law. (AREU, 2014, p. 92; GIRoA: Civil Servants Law, 2008, p. 16). The assessor could not find any public information suggesting that the law or pay rates had changed.

COMMENTS -+

1) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Civil Servants Law,&quoute; June, 2008, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.csmd.gov.af/images/legal/civil%20servants%20law%20eng.pdf]

2) MoD. &quoute;ANA salary policy,&quoute; 2007, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mod.gov.af/Content/files/palicy/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%20%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AA.pdf]

3) NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan. &quoute;Afghan National Army Base and Incentive Pay Chart,&quoute; April 20, 2011, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [https://publicintelligence.net/afghan-national-army-base-and-incentive-pay-chart/]

4) Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. &quoute;The A to Z Guide to Assitance in Afghanistan,&quoute; 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/A%20to%20Z%202014%20Final%206.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
1

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

Researcher4693: There is strong evidence that personnel do not receive pay on time.

Details about salaries and payment from the MOD website are somewhat unclear. Article 10 of the Inherent Law of Officers and NCOs (ILON) which was passed in 2011, discusses the salary of ANA personnel. It stipulates, “The salary and benefits of officers and NCOs shall be paid considering their ranks and number of their service years based on a norm agreed by the Council of Ministers.” The directive from the Council of Ministers on the amount of salary of the ANA personnel is not published by MOD. In addition, article 11 of ILON stipulates the incentive salaries and benefits payable to ANA personnel. According to ILON, the incentive salaries are paid at times of war and emergency situations. In December 2008, the MOD ratified a document titled Policy and Regulation on Incentive Salaries. The document is available in Dari on the MOD website.

An Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit report states that &quoute;Delayed pay has also led to indiscipline; one ISAF source acknowledged that as late as 2013, soldiers had complained about late salary payments, but ANA sources stated that was not the only issue. In one case, '100 ANA soldiers' in Nuristan reportedly sold their weapons because they had not received their salaries.&quoute; (Afghanistan Research and Revaluation Unit, 2014; Jalalzai, 2015). Reports also indicate that &quoute;The current compensation incentives for ANA personnel with logistical and information technology skills and experience necessary to support logistical functions and operations was [sic] not competitive with comparable private sector opportunities.&quoute; (AREU, 2014)

The system of payment is established, although it is explained in detail in the SIGAR Audit Report 15 - 54, that the system is not fully functional and that weaknesses within ANA data and payment systems provide limited assurance that personnel receive accurate salaries. In addition to untimely payments, the electronic systems aimed at transparent payments for personnel are missing some important data collection functions and identification cards are not used properly. (SIGAR Audit Report 15 - 54; SIGAR: Quarterly Report..., 2015)

SIGAR describes the process for payment:

&quoute;According to CSTC-A, battalion-level ANA officials summarize each individual’s monthly attendance and applicable incentives into a spreadsheet that they send to corps headquarters by hand or email. Corps headquarters officials manually calculate personnel salaries, deducting for absences, and create salary payment requests for personnel. These officials then pass the salary payment requests, along with payment summaries and bank transfer forms, to provincial-level representatives of the MOF. This MOF staff subsequently enters payroll data into the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS), the Afghan government’s accounting system, determines the total salary amount to be sent to each ANA location, and disburses funds monthly to one of four banks.16 The banks then electronically transfer salaries directly to individual bank accounts.&quoute;

This process therefore still carries some risk and potential for interference since there are still a few steps before information is entered into an electronic database. In February 2015, &quoute;CSTC-A reported that the command was evaluating available systems to select the most suitable automated pay system for the MOD, with the ultimate aim of achieving an integrated personnel and pay system. Until that system is implemented, the MOD will continue to calculate ANA salaries manually, making the salaries vulnerable to inaccuracy and manipulation&quoute;. (SIGAR, 2015)

Moreover, the Audit Report also concludes that ANA salary payments through agents still occur. Moreover, &quoute;Afghanistan’s poor infrastructure and lack of electronic banking mechanisms have forced many soldiers to deliver pay to their family(s) in-person, resulting in unreported absences from their field units, often for days at a time&quoute;. (Institute for Study of War, no date)


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that, according to SIGAR, AFMIS only contains aggregated ANA salary expenditures, not individual salary payments. Moreover, the payment system is not clear or published by the Afghan government. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Antonio Giustozzi with Peter Quentin, &quoute;The Afghan National Army: Sustainability Challenges beyond Financial Aspects,&quoute; AREU, February 2014. http://www.areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=748&ParentId=7&ContentId=7&Lang=en-US

2) Institute for the Study of War. &quoute;Afghanistan National Army,&quoute; no date, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.understandingwar.org/afghanistan-national-army-ana]

3) Musa Khan Jalalzai. &quoute;The Afghan army is joining IS&quoute;, Daily Times, March 10, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/10-Mar-2015/the-afghan-army-is-joining-is]

4) Sune Engel Rasmussen. &quoute;Afghan police struggle as US watchdog finds holes in payroll data,&quoute; The Guardian, January 12, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/afghanistan-police-payroll-data-watchdog-report]

5) SIGAR. &quoute;Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,&quoute; January 30, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-01-30qr.pdf]

6) Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Army Enlistment Policy,&quoute; Ministry of Defence, 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mod.gov.af/Content/files/palicy/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%20%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AA%20%D8%AF%D8%B1%20%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%DB%8C%20%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C(1).pdf]

7) William Byrd. &quoute;Paying for Afghanistan’s Security Forces During Transition: Issues for Chicago and Beyond,&quoute; United States Institute of Peace. April 23, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/PB-124.pdf]

8) SIGAR 15-54 Audit Report, April 2015. Accessed on September 7, 2015. Avaialble on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-54-AR.pdf]

9) Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Army Pay Policy and Procedures,&quoute; no date, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mod.gov.af/Content/files/palicy/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%20%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AA.pdf] Only available in Dari

10) Ministry of Defence, “Policy and Regulation on Incentive Salaries,” 2008. Available on http://mod.gov.af/Content/files/palicy/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%20%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AA.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2015).

11) Ministry of Justice, “Inherent Law of Officers and NCOs (ILON),” 2011. Available on http://moj.gov.af/content/files/OfficialGazette/01001/OG_01035.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2015).

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: All personnel receive their salaries and incentives on time. Based on an MOD leadership directive, the payment for salaries for all central and regional units starts at the 20th day of each month. There is no evidence of late payment in MOD. The payroll is very vital to MOD leadership. The payments are made through AFMIS once the M-41 reaches MOD-Finance or central corps finance units. Based on the M-41 the responsible finance officers prepare the M16 for salaries and forward it to the MOF or Regional Mostofiayats. AFMIS issues cheques in favor of cashier. Using a cheque means only the beneficiary is authorized to transfer the total amount into commercial banks from central bank. Once the central bank transfer the amount into commercial banks, the commercial bank distributes the amount based on ANA payroll sheet which declares how much each soldier receives in terms of salaries and incentives. Therefore this is a banking wire payment and is similar to the electronic payment system.

All ANA soldiers receives their salaries through banking wire which is an electronic system. The discretionary adjustments happens before preparing the M-41, the status of the soldiers are examined within that form and the payment can only made once the M41 reaches to finance offices.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
2

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

Researcher4693: There is an established system for the appointment of military personnel, but it is not adhered to in practice and there is significant evidence of appointment not based purely on merit.

While the appointment of the Minister of Defence requires parliamentary approval, the current minister of defence has not yet received parliamentary approval. (Clark, 2015)

Other senior appointment and promotions are guided by the MOD based on Inherent Law of Officers and NCOs (Ministry of Justice, 2011) enforceable since August 2011. Article 26 of ILON states, “an officer having appraisal records shall be promoted if there is a vacant position (baste), experience, education, competence, physical and mental ability and health condition and special training course.” Based on ILON (article 26) a colonel is required to work for three years until he is qualified to become a brigadier general. A qualified colonel working at Headquarters of MOD, for example, will request (through informal channels) the Personnel Department or the Personnel Department on its own would process it (as the law indicates) that there is a vacant position for a general at, for example, 207 Zafar Corps. He shall be simultaneously promoted and appointed to that particular position. The ILON further stipulates that if there is a delay in promotion due to lack of vacant position, the particular officer shall be paid his increased salary when he is appointed (ILON: article 26(7)).

The process of promotions and appointment are further discussed in ILON and by-laws. Section (2) of Article 26 of ILON also talk about appraisal records. It states, “The appraisal of officers and NCOs shall be outlined in a by-law.” In Afghanistan, by-laws or regulations are prepared by the Ministry of defence. The MOD seems to be using the by-law it had prepared in 5/12/1383 (February 2005) because it exists in its website as enforceable. The by-law titled the Policy on Assessing the Performance of ANA Personnel (PAPAP) is a 7-page document outlining when and how the assessment of a particular officer happens. Article 3 section 3 of PAPAP stipulates that a person who oversees the performance of an officer shall fill his appraisal form and usually he is his direct commander. Therefore, appraisal happens through the chain of command not an independent organ. Article 4 section 2 of PAPAP also stipulates, “The information received through this appraisal form shall be used for next steps such as promotions, selection for further education, appointment, and quality organization.” Regarding the timeline of appraisal, Article 5 of PAPAP stipulates that appraisal happens every year, or a certain timetable, or at times of reappointment or transfer of an officer.

In practice, however, there are articles or reports stating that nepotism is widespread, (Jalalzai, 2014; MEC, 2014) in spite of President Ghani's statements in general that appointments will be made on the basis of merit (Soadat, 2014). According to the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit report by Antonio Guistozzi and Peter Quentin, the lack of clear rules concerning appointments
and promotions has facilitated the spread of nepotism and that &quoute;Even when individuals with a professional background have been appointed, they have not necessarily been the most qualified; cases of very fast promotions have often been reported.&quoute; (Giustozzi & Quentin, 2014) Senior officials have reportedly been &quoute;under heavy pressure from various sources to twist meritocratic criteria when making appointments.&quoute;

In the civil sector, appointments should follow the Civil Service Law. Chapter 4, Art. 15 of the law describes appointment procedures. Chapter 7, Article 23 of the law states &quoute;Civil Servants are appointed based on merit and professional skills...&quoute; (GIRoA, “Civil…, 2015) Article 10 of the Civil Servants Law stipulates &quoute;a person shall be selected on the basis of competency; professional skills (education, experience and other job qualifications) shall be identified, selected and appointed through open competition.&quoute; It is unclear whether MoD appointments and promotions follow the civil service law.

Lack of a formal appraisal processes for personnel promotions and allegations of nepotism are evident across Afghan government ministries. (Derksen: All the President’s Strongmen, 2014; Katzman, 2015; MEC, 2015; IWPR, 2014; IWA, 2015)


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Note that a score of 3 requires evidence of the use of objective job descriptions and assessment processes for appointments, and oversight of this process by independent personnel. There is also strong evidence to suggest that appointments are not based purely on merit.

COMMENTS -+

1) Musa Khan Jalalzai. &quoute;Afghanistan: ethnicisation of intelligence,&quoute; Daily Times, March, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/08-Mar-2014/afghanistan-ethnicisation-of-intelligence].

2) MEC. &quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report,&quoute; Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, January 30, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

3) Saleha Soadat. &quoute;Ghani: Appointments for Security Ministries Won't Be Politically Compromised&quoute;, Tolo News, December 14, 2014, accessed July 03, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17466-ghani-appointments-for-security-ministries-wont-be-politically-compromised]

4) 1TV. &quoute;Special Report: How Patronage Appointment Prevails in the Afghan Police,&quoute; January 22, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/14885-special-report-how-patronage-appointment-prevails-in-kabul-police]

5) Mohammad Razaq Isaqzadeh, Antonio Giustozzi. &quoute;Senior Appointments and Corruption within the Afghan MoI: practices and perceptions&quoute;, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2015, accessed on September 7, 2015 Available on [http://integritywatch.co/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/moi_senior_appointments_and_corruption_english.pdf]

6) MEC. “MEC Finds Widespread Irregular Hiring and Personnel Practices at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” June 3, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/2015_06_03_MOFA_Press_Release_(English).pdf]

7) Kenneth Katzman. “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” US Congressional Research Service, January 12, 2015. Available on [https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf]

8) Deedee Derksen. &quoute;All the President’s Strongmen&quoute;, Foreign Policy, December 8, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/08/all-the-presidents-strongmen/]

9) The Institute for War & Peace Reporting. &quoute;Corruption Claimed in Afghan Civil Service Appointments&quoute;. December 31, 2014, accessed on September 8, 2015. Available on [https://iwpr.net/global-voices/corruption-claimed-afghan-civil-service-appointments]

10) GIRoA. &quoute;Civil Service Law&quoute;. Accessed on September 8, 2015. Available on [http://iarcsc.gov.af/en/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Civil-Service-Law.pdf]

11) Kate Clark. &quoute;Stanakzai Goes from Peace to War: For Afghanistan, finally a defence minister?&quoute; Afghan Analysts Network, May 28, 2015. Available on [https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/stanakzai-goes-from-peace-to-war-for-afghanistan-finally-a-defence-minister/]

12) Ministry of Justice (2011), “Inherent Law of Officers and NCOs (ILON),” http://moj.gov.af/content/files/OfficialGazette/01001/OG_01035.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2015).

13) Ministry of defence (2005), “Policy on Assessing the Performance of ANA Personnel (PAPAP),” http://mod.gov.af/Content/files/palicy/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%20%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%A8%DB%8C.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2015).

14) Antonio Giustozzi with Peter Quentin, &quoute;The Afghan National Army: Sustainability Challenges beyond Financial Aspects,&quoute; AREU, February 2014. http://www.areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=748&ParentId=7&ContentId=7&Lang=en-US

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The GSG1 is the responsible Directorate at MOD which manages all the 195,000 military personnel, their recruitment, appointment and promotions. GSG1 follows the MOD Personnel Policy which clearly outlines all the policies related to appointments.

Additionally MOD leadership always appoints a review committee to review candidates based on the predefined job descriptions and criterion.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Agree with the assesor, there is little to suggest that any formal appointment system exists. As such there is no transparency to this process and given other information seems to be largely based on patronage and nepotism.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
1

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Researcher4693: There are formal processes in place, but evidence suggests that these are undermined.

At the beginning of his term, President Ghani committed to implementing a merit - based recruitment system. Subsequently, Ghani has issued a presidential decree which forbids that the Minister of Interior &quoute;use of any kind of influence, connections [waseta] and personal relations” in promotion or transfers of higher-ranking personnel.&quoute; (Rutting, 2014). It is unclear whether this decree also applies to the defence ministry.

Although President Ghani and former President Karzai both decreed that merit-based promotions are the expectation (MEC, 2014; Office of the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2012, p. 85), corruption in the promotion process is reported on. (Jalalzai, 2015)

Promotions are guided by the MOD based on Inherent Law of Officers and NCOs (Ministry of Justice, 2011) enforceable since August 2011. Article 26 of ILON states, “an officer having appraisal records shall be promoted if there is a vacant position (baste), experience, education, competence, physical and mental ability and health condition and special training course.” Therefore, if there is not a vacant position for appointment, an officer would not be promoted. For example, based on ILON (article 26) a colonel is required to work for three years until he is qualified to become a brigadier general. A qualified colonel working at Headquarters of MOD, for example, will request (through informal channels) the Personnel Department or the Personnel Department on its own would process it (as the law indicates) that there is a vacant position for a general at, for example, 207 Zafar Corps. He shall be simultaneously promoted and appointed to that particular position. The ILON further stipulates that if there is a delay in promotion due to lack of vacant position, the particular officer shall be paid his increased salary when he is appointed (ILON: article 26(7)).

The process of promotions are further discussed in ILON and by-laws. Section (2) of Article 26 of ILON also talk about appraisal records. It states, “The appraisal of officers and NCOs shall be outlined in a by-law.” In Afghanistan, by-laws or regulations are prepared by the Ministry of defence. The MOD seems to be using the by-law it had prepared in 5/12/1383 (February 2005) because it exists in its website as enforceable. The by-law titled the Policy on Assessing the Performance of ANA Personnel (PAPAP) is a 7-page document outlining when and how the assessment of a particular officer happens. Article 3 section 3 of PAPAP stipulates that a person who oversees the performance of an officer shall fill his appraisal form and usually he is his direct commander. Therefore, appraisal happens through the chain of command not an independent organ. Article 4 section 2 of PAPAP also stipulates, “The information received through this appraisal form shall be used for next steps such as promotions, selection for further education, appointment, and quality organization.” Regarding the timeline of appraisal, Article 5 of PAPAP stipulates that appraisal happens every year, or a certain timetable, or at times of reappointment or transfer of an officer.

However, according to the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit report by Antonio Guistozzi and Peter Quentin, the lack of clear rules concerning promotions has facilitated the spread of nepotism and that &quoute;cases of very fast promotions have often been reported.&quoute; (Giustozzi & Quentin, 2014) Senior officials have reportedly been &quoute;under heavy pressure from various sources to twist meritocratic criteria.&quoute;

The US DOD Inspector General reports that “the lack of a true merit-based personnel promotion and assignment system negatively impacted the further development of a new generation of ANA leaders” (DOD IG, 2013). Moreover, where promotions do occur, it unclear what exactly constitutes a merit-based appointment. For instance, in 2015 an Afghan soldier was honoured for thwarting a Taliban attack on parliament with a medal, promotion in rank and keys to a new apartment, and a new car. (Lambert F.: Afghan hero soldier..., 2015)

Further, &quoute;the lack of distributed authority to hold subordinate leaders accountable and have a merit based assignment and promotion system facilitates corruption and nepotism, and enables unethical command influence in prosecuting issues involving corruption. This issue is widely recognized in the MOD, but there is little appetite to confront the issue in the current political environment.&quoute; (DOD, 2014, p. 29).

Lack of a effective appraisal processes for personnel promotions is evident in other Afghan government ministries (1TV, 2015; Derksen: All the President’s Strongmen, 2014; Katzman, 2015; MEC, 2015; IWPR, 2014; Isaqzadeh and Guistozzi, 2015)

The assessor could not find any further publicly available information regarding promotion boards or the existence of independent oversight.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Evidence suggests that formal processes that are in place are undermined. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) DOD. &quoute;Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,&quoute; April, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf]

2) DOD. &quoute;Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army,&quoute; Inspector General, June 24, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on.[http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-094.pdf]

3) MEC. &quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report,&quoute; Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, January 30, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

4) Office of the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Presidential Decree no. 45,&quoute; July 29, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2012/07/the-office-of-the-president-of-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-decree-on-the-execution-of-content-of-the-historical-speech-of-june-21-2012-in-the-special-session-of-national-assembly/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PermanentMissionOfAfghanistanToTheUnInNewYork+%28Permanent+Mission+of+Afghanistan+to+the+UN+in+New+York%29bestth]

5) Musa Khan Jalalzai. &quoute;The Afghan army is joining IS,&quoute; Daily Times, March 10, 2015. Available on [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/10-Mar-2015/the-afghan-army-is-joining-is]

6) 1TV. &quoute;Special Report: How patronage appointment prevails in Kabul police,&quoute; January 22, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/14885-special-report-how-patronage-appointment-prevails-in-kabul-police]

7) Saleha Saodat. &quoute;Ghani: Appointments for Security Ministries Won't Be Politically Compromised&quoute;, Tolo News, December 14, 2014, accessed July 03, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17466-ghani-appointments-for-security-ministries-wont-be-politically-compromised]

8) Lambert F. &quoute;Afghan hero soldier released from jail after car wreck&quoute;, UPI.com, July 14, 2015, accessed on September 7, 2015. Available on [http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/07/14/Afghan-hero-soldier-released-from-jail-after-car-wreck/5351436893391/]

9) Thomas Rutting. &quoute;The Start into the Better Governance Marathon: Ghani’s first days&quoute;, Afghanistan Analysts Network, October 11, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-start-into-the-better-governance-marathon-ghanis-first-days/]

10) Mohammad Razaq Isaqzadeh, Antonio Giustozzi. &quoute;Senior Appointments and Corruption within the Afghan MoI: practices and perceptions&quoute;, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2015, accessed on September 7, 2015 Available on [http://integritywatch.co/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/moi_senior_appointments_and_corruption_english.pdf]

11) MEC. “MEC Finds Widespread Irregular Hiring and Personnel Practices at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” June 3, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/2015_06_03_MOFA_Press_Release_(English).pdf]

12) Kenneth Katzman. “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” US Congressional Research Service, January 12, 2015. Available on [https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf]

13) Deedee Derksen. &quoute;All the President’s Strongmen&quoute;, Foreign Policy, December 8, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/08/all-the-presidents-strongmen/]

14) Ministry of Justice (2011), “Inherent Law of Officers and NCOs (ILON),” http://moj.gov.af/content/files/OfficialGazette/01001/OG_01035.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2015).

15) Ministry of defence (2005), “Policy on Assessing the Performance of ANA Personnel (PAPAP),” http://mod.gov.af/Content/files/palicy/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%20%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%A8%DB%8C.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2015).

16) Antonio Giustozzi with Peter Quentin, &quoute;The Afghan National Army: Sustainability Challenges beyond Financial Aspects,&quoute; AREU, February 2014. http://www.areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=748&ParentId=7&ContentId=7&Lang=en-US

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The GSG1 is the responsible Directorate at MOD which manages all the 195,000 military personnel, their recruitment, appointment and promotions. GSG1 follows the MOD Personnel Policy which clearly outlines all the policies related to appointments.

Additionally MOD leadership always appoints a review committee to review candidates based on the predefined job descriptions and criterion.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Media reports have noted that the promotions process is largely politicized or based on nepotism. There seem to be little formal mechanisms in place that would suggest a merit-based process and supports the claims of the assessor.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
N/A

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4693: Compulsory conscription was abolished in 1992 in Afghanistan (BBC News, 2010) . Therefore, no evidence of measures against bribery in conscription - if it occurred - exists. Although the Afghan Constitution allows for compulsory service (Art 55) and president Karzai had intentions to reintroduce it (Partlow, 2011), this has not happened in practice. According to the CIA World Factbook, &quoute;18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2012)&quoute;.

COMMENTS -+

1) RAND. &quoute;The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army,&quoute; 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on[http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf]

2) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Constitution of Afghanistan,&quoute; January 3, 2004, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://supremecourt.gov.af/content/media/documents/constitution2004_english241201294958325553325325.pdf]

3) BBC News. &quoute;Karzai considers introducing Afghan conscription,&quoute; February 7, 2010, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8502948.stm]

4) Joshua Partlow. &quoute;Karzai considers military draft in Afghanistan instead of all-volunteer army,&quoute; The Washington Post, April 29, 2011, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/karzai-considers-military-draft-in-afghanistan/2011/04/27/AFe0HL6E_story.html]

5) CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No compulsory subscription in Afghanistan.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
N/A

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4693: The ANA is an all volunteer force. The army enlistment policy does not discuss bribery (“Army Enlistment Policy,” 2009). Although no ANA specific data was reported, according to UNODC and HOO, more than 50% of ANP received assistance with recruitment from friends, family, or community members, and approximately 6% paid a bribe for recruitment (UNODC & HOO, 2012, p. 20).

There appear to be no special guidelines on how to deal with or safeguard against this problem. However, it is possible to report such bribery to the public prosecutor’s office and the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption. It is not know to what extent the reported cases are successfully resolved. (UNODC: Corruption in ..., 2012)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: As Afghanistan has an all-volunteer force this question does not apply.

COMMENTS -+

1) UNODC. &quoute;Corruption in Afghanistan,&quoute; December 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf]

2) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Army Enlistment Policy,&quoute; 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mod.gov.af/Content/files/palicy/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%20%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AA%20%D8%AF%D8%B1%20%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%DB%8C%20%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C(1).pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Afghan National Army is a voluntary army hence applicants join in willingly and are recruited by the ANA based on a need to regularly fill up positions. This means there is little room for corrupt practices. The GS Inspector General conducts regular audits and holds seminar of anti-corruption to ensure greater awareness.

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
1

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

Researcher4693: SIGAR recently raised concerns “that the U.S. may be unwittingly helping to pay the salaries of non-existent members of the Afghan National Police (ANP)”. Although the issue is mostly anecdotal and ANP specific, SIGAR has initiated an audit of payroll data for both the ANA and ANP which is the same is true for the military.

The number of soldiers in the ANSF is unknown to both the Afghan government and the international community. SIGAR states that the payroll data are still not accurate. (SIGAR:Quarterly report to ..., 2015; SIGAR 15 -26 Audit..., 2015) This trend seems to have lasted for years (Sedra: Afghanistan and the ..., 2011) According to the result of SIGAR's ANA audit, &quoute;Although the U.S. and Afghan governments have been working to develop effective ANA personnel and payroll processes, those processes continue to exhibit extensive internal control deficiencies.&quoute; SIGAR further states that effectiveness of the Afghanistan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) - a system to store ANSF human source information - is limited because it &quoute;lacks certain electronic data system functions and controls, such as the ability to differentiate between active and inactive personnel, and track ANA personnel by their position and identification number.&quoute;

However, the report also acknowledges that officials are in the process of remedying this shortfalls. (SIGAR 15-54 Audit..., 2015) Furthermore, according to some sources, &quoute;DOD and Afghanistan’s defence Ministry agreed with the auditors’ recommendations.&quoute; ( Ehley B.:The U.S. Could Be..., 2015) The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) which provides funding for the payment of ANP salaries, is reportedly focused on the development of innovative and modern police payroll technologies, though these efforts haven’t generated a system that is fully functional, according to SIGAR.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Given the weaknesses of the AHRIMS system (as described by SIGAR) and the discrepancies found in payroll data, a higher score could not be awarded. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) SIGAR.&quoute;Quarterly report to the United States Congress,&quoute; January 30, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/allreports/index.aspx?SSR=5]

2) SIGAR. &quoute;SIGAR 15 - 26 Audit Report,&quoute; January 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-26-AR.pdf] Last modified on Jan 2015

3) Mark Sedra..&quoute;Afghanistan and the DDR - SSR Nexus&quoute; In Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR (Washington: National Defence University Press, 2011) pp.249 - 264.

4) John Sopko. &quoute;SIGAR-14-36-SP,&quoute; February 19, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-14-36-SP.pdf]

5) Franz-Stefan Gady, &quoute;Pentagon Declassifies Information on Afghan Security Forces,&quoute; March 4, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on[http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/pentagon-declassifies-information-on-afghan-security-forces/]

6) SIGAR 15-54 Audit Report, April 2015. Accessed on September 7, 2015. Avaialble on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-54-AR.pdf]

7) Ehley B. &quoute;The U.S. Could Be Paying $2.3 Billion a Year for Afghan Ghost Soldiers&quoute;, The Fiscal Times. April 30, 2015, accessed on Septemeber 7, 2015. Available on [http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/04/30/US-Could-Be-Paying-23-Billion-Year-Afghan-Ghost-Soldiers]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Ministry of defence and Ministry of Interior have an active Human Resource Management Information System which has the complete database of all active and non-active personnel. This HRMIS database is fully accessible to Resolute Support and is the basis for all personnel-related decisions in the ministry.

Additionally an Electronic Payment System which will be connected to the HRMIS system is already in place at the Ministry of Interior and is being introduced to Ministry of defence by Resolute Support. This system gives very high confidence on the existing personnel on payroll and their attendance effectively addressing the issue of ghost soldiers.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
2

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

Researcher4693: Policy indicates that the payments of all personnel are to be made using Electronic Funds Transfer via the Ministry of Finance as part of the Individual Salary Program (ISP). This policy is published in the ANA promotion and recruitment policy. This policy was specifically introduced to separate chain of command with chain of payment and to reduce corruption (“Accessions,” 2009, sec. 9.3 para 6). Banking details are arranged upon enrolment.

In February 2015, &quoute;CSTC-A reported that the command was evaluating available systems to select the most suitable automated pay system for the MOD, with the ultimate aim of achieving an integrated personnel and pay system. Until that system is implemented, the MOD will continue to calculate ANA salaries manually, making the salaries vulnerable to inaccuracy and manipulation&quoute;. (SIGAR, 2015) The units are supposed to report attendance data through their chains of command to the respective headquarters, which then aggregate, summarize, and provide the data to the MOD as well as the MOF. The MOF then uses the data to calculate lump sum salary payments to be disbursed to local Afghan banks. This indicates that commanders are potentially able to impact salaries by manipulating the attendance figures.

Moreover, &quoute;while most ANA and ANP salaries are paid directly into bank accounts electronically, approximately 20 percent of ANP personnel and an estimated 5 percent of ANA personnel receive salaries in cash from a &quoute;trusted agent.&quoute; (SIGAR 15-26 Audit Report, 2015)

According to the result of SIGAR's ANA personnel and payroll data audit, the provided data are not accurate: &quoute;Although the U.S. and Afghan governments have been working to develop effective ANA personnel and payroll processes, those processes continue to exhibit extensive internal control deficiencies.&quoute; SIGAR further states that &quoute;Some ANA Personnel Receive their Salaries via Trusted Agent Method of Salary Distribution&quoute; (SIGAR 15-54 Audit..., 2015)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that a review of sources indicates that the MOD is, at the time of this assessment, still calculating ANA salaries manually, making the salaries vulnerable to inaccuracy and manipulation and that processes continue to exhibit deficiencies. A higher score can therefore not be awarded. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) SIGAR. &quoute;SIGAR 15-26 Audit Report,&quoute; January, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-26-AR.pdf]

2) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Accessions Management for the ANA,&quoute; 2008, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mod.gov.af/Content/files/palicy/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%20%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AA%20%D8%AF%D8%B1%20%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%DB%8C%20%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C(1).pdf] This link provides the original Dari policy; the English translation is no longer publicly available.

3) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Army Pay Policy and Procedures,&quoute; no date, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mod.gov.af/Content/files/palicy/%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%20%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AA.pdf] This link provides the original Dari policy; the English translation is no longer publicly available.

4) SIGAR 15-54 Audit Report, April 2015. Accessed on September 7, 2015. Avaialble on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-54-AR.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Chain of commands are separate from chain of payment in the Ministry of defence.

The MoD Finance Chief has the authority to sign the ANA salaries payment and it does not refer to MOD leadership. MoD payments are executed using the MOF standard financial forms and procedures that the MoD chain of command can not influence. As the MOD is a budgetary unit to GIRoA, AFMIS terminals to authorize fund disbursement into vendor’s account is not only within MOD authorities -- MOF has its own procedures to controls the disbursement to vendor at any point. Please refer to Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law – PFEML. For instance, the evidence can be any forms used within financial procedures. M-16 is the form for payment, this form can be signed by MOD-F chief for salaries payment.

The FDM and the General Staff have no direct influence to change the amount of payment. The General Staff only ensures the presence of the soldiers but has no authority to pay to soldiers.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
2

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

Researcher4693: There is a Core Values Statement, however it is not comprehensive nor is it publicly available and there is no evidence of an oversight mechanism. “In July 2011, the Minister of defence approved and signed the ANA Core Values Statement, a one- page document that identifies six core values under ‘God, Country, and Duty.’ Planning and initial steps to incorporate the six values (Integrity, Honor, Service, Respect, Courage, and Loyalty) into all ANA training curricula is ongoing” (DOD, 2011, p. 24) No evidence could be found as to whether the Core Values Statement has been successfully distributed to ANA members, or whether it is being applied.

ANP has its own Code of Conduct available on MoI Website. It clearly covers conduct in respect to bribery and corruption, gifts and hospitality and conflicts of interest. It also states disciplinary procedures in a case of breaking it. (MoI: Afghan National..., 2011)

Civilian personnel follow Civil Servants Code of Conduct which provide a regulation of the rules of conduct for civil servants. According to the Art 6(2), a civil servant shall &quoute;Avoid accepting or providing gifts or any other material or immaterial interests from relatives, friends, relevant director, colleague and/or subordinates.&quoute; Art 6(8) further states that he/she shall &quoute;abstain from participating in activities and official decision makings in which the civil servant may hold a personal interest.&quoute; According to a September 2015 report from the Afghan government, &quoute;the Code of Conduct has been reviewed and the weaknesses and gaps were identified. Based on the identified gaps, the amendments to the Code of Conduct will be finalized by end of September 2015 to prevent illegal and corrupt partnership between government officials and businessmen.&quoute; (GIRoA, 2015) No evidence could be found to suggest the Code of Conduct has been finalised at the time of this assessment. There was also no evidence to comment on the application and distribution on any of the Codes referenced.


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: No publicly available evidence could verify your comments or comment on the application and distribution of the Code of Conduct/Values. Further, neither is comprehensive in its guidance. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) DOD. &quoute;Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,&quoute; October, 2011, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/pdfs/October_2011_Section_1230_Report.pdf]

2) MoI. &quoute;Afghan National Police Code of Conduct,&quoute; July, 2011, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://moi.gov.af/en/page/3177/usulnama].

3) Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Code of Conduct for Civil Servants,&quoute; Civil Service Management Department, no date, accessed on May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.csmd.gov.af/images/legal/Civil%20Servants%20Code%20of%20Conduct.pdf]

4) Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. “Afghanistan’s Road to Self-Reliance: The First Mile Progress Report,” September 05, 2015. Available on [http://www.acbar.org/files/downloads/SOM%20main%20paper%20with%20annexs%20final%203%20sep2015(1).pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The ANA value code of conduct has been revised, printed, distributed, and conducted by the MoD religious and cultural affairs department after a one day seminar that included the participation of MOD high authorities and ISAF high ranked representatives.

The small size printed version of the code of conducts (ANA values) was distributed to a number of ANA generals. The practical implementation and explanation of this code has been overseen by the religious and cultural affairs department.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
1

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

Researcher4693: No evidence has been found that breach of the Code of Conduct is addressed. According to Source 1, there has been no administrative action for the breach of the Code of Conduct. (Interview: Source 1, 2015)

SIGAR investigators and CSTC-A are reportedly working closely with President Ghani’s advisors to investigate allegations of misconduct. (SIGAR, 2015) A SIGAR interview with President Ghani also denotes that he retired 72 generals in the MoD in 2015.&quoute; (SIGAR, 2015)

However, there is only anecdotal evidence that misconduct is at times addressed. In 2015 there was an incident where 2 soldiers were arrested when least 28 people at a wedding were reportedly killed by artillery fire from a nearby military checkpoint. The article stated that investigators from the MoD had attended the scene. (Khan, 2015) However, it is unclear whether this investigation was the result of a violation of the Code of Conduct or a response to a violation of the law. Moreover, such evidence remains anecdotal and there are many cases where violations have gone unpunished. (Gulabzoi N.: The Narco-State of..., 2015)
According to the Afghanistan Analysts Network the country is marked with &quoute;pervasive impunity in Afghanistan for human rights violations, crimes and corruption that is caused, encouraged and sustained by weak State institutions, insecurity and lack of rule of law facilitated by decades of conflict.&quoute; (Clark, 2015) Numerous op-eds also seem to suggest that a sense of impunity continues to exist widely in Afghanistan. (Alizada, 2015; Hamdam, 2015; Pajhwok Afghan News, 2015)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The assessor could not locate publicly available evidence to verify your statements regarding the referral of cases by the MoD IG to the MOD’s Legal Affairs Directorate, General Staff Legal Directorate or with the Ministry of Justice. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015.

2) Mirwais Khan. &quoute;Afghan arrests 2 soldiers after fatal army attack on wedding&quoute;, yahoo news. January 2, 2015, accessed on September 7, 2015. Available on [http://news.yahoo.com/afghan-team-probes-fatal-army-attack-wedding-080130606.html]

3) Gulabzoi N. &quoute;The Narco-State of Afghanistan&quoute;, The Diplomat. Available on [http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-narco-state-of-afghanistan/] Last modified on 12 Feb 2015

4) Kate Clark. &quoute;Because of Impunity: UN reports Afghan forces still torturing Afghans,&quoute; Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 25, 2015. Available on [https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/because-of-impunity-un-reports-afghan-forces-still-torturing-afghans/]

5) Nazifa Alizada. &quoute;Farkhunda’s Murder and the Imperative of Introspection,&quoute; Khaama Press, April 01 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/farkhundas-murder-and-the-imperative-of-introspection-9362]

6) Mohammad Shafiq Hamdam. &quoute;What else can go wrong?,&quoute; Khaama Press, April 16, 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/what-else-can-go-wrong-9388

7) Pajhwok Afghan News. &quoute;Afghan govt urged to prosecute rights abusers,&quoute; March 04, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/03/10/afghan-govt-urged-prosecute-rights-abusers]

8) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” April 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-04-30qr.pdf]

9) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” October 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-10-30qr.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD’s Legal Affairs Directorate and General Staff Legal Directorate both conduct internal prosecutions of cases referred to them by the MOD Inspector General’s office. All the cases are shared with the Ministry of Justice.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
2

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

Researcher4693: Evidence of regular anti-corruption training currently occurring within the ANA could not be found.

Irregular courses have been provided by external entities. For instance, Transparency International UK Defence and Security Programme (TI) has provided training on integrity building and anti - corruption procedures for Afghan military and police.

According to a TI report, “in 2008, TI UK’s Building Integrity training team developed a five-day tailored education course that teaches officers and defence officials how corruption can be tackled and prevented, in collaboration with NATO’s ‘Building Integrity’ (BI) initiative. The course builds up knowledge on the concept of corruption, how it manifests itself in the defence and security sector, how it can be prevented and how to build institutional integrity. It also builds confidence among participants that such an objective is worthwhile and achievable.” The course was run in 2009, and twice in 2011 (February and December) for 40 participants. A TI UK &quoute;Train the Trainers” Building Integrity Event, hosted in Ankara in May 2011 also included approximately 12 Afghan commanders. (Anti-Corruption Training Course in Kabul report, Feb 2013)

TI UK's Defence and Security Programme and the UK Defence Academy resumed anti-corruption training in May and November 2014 with a Senior Leaders Course which is aimed at 1, 2 star generals. The Chief of the Armed Staff selected 40 generals that in his view would most benefit from, and disseminate, this training over the long term. The next Senior Leaders Course will be run in September 2015 at the UK embassy in Kabul. Feedback from course attendees included extending the course to allow for further discussion -- as a result, the 2015 courses will be extended to 4 or 5 days. NATO has been in discussions with UK Defence Academy and NATO to jointly organise and run these and future Building Integrity Courses” (Source 2). TI UK has also had two Colonels on secondment to their offices in London where they developed a training course for Colonel rank officers. This is due to be run in Afghanistan at least twice this year.

Afghanistan’s national security forces opened the Center for Acquisitions and Procurement where soldiers, police and civilian employees of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of defence will attend CAP for procurement and resource management training in specialties like budgeting and tracking funds in accordance with Afghan procurement and finance laws. This indicates the government is attempting to institutionalize professional training for procurement staff and also offer training opportunities on specific issues to civilian staff. In June, the CEP has already started running basic and advanced pilot courses. The school will serve in a continuing education capacity, where students can not only earn a basic certificate, but can return after a few years of practical experience to earn an intermediate certificate. (RSM, 2015)

Training for procurement staff is also available through the Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) from the Ministry of Finance though is not likely focused on the defence and sector as the CAP training courses. These trainings are focused on procurement planning, familiarisation with Procurement law and Rules of procedure.(PPU: Capacity Building; PPU: PCBC Complete Procurement..., 2015) The PPU’s Procurement Capacity Building Component has conducted specialized training for MOD staff (PPU, n.d.; “Report,” 2012). There is no information as to how regularly these trainings are conducted.

There is also training organised by EUPOL for ANP. (EUPOL: EUPOL national staff..., 2014)
This training focuses on procurement law and stress the importance of accountability and transparency.

No further information on anti-corruption training courses is available. Although not directly anti-corruption training, perhaps the most important wide-spread education occurring within the ANA is literacy training: “In NTM-A/CSTC-A’s view, literate forces are easier to train, more capable and effective, and better able to understand human rights and the rule of law. Further, literate soldiers and police can account for equipment and weapons by completing paperwork and reading serial numbers. They can also mitigate corrupt practices by tracking their own pay” (SIGAR, 2014a, p. 4).


DSP Comment: DSP can confirm the above-mentioned training has taken place. A senior leaders course is scheduled to take place in mid-late September 2015. In the past this type of training has primarily been delivered by organisations from the international community. However, this year, DSP can confirm that two of its former secondees also held a Train-the-Trainer course on anti-corruption at the National Defence University in August 2015. The training audience included personnel from a range of departments including the MoD Inspector General's Office. While the intention is for these trainers to hold regular anti-corruption training for mid-ranking officers, this has not yet taken place as the Afghan-led training program only started recently.


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: As the training led by Afghan military staff is not yet routine and regularly repeated, a score of 3 cannot be awarded. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 2, anti-corruption defence consultant, 19 Feb 2015

2) NATO. &quoute;Building Integrity Programme: Strengthening transparency, accountability and integrity and reducing the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector 2012-2014,&quoute; December 7, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_93045.htm]

3) SIGAR. &quoute;Afghan National Security Forces: Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain about Literacy Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment (Audit No. 14-30),&quoute; January, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR_14-30-AR.pdf]

4) TI UK. &quoute;Anti-Corruption Training Course in Kabul for Afghan MOD,&quoute; February 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/20-category-publications/publications-dsp/74-dsp-pubs-afghan-training.html]

5) EUPOL. &quoute;EUPOL national staff delivers procurement training in the provinces,&quoute; May, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.eupol-afg.eu/node/108]

6) PPU. &quoute;Capacity Building,&quoute; no date, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/CapacityBuilding/TA.aspx]

7) PPU. &quoute;PCBC Complete Procurement Basic Training, Award Certificates to Participants,&quoute; March 8, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/NewsMaster.aspx?code=51]

8) RSM. “ANSF Acquisitions and Procurement Center Now Open for Business,” June, 2-15. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/ansf-acquisitions-and-procurement-center-now-open-for-business.html]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: MOD has succeeded to implement the TI and NATO Building Integrity program.
It is worth mentioning that the MOD- IG and general staff- IG have prepared and conducted the training program for the decreasing the risk of corruption in the working systems and given corrective measures to implement the counter corruption policies.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
0

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

Researcher4693: There is no policy that outcomes of the prosecution of defence personnel must be made public.

When officials have been arrested on charges related to corruption, there is commonly no information on subsequent prosecution outcomes. For instance, in 2012, one case that was made public involved the Afghan National Army Surgeon General who allegedly stole money from a hospital to purchase an unneeded mammogram machine from a company in which his brother worked. Although the surgeon general was suspended, there is no evidence that he has ever been on trial for embezzlement. (Washington Times, 2013; New York Times, 2012). The arrest of an Afghan Army General for trafficking heroin in July 2015 has also not led to the publication of further information regarding a possible prosecution. (RFERL, 2015)

More recently, controversy emerged when the media reported that &quoute;a dozen police officers have been arrested, including several senior commanders,... and others have been fired or suspended&quoute; after being accused of corruption. (Goldstein, 2015) Whether the senior commanders were prosecuted, was not possible to determine.

Lack of evidence shows that whilst there are consequences for defence personnel involved in corrupt activity there are no indications that prosecutions of the individuals takes place or is done so consistently. A 2015 report from SIGAR also states that despite many referrals reaching the Attorney General's Office, there has been no apparent improvement in case processing at the AGO.&quoute; and that &quoute;corruption cases handled by the MCTF must pass through at least two prosecution offices before reaching the AGO’s anticorruption prosecution units. Cases face potential derailment as they navigate each additional office.&quoute;

Moreover, SIGAR reporting also stated &quoute;MCTF senior leadership and line investigators continue to encounter resistance from senior Afghan government officials and members of parliament when investigating allegations of corruption against politically-connected targets.&quoute; (SIGAR, 2015) Furthermore, the Asia Foundation's Survey of the Afghan People states that 55% of the respondents in the survey stated that they had to pay a bribe to the judiciary, indicating that when cases do reach prosecution, there are still no assurances of a fair trial. Transparency International's Corruption Barometer 2013 states that Afghans perceived the judiciary to be the most corrupt institution in the country (60%).

According to the Afghanistan Analysts Network the country is marked with &quoute;pervasive impunity in Afghanistan for human rights violations, crimes and corruption that is caused, encouraged and sustained by weak State institutions, insecurity and lack of rule of law facilitated by decades of conflict.&quoute; (Clark, 2015) Numerous op-eds also seem to suggest that a sense of impunity continues to exist widely in Afghanistan. (Alizada, 2015; Hamdam, 2015; Pajhwok Afghan News, 2015)

COMMENTS -+

1) Phillip Swarts. &quoute;Afghan prosecutors faulted for lax corruption efforts,&quoute; Washington Times, October 2, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/2/afghan-prosecutors-faulted-lax-corruption-efforts/]

2) Matthew Rosenberg and Graham Bowleymarch. &quoute;Intractable Afghan Graft Hampering U.S. Strategy,&quoute; New York Times, March 7, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/world/asia/corruption-remains-intractable-in-afghanistan-under-karzai-government.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0]

3) Joseph Goldstein. &quoute;Police Force in Afghanistan Is Studied for Ties to Taliban&quoute;, New York Times, February 8, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/world/asia/police-force-in-afghanistan-is-studied-for-ties-to-taliban.html]

4) Kate Clark. &quoute;Because of Impunity: UN reports Afghan forces still torturing Afghans,&quoute; Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 25, 2015. Available on [https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/because-of-impunity-un-reports-afghan-forces-still-torturing-afghans/]

5) Nazifa Alizada. &quoute;Farkhunda’s Murder and the Imperative of Introspection,&quoute; Khaama Press, April 01 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/farkhundas-murder-and-the-imperative-of-introspection-9362]

6) Mohammad Shafiq Hamdam. &quoute;What else can go wrong?,&quoute; Khaama Press, April 16, 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/what-else-can-go-wrong-9388

7) Pajhwok Afghan News. &quoute;Afghan govt urged to prosecute rights abusers,&quoute; March 04, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/03/10/afghan-govt-urged-prosecute-rights-abusers]

8) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” July 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-07-30qr.pdf]

9) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” October 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-10-30qr.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
0

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

Researcher4693: Facilitation payments and petty bribery are a common practice in Afghanistan to speed up long administration processes. (Public Intelligence: Joint Chiefs of..., 2014) Although HOOAC informs on its website about risks of petty corruption, there is no specific information on how to tackle/prosecute it neither in the Anti - Corruption Strategy nor in HOOAC Law. (HOOAC: About Corruption)

The Word Bank has supported the customs reform in Afghanistan to mitigate facilitation payments at the borders by, for example, advising Customs Department to regularly publish revenue collection data. This measure increases transparency but it has not improved the overall situation significantly. (World Bank: Eliminating Customs of ..., 2014) It could not be established that facilitation payments are illegal in Afghanistan.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that this question relates to facilitation payments, not necessarily the procurement process. Please also note that this question asks about to extent to which facilitation payments are illegal and whether they occur in practice.

COMMENTS -+

1) Public Intelligence. &quoute;Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide Offers Blunt Assessment of Afghan National Police,&quoute; September 8, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://publicintelligence.net/jcisfa-afghan-national-police/]

2) HOOAC. &quoute;About Corruption,&quoute; no date, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://anti-corruption.gov.af/en/page/1736]

3) World Bank. &quoute;Eliminating Customs of Corruption: New Approaches in Cameroon & Afghanistan,&quoute; April 6, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/eliminating-customs-corruption-new-approaches-cameroon-afghanistan].

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: With the new government of Afghanistan, the MOD has committed to make corrective measures in all working affairs, especially in procurement field and fully apply the public Procurement Law and rules. It is worth mentioning that all procurement documents have been seen by national procurement authority experts and CSTC-A representatives.

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
1

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

Researcher4693: There is no Afghan military doctrine publicly available and it is not clear whether such a document exists. The only reference to military doctrine is from the year 2008 in an article by US Army Sergeant who said Afghan doctrine appeared to be heavily influenced by the US military and consisted &quoute;of manuals that have been cut copied and replaced” by the US military. (Hoh, 2008)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that this question is specific to the existence of anti-corruption doctrine, which is different from policy. The assessor could not find the existence of military doctrine on this issue or confirm that there is recognition of corruption as a strategic issues in operations. Therefore a score of 3 cannot be awarded. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Anthony Hoh. &quoute;The Problems with Afghan Army Doctrine&quoute;, Small Wars Journal, June 17, 2008, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-problems-with-afghan-army-doctrine]

2) Attorney General's Office. &quoute;Organizational chart,&quoute; no date, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://ago.gov.af/en/documents]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD reviewed the counter corruption policy, and has identified and analysed the priorities step by step, which are related to corruption. Recently an internal control document was prepared and approved by MOD high authorities’ who then discussed and introduced it in a one day seminar. This document will subsequently be implemented. The internal counter corruption system has already been explained in previous sections.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
2

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

Researcher4693: Anti-corruption training for the ANA has included commanders though not at all levels, and included corruption issues they may face during in country deployment. However, these training are not conducted regularly. (Interview: Source 2, 2015).

There is anecdotal evidence that some of the attendees apply this knowledge in the field, but no proven evidence. (Interview: Source 2, 2015).

The most recent Senior Leadership Course TI ran in Kabul in November 2014, the Minister of Defence, Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah and the Chief of the Armed Forces General Karimi, also took part with 20 other General rank military officers (Interview: Source 2, 2015).

TI DSP and the UK Defence Academy resumed anti-corruption trainings in May and November 2014 with a Senior Leaders Course. “A Senior Leaders Course was run in September 2015 at the UK embassy in Kabul. TI DSP has been in discussions with UK Defence Academy and NATO to jointly organise and run these and future Building Integrity Courses” (Source 2).

Also, the police is trained in anti-corruption practices. For example, EUPOL offered several anti-corruption courses for the commanders level and below. (EUPOL, 2015)

It should be noted that all anti-corruption training for defence and security personnel in the Afghan context will have elements of training on anti-corruption in operations as well.

TI DSP Comment: TI DSP can confirm the above-mentioned training has taken place. A senior leaders course took place in mid-late September 2015. In the past this type of training has primarily been delivered by organisations from the international community. However, this year, DSP can confirm that two of its former secondees also held a Train-the-Trainer course on anti-corruption at the National Defence University in August 2015. The training audience included personnel from a range of departments including the MoD Inspector General's Office. While the intention is for these trainers to hold regular anti-corruption training for mid-ranking officers, this has not yet taken place as the Afghan-led training program only started recently.

COMMENTS -+

1) Transparency International UK. &quoute;Anti-corruption training course in Kabul for Afghan MOD and MOI senior officers,&quoute; February, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://issuu.com/tidefence/docs/2013-02_afghantraining_report]

2) Interview with Source 2, anti-corruption defence consultant, 19 Feb 2015.

3) EUPOL. &quoute;&quoute;Is this really corruption?&quoute;&quoute;, accessed on September 7, 2015. Available on [http://www.eupol-afg.eu/taxonomy/term/70?page=2]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: MOD is completely agreed.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
0

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

Researcher4693: According to Source 2, there are professionals trained to understand corruption related risks however they are not currently used to monitor corruption in the field. However, the process to train Afghan instructors for anti - corruption courses has started. (Interview: Source 2, 2015)

No publicly available sources were identified to support or contradict this statement.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 2, anti-corruption defence consultant, 19 Feb 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
1

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

Researcher4693: Afghanistan’s national security forces opened the Center for Acquisitions and Procurement where soldiers, police and civilian employees of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of defence will attend CAP for procurement and resource management training in specialties like budgeting and tracking funds in accordance with Afghan procurement and finance laws. This indicates the government is attempting to institutionalise professional training for procurement staff. In June, the CEP has already started running basic and advanced pilot courses. The school will serve in a continuing education capacity, where students can not only earn a basic certificate, but can return after a few years of practical experience to earn an intermediate certificate. (RSM, 2015) It is uncertain whether there will be specific training aimed at contracting whilst on deployment.

Military staff receive training on anti-corruption through for example NATO Building Integrity Program, Transparency International's courses or through the Transparency Accountability and Oversight Enterprise Advisory Group (former CJIATF-Shafafiyat). However, it is not clear whether there are any specific guidelines Afghan forces can use to address the corruption risks in contracting whilst deployed on operations.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that this question revolves around addressing corruption risks in contracting while on operations. The assessor could not find a consolidated set of guidance on these issues. it is possible that the courses at the CAP will include corruption risks for contracting on operations; however, this could not be verified through publicly available sources. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) RSM. “ANSF Acquisitions and Procurement Center Now Open for Business,” June, 2-15. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/ansf-acquisitions-and-procurement-center-now-open-for-business.html]

Sources searched include the Ministry of defence Website (http://mod.gov.af/en), Afghan local news (Tolo:
http://tolonews.com/ and Pajhwok: http://pajhwok.com/),Interview with Source 2, anti-corruption defence consultant, and all other documents specifically referenced throughout this assessment.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Ensuring the coordination among security forces and ANA in the peaceful operation out of Afghanistan soil is already mentioned in the nation military strategy which is still a strategic objective for Afghanistan's security forces.

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
2

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Researcher4693: PMCs are employed in Afghanistan though no publicly available information was identified regarding whether existing PMCs are used by the MoD or MoI or whether they are regulated by Afghan law and subject to Afghan scrutiny and oversight.

According to Irin News, the Afghan government has scaled up support of anti-Taliban militia recently, and &quoute;supplies militias with ammunition and food while they are fighting, but does not pay them.&quoute; The Washington Post also reported that the Afghan government is paying the salaries of some of these militia fighters and supplies them not only with ammunition, but also pickup trucks and Humvees. (Raghavan, 2015)

In 2010, by Presidential Decree No 62, the Afghan government established the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), which is subordinate to the MoI and was intended to replace all non-diplomatic PMCs in Afghanistan by 2012. (APPF, no date) In Feb 2014, the President indicated his intention to disband the APPF (Hodge, 2014; SIGAR, 2014, p. 90). The reason for dissolving the APPF is not clear, and occurred without a plan for replacing its services (SIGAR, 2014, pp. 90–91). The APPF’s website is still active however and it is not clear if the APPF has yet been disbanded.

American PMCs are still active and operating in Afghanistan. Although they are subject to some scrutiny by the US authorities, it appears that they are not subject to effective sanctions. For example, one of the US PMC was found to have done a subpar job on a construction project for the ANA. (Daily Beast, 2014) The DOD was criticised recently for not applying sufficiently regulatory initiatives and accountability measures in regard to PMCs. (Professional Overseas Contractors, 2015) The lack of oversight “creates opportunities for criminals and insurgents to enrich themselves” (Schwartz: Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis and Issues for Congress, 2011, p. 5) and insufficient data and accountability raise doubts about effective management of resources. (Francis D.: What Are 108,000 Military…, 2013; Weiner R., Wallace D.: Military contractors belie…, 2015)

The US Senate Committee on Armed Services in its report states that DOD is required to examine a company's past performance prior to awarding a contract. Once a contract is awarded, the government relies on contracting officers and their delegated representatives to oversee performance. But audits conducted by the Government Accountability Office cites several deficiencies in the oversight process, including a lack of DOD oversight personnel.

The aforementioned articles also detail cases when PMCs were sanctioned, although these sanctions were not related to corruption. No specific examples of corrupt activities by PMCs could be found though all the articles and reports listed above mention that the lack of oversight creates opportunities for mismanagement of resources.

Score 2 has been selected to reflect that there is no evidence of the use of PMCs by the MOI or the MOD and there is no prohibition on their use either.

COMMENTS -+

1) Afghan Public Protection Force. &quoute;About the APPF,&quoute; APPF Advisory Group, no date, accessed April 1, 2015. Available on [https://sites.google.com/site/appfadvisorygroupdocuments/about-the-appf]

2) The Daily Beast. &quoute;The Real Winner of the Afghan War Is This Shady Military Contractor,&quoute; April 24, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/24/the-real-winner-of-the-afghan-war-is-this-shady-military-contractor.html].

3) APPF. &quoute;Afghan Public Protection Force,&quoute; no date, accessed May 15, 2015. Available on [http://www.appf.gov.af/index1.htm]

4) Professional Overseas Contractors. &quoute;Department of State critized for not implementing accountability initiatives for Private Military Contractors,&quoute; January 12, 2015, accessed May 15, 2015. Available on [http://www.your-poc.com/department-state-critized-not-implementing-accountability-initiatives-private-military-contractors/#sthash.5RfSmKCd.dpuf]

5) Nathan Hodge. &quoute;Afghanistan to Disband Crucial Guard Force,&quoute; Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304585004579418730552246724]

6) SIGAR. &quoute;Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,&quoute; April, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/index.aspx?SSR=6]

7) Schwartz M. &quoute;Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis and Issues for Congress&quoute;. Available on [https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42084.pdf] Last modified on 14 Nov 2011

8) Francis D. &quoute;What Are 108,000 Military Contractors Still Doing In Afghanistan?&quoute;, Businness Insider. Available on [http://www.businessinsider.com/108000-contractors-are-in-afghanistan-2013-6?IR=T] Last modified on 5 June 2013

9) Weiner R., Wallace D. &quoute;Military contractors belie myth of U.S. leaving Afghanistan and Iraq&quoute;. Available on [http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/04/military_contractors_believe_m.html] Last modified on 24 Apr 2015

10) Committee on Armed Services. &quoute;INQUIRY INTO THE ROLE AND OVERSIGHT OF PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN&quoute;. Available on [http://fas.org/irp/congress/2010_rpt/sasc-psc.pdf] Last modified on 28 Sep 2010

11) Bethany Matta. &quoute;Abuses rise along with pro-Afghan government militias,&quoute; Irin News, September 8, 2015. Available on [http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2015/09/08/abuses-rise-along-with-pro-afghan-government-militias.html]

12) Sudarsan Raghavan. &quoute;Afghan government turns to militias as Taliban gains strength,&quoute; Washington Post, October 29, 2015. Available on [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-taliban-resurges-an-afghan-warlord-gains-power/2015/10/29/5e431aaa-21bf-4713-b681-7226681c18a1_story.html]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: PMCs currently deployed to Afghanistan are ostensibly supposed to be under greater scrutiny from Afghan authorities after Karzai implemented the Afghan Public Protection Force. However, many foreign PMCs continue to operate effectively independent from significant oversight save for that of their home country.

The government has sought to rein in activities by PMCs in the past with limited success suggesting that there are few penalties towards PMCs operating in Afghanistan or they are not reliably enforced.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
1

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

Researcher4693: The National Procurement Law (2008, amended 2009) applies to all government procurement including defence and security procurement; there is no defence specific procurement law. Presidential Decree 45, Art 2(1) orders the MOD to “Prepare and provide a revised, transparent and complete procurement mechanism for the ministry with the assistance of the MoF, MoEc and MoJ.” The Procurement Law was revised, and new amendments were ratified by H.E President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan through legislative decree no. (75) Dated October 7, 2015.

According to the MEC however, the resulting MOD policy “is vague and only reflects the Procurement Law, rather than the specific procurement needs of the MOD. Furthermore, the policy does not include an implementation plan” (MEC, 2014, p. 119).

To further support the Procurement Law, the Ministry of Finance published ‘The Rules of Procedure For Public Procurement’ where Chapter X directly discusses risks of corruption, for example it stipulates that “A proposal for award shall be rejected if it is determined that the bidder recommended for award has, directly or through an agent, engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive or coercive practices… “ (Rule 163(3)) or it rules out conflict of interests. (MoF: The Rules of Procedure For..., 2009)

President Ghani has established a National Procurement Commission (NPC) where senior officials are closely monitoring major procurement contracts to prevent corruption and ensure transparency. The body sits within the Office of the President and is separate from the National Procurement Authority . The meetings are held weekly, chaired by President Ghani himself and open to civil society observers. (UNOPS, 2015) According to media sources quoting the government, by June 2015 the Commission has reportedly saved Government Treasury more than $150 million including $9 million from 17 contracts of the MoD. (Adeel, 2015) The body was created after an MoD oversight body (uncertain which) revealed $200 million alleged fraud in a defence ministry oil contract. The Special Procurement Commission which was supposed to be overseeing the contract was also implicated, hence the creation of the new NPC. Government source stated that the embezzlement of $200 million was confirmed by coalition forces and SIGAR. The results led to the contract’s cancellation – the contract would be re-announced for bidding. (1TV News, 2015)

Large-scale procurement, including those within MoD procurement, are currently reviewed by the NPC. In an interview with SIGAR, President Ghani noted that &quoute;Every single contract, in terms of food, supplies, and others in the Ministry of defence, was overhauled [...] But the core of it is that everything now is becoming legal, because the smallest part of our procurement law is being enforced. People are not being allowed to get away with first authorizing a project and then saying the budget must be allocated. &quoute; (SIGAR, October 2015)

At a recent NPC meeting, the President said that &quoute;the procurement system of the Ministry of defence should be civilianized in order to improve capacity of the procurement section in the Ministry. The President also instructed the National Procurement Commission to look into all the evaluated contracts in light of the past meetings to determine their capacity and transparency as well as possible connections of officials with companies.&quoute; President Ghani also reportedly asked the Commission to seek help from the office of CSTC-A in this regard. (Office of the President, 2015)

Exemption is related to procurement which &quoute;requires confidentiality to ensure the interest and protection of the nation&quoute; (Procurement Law, 2009, Art 4 (2)). Whether any mechanism exists to scrutinize procurement under such exemption, is unclear. However, cases of procurement law violations have been discussed in media (Capaccio A.: Afghanistan Can’t Manage..., 2015; Soadat S.: $100 Million USD..., 2015) During a a meeting in July 2015, an official from the defence ministry reportedly briefed the president on the scrutiny of its procurement contracts and informed the NPC about its future requirements. The president subsequently urged the creation of a separate framework to deal with logistic issues and equipment of security forces. (Office of the President, July 2015) This statement combined with the exemption of confidential procurement leads one to reason that procurement oversight by the NPC may not be comprehensive.

The National Procurement Authority, the main procurement body for the government, states on its website that it has five directorates under its structure: (a) Procurement Policy Directorate (b) Civil Procurement Directorate (c) Military & Emergency Procurement Directorate (e) Procurement Legal and Dispute Resolution Directorate and (e) Contracts Implementation Monitoring Directorate. This would indicate that procurement that would normally be exempt under the Procurement Law could also be up for discussion. However, the existence of independent oversight for exempt procurement could not be verified.

Furthermore, the SAO found in its compliance audit of 1392 (2013-2014) the MoD was non-compliant with provisions of the Procurement Law in areas such as payment, delivery and sourcing (single vs competitive).

COMMENTS -+

1) Ministry of Finance. &quoute;Procurement Law,&quoute; 2008, revised 2015, accessed November 19, 2015. Available on [http://mof.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/ProcurmentLawincoporatedJan2009762011102131268553325325.pdf] or [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/PPU/PL.aspx#]

2) Ministry of Finance. &quoute;The Rules of Procedure For Public Procurement,&quoute; November 18, 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Documents/RulesofProcedure/English/Afg%20Procurement%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20120407%20Eng.pdf]

3) MEC. &quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report,&quoute; Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, January 30, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

4) Capaccio A. &quoute;Afghanistan Can’t Manage Billions in Aid, U.S. Inspector Finds&quoute;, March 10, 2015, accessed August 18, 2015. Available on [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-10/afghanistan-can-t-manage-billions-in-aid-u-s-inspector-finds]

5) Saleha Soadat. &quoute;$100 Million USD MoD Fuel Contract Scandal Revealed&quoute;, ToloNews, April 09, 2015, accessed July 03, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18985-100-million-usd-mod-fuel-contract-scandal-revealed]

6) Mirwais Adeel. “Ghani: Over $150 million saved from the Government Treasury,” June 7, 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/ghani-over-150-million-saved-from-the-government-treasury-9469]

7) 1TV News. “Afghan MoD oil contract cancelled amid fraud allegations, measures introduce,”
February 02, 2015. Available on [http://1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/15070-afghan-mod-oil-contract-cancelled-amid-fraud-allegations-measures-introduced]

8) Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. “Introduction of the National Procurement Authority,” 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/AboutUs.aspx]

9) UNOPS. “Press release: UNOPS Executive Director reaffirms key partnerships in Afghanistan,” May 8th, 2015. Available on [https://www.unops.org/english/News/Press-releases/Pages/UNOPS-Executive-Director-reaffirms-key-partnerships-in-Afghanistan.aspx]

10) Saleha Soadat. &quoute;$100 Million USD MoD Fuel Contract Scandal Revealed,&quoute; April 9, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18985-100-million-usd-mod-fuel-contract-scandal-revealed]

11) Pajhwok Afghan News. &quoute;NPC approves 15 contracts worth one billion afghanis,&quoute; October 22, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/10/22/npc-approves-15-contracts-worth-one-billion-afghanis]

12) Office of the President. &quoute;The Main Goal for Evaluation of MoD Contracts is to Provide Better Logistics Services and Facilities for Soldiers.&quoute; July 11, 2015. Available on [http://president.gov.af/en/news/49386]

13) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” April 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-04-30qr.pdf]

14) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” October 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-10-30qr.pdf]

15) Office of the President. &quoute;The Main Goal for Evaluation of MoD Contracts is to Provide Better Logistics Services and Facilities for Soldiers.&quoute; July 11, 2015. Available on [http://president.gov.af/en/news/49386]

16) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Summary of Result of Compliance Audit for ARTF IP benchmark 1393,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/en/page/1568/summary-of-result-of-compliance-audit-for-artf-ip-benchmar-1393]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
1

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

Researcher4693: For non-armed procurement all stages of the procurement from bidding announcement up until award are disclosed to the public. But armed and other procurements which require secrecy based on Article 4 of the Procurement Law are not publicy disclosed (PPU: Procurement Law, 2009). Therefore some of the defence related purchases might not publicly available. (Email Interview: Source 3, 2015) The PPU website provides a list of bidding opportunities as well as a list of awarded contracts. (PPU, 2015)

Although the MOD is working on a procurement policy in accordance with Presidential Decree 45 art 2(1), this policy is not currently public. Procurement cycle specific policies are unlikely to exist given the MEC assessment that the MOD’s policy is “vague and only reflects the Procurement Law, rather than the specific procurement needs of the MOD. Furthermore, the policy does not include an implementation plan” (MEC, 2014, p. 119). The Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement do specify various stages of the procurement process including: Planning, Aggregation of Requirements, Planning an individual procurement requirement, Request for Proposals, Tendering, Bid Evaluation (Technical and Financial), procedures for single-source procurement, contract award, payment, contract administration.

In the past the MEC’s 2014 report indicates that the MOD has not fully complied with the Procurement Law’s requirements. Generally contracts made public are incomplete and lack any detail, based on those submitted by other ministries. According to MEC: “The ARDS requested all government institutions to provide them with their contracts to publish on the ARDS website… the MOD and MOI agreed to share their contracts, but have not sent them yet. The ARDS has published most of the government contracts on its website, which seems to be a positive move towards transparency and accountability. Unfortunately, most of these contracts are incomplete, and many only contain a summary. Additionally, a large number of the contracts do not have attachments and only include names with contract amounts (MEC, 2014, p. 124)

No more information could be found on the defence procurement cycle or whether it has been formalised at all.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: While your information was useful, please note that this question inquires about the disclosure of the procurement cycle. A lack of publicly available information signals that the cycle is not disclosed in full and does not specify the procurement cycle for MoD procurement. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Ministry of Finance. &quoute;Procurement Law,&quoute; 2008, revised 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mof.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/ProcurmentLawincoporatedJan2009762011102131268553325325.pdf] or [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/PPU/PL.aspx#]

2) PPU. &quoute;Introduction to PPU,&quoute; no date, accessed April 01, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/English.aspx]

3) Email interview with Source 3, anti-corruption policy advisor, 23 February 2015.

4) MEC.&quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report. Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, January 30, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

5) PPU. &quoute;Awarded Contracts,&quoute; 2015, accessed September 10, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/English/ProcuringEntities/AC.aspx]

6) Ministry of Finance. &quoute;The Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,&quoute; November 18, 2009. Available on [http://ppu.gov.af/Documents/RulesofProcedure/English/Afg%20Procurement%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20120407%20Eng.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD has published all the non- armed contracts which are not confidential (due to national interest) via news and the MOD official web site ( www.mod.gov.af / bidding opportunities ). Bidders can also download the bidding document from the official website of the MoD. The ministry has published the public notice of contract award proceedings in the mass media ( public circulars/news) so at be made available across Afghanistan, as required by the Public Procurement Law.

The MOD has the honour of receiving the competency and capacity Certificate from the PPU/ MOF which according to regulations, means the MOD can proceed with high value contracts without any facilitation by the ARDS.

Source:
1-tArticles 27 and 63 of Procurement Law and related roles and procedures
2-tMoD official website / Bidding opportunities
3-tPPU published circulars PPU /C025/1387 solar calendar and PPU published circulars PPU /C033/1389 solar calendar
4-tNews

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
2

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Researcher4693: A 2010 International Crisis Group report states defence procurement oversight has reportedly been conducted by the Ministry of Defence Inspector General. This is corroborated by Source 1. However, there is no publicly available evidence indicating the effectiveness of this body.

The 2015 fuel contract scandal highlights the existence of an Oversight Committee for the Ministry of defence Agreements chaired by Hamidullah Farooqi. (Soadat, 2015) However, no further information could be found on this body to comment on its activity, resourcing or effectiveness.

Following this event in April 2015, President Ghani established National Procurement Commission to provide independent oversight of defence procurement. Sources shows that the National Procurement Commission is very active and chaired by the president at weekly meetings. (UNOPS, 2015) According to sources, all contracts go through a vigorous review process before the Commission gives final approval. Since its inception, it has rejected several contracts or recommended them for adjustments. (Soadat, 2015; Office of the President, 2015; Addeel, 2015) The Commission regularly states how much money has been saved thanks to the review process and information on which contracts have been approved. On the Office of the President website, the information on which contracts have been approved, are regularly updated. Also, it contains information who attended the meeting. During a recent meeting, news sources reported that &quoute;During the meeting, official from the defence ministry briefed the president on the scrutiny of its procurement contracts and informed the NPC about its future requirements. [...] The president urged the creation of a separate framework to deal with logistic issues and equipment of security forces.&quoute;

However, further details of the review process are not known. As the Commission has been established only recently, it is not possible to predict whether its activity will span changes in government.

Although it seems that the commission conducts thorough review process of the awarded contract and does not hesitate to reject already awarded contracts when there are shortcomings, it can be hardly considered as &quoute;an independent formalised process&quoute; as a lot of the activity appears to be dependent on the President’s initiative. Moreover, whilst the committee reviews high-value contracts, it is unclear whether any oversight mechanisms have been established for small value contracts.

The SAO's compliance audit for the MoD (and two other ministries) for 1392 (2013-2014) notes non-compliance with the procurement law stating that &quoute;Controls for procurement and contract management were not adequate to ensure compliance with the applicable procurement laws and guidelines, provisions of the contracts in the three ministries.&quoute; This indicates a degree of oversight is exercised by the SAO. The report also recommended that the ministries and their agencies at the centre and the directorates in the provinces should strengthen their controls and monitoring systems. However, it is not clear to what degree these recommendations are effectively addressed.

It is also unclear whether any oversight mechanisms have been established for confidential procurement which is exempt from Procurement Law. The National Procurement Authority's website states that it has five directorates under its structure including a Military & Emergency Procurement Directorate. This would indicate that procurement that would normally be exempt under the Procurement Law could also be up for discussion though this could not be verified by the assessor.

According to interviewee 1, although procurement oversight mechanisms formally exist, the overall procurement process in practice lacks transparency to an extent that corruption often occurs in the process. When a bid is announced, it is already known which bidding company will win the contract. Through the bidding process, if the preferred company does not win the contract legitimately, the bid process will then be challenged, following which a committee will be established. This committee issues a final decision, the purpose of this procedure is to award the contract to the preferred company. The interviewee added that the preferred company secures its place in the bidding process by paying bribes to the more senior employees within the Ministry. (Interview: Source 1, 2015) In the latest fuel procurement scandal at MoD, several high Ministry and government representatives were involved. The Chairman of the Oversight Committee for MoD contracts confirmed that &quoute;The issue of bribes is the case here, one of the officials has been paid up to $5 million USD.&quoute; (Soadat S.: $100 Million USD..., 2015)

Response to government reviewer: Efforts made to improve oversight and minimise the risk of corruption in the procurement process are acknowledged and welcomed. However, they have been introduced too recently to be judged on their effectiveness. Further there remain concerns regarding oversight and corruption in the procurement nonetheless. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) International Crisis Group. (2010). A FORCE IN FRAGMENTS: RECONSTITUTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY ( No. 190), May 12, 2010, accessed July 3, 2015. Available on [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190%20A%20Force%20in%20Fragments%20-%20Reconstituting%20the%20Afghan%20National%20Army.pdf] Last modified on 12 May 2010

2) Office of the President. &quoute;National Procurement Commission Approves 15 Contracts&quoute;. August 30, 2015. Accessed on September 6, 2015. Available on [http://president.gov.af/en/news/national-procurement-commission-approves-15-contracts]

3) UNOPS. &quoute;Press release: UNOPS Executive Director reaffirms key partnerships in Afghanistan&quoute;. August 5, 2015. Accessed on September 6, 2015. Available on [https://www.unops.org/english/News/Press-releases/Pages/UNOPS-Executive-Director-reaffirms-key-partnerships-in-Afghanistan.aspx#sthash.vzuUo76Y.dpuf]

4) Mirwais Addeel. &quoute;Ghani: Over $150 million saved from the Government Treasury&quoute;, Khaama. June 7, 2015. Accessed on September 2015. Available on [http://www.khaama.com/ghani-over-150-million-saved-from-the-government-treasury-9469]

5) Interview with Source 1, anti-corruption policy advisor, 18 Feb 2015.

6) Soadat S. &quoute;$100 Million USD MoD Fuel Contract Scandal Revealed&quoute;, ToloNews. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18985-100-million-usd-mod-fuel-contract-scandal-revealed] Last modified on 9 Apr 2015

7) Pajhwok Afghan News. &quoute;NPC approves 15 contracts worth one billion afghanis,&quoute; October 22, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/10/22/npc-approves-15-contracts-worth-one-billion-afghanis]

8) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Summary of Result of Compliance Audit for ARTF IP benchmark 1393,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/en/page/1568/summary-of-result-of-compliance-audit-for-artf-ip-benchmar-1393]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Over the past year procurement affairs have been overseen by the National Procurement Authority and National Procurement Commission which are led by His Excellency president M. Ashraf Ghani.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
2

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

Researcher4693: Awarded contracts are displayed on the National Procurement Authority's website. (Procurement Policy Unit: Awarded contracts) A list of current tenders is available on the Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services' (ARDS) website. A requirement for publishing current and potential procurements, is stated in the Procurement Law: &quoute;After the decision of the award authority, the entity shall publish the procurement proceedings, request for proposals [proceedings], the contract award with the winner, his Role, address, and the contract value in the mass media and internet for public notice&quoute; (&quoute;Procurement Law&quoute;, 2009, art. 63). This information is listed on MoD and ARDS websites, no further publicly available evidence was found. It is also unlikely that the contracts listed online include sensitive procurement that has been deemed exempt under the Procurement Law due to national security.

However the MEC’s 2014 AC Monitoring and Evaluation Committee Report indicates that the MOD has not fully complied with its requirements. Generally contracts made public are incomplete and lack any detail, based on those submitted by other ministries. According to MEC: “The ARDS requested all government institutions to provide them with their contracts to publish on the ARDS website… the MOD and MOI agreed to share their contracts, but have not sent them yet. The ARDS has published most of the government contracts on its website, which seems to be a positive move towards transparency and accountability. Unfortunately, most of these contracts are incomplete, and many only contain a summary. Additionally, a large number of the contracts do not have attachments and only include names with contract amounts (MEC, 2014, p. 124)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Thank you for your comments. A score of 3 requires some evidence of forward purchase plans. While the Procurement Law requires the publication of contract details, no evidence of forward purchase plans could be found. Moreover, given the lack of clarity surrounding classification of information and determining exemption, it is unclear how many purchase plans are withheld due to secrecy. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Procurement Policy Unit. &quoute;Procurement Policy Unit,&quoute; January, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/ProcuringEntities/AC.aspx]

2) Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services. &quoute;Opportunities,&quoute; no data, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ards.gov.af/SearchTenders.php?pEntity=MOD&pLocation=&cDate=&search=Search]

3) Ministry of Finance. &quoute;Procurement Law,&quoute; 2008, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mof.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/ProcurmentLawincoporatedJan2009762011102131268553325325.pdf]

4) MEC.&quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report,&quoute; Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, January 30, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

5) Office of the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Presidential Decree no. 45,&quoute; July 29, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2012/07/the-office-of-the-president-of-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-decree-on-the-execution-of-content-of-the-historical-speech-of-june-21-2012-in-the-special-session-of-national-assembly/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PermanentMissionOfAfghanistanToTheUnInNewYork+%28Permanent+Mission+of+Afghanistan+to+the+UN+in+New+York%29bestth]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD has published all the non- armed contracts which are not deemed confidential (for reasons of national security) via news and the MOD official web site (www.mod.gov.af / bidding opportunities). Bidders can also download the bidding documents from official website of MoD. The ministry has published the public notice of contract awards in the mass media (news) to make sure it is circulated in Afghanistan, as required under the Public Procurement Law.

The MOD has the honour of receiving the competency and capacity Certificate from PPU/ MOF which, according to regulations, means the MOD can proceed with high value contract without any facilitation by the ARDS.

Source:
1-tArticles 27 and 63 of procurement Law and related roles and procedures
2-tMoD official website / Bidding opportunities
3-tPPU published circulars PPU /C025/1387 solar calendar and PPU published circulars PPU /C033/1389 solar calendar

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are no stated exemptions to the Procurement Law as outlined by the PPU, however, it remains unclear the extent to which this incorporates military and defence requirements. While the MoD has, in principle a process for procurement, the mechanisms which govern it are unclear.

There are no clearly stated exemptions in this case.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
2

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

Researcher4693: The Procurement Law and Rules of Procedures state very clearly what kind of procedures and standards companies are required to have in order to be able to bid for a government contract.

Rule 163 of the Rules of Procedure defines corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, and coercive practices, and rejects and and stipulates the sanctions applicable to bidders who engage in them. The Rules state that “information on the Government’s policy on fraud and corruption, including the debarment of bidders” shall be included in Bidding Documents (Rule52(2)(k)), Requests for Proposals (Rule 83(2)(h)), Request for Quotation Documents (Rule 110 (2)(g)) and Contract Documents (Rule 141 (3)(j)). According to Section 1.3.(e) the government &quoute;will have the right to require that a provision be included in bidding documents and in contracts financed by the GoA, requiring Bidders, suppliers, and contractors and their sub-contractors to permit the Government to inspect their accounts and records and other documents relating to the Bid submission and contract performance and to have them audited by auditors appointed by the Government.&quoute;

It was not possible to determine whether companies are required to show that they have a formal and publicly declared compliance programme. No evidence has been found whether companies are required to show evidence that they insist on an ethical supply chain.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that in order to obtain a score of 3 it must be evident that companies are required to show that they have a formal and publicly declared compliance programme in order to bid for defence work. The assessor could find no evidence of these requirements being in effect in Afghanistan. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) PPU. &quoute;Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,&quoute; November 18, 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Documents/RulesofProcedure/English/Afg%20Procurement%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20120407%20Eng.pdf]

2) PPU. &quoute;Procurement Law,&quoute; 2008, modified 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/PPU/PL.aspx]

3) Email interview with Source 3, anti-corruption policy advisor, 23 Feb 2015

4) PPU. &quoute;Standard Bidding Documents for Goods.&quoute; no date. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/PPU/SBDGoods.aspx]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: According to the PPL and related rules and procedures, the MOD has prepared Standard Bidding Documents (SBDs). The MOD has also stated requirements for all bidders who would participate in the bidding process to include: attaching a signed declaration along with the offers, requiring the bidder to read and sign all the pages, including in the Invitation to Bid (ITB) and General Conditions of the Contract (GCC) clauses are specified.

The MOD acquisition agency has prepared guidelines to assist the bidder in drafting their own offers and submitting the document according to the content of bid sheet and the qualification criteria.

Sources:
1-tStandard biding document ( SBD ) ITB( Instruction to Bidder) clause 3
2-tStandard biding document ( SBD ) ITB clause 11
3-tStandard biding document ( SBD ) ITB clause 16,17,18and 19
4-tStandard biding document ( SBD ) BDS( bidding data sheet) clause 11
5-tStandard biding document ( SBD ) GCC(General condition of contract) clause 3
6-tBid submission form 03 ( SBD inside forms )
7-tAfghanistan PPL article 62 and related rules and procedures

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
1

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

Researcher4693: Procurement planning and budgeting have been a long-standing problem in ANSF. The responsibility for procurement previously lay with ISAF. The Resolute Support Mission states in its mission statement that it will assist the ANSF to build capacity in the areas of logistics, procurement and acquisition. (NATO Resolute Support Mission: Mission, 2015)

A Working Group, established under the umbrella of RSM was established to identify requirements for the next three years to work towards these objectives. Documents on the RSM website suggest that an Afghan National Security Strategy was developed however no further detail are available, nor is it possible to access this document via other sources. (GIRoA: National Security documents, 2015) It is therefore difficult to assess whether there is an openly published national defence and security strategy and to what extent it influences current procurement requirements and processes.

It appears that the Afghan MOD is moving towards improvements this area: the US DOD reported in 2014 that the Afghan MOD, “in conjunction with an advisory team, conducted budget planning for the next fiscal year. This planning effort included visits to corps to aid in requirements development. Although there are many faults in the document, it is their first attempt at generating requirements based upon military objectives and national strategic guidance&quoute; (DOD, 2014, p. 29).

During a recent meeting of the NPC, news sources reported that &quoute;During the meeting, official from the defence ministry briefed the president on the scrutiny of its procurement contracts and informed the NPC about its future requirements. [...] The president urged the creation of a separate framework to deal with logistic issues and equipment of security forces.&quoute; This indicates that there is awareness among some personnel of procurement requirements though whether those requirements would be connected to a broader strategy is unknown.

It is important to note that the majority of defence spending is off-budget, external to central government allocation, provided and procured by the international community. The transparency and accountability of this funding is therefore less transparent than on-budget spending. (Bizhan, 2012, p. 10)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Not all of the sources you provided could be accessed through publicly available sources. It is also still unclear whether there is a strategy in existence (from which procurement requirements can be derived). The score has been selected on this basis and given it is not possible to verify whether procurement is conducted in line with strategic requirements. Further there is evidence of opportunistic purchases.

COMMENTS -+

1) NATO Resolute Support Mission. &quoute;Mission,&quoute; 2015, accessed February 10, 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/mission.html]

2) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, &quoute;National Security Documents,&quoute; February 4, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/20150204_national_strategy_final.pdf]

3) DOD. &quoute;Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,&quoute; April, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf]

4) Nematullah Bizhan. &quoute;Budget Transparency in Afghanistan: A Pathway to Building Public Trust in the State,&quoute; International Budget Partnership, February 1, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI-case-study-Afghanistan.pdf]

5) William Byrd. &quoute;“We Pretend To Work, And They Pretend To Pay Us”, United States Institute of Peace, May 22, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB148.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Since the establishment of the reform process, the MoD has jointly coordinated with CSTC-A on initiatives that focus firmly on training in the areas of planning , programming and budgeting as has also been arranged in the military strategic planning framework.

Essential steps of this framework process are being implemented including the national military strategy guideline and other guidelines. The annual review process of the planning and programming directorate has been established under the policy and program strategy deputy of the MOD, who mainly works on the MOD need assessment.

The MOD believes and is committed to fully implementing strategic planning as a basic effective step to ensure transparency, accountability in counter corruption activities.

The MOD has prepared a number of policies based on NATO requirements. Within this work the logistic section of MOD has prepared and reviewed the 4.0 policy series which entailed identifying the items and needs of the MOD 10 classes of logistics requirements. The 4.0 policy series was prepared by the logistics experts working group of the MOD. Initially, the requirement generation process was developed, initiated and assisted by the advisory team AFSA( Admin finance Senior Advisory Team ) in 2013 and followed in 2014 for next three years jointly with MOD logistics experts from different involved and budgetary units. The MoD still needs cooperation of the international society to improve their efforts to introduce the most accurate system for MOD and to make the next requirements generation process more efficient and accurate.

Sources:
1-t4.0 -4.9 series policies for logistic section of MOD
2-tRequirement generation of MOD 1392 and 1393 accumulated for next three years

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
1

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Researcher4693: There is evidence to indicate a formal procedure for quantifying purchase requirements existence. However, there is no evidence to suggest purchases are based on clearly identified requirements. There is evidence of opportunistic and unplanned purchases. Moreover, much of the military equipment is provided to the Afghan military by other nations on an ad-hoc basis.

The Resolute Support Mission states in its mission statement that it will assist the ANSF to build capacity in the areas of logistics, procurement and acquisition. (NATO Resolute Support Mission: Mission, 2015) A Working Group, established under the umbrella of RSM was established to identify and requirements for the next three years to work towards these objectives. Documents on the RSM website suggest that an Afghan National Security Strategy was developed however no further detail are available, nor is it possible to access this document via other sources. (GIRoA: National Security documents, 2015) It is therefore difficult to assess whether procurement is based on clearly identified and quanitified requirements. It appears that the Afghan MOD is moving towards improvements this area: the DOD reported in 2014 that the Afghan MOD, “in conjunction with an advisory team, conducted budget planning for the next fiscal year.&quoute; (DOD, 2014, p. 29).

According to an interviewee, the MoI and MoD both deal with their procurement needs in an ad-hoc basis rather than a thorough pre-planned needs assessment. For non-weapons procurement both the MoI and the MoD allegedly negotiate with the vendor and prepare and quantify their needs according to what is in the vendor's stock at the time, regardless of the actual procurement requirements of the two ministries. This personal negotiation leads to opportunities for corruption and bribery. (Email Interview: Source 3, 2015). This statement is supported by allegations and investigations for corruption and bribery in defence procurement in media articles and publicly available sources. (Donati, 2015)

It is unknown to what extent the National Procurement Commission set up by President Ghani to oversee major procurement contracts would also base its decisions or draft any contracts on clearly identified and quantified requirements. During a recent meeting, news sources reported that &quoute;During the meeting, official from the defence ministry briefed the president on the scrutiny of its procurement contracts and informed the NPC about its future requirements. [...] The president urged the creation of a separate framework to deal with logistic issues and equipment of security forces.&quoute;


RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The sources you provided do not appear to be publicly available. Score has changed from 0 to 1 due there being indications that a formal procedure appears to be in place for defining purchase requirements. Relevant comments and sources have been added.

COMMENTS -+

1) Email Interview with Source 3, anti-corruption policy advisor, 23 Feb 2015.

2) Jessica Donati. &quoute;Afghan leader orders graft review for all army supply contracts&quoute;, Reuters, March 4, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/04/us-afghanistan-military-corruption-idUSKBN0M00H220150304]

3) NATO Resolute Support Mission. &quoute;Mission,&quoute; 2015, accessed February 10, 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/mission.html]

4) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, &quoute;National Security Documents,&quoute; February 4, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/20150204_national_strategy_final.pdf]

5) DOD. &quoute;Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,&quoute; April, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf]

6) Pajhwok Afghan News. &quoute;NPC approves 15 contracts worth one billion afghanis,&quoute; October 22, 2015. Available on [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/10/22/npc-approves-15-contracts-worth-one-billion-afghanis]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Procurement planning and budgeting have been a long-standing problem in ANSF. The responsibility for procurement previously lay with ISAF. The Resolute Support Mission states in its mission statement that it will assist the ANSF to build capacity in the areas of logistics, procurement and acquisition. (NATO Resolute Support Mission: Mission, 2015) A Working Group, established under the umbrella of RSM was established to identify and requirements for the next three years to work towards these objectives. Documents on the RSM website suggest that an Afghan National Security Strategy was developed however no further detail are available, nor is it possible to access this document via other sources. (GIRoA:National Security documents, 2015) It is therefore difficult to assess whether there an openly published national defence and security strategy and to what extent it influences current procurement requirements and processes. It appears that the Afghan MOD is moving towards improvements this area: the DOD reported in 2014 that the Afghan MOD, “in conjunction with an advisory team, conducted budget planning for the next fiscal year. This planning effort included visits to corps to aid in requirements development. Although there are many faults in the document, it is their first attempt at generating requirements based upon military objectives and national strategic guidance&quoute; (DOD, 2014, p. 29). It is important to note that the majority of defence spending is off-budget, external to central government allocation, provided and procured by the international community. The transparency and accountability of this funding is therefore less transparent than on-budget spending (Bizhan, 2012, p. 10)

The MOD has prepared a number of policies based on NATO requirements. Within this work the logistic section of MOD has prepared and reviewed the 4.0 policy series which entailed identifying the items and needs of the MOD 10 classes of logistics requirements. The 4.0 policy series was prepared by the logistics experts working group of the MOD. Initially, the requirement generation process was developed, initiated and assisted by the advisory team AFSA( Admin finance Senior Advisory Team ) in 2013 and followed in 2014 for next three years jointly with MOD logistics experts from different involved and budgetary units. The MoD still needs cooperation of the international society to improve their efforts to introduce the most accurate system for MOD and to make the next requirements generation process more efficient and accurate.

Sources:
1-t4.0 -4.9 series policies for logistic section of MOD
2-tRequirement generation of MOD 1392 and 1393 accumulated for next three years

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is little corroborating evidence to suggest that defence purchases are subject to an overarching strategy. Similarly, much of the military equipment is provided to the Afghan military by other nations on an ad-hoc basis.

Media reporting suggested a 'wish-list' compiled by Karzai of defence procurements but noted the reliance on donations rather than purchasing.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
1

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

Researcher4693: According to a 2011 report from the Overseas Development Institute, single source procurement by the Afghan government as a whole represented about 36% of all the procurement (McKechnie, 2011). However, the report does not specify such a figure for the defence and security sector nor are more recent figures publicly available.

Afghanistan's Procurement Law establishes strict requirements for open competition (Arts. 22-24). The MOD website provides a list of current and past procurement announcements (“Announcements,” n.d.). However, &quoute;Alternative or modified procurement rules may only be applied in the case of (a) Procurement related to national defence or national security, in accordance with article 4(1) of the Law&quoute; (Rule 1.(2)).

It is not clear whether the exemptions are justified to scrutinizers. However, some information suggests that this is often not the case as &quoute;security procurement and spending are not factored into national development strategies or systems of accountability... and the main drivers of corruption in Afghanistan have been collusive procurement practices, abuse of the legal system...(Embassy of Afghanistan: Realizing Self-Reliance..., 2014)

In the latest procurement scandal in the MoD, losing bidders accused the winner of illegal practices. After president Ghani had taken interest in this case, it was revealed that the fuel price set up by the winning company had been significantly above the market price. The Oversight committee for MoD agreements, which reviewed the case, had recommended to “seize properties owned by government officials who are accused of being involved and have called for them to be investigated and if found guilty to be fired and to be charged in a court of law.” All officials are denying the accusations and no one has been charged yet. (Soadat S: $100 Million USD…, 2015; Stancati M.: Afghan Deal Probe..., 2015 )

A 2013-2014 compliance audit by the SAO found that the MoD and two other ministries were noncompliant with provisions of the Procurement Law in single source contracting for goods and services which could have been procured on competitive basis and at lesser rates.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The figure you provided (10%) could not be verified through publicly available sources. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington DC. &quoute;Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to Reform and Renewed Partnership,&quoute; November 20, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/realizing-self-reliance-commitments-to-reform-and-renewed-partnership]

2) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Announcements,&quoute;. Ministry of defence, no date, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fa&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fmod.gov.af%2Ffa]

3) PPU, &quoute;Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,&quoute; November 18, 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Documents/RulesofProcedure/English/Afg%20Procurement%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20120407%20Eng.pdf]

4) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Procurement Law,&quoute; 2008, amended 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. : Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/PPU/PL.aspx]

5) Soadat S. &quoute;$100 Million USD MoD Fuel Contract Scandal Revealed&quoute;, ToloNews. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18985-100-million-usd-mod-fuel-contract-scandal-revealed] Last modified on 9 Apr 2015

6) Stancati M. &quoute;Afghan Deal Probe Tests New President&quoute;, Wall Street Journal. Available on [http://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-fuel-deal-probe-tests-new-president-1424829651] Last modified on 24 Feb 2015

7) Alastair J. McKechnie. &quoute;Post-war programme implementation and procurement: Some lessons from the experience of Afghanistan,&quoute; Overseas Development Institute, August, 2011, accessed July 3, 2015. Available on [http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7277.pdf]

8) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Summary of Result of Compliance Audit for ARTF IP benchmark 1393,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/en/page/1568/summary-of-result-of-compliance-audit-for-artf-ip-benchmar-1393]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD has followed the Afghanistan PPL which stated the open tendering is the default procedure of procurement. In exceptional circumstances, which has the prior approval of SPC, does single source selection occur. This accounts for approximately 10 % of all contracts of the whole procurement plan.

Source:
1-tAfghanistan PPL article 20 sub article 2
2-tAfghanistan PPL article 22 sub article 2

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
1

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Researcher4693: According to the Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement, Tender Board Evaluation Committees &quoute; are responsible for the evaluation of bids and the preparation of an evaluation report with recommendations for submission to the respective award authority.&quoute; (PPU: Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement, Rule 65, 2009). An invitation for bids from the MoD from 2014 mentions that results from the vetting process &quoute;will be presented as part of the technical and evaluation committee as a condition of contract award eligibility&quoute; further supporting the claim that evaluation committees exist in praxis (ARDS, 2014). No further details were found on tender board procedures and practice.

The Procurement Law from 2008 (amended in 2009) is still valid and states that procurement staff are required to swear an oath upon appointment to uphold fairness and the law (PPU: Procurement Law, Art. 68, 2009). No further guidelines, regulations or codes of conduct were found.

A 2011 report by the International Advisory Panel on Resources Investment in Afghanistan on the Hijak Bid Process in suggests that Evaluation Committees exist and might be subject to international scrutiny. (International Advisor Panel On Resources Investment in Afghanistan: Third Interim Report..., 2011) However, no further publicly available sources were found on Evaluation Committees being used specifically for defence procurement.

A SAO Auditor General report for the 1393 solar year noted that &quoute; in certain projects, bid evaluation did not examine the responsiveness of the bid to the conditions of procurement and lack of documentary proofs or at time signature of the bidder to establish the bona fide of the bidder &quoute; indicating the regulations over tender boards have been audited but the regulations themselves are frequently not followed.

No evidence has been found to indicate that audits of tender boards for defence procurement are routinely undertaken.

A press statement of the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum states that an audit firm took part in the bidding process. (MOM, 2013) However, no such evidence could be found with respect to defence procurement.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Please note that it could be not be shown, using publicly available sources, that audits of tender boards and decisions are not regularly undertaken. Moreover, the regulations surrounding tender boards are not wholly transparent. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) PPU, &quoute;Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,&quoute; November 18, 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Documents/RulesofProcedure/English/Afg%20Procurement%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20120407%20Eng.pdf]

2) Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. &quoute;International Advisory Panel on Resources Investment in Afghanistan: Third Term Interim Report: Hajik Bid Process,&quoute; November, 2011, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/IAP_THIRD_INTERIM_REPPORT_NOVEMBER_2011.pdf]

3) ARDS. &quoute;Invitation for Bids: Supply & Delivery of Aviation Fuel to AAF Sites for Solar Years 1394 & 1395,&quoute; December 28, 2014, accessed May 14, 2014. Available on [http://www.ards.gov.af/documents/MOD/MOD1979/Web.doc]

4) MOM. &quoute;Cabinet Approves Afghan-Tajik Oil and Gas Contracts,&quoute; September 29, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mom.gov.af/en/news/cabinet-approves-afghan-tajik-oil-and-gas-contracts]

5) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Procurement Law,&quoute; 2008, amended 2009, accessed May 14, 2015.Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/PPU/PL.aspx]

6) Supreme Audit Office. &quoute;Report of Auditor General: Audit Report on Qatia Accounts for the fiscal year ended 1392,&quoute; accessed November 23, 2015. Available on [http://sao.gov.af/Content/files/Qatia%20Audit%20Report%201392_English%20Final.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: After responsibilities are transferred through the transitional process, the MOD will only make plans through applicable budgetary codes 21, 22 and 25. Other logistic classes for aviation equipment and spare parts have been planned by CSTC-A. The MoD has followed policies and rules but in some circumstances continuous war means procurement has faced challenges.

The MOD seriously commits to bear other logistics class responsibilities during the transition process.
In conclusion, the MOD has started an inquiry into the procurement process and a number of contracts which will proceed on an annual basis. The MoD has recognized that one procurement committee alone cannot review the MOD annual procurement contract load , so the MOD has proposed four procurement committees as in description below:

1-tProcurement committee for logistic classes 1,2,3,6,7 and 9
2-tProcurement committee for work ( construction )
3-tProcurement committee for class 2 ( information technology equipment’ )
4-tProcurement committee for class 8

All procurement proceedings have been inspected by the MOD-GI and the Afghanistan high directorate of Inspection.

The MOD has followed the Afghanistan Public Procurement Law and appointed the evaluation committee according to the provisions of the Law (i.e. a minimum of 3 persons must conduct the evaluation process to include legal experts). The evaluation committee conduct the process based on criteria set forth in bidding document.

The oversight process is led by the procurement committee who has the authority to check and verify all required documents as well as the evaluation report. The committee also assists in making recommendations for the award decision of the contract.

All oversight processes and anti-corruption controls are led by a PPU procurement specialist and controller representatives during the procurement process as well as during individual audit.

Source:
1-tAfghanistan PPL Article33 and 34
2-tThe rules and procedure for public procurement section –C: evaluation of bids
3-tPPU official circular 0023 / 1387

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
1

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Researcher4693: The legislative framework - although not specifically established for the defence sector - exists and makes collusion between bidders illegal. According to the Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement, &quoute;a firm or individual shall be sanctioned and declared ineligible, either indefinitely or for a stated period of time, to be awarded a procurement contract&quoute; if they have been involved in collusive practices. (The Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement, Rule 163, 2009). Art. 70 of the Public Procurement Law stipulates reasons for debarment of bidders, such as collusive behavior. The Procurement Policy Unit has right to refer violations of the to the relevant authorities for prosecution (Art 81 (1) vii). The law does not stipulates other types of sanctions used under the regulations.

There is evidence that when collusion appears, the companies involved are sanctioned by international bodies. For example, The United Nations Office for Project Services provides a list of vendors involved in collusion practices with respective sanctions. (UNOPS: Vendor sanctions, 2015). However, it seems that the sanctions are not always strictly enforced, as is noted in a report from London Conference on Afghanistan:&quoute; Actions to fight corruption, end patronage, and avoid collusive practices have been undertaken half-heartedly or undermined from within.&quoute; (Realizing Self-Reliance..., 2014, p.5)

There has been anecdotal evidence that those involved in collusion are sanctioned. President Ghani has started to review major defence contracts through the National Procurement Commission after a scandal with fuel procurement at the MoD has been revealed. SIGAR and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) briefed President Ashraf Ghani on February 1, 2015, that four contractors had engaged in price-fixing, bid-rigging, and bribery prior to the award of the MOD fuel contract. (SIGAR, April 2015)

The Oversight committee for MoD agreements too had stated that companies colluded with each other and with the MoD, the Directorate of Reconstruction and Development and the Special Procurement Commission in a procurement contract for fuel supply for ANA and set up price for the fuel significantly above the market price. The committee recommended to “seize properties owned by government officials who are accused of being involved and have called for them to be investigated and if found guilty to be fired and to be charged in a court of law.” (Soadat S: $100 Million USD…, 2015). Recent development shows that the contract has been cancelled and some senior ministry officials involved in the scandal, sacked. (Haroun Mir, Habib Wardak:The perils of corruption..., 2015)

In an interview with SIGAR, President Ghani noted that &quoute;Every single contract, in terms of food, supplies, and others in the Ministry of defence, was overhauled [...] But the core of it is that everything now is becoming legal, because the smallest part of our procurement law is being enforced. People are not being allowed to get away with first authorizing a project and then saying the budget must be allocated. &quoute; (SIGAR, October 2015) The website of the National Procurement Authority appears to denote a list of companies that have been debarred from public procurement, though it's unclear how many of these were companies active in the defence and security sector and what percentage of violations result in debarment.

At a recent NPC meeting, the President said that &quoute;the procurement system of the Ministry of defence should be civilianized in order to improve capacity of the procurement section in the Ministry. The President also instructed the National Procurement Commission to look into all the evaluated contracts in light of the past meetings to determine their capacity and transparency as well as possible connections of officials with companies.&quoute; President Ghani also reportedly asked the Commission to seek help from the office of CSTC-A in this regard. (Office of the President, 2015)

The Chairman of the Oversight committee for MoD also recently indicated the presence of collusion when he stated an instance where four companies vying for the contracts submitted the exact same bidding prices -- the numbers matched right up to the last decimal place. &quoute;That's only possible... if there is bidder collusion or if the price list is leaked (from inside the government)&quoute; (Chopra, 2015).

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Despite anecdotal references to the enforcement of anti-collusion legislation, the assessor could not find conclusive evidence to indicate that enforcement of measures to punish colluding companies is consistently and effectively applied. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) PPU, &quoute;Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,&quoute; November 18, 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Documents/RulesofProcedure/English/Afg%20Procurement%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20120407%20Eng.pdf]

2) UNOPS. &quoute;Vendor sanctions,&quoute; no date, accessed February 10, 2015. Available on [https://www.unops.org/english/Opportunities/suppliers/Pages/Vendor-sanctions.aspx]

3) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership,&quoute; London Conference on Afghanistan, December, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/d-af/dv/realizing-self-relian/realizing-self-reliance.pdf]

4) Soadat S. &quoute;$100 Million USD MoD Fuel Contract Scandal Revealed&quoute;, ToloNews. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18985-100-million-usd-mod-fuel-contract-scandal-revealed] Last modified on 9 Apr 2015

5) Haroun Mir, Habib Wardak. &quoute;The perils of corruption in Afghanistan&quoute;, Aljazeera.com. June 24, 2015, accessed on September 6, 2015. Available on [http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/06/perils-corruption-afghanistan-150623074926689.html]

6) Chopra A. &quoute;Anti-graft academic leads Afghan push against 'economic mafia',&quoute; AFP, April 16, 2015. Available on [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3041558/Anti-graft-academic-leads-Afghan-push-against-economic-mafia.html]

7) PPU. &quoute;Procurement Law,&quoute; 2008, amended 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/PPU/PL.aspx]

8) Office of the President. &quoute;The Main Goal for Evaluation of MoD Contracts is to Provide Better Logistics Services and Facilities for Soldiers.&quoute; July 11, 2015. Available on [http://president.gov.af/en/news/49386]

9) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” April 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-04-30qr.pdf]

10) SIGAR. “Quarterly Report to Congress,” October 30, 2015. Available on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-10-30qr.pdf]

11) PPU. &quoute;List of Debarred Companies,&quoute; 2015, accessed November 24, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/More/LDS.aspx]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD has conducted all procedures in line with the Public Procurement Law and related procedures. This includes an investigation of all bidders are participating in the bidding process. The MOD thoroughly reviews the bidder qualifications and identifies any breach of the law breaches. If such legal breaches are found, the company is consequently debarred. The MoD also looks to see if companies fail to meet a legal obligation or violate any procurement-related ethics; in so doing, they provide full oversight. Activities are also observed by PPU controllers and specialists jointly with the anti-corruption authority which is independent.

Source:
1-tPPU official site www.ppu.gov.af / debar companies
2-tAfghanistan PPL section 5 article85 and related rules
3-tAfghanistan PPL section 7 article81 and related rules
4-tAfghanistan PPL article73and related rules
5-tAfghanistan PPL article70 and related rules

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
1

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

Researcher4693: Afghanistan’s national security forces opened the Center for Acquisitions and Procurement (CAP) where soldiers, police and civilian employees of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of defence will attend CAP for procurement and resource management training in specialties like budgeting and tracking funds in accordance with Afghan procurement and finance laws. This indicates the government is attempting to institutionalise professional training for procurement staff. In June, the CEP has already started running basic and advanced pilot courses. The school will serve in a continuing education capacity, where students can not only earn a basic certificate, but can return after a few years of practical experience to earn an intermediate certificate. (RSM, 2015) Given that this is a new establishment it is too early to say whether training has empowered procurement sufficiently to prevent external influence.

Training for procurement staff is also available through the Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) from the Ministry of Finance though is not likely focused as on the defence and sector as the CAP training courses. These trainings are focused on procurement planning, familiarisation with Procurement law and Rules of procedure. (PPU: Capacity Building; PPU: PCBC Complete Procurement..., 2015) The PPU’s Procurement Capacity Building Component has conducted specialized training for MOD staff (PPU, n.d.; “Report,” 2012). There is no information as to how regularly these trainings are conducted.

Despite training provided, both the MoD and the MoI have limited capabilities in regard to procurement. (DoD: Report on Progress..., 2014) No evidence was found indicating undue influence from higher grades. In 2013, Afghan government organised the National Procurement Conference. This high level conference aimed to promote transparent procurement processes. (MoF: National Procurement Conference in Kabul, 2013).

It is not possible to determine whether there are staff shortages and staff rotations which limit their ability to perform effective oversight of defence contractors. It was not possible to determine to what extend procurement staff is able to hold defence contractors to account on their obligations on reporting and delivery although considering the training provided, the staff is able to ensure to some degree that defence contractors meet their obligations.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Given that the CAP was only recently established, the assessor could not award a higher score as there are still concerns about the scale of the capacity required to administer Afghanistan's defence procurement system. This is also in light of earlier questions which show that there may use of undue influence within the MoD. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) EUPOL. &quoute;EUPOL national staff delivers procurement training in the provinces,&quoute; May, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.eupol-afg.eu/node/108]

2) PPU. &quoute;Capacity Building,&quoute; no date, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/CapacityBuilding/TA.aspx]

3) PPU. &quoute;PCBC Complete Procurement Basic Training, Award Certificates to Participants,&quoute; March 8, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/NewsMaster.aspx?code=51]

4) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. &quoute;National Procurement Conference in Kabul&quoute; Ministry of Finance, November 6, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://mof.gov.af/en/news/national-procurement-conference-in-kabul]

5) DoD. &quoute;Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,&quoute; October, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.defence.gov/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf]

6) RSM. “ANSF Acquisitions and Procurement Center Now Open for Business,” June, 2-15. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/ansf-acquisitions-and-procurement-center-now-open-for-business.html]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD acquisition agency staff will all be trained by the Public Procurement Unit (PPU) and Procurement Capacity Building Component (PCBC) periodically in two steps: basic and intermediate. Training covers component such as the Law , rules and procedures , goods , works consultancy , standard bidding documents, contracts, dispute resolution, case studies and all aspect of Afghanistan Public procurement affairs. In addition to the aforementioned program , the MOD acquisition agency established the Procurement School which provides and conducts a procurement capacity building program.

Based on PPU responsibilities all trainees who have received the training benefits are recorded in the PCBC database.

Source:
1-tPPU official web site
2-tPCBC/ PPU data base
3-t Afghanistan PPL article 80 and 81

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
2

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

Researcher4693: A formal complaint mechanism is in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. The Public Procurement Unit issued a &quoute;Manual of Procedures for Procurement Appeal & Review&quoute; in 2007 (PPU: Manual of Procedures..., 2007) to provide guidelines for an Administrative Review committee established in accordance with the Public Procurement Law (Chapt. VII, Art. 72). (PPU: Procurement Law, 2009) The role of the committee is to conduct an independent administrative review in respect of complaints by bidders. However, only one case has been publicly identified of an appeal being raised by a company for perceived malpractice in the bidding process. (Tolo News: Scrutiny Falls on..., 2015)

It is unclear whether this mechanism has not been used more often because companies feel they will be unfairly disadvantaged or debarred from future procurement. No more sources were found on the issue.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Given the lack of clarity regarding the use of the specified mechanism, a score of 3 cannot be awarded. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) PPU. &quoute;Manual of Procedures for Procurement Appeal & Review,&quoute; March 18, 2007, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/PPU/ARM.aspx]

2) PPU. &quoute;Procurement Law,&quoute; 2008, amended 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://ppu.gov.af/Beta/English/PPU/PL.aspx]

3) Tolo News. &quoute;Scrutiny Falls on defence Ministry as Ghani Launches Investigation,&quoute; February 2, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18056-scrutiny-falls-on-defence-ministry-as-ghani-launches-investigation]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The procedures and rules are well defined by the law. In the first step, companies can make complaints in line with the level of transparency and code of ethics. Complainants can feel complete confidence in the process without any risk of discrimination to complainant. In the second stage, complaints are reviewed by a board of experts at MOF/PPU.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is little evidence to suggest that complaints have resulted in disadvantages or debarment however, this is due to lack of transparency rather than an effective mechanism.

There is no clear evidence to suggest these mechanisms are used by companies.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
2

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

Researcher4693: Procurement Law and the Rules of Procedures establish a legal framework to punish the corrupt activities of suppliers. These suppliers should be debarred from future contracts. (PPU: Rules of Procedures, 2009)
A list of debarred contractors can be found on the National Procurement Authority website indicating that sanctions are sometimes applied in practice. Evidence of the different types of sanctions applied, such as financial fine or imprisonment, was not found.

COMMENTS -+

1) PPU. &quoute;Rules of Procedures,&quoute; November 18, 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Documents/RulesofProcedure/English
/Afg%20Procurement%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20120407%20Eng.pdf]

2) PPU. &quoute;List of Debarred Suppliers,&quoute; updated April, 2015, accessed March 29, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/English/More/LDS.aspx]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
N/A

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

Researcher4693: There is no indication that Afghanistan negotiates offset contracts. The investment climate statement released by the US Department of State reports that Afghanistan “does not impose offset requirements on its procurements” (Department Of State, 2013). No evidence has been found that would suggest the contrary.

COMMENTS -+

1) Department Of State. &quoute;2013 Investment Climate Statement - Afghanistan (Report),&quoute; February, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/205289.htm]

Sources searched include the Ministry of defence Website (http://mod.gov.af/en) and other relevant government websites, Afghan local news (Tolo: http://tolonews.com/ and Pajhwok: http://tolonews.com/),Interview with all Sources, Afghan Laws, and all other documents specifically referenced throughout this assessment.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
N/A

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

Researcher4693: There is no indication that Afghanistan negotiates offset contracts. The investment climate statement released by the US Department of State reports that Afghanistan “does not impose offset requirements on its procurements” (Department Of State, 2013).

COMMENTS -+

1) Department Of State. &quoute;2013 Investment Climate Statement - Afghanistan (Report),&quoute; February, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/205289.htm]

Sources searched include the Ministry of defence Website (http://mod.gov.af/en) and other relevant government websites, Afghan local news (Tolo: http://tolonews.com/ and Pajhwok: http://tolonews.com/),Interview with all Sources, Afghan Laws, and all other documents specifically referenced throughout this assessment.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
N/A

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

Researcher4693: There is no indication that Afghanistan negotiates offset contracts. The investment climate statement released by the US Department of State reports that Afghanistan “does not impose offset requirements on its procurements” (Department Of State, 2013).

COMMENTS -+

1) Department Of State. &quoute;2013 Investment Climate Statement - Afghanistan (Report),&quoute; February, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/205289.htm]

Sources searched include the Ministry of defence Website (http://mod.gov.af/en) and other relevant government websites, Afghan local news (Tolo: http://tolonews.com/ and Pajhwok: http://tolonews.com/),Interview with all Sources, Afghan Laws, and all other documents specifically referenced throughout this assessment.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
1

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

Researcher4693: The Procurement Law and the Rules of Procedure do not specifically mention the use or control of agents or intermediaries in the procurement cycle. There is no explicit provision outlining the use of agents nor is there a provision forbidding the use of agents. The issue is, however, subject to inferences and interpretations.

The Rules of Procedure do state: &quoute;Individuals who served as procurement officers or participated in the approval of any procurement activities with respect to a procurement shall not: (a) participate in any manner, as an officer, employee, agent or representative of a bidder or contractor, in any negotiations or technical discussions leading to the award, modification or extension of the contract for such procurement; or (b) participate personally or substantially on behalf of a contractor in the performance of such contract&quoute; (Rule 164). However, this does not relate directly to the use of agents but has been considered as a form of control over their use.

There is no evidence that agents or intermediaries are scrutinized or vetted. The prevalence of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycles is unknown though there have been anecdotal reports of the use of agents in issuance of payment. (SIGAR, 2015) No evidence has been found how effective the control of intermediaries is as these controls (aside from the provision in the Rules of Procedure mentioned above) appear not to be public. It was not possible to determine whether the controls are well known to companies.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER:
This has been difficult to determine. The provisions in Rule 164 pertain to the post-employment restriction of procurement officers, while the provision you cite (163) pertains to anti-corruption provisions in the Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement. Neither Rule 164 nor 163 are specifically relevant to the use or lack of use of agents. While there is therefore some disagreement about the mention of agents in Afghan laws, there are no clear restrictions on their use. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) PPU. &quoute;Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,&quoute; November 18, 2009, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.ppu.gov.af/Documents/RulesofProcedure/English/Afg%20Procurement%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20120407%20Eng.pdf]

2) SIGAR 15-54 Audit Report, April 2015. Accessed on September 7, 2015. Avaialble on [https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-54-AR.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Afghan Procurement Law requires an official introduction of company agents and intermediaries and holds them liable in their representation during procurement procedures. (Article 3 sub-article 3). Additionally each contract has clear provisions recognizing officially introduced agents and intermediaries with their picture, identification and signatures all of which are officially submitted to the MOD Acquisition Agency. The law is publicly available in the MOF Public Policy Unit website (PPU/C053/1392).

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

74.
score
0

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

Researcher4693: Details on the financing package surrounding major arms deals are not available. However, Afghanistan's major arms are procured and provided by international donors. (Carberry S.: U.S., Afghanistan At..., 2013)

COMMENTS -+

1) Sean Carberry. &quoute;U.S., Afghanistan At Odds Over Weapons Wish List,&quoute; February 6, 2013, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.npr.org/2013/02/06/171194064/u-s-afghanistan-at-odds-over-weapons-wish-list]

2) Email interview with Source 3, anti-corruption policy advisor, 23 Feb 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
0

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

Researcher4693: The Procurement Law and the Rules of Procurement Procedure do not require subsidiaries and sub-contractors to adopt anti-corruption programmes. Subcontracting is used frequently in Afghanistan, according to the MEC's 2014 AC Monitoring and Evaluation Committee report it has discovered cases where 100 per cent of a project has been subcontracted (MEC, 2014, p. 95). No more information could be found on the use of sub-contractors or whether the government encourages the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes.

COMMENTS -+

1) MEC. &quoute;Fifth Six-Month Report,&quoute; Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, January 30, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf]

2) Ministry of Finance. &quoute;The Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement,&quoute; 2009. Available on [http://ppu.gov.af/Documents/RulesofProcedure/English/Afg%20Procurement%20Rules%20of%20Procedure%20120407%20Eng.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: While the government has guidelines on corruption there seems to be little oversight over the subcontracted firms. As a result, there have been numerous instances of corruption or fraudulent practices with regards to subcontracting and remains a serious area of concern.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
2

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

Researcher4693: Military needs are determined by seller nations because defence acquisitions are provided by the international community. (Eurasia Review: Cost of Violence..., 2015) Although with the end of ISAF mission, the stated aim is that the Afghan government will take responsibility for its defence procurement processes (Stars&Stripes: NATO gives Afghans..., 2014) the current status of this remains unclear. According to statements made by the DOD, &quoute;Coalition advisors will focus on capability gaps in the ANSF such as aviation, intelligence, and special operations. They will also focus on improving logistics, medical, and Counter Improvised Explosive Device systems.&quoute; (DoD: Justification for FY 2015, 2014, p. 4) A published list of Afghan MoD future equipment purchases does not contain any justification why the specific equipment has been selected. (RS: MoD Equipment, 2015)

Since 2007, Afghanistan has been the largest beneficiary of the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, which provides grants and loans to help countries purchase weapons and defence equipment produced in the United States as well as acquiring defence services and military training. FMF funds purchases are made through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which manages government-to-government sales. On a much less frequent basis, FMF also funds purchases made through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) program, which oversees sales between foreign governments and private U.S. companies.

The State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs sets policy for the FMF program, while the defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), within the defence Department, manages it on a day-to-day basis. Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs), military personnel in U.S. embassies overseas, play a key role in managing FMF within recipient countries. Some FMF pays for SAO salaries and operational costs. Congress appropriates funds for FMF through the yearly Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Accepted. Score raised from 1 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

1) Tamim Asey. &quoute;Cost of Violence: The Fiscally 'Unsustainable' Path of Afghan National Security Forces -- Analysis,&quoute; Eurasia Review, January 18, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.eurasiareview.com/18012015-cost-violence-fiscally-unsustainable-path-afghan-national-security-forces-analysis/]

2) Matt Millham. &quoute;NATO gives Afghans $6M in medical supplies ahead of fighting season,&quoute; Stars & Stripes, April 16, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.stripes.com/news/nato-gives-afghans-6m-in-medical-supplies-ahead-of-fighting-season-1.278275]

3) DoD. &quoute;Justification for FY 2015: Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF),&quoute; June, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://comptroller.defence.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/FY2015_ASFF_Justification_Book-Final.pdf]

4) RS. &quoute;MoD Equipment,&quoute; February 4, 2015, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/20150204_mod_equipment_final.pdf]

5) William Byrd. &quoute;Paying for Afghanistan’s Security Forces During Transition: Issues for Chicago and Beyond,&quoute; US Institute of Peace, April 24, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/PB-124.pdf]

6) The White House. &quoute;Fact Sheet: Chicago Summit - Sufficient and Sustainable ANSF,&quoute; Office of the Press Secretary, May 21, 2012, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/21/fact-sheet-chicago-summit-sufficient-and-sustainable-ansf]

7) U.S. Census Bureau. &quoute;US Government Foreign Grants and Credits by Type and Country: 2000 to 2009,&quoute; 2011, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s1296.pdf]

8) U.S. Census Bureau. &quoute;U.S. Foreign Economic and Military Aid by Major Recipient Country: 2001 to 2008,&quoute; 2011, accessed May 14, 2015. Available on [www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s1298.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Off-budget expenditures are fully controlled by the donor nations with limited input from the Afghan Ministry of defence but all on-budget purchases and procurements are done with the best and most cost-effective offer with limited input and/or influence by donor nations. Unless the funds are specifically restricted for purchasing goods from certain nations (such as Iran, North Korea) then no other influence has been experienced in the procurement of goods by seller nations.

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+