Researcher4116: There is no transparency of how military assets are disposed, and no information of public/private tenders regarding sales or disposals. Furthermore there is no information available regarding usage of the proceeds of the sales. [1] However, there is a clause in the budget for profit for military activities and assets.[2]

Researcher4116: There is no information available on who is responsible for the disposals of military assets, and there is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinised by an oversight body of any form.

Researcher4116: There is no mention of expenditures dedicated to secret items in the budget of the Ministry of Defence. [1]

The intelligences services is funded by the Presidency, and therefore it is difficult to assess the percentage of the overall military defence and security budget. In 2012, the Presidents' Office allocated MGA 577, 618 to the CIS, rising to MGA 622, 618 for 2013, and MGA 684, 879 for 2014. It is expected to allocate MGA 747, 141 for 2015.

Researcher4116: There is no information suggesting that the legislative is provided with any information on spending on secret items.

Researcher4116: In the absence of publicly available information on audit reports of annual accounts of the security sector being provided to the appropriate legislative body, or evidence of parliamentary debates and in the light of the weakness of the legislative body (due to semi-presidential nature of the constitution [1]), I think that legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items.

Researcher4116: It is not clear if there are any off-budget expenditures taking place; however, given the minimal oversight of expenditure and the defence budget, this is a strong possibility. Score 1 has been selected to reflect this risk.

Interviewee 5 claims that the budget is too limited in regards to the number of staff. Therefore, the budget is often confined to wage costs and there is not much left for operational allocation.[1]

Response to Peer Reviewers: Score adjusted to 1 to reflect risk where this is no clear prohibition of such expenditure.

Researcher4116: There are no publicly available records, either in the budget or media reports, of any off-budget military expenditures. Given the prevailing lack of transparency, it is possible that there are off-budget expenditures, but these are not revealed to the public. Interviewees could not assist with this question, as they could not confirm or deny the existence of off-budget expenditure.

Besides, due to the high level of corruption in defence institution an off-budget could involve illicit economic activity. However, as there is no direct evidence of this, score 2 has been selected.

Response to Peer Reviewers: Score adjusted to 2 in light of comments.

Researcher4116: There is no legislative documents available on how to classify data, or scrutiny mechanisms to oversee this process. It is likely that decisions have been made depending on political and military elites.

For instance, the multiplication of appointment of high-ranking officers fall under the classification &quoute;secret defence&quoute;. These appointments of colonels and generals are inconsistent with the country's reality[1]

Researcher4116: I could not find report of commercial businesses owned by national defence and security institutions. This was confirmed by Interviewee 1. Nor could I find report of existing restrictions to what the defence and security institutions can own.

Given there is a risk that military owned businesses may exist, score 2 has been selected.

Researcher4116: I could not find report of commercial businesses owned by national defence and security institutions, and this was confirmed by Interviewee 1.

There is no information suggesting the existence of any restrictions on what defence and security institutions can own.

Given there is a risk that military owned businesses may exist, score 2 has been selected.

Researcher4116: There is no public evidence of unauthorised enterprises as such, but military personnel and security forces do engage in unauthorised activities for monetary gain at different levels. The participation of members of security forces in the trafficking of precious wood and zebus falls under this section.

According to the Small arms survey of 2011, “The escalation of the dahalo (cattle theft) phenomenon is emblematic of the fragmentation and co-option by economic interests of Madagascar’s security sector. It seems beyond doubt that many gendarmes and soldiers accept bribes to turn a blind eye, rent out their firearms, and collaborate directly with the dahalo”.[1] Cattle trafficking is outlawed by the government and “cattle theft is a crime punishable with severe penalties”. [2] As for other trafficking, such as rosewood, precious stone, metals and drugs, “while they have no proof, many locals suspect the government’s involvement through collusion or tacit cooperation”. [3]

As regards to cattle theft, an ad-hoc committee for the fight against insecurity was created at the National Assembly in 2014. The committee insisted on the need to replace a large number of military officials where the phenomenon of cattle theft reigns. It has focused on the complicity between many civilian officials and military with the dahalo in some red areas.[4] The committee considers that the government has not yet implemented their proposal.[5] The President of the committee even threatened to censure the government via a non-confidence motion.[6]

In conclusion, the government outlaws private enterprise (relevant to Madagascan realities) under the umbrella of the state's defence and security operations, but it does not openly or overtly discourage employees from taking part in such (illicit) activities.

Researcher4116: The issue of corruption is acknowledged by officials in Madagascar. The Defence Ministry made strong a statement in 2011 regarding its commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures [2]. According to the CSI, the Ministry of Defence has declared 2011 the year of “ethics and professional ethics” (translated by Assessor) [2]. To meet this goal, the Ministry requested the support of the CSI to design and formulate a programme.[1] Therefore, the CSI provided the Ministry with a report on Military Ethics in Madagascar.[2]

Senior members of the armed forces are taking part in the CSI programme [1]. Senior armed forces officers have also made similar anti-corruption statements [3], which are reported in the media [6]. During a meeting between leaders of the Armed Forces, the Commander of the National Gendarmerie stressed the fight against corruption as the first challenge facing the gendarmerie. The Chief of Staff of the Malagasy Army also highlighted the fight against corruption as a top priority for 2013. [3] The fight against corruption was a clear directive of the Defence Minister. [4]

Finally, BIANCO and CSI, the instruments for combating corruption, appear in the Presidency’s budget.[5]

Researcher4116: There are formal measures in place. Article 180 of the 2004 Law on the Fight Against Corruption states that military personnel would be fined and that officers will also be dismissed.[1]

Some media reports mention the arrest of security personnel, for instance the arrest of a former CIS Colonel.[2] However, this is an exception, as the problem is widespread. Security personnel are sometimes underpaid,[3] and in these circumstances bribery can be seen as a necessity for many and accepted as such.[4] Therefore, small bribes are barely reported by the population, and no public evidence suggest that actions are taken efficiently against those who take the bribes.

Finally, the Human Rights Report of the United States Mission to Madagascar condemns the fact that “[t]here is no systematic mechanism available for investigating security force abuses. However, victims may lodge complaints in the Court of Jurisdiction. This has rarely, if ever, occurred.”[5] The report is harsh on the executive during the transition, especially on precious wood trafficking, denouncing high level corruption. “Chinese businessmen were caught on tape alleging that they paid de facto leader Rajoelina directly for illegal logging rights.”[5]

It should be mentioned that the regime during the transition period was seen as one of the most corrupt in the world. The situation might have evolved in recent times, as the new regime is recognised as legitimate by the international community. For instance, the United States has lifted restrictions on US assistance to the Malagasy government, while the African Union has lifted the suspension of Madagascar’s membership.[6]

Researcher4116: There is no evidence suggesting that whistleblowing is being encouraged by the government, and nor is there evidence of any specific mechanism/legislation for military personnel and officials. Therefore there is presumably no trust among officials that they would be provided with adequate protection if reported corrupt activities

In its 2009 annual report, the CSI mentioned that it was studying types of whistleblowing and that a framework must be developed to protect whistleblowers. The topic was only mentioned in passing (1 paragraph in 20 pages) approached in the report and there is no evidence that this discussion would include military and security apparatus.[2] The High Council for the Fight Against Corruption (Conseil supérieur de lutte contre la corruption), the predecessor of the CSI, had been gathering information in the UK, analysing the English system for the protection of whistleblowers.[1] There is no evidence that this has materialised into legislation as of March 2015.

The United States Mission to Madagascar, 2013 Human Rights Report [3] also states that there is no specific law on whistleblowers s but that the 2004 Law on the fight against corruption [4] states the importance of protecting the identity of whistleblowers during an ongoing investigation. However, the US report is not confident in the fact that provisions of the 2004 law are being implemented. Again, there is no evidence suggesting the military and defence ministries are included in this law.

According to Interviewee 4 there is a lack of organisational structure for protection of whistleblowers and witnesses in the country.[5]

It is worth mentioning that a new initiative, Project Tsycoolkoly of the NGO Tolotsoa, funded by UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) has been launched to participate in the fight against corruption. Project Tsycoolkoly [6] is a website where citizens can testify when they have been victims of corruption. They won't be prosecuted. The objective is to change behaviour, for corruption to be no longer banalized and the norm. This website has been created for citizens suffering from abuses and might not affect military and defence personnel. However it shows a will to change mentalities.

Researcher4116: As discussed with interviewee 1 and 5 regarding, there is linkage between politics and military appointments. This would suggest that any senior appointment is subject to corruption, i.e. the preference of powerful politicians. There are too many high ranking officers as regards to the small number of troops. Each time a new man comes to power he appoints new generals to have the support of the military. Thus inconsistency in the military pyramid of power: too many generals [2 and confirmed by interviewees 1 and 5].

There is evidence that a special attention is paid to military personnel to field personnel. The section on “good governance”, contained in the Directive for 2013 by the Ministry of Defence recommends to “carry out frequent checks at each level and to organise turnover for staff on secondment as much as possible to prevent embarrassing relations” (Translated by Assessor).[1]

However, there is no publicly available information that this is implemented nor is there it (or any other special attention) is applied to personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. Neither is there a separate defence procurement programme that might cover this.

Researcher4116: Information on the number of civilian and military personnel is not made available on the MOD’s website.

Interviewee 1 claimed that the actual number of personnel is difficult to ascertain. According to Interviewee 1, there are currently 150 Generals in the army, overseeing around 12,500 military staff (including 500 in the air force and 250 in the navy). There is approximately 8,100 personnel in the gendarmerie and 20,000 in the police. [1] The data from IISS of 2009 the Small Arms Survey of 2011 also concludes that there are 12,500 troops, and too many high-ranking officers for this number of troops. [2]

Researcher4116: Law N° 96-029 of 1996 deals with the status of military personnel.

Chapter III in Titre I deals with pay and allowance [1], however there are no numbers available.

No other public sources were found which discussed these matters any further.

Researcher4116: There is no information publicly available on the payment system. The payment system is therefore neither clear nor transparent.

The police and regular forces [1,2] are underpaid. Reports alleged that police officers and armed forces are tempted to illegally rent their service weapons due to low salaries. [3] However, there were no reports indicating late payment.

As regards to military personnel, Interviewee 5 confirmed the existence of regulations, even if they are not made publicly available. The new government has been trying to raise salaries and military personnel has a better situation than other civil servants.[4]

The lack of transparency in the payment system make it possible for discretionary adjustments to happen along the chain of payment.

Researcher4116: There is a correlation between politics and military appointments and promotions, meaning with every new regime there are numerous promotion or appointments in the military. The officers and generals benefit from special favours and relationship with the governments. [1]

A report by International Crisis Group on the challenges facing the new elected president, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, outlines the urgency for the government “to avert military incursions into political life” as well as to “stop manipulation of military career advancement”.[2]

There is no transparency in the appointments but strong evidence suggests that advancement has not been based on merit.

Officially, law N° 96-029 of 1996 deals with the status of military personnel. Chapiter VII in Titre I deals with promotion [3]. Furthermore, the Military Academy of Antsirabe has signed an agreement with the MoD, the Ministry of Civil Service and BIANCO to fight corruption. The objective being more transparency in administrative competitions, for the recruiting process of graduate officers [4].

Researcher4116: Law N° 96-029 of 1996 deals with the status of military personnel. Chapter VII in Titre I deals with promotion. Article 61 states that promotion takes place either by “choice” or by “choice and seniority”[1].

However, there is no indication of any formal processes, promotion boards or oversight of the promotions process.

Besides, many appointments appear to be more political than meritocratic,[2] especially when it comes to high ranking officers[3]. Each time a new man comes to power he appoints new generals to have the support of the military so there is inconsistency in the military pyramid of power: too many generals [4].

It must be noted within this question that Madagascar has only just emerged from a period of political instability, where generals were promoted by each new regime. However, during the transition, this situation was further aggravated. Colonels and generals were appointed to key political positions, such as Chief of region [5, 6].

Madagascar is no longer in this transition period but it is too earlier to assess the new situation as regards to promotion

Researcher4116: There is no mandatory conscription in Madagascar as per the 1995 modifications to the 1968 law governing the organisation of the Malagasy Defence Forces [2].

Researcher4116: There is no evidence of conscription and accordingly, N/A has been selected.

For context, there is no evidence that policies, rules or mechanisms against bribery for soliciting preferred position in the recruitment process exist. It is likely that bribery is widely practised due to the fact that “a career in the military is seen as a path to social status, political influence and personal self-enrichment”.[1]

Interviewee 5 confirmed the existence of nepotism within the recruitment process. Recruitment is done via an open competitive process in the Military Academy. However, the number of new recruits is often the result of crony-ism rather than the result of an objective assessment of needs. This explains important imbalances in the military personnel.[2] There are no other publicly available sources.

Researcher4116: There is no evidence of “ghost soldiers” in publicly available documents such as the budget or military expenditures. There are also no media reports of any non-existent soldiers on government payrolls.

However, according to the assessor, the lack of enforced accountability in payment systems make it likely that the phenomenon of ghost soldiers occurs.

Researcher4116: Order N° 2002-574 determining the functions of the Minister of National Defence as well as the General Organisation of the Department, amended by order N° 2004-179 in February 2004, mentions the existence of a Human Resource Branch within the MOD. [1] This branch might suggest that chains of command are separated from chains of payment, but there is no published policy confirming that this is the case.

However it is difficult to get further information on the functioning of this office, and whether it is free from influence from the commanding chain.

Researcher4116: The Code of Conduct of the Malagasy army is a recent initiative. It was enacted by the Ministry of Armed Forces via Order number 20 404/2022 of 28 June 2011.[1] Articles 38 and 39 of section IV are devoted to the issue of conflicts of interests.

However, the rest of the document does not deal specifically with corruption and there are no mentions of bribery, gifts, hospitality and post-separation activities.[2] The document is addressed to military personnel and it should be noted that booklet of this Code of Conduct have been distributed by BIANCO. [3]

A Code of Conduct for civilian personnel is not publicly available. There is no known oversight mechanism in place for the military code of conduct.

Researcher4116: The Code of Conduct [1] is relatively new and has been adopted during a period of political instability. Reports suggest that attempts have been made to address breaches of the Code of Conduct but that most are not effectively addressed; there is an obvious lack of transparency in that respect. [2] .

However, certain measures are taken to facilitate prosecution. For instance a Special Board of Investigation (Conseil Spécial d’Enquête et de Discipline) was set up in November 2012 to investigate abuses committed by members of security forces, focusing specifically on soldiers who abusively used their weapons. [3] The creation of this Board follows the controversy over the abuses by elements of the security forces during operation “Tandroka”, the aim of which was to combat the “dahalo” threat in the south of the country (an example of an attempt to address code breaches).[4]

Finally, it should be noted that according to Interviewee 3, since 2009 the situation has changed in the army. Before, corruption was limited. With the transitional government people in power created security bodies, turning some military personnel into mercenaries &quoute;who had forgotten the sense of honour&quoute;. [5]. Indeed, Dr Ramasy and Dr Vallée mentioned an escalation in the militarisation of the political system during this transitional period.[6] ]According to interviewee 3, with the legitimate government and the Fourth Republic, the situation is still delicate but the corrupt officials have been replaced.The Ministry of Defence has been restructured.[5]

Researcher4116: Statements, reports and orders by officials stress the importance of training military personnel to develop their professional ethics. For example, the 2013 directive by the Ministry of Defence included a section on ethics, recommending the pursuit of the Code of Conduct appropriation via training. [1]

The CSI report on Military Ethics in Madagascar addressed the importance of a module on military ethics during initial training, and then periodically during the career. However, there are no details of trainings taking place, and which personnel - civilian or military - benefit from this training.

Researcher4116: No evidence was found of such a policy, but there are periodically reports in the press. Amnesty International Report of 2013 points out the issue of impunity, saying that “[s]ecurity officials and members of armed groups responsible for serious human rights violations, including unlawful killings, continued to act with impunity.” [1]

Interviewee 4 added that the fight against corruption was part of the five priorities of the newly elected President. Coming into power he quickly disbanded the security forces and some new structures have been created. Some members of the security forces have been prosecuted and their trials publicised in the media [3]. However there is no telling if cases are effectively prosecuted. Due to the confusion of the transitional period it is impossible to assess if other attempted prosecutions have been suppressed or inappropriately sanctioned. For example, when military personnel is involved in criminal activities, media have a tendency to speculate about a possible military coup, while it might just be personal interest [4].

Less encouraging is the fact that in the new government there are people who are alleged to have been involved in illegal activities, such as rosewood trafficking. There is also a lack of data on the state of corruption following the crisis of 2009-2014.[2]

Researcher4116: While no specific law was found to be addressing facilitation payments, the fact that they are illegal is implied by the existence of a government initiative to encourage citizens to reports bribes [1].

Their illegality was confirmed by Interviewee 2 who is also of the opinion that facilitation payments, although illegal, are not properly addressed. It is claimed that facilitation payments are widely spread at all levels of society. Another issue is that salaries are too low for anti-facilitation payment measures to deter people from paying them.

Researcher4116: The armed forces have no military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations; it is addressed on a case by case basis.

The issue appears to be addressed only as a result of blatant abuses by security forces that have forced the Ministry of Defence to deal with the outcomes of the Tandroka operation.[1] As for the operation « coup d’arrêt », the newspaper Le Daily notes that neither the number of troops nor the budget allocated to the security in the South has been released publicly.[2]

The Malagasy army has the specificity to deal with internal threats therefore, this refers to military operations at home. It should be noted that Madagascar sends troops to take part in UN peacekeeping missions, however this participation is limited (69 individual police in 2013).[3]

Response to Peer Reviewer: Accepted. Score adjusted to 0.

Researcher4116: I could not find evidence of training on corruption designed for commanders.

However, the newspaper Newsmada reported in 2014 that there are demands from the population in the South where personnel are deployed, that the budget should be re-evaluated in order to avoid abuses on local population and corruption [1].

Researcher4116: There is no evidence of the existence of trained professionals being deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field.

However, I have awarded a score of 1 because of the section on “good governance”, contained in the Directive for 2013 by the Ministry of Defence, which recommends to “carry out frequent checks at each level and to organise turnover for staff on secondment as much as possible to prevent embarrassing relations” (Translated by Assessor).[1]

Researcher4116: There is no publicly available information about any such training. According to the assessor with the general country context in mind, it is likely that the military is not open to such training. As for peacekeeping missions, Madagascar has only sent a limited amount of personnel - only 19 police personnel, no military personnel - [1] which might explain the lack of guidelines on the matter.

Researcher4116: As per the 2011 Small Arms Survey report, there is evidence to prove that PMCs operate in Madagascar, particularly due to increasing security in the country. There is no information regarding the level of scrutiny that these PMCs are facing, however.

The Small Arms Survey of 2011 points out that “the state administration has encouraged the organization of neighbourhood watch initiatives and village self-defence groups; it has also turned a blind eye to the operations of highly aggressive indigenous private security companies that hunt down rural bandits”. There is no evidence that PMCs are being employed by the military, it appears that they are employed only by individuals. There is no legal framework regarding the employment of PMC nor evidence of corruption amongst the PMCs.

Score 2 has been selected on the basis that PMCs do not appear to be employed by defence institutions but they are not prohibited from this either.

Researcher4116: Defence and security procurement procedures remain secretive and exempt from legislative oversight. However the fact that no major procurements have occurred recently given the poor state of the military's equipment [1] might explain the absence of a need for thorough procurement processes.

There is a however a Public Procurement Regulation Authority [2] which is an independent organ created in 2006 for a fair implementation of the public procurement [3] that performs oversight on all public procurements, so by implication also the MoD.

As regarding the military this would be mostly about supplies, services and construction work.

Researcher4116: The Ministry of Defence does not publish information about concluded contracts, implementation and sign-off.

There are occasional press releases by the Ministry about donations, such as a gift from France of an aircraft as part of military cooperation[1], also training, transmission system etc., or military cooperation and assistance from the United States and China with training and military equipment.[2] Madagascar is an extremely poor country, its army relies a lot on aid and donation from other armies; therefore it not a priority to formalise a defence procurement cycle which is per se not needed.

Further to that, in support of the lack of transparency in the defence procurement cycle process and assessment of needs is the finding that United Kingdom had sold over 3,000 weapons to the Malagasy government between 2011 and 2012. No information was provided on the destination of these weapons and on the reason for their import.[3-4]

Researcher4116: There is no evidence of a defence procurement policy in Madagascar and therefore no oversight mechanism for it.

This lack of transparency has been particularly evident in the case of MAD Africa Distribution's sale of Belgian Army helicopters to the Madagascan army in 2009 (given the limited number of purchases Madagascar makes this was the most recent found on record). There is a controversy over the nature of the helicopters acquired by the government, and on their efficiency and price.

There is a however a Public Procurement Regulation Authority [2] which is an independent organ created in 2006 for a fair implementation of the public procurement [3] that performs oversight on all public procurements, so by implication also the MoD. As regard to the military this would be mostly about supplies, services and construction work.

I could not find information in the media, interviews, CSO reports and academic work to assess its efficiency or its compliance with its policy of transparency, or the will to fight corruption in public procurements. Score 0 has been selected as there is no evidence of oversight of the PPRA over defence procurement.

Researcher4116: Information on actual and potential defence purchases are not available on the MOD's website (an aggregate total of defence purchase is not published).

Furthermore there is a lot of speculation surrounding defence purchases. For example, Malagasy President Hery Rajaonarimampianina visited the state of Israel at the beginning of June 2014. This visit was announced on the President’s website, along with the fact that several ministers were joining, such as the Minister of National Defence.

No specific information was provided with regard to potential defence purchases or agreements.[1] The absence of comment from the President and the Minister of Defence regarding this visit leaves room for speculation.[2-3-4-5] In the case of the visit to the state of Israel, secrecy might have more to do with Isaeli policy than with Madagascar.

However, Madagascar's defence sector is limited, and therefore its defence purchases are similarly limited.[6]

Researcher4116: No information is available on additional requirements for defence tenders.

Information is available on general requirements from companies wishing to do business in Madagascar on the World Bank and the Economic Development Board of Madagascar. The Public Procurement Regulation Authority [3] is supposed to prevent corruption therefore, it could discriminate on the ground of integrity.

However, I don't think it applies to the MoD and I cannot assess the reality of its independence.

Researcher4116: I could not find evidence that procurement requirements were derived from a well-audited defence strategy.
Further to this, a national defence strategy was never discussed[1.] Therefore it is unlikely that it is audited.

In support of the lack of transparency in the defence procurement cycle process and assessment of needs is the finding that United Kingdom had sold over 3,000 weapons to the Malagasy government between 2011 and 2012. No information was provided on the destination of these weapons and on the reason for their import.[2-3]

Procurement might be opportunistic in the sense that Malagasy army relies a lot on foreign donations especially from France, the US and China. Military acquisitions might therefore depend on diplomatic relations. For instance during the political crisis, the US suspended their military support [4]. While the acquisition of military equipement such as helicopter, aircraft as discussed with China might be opportunistic [5].

Researcher4116: Defence purchases are not clearly defined through any formal procedure and there is no information about capability gaps and procurement needs. If they are clearly identified, then there is no way of knowing as they are not published.

Procurement might be opportunistic in the sense that Malagasy army relies a lot on foreign donations especially from France, the US and China. Military acquisitions might therefore depend on diplomatic relations. For instance during the political crisis, the US suspended their military support [1]. While the acquisition of military equipment such as helicopter, aircraft as discussed with China might be opportunistic [2].

Researcher4116: Due to the special relationship with France, Madagascar receives assistance in various forms and might receive equipment and supplies which may otherwise be procured in an open competition. The same can be said with regards to the United States and China. [1]

MADAfrica purchased 23 Alouette II helicopters from the Belgian government for EUR 900,000 (EUR 39,130 per helicopter). The company then sold 4 helicopters for EUR 750,000 to Madagascar (EUR 187,500 per helicopter).[3] The deal was viewed with wide suspicion, in part because of the incompatibility of the equipment with the army’s needs, lack of transparency and an absence of competition in the allocation process. [2] It is important to mention that this transaction took place during the political crisis.
The landscape as of Hery Rajonarimampianina's inauguration in January 2014 is shifting [6].

Researcher4116: There is a Code of ethics for public procurement [1]. Parties to contracts must respect this code but no reference to tender boards was found. No information is available on existence of tender boards.

There is also a Public Procurement Regulation Authority [2] and a National Public Contract Commission (La Commission Nationale des Marchés) to check transparency and fair allocation of public procurements [3]. This Commission could be interpreted as a tender board. However, there is no information on its activities in the media, or a way of assessing these activities in greater detail.

Researcher4116: There is no evidence of such legislation.

Researcher4116: There is no evidence of training for procurement staff and contract managers. There is no concrete evidence to suggest that procurement staff are organised into a professional staff department nor that it suffers from staff shortages.

The case of the sale of the Belgian Army helicopters to the Madagascar army in 2009 [1-2] is an example of the little control or oversight of defence contractors by procurement staff.

Researcher4116: No information is available on procurement practices within the MOD. [1-2]

There is a formal mechanism to allow companies to complain about the procurement process in general.
The Public Procurement Regulation Authority (l'Autorité de Régulation des Marchés publics - ARMP) must respect this code. Within this Public Procurement Regulation Authority, the Redress Section (La Section du Recours S.R) of the Regulation and Redress Committee (Le Comité de réglementation et de recours - CRR is in charge of judging disputes on allocation of public procurement.

There is no evidence available to suggest that companies would be disadvantaged in future procurements if they attempt to complain. However, there is also no evidence to suggest that their complaints are being dealt with.

Researcher4116: There is no information available on punitive actions against suppliers of the MOD. Civilian disputes on the other hand are handled according to the information on the Economic and Development Board of Madagascar, by either domestic legislation or international bodies depending on jurisdiction.

As for recent case, there is an ongoing investigation by BIANCO on irregularities in the management of Jirama, Madagascar's national water and electricity utility. This investigation deals with non-compliance of contracts by suppliers [3].

The anti-corruption law of 2004 [2] states sanctions in case of corruption. The law makes no mention of suppliers or of debarment.

Researcher4116: No information on the existence of offsets was found during the research process.

It is unlikely that the government is negotiating off-set contracts because there are no large procurement programmes, and most equipment comes from direct donations.[1]

Researcher4116: The Madagascan government does not likely have any offset programmes in defence, as there are no big procurement programmes, and most military equipment comes from donations.

Researcher4116: There is no evidence of offset contracts, and there is no further public information suggesting that the government regulates them.

Researcher4116: There is no large procurement process and there is no mean to assess if there is use of an agent.
It is likely to be a government to government process. [1]

The public procurement code (le code des marchés publics) [2]does not mention intermediaries, only representatives, and there seems to be no restriction on the use of representatives. There is no mention of oversight for this process.

Researcher4116: I did not find information suggesting that the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals were made publicly available prior to the signing contact. However different examples, such as weapons sold by the United Kingdom between 2011 and 2012[1], points out the lack of publicly available information even after the purchase.

Researcher4116: No information is available on requirements that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and subcontractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, although information is available on general requirements from companies wishing to do business in Madagascar on the World Bank and the Economic Development Board of Madagascar's websites.

There is no evidence of the government informally encouraging this practice of ensuring subsidiaries have anti-corruption programmes in place. My interviewees were able to provide me with further information.

Researcher4116: It is very common for defence acquisitions in Madagascar to be based on political influence by the selling nation. France has a special relation with Madagascar. Madagascar benefits from France’s military surplus due to its status as a former colony. Indeed, there are occasional press releases by the Ministry about donation, such as France gift of an aircraft as part of military cooperation[1] This could be seen as political influence and there is no doubt that France has still a tremendous amount of influence in Madagascar, due to collaboration in the defence and security sectors.[2] Acknowledging this reality, it should be noted that France largely provides training and military surplus, rather than selling equipment, as the Malagasy defence budget is relatively limited.

However, in the case of MAD Africa Distribution sale of Belgian Army helicopters to the Madagascar army in 2009, the decision to buy them seems not to be the result of political influence by the selling nation, but the influence of an individual, David Verly, over the transitional government. David Verly, MAD Africa Distribution's manager, had at the moment of the transaction strong ties with transitional government. [3]

Further to that, in support of the lack of transparency in the defence procurement cycle process and assessment of needs is the finding that United Kingdom had sold over 3,000 weapons to the Malagasy government between 2011 and 2012. No information was provided on the destination of these weapons and on the reason for their import.[4 and 5]