Researcher4117: I have been unable to uncover any discussion of asset disposal (which is limited in the Gambia) in the media, in the scholarly literature, or NGO literature. Inquiries with contacts in the Gambia have not yielded any further information. The context here is important: given the risks journalists face if found reporting on security related issues, the Gambian media is unlikely to publish stories that may invoke the ire of the President and CSOs are generally not involved with the defence and security sector, even if defence/security fall under their purview (interview 2). There is thus not even speculation about asset disposal, simply a lack of knowledge and an unwillingness to guess.

Researcher4117: Based on the overall political climate of the Gambia and the general lack of scrutiny over defence matters, I find it highly unlikely that a) there is oversight and b) if such oversight exists the reports are publicly available. Note that while Baldeh (2015) reports on the National Audit Office exercising some oversight of the Ministry of defence budgets, it is clear from this article that a) MoD figures are not reliable, b) expenditures are hidden or wrongfully reported; and c) asset disposal appears not to have been subject of the audit, or if it were it was not reported in the newspaper article.

Researcher4117: There has been no statement, formal or informal, about government spending on secret items. The 2013 budget does not include any information about the National Intelligence Agency and the figures for the Army only mention infrastructural costs. Anecdotal evidence reported by the interviewee suggests that &quoute;off the books&quoute; arms shipments have arrived at Gambia National Airport in the last three years, but that is impossible to confirm.

Researcher4117: The budget as presented to the National Assembly includes no information on secret items and very limited information on defence and security matters overall (at least insofar as what is given to them is made publicly available). The accompanying budget speech by the Minister of Finance (included in the same source) does not mention the defence and security sectors at all. Legislators are presented with a very basic outline of expenditures on defence and law enforcement (it is only one page in the above source) and this information excludes the National Intelligence Agency. If any further information is provided to them it is not done so publicly. Available records of parliamentary debates do not show any discussion of defence-related expenses whatsoever.

Researcher4117: Legislators are presented with a very basic outline of expenditures on defence and law enforcement (it is only one page in the above source) and this information excludes the National Intelligence Agency. If any further information is provided to them it is not done so publicly. Available records of parliamentary debates do not show any discussion of defence-related expenses whatsoever.

However, there is no evidence of audit reports of secret expenditure being submitted to legislators.

Researcher4117: There is no evidence as to whether off-budget military expenditures are permitted by law or not. There are no laws that prohibit this, nor any recordings in the budget of the sort suggested by criteria 2, for example. Additionally, Gambia military personnel are routinely asked to volunteer on Kanilai, the President's farm, and it is unclear who pays for this expense. The article by Ndow (in a pro-government newspaper) illustrates this common phenomenon. It notes that &quoute;4,000 volunteers, including staff of his office, armed and security forces, helped him [the President] weed his groundnut fields.&quoute; The same article later notes that &quoute;The president of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the Gambia Armed Forces (GAF) has rewarded the armed and security services of the country with a staggering three million Dalasis (D3, 000, 000)), earmarked for their welfare trust.&quoute;

This points to a greater issue of the blurring of presidential &quoute;gifts&quoute; and military (and other forms of state) expenditure as indicated. The article by Janko similarly notes that the President donated computers to the Gambia Police Force and the Gambian Armed Forces, but it is unclear how these were paid for. There thus appears to be something of an off-the-books quid-for-pro arrangement where security forces are used to bolster the president in return for donations that may in fact be paid for by government tax revenues.

Researcher4117: It is difficult to find evidence of off-budget military expenditures from looking at ERE and other domestic sources. The ERE includes military spending by clear categories (e.g. utilities, salary, office furniture, etc.) and there is no specific evidence that these are not accurate. Note, however, that other security agencies, including the National Intelligence Agency, are not included in the ERE. Note also, however, that a substantial amount of government spending in the Gambia comes through supplementary spending bills and how these are spent is not transparent; Sanneh (2014) notes that almost half of a 2014 supplementary budget went to the President's Office. Also note that that the annual budget speech (included in the ERE) does not address military and security expenditures.

US State Department and Security Assistance Monitor data show that Gambia is a recipient of limited US security and military assistance. Therefore, there is evidence of some off-budget military revenue and expenditure, however the extent that this is a practice is unclear.

Researcher4117: There is an Official Secret Act that restricts the acquisition of information by the public on national security and public welfare grounds unless such acquisition is authorized. The 2008 amendment changed the penalty for disclosure of restricted information to a minimum of 30 years in prison. This is indicative of a far-reaching effort to manage the circulation of information by the Gambian government, not just on defence-related matters. The deteriorating situation of freedom of speech in the Gambia is documented by a number of NGOs and commentators. A very recent overview is offered by Samateh 2015. The application of the OSA appears to be inconsistent and both informal and formal. There is no effective way to appeal a classification of secret, whether or not such a classification is supported in law.

Note that there is nothing similar to a Freedom of Information Act (one was under discussion a few years ago but appears not to have been adopted). In addition, information that ought not be classified as restricted is routinely treated as restricted by government institutions (see Hultin). That is, information that is technically public is de facto treated as classified by all levels of government.

Researcher4117: There is no evidence in the media that the armed forces or other security agencies as institutions have ownership of commercial businesses on any scale.

However, in the Gambia there is a persistent blurring of state institutions more broadly and the persona of the president - a blurring that is well captured in the persistence of the term mansakunda (literally king's compound in Mandinka, one of the local languages) to describe the government (for a discussion of this, see Hultin 2015). The President has significant business interests in agriculture, tourism, bakeries, etc. For example, the operating manager of the President's Kanilai Farms has the military rank of Brigadier (&quoute;GFF makes landmark visit to Kanilai Farms&quoute;) and military personnel are frequently tasked with farm work at this establishment (under the rubric of &quoute;volunteering&quoute; but it is uncertain to what extent such volunteering is genuine) (see, e.g. Ndow 2014). The President is also widely rumored to have sizeable business interests both inside the Gambia and outside the country (&quoute;Yahya Jammeh's offshore business entities uncovered; the President owns multi million dollars hotel in Spain&quoute;). However, for all practical purposes ownership is by the President and not the military. While it is possible that military officers have business interests, it is unlikely that this is independent of President.

Response to Reviewers: agree. The senior leadership may or may not have stake in Kanilai ventures. Given the high level of secrecy in the sector and lack of concrete evidence for the the defence sector's beneficial ownership of commercial enterprises, the score has been changed from 1 to 2 upon the recommendation of Peer Reviewer 1.

Researcher4117: There is no evidence that military-owned business do exist in the Gambia, unless - and this is admittedly a big qualifier - you included business-owned by the country's President that that use the military as essentially free labor (see Ndow 2014). If you do, a score of 0 would be appropriate as there is no evidence of any oversight, scrutiny, or auditing of these companies. A 2012 story by a leading diaspora opposition newspaper alleged that two of the President's companies &quoute;are actually legally constituted companies. They pay neither import duties, capital gains, PAYE, social security contributions, or any taxes.&quoute; Whether or not this accusation is true, there is no evidence of any oversight over these companies.

Score 2 has been selected to reflect the risk that military owned businesses may exist.

Researcher4117: The Gambia Armed Forces Act prohibits some commercial activity by servicemen and women, such as allowing goods of a private nature on military transport (s. 18e) and the more ambiguously worded &quoute;acts of fraudulent nature&quoute; (s. 18f). Score 0 has been selected as private enterprise is not outlawed as such, but there is no evidence that the Gambian military engages in private enterprise. President Jammeh has significant commercial interests and use military personnel as free labor and there appears to be zero oversight of this (see, e.g. Ndow 2014). In cases where military personnel have been found profiting from commercial activity, these have been more along the lines of corruption than of running a business (i.e. selling state-owned goods) (&quoute;Soldier jailed for stealing..&quoute;). The Gambia Armed Forces Act does include provisions for penalties; for example, acts of using military vehicles for private gains can carry a prison term of up to 12 months (para 80).

Researcher4117: Military leaders seldom give public statements in the Gambia, as this would be politically unwise and the Gambian government deploys a very restrictive reading of legislation such as the 1992 Official Secrets Act to ensure self-censorship by government employees (Jallow 2013; see also Hultin 2007). In 2008 the act was amended to increase penalties for unauthorised disclosure to life in prison (Senghore and Gibba 2008).
The MoD does have a Public Relation Officer, but I have not been able to uncover any recent statements by him/her on corruption. The Minister of Defence is the President, and he does not give statements on military matters except for decrying elusive foreign involvement and the like.

Peer Reviewer 1: Agree. Comment updated.

Researcher4117: High-ranking military officials have been charged with corruption previously, but it is unclear if these were politically motivated charges or not. In one high profile case, that of a Lt Colonel, there has been allegations of him being tortured (US Department of State report; &quoute;Ex-GNA officer says tortured..) and one prominent diaspora newspaper has alleged that the charges against him are false (&quoute;Silaba Samateh...&quoute;). Although it is not clear if this particular case is politically-motivated, it is consistent with an African Development Bank report and a Freedom House report, both noting the use of politically motivated enforcement of anti-corruption provisions to case aside political opponents (OSGE 2007; Freedom House 2012). Freedom House notes in their 2014 report on the Gambia that high-ranking security officials who were found guilty on drug and corruption charges were able to re-join the government after paying fines.

The Gambia Armed Forces Act does not address bribery or corruption specifically and does not include specific safeguards against these, though it does allow for for the court martial of military personnel for civil offenses (s. 83).

Peer Reviewer 1: Agree. Comment updated and sources added. Score changed from 3 to 2.

Researcher4117: In law and in practice, the Gambia does not encourage nor protect whistleblowing and, in fact, over the last decade the Gambian government has adopted legislation to strengthen and broaden the Official Secrets Act to further discourage whistle blowing (see article by Senghore and Gibba and US Department of State 2014 on 2013 amendment to the Information and Communications Act, which specifically does not provide protections for whistleblowing for any governmental sector). This is widely noted in the scholarly literature (Saine, Hultin, Jallow) and by NGOs such as Article IX and Freedom House. The latter classified the Gambia as &quoute;not free&quoute; in terms of freedom of the press and information (which would include whistleblowing protections), citing, among other items, the Minister of Presidential Affairs as saying &quoute;“If you cannot say anything good about the country, then you should keep quiet.&quoute; Indeed Jeffrey Smith of the RFK Centre for Justice and Human Rights has referred to The Gambia as &quoute;the North Korea of Africa&quoute; in terms of freedom of speech and political rights (quoted in Porzucki 2015). There are no reported cases of whistle-blowers in the military or in the defence industries and the likelihood of any protections for such individuals is nil.

More recent reports on the as-of-yet (July 2015) in operation Anti-Corruption Commission will provide some protection for whistleblowers but it is unclear if this will extend to defence matters, nor if it will be effective (Jammeh 2015).

Peer Reviewer 2: Agree. Comment updated and sources added.

Researcher4117: The Gambian regulatory framework governing the civil service does not appear to make any specific provisions for people in sensitive positions (Code of Conduct).

While there is a Public Service Commission tasked to supervise the conduct of officials, one former government civil servant has alleged that its powers are routinely abrogated and it has no influence over hiring, firing, promotion, and demotion in the civil service (speaking in reference to the abrupt firing of 12 civil servants with the Ministry of Agriculture in 2014). It is also not clear from the PSC's website how active it is - the most recently provided annual report is from 2007. Records where available provide no evidence of a National Assembly debate on appointments (National Assembly) of individuals in sensitive positions - or positions in general. Appointments appear to be largely at the will of the President, which is supported by anecdotal evidence and research by Dwyer (2014) on the Gambian military.

Finally, a draft report conducted by a respected Gambian law firm noted that there is a widespread lack of familiarity with the rules governing the civil service among Gambian government ministries and a cavalier attitude towards their enforcement. In particular, they noted that &quoute;in all the Ministries visited, copious examples were furnished of erosion of discipline and performance standards as a result of political patronage and influences&quoute; .

Researcher4117: The above document gives number of civilian employees of the MoD (32 individuals) and approved spending on military salaries (GMD 103,268,760 for 2013, but does not give numbers for each ranks. No numbers are given for the NIA (and, in fact, the interviewee stated that one prominent agency, the paramilitary Police Intervention Unit, has explicitly declined to provide numbers). Numbers for the GPF are payments to each rank, but how many individuals have each rank is not given.

That said, DefenceWeb lists Gambian military strength as 1525 (900 Arm, 125 Navy, 100 Air Force, and 400 Gendarmerie). In contrast, AccessGambia lists military strength as 1,900, while Wikipedia says 2,500 but does not provide a source.

Researcher4117: Both pay rates and allowances for officers are published in aggregate form. That is, a lump sum is given for all military personnel, followed by allowances disaggregated by kind (e.g. car, housing) but not by rank/number.
Another qualifier here is the extent to which this document can be considered public. While the Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure is, technically, a public document it is not widely circulated in the Gambia nor is it published online. One can only obtain a copy by going to the National Assembly or the Ministry of Finance and convincing the appropriate clerks that one should in fact have access to it.

Researcher4117: There are a few incidents of pay being docked or withheld for unclear reasons. Gainako News reported, for example, that six Gambian soldiers received unexplained salary reductions and that they were court marshaled as punishment for inquiring into the situation. The same story also suggests that salaries for soldiers were transferred to other government entities for unexplained reasons. In the fall of 2013, there were also unverified rumours that pay had not been forthcoming for several months (reported to me by Interview 5); I was not able to verify these rumors, however.

In general, these rumors and stories are relatively rare and there is no evidence that they represent the norm. Furthermore, there is also no evidence that payments are in fact on time regularly.

There is, however, no published payment system for the military, to the best of my knowledge, and the one for the civil service is subject to a great deal of institutional autonomy according to a recent World Bank case study (Viñuela and Alvesson 2014) - that is, pay scales can unpredictably fluctuate across ministries and institutions. Whilst there is no direct evidence on the military specifically, general trends in the government could be taken as a proxy. Therefore, score 1 has been selected.

Researcher4117: GAFA stipulates a process for appointment, promotion and dismissal but it does not include objective job descriptions. This process includes the establishment of a Board to approve of all promotions and restrictions on demotions (s. 139). In 2012, the President is quoted as &quoute;re-affirming&quoute; that promotion is based on merit (Fadera 2012). In practice, however, the Gambian military is frequently interfered with by the President (see Dwyer). For example, in 2012 President Jammeh fired army officers in response to unsubstantiated coup rumors. There is no evidence that the fired officers were involved with the rumors or that their dismissal was conducted in accordance with the GAFA or subsidiary regulations.

Researcher4117: The Gambia Armed Forces Act stipulates that there should be a Board responsible for appointments and promotion. There is no specific evidence of corruption in the form of pay-for-promotion, but there is a strong suggestion of political interference with the process (see &quoute;Mass dismissal...&quoute;. Dwyer further reports widespread corruption (or perceptions thereof among the soldiers) in the military and favouritism in terms of promotions during the 1990s. It is unclear if the situation has improved. Fadera (2012) reports President Jammeh reaffirming that promotion is based on pay, although the evidence to the contrary (in Dwyer and in Kibaaro News, for instance) suggests that this is not consistent practice.

Researcher4117: The Gambia does not use compulsory conscription. GAFA prohibits any enlistment that is not voluntary.

Researcher4117: There are prohibitions on Gambian armed forces members soliciting or accepting bribes in the conduct of their duties, although these do not specify postings or recruitment in particular. There are appropriate actions and punishments on the books for the former, although there is no evidence that any servicemen or women have been punished for accepting a bribe for voluntary conscription. The interviewee noted that bribery is sometimes used to join the armed forces, as it is considered a good job in the Gambia.

To confirm, the Gambia does not use conscription. GAFA prohibits any enlistment that is not voluntary.

Peer Reviewer 1: disagree. Gambia does not use conscription. Score maintained.

Researcher4117: The assessor has been unable to find any evidence of ghost soldiers in the past five years or previously. Nor is there any evidence that this is a concern of the Gambian government prompting efforts to reform payment systems. This should not be interpreted as a sign of robust payment systems/oversight. There are no available sources discussing the strength of the payment system, though there are reports of unexplained withholding of pay and similar irregularities (Gainako News). A reasonable assessment of the situation would suggest that ghost soldiers are possible but most likely not in widespread use, in part due to the small size of the Gambian military.

Peer Reviewer 1: Agree. Comment updated.

Researcher4117: The constitution established an Armed Forces Council that may consult the President on budgetary matters (though this advice is not required). This means that the President has sole authority over personnel and pay matters.

In practice, there is a great deal of confusion between chains of payment and chains of command. Partial evidence of this is offered by speculation in the opposition news that the court martial of six GAF soldiers who had served in Darfur was caused by confusion over docked pay - that is, it is possible, though not proven, that the court martial was a retaliation/cover up for protests against a theft of pay by commanding officers. Therefore, this partial evidence suggests that chains of command are unlikely to be separated from chains of payment.

Researcher4117: The presence of a Code of Conduct for security services depends on which service is under consideration. The Gambian Armed Forces Act functions like a code of conduct in that it prohibits military personnel from receiving gifts/bribes (s. 82) and using or selling military equipment for private gain (s. 72 and s. 81). They do not specifically cover post-separation activities. There is no information available as to these regulations' distribution or how well known they are to military personnel, although, in principle they are available to the public through the Government Printing Office. These provisions do not extend to civilian employees, though the latter would be covered by the code of conduct of the civil service, which similarly prohibits the use of public resources for private gain and adds a conflict of interest section (s. 3). Prosecution of military personnel is reported in the local press (Gainako News).

According to the recent report by the UN Special Rapporteur, the police is not yet governed by a dedicated code of conduct although one is being drafted. The NIA claims to have a code of conduct but the SR was unable to obtain any evidence of one.

Peer Reviewer 2: Comments updated and sources added. Score has been changed from 3 to 2. Disagree with the assessment of a score of 1 as the GAFA functions like a code of conduct and the code of conduct for civilian service covers civilian personnel.

Researcher4117: There has been occasional media reports about violations of the code of conduct (as put forth in The Gambia Armed Forces Act) being prosecuted. In one case, soldiers were tried for stealing rice and in another case soldiers were prosecuted for a range of violations of the code of conduct while on peacekeeping duty in Darfur (the quoted story suggests an ulterior motive behind the prosecution, however, as indicated by the story's title).

Whether these prosecutions occur in a large number of cases is not clear. Note that the Gainako News article describes an unexplained delay between verdict and the public release of information. Given that legal decisions are often not known at all, this is not surprising (unpublished research conducted by me in Kanifing, the Gambia, in 2014 showed that legal decisions are written down in the court register in less than 10% of all cases).

Given the sparsity of data, it is thus difficult to make any general comments about breaches of the Code of Conduct and public availability of information. All that can be conclusively said is that there have been cases of effective prosecution of cases known to the media but that it is unlikely that such information is made public as a matter of course.

Comments to Reviewers: Agree. Comment updated to address point 3. Peer Reviewer 2: GAFA functions like a code of conduct and the code of conduct for civilian service covers civilian personnel.

Researcher4117: There is no evidence of anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel. There are media reports of Gambian peacekeeping soldiers and police officers being trained under bilateral agreements with Sweden, Turkey, Canada, and the United Kingdom. This training includes conduct and discipline (Wally 2014). However, there is no evidence of specific and consistent training on anti-corruption and one provided by the Gambian government. That said, interview 10 did note that soldiers are more &quoute;professional&quoute; and less likely to be &quoute;corrupt&quoute; than police officers.

Peer Reviewer 1: pre-deployment training is reflected in the comment above. However, there is no evidence that anti-corruption training is provided. Score maintained.

Researcher4117: There is some evidence of effective prosecutions under the current government. The Point article describes the effective prosecution of a lower ranking armed forces member for stealing rice. There has been other instances of higher profiled military personnel prosecuted for drug and corruption charges (Daily Nation), including the sentences of senior police and military personnel for drug trafficking. In both cases the outcomes were made public, but there is no policy that they must be. The Freedom House report, however, suggests that at least some high-ranking officials were able to re-join the government in spite of being prosecuted for serious crimes, suggesting that prosecution is not taken seriously by the Executive in a consistent manner.

Due to the paucity of information, it is not possible to say whether these prosecutions are anomalies cutting against the trend of suppression of prosecution or indicative of a lack of need for prosecution. It is clear, however, that skepticism over these sorts of trials are widespread in the Gambia. Typically, this sort of skepticism is spoken about in hushed tones. The diasporic opposition press, however, is much more open in its critique as seen, for example, in the case of an ex-army officer (Mam Matarr Secka) arrested on corruption charges (Freedom Newspaper).

Researcher4117: Facilitation payments are prohibited by s. 82 of the Gambia Armed Forces Act (it does not use the term &quoute;facilitation payment&quoute; but does prohibit the direct or indirect compensation, whether demanded or freely given, for any duty or matter relating to the Armed Forces. Civilian personnel would be governed by the analogous provisions in the code of conduct (s. 3).

There are no available media reports on facilitation payments having been accepted or solicited, nor, therefore, any evidence that mechanisms to prevent them are effective.

Researcher4117: I have been unable to determine if there is any kind of military doctrine speaking specifically to corruption. The only publicly available regulation governing the military is the GAFA. There are no white papers or other documentation on military doctrine in circulation either online or in-country.

Peer Reviewer 1: There is no evidence that peace support deployments have enabled GAF to be aware of corruption as a strategic issue for operations. Score maintained.

Researcher4117: I have been unable to determine whether or not commanders at all levels are currently trained in corruption issues (no active military personnel were willing to discuss their work with me). While there are reports of peacekeepers being court martialed for violations taking place in Darfur, there is concern in the opposition press that these were politically motivated trials, nor is it clear if this was due to corruption (one of the charges included &quoute;scandalous conduct&quoute; which can include corruption but does not need to do so).

At the same time, there is not extensive evidence of mishandling of corruption cases through media reports, inquiries, or any other sources.

Researcher4117: There is no evidence that the country deploys personnel specifically for corruption monitoring. The Gambia has deployed military police to the UNAMID mission in Darfur (Interview 9), it is not clear if they received any training or were tasked with monitoring corruption. According to the UNAMID press release, their task was to provide security at UNAMID headquarters in El Fasher, Sudan. Wally reports that Gambian police officers have undergone training, supported by Sweden, that includes &quoute;conduct and discipline&quoute; though the article does not mention corruption by name, nor does it make clear whether or not the mandate of these officers would be to prevent corruption.

The Gainako News story suggests that the court martial of six soldiers on the UNAMID mission might have been due to corruption, but the same story also suggests the court martial might have retaliatory or a way to silence the soldiers complaints about missing salary payments.

Researcher4117: There are media reports of Gambian peacekeeping soldiers and police officers being trained under bilateral agreements with Sweden, Turkey, Canada, and the United Kingdom. This training includes conduct and discipline (Wally 2014). There is no evidence that this training included specific guidelines on fighting corruption in contracting. It is also not clear whether or not the government has adopted guidelines or regulations concerning other aspects of peacekeeping operations, such as base constructing and logistics.

Researcher4117: There is no evidence that the Gambian government uses PMCs either in-country or during peacekeeping operations. There is no legislation specifically prohibiting their use.

Researcher4117: All defence procurement is covered by the GPPA, updated in 2014 (GPPA 2014). However, the GPPA allows for the modification of procurement rules in situations where the Minister of Defence, &quoute;with the approval of the [Minister of] Finance&quoute; finds that the procurement is &quoute;related to national defence or national security.&quoute; Non-armaments (e.g. uniforms, computers) for the armed forces are not covered by this exemption. The act does not call for independent review other than as provided by the mandatory approval of the Minister of Finance.
The same provision also allows the President of the country to exempt procurement from GPPA approval and replace it with cabinet approval.

There are suggestions in the media and by officials that these procurement rules are being worked around. A company owned by a senior ranking government official allegedly imported arms without the relevant licenses, for example. Interview 7 similarly stated that it is &quoute;highly likely&quoute; that arms enter the Gambia through non-approved channels at the behest of the high ranking government officials.

The above comments are of a speculative nature, as there has been no independent confirmation of non-standard defence and security procurement by academics or CSOs, but a 2015 Gambian newspaper story covering the report of the National Audit Office to the National Assembly describes that the former stated that the Ministry of Defence's procurement polices were not &quoute;properly constituted&quoute; and contracts were determined by the permanent secretary (the highest ranking civil servant) and his deputy.

GPPA does prohibit Public officers from engaging in corrupt practices such as &quoute;improper inducements&quoute; (para 27) and allows for the termination of bidders engaging in corrupt practices, price-fixing, etc. (para. 28(2)(d)).

Researcher4117: Based on available statistics (from NISAT), the Gambia has had very limited procurement of military equipment since the 1994 military coup. The GPPA website, which is not up-to-date, does not list any defence related procurements. There is thus no evidence of any kind of procurement cycle or tendering process having taken place. While it is impossible to know whether the absence of data on this point is simply due to the lack of updated information or a lack of disclosure, given the political situation in the Gambia it is reasonable to assume that where procurement does happen, regular procurement policies are circumvented. The latter is in fact legal, as the GPP Act allows for the modification of procurement rules for material relevant to defence as determined by the Secretary of State (now Minister) of defence (who is President Jammeh).

Researcher4117: While, in theory, the process covering defence procurement can be covered by the GPPA and thus regulated by the authority, there is no evidence that such oversight has taken place. The act also allows for exceptions or modifications to regular procurement policies and practices at the request of the Secretary of State for Defence and with the approval of his/her counterpart in finance (the former is today the President ). The GPPA is active in non-defence procurement, however, so the absence of evidence is arguably a function of the GPPA being ignored or circumvented by the executive rather than the inactivity or lack of transparency of the authority as such. This is indeed what is reported by Baldeh (2015), suggesting that some oversight is active but ineffective. This interpretation would also be consistent with information obtained from Interview 7, who when asked if there was any kind of legal framework governing arms purchases in broad terms, suggest that there is &quoute;no way&quoute; that the President would allow &quoute;civilian&quoute; (his/her term) oversight of security matters.

Researcher4117: Aggregate information is in ERE 2013 for specific headings such as &quoute;arms and ammunition,&quoute; &quoute;office supplies,&quoute; etc. but that is all that is being disclosed aside from donations.

Given the paucity of public discussion of defence matters in the Gambia, I am unable to confirm that there is or is not a policy to disclose, nor that there are any specific justifications/exemptions. Simply put, defence spending is simply not part of public discussion in the Gambia and whatever information can be obtained about it is piecemeal and ad-hoc, based on sources such as the ERE.

Researcher4117: It is likely that, in most cases, defence procurement exists outside of the standard procurement procedures as outlined in the Gambia Public Procurement Regulations 2003 and in the Gambia Public Procurement Act of 2001 and 2014 (the latter is not available online, but a summary is provided by Blunt et. al.). Both the 2001 and 2014 Acts provide for exemptions for defence material. In GPPA 2001 s. vi 21(2), the Minister of defence (in the Gambia, this is the President), with the approval of the Minister of Finance, to exempt material related to national defence from this regulation. There is no review of such a decision and there are no specific restrictions on how these rules can be modified. According to Blunt, GPPA 2014 contains a broader provision exempting national defence/national security procurement or any procurement at the President's directive. Furthermore, a 2005 amendment to the Gambia Public Procurement Act that the President can replace GPPA approval with cabinet approval at his say so (s. 2).

If defence procurement is subject to the GPPA, it is required to comply with the 2003 regulations. The latter does not address corruption specifically other than allowing the GPPA to debar a contractor in case of corruption (s. 155) . It does state the need of a contract to abide by &quoute;compliance with specifications&quoute; (e.g. s. 153) and requires a bidder to provide detail on &quoute;legal and factual grounds&quoute; of bid review (schedule 3, s. 1). Available documentation does not show that there is a specific compliance programme that a bidder must comply with, nor that this is a factor in the awarding of bids.

Score 0 has therefore been selected to show that no requirements are placed on companies beyond what is generally in company law and there is no evidence that discrimination is made between companies on the grounds of integrity.

Researcher4117: There is no evidence that there is a defence policy, nor that any regulated procurement has taken place. It is certainly possible that there is a policy and a plan for procurement, but if so it is not available to the public and interviewees have informed that any kind of information on defence procurement could not be divulged - that is, it would be impossible for anyone not belonging to the President's inner circle or the military leadership to know about such as plan or policy and that asking about it could expose to legal or other repercussions. This is not necessarily based on legal restrictions but on the absence of a freedom of information law or policy as well as due to the nature of Gambian politics. There are no CSOs working on defence procurement or related issues and no media inquiry, given the political conditions in which Gambian media operates. There also is no scholarship addressing present-day Gambian defence procurement. Insofar as procurement happens, it does not appear to follow any particular pattern and, at any rate, procurement of big ticket items is limited.

In sum, insofar as procurement happens it is not clear whether or not it is in consonance with a national strategy as the latter is not know. By the same token, it cannot be known whether it is opportunistic, although that seems likely. Either way, procurement of this sort is infrequent in the Gambia.

Researcher4117: There is absolutely no discussion in the media or anywhere else public as to how defence procurement is determined, nor have I been able to discuss this with an appropriately based informant. That is, I don't have a source that says there are no requirements, nor do I have source saying there are requirements. The score of 0 is based on the reasoned assumption that the dearth of data suggests that absence of a formal procedure.

Researcher4117: Given the overall absence of data and the lack of transparency in defence procurement, it is not possible to say whether or not procurement from a particular country is the result of an open competition or single-source procurement. It is worth noting that NISAT shows procurement from a wide range of countries, although this does not tell us much about the nature of the procurement decision.

In other words, available data cannot tell us if there is an open competition, or if most contracts are single-sourced. My reasoned assumption based on how Gambian foreign policy is conducted is that defence procurement is single source, ad hoc, and driven by political calculations from the Gambian president's office.

The GPPA, which has been established appears to be circumvented in defence matters. It calls for open competition but the statutory language is quite vague as to how this should be realized (see, for example, para 25(3).

Researcher4117: 'Regular' procurement allows for the GPPA to review tenders. The extent to which tenders are audited by an independent process and, more broadly, the extent to which the review of tenders does in fact happen is not entirely clear. The study by Wittig and Jeng is the most recent study of Gambian procurement and they note that the GPPA has set a &quoute;course of significant change in how public resources are managed&quoute; and an &quoute;unprecedented level&quoute; of supplier participation, general awareness, etc. Of course, this study: a) is dated, but there is no available data suggesting that the situation has improved further or, for that matter worsened; b) does not address defence procurement at all. It is also worth noting that, whatever the credibility of the procurement process, it can be modified for defence-related procurement, per the GPPA.

The tender section of the GPPA website includes no information on audits and evaluations. The only relevant items included are blank forms dating to 2003. Other, unrelated, sections of the website have been updated, however.

In sum, there is no evidence of competitive tenders for defence procurement, but there is also no evidence of significant defence procurement.

Researcher4117: There is no legislation in place that outlaws conclusion for the defence sector specifically, though it would presumably be covered by the general prohibition of collusion in the Gambia Public Procurement Act, 2014.

While the GPPA can exclude a bidder if the bidder has been found guilty of collusion, this is one of the provisions that can be circumvented either by the Minister of defence declaring that the item under consideration is relevant to national security (in this case the Minister of Finance must agree) (para 20(2) or, if the President chooses to replace GPPA approval with cabinet approval (para 20(4). For this reason, and given the overall political situation in the Gambia, it is unlikely that enforcement of measures would be robust in defence matters.

Given this, plus the very limited defence procurement that does occur in the Gambia, there is no press discussion of possible collusion, nor any evidence of collusion.

Researcher4117: Speaking of procurement generally--thus not limited to the defence sector--there is evidence that GPPA staff has been trained (see Wittig/Jeng) and the legal framework empowers the GPPA to terminate contracts and to offer remedies in cases of aggrieved bidders. For example, the Gambia Public Procurement Regulations allows for the pre-shipping inspection of goods and examination upon receipt (s. 128-129), random checking of procurement (s. 6), observe contacts committee meetings (s. 7), etc. I have been unable to find evidence of GPPA training, though there are very recent media reports (&quoute;GPPA needs tap on the back&quoute;) of the GPPA training other government stakeholders (and presumably the trainers have been trained, as it were). Again, nothing here is specific to defence procurement.

There is no more recent academic work relevant to procurement in the Gambia, and no NGOs that I am aware of that are active in this area. Furthermore, I have been unable to ascertain whether staffing levels are adequate to accomplish this, nor have I seen any evidence of executive meddling in the review process. Based on my experience in the Gambia, I would consider it likely that there are staff shortages as there is an overall shortage of human capacity in the country as identified by scholars of other sectors in the Gambia (e.g. Odor 2014 on research governance and Sundby 2014 on public health). It is also probably that the procurement process is circumvented in cases of defence spending.

Score 1 has been selected given the overall absence of data and the lack of transparency in defence procurement, and the fact that the GPPA appears to be circumvented in defence matters.

Researcher4117: The legal framework and the regulations includes a complaints mechanism, but there is no specific mention of discrimination or protection thereto. This complaints mechanism is an application to a Complaints Review Board , the makeup of which is not specified GPPA (para 54.) and a debarred supplier can also appeal to the High Court (GPPR s. 155(22)). There is no independent review board as such. The Director General of the GPPA has also made public statements re: a complaints mechanism being put into place, though it is not entirely clear from these statements how effective it is (Danso).

I have no instances of companies choosing not to avail themselves of these regulations as it might be dangerous to complain. There are instances where senior officials have been brought to trial for failing to adhere with GPPA regulations; in the case described by Jawara, fertilizer was procured by the Ministry of Agriculture without compliance with GPPA regulations. The GPPA alleged at hearing that the ministry refused to submit the appropriate forms and that therefore the procurement request was rejected. This hearing was conducted by a Fertilizer Commission to examine irregularities in fertilizer procurement, however, and was not brought on by a company (the GPPA essentially submitted that they were not responsible).

The section of the GPPA website that would list the results of any reviews are presently blank (as of February, 2015) and there are no academic or other sources available that describes a procurement complaint.

Score 2 has been selected given the overall absence of data and the lack of transparency in defence procurement, and the fact that the GPPA appears to be circumvented in defence matters.

Researcher4117: A supplier or bidder can be debarred for up to five years (GPPA s. para 28) if the supplier is deemed to have provided false information, colluded, refused a successful bidder, found to have connived to interfere with competing bids, conviction of an &quoute;economic crime&quoute; or a &quoute;criminal offense&quoute; relating to the contract. An existing contract can also be terminated by the procuring entity if it is &quoute;in the public interest&quoute; (para. 31(2)(b)). A supplier that has been debarred three or more times can only be reinstated with cabinet approval (GPPR s. 155(25).

There is no evidence of these sanctions being applied, nor is there any evidence of sanctions not being applied where they should have been - that is, there is no data on situations where companies failed to meet procurement criteria or violated the procedures, and consequently no data on the failure to address such situations. The GPPA website does not list any supplies as debarred (GPPA 2015).

Peer Reviewer 2: agreed. Comment updated and source added.

Researcher4117: There appears to be no specific restrictions on offset contracts, nor is there any evidence of the Gambian government having signed any such contracts. It is highly unlikely that the country engages in offset contracts given the small size of its defence budget.

Peer Reviewer 1: Upon reconsideration, comments edited and score adjusted to N/A.

Researcher4117: I have been unable to find any evidence that the government makes any details about offset contracts publicly available. This is based on a review of media reports as available through the allAfrica.com archives (which covers the three major newspapers in the Gambia). On checking with a Gambian journalist source if he/she has ever heard of any such information being made public, he/she said 'no'. However, there is no evidence that the government in the Gambia is actually involved in offset contracts and programmes, be it in the defence or other sectors. It is highly unlikely that the country engages in offset contracts given the small size of its defence budget.

Peer Reviewer 1: Upon reconsideration, comments edited and score adjusted to N/A.

Researcher4117: t is highly unlikely that the country engages in offset contracts given the small size of its defence budget.

Peer Reviewer 1: Upon reconsideration, comments edited and score adjusted to N/A.

Researcher4117: Intermediaries are allowed to be used but they need to be specified and must be approved by the procurement authority (GPPR s. 17) and procurement officers are prohibited from acting as agents post-employment (GPPR s. 144). The 2003 rules further specific that a bidder that uses any brokers or intermediaries must provide copies of countries relating thereto (s. 37(1)(d)). There is no specific vetting or scrutiny of intermediaries beyond these provisions. The updated Gambia Public Procurement Act of 2014 does not address intermediaries.

There are no publicly available examples of intermediaries being used, however, in procurement, and, consequently, nor any evidence of enforcement of these provisions.

There are media reports of active training programs of government officials on procurement policies, which may cover the use of intermediaries and brokers (Nyockeh 2015).

Peer Reviewer 2. Agree. Comment updated and source added.

Researcher4117: According to NISAT, there has been multiple smaller small arms transfers into the Gambia under the present country and, according to SIPRI, the here been a transfer of patrol boats from Taiwan. I have been able to find media reports about the latter only, and these appears to be donations from the government of Taiwan (Hsiu-chuan 2013). There is thus no information about the financing package on any arms deals.

Researcher4117: GPPA and GPPR does not require anti-corruption programs on part of contracts or sub-contractors. There is no evidence that corruption is encouraged informally, beyond generic statements by the political leadership that corruption needs to be eliminated in all facets of life. For example, at a speech in July, 2014, President Jammeh reportedly said that &quoute;Corruption and greed have become some of the main challenges to our efforts to develop this country, and we are committed to eradicating them without mercy, and by any means” (&quoute;National Anti-Corruption...&quoute;

Informants were not willing to discuss possible corruption in procurement as they were concerned with the political sensitivity of the matter or, in the case of Interview 2, simply bemoaned the lack of information available to them on this issue.

Researcher4117: According to SIPRI, The Gambia has had very few reported imports of arms since the 1994 military coup. This includes an aircraft from Georgia and second-hand patrol boats given by the Republic of China (Taiwan). The latter might be linked to political influence-peddling given that the Gambia at the time was one of only a handful of countries in sub-Saharan Africa that recognized Taiwan (over China). I have not been able to get any information about the Georgian aircraft, though it is unlikely that Georgia was able to provide pressure compelling the Gambia to purchase from them.

NISAT presents a broader range of purchases. Since 1994, the Gambia has imported small arms, parts, and ammunition from Austria, Belgium, China, Czech Republic, European Union, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, and United States. Several of the reported transfers are classified as &quoute;sporting & hunting shotguns&quoute; or &quoute;sporting rifles&quoute; or are of a very low monetary value, suggesting civilian imports. Major arms purchases include grenade launchers and flame throwers from the USA in 2011, 300,000 worth of parts & accessories from the UK in 1991, and a series of large arms transfers from Czech Republic between 2000-2011. Given the lack of reporting on these arms transfers in the local media and the paucity of public discussion by government agents of these trades, it is impossible to know whether any kind of political influence was exercised.