Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no indication of controls over assets disposals in defence and security documents in Zambia. In fact, there is no law or any rules of procedure that requires Zambian defence officials or MPs to declare their assets and business interests for the sake of transparency and integrity (African Parliamentary Index 2012)
Given the lack of transparency in budgets, there is a risk of corruption in asset disposals.

In the Report of the Auditor General on the accounts for the financial year ended 31st December 2013, it was noted, with regards to the Ministry of Defence, that 'Contrary to Public Stores Regulations No. 16, various stores items costing K11,096,168 (General Stores - K10,334,188; Fuel – K757,947 and Drugs K4,033) procured during the period under review could not be accounted for in that there were no disposal details.'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: A report by the African Parliamentary Index (API) (2012) suggests that 'The budgeting system in Zambia is audited by the office of the Auditor General who verifies whether funds have been spent on the authorised items; also verifies any under or over spending, misappropriation, theft; and whether resources have been utilised efficiently or not. Experience has shown that this stage takes a long time and reports from the Auditor General only come out at least a year after the budget period under review.' The API report further notes that 'The role of Parliament in the budget process in Zambia has been seen as ineffectual.

The submissions from witnesses especially those representing NGOs, CSOs and professional associations, to Parliament’s Expanded Estimates Committee, have born no positive results after submissions have been presented to Parliament’s plenary. This is due to the absence of any real authority on the part of Parliamentary oversight committees to scrutinise and approve the budget figures.'

There is no direct evidence that links the PAC/CNSFA to asset disposal scrutiny in defence establishments. The PAC has a specific mandate under the standing orders of Parliament and as such cannot initiate an investigation into any matter of public interest. The PAC only makes recommendations to the Executive who are expected to enforce (API 2012).

There is no clear evidence that asset disposals are scrutinised by any of the aforementioned bodies, however, and the score has been selected accordingly.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: It is difficult to determine the percentage of defence and security expenditure in the Zambian budget year dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and intelligence services as the government provides the public with very little information on the national government’s defence budget and financial activities during the course of the budget year.

The government provides the public with basic, aggregate information on allocations to defence institutions. Information is usually available through media sources. For example, in an document entitled 'Analysis of Zambia 2013 Budget: Revenue and Expenditure,' Zambia Reports (October 12, 2012) stated that, 'The defence sector will get K2.034 trillion while public order and safety will get K1.34 trillion with the education sector getting K5.62 trillion of which K663.3 billion will be spent on infrastructure development.'

Military expenditure (% of GDP) in Zambia was measured at 1.71 in 2010, according to the World Bank.
MilitaryBudget.com, citing SIPRI.org, claims that Zambia spent $319,000,000 on its military in 2012 which translates to 1.6% of the country’s GDP that year. Over the last 12 years, Zambia has spent $2,342,000,000 on military expenditure.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The main source of budget information in Zambia is the annual Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, also known as the 'Yellow Book'. The Ministry of Finance and National Planning prints a draft Yellow Book which is discussed by Cabinet. After Cabinet has approved it, it is then presented as a ‘final’ document to Parliament. Information contained in the Yellow Book for the budget year expenditure in Zambia is generally incomplete and unreliable. It is often poorly classified and too outdated to be useful or reliable.

Information on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence is either inadequate or entirely absent. The Legislatures’ ability to effectively engage with the budget is undermined by poor, unreliable and untimely budget information and insufficient in-house research capacity (World Bank, online resource). Even when the defence budget is presented to parliament for scrutiny and approval, it is never referred to the two committees for comments and input (API 2012).

The Zambian parliament is not provided with full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence (African Parliamentary Index 2012) but there appears to be some aggregated information provided (Open Budget Index 2010).

According to the Open Budget Index 2010, audit reports on secret items are presented to legislators but there is no debate on secret items.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Audit reports of government accounts (2003-2013), carried out by the Office of the Auditor General, are available online (http://www.ago.gov.zm/report.html). These audit reports are fairly detailed and extend to annual accounts of the security sector. In the Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the financial year ended 31st December 2013, a total provision of K933,818,457 was made to cater for various programmes under the Zambia Army against which amounts totalling K1,072,252,501 were released resulting in an overfunding of K138,434 ,044. In the Estimate of Revenue and Expenditure for the financial year ended 31st December 2013, a provision of K581,063,781 was made to cater for various activities at the Zambia Air Force (ZAF) against which K617,536,943 was released resulting in an over funding of K36,473,162 which was not supported by a supplementary provision (full report available online - REPORT of the AUDITOR GENERAL ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 2013).

The PAC is also one of the oversight committees of Parliament that scrutinises the budget after implementation. As such, the audit activities of the PAC is likely to extend to review of expenditure on secret items (African Parliamentary Index 2012). The African Parliamentary Index (API) report notes that 'The PAC has power to subpoena witnesses and documents for all users of public funds including Ministers and this is backed by law as provided in Standing Orders and the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act, CAP 12 of the Laws of Zambia. This instrument provides for proceedings to be held in public except for matters bordering on national security. PAC reviews all standard audit reports in a timely manner while performance Audit Reports are sent to relevant portfolio committees.' The PAC only makes recommendations to the Executive who are expected to enforce them.

According to the Open Budget Index 2010, audit reports on secret items are presented to legislators but there is no debate on secret items.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence to suggests that off-budget expenditures are permitted by law. Also, these are not recorded by the government or reported on in audit reports (Office of the Auditor General, Audit Reports - 2003-2013).

In 2013, the Zambian Parliament approved a K9.3 billion supplementary budget for the 2013 Budget to enable Government execute developmental projects and other statutory obligation expenditures for the year under review (Times of Zambia, 17 December 2013).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Public evidence suggests that there are considerable off-budget military spending and there is evidence this involves illicit economic activity in Zambia (interview).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security does not appear to be mentioned in law. Information gathered from the interviewee suggests that national security appears to be a preferred tool by which government in Zambia illegitimately suppress the free flow of information and ideas.

In Zambia, the mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security are not subject to effective scrutiny, nor are they open to public debate. They are strictly the preserve of the Executive (the President). There is an apprehension in the government that if defence and intelligence budgetary allocations were exposed by being debated in Parliament, the country’s enemies would be in a position to assess and undermine Zambia’s defence capabilities (interview).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Public evidence in Zambia suggests that defence institutions generally own commercial businesses such as football clubs or pubs, and this is publicly known. The ownership of commercial businesses is not publicly declared. According to the African Parliamentary Index (API) (2012) report, there is no law or any rules of procedure in Zambia that requires defence officials or MPs to declare their assets and business interests for the sake of transparency.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that the auditor general, or the Office of the Auditor General, audits such businesses owned by the military.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The laws of Zambia, specifically the Defence Act, are mute on the issue of unauthorised private enterprise by the military. There is no evidence that the government publicly discourages private enterprise for military or defence staff. The interviewee, however, suggests that there are no serious consequences for defence ministry employees who engage in private enterprise.

There is some available evidence that points to the direct involvement of government officials in illegal (Elephant and Rhino) poaching activity, that undermine the effectiveness of anti-poaching laws. One report remarked: ‘members of the Zambian military and police units, also suffering from income declines, possess… the weapons and authority to support a great deal of illegal hunting activity.’ A report by the Zambia Wildlife Conservation Society found well-documented incidents of army personnel setting up roadblocks at game park entrances. Army vehicles, laden with mean and tusks, would be seen driving away later. Even if not directly poaching, soldiers and police regularly allowed other Zambians to rent, purchase, or borrow official weapons and ammunition.’ There are also allegations of Chinese diplomats involved in cartels with rogue military officials in Zambia in exporting ivory to China.

In April 2012, The Zambian Economist reported that 'Three former defence service chiefs were arrested last week and jointly charged with theft by public servant involving K1.5 billion meant for defence operations during and after last September’s tripartite elections. The three are former Zambia Army commander, former Zambia Air Force commander and former Zambia National Service commander.' Former Zambia Air Force commander has been convicted of theft, and faces a possible 15 year jail term. Lieutenant General was found guilty of pocketing around K1, 500, 000 that was earmarked for covert security ahead of 2011 elections. A Lusaka court found two other top brass – former Zambia Army commander and former Zambia National Service (ZNS) commander – not guilty on the same charges.

In general, it appears that the Zambian government does not explicitly outlaw private enterprise by military officials.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: While corruption is still perceived as widespread and systemic in Zambia (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center 2014), some efforts have been made in recent years to tackle the scourge in government institutions.

In 2012, Zambia achieved full compliant status with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which aims at ensuring transparency in payments by extractive industry companies to governments and government-linked entities. Also in 2012, the Anti-Corruption Commission Act came into force. The Act reintroduced an abuse of office clause, which has since been used to bring legal proceedings against a number of officials from former governments (Business Anti-Corruption Portal 2014).

President Michael Sata (2011-2014) set out this direction in his inaugural speech to Parliament: 'I am sounding a timely warning that my Government has taken a zero tolerance against corruption in both the public and private sectors. Those who allow themselves to engage in corruption must know that they are taking a serious risk and that once caught they will be prosecuted irrespective of their status or position' (Zambian Economist 2013).

However, civil society groups have lashed out in criticism of the late Zambian President, arguing that he has gone soft on corruption compared to his bold campaign promises (Zambian Reports 2012). The Coalition for the Defence of Democratic Rights (CDDR) has also accused the Zambian government of exercising “double standards” when it comes to issues of media coverage of its anti-corruption fight, as political opponents are frequently smeared in the pro-government media while state officials are untouchable (Zambian Reports 2012).

On May 16, 2012, Lusakatimes.com featured an article entitled 'There will be no corruption in Zambia Army’s recruitment programmes-Army spokesperson.' Therein, the Zambian army announced that there will be no corruption and nepotism in its recruitment programmes, contrary to information filtering in the media that such exercises are marred by corruption and nepotism'&quoute;

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Defence Act makes provisions in Part V for the Discipline and Trial and Punishment of Military Service. This includes punishment of officers, ranging from suspension and dismissal to imprisonment for corruption and bribery related crimes. However, public evidence suggests that these provisions are highly ineffective in curbing corruption in the Ministry of Defence.

That said, Zambia has witnessed an unprecedented campaign in the fight against corruption since the coming to power of President Levy Mwanawasa in 2001. There have been high profile cases involving former senior government officials, including former President Fredrick Chiluba, which have been prosecuted before the Zambian courts. Notwithstanding these efforts, there has not been a dramatic improvement in the public perception of anti-corruption efforts over the past years. Grand and petty corruption remains widespread and systemic in the country, and often implicates junior and senior defence or government officials (Source 5).

The penalties for members of the police and armed forces found to have sold or rented their firearms to civilians are strict, although unspecified by law. These include dismissal, fine and/or imprisonment, depending on the seriousness of the offence. Normally, the police and armed forces do not report internal firearm losses, citing security reasons, since under the State Securities Act alarming the public is a criminal offence

In April 2012, The Zambian Economist reported that 'Three former defence service chiefs were arrested last week and jointly charged with theft by public servant involving K1.5 billion meant for defence operations during and after last September’s tripartite elections. The three are former Zambia Army commander, former Zambia Air Force commander and former Zambia National Service commander.' Former Zambia Air Force commander has been convicted of theft, and faces a possible 15 year jail term. Lieutenant General was found guilty of pocketing around K1, 500, 000 that was earmarked for covert security ahead of 2011 elections. A Lusaka court found two other top brass – former Zambia Army commander and former Zambia National Service (ZNS) commander – not guilty on the same charges.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is some evidence that government institutions are beginning to encourage whistleblowers in general. For example, on 12 March 2014, the Times of Zambia reported that the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) has instituted legal proceedings against the Rural Electrification Authority (REA) for terminating employment of three employees who reported suspected corrupt activities at the institution.

ACC public relations manager said REA had been charged with unlawful reprisal contrary to section 46 as read with section 18 (c) (III) of the Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistle-blowers) Act No. 4 of 2010 of the Laws of Zambia.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is very little evidence that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions in Zambia. The President appears to make most of the decisions regarding the appointment of senior officials to defence positions.

Section III(9) of the Defence Act states that ‘No person shall be granted a commission in the Defence Force unless he has been recommended by a selection board which shall be established for this purpose by the President.’ The members of the Defence Council are also appointed by the President who has the power to ‘co-opt any other person as a member of the Defence Council from time to time as he may decide.’

The researcher could not establish any indication that there is recognition that some positions may be more susceptible to corruption than others

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Official government data on the number of civilian and military personnel is not publicly accessible.

Available statistics from the National Master show that Zambia’s armed forces personnel amounted to 22,000 in the year 2000; its paramilitary personnel amounted to 1,400 in 2014; and its personnel amounted to 16,000 as at 2005. There is hardly any recent reliable information to suggest that the number of civilian and military personnel is accurately known and publicly available in Zambia.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no available evidence in Zambia to suggest that pay rates and allowances for military personnel and civilian are openly published or publicly available. Zambia’s Employment Act does not offer much in this regard.

Interviews conducted with military personnel by Zambia Reports (in April 2014) suggest that they are very unhappy with the recent wage freezes, which they say has negatively affected morale among the troops. The report further suggests that both soldiers and officers in the barracks were upset that there would be no promotions and salary increments among the ranks in the foreseeable future. The source further noted that the military fraternity are also not happy at the way some senior army officers were retired when the Patriotic Front (PF) government assumed power in 2011.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The interviewee suggested that defence personnel generally earn poor salaries that cannot cater for their basic needs, especially those in the junior ranks.

Interviews conducted with military personnel by Zambia Reports (in April 2014) suggest that they are very unhappy with the recent wage freezes, which they say has negatively affected morale among the troops. The report further suggests that both soldiers and officers in the barracks were upset that there would be no promotions and salary increments among the ranks in the foreseeable future. The source further noted that the military fraternity are also not happy at the way some senior army officers were retired when the Patriotic Front (PF) government assumed power in 2011.

In addition, an examination of accounting and other records at the Ministry of Defence headquarters, ZAF and physical inspections of selected projects in Livingstone, Mumbwa, Kabwe, Mbala, Ndola and Chamba Valley carried out from August to September 2014 revealed that 'Contrary to Terms and Conditions of Service for the Public Service No. 92, recoveries in respect of special and salary advances amounting to K420,000 paid to one hundred and eleven (111) officers during the period under review had not been effected as of November 2014' (see Report of the Auditor General on the Accounts for the Financial Year Ended 31st December 2013).

The system of payment does not appear to be well-established, routine or publicised.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is an Officers Selection Board which is established by the President for the purpose of selecting military personnel at middle and top management level. The interviewee suggests that this process is fraught with nepotism and/or favouritism. There is no evidence that the Officers Selection Board follow a system for appointments that is made available to the public.

On May 16, 2012, Lusakatimes.com featured an article entitled 'There will be no corruption in Zambia Army’s recruitment programmes-Army spokesperson.' Therein, the Zambian army announced that there will be no corruption and nepotism in its recruitment programmes, contrary to information filtering in the media that such exercises are marred by corruption and nepotism. In July 2010 the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ) passed a vote of no confidence in Government's commitment to fight corruption (Lusakatimes.com).

In 2012, the Zambia Daily Mail published an article in which it called for the involvement of detectives in Zambia's defence recruitment process. The newspaper noted that an uproar has been raised by members of the public regarding the recent recruitment exercises for the Zambia Air Force, Zambia Army, the Zambia National Service and the Zambia Police officers, bordering on the possible involvement of ‘underhand’ methods in the enrolments. The article called on the he Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to 'get down to the core of the allegations by following through the entire recruitment process. This should start with examining the original lists of applicants and the criteria used for shortlisting, right up to the final lists of the recruited officers.'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Available evidence, especially from the media, suggests that the process of promotion in the Zambian defence service is neither meritocratic nor objective.

There is an Officers Selection Board which is established by the President for the purpose of selecting military personnel at middle and top management level. However evidence from interviewee suggests that this process is fraught with nepotism and/or favouritism.

One of the key problems is the informality of the process and the lack of independent oversight.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: In Zambia, there is no compulsory military service in the armed forces and the country has never had any since achieving independence. However, Zambia has another form of conscription, the Zambian National Service (ZNS), which involves three months’ military training.

The ZNS is not compulsory. The Zambia National Service Chapter 136 of the Laws of Zambia (PART III MEMBERS, SERVICEMEN, REGISTRATION, ENLISTMENT, ETC) states the following:

'4. (1) The Service shall consist of such number of members
as may, from time to time, be determined by the President.
(2) The members of the Service shall be-
(a) persons who enlist voluntarily under section five;
(b) persons who are enlisted under section eleven;
(0) persons who are appointed to the permanent staff under
section six; and
(d) persons in the civil or military service of the Republic
who are seconded to the Service under section seventeen.'

The researcher is not aware of any existing policy for not accepting bribes to avoid the ZNS.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no conscription in Zambia.

The Zambia National Service Chapter 136 of the Laws of Zambia (PART III Members, Servicemen, Registration, Enlistment, etc) states the following:

4. (1) The Service shall consist of such number of members
as may, from time to time, be determined by the President.
(2) The members of the Service shall be-
(a) persons who enlist voluntarily under section five;
(b) persons who are enlisted under section eleven;
(0) persons who are appointed to the permanent staff under
section six; and
(d) persons in the civil or military service of the Republic
who are seconded to the Service under section seventeen.'

The researcher is not aware of any existing policy for not accepting bribes to avoid the ZNS.

Response to Peer Reviewers: Upon reconsideration, the question had been initially answered with respect to voluntary recruitment, not conscription. The score has been adjusted to N/A.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of ghost soldiers on the payroll in defence institutions in Zambia. The researcher could find no source that speaks to the phenomenon of ghost soldiers in Zambian government institutions. The opportunities for corruption in the Zambian defence sector as well as a poor payment system makes it however very likely that the phenomenon occurs (interview).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Evidence from interview and audit reports indicates that chains of command are generally separated from chains of payment. The President of Zambia is the Commander-in-chief of the armed forces and is the head of the military chain of command, assisted by civilian personnel who oversee the daily activities of the armed forces through the Ministry of Defence.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: In the Zambian Constitution, Part XIV Public Service and Commissions 267(1) states that ‘Parliament shall enact legislation to provide for the guiding values and principles of the public service.’ Part VII Code of Ethics and Conduct of Public Officers 91 states that ‘Parliament shall enact legislation to provide for the compiling and publication of a code of conduct and ethics for any profession or vocation that involves the provision of services to the public.’

The content and transparency of the Code of Conduct for the Ministry of Defence personnel is available online (see above), but vague. Inspector-General of police recently noted that ‘We are coming up with a code of ethics to guide our officers in their conduct in addition to the disciplinary code which we already have in existence… so we expect that our officers will behave in a professional manner at all times.’
The Code of Conduct covers issues of bribery and corruption.

There is no evidence that this Code of Conduct is effectively enforced in Zambia, nor is there knowledge of any system to ensure its enforcement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: In April 2012, The Zambian Economist reported that 'Three former defence service chiefs were arrested last week and jointly charged with theft by public servant involving K1.5 billion meant for defence operations during and after last September’s tripartite elections. The three are former Zambia Army commander, former Zambia Air Force commander and former Zambia National Service commander.'

The Former Zambia Air Force commander has been convicted of theft, and faces a possible 15 year jail term. The Lieutenant General was found guilty of pocketing around K1, 500, 000 that was earmarked for covert security ahead of 2011 elections. A Lusaka court found two other top brass – former Zambia Army commander and former Zambia National Service (ZNS) commander – not guilty on the same charges.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of anti-corruption training in place for officers in Zambia. Information on this issue is not available on media reports or government statements (interview).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no specific policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. However, there is some evidence of prosecutions of government officials in general in recent years.

In February 2015, for example, Reuters reported that Zambia's chief prosecutor was arrested over corruption accusations in the first high profile case since new President Edgar Lungu was elected promising to end graft. Also, the Anti- Corruption Commission published a story in the media on 4th February, 2015 titled ‘Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) Director Arrested for Corrupt Practices’. She was arrested for alleged corrupt practices committed in her former capacity as Legal and Compliance Manager at the Citizen’s Economic Empowerment Commission (CEEC). On 16th December 2014, Two officers were convicted of corruption in Kabwe. The Kabwe Magistrate’s Court on 16th December sentenced two Police Officers of Kabwe to 24 Months Imprisonment with Hard Labour for corrupt activities involving K 800. 00 Kabwe Principal Resident Magistrate found them guilty of one count of Corrupt Practices by Public Officer, contrary to Section 19(1) as read with Section 41 of the Anti-Corruption Act No. 3 of 2012.

More generally, there is some media speculation that attempted prosecutions have been suppressed in Zambia. On 13 February 2015, for example, The Jurist carried an article which was entitled 'Zambia court blocks arrest of chief prosecutor on corruption charges.' The Jurist article stated that 'In 2013 Zambian authorities arrested former president on allegations that he misappropriated over USD $11 million during his three-year tenure in office. In 2010 Zambia's Supreme Court acquitted, the wife of former Zambian president Frederick Chiluba, of charges that she accepted stolen property during the years of her husband's administration. Frederick Chiluba was acquitted in 2009 of charges of stealing money from the country's treasury while in office from 1991-2001.'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Although they are not specifically addressed in Zambian legislation, it is assumed they are illegal under the current framework for bribery and corruption.

However, the US State Department Human Rights Report 2013 states that it is common for the Zambian police to release prisoners in exchange for bribes, to extort money from victims and to require ‘document processing fees’ to commence investigations. Reportedly, the police also enjoy a high-degree of impunity.

This is supported by the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 which states the police are perceived by respondents to be the most corrupt public institution in Zambia. Public evidence from interview suggests that the occurrence of facilitation payments in Zambia is widespread (interview).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Public evidence from media reports suggests that there is a poor level of awareness of corruption as a strategic issue for operations at the level of governance and public officials (Zambia Daily Mail 2014). The modicum of military doctrine on corruption that exists rarely translates into appropriate action or conformity on the part of officers (interview). Besides a disciplinary code which is already in existence, there is no Code of Ethics available to military personnel in the conduct of peace and conflict operations.

However, Part V (35) of the Defence Act does explicitly prohibit ‘looting’ during peace and conflict operations: ‘Any person subject to military law under this Act who-(a) steals from or with intent to steal searches the person of anyone killed or wounded in the course of warlike operations; or (b) steals any property which has been left exposed or unprotected in consequence of warlike operations; or (c) takes otherwise than for the public service any vehicle, equipment or stores abandoned by the enemy; shall be guilty of looting and liable, on conviction by court-martial, to imprisonment or any less punishment provided by this Act.’

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence to support the presence of anti-corruption training for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment.

In fact, public reports from media sources suggest that many senior officers are implicated in corruption scandals in the country. Public evidence from interview also suggests that officers routinely engage in corrupt activities with impunity (Lusaka Times). In other words, very few efforts have been made by the government to punish offending officers.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is evidence from media reports which suggest that Zambia does take part in peacekeeping missions.

For example, on 25 November 2014, an article appeared in Zambia Reports with the title 'Zambian Peacekeeping Troops Lack Funds to Deploy to CAR.' The article noted that the deployment of more than 400 Zambian peacekeeping troops to the Central African Republic (CAR) is on hold largely due to funding and logistical setbacks on the part of the Zambian government.

The researcher could find no public source that addresses the regular deployment of trained professionals to monitor corruption risk during Zambia peacekeeping operations.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: In Zambia, there are very general guidelines touching on this form of corruption, but they are often incomplete and piecemeal (see the Anti-Corruption Bill).

There is no further evidence of guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There are available online reports which suggest the employment and operation of PMCs in Zambia. However, there is no evidence to suggest that they are subject to any scrutiny, and corruption is very likely to be prevalent, especially given Zambia’s corruption-prone context and the culture of silence and secrecy among government and defence officials (Interview).

The researcher could not find media reports that address corruption amongst PMCs that are active in Zambia.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Zambia does not seem to have a specific legislation that covers defence and security procurement. There is only a general legislation covering public procurement - which extends to defence services. Section 42 (1) of the Public Procurement Act No. 12 of 2008 mandates each procuring entity to plan its procurements. In particular, the Act states that 'a procuring entity shall aggregate its requirements wherever possible, both within the procuring entity and between procuring, entities, to obtain value for money and reduce procurement costs; make use of rate or running contracts wherever appropriate to provide an efficient, cost effective and flexible means to procure goods, works and services that are required continuously or repeatedly over a set period of time; avoid splitting of procurement to defeat the use of appropriate procurement methods; and, integrate its expenditure programme with the procurement plan.'

The Public Procurement Act (2008) states that where procurement is conducted using open or limited bidding or selection, a draft contract shall be included in the solicitation document issued. This draft contract shall include (section 3(J)): 'information on the Government’s policy on fraud and corruption, including the suspension of bidders.'

The procurement Guidelines are applicable to all public sector procurement and derive their authority from the Zambia National Tender Board (ZNTB) Act, Cap 394 of the Laws of Zambia and any Regulations made thereunder. While the ZNTB is expected to enforce procurement rules, in practice it is liberal in permitting exceptions and allowing negotiations to replace clear procurement guidelines.

Public evidence obtained from media reports suggest that the procurement process is fraught with corruption and undue influence from government. In October 2013, a senior officer in the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA) issued a statement that politicians' interference in the public procurement process which was making it difficult to fight corruption. The details he had seem not to have been passed on to the ACC to pursue further. The Times of Zambia notes that 'It is this desire to issue statements rather than report to the ACC which prevent the general public from thinking that there is anything to expect in the ZPPA.'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that the defence procurement cycle is disclosed or formalised. The government withholds information related to defence and the security forces from the public for reasons of national security.

Zambia has little or no freedom of information law in place and there is an unwillingness on the part of the government to provide the public with access to available information on defence and security procurement.

In the Report of the Auditor General on the accounts for the financial year ended 31st December 2013, it was noted, with regards to the Ministry of Defence, that 'Contrary to Public Stores Regulations No. 16, various stores items costing K11,096,168 (General Stores - K10,334,188; Fuel – K757,947 and Drugs K4,033) procured during the period under review could not be accounted for in that there were no disposal details.'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The CNSFA oversee operations of the Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs. Specifically the functions of the CNSFA include: '(i) study, report and make recommendations to the Government through the House on the mandate, management and operations of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs, departments and/or agencies under their portfolios; (ii) carry out detailed scrutiny of certain activities being undertaken by the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, departments and/or agencies under their portfolio and make appropriate recommendations to the House for ultimate consideration by the Government; (iii) make, if considered necessary, recommendations to the Government on the need to review certain policies and/or certain existing legislation; and (iv) consider any Bills that may be referred to them by the House' (Report of the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 2006).

There is limited Parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sector, as this is seen as the preserve of the Executive (President) (3).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Actual and potential defence purchases are rarely made public in Zambia. Part II 13(1) of the Zambia National Tender Board clearly states that ‘No person shall, without the consent in writing given by or on behalf of the Board, publish or disclose to any person, otherwise than in the course of his duties, the contents of any documents, communication or information whatsoever, which relates to, and which has come to his knowledge in the course of, his duties under this Act.’

In 2013, the Zambian government made public its intention to buy arms from Brazil and stock them in barracks. Notably, The minister did not say how much will be spent and where the money will also be acquired through another Eurobond (African Watchdog April 14 2013).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Government requires that Procuring Entities (including beneficiaries of the funds), as well as Bidders, Suppliers, Contractors, and Consultants under Government-financed contracts, observe the highest standard of ethics during the procurement and execution of such contracts.

The law requires certification of availability of funds before solicitation of tenders, and there is a system in place to check this. These requirements are to be found in standard company law. There is no evidence that companies need to sign 'no-corruption' clauses in contracts with the governments; however, the government does make reference to the need for companies to avoid corruption.

There are no standard bidding documents for the procurement of goods, services or works.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Zambia practices Activity Based Budgeting, and while procurement is part of the country’s financial management system, procurement planning is not part of the budgeting process.In Zambia, there is no supporting evidence of an overarching national defence and security strategy that guides the formulation of procurement requirements. The major concern is the lack of procurement planning for government and defence procurements. The annual budget is based on activities for ministries (Ministry of Finance 2013). The major factor that affects planning is that the release of funds from the Ministry of Finance and national planning is very slow (interview).

The procurement Guidelines are applicable to all public sector procurement and derive their authority from the Zambia National Tender Board (ZNTB) Act, Cap 394 of the Laws of Zambia and any Regulations made thereunder. While the ZNTB is expected to enforce procurement rules, in practice it is liberal in permitting exceptions and allowing negotiations to replace clear procurement guidelines.

Public evidence obtained from media reports suggest that the procurement process is fraught with corruption and undue influence from government. The Times of Zambia, for example, articulated certain corrupt weaknesses discovered in the Zambia National Tender Board, which was replaced by the Zambia Public Procurement Authority, the new Act No 12 of 2008 restated the principal objectives thus: 'To revise the law relating to procurement so as to ensure transparency and accountability in public procurement; regulate and control practices relating to public procurement in order to promote the integrity of, fairness and public confidence in, the procurement process.' In October 2013, a senior officer in the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA) issued a statement that politicians' interference in the public procurement process which was making it difficult to fight corruption. The details he had seem not to have been passed on to the ACC to pursue further. The Times of Zambia notes that 'It is this desire to issue statements rather than report to the ACC which prevent the general public from thinking that there is anything to expect in the ZPPA.'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is likely to be a formalised procedure for the quantification of requirements in defence procurement. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is an independent oversight body that considers reports through the auditor-general on defence expenditure/purchases. The PAC has effectively taken on the responsibility of scrutinising how money it approves is expended by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). To complement the role of the PAC in providing checks and balances to the executive in general, and the MoD in particular, parliament has empowered the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs (CNSFA), formerly the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to institute oversight on policy matters. Parliamentary oversight of military budget is generally weak. The internal audit service is presented across government and a consolidated annual work program is produced and costed. Internal audit reports, which include recommended actions, are sent to the relevant Controlling Officer in the line ministry and the office of the Internal Auditor. There appears to be a system for tracking implementation and there is evidence that some recommendations are being adopted, particular in auditing arrears.

An examination of accounting and other records maintained at the Zambia Army Headquarters and physical inspections of selected projects carried out in May 2014 revealed some useful information. A review of accounting and related documents revealed that from 2012 to 2014, a total amount of K2,249,599 Government funds had been spent on the construction of a banquet hall for defence services in Zambia. However, the project was not budgeted for in the 2013 Budget and the source of funds for the expenditure of K2,249,599 incurred in 2013 could not be explained as of October 2014. The report also stated that although the building was in use, as of September 2014, the Ministry of Works and Supply had not certified the works as complete and ready for occupation (Auditor General's Report for 2013).

In addition, on 20th December 2012, Easi Build Ltd was engaged to supply, construct and erect reticulation services, electrical, sewerage and fresh water for three (3) bedroomed houses at Mushili, Ndola at a contract sum of K447,592 with a completion period of four (4)months. As of December 2013, the contractor had been paid amounts totalling K220,000. However, the following were observed: 'i. Failure to Follow Procurement Procedures Contrary to the provisions of the ZPPA Act, the Army did not obtain a ‘No
Objection’ from the ZPPA for the single sourced contractor.193 ii. Failure to Obtain Stage Completion Certificates Although the contractor was paid K220,000 for the works done, no stage completion certificates were availed for audit to support the payment. iii. Irregular Variation of Works Although the contractor was engaged to do water reticulation works, it was observed that the contractor was constructing three prefabrication houses and no variation orders were availed for audit' (Auditor General's Report for 2013)

In the Estimate of Revenue and Expenditure for the financial year ended 31st December 2013, a provision of K581,063,781 was made to cater for various activities at the Zambia Air Force (ZAF) against which K617,536,943 was released resulting in an over funding of K36,473,162 which was not supported by a supplementary provision (Auditor General's Report 2013).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Zambia’s public procurement regulations require that contracts should be awarded following an open tender to the public, under which all qualified bidders are invited to participate, enabling the government to compare prices and solutions.

However, allegations of single-sourcing of defence procurement are widespread in Zambia. The African Parliamentarian Network against Corruption (APNAC) recently accused the Zambian government of single sourcing the supply of CCTV cameras systems which are to be installed on most streets in Lusaka. Reports suggest that, without openly advertising, the government picked a firm to supply the equipment, reportedly worth over US$210 million. It is believed that the government used the law which allows them to choose a supplier of security and defence equipment secretly without advertising, but critics allege that the purchase of CCTV made by Home Affairs is for civilian purposes like traffic monitoring and cannot be classified under the secrecy law.

Allegations of single sourcing are widespread in defence services in Zambia, according to media reports. In December 2012, Think Africa Press featured an article which detailed attacks against then Minister of Defence by the Post newspaper, accusing him of pressuring the public utility ZESCO to award contracts to his company. The Minister then resigned in 2013.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is an independent oversight body that considers reports through the auditor-general on defence expenditure/purchases. The PAC has effectively taken on the responsibility of scrutinising how money it approves is expended by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). To complement the role of the PAC in providing checks and balances to the executive in general, and the MoD in particular, parliament has empowered the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs (CNSFA), formerly the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to institute oversight on policy matters. Parliamentary oversight of military budget is generally weak and incapacitated.

The Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA), formerly the Zambia National Tender Board, was established in December 2008 under the Public Procurement Act No 12 of 2008. The ZPPA is an independent regulatory body with responsibility for policy, regulation, standard setting, compliance and performance monitoring, professional development and information management and dissemination in the field of public procurement (ZPPA 2014)

While the ZPPA is expected to enforce procurement rules, in practice it is liberal in permitting exceptions and allowing negotiations to replace clear procurement guidelines. In October 2013, a senior officer in the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA) issued a statement that politicians' interference in the public procurement process which was making it difficult to fight corruption. The details he had seem not to have been passed on to the ACC to pursue further. The Times of Zambia notes that 'It is this desire to issue statements rather than report to the ACC which prevent the general public from thinking that there is anything to expect in the ZPPA.'

In October 2013, a senior officer in the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA) issued a statement that politicians' interference in the public procurement process which was making it difficult to fight corruption. The details he had seem not to have been passed on to the ACC to pursue further. The Times of Zambia notes that 'It is this desire to issue statements rather than report to the ACC which prevent the general public from thinking that there is anything to expect in the ZPPA.'

There is no evidence of tender board procedures in defence procurement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no knowledge of any national law specific to defence procurement that outlaws collusion. Collusion does not appear to be actively discouraged by the government as evidence by the lack of relevant government statements in public media against collusion.

However, Section 24 of the Public Procurement Act 2008 approves of the cancellation of procurement proceedings whenever possible when there is evidence of collusion between bidders. The Zambia Procurement Authority Public Act states that the government ‘will reject a proposal for award if it determines that the Bidder recommended for award has, directly or through an agent, engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive or coercive practices in competing for the Contract in question; will cancel the portion of the funds allocated to a contract if it determines at any time that representatives of the Procuring Entity or of a beneficiary of the funds engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive or coercive practices during the procurement or the execution of that contract, without the Procuring Entity having taken timely and appropriate action satisfactory to the Government to remedy the situation.’

In practice, enforcement of measures to punish colluding companies is likely to be only weakly enforced.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Zambian government adopted the Public Procurement Action Plan in 1996, which aimed to develop the human resources of the public procurement system along with decentralising procurement to various ministries and agencies and strengthening audit and oversight function. However, public evidence suggests that the public procurement system is undermined by poor capacity and performance. Assessment reviews by the World Bank suggest limited training for procurement staff.

Previous reforms suggested that the Zambian National Tender Board (ZNTB) provided training and money has been allocated for training of staff towards the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS) diploma. The assessor cannot confirm this is still the case.

Information on staff training and organisation into a professional staff department could not be gleaned from the official website of the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA). Several reports and surveys indicate that corruption in procurement and contracting in Zambia is not uncommon. The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 states it is common for government officials to favour well-connected companies and individuals when awarding contracts. The Investment Climate Statement 2013 also notes that government procurement is one of the areas where corruption is common. Companies are recommended to use a specialised public procurement due diligence tool in order to mitigate the corruption risks associated with public procurement in Zambia (Business Anti-Corruption Portal 2014).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The complaints system structure and sequence for companies is non-existent, or at most ambiguous. This is derived from the Zambian National Tender Board Act.

There is no evidence to suggest that companies would be disadvantaged in future procurements if they attempt to complain (Zambian Public Procurement Authority - Official Website).

On Investigation of complaints and applications for review or appeal, the Public Procurement Act (2008) states in section 179. (1) that 'A review or appeals panel shall, in hearing a complaint or application for review or appeal, consider— (a) the information contained in the written complaint or application for review or appeal; (b) supplementary information requested from or submitted by the applicant, in writing; (c) information obtained through an examination of the relevant procurement records; (d) written comments provided by the procuring entity;(e) information submitted by other bidders; (f) information obtained by examining staff of the procuring entity, the applicant, or any other relevant parties through means of statements or a hearing; (g) additional information or statements from other parties as may be necessary for the fair resolution of the complaint or application; (h) confidential information provided by the controlling officer, or chief executive officer; and (i) any other relevant information.'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Zambia’s Public Procurement Act provides for breaches, ranging from rejecting a bid proposal to cancelling the portion of the funds allocated to a contract and declaring a firm ineligible for future bids, sometimes indefinitely. A bidder or supplier aggrieved by such a decision may appeal in accordance with Section sixty-nine of the Public Procurement Act of 2008 ((Zamtel 2014).

However, public evidence obtained from interview suggests that there is particular concern about the lack of enforcement of the provisions of the procurement legal and regulatory framework by the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA). The result of this is poor compliance by companies and suppliers leading to mis-procurements, increasing opportunities for corrupt practices (CSPR Zambia 2013).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: No evidence could be found that the government is involved in offset contracts.

The researcher could not find evidence that the Zambian government specifically addresses corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors. A report by KPMG Zambia notes that 'Government does not impose &quoute;offset&quoute; requirements or impose conditions on permission to invest in specific geographic area or local content, but investors are encouraged to employ local nationals.&quoute;

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of specific legislation against offset contracts. That said, there is the possibility that Zambia engages in offsets contracts only that details of these engagements are not disclosed.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that offset contracts are subject to any level of competition regulation in Zambia. The Competition and Fair Trading Act of 1994 came into force in Zambia on 15th February 1995. The Act concerns agreements and concerted practices of enterprises and organisations that are appreciably anti-competitive, and the abuse of market power by enterprises that are dominant. The Zambia Competition Commission (ZCC) was established in May 1997 as a Statutory Body Corporate with perpetual succession. Its main function is to monitor, control and prohibit acts or behaviours which are likely to adversely affect competition and fair trading in Zambia.

Private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 reported that when making contracts, government officials favoured well-connected companies.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Public evidence obtained from interview suggests that the government of Zambia lacks an effective control on the use of agents and intermediaries in the contractual process. Moreover, the U4 Anti-Corruption Research Centre reported that unofficial payments and gifts to obtain government contracts were widespread in Zambia.

The Zambia Procurement Authority Public Act states that the government ‘will reject a proposal for award if it determines that the Bidder recommended for award has, directly or through an agent, engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive or coercive practices in competing for the Contract in question.

Information obtained from interview suggests that the government of Zambia lacks an effective control on the use of agents and intermediaries in the contractual process. Moreover, the U4 Anti-Corruption Research Centre reported that unofficial payments and gifts to obtain government contracts were widespread in Zambia

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Details of financial packaging around arms deals are not made publicly available in Zambia. The researcher could not access information on whether a financial package exists at all. This is in line with the country’s record of failing to make relevant information accessible to the public and civil society organisations on the grounds of national security.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Zambian government does not require the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes.

However there is evidence that the law does make provisions against corrupt practices by contractors. The Zambia Procurement Authority Act states that the government ‘will reject a proposal for award if it determines that the Bidder recommended for award has, directly or through an agent, engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive or coercive practices in competing for the Contract in question; will cancel the portion of the funds allocated to a contract if it determines at any time that representatives of the Procuring Entity or of a beneficiary of the funds engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive or coercive practices during the procurement or the execution of that contract, without the Procuring Entity having taken timely and appropriate action satisfactory to the Government to remedy the situation.’

In the World Bank’s 2007 World Enterprise Survey, the most recent available for Zambia, 27.4 percent of manufacturing firms in Zambia expected to give gifts to secure government contracts.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Media reports suggest that Zambia government does justify defence purchases based on military need . In 2013, the Zambian Watchdog reported that Zambian government is preparing to buy arms from Brazil and stock them in barracks. The report contrasted this action of the government with that of previous governments, arguing that previous governments refused to buy arms because the country is not at war and preferred to channel the money to needy areas such as health and education.

In 2013 the Zambian government embarked on a programme to modernise the three defences services, which saw the acquisition of technologically advanced equipment from countries like Brazil and China. Under the programme, the government aimed to upgrade equipment ranging from radar and communication systems to transport and various other types of military equipment.

Zambia has also recently borrowed US$19.5 million from China to resume making bombs, bullets and gunpowder at a military location in Serenje district. Although China's relationship with Zambia dates back to the building of the Zambia to Tanzania Railway in the 1970s, it is in the last 10 years that Sino-Zambian trade has really taken off, growing from just $100m (£63m) in 2000 to $2.8bn in 2010 (BBC News Africa 2011).