Jordan

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Asset disposal is perhaps the biggest area of concern with respect to corruption within the defence and security establishment. The Jordanian Armed Forces’ industrial conglomerate the King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau/KADDB, receives significant funding from the government ($12 million/year as of 2008, the only year for which a figure is available), and in recent years has reportedly signed tens of millions of dollars in arms export contracts (mostly at the annual state-sponsored Special Operations Forces Exhibition/SOFEX trade fair) yet neither KADDB’s subsidies nor its profits appear in the official government budget. Many sales are reported in press releases prepared by professional public relations firms, industry organizations, and defence-trade publications, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and IHS Global Insight, both of which have agreements with KADDB to promote the latter’s business operations. This makes information available on an ad-hoc basis, but this is clearly in the interests of commercial promotion, not part of an official effort to make comprehensive information available to the Jordanian public.

According to statistics available from the UN Comtrade Database compiled by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, since 2000 Jordan has exported small arms and ammunition to: Cyprus, Greece, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the UK, Hong Kong, the Ivory Coast, Canada, the United States, and Yemen. The UN figures are based on information collected from Jordanian customs. (The US, UK, Canada, Greece and Switzerland were also primary destinations for members of the Jordanian Procurement Directorate during this same period, although that does not necessarily indicate corrupt activity, it may suggest that some reciprocity is expected in defence-related trade).

The re-sale of old equipment (such as the recent sale of 12 F-16 jets to Pakistan); and income from projects carried out by the military’s other commercial operations (Mawared and the Development Investment Projects fund/DIP, both of which are primarily involved in commercial and residential development using land that was previously reserved for military purposes but is now extremely valuable suburban real estate), also generate substantial revenues. None of these revenues generated by these entities is published, and they are not included on the list of entities subjected to audit by the Audit Bureau. This is despite the fact that they meet the 50% threshold for government ownership that should trigger an official audit and their employees meet the definition of ‘public sector’ worker that should, in theory, subject them to the same legal code applied to state officials. Several high-profile real estate development projects carried out by Mawared and DIP have been heavily scrutinized in the media, and a number of officials involved in these projects have been prosecuted in the State Security Court on charges of corruption and sentenced to jail time.

The only reference I could find to the “scrapping/recycling” of weapons material was that in 2004 U.N. weapons experts found 20 engines used in banned Iraqi missiles (alongside other potentially hazardous equipment) in a Jordanian scrapyard.” The inspectors found that the only controls at the borders (at that time) were for the weight of the scrap metal and to check for explosive or radioactive material.

[Note: According to Economic Crimes Law No. 40 of 2003, employees of the following entities are considered as public officials: public institutions, ministries and government departments, lower and upper house, municipalities, rural councils and “councils of joint services”, unions and syndicates, associations and clubs, banks and public companies, specialised loan institutions, political parties, any entities that are regulated by the Law on Public Funds and any entities being funded in part by the Sate budget.]

Response tovGovernment Reviewer: Score upgraded to 2: &quoute;There are controls over asset disposals, though there may be shortcomings in the strength of these controls. There is no or only highly abbreviated public information on procedures or controls.&quoute;

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: There does not appear to be any internal auditing of the operations of the defence establishment’s commercial operations, which include KADDB, Mawared, and DIP. Nor do these entities appear on the list of institutions subjected to external audit by the Audit Bureau. Many of KADDB’s arms export sales are reported in press releases prepared by professional public relations firms, industry organizations, and defence-trade publications, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and IHS Global Insight, both of which have agreements with KADDB to promote its business operations. This makes information available on an ad-hoc basis, but this is clearly in the interests of commercial promotion, not part of an official effort to make comprehensive information available to the Jordanian public.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: There is no public information on secret budget items relating to national security and/or intelligence. According to a 2004 U.S. State Department cable published by Wikileaks, Jordanian Finance Ministry personnel reported that the absence of detail in the Public Security Directorate budget was used to obscure spending by the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). However, it is unknown how much additional expenditure is dedicated to secret items that are not hidden in the PSD budget figures.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Neither the intelligence budget nor foreign military aid is subject to any form of parliamentary oversight (El Kurd 2014). This means that, in effect, a large chunk of the defence and security budget is completely beyond the authority of the parliament. There is no permanent defence or security committee within the Jordanian parliament, and no indication that any legislative committee is given access to budgetary information regarding secret items related to national security and/or military intelligence.

Civilian oversight of defence and security budgets may increase as a result of King Abdullah’s decision in August 2014 to revive the position of Minister of Defence. The royal mandate, which took the form of a constitutional amendment, directed the government to “Transfer the non-military logistic, administrative, investment and development duties, and those not associated with specialised professional military domain from the jurisdiction of the General Command of the Jordan Armed Forces (ie, the joint chiefs of staff) to the Ministry of Defence” (Jordan Times, 2014).

This means that the military’s commercial real estate interests, investment projects, and retiree benefits program will be transferred to the authority of the Ministry of Defence. Separating these will also likely necessitate two parallel budgets, which has the possibility of enhancing the level of oversight exercised by the Audit Bureau (Sabbagh 2014). The fact that organizations and spokespersons representing the military were largely opposed to the change supports this interpretation (Sabbagh 2014).

It is too early to determine whether this will genuinely increase civilian oversight of the military and defence establishment. Under the previous system, the only time a Prime Minister was able to effect oversight of the military was if he had a background in the security services or direct personal connections to the heads of the various service branches (El Kurd 2014).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: According to the Jordanian constitution, the Audit Bureau must issue an annual report of its ongoing audits at the beginning of each Parliamentary session, and at the request of MPs; copies are also sent to the offices of the Finance Minister and the Prime Minister (who is also the Defence Minister). According to a 2004 U.S. State Department cable published by Wikileaks, military expenditures are audited by three separate entities: an internal body within the Armed Forces, The Audit Bureau, and personnel from the Office of the Financial Controller, who report any observed discrepancies between the military’s budget and its actual income and expenditures to the Ministry of Finance. The Audit Bureau maintains a team of 13 auditors permanently stationed at the military’s General Headquarters, where they monitor the different branches’ financial accounts and report irregularities to the JAF General Staff for resolution. [These auditors are housed within the Bureau’s directorate in charge of monitoring expenditures by public agencies].

However, it is unlikely that members of the Audit Bureau have access to information regarding secret budgets.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: A significant portion of Jordan’s military procurement budget is financed by aid from the U.S. and Arab Gulf countries, which is “off-budget” and not subject to any form of parliamentary oversight (El Kurd 2014). The Army’s industrial conglomerate the King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau/KADDB and its investment arm the KADDB Investment Group/KIG earns most of its revenues from Jordanian government contracts, but it operates as an independent entity able to partner with private firms and share the resulting revenues. It can spend these revenues internally without being subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

The finances of Mawared and the Development Investment Projects fund/DIP (both of which are primarily involved in commercial and residential development using land that was previously reserved for military purposes but is now extremely valuable suburban real estate) are also off-budget. None of the revenues generated by these entities is published, and they are not included on the list of entities subjected to audit by the Audit Bureau. (This is despite the fact that they meet the 50% threshold for government ownership that should trigger an official audit and their employees meet the definition of ‘public sector’ worker that should, in theory, subject them to the same legal code applied to state officials). KADDB does, however, employ individuals trained as accountants and financial managers, but whether this personnel is tasked with internal monitoring of accounts for corrupt transactions is unclear.

The fact that these entities operate as independent companies has generated significant criticism from the opposition voices in Jordan (Shuqairi 2011).

Civilian oversight of the armed forces and defence establishment may increase as a result of King Abdullah’s decision in August 2014 to revive the position of Minister of Defence. The royal mandate, which took the form of a constitutional amendment, directed the government to “Transfer the non-military logistic, administrative, investment and development duties, and those not associated with specialised professional military domain from the jurisdiction of the General Command of the Jordan Armed Forces (ie, the joint chiefs of staff) to the Ministry of Defence” (Jordan Times, 2014).
This means that the military’s commercial real estate interests, investment projects, and retiree benefits program will be transferred to the authority of the Ministry of Defence. Separating these will also likely necessitate two parallel budgets, which has the possibility of enhancing the level of oversight exercised by the Audit Bureau (Sabbagh 2014). The fact that organizations and spokespersons representing the military were largely opposed to the change supports this interpretation (Sabbagh 2014).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: In the case of Jordan, the link between off-budget military expenditures and illicit economic activity is less direct. Jordan’s reliance on foreign military aid (which is off-budget) has very likely contributed to its frequent involvement in illicit arms transfers and oil smuggling, as these actions are often taken at the behest of its patrons (notably the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) in pursuit of their own geostrategic interests. Jordan’s proximity to Iraq – which was unable to legally export oil or import industrial goods for decades due to either war or sanctions – made Jordan a major source of illicit trafficking and black market activity, including weapons and oil smuggling (the latter of which was carried out with explicit U.S. support).

Jordan also transferred arms to the Haitian dictator ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier (who is now on trial for crimes against humanity) in 1973, again at the behest of Washington. [Although a cable from U.S. embassy staff in Haiti questions officials in Washington about what should have been contained in the shipment, as staff identified mortars, cannons, and anti-aircraft guns that exceeded the direct authorization by the U.S. Government, which was only for M-1 rifles and ammunition. This suggests that either U.S. staff in Haiti were purposefully kept in the dark about the weapons that officials in Washington wished to transfer to Duvalier, or that Jordan violated the U.S. request by adding more sophisticated weapons to the shipment].

The current conflict in Syria has again made Jordan a way-station for the illicit movement of goods, including the supply of arms to rebels fighting inside Syria. In December 2012, Croatia shipped $6.5 million of weapons to Jordan (paid for by Saudi Arabia and bound for rebels in Syria). The sale and shipment were agreed under U.S. direction, but were a violation of an EU arms embargo. Given the origin of the weapons (Croatia had not previously made any sizeable export of weapons) and their destination, it is possible that some segment of the cache will be re-directed or go missing.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Information classification is still subject to the Provisional Law on Protection of State Secrets and Documents No. 50. (1971), which is roundly criticized as it neither identifies the agency in charge of classifying information nor provides for an independent body to verify or review the classification system.

Studies conducted by press freedom organizations and other freedom of information advocacy groups have found that the classification scheme varies widely between government departments and is extremely arbitrary. The recent Law on Guarantee of Access to Information (2007) was framed as a reform of the Protection of State’s Secrets Law, but has serious limitations, as the information seeker must prove a “lawful interest or a legitimate reason” for accessing the information, in addition to numerous other hurdles. Judgment here is decided by the Information Council, which the 2007 law expanded to include the General Director of Press and Publications Department, the President of the Jordanian Lawyers Association and the President of the Jordanian Journalists Association. Previously the council did not include representatives of these professional associations, but consisted only of government officials (the Minister of Culture, the Information Commissioner, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice, the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior, the Director General of General Statistics, the Director General of the National IT Center, the Director of Moral Guidance in the Armed forces, and the Commissioner General for Human Rights).

Various articles of the Protection of the State’s Secrets and Documents Law No. 50 (1971) outline the basis for different classification levels (see below).

Protection of the State’s Secrets and Documents Law No. 50 (1971) Article 3, provides that a document shall be classified as ‘strictly confidential’ if it contains:

a. Any information that would lead to “serious damages to the internal or external security of the State or….(provide) great benefit to any other State which would form or may form a threat to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.”

b. “Plans and details of military operations, public security or general intelligence
measures or any plan of general relation to military operations or internal security
measures, whether [related to] economic, production, supply, construction or transportation.”

c. “Political documents relating to international relations, agreements, conventions and all relating discussions and studies.”

d. “Information and documents relating to the methods of military intelligence, general intelligence, counter intelligence, espionage resistance or any information affecting the sources of military intelligence and general intelligence or persons working therein.”

e. “Very important information relating to arms, ammunition or any other source of
defence force whose disclosure forms a threat to the internal or external security of the State.”

Article 6 provides that a document shall be classified as ‘strictly confidential’ if:

a. “Any important information, the disclosure of the context thereof to persons whose nature of work does not require having access thereto, would lead to a threat to the security of the State, cause damage to its interests or be of great benefit to any foreign State or any other party.”

b. “Any information on the sites for [storing] defence or economic materials or [of] vital institutions relating to sources of power whenever it touches upon the security of the
State.”

c. “Any information on the movement of the armed forces or public security.”

d. “Any information on the weapons and forces of the sister Arab States.”

Article 8 classifies information as ‘restricted’ if it contains:

a. “Any information whose disclosure to persons authorized to have access would lead to the detriment of the interests of the State, form an embarrassment to it, cause administrative or economic difficulties for the country or be of benefit to a foreign
State or any other party which may reflect a detriment on the State.”

b. “Any documents relating to an administrative or criminal investigation, trials, tenders or general financial or economic affairs, unless the disclosure of the context thereof is permissible.”

c. “Military intelligence reports, unless they fall within another higher classification.”

d. “Reports which, if disclosed, may demoralize the citizens unless its publication is permitted.”

e. “Military wireless frequencies of the armed forces, security forces, public intelligence or any other governmental authority.”

f. “Any other information or protected document that harms the reputation of any official or impairs the standing of the State.”

Article 10 classifies all other official documents, not included in the above classification scheme, as ‘ordinary’ documents which may not be disclosed to “non-concerned persons … unless permitted for publication.”

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: The Jordanian Military has beneficial ownership of a number of commercial conglomerates; the largest include the King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau/KADDB, the industrial manufacturing arm of the Jordanian Armed Forces; Mawared (aka the National Resources Development Company); and the Development Investment Projects fund (DIP). MAWARED and DIP are both involved in commercial and residential development using land that was previously reserved for military purposes but is now extremely valuable suburban real estate, and both have had numerous projects referred to Jordan’s Anti-Corruption Commission for investigation. A number of officials involved in these projects have been prosecuted in the State Security Court on charges of corruption and sentenced to jail time, suggesting that reporting and supervision (if it exists at all) is insufficient.

DIP’s business operations include a number of extractive, manufacturing, technology, and real estate development projects, including at least three that were referred to Jordan’s Anti-Corruption Commission for investigation: these were O-Beach (a luxury beach resort), the Amman Living Wall (a mixed-use development), and Brinsley Enterprises (a precious metals exploration company). Other projects include the Amber Valley Luxury Resort and Spa; the 5-Star Hotel “Royal Officers Club;” and new general headquarters complex for the Jordan Armed Forces. According to its website, DIP’s companies include: Space Telecommunications; INFRA Project Management; Aqaba Petroleum Company; United Technology Solutions; El Zay Ready Wear Manufacturing Company; Jordan Fabric Company; and Brinsley. MAWARED generates profits for the armed forces partially through “selling land, doing master planning and managing real estate,” and many of its property sales and development project have been referred to the Anti-Corruption Commission, including the sale of Aqaba Port and Medical City, and a massive low-income housing development project at King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz City.

None of the revenues generated by these entities is published, and they are not included on the list of entities subjected to audit by the Audit Bureau. This is despite the fact that they meet the 50% threshold for government ownership that should trigger an official audit and their employees meet the definition of ‘public sector’ worker that should, in theory, subject them to the same legal code applied to state officials. KADDB does, however, employ individuals trained as accountants and financial managers, but whether this personnel is tasked with internal monitoring of accounts for corrupt transactions is unclear. In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, (in direct response to questions about military-owned businesses) the Jordanian Government reported that such enterprises are operated as non-profit organizations and that the are subject to “all kinds of internal and external financial supervision,” (p4).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: The Army’s industrial conglomerate the King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau/KADDB and its investment arm the KADDB Investment Group/KIG earns most of its revenues from Jordanian government contracts, but it operates as an independent entity able to partner with private firms and share the resulting revenues. It can spend these revenues internally without being subject to parliamentary scrutiny; nor are its other investment decisions or joint venture partnerships subject to scrutiny.

The finances of Mawared and the Development Investment Projects fund/DIP (both of which are primarily involved in commercial and residential development using land that was previously reserved for military purposes but is now extremely valuable suburban real estate) are similarly free of oversight. None of the revenues generated by these entities is published, and they are not included on the list of entities subjected to audit by the Audit Bureau. (This is despite the fact that they meet the 50% threshold for government ownership that should trigger an official audit and their employees meet the definition of ‘public sector’ worker that should, in theory, subject them to the same legal code applied to state officials). KADDB does, however, employ individuals trained as accountants and financial managers, but whether this personnel is tasked with internal monitoring of accounts for corrupt transactions is unclear.

The fact that these entities operate as independent companies has generated significant criticism from the opposition figures in Jordan (Shuqairi 2011).

According to Economic Crimes Law No. 40 of 2003, employees of the following entities are considered as public officials: public institutions, ministries and government departments, lower and upper house, municipalities, rural councils and “councils of joint services”, unions and syndicates, associations and clubs, banks and public companies, specialised loan institutions, political parties, any entities that are regulated by the Law on Public Funds and any entities being funded in part by the State budget.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Many members of the defence and security establishment are involved in private enterprise in related sectors. This is similar to the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon also seen in most Western States, where military and security officials rotate between high-level official positions and executive posts at private firms. Many former members of the defence and security establishment become middle-men in the re-sale of equipment or set up subcontracting/supplier firms. Often these individuals are brought into deals brokered by wealthy businessmen who lack a military/security background and the necessary contacts. But whether any one enterprise depends on bribes and kickbacks or is the result of well-connected individuals exploiting personal contacts and insider knowledge is different for each case. There is certainly an insufficient legal framework to address the inequities that allow individuals to trade on their insider knowledge and contacts.

Even when there are improprieties in these arrangements, the government is likely to look the other way. Many of these enterprises have military figureheads with staunch East Bank (pro-monarchy) credentials, but they are often financed by wealthy businessmen that are either non-Arab foreigners or Arabs with Palestinian heritage. This arrangement creates a stable situation for the monarchy as it not only incorporates ‘foreign’ capital but also provides jobs for military retirees.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: The Prime Minister (who is also the Defence Minister) often makes statements about corruption, but this has more to do with his role as a civilian politician than with any concrete rhetoric coming out of the defence and security establishment. I was unable to find any references to corruption or bribery in official statements made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any high-ranking officials of the different service branches.

In 2010 the National Committee for Retired Military Personnel (a political party composed of retired officials) issued a series of statements critical of the government, including its perceived failure to address issues of corruption. In response, The Economic and Social Association of Retired Servicemen and Veterans (the state-affiliated syndicate for military veterans) accused the National Committee of being divisive and meddlesome. Their reluctance to even accommodate the discussion of corruption suggests this is not considered an issue worth addressing in the defence and security establishment.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: According to a UN Review Panel convened to evaluate the suitability of Jordan’s legal framework with respect to implementing the UN Convention Against Corruption, there is a sufficient legal framework for investigating and prosecuting officials and public sector employees on corruption charges, and the available penalties were judged to be “sufficiently dissuasive.” Such legal measures include section 422 of the Jordanian Criminal Code, which captures all the indicators of corruption (embezzlement misappropriation or other diversion of property); the penal code, which provides for the prosecution and punishment of crimes of corruption and bribery, as well as a code of conduct for all public sector employees that references issues such as favoritism and preferential treatment (wasta); and article 6 of the Financial Disclosure Law of 2006, which covers declaration of assets and sanctions for failure to declare. However, none of these single out specific measures for defence and security personnel.

According to the Protection of the State’s Secrets and Documents Law No. 50 (1971),
Article 13, information concerning investigations carried out by the Public Prosecutor, Judicial Police, or other security organs is considered a state secret and not publicly released. (Unless that agency authorizes the information for release). In practice, the results of some cases are reported in the media. According to a DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) report whose author gained access to the 2003 Audit Bureau report that was presented to Parliament, there were 35 ‘unlawful actions’ attributed to the Jordanian Armed Forces, and slightly more incidents reported in the police forces under the Ministry of Interior.

Peer reviewer writes:

Evidence of some GID officers taking bribes from their informers and collaborators was disclosed. No action taken from the government against such practices.

Although Jordan ratified many Anti-Corrpution agreements, the government only found senior officials engaged in corruption as scapegoats for its own political motivations. Sentencing two senior GID officers while turning a blind eye on middle-ranked officers engaged in corrupt practices is an example of cherry-picking method adopted by the government. http://impatientbedouin.com/the-case-of-former-intelligence-chief-mohammad-dahabi.

Agree with Peer Reviewer: score changed from 3 to 2.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: According to Article 23 of the law establishing the Anti-Corruption Commission (JACC Law No. 62 of 2006, as Amended), “The commission shall provide effective protection for informants and witnesses and whistleblowers and experts in corruption cases and their relatives and other persons close to them from any assault or potential retaliation or intimidation,” including through the provision of accommodation and financial assistance and maintaining the whistleblower’s anonymity. Additionally, the formation of a witness protection unit with the ACC was one of the organization’s strategic goals, slated for 2013-2014.

However, several organizations report that these protections are insufficient. The nonprofit organization Global Integrity reported that (as of January 2014) Jordan lacks specific protections for whistleblowers – that the only legal provisions are those that promise confidentiality of the informant, with those violating this protection subject to a one year prison term. Freedom House found that this new law, “does not make binding guarantees of privacy to informants.” Furthermore, those who do submit cases of corruption to the ACC may be prosecuted if there is insufficient evidence to prove their allegations. There is no explicit reference to the defence and/or security establishment, although in its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government cited the ‘Directorate of the Military Judiciary’ as the body responsible for whistleblowers within the defence establishment. Nor are there many references in the media to whistleblowers in Jordan. The one instance where this did appear was the case of Raed Odwan, who was summoned by the ACC for a hearing on his allegations that “influential persons” within the agriculture ministry allowed tainted poultry to be shipped into Jordan from Iraq. Although no charges appear to have been filed, Odwan’s accusations must have had some merit, as he currently holds the same post he did before the allegations were made publicly, as director of the Interior Ministry’s local development directorate. If his allegations were spurious, he likely would have been dismissed from his post and/or prosecuted for false claims.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Although there is no formal (public) bylaws regarding selection processes, in its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government cited the following policies: that personnel participate in specialized training courses during the period of service; that they are required to disclose their financial assets before taking a position, that they will be rotated “from time to time” and that conditions of employment are subject to the supervision of the Audit Bureau and “other concerned security institutions” (p6). The online employment profiles of personnel from within the Directorate of Defence Procurement does indeed suggest a regular rotation schedule, with individuals moving between different procurement departments and shifted to different roles within those departments roughly every two years. In prepared remarks delivered by an unidentified Jordanian official at the 1999 Global Forum on Fighting Corruption (which dealt specifically with corruption among public employees in the justice and security sectors) the official refers to some policies that Jordan follows to reduce corruption, including random rotation of units in their areas of responsibility, duration and location, to reduce vulnerability to corruption.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: I was unable to find these figures on the websites of the Civil Service Bureau (which includes categories for employees in most public sectors, but not the armed forces or security services). However, other government websites list recent historical figures. Older numbers taken from official Jordanian government source are available from the United Nations Division for Public Administration and Development Management up to 2000.

Of particular note is the absence of GID payroll data. While we know, roughly, the number of people who work in the military and Interior Ministry, there is virtually no reliable source as to the number of officers, analysts, and informants run by the intelligence services.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Certain pay rates (and changes/supplementary payments) are published in the official gazette, (Jordan Times) but I was unable to determine whether comprehensive pay rates are published in the official gazette or another format available to the public. Allowances (such as subsidized health care, preferential access to university, and special business opportunities) appear to be widely known, so it is possible they are also published in the official gazette, but I was similarly unable to determine whether that was the case.

Allowances account for about 3/4 of the Jordan’s public sector wage bill (world bank 2012). The official categories of allowances (for civilian employees) include: personal living expenses, family living expenses, basic allowance, overtime, transport allowance, transport fees, fieldwork, bonuses, additional allowances, and other allowances. There is no similar breakdown provided for the military’s wage bill (ie, no specific allowances are listed).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Transparency and equity in pay for public sector employees is a major source of discontent. In 2011, the government passed a new bylaw creating a two-tiered system for personnel payment, in part to address concerns over privileges and bonuses provided to certain employees, including issues regarding the salaries paid to senior public sector employees to sit on the boards of directors of public companies, including, presumably, many of the operations owned by the Armed Forces, including KADDB, Mawared, and DIP.

One organization explicitly exempted from the new pay restrictions was The Economic and Social Association of Retired Servicemen and Veterans, the state-affiliated syndicate for military veterans.

Response to Government Reviewer: Agreed, score also reflects that there are minor shortcomings in the clarity and transparency of the payment system.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: According to the 1993 law that outlines criteria and rules for the selection and recruitment of government employees, recruitment for the non-defence civil service is based on competitive exams, seniority, and geographic distribution. This last consideration is likely a proxy for tribal affiliation and the government’s desire to distribute positions and promotions according to political calculations. The pervasive and ubiquitous concern over nepotism and ‘wasta’ most likely deter the government from publishing the relevant laws and regulations, as once they are public, there is grounds for contestation and litigation. It may be that ordinary and standard promotions at low and mid-level ranks adhere to established formal criteria, but appointments and promotion at higher levels is likely to be influenced by political considerations.

As the peer reviewer observes: while the practice has diminished under Abdullah, it is still customary to appoint certain military positions and staff roles through tribal distribution, with the central Bedouin and northern tribes most commonly expected to be represented. While some of those appointees and promotions are undoubtedly defensible due to merit, their tribal affiliations retain importance--although again, this has gradually diminished since the 1990s.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government states that promotions within the Jordanian Armed Forces are based on seniority, an evaluation of the applicant/professional qualifications, and vacancy type, and that these processes are enshrined in formal laws and regulations. It cites the body responsible for this process – the Directorate of Officers’ Affairs. A 2006 NATO report stated that certain qualifications (foreign language competency, computer skills, etc.) are now required for a range of promotions.

According to the 1993 law that outlines criteria and rules for the selection and recruitment of government employees, recruitment for the non-defence civil service is based on competitive exams, seniority, and geographic distribution. This last consideration is likely a proxy for tribal affiliation and the government’s desire to distribute positions and promotions according to political calculations. The pervasive and ubiquitous concern over nepotism and ‘wasta’ most likely deter the government from publishing the relevant laws and regulations, as once they are public, there is grounds for contestation and litigation. It may be that ordinary and standard promotions at low and mid-level ranks adhere to established formal criteria, but appointments and promotion at higher levels is likely influenced by political considerations.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Conscription, which had been suspended after the treaty with Israel, was re-introduced in 2007 (although the draft law had still not made its way through the parliament as of December 2013). Ostensibly the new conscription system is designed to use the military’s manpower and physical infrastructure to provide vocational and technical training to combat youth unemployment. The term of service was shortened considerably, from two years under the old system to 3-6 months under the new rule. As with the previous conscription system, waivers are available for only sons, those who had brothers killed in service, and those who were permanently disabled; deferrals are available to students and those living abroad. An exemption fee of approximately $4,000 may also be paid to avoid the mandatory service. Even previous to this new policy, most experts and historians report that prior to the peace treaty, conscription was applied so selectively as to barely merit the term ‘conscription.’ Most of those individuals affected by this policy were Palestinians that possessed important technical and/or managerial skills that were in short supply in the military.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Although conscription is not implemented at present, the fact that the resumption of this policy is framed as a method of imparting vocational skills and ‘on-the-job’ training to young Jordanians suggests that there will be considerable discretion regarding conscripts’ placement into different training programs, which could present a bribery risk. However, there is obviously no legislation that governs this process, as it has yet to be fully implemented.

I was not able to find any reports of enlisted soldiers paying bribes for preferred postings.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: There is no evidence of ‘ghost soldiers,’ but the percentage of the population employed by the defence and security establishment is so large (2.5% in 2000, according to the United Nations Division for Public Administration and Development Management) and the government’s wage bill for the military and security services is so high (thought to account for more than 3/4 of overall military expenditure) that such discrepancies may be difficult to identify.

I was unable to find any reports or media references to ghost soldiers in Jordan.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Given the percentage of the population employed by the defence or security establishment (2.5% in 2000, according to the United Nations Division for Public Administration and Development Management) and the resulting high wage bill (thought to account for more than 3/4 of overall military expenditure), it is likely that the payment system is highly centralized and not subject to the interventions of individuals outside the highest levels of government. The comparatively robust system for collecting pension contributions (which now requires that military members contribute to the same Social Security Corporation fund to which civilian public sector workers and those in the private sector contribute) would also make it less likely that pay would be manipulated.

Civilian oversight of the armed forces and defence establishment may increase as a result of King Abdullah’s decision in August 2014 to revive the position of Minister of Defence. The royal mandate, which took the form of a constitutional amendment, directed the government to “Transfer the non-military logistic, administrative, investment and development duties, and those not associated with specialised professional military domain from the jurisdiction of the General Command of the Jordan Armed Forces (ie, the joint chiefs of staff) to the Ministry of Defence” (Jordan Times, 2014).

This means that the military’s commercial real estate interests, investment projects, and retiree benefits program will be transferred to the authority of the Ministry of Defence. Separating these will also likely necessitate two parallel budgets, which has the possibility of enhancing the level of oversight exercised by the Audit Bureau (Sabbagh 2014). The fact that organizations and spokespersons representing the military were largely opposed to the change supports this interpretation (Sabbagh 2014).

However, members of the Royal Court could certainly interfere with the payment system (to reward loyal officers or punish disloyal ones), as it is not subject to the same laws as the bureaucracy. Although the budget of the Royal Court has historically been off-limits to parliamentary scrutiny, it was presented before a Parliamentary committee (for the first time) for the fiscal year 2014. Presumably such scrutiny would make the practice of side-payments more difficult to exercise. The Royal Court is often mentioned alongside the defence and security services as the country's least transparent and most corrupt institutions (Barakat and Leber).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: There is a penal code that provides for the prosecution and punishment of crimes of corruption and bribery, as well as a code of conduct for all public sector employees that references issues such as favoritism and preferential treatment (wasta); and article 6 of the Financial Disclosure Law of 2006, which covers declaration of assets and sanctions for failure to declare. However, none of these single out specific measures for defence and security personnel. The only explicit legal sanction related to corruption in the defence sector is the prohibition against intermediaries and agents in military procurement (first by article 3(e) of Law No. 44 of 1985; replaced since 2001 by a new Commercial Agents and Middleman Law). In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government states that there are several laws governing the behavior of defence and security personnel, including Law No. 24 (1966) which covers officer service in the JAF; Law No. 2 (1972) which covers regular military personnel; and the 2004 Armed Forces Law, which covers civilians employed by the defence sector. These are in addition to the penal codes described previously.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: According to a DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces) report whose author gained access to the 2003 report, there were 35 ‘unlawful actions’ attributed to the Jordanian Armed Forces, and slightly more incidents reported in the police forces under the Ministry of Interior. According to the Protection of the State’s Secrets and Documents Law No. 50 (1971) Article 13, information concerning investigations carried out by the Public Prosecutor, Judicial Police, or other security organs is considered a state secret and not publicly released. (Unless that agency authorizes the information for release).

Since the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission, the military’s many commercial projects are receiving greater scrutiny. According to the ACC’s 2011 annual report, of the 12 major public sector corruption investigations conducted, five involved the Jordanian Armed Forces, including the construction of the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) Headquarters in Dabouq; the Disi Water Conveyance Project feasibility study (handled by the JAF’s Development Investment Projects/DIP fund; the Decent Housing for Decent Living initiative (which involved military real estate holdings); the commission of JAF General Command building; and the contribution made by DIP to Brinsley Enterprises Ltd. The ACC’s annual report is available online. However, reports of the prosecution of individuals are rarely reported in the media. The cases that do appear in the media are the result of official government announcements, not investigative reporting on the part of the media outlets themselves, suggesting that it is either near impossible to get detailed information on violations and investigations, or the media is self-censoring.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: TI-DSP and Rasheed Coalition contributed to a UKDA UK (Defence Academy) run Building Integrity Foundation Course which is aimed at mid-upper ranking Jordanian officers. This ran in February 2015 and is to be repeated in October 2015. TI-DSP and the UKDA are also in discussions with the Jordanian MOD to arrange a Building Integrity intensive secondment to the TI-DSP offices in London for mid-ranking officers on defence corruption related issues, no dates have as yet been set.

More generally, international organizations have hosted training programs for public sector workers on non defence-specific sectors. In 2012, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) concluded a three-day workshop in cooperation with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for members of the justice ministry, the Central Bank of Jordan's Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Unit, and a number of prosecutors general on asset recovery during corruption investigations. A major component of the ACC’s national strategy is to hold training programs on identifying and prosecuting corruption offenses in “sectors vulnerable to corruption,” but there is no mention of the defence or security sectors with respect to this training.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: According to the Protection of the State’s Secrets and Documents Law No. 50 (1971),
Article 13, information concerning investigations carried out by the Public Prosecutor, Judicial Police, or other security organs is considered a state secret and not publicly released. (Unless that agency authorizes the information for release). Since the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission, the military’s many commercial projects are receiving greater scrutiny. According to the ACC’s 2011 annual report, of the 12 major public sector corruption investigations conducted, five involved the Jordanian Armed Forces, including the construction of the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) Headquarters in Dabouq; the Disi Water Conveyance Project feasibility study (handled by the JAF’s Development Investment Projects/DIP fund; the Decent Housing for Decent Living initiative (which involved military real estate holdings); the commission of JAF General Command building; and the contribution made by DIP to Brinsley Enterprises Ltd. The ACC’s annual report that lists these investigations is available online. However, reports of the prosecution of individuals are rarely reported in the media. The cases that do appear in the media are the result of official government announcements, not investigative reporting on the part of the media outlets themselves, suggesting that it is either near impossible to get detailed information on violations and investigations, or the media is self-censoring.

According to a U.S. State Department cable obtained by Wikileaks (dated 2005), the impetus for the creation of the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission was a direct effort by the King to sideline the anti-corruption unit within the GID, as it had in fact become a major source of government corruption. The prosecution of personnel within the GID (notably former GID chiefs Samih Battikhi and Mohammed Dahabi) suggests that the ACC does not have the political leverage to confront systematic corruption within the GID or the rest of the defence and security establishment, and that offenders are only pursued if they have also run afoul of the monarch. Not is there any explicit mandate within the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Commission to address corruption within these sectors.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: According to the Business Anti-Corruption Portal, bribery and facilitation payments are perceived to be less widespread than in other countries in the region (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, no date). According to the World Bank Enterprise Survey of 2006 (the most recent available) only 2.5 per cent of companies are expected to offer gifts or bribes in order to secure an operating license.

According to the US Commercial Service, oversight of defence-related procurement is conducted by a department within the Jordanian Armed Forces, while non-defence procurement is overseen by the Government Tenders Directorate (GTD) and the General Supplies Department (GSD).

According to Global Integrity’s 2011 report on Jordan, violations of tender regulations (such as facilitation payments made to officials) should result in the blacklisting of companies or their treatment as “non-preferential suppliers” – although this rarely happens in practice. The US State Department’s 2013 report states that the Competition Directorate at the Ministry of Industry and Trade can examine complaints and report violators to the judicial system, and that the government has made major advances in transparency through its e-procurement initiative, which publishes public tenders on the website of the Jordanian tendering office.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Corruption is treated as a bureaucratic or political issue, not a strategic one. Corruption awareness and related legal codes focus on procurement and the impact on morale, but not specifically its strategic impact. There is only very dated information available regarding whether military commanders are aware of the potential impact of corruption on operations. For example, in prepared remarks delivered by an unidentified Jordanian official at the 1999 Global Forum on Fighting Corruption (which dealt specifically with corruption among public employees in the justice and security sectors) the official states that the corruption inherent in smuggling and trafficking operations – exacerbated by the cycle of sanctions and war in neighbouring Iraq – is a real threat to the ability of the armed forces to defend the country and enforce the law.

Response to Government Reviewer: A score of 4 would require evidence that Jordan has a comprehensive and detailed military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict that may even be publicly available.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: TI-DSP and Rasheed Coalition contributed to a UKDA UK (Defence Academy) run Building Integrity Foundation Course which is aimed at mid-upper ranking Jordanian officers. This ran in February 2015 and is to be repeated in October 2015. TI-DSP and the UKDA are also in discussions with the Jordanian MOD to arrange a Building Integrity intensive secondment to the TI-DSP offices in London for mid-ranking officers on defence corruption related issues, no dates have as yet been set.

In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government points to the Directorate of Joint Training as the body responsible for training in corruption issues, although there is no public evidence that provides any further detail on such training.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: There is no indication that Jordan deploys personnel for corruption monitoring on operations or peacekeeping missions.

In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government points to the Directorate of Joint Training as the body responsible for training in corruption issues, although there is no secondary evidence that provides any detail on such training. International organizations have hosted training programs for public sector workers, but not explicitly within the defence sector.

In 2012, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) concluded a three-day workshop in cooperation with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for members of the justice ministry, the Central Bank of Jordan's Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Unit, and a number of prosecutors general on asset recovery during corruption investigations. A major component of the ACC’s national strategy is to hold training programs on identifying and prosecuting corruption offenses in “sectors vulnerable to corruption,” but there is no mention of the defence or security sectors with respect to this training.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: There is no evidence of guidelines or staff training for addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.

The Jordanian Armed Forces are frequently contracted on regional and overseas missions. Jordan is one of the 10 largest contributors to U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and jointly train regional forces (such as the Iraqi military) in conjunction with the U.S. Military. Although UN Peacekeepers do receive training on a number of issues (such as human rights and identifying trafficking victims) the UN’s Department of Peace Keeping Operations itself has been criticized for high-levels of fraud and abuse. It is reasonable to believe that such corruption also infects Jordanian peacekeepers. The extraordinary levels of corruption, smuggling, trafficking and cross-border criminal activity generated by persistent conflict in Iraq and Syria must also have directly impacted Jordanian military and police personnel. In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government again points to the Directorate of Joint Training/Directorate of Joint War Operations as the body responsible for training deployed personnel regarding corruption issues, although there is no secondary evidence that provides any detail on such training.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: There is a great deal of private military contracting in Jordan, primarily owing to the ongoing war in Iraq. Many large PMCs have offices in Jordan, and many Jordanian companies act as subcontractors on large US military contracts. These subcontractors have been accused of serious wrongdoing, including engaging in human trafficking by recruiting workers from abroad, seizing their travel documents, and forcibly re-locating them to work sites on US military bases in Iraq (case of Daoud & Partners, a KBR subcontractor). Officials from US PMC Blackwater were also indicted on weapons charges for falsifying records to hide gifts of weapons to King Abdullah, who had contracted the firm to train an elite cohort of Jordanian counter-terrorism troops. Although Jordan is a signatory of the Montreux document, cases against Jordanian contractors have been brought in US courts – not Jordanian ones.

There are also many indigenous private security providers in Jordan, and there is significant evidence to suggest an improper relationship between these providers and officials within the Jordanian state defence and intelligence hierarchy. Applications for business licenses are submitted to the Ministry of Commerce, but reviewed by the heads of military intelligence, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and the Public Security Directorate (PSD), and because these operators are primarily owned and staffed by military and police retirees, their personal connections ensure they face few legal or regulatory hurdles. (One of the only requirements in place now is a capitalization of 50,000 JOD).

The various subsidiaries of the King Abdullah Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) – which is owned by the Jordanian Armed Forces – also provides private services such as armored vehicle transport (for valuables and VIPs); security for large events and critical sites; and consulting for private sector customers. KADDB is also a joint venture partner with several high-profile PMCs, including Securitas of Sweden. For many years KADDB was headed by Shadi Ramzi Al Majali, the nephew of Abdel Hadi Al Majali, fomer Army Chief of Staff and Director General of Public Security, who founded one of Jordan’s first private security providers, the Middle East defence & Security Agency (MEDSA). According to MEDSA’s website, the company was formed “in response to the growing demand in Jordan for commercially available security services,” but researchers suggest that it was the leadership of the Jordanian police that pressured the banks to retain the company’s services.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: According to the US Commercial Service, oversight of defence-related procurement is conducted by a department within the Jordanian Armed Forces, while non-defence procurement is overseen by the Government Tenders Directorate (GTD) and the General Supplies Department (GSD).

According to Global Integrity’s 2011 report on Jordan, violations of tender regulations should result in the blacklisting of companies or their treatment as “non-preferential suppliers” – although this rarely happens in practice. The US State Department’s 2013 report states that the Competition Directorate at the Ministry of Industry and Trade can examine complaints and report violators to the judicial system, and that the government has made major advances in transparency through its e-procurement initiative, which publishes public tenders on the website of the Jordanian tendering office. According to the website of the Directorate of Defence Procurement, there are significant exceptions to the practice of competitive tendering, including: cases of emergency; if there are no more than two sellers; if the number of suitable proposals received is insufficient; if the prices are fixed by state authorities; there is only one source of supply; if the purchase is for ‘certain scientific materials;’ if the proposed prices received through the tender prices are unacceptable; or if international law supersedes the tender agreement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: The defence procurement cycle process is not disclosed to the public; there is little formal discussion of defence needs in the Parliament or the media. According to a 2004 U.S. State Department cable published by Wikileaks, the budgets for the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) and the Public Security Directorate (PSD) (PSD is within the Interior Ministry) are “noticeably more vague” than the parallel budgets submitted by Jordan’s other defence and security agencies (these are the Royal Medical Services and the Civil Defence department, the latter being within the Interior Ministry). Jordanian Finance Ministry personnel reported that the absence of detail in the JAF budget was to allow the JAF to adjust procurement and spending policies in response to shifting priorities, whereas the absence of detail in the PSD budget was to obscure spending by the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). Private discussions with former members of the Jordanian defence and security establishment suggest that the private initiative of high-ranking personnel has a significant impact on procurement decisions beyond the type of technocratic planning typically undertaken by civilian defence experts within the government. This ability of such individuals to influence the procurement process suggests a high degree of corruption risk.

Although the government has made major advances in transparency through its e-procurement initiative, which publishes public tenders on the website of the Jordanian tendering office, there are significant exceptions to the practice of competitive tendering. Currently the public can access a list of defence tenders that have been issued by the government – for everything from tanks to laser printers and surgical gloves – including from the departments of the quartermaster and transportation/freight contracts. However, it is not clear whether this website includes information on contracts that have been awarded under non-competitive conditions.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: According to the US Commercial Service, oversight of defence-related procurement is conducted by a department within the Jordanian Armed Forces, while non-defence procurement is overseen by the Government Tenders Directorate (GTD) and the General Supplies Department (GSD).

According to Global Integrity’s 2011 report on Jordan, violations of tender regulations should theoretically result in the blacklisting of companies or their treatment as “non-preferential suppliers” – although this rarely happens in practice.

The US State Department’s 2013 report states that the Competition Directorate at the Ministry of Industry and Trade can examine complaints and report violators to the judicial system, and that the government has made major advances in transparency through its e-procurement initiative, which publishes public tenders on the website of the Jordanian tendering office.

Given that a large portion of the Jordanian military procurement budget comes from U.S. Military Assistance (known as FMF, or Foreign Military Financing), there is likely to be a high degree of coordination in procurement between military officials and civilian defence planners from both countries, and Jordanian defence and security officials likely participate in courses and workshops focused on procurement and acquisition under the U.S.-funded International Military Education & Training (IMET) Program. Therefore much of military procurement is likely to be at least somewhat transparent, given the fact that the financing for much of this procurement comes from US military assistance funds.

[It should be noted the US Government’s own procurement process has major shortcomings, as the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown. Therefore coordination with US military planners would not necessarily improve the transparency or efficiency of the Jordanian defence procurement process.

However, according to interviewee 1, the private initiative of high-ranking personnel has a significant impact on procurement decisions beyond the type of technocratic planning typically undertaken by civilian defence experts within the government. This ability of such individuals to influence the procurement process indicates a high degree of corruption risk. Although the Jordanian Audit Bureau conducts regular assessments of Jordanian military expenditures, the ability of the bureau to sanction violations is limited by the political influence of the defence and security establishments. See previous (esp. Question 10).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Some information on potential defence purchases is made available through the website of the Directorate of Defence Procurement, which lists open tenders. However, this is likely not an exhaustive list. In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government states that the tenders are advertised in at least three newspapers for a period of more than one day (p12). However, a detailed defence procurement budget is not publicly available or openly debated in Parliament. A reflection of this is the uproar caused by the Lower House’s demand in 2012 that the Prime Minister (in his capacity as Defence Minister) discuss the budget directly with members of the Finance Committee. This request was based on the claim that the spending figures proposed would place an undue burden on the national budget, as they were dependent on foreign aid and grants that may not be forthcoming.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: There is no information specific to procedures and standards required of companies to bid on defence contracts, but there is information on general government procurement. According to the pre-qualification document on a recent water treatment project financed by a German government-owned development bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), companies are ruled out by the Jordanian Government Tenders Directorate if: “Participation of an applicant is ruled out by sanctions issued by the UN Security Council; the applicant is or was involved as a consultant in the preparation or implementation of the project; the same applies to an enterprise or an individual that is closely connected to the bidder under a company group or a similar business link, or to several enterprises or individuals associated correspondingly; failure to submit a declaration of undertaking in the form provided in the Questionnaire; the applicant is legally barred from the procurement process in Jordan on the grounds of previous violations of regulations on fraud and corruption; the applicant or subcontractors to be contracted for considerable portions of the contract are enterprises economically intertwined with the contracting agency in Jordan and/or state controlled enterprises that are legally or financially independent.” The document also contains an anti-corruption provision, worded as follows “No payment, consideration, offer, or benefit of any kind constituting an illegal or corrupt practice shall be made, directly or indirectly, and an inducement or reward for supporting prequalification or for award of any contract in this project. Any such conduct will be grounds for cancelling the applicant’s prequalification or tender submission or contract award, and may initiate other civil or criminal (or both) actions against the applicant or any individual, as may be applicable.” This language seems to be generally representative of the kinds of requirements that companies must meet to qualify as government contractors, but projects that involve an external donor are also likely to have more rigorous qualification requirements than projects that do not involve a third-party financing agency.

Despite this formal language, both conventional wisdom and recent history suggest that large government contracts are frequently awarded on the basis of personal and familial connections and/or business associations.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Jordan’s national security strategy is neither open nor well-audited, and the degree to which procurement requirements are derived from this strategy is unclear. A recent report by the Geneva-based Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, stated that “security issues are rarely discussed [in Parliament], and even when discussed they are spoken about in general terms…if, for example, one were to look at the records of the Jordanian Parliament, one would be unable to find any records of any enquiries into Jordan’s defence policy.”

Also, to the extent that a detailed defence budget reflects the country’s overall national defence policy, it is neither publicly available nor openly debated. A reflection of this is the uproar caused by the Lower House’s demand in 2012 that the Prime Minister (in his capacity as Defence Minister) discuss the budget directly with members of the Finance Committee. This request was based on the claim that the spending figures proposed would place an undue burden on the national budget, as they were dependent on foreign aid and grants that may not be forthcoming.

According to interviewee 1, the private initiative of high-ranking personnel has a significant impact on procurement decisions beyond the type of technocratic planning typically undertaken by civilian defence experts within the government. This ability of such individuals to influence the procurement process indicates a high degree of corruption risk.

Given that a large portion of the Jordanian military procurement budget comes from U.S. Military Assistance (known as FMF, or Foreign Military Financing), there is likely to be a high degree of coordination in procurement planning between military officials and civilian defence planners from both countries, and Jordanian defence and security officials likely participate in courses and workshops focused on procurement and acquisition under the U.S.-funded International Military Education & Training (IMET) Program.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Since Jordan’s national security strategy is neither open nor well-audited, the degree to which the type and quantity of defence purchases is derived from clearly identified and requirements is unclear. Given that a large portion of the Jordanian military procurement budget comes from U.S. Military Assistance (known as FMF, or Foreign Military Financing), there is likely to be a high degree of coordination in procurement planning between military officials and civilian defence planners from both countries. However, foreign military assistance is “off-budget,” and therefore does not show up in public documents. According to interviewee 1, the private initiative of high-ranking personnel has a significant impact on procurement decisions beyond the type of technocratic planning typically undertaken by civilian defence experts within the government. This ability of such individuals to influence the procurement process indicates a high degree of corruption risk.

Agree with Peer Reviewer: Score changed from 2 to 1.
Response to Government Reviewer: no evidence given to support score 3 and criteria that &quoute;there is evidence that the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces do base most of their purchases on clearly identified requirements.&quoute;

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: The government has made major advances in transparency through its e-procurement initiative, which publishes public tenders on the website of the Jordanian tendering office. Currently the public can access a list of defence tenders that have been issued by the government – for everything from tanks to laser printers and surgical gloves – including from the departments of the quartermaster and transportation/freight contracts (US Department of State).

The law requires competitive bidding, but information about tenders is not always disseminated to the private sector (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, undated). There are significant exceptions to the practice of competitive tendering. According to the website of the Directorate of Defence Procurement, these exceptions include: cases of emergency; if there are no more than two sellers; if the number of suitable proposals received is insufficient; if the prices are fixed by state authorities; there is only one source of supply; if the purchase is for ‘certain scientific materials;’ if the proposed prices received through the tender prices are unacceptable; or if international law supersedes the tender agreement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government did not indicate any independent oversight of tender boards and other defence procurement personnel, instead stating that “the chief of the central tenders committee and its members are considered in charge of” “any violation” and may be required to justify their decisions “at any time” (p12) – though the individual or government body to whom they would be subject is not specified. In this same statement the government also stated that defence personnel are rotated “from time to time” and that conditions of employment are subject to the supervision of the Audit Bureau and “other concerned security institutions” (p6) although this language does not specifically reference tender boards or procurement staff. One online employment profile for a high-ranking individual within the Directorate of Defence Procurement does indeed suggest a regular rotation schedule, with this particular individual moving between different procurement departments and shifted to different roles within those departments roughly every two years.

According to the US Commercial Service, oversight of defence-related procurement is conducted by a department within the Jordanian Armed Forces, while non-defence procurement is overseen by the Government Tenders Directorate (GTD) and the General Supplies Department (GSD). According to Global Integrity’s 2011 report on Jordan, violations of tender regulations should result in the blacklisting of companies or their treatment as “non-preferential suppliers” – although this rarely happens in practice. The US State Department’s 2013 report states that the Competition Directorate at the Ministry of Industry and Trade can examine complaints and report violators to the judicial system, and that the government has made major advances in transparency through its e-procurement initiative, which publishes public tenders on the website of the Jordanian tendering office.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: There is no information specific to collusion between bidders for defence contracts, but collusion in general government procurement is prohibited by existing legislation, and Jordan is party to the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement. A unified procurement by-law prepared in coordination with the World Bank also awaits ratification. The new law covers all types of government procurement and “separates policy and regulatory functions from operational functions through an independent procurement policy and oversight unit…and creates a mechanism to handle complaints through appointed committees.” The authors of a related World Bank study concluded that in order for the procurement process to be properly reformed, significant capacity-building measures were necessary, including handling complaints, preparing contracts, and conducting technical and financial analysis.

In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index , the Jordanian Government reported that the Directorate of Defence Procurement requires bidders to sign an affidavit that they will not engage in any type of “falsification” – although it does not specifically reference collusion.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Jordanian defence and security officials participate in courses and workshops focused on procurement and acquisition under the U.S.-funded International Military Education & Training (IMET) Program. In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government confirmed that its personnel attend training sessions on project management both locally (at JAF institutes) and abroad (in the US and UK).


According to Global Integrity’s 2011 report on Jordan, there is no legislation mandating professional training for public procurement officials.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Companies are legally entitled to challenge public tender results in court, and information on challenging a bid is available on the website of the Government Tenders Department. Through its e-procurement initiative, the government publishes public tenders on the Government Tenders Department website, and the results of the technical evaluations of companies that bid for (civilian) government contracts do seem to be publicly available – allowing companies to see which competitors qualified and which did not. [See the evaluation of proposals submitted for the As-Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant Expansion BOT Project].

However, there are no similar provisions in Jordanian procurement or competition law specifically related to defence procurement, which is under the sole jurisdiction of the Armed Forces. In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government states that defence companies can present their complaint to the Directorate of Defence Purchases; the Joint Chief of Staff; the Prime Minister; or the Anti-Corruption Commission (p13). The latter institution does have a hotline listed on its website for reporting such violations, although the Directorate of Defence Purchases does not, and it is unlikely that individual companies would contact the offices of the Prime Minister or the Joint Chief of Staff to file a formal complaint. There is no mention in Jordan’s procurement or competition laws of protection against retaliation or discrimination in response to filing a complaint.

Competition Law No. 33 (2004) has been used by companies (both foreign and domestic) to pursue complaints regarding unfair and anticompetitive practices. Complaints are lodged with the Competition Directorate within the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which investigates complaints and report violators to the judicial system, where a specialized judge appointed by a judicial board adjudicates the case. Several cases have resulted in prosecutions and fines levied by Jordanian Courts. The Directorate has examined several hundred cases since its inception in 2003, including 47 cases in 2010. A sample of cases are available in “Competition Regimes in the World – A Civil Society Report” referenced in the source list below. However, again, there are no provisions for protection against retaliation or discrimination in this law, and it does not reference trade in defence or security items, the procurement of which is under the sole jurisdiction of the Jordanian Armed Forces.

As to whether companies are protected from discrimination or retaliation for filing complaints, there is no clear protection. As stated above, there are no provisions for protection against retaliation or discrimination in Competition law No 33 (2004). In cases where a bidding company may wish to file a complaint alleging that the tender process was corrupt, it is unclear whether the company or its personnel would be protected under Jordan’s rather feeble whistleblower protections. Global Integrity reported that (as of January 2014)

Jordan lacks specific protections for whistleblowers – that the only legal provisions are those that promise confidentiality of the informant, with those violating this protection subject to a one year prison term. Freedom House similarly found that the law, “does not make binding guarantees of privacy to informants.” Furthermore, those who do submit cases of corruption to the ACC may be prosecuted if there is insufficient evidence to prove their allegations. There is no explicit reference to the defence and/or security establishment, although in its official response to the release of TI’s 2012 Defence Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government cited the ‘Directorate of the Military Judiciary’ as the body responsible for whistleblowers within the defence establishment. Nor are there many references in the media to whistleblowers in Jordan. The one instance where this did appear was the case of Raed Odwan, who was summoned by the ACC for a hearing on his allegations that “influential persons” within the agriculture ministry allowed tainted poultry to be shipped into Jordan from Iraq. Although no charges appear to have been filed, Odwan’s accusations must have had some merit, as he currently holds the same post he did before the allegations were made publicly, as director of the Interior Ministry’s local development directorate. If his allegations were spurious, he likely would have been dismissed from his post and/or prosecuted for false claims.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: According to Global Integrity’s 2011 report on Jordan, violations of tender regulations should result in the blacklisting of companies or their treatment as “non-preferential suppliers” – although this rarely happens in practice. The US State Department’s 2013 report states that the Competition Directorate at the Ministry of Industry and Trade can examine complaints and report violators to the judicial system, and that the government has made major advances in transparency through its e-procurement initiative, which publishes public tenders on the website of the Jordanian tendering office. In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government states that fines are also applied, according to the military supply law of 1995 (p13).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Although Jordan denies having an official offset program, procurement decisions that involve national funds (as opposed to US military assistance funds) are frequently based on which defence firms are willing to include some form of collaborative weapons production in their contract; operating as a quid pro quo system that uses the Jordanian defence procurement budget as a subsidy to lure foreign partners into joint ventures with the Jordanian Armed Forces’ industrial manufacturing arm, the King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau (KADDB).

Although Jordanian officials claim that Jordan has no formal offset policy, they are careful to insist that they reap the benefits of the practice. In an interview with the editor of the Countertrade and Offset Newsletter, a defence industry trade publication, the CEO of KADDB said: “We encourage that whenever we do an important procurement part of it is manufactured in Jordan as much as possible. Although it is not technically described as an offset, it is something that we would like to do because we would like to create jobs for our people.”

Researchers have demonstrated that this tit-for-tat dynamic is visible in numerous cases where firms that sell off-the-shelf items to Jordan are engaged in co-production activities with KADDB. When Jordan began exploring options to acquire surplus F-16s from European fleets in early 2009, jets were ultimately purchased from Belgium and the Netherlands; that same year, Strategem, a logistics firm with offices in Belgium and the Netherlands, received a contract from the Dutch Agency for Economic Development to conduct feasibility studies for establishing an F-16 maintenance facility in Jordan, which is now currently being constructed by the Dutch company Daedalus Aviation. Likewise, three years after Jordan purchased six Russian-made KA-226 helicopters in 2003, the manufacturer Oboronprom signed an agreement with KADDB to establish an in-country production and maintenance facility for the helicopters.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: The government denies the existence of offset programs, and does not make public any details of the linkages between defence procurement and collaborative production with foreign defence firms. The government does have a robust public relations capacity, including a contract with IHS Global Insight (the Janes Defence Group), which produces press materials for KADDB and its many subsidiaries, including announcements of new joint ventures and other forms of collaborative production. This is the only mechanism through which information is publicly distributed – and does not include information on the details of the contract such as tax holidays or other subsidies provided by any party.

Many of the joint ventures that were established as KADDB subsidiaries have been rolled into the KADDB Investment Group (KIG), and after short periods of operation, many of these enterprises appear to be dormant. In interviews conducted by the researcher, some individuals attributed this to the global financial crisis, while others suggested that these enterprises had always been mere vehicles for the accumulation of wealth by the King and his inner circle, and as such were never meant to be long-term sustainable enterprises.

Response to Government Reviewer: No evidence provided to contradict sources provided above, score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: There is no competition regulation involved in Jordan’s defence offset program because the offset program itself is informal. Jordan denies having an official offset program, but procurement decisions are frequently based on which defence firms are willing to include some form of collaborative weapons production in their contract; operating as a quid pro quo system that uses the Jordanian defence procurement budget as a subsidy to lure foreign partners into joint ventures with the Jordanian Armed Forces’ industrial manufacturing arm, the King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau (KADDB). (Contracts financed with US military assistance funds are an exception, as these funds must be spent on US-origin material, and the US prohibits offsets for all military aid recipients other than Israel.) Since the government denies the very existence of an offset program, it does not make public any details related to the negotiations involved in securing collaborative production arrangements with foreign sellers. [For details on how the defence offset program operates informally, see Question 70].

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Intermediation in military procurement is illegal in Jordan according to article 3(e) of Law No. 44 of 1985 governing Agents and Commercial Intermediaries (replaced since in 2001 by a new Commercial Agents and Middleman Law), and non-compliance is punishable with imprisonment for at least three years. However, as in most countries, the use of defence consultants is commonplace. Jordan’s legal framework for dealing with corruption in the private sector is also much less well-developed than the parallel framework for public officials and civil servants.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: Information on the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals is only available when made public by the seller, as when the United States Department of Defence must inform the US Congress of pending arms sales and their associated financing terms. The Jordanian government does not provide this information. In its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government states that this information is considered a state secret, and therefore not available to the public or media.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: I was unable to find legislation or official documentation that confirmed the government held contractors accountable for the actions of their subsidiaries and subcontractors regarding corruption, although in its official response to the release of TI’s 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, the Jordanian Government states that contractors are responsible for the actions of their subcontractors.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer1332: It is very common for politics to influence defence acquisition decisions. First and foremost, US military assistance funds account for the majority of Jordanian defence procurement, and as these funds must be spent on US-origin material, a majority of procurement decisions are predetermined. Where US military assistance is not the ultimate arbiter of procurement decisions, the willingness of foreign defence firms to enter into collaborative production (and the personal connections of individual firm executives) are as likely as high politics to influence procurement decisions.

Procurement decisions are frequently based on which defence firms are willing to agree to some form of collaborative weapons production (i.e., defence offsets), although there is no formal defence offset process. Under these informal conditions, procurement often operates as a quid pro quo system wherein defence equipment purchases are made in exchange for the promise of defence firms to enter into subsequent joint ventures with the Jordanian Armed Forces’ industrial manufacturing arm, the King Abdullah Design & Development Bureau (KADDB). For evidence of such dynamics in Jordan’s arms procurement process, see Question 70.