Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Non-tax revenue (which would include asset disposal) is generally accounted for in the national budget. While most non-tax revenue is identified individually, there are some items that are simply labeled as ‘other’ or ‘unidentified.’ Asset sales is its own category, but the details of the sales are not included in the budget; nor is it detailed how much revenue from asset sales is from the defence and security sector.

There is very limited information on the procedures of asset disposal however, and it is worth noting that Liberia’s military has next no equipment to dispose of. According to Defenceweb, “almost all aircraft, equipment, materiel and facilities were damaged or destroyed during the Civil War. The country has received almost no new equipment, apart from some 50 assault rifles, 200 000 rounds of 7.62 and 100 000 rounds of 9 mm ammunition received from China in 2008.”

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: While total revenues from asset disposals are included as a line item in the budget, it is unlikely that any of these asset disposals are related to the defence and security sector, although it is difficult to know given the secrecy around defence and security in Liberia. It is noteworthy that Liberia has a very limited arsenal of military equipment, as most assets were destroyed in the civil wars, reducing the likelihood that any asset disposals accounted for in the national budget are from the defence and security sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The Open Budget Survey estimates are that 2% of total spending is allocated to secret items.

It is more difficult to know how much of defence and security expenditures specifically are allocated for secret items. However, within the defence budget there are line items that are very high level and for which no spending detail is provided. These items include the categories of ‘special operations services’ and ‘intelligence services,’ and in sum represent about 1/3 of total spending on defence when considering the budgets for the Ministry of defence, the National Security Agency and the Executive Protections Services (Ministry of Finance, “Draft National Budget Fiscal Year 2014-15). This does not mean that all of this spending is for secret items, but it indicates a lack of transparency in the defence budget, including spending on secret items.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Records on secret spending related to the security sector are itemized at a very high level in the budget, and the details of such spending are not made available to the legislature, nor are they presented in the annual budget outturn reports (International Budget Partnership, 2011; IMF, 2012). This is partially because the legislative committees that are responsible for budget oversight do not work with the committees responsible for defence and security as necessary to obtain information on the budget and expenditures (Jaye, 2012). It is also due to the fact that much of the secret spending on defence and security is tied to the intelligence sector, such as the National Security Agency, which is not subject to legislative oversight due to reasons of national security (see Act Creating the National Security Agency; Interviewee 1, 2014).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The legislature is not provided with reports of the audits of Liberia’s defence and security sector. Since 2008, the GAC has provided the legislature with over 70 audit reports (U.S. State Department, 2013), none related to the defence and security sector (General Auditing Commission, 2015); the legislature has not reviewed or acted upon any of them (U.S. State Department, 2013).

GAC audits of the defence and security sector however are more opaque (Interviewee 1, 2014). External audits are not conducted on the National Security Agency (NSA) as its governing legislation exempts the agency from budget oversight, as well as the general government's &quoute;procurement, accounting and auditing system&quoute; (see Act Creating the National Security Agency). The vast majority of defence and security related procurement is also exempt from audit (Liberia: Amended at Restated Public Procurement and Concessions Act, 2010.)

There is evidence however that the GAC has audited the budget expenditures of the Ministry of Defence, as it does all government ministries (General Auditing Commission, 2011). It has also been noted that when necessary, the GAC hires external consultants to conduct audits of the defence and security sectors (International Budget Partnership, 2011), although evidence of such audits could be found.

A thorough review of the GAC’s website reveals no audit reports specifically on the defence and security sector, where published reports date back to 2007. It is therefore unlikely that external transparent audits of the defence and security sector have been undertaken.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Off-budget expenditures are permitted in law, although they are not exceptional circumstances and it is unclear how well they are controlled. Off-budget expenditures make up a significant portion of the country's revenue streams, primarily due to large levels of aid from foreign governments and donor organizations (Ministry of Finance, December 2012).

According to Liberia's Public Finance Management Regulations the annual budget framework paper shall include &quoute;a summary statement of off-budget donor funding showing name of project and program, funding agency, recipient government agency, disbursements effected in the previous financial year, projected disbursement in the following financial year&quoute; ( Ministry of Finance, 2009).

The Budget Framework Paper 2013-2014 address off-budget funding, and provides detail on some of the projects, although some are simply categorized as 'other.' No projects are related to the defence and security establishments (Ministry of Finance, May 2013).

The Budget Framework Paper 2014-2015 states that beginning in fiscal year 2014-2015, all borrowing will be brought on budget (Ministry of Finance, May 2014). The Executive Budget Proposal for the fiscal year 2014-2015 clearly identifies donor grants from foreign governments and international organizations as part of the budget, although not all funds are itemized (Ministry of Finance, June 9, 2014) and the details required by the Public Finance Management Regulations (name of project and program, funding agency, recipient government agency, etc.) are omitted, making it difficult to identify how many of these expenditures are related to the defence and security establishments.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: According to Liberia's Public Finance Management Regulations, the annual budget framework paper shall include &quoute;a summary statement of off-budget donor funding showing name of project and program, funding agency, recipient government agency, disbursements effected in the previous financial year, projected disbursement in the following financial year&quoute; ( Ministry of Finance, 2009).

The Budget Framework Paper 2014-2015 states that beginning in fiscal year 2014-2015, all borrowing will be brought on budget (Ministry of Finance, May 2014). The Executive Budget Proposal for the fiscal year 2014-2015 clearly identifies donor grants from foreign governments and international organizations as part of the budget, although not all funds are itemized (Ministry of Finance, June 9, 2014) and the details required by the Public Finance Management Regulations (name of project and program, funding agency, recipient government agency, etc.) are omitted. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to know how much off-budget expenditure is related to the defence and security establishments, and whether any of this expenditure involves illicit economic activity, although no evidence was found to suggest this is the case.

The Budget Framework Paper 2013-2014 also addresses off-budget funding, and provides detail on some of the projects, although some are simply categorized as 'other.' None of the projects listed were related to the defence and security establishments (Ministry of Finance, May 2013).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The processes for classifying information are detailed in Liberian’s Freedom of Information Act of 2010. The Act stipulates that a request for information may be denied if it is determined that the release of the information would &quoute;cause injury or substantial harm to the security, defence or international relations of the Republic of Liberia or would divulge any information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of another country to the Government&quoute; (FOI Act, 2010). The Act further states that for all exemptions, the harm that would be caused by the disclosure of the information must be greater than the public interest in having the information disclosed.

As a mechanism of oversight, the Act calls for the appointment of an independent Information Commissioner to oversee compliance with the law, and the first commissioner was appointed by the President in May 2012. While there is no evidence of individuals or agencies influencing decisions regarding the Freedom of Information Act, the law is currently far from operational, as the government lacks the “capacity to fully and effectively put their…regime into practice” (The Carter Center, 2015). The Information Commissioner has argued that his office is without the resources needed to effectively oversee compliance with the law (Clayeh, 2015) and the law is often ignored by government agencies (Fayia, 2015).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: No information was found on whether defence and security establishments have beneficial ownership in any businesses. There is no evidence that defence and security institutions are removed from ownership in the legislation, and Liberia does not consistently maintain beneficial ownership records, nor does it require that company ownership records be made public (Financial Secrecy Index, 2013; Front Page Africa, 2014). The result is that if defence and security institutions did have beneficial ownership in any commercial business, this information would not be readily available as there is no transparency regarding beneficial ownership in Liberia.

While Liberia is currently a part of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative's beneficial ownership pilot project, which aims to identify the real owners of the extractive companies operating in the country, currently Liberia does not require beneficial ownership information to identify the 'natural person' behind a company, only the corporate owners (Front Page Africa, 2014.) The EITI pilot project is expected to run until late 2015.

Given high levels corruption in Liberia (Front Page Africa, 2014), the limits on the collection of beneficial ownership information, and the strong secrecy regarding issues of defence and security, there is a strong possibility that defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: No information was found on whether defence and security establishments have beneficial ownership in any businesses, which is unsurprising as Liberia does not consistently maintain beneficial ownership records, and it does not require that company ownership records be made public (Financial Secrecy Index, 2013; Front Page Africa, 2014).

Liberia is currently a part of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative's beneficial ownership pilot project, which aims to identify the real owners of the extractive companies operating in the country. However, currently Liberia does not require beneficial ownership information to identify the 'natural person' behind a company, but only corporate owners (Front PAge Africa, 2014.) The EITI pilot project is expected to run until late 2015.

Given high levels corruption in Liberia (Front Page Africa, 2014), the limits on the collection of beneficial ownership information, and the strong secrecy regarding issues of defence and security, there is a strong possibility that defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses. However, there is no evidence that they are subject to transparent, independent scrutiny.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: There have been suspicions of unauthorized private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees. For example, Interviewee 2 spoke of personally witnessing AFL personnel selling their AFL uniforms, and stated that such uniforms are regularly seen for sale in local markets. He/she has also observed AFL personnel providing transportation to civilians for a fee, while on duty.

In addition, in December 2013, President Johnson-Sirleaf suspended a Deputy Minister at the Ministry of National defence, in connection with suspected fraudulent activity related to fuel, who was later cleared of all allegations.

While there is no evidence that private enterprise is explicitly permitted, given the lack of transparency surrounding defence and security, it is likely that it occurs and officials turn a blind eye to it.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, has publically committed to a zero-tolerance policy toward corruption. In support of this commitment, she dismissed 17,000 government employees upon taking office, and fired all of the transitional political appointees in the finance ministry after allegations of corruption came to light.

defence Minister Brownie Samukai, has also publically committed to integrity measures, emphasizing that the armed forces are accountable to the civilians they protect. He also noted in a speech at the Armed Forces Day Celebrations on February 11, 2014 that President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf “tasked us to set transparent, accountable and higher standards for entry into our new Armed Forces based on the order merit” (see Azango Maeazango, Mae) and concluded that this goal had been achieved.

The Commanding Officer in Charge of the AFL, Major General Suraji A. Abdurrahman has also publically called on new recruits to abide by the rule of law.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The Penal Code of Liberia criminalizes corruption (both active and passive), extortion, money laundering and the misuse of public funds. The Administrative Code of Conduct for the Executive Branch and the Code of Conduct Law prohibit nepotism, bribery and misuse of public funds. Violators can be suspended, demoted or dismissed from public service; the legislation also allows for offenders to be banned from government employment for 5 years after dismissal. If the violation amounts to a criminal offence, charges may also be laid.

There is some evidence of effective measures being carried out against personnel found to have taken part in bribery and corruption. After coming to power and committing to rid the government of corruption, President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf dismissed 17,000 government workers for corrupt behaviour. In addition, in December 2013, President Johnson-Sirleaf suspended the Deputy Minister, in connection with suspected fraudulent activity related to fuel, who was later cleared of all allegations.

Although a strong legal framework exists, concerns have been expressed by anti-corruption advocates that civil service positions are reserved for party members only, and that those who are not party members are pressured to join (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2012). It has also been noted that there have been very few successful prosecutions for corruption (U.S. State Department, 2013; Freedom House, 2015), and the government has been accused of turning a blind eye to corruption (Davis, 2014).

For example, the military enforced quarantines and travel restrictions imposed by the government during the Ebola crisis that hit the country in 2014, and some residents say they routinely bribed soldiers to let them through the barricades and checkpoints. Brig. Gen. Daniel D. Ziankahn, the Liberian military's Chief of Staff, has promised to fully investigate these allegations, and publish any wrongdoing (Freedom House, 2015). To date, there is no indication that any action has been taken against the soldiers accused of accepting bribes.

It is also worth noting that since the Code of Conduct law was only signed into effect on May 12, 2014, which may mean that not enough time has passed to determine if breaches are effectively addressed under this particular piece of legislation.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: A whistleblower law, introduced in 2010, is still pending before the Liberia legislature (Library of Congress, 2010). While the reasons the law remains stalled are unknown, it has been observed that members of the legislature have in the past refused to take action on legislation that threatened the personal financial benefits they receive as a result of their position (USAID, 2014, p.16)

In response to the inaction of the legislature, President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf issued an executive order implementing protections for whistleblowers on May 1, 2014, which aims to protect whistleblowers in both public and private institutions and allows whistleblowers to take legal actions in the event of retaliation (AllAfrica, 2014). Retaliation against whistleblowers is also deemed to be an indictable offense. The Administrative Code of Conduct also states that “a public servant shall be protected from discipline or reprisal for reporting in good faith, allegations of wrong doing or contraventions of the code.” (Executive Order #55, Part XII, Section 12.3). Despite such provisions, whistleblowing protection methods have not been implemented with any success. Global Integrity has pointed out that the legislation does not provide a mechanism for complaints such as a phone hotline, e-mail address or local office, and concerns have been raised that corruption is rife within the process (Global Integrity, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre).

The Liberian Anti Corruption Commission also has a whistleblower program under which anyone can report acts of corruption or impropriety to the LACC with the promise of confidentiality. However, the U.S. State Department points out that the LACC is often unable to act on such reports due to chronic under funding and under resourcing (U.S. State Department, 2013)

According to Global Integrity and Interviewee 2, Individuals generally fear retaliation for exposing wrongdoing, and there have been cases of reprisals against whistleblowers at state owned enterprises, such as the National Port of Authority, where employees who blew the whistle on wrongdoing were fired, allegedly for their breach of confidence. Only one case of whistleblowing involving the defence and security sector could be found, a case which includes allegations of corruption against numerous high ranking government officials, including the President and the Minister of defence. The outcome of this case is pending.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Due to the fact that the Liberian armed forces were completely disbanded and built from scratch beginning in 2004, all recruits, including personnel at the middle and top management, have been selected through a rigorous vetting process, which has been called by some the best in the world (see International Crisis Group, 2009). This vetting process includes literacy, aptitude, drug and HIV testing and obtaining assurances from the public that the individual has no history of war crimes or human rights violations stemming from the country’s civil wars. There has also been a concerted effort to hire educated personnel, with many having at least a high school education.

In addition, the Administrative Code of Conduct stipulates that those “involved in making decisions affecting contracting, tendering or procurement, and issuing of licenses of various types shall sign performance or financial bonds and shall in addition declare his/her income, assets and liabilities.” The information is to be provided to the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) and updated as necessary (Executive Order #55, Part X, Section 10.1-10.2). However, there is no mention in the Code of specific vetting requirements, rotation of post or post retirement restrictions, and there is no evidence that such positions are openly declared or made public.

In addition, while the Code applies to all government civil employees, which would include procurement officers, finance managers and commercial managers, as well as personnel involved in awarding and overseeing contracts within the Ministry of Defence, the Code does not apply to members of the Armed Forces of Liberia. It is unknown if special attention is paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions within the AFL.

While there is some recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others, limited information could be found on mechanisms for selection and oversight of such positions. While the LACC is responsible for overseeing the asset declaration process, It has also been noted that such provisions have not been well enforced and known conflicts of interest have been ignored (United Nations, 2014). There are also concerns with the capacity of the LACC to maintain and verify this information, highlighted by the fact there are 30 cases of individuals believed to have misrepresented their assets during their conflict of interest disclosure to the LACC that have yet to be investigated (United Nations, 2014).

Despite such challenges, a score of 2 has been selected to reflect the fact that the Code’s asset declaration requirements for those “involved in making decisions affecting contracting, tendering or procurement, and issuing of licenses of various types” reflect that special attention is paid to some personnel in sensitive positions, although these positions are not declared and there is limited clarity over the mechanisms for selection and oversight of these positions. The score also reflects the lack of information regarding the attention paid to such positions within the Armed Forces.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The number of military personnel is thought to be known and publicly available. The most recent available sources indicate the current Liberian armed forces is made up of 1,835 personnel (United Nations Security Council, 2015) and comprises two infantry battalions (1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Brigade and 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Brigade) and supporting units. This is supplemented by 4,415 UNMIL troops. While the UNMIL figures are likely to be accurate, the Ministry of defence does not make this information publicly available. The number of civilian personnel in the Ministry is not known.

It is worth noting that the expected upcoming withdrawal of UNMIL troops from the country, responsibility for security will rest solely with the Liberian forces; this fact is reflected in the 2014/15 draft national budget, which proposes a 27% increase in allocations for the security sector over the previous fiscal year. Liberia's National defence Strategy calls for the AFL to be be 2,500 strong by mid-2015.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel are published in the Ministry of National defence Executive Law (Chapter 10). Although the pay rates have increased significantly in recent years, the salaries of public officials remain very low. The minimum pay for civil servant is US$100 per month. Most soldiers in the AFL make about US$210 per month, which is higher than most Liberians but not enough to support a family. There is also a large gap between the personnel at the bottom and those at the top in the Ministry of defence. There have been promises to provide pensions to members of the AFL, but the necessary laws have yet to be passed.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Although the rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel are published in the Ministry of National defence Executive Law (Chapter 10), concerns exist about the capacity of the Ministry of defence to handle its payroll. For example, army personnel and Ministry of defence civil servants often experience delays in receiving their pay (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2012), and the AFL personnel serving as peacekeepers with the United Nations in Mali went for 5 months without pay. This mismanagement can be attributed to the Ministry of defence (and not the United Nations), as it was the Ministry of Defence who was managing these payrolls (Liberia News Agency, 2013). There is also evidence of discretionary payments, such as bonuses and some allowances, which are processed outside of the normal system and without oversight (IMF, 2012, p.55).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Due to the fact that the Liberian armed forces were completely disbanded and built from scratch beginning in 2004, all recruits, including personnel at the middle and top management, have been selected through a rigorous vetting process, which has been called by some the best in the world (International Crisis Group, 2009). This vetting process includes literacy, aptitude, drug and HIV testing and obtaining assurances from the public that the individual has no history of war crimes or human rights violations stemming from the country’s civil wars. There has also been a concerted effort to hire and promote educated personnel, with many having at least a high school education (Security Sector Reform Resource Center, 2012).

Appointments within the AFL are considered to be based on merit and there is an established and documented system, although this system is not published. All appointments to the Officer Corp. from the rank of 1st Lieutenant to General are made by the President, and must be confirmed by the Senate (Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, Article 54; Interviewee 3, 2015). Promotion is based on time in the service, output and performance, and a bachelor degree is a major requirement for appointments at this level. Recommendations for appointment are made in collaboration with mentors from the US Army and ECOWAS, after potential candidates complete a standard written and practical test (Interviewee 3, 2015).
Top figures within Liberia’s defence and security institutions have also publically committed to a merit-based promotion system. During the commissioning of Brig. General D. Daniel D. Ziankhan in 2014, Defence Minister Brownie Samukai, reflecting on the instructions of President Sirleaf-Johnson, stated “you…tasked us to set transparent, accountable and higher standards for entry into our new Armed Forces based on the order merit. You called for a military that is robustly trained, prepared to defend our territorial integrity and as a matter of policy ensure that not one inch of our territory should be used to destabilize our neighbors. I am proud to report madam President that our new military is ready to carry out its mission” (Azango, 2014). President Sirleaf-Johnson echoed these sentiments at the same public ceremony: “Fellow Liberians, today we have made a transition in the Armed Forces of Liberia based on a very credible vetting process, and on the order of merit. We have been able to appoint... well-trained, experienced and disciplined Liberian officers as the new dedicated leaders of our Armed Forces&quoute; (Parley, 2014).

This rigorous system of recruitment and promotion is overseen by the Liberian Ministry of Defence, in conjunction with mentors from the United States military and tECOWASwho advise the Liberian government (GlobalSecurity.Org, 2012; Interviewee 3, 2015). There is also oversight from the Legislature of Liberia, due to the fact that promotions within the Officer Corp have to be confirmed by the Senate (Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, Article 54; Interviewee 3, 2015).

Despite evidence of the existence of an established system for the appointment of military personnel at middle and top management level, the process is not made public (Interviewee 3, 2015) and there is no information related to open and objective job descriptions, with , the relevant pages on the Ministry of Defence website state 'content will be available soon' (http://www.mod.gov.lr/). Concerns have also been expressed by anti-corruption advocates that civil service positions are reserved for party members only, and that those who are not party members are pressured to join the party (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2012).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: A legal framework exists for an objective, meritocratic process of promotions, including the Code of Conduct passed by the Legislature in 2014, which prohibits nepotism and provides for the suspension, demotion or dismissal from service as a sanction for nepotism. In addition, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Liberia, has declared that her appointments of top personnel in the Armed Forces of Liberia to be “based on a very credible vetting process, and on the order of merit. We have been able to appoint... well-trained, experienced and disciplined Liberian officers as the new dedicated leaders of our Armed Forces&quoute; (Parley, 2014).

Despite such statements, no information could be found outlining the promotion process, and limited transparency in the promotion system has been identified as a concern within the security sector by UNMIL.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: There is no conscription in Liberia.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: There is no conscription (compulsory or voluntary) in Liberia.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: There has been evidence of non-existent or retired civil servants on the government payroll in the past (Interviewee 2, 2015; BBC, 2007; IMF, 2012; USAID Report, 2014) and efforts have been made to remove them, including a comprehensive audit and the introduction of a biometric identity system (IMF, 2012, p.56 & 57). There is evidence that these efforts were not completely successful as ghost workers were discovered on the payroll as recently as 2013 (USAID Report, 2014).

The AFL was completely disbanded and rebuilt from scratch, beginning in 2004, making it easier to keep track of the overall wage budget for the AFL. However, the existence of ghost soldiers is still a possibility given that &quoute;security sector agencies—the Armed Forces of Liberia, the Liberia National Police, the Special Security Service, and the National Security Agency...process their payroll through the Accounting Services Unit, Comptroller and Accountant General, Ministry of Finance, outside of Government Accounting Payroll System...making it difficult to apply standard controls and audit trails to all government payroll processing&quoute; (IMF, 2012, p.55). It is also been suggested that Liberia suffers from &quoute;entrenched, syndicate-like practices of bureaucratic corruption that are both systemic and organized&quoute; and that &quoute; government payroll in Liberia is dominated by syndicates of corruption that operate at all levels of the public administration&quoute; (USAID Report, 2013).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Chains of command are generally separate from chains of payment. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for all military-related expenditures, including payroll, which is managed by an administration department and a comptroller within the Ministry of Defence (Interviewee 3, 2015; Front Page Africa, 2014). While this system is documented in internal polices and procedures, it is not a published policy (Interviewee 3, 2015).

Given the 'start from scratch' approach of the post-2004 AFL and its extensive use of US advisers (International Crisis Group, 2009; Security Sector Reform Resource Center, 2012); it is likely that in practice, chains of command are separate from chains of payment. However, there is evidence that the controls in place may not be entirely effective, demonstrated by the recent suspension of 4 personnel within the Ministry of Defence for manipulating payroll controls in order to defraud the Ministry (Front Page Africa, 2015), although there is no indication that such manipulation served to remove any separation between chains of command and chains payment.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The Code of Conduct Law applies to all public officials and employees of the Government of Liberia, including civilian employees of the Ministry of defence. A separate Administrative Code of Conduct for members of the Executive Branch of Government also exists. The Administrative Code of Conduct for the Executive Branch addresses the use of public funds and property by government employees, gifts, bribery and conflict of interest. It does not deal with post-separation activities. The Code of Conduct Law was passed by the legislature in 2014 and is very similar to the Administrative Code of Conduct, but it adds nepotism to the list of prohibited behaviour. However, these Codes of Conduct do not apply to military personnel, who are supposed to be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice has been signed by Minister of defence in 2013 (United Nations, 2014) but not yet ratified by legislature. As a result of this inaction, President Johnson Sirleaf has issued executive orders that all sanctions for military personnel should be implemented in keeping with the Code (Africa News Service, 2014; Liberia News Agency, 2014). While the Uniform Code of Military Justice is mentioned extensively in secondary sources, the Code itself is not a public document (Interviewee 3, 2015). As a result of the inability to examine the primary source, it is not known whether it addresses corruption.

However, conduct standards for personnel relating to corruption and bribery are in the Penal Code as well.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: There are indications of breaches of the code of conduct being effectively addressed. Disciplinary measures include warnings, demotion, fines and dismissal. If the violation amounts to a criminal offence, charges may also be laid. There is evidence of charges being made public (Liberian News Agency, 2014), although it is not known whether it is a policy to do so.

There are concerns over the effectiveness of military justice however, as resource shortfalls are common. First, the Uniform Code of Military Justice has not yet been ratified by the legislature, so it is unclear which code of conduct currently governs the armed forces, despite the fact that President Johnson Sirleaf has issued executive orders that all sanctions for military personnel should be implemented in keeping with the Code (Africa News Service, 2014; Liberia News Agency, 2014). Second, personnel, training and facilities for military justice are deficient. The lack of lawyers in particular is a concern, because without them military personnel who violate the Liberian Uniform Code of Military Justice (once it is implemented) will not be able to be brought before a courts martial for their crimes (Skinner, 2011). Despite such shortcomings, there have been examples of soldiers being discharged from the AFL for other violations such as drug use (Liberian News Agency, 2014).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Since the creation of the new armed forces, Liberia has been a beneficiary of much international support, including military training. This training has come from UNMIL, as well as countries, such as Ghana, the United Kingdom, and the United States, although much of the training has been ad hoc in nature. It is not known whether these training initiatives included an anti-corruption component.

The United States in particular has been an active participant through its support of the Liberia Security Sector Reform program, known as Operation Onward Liberty, a five year program that began in 2010. However, under this program the Armed Forces of Liberia has been responsible for training its own forces, with the U.S. advisors playing a supporting and advisory role (GlobalSecurity.Org, 2015).

While training for the AFL and civilian defence personnel is ongoing, the frequency and depth of training specific to anti-corruption is not known. DynCorp had originally proposed training with a focus on rule of law, however the time allocated for this training was later cut short as a result of time constraints. While there is evidence that anti-corruption training has occurred for those involved in procurement and for those deployed in Mali with the United Nations (The New Dawn, 2013) and for those commanders who have been trained at military academies overseas (Cooper, 2014; Interviewee 3, 2015) there is no indication that all military personnel routinely receive specialised anti-corruption training.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The National defence Law mandates that a notice of all upcoming courts-martial must be posted publicly, however the military justice system in Liberia is still in the development phase, as the Uniform Code of Military Justice has not yet been ratified by the legislature, and the training of lawyers to enforce military justice and carry out courts martial is still ongoing .

While there have been examples of soldiers being discharged from the AFL for violations such as drug use, extensive research turned up no cases of criminal prosecutions of AFL soldiers since the reconstruction of the force. As discussed in Question 35, the government has been accused of turning a blind eye to corruption.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: While the Liberian Penal Code criminalizes active and passive corruption (bribery), extortion, attempted corruption, foreign bribery and money laundering, as well as misuse of entrusted property (Global Integrity, 2011), research did not find any indication that facilitation payments are explicitly prohibited. However, an IFC & World Bank Enterprise Study found that a high percentage of companies reported regularly paying facilitation payments for the provision of public services, permits or licenses, or to secure a government contract. This same study found that the rates of occurrence for facilitation payments are significantly higher in Liberia than in other Sub Saharan African countries, and than in other low income countries. In fact, petty bribery in Liberian is widespread, despite laws prohibiting it (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2012).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: It is thought that the Armed Forces of Liberia do have a military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations, however this cannot be confirmed as the document is not publicly available (Interviewee 3, 2015).

The Liberian Armed Forces has limited experience in international operations. The country participated in its first peacekeeping mission since the end of the civil war when it contributed to the UN MINUSMA in Mali (the only other time the country had participated in international peacekeeping was in the 1960’s when it sent troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo). Domestically, security operations have been under the authority of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) since 2003, although the UNMIL force has begun to draw down its presence and share responsibility for domestic security with the Armed Forces of Liberia (United Nations Security Council, 2014).

More recently the AFL has been involved in internal operations, including helping to secure the border with Ivory Coast as part of Operation Restore Hope (Parley, 2015), and providing security and contributing to the construction of medical facilities during the recent Ebola outbreak. There is evidence that the military was at least aware of corruption as a strategic risk during these operations, and Joseph F. Johnson, a deputy minister at Liberia’s defence Ministry, highlighted the importance of the AFL earning the trust of the people through good behaviour during the Ebola crisis (Cooper, 2014). Despite such acknowledgment, numerous reports of bribery surfaced during the AFL’s quarantine of the West Point neighbourhood during the Ebola crisis (Onishi, 2014).

There is further evidence that the senior defence and military leadership are well aware of corruption as a strategic issue, or at least acknowledge it in public, as Defence Minister Brownie Samukai did in February 2014 when he spoke publicly about the need for the AFL to regain the trust of the Liberian people through transparency and accountability (Azango, 2014). UNMIL officials have also identified corruption within Liberia's security sector as a concern, with the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative to Liberia observing that corruption pervades every aspect of Liberian society, and identifying corruption within the security sector as particularly troubling (Harmon, 2014).

Note: A score of 2 has been chosen instead of 3 because although the country is thought to have a military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue for operations, this cannot be confirmed as the document is not publicly available.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The Liberian Armed Forces has limited experience in international operations. The country participated in its first peacekeeping mission since the end of the civil war when they contributed to the UN MINUSMA in Mali (the only other time the country had participated in international peacekeeping was in the 1960’s when they sent troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo). Domestically, security operations have been under the authority of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) since 2003, although the UNMIL force has begun to draw down its presence and share responsibility for domestic security with the Armed Forces of Liberia (United Nations Security Council, 2014), and the AFL have recently been involved in operations to secure the border with Ivory Coast and in providing emergency relief during the Ebola Crisis (Parley, 2015; Cooper, 2014).

Armed Forces of Liberia personnel that participated in the UN mission in Mali underwent rigorous pre-deployment training that was tailored to the risks that would be faced in Mali. Under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the training included courses in humanitarian law, ethics and human rights. The soldiers were also trained in the UN peacekeeping code of conduct, which addresses anti-corruption in its ‘Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets.’

Domestically, anti-corruption is believed to be an integral part of the training process for all members of the Officer Corp, with anti-corruption training believed to take place about 3 times a year (Interviewee 3, 2015), although no documented evidence of this could be found. In addition, the AFL's new generation of commanders are typically trained at military academies overseas - often in the United States - and it is likely that they receive training on corruption issues at these institutions (Cooper, 2014; Interviewee 3, 2015).

There is evidence that such training is applied in the field, illustrated by the public acknowledgements by senior military officials during the Ebola crisis of the importance of accountability and good behaviour in building the reputation of the AFL and earning the trust of the people (Cooper, 2014).

However, despite such training, there has also been evidence that these officers engage in, or turn a blind eye, to corrupt activities (MacDougall, 2014); examples include questionable transactions by the Ministry of National Defence in their disbursement of funds for fighting Ebola (The NEWS Monrovia, 2015) and the scandal surrounding the procurement of rice for army barracks, found by the General Auditing Commission to have been paid for and recorded as received, despite never being delivered (Bayjay, 2011).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: It is unclear whether or not corruption monitors are deployed.

The Armed Forces of Liberia have very little experience in international operations. The country participated in its first peacekeeping mission since the end of the civil war when they contributed to the UN MINUSMA in Mali (the only other time the country had participated in international peacekeeping was in the 1960’s when they sent troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo). Domestically, security operations have been under the authority of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) since 2003 , although the UNMIL force has begun to draw down its presence and share responsibility for domestic security with the Armed Forces of Liberia (United Nations Security Council, 2014).

More recently the AFL has been involved in internal operations, including helping to secure the border with Ivory Coast as part of Operation Restore Hope (Parley, 2015), and providing security and contributing to the construction of medical facilities during the recent Ebola outbreak. There is evidence that the military was at least aware of corruption as a strategic risk during these operations, and Joseph F. Johnson, a deputy minister at Liberia’s defence Ministry, highlighted the importance of the AFL earning the trust of the people through good behaviour during the Ebola crisis (Cooper, 2014). Despite such acknowledgment, it is unknown whether or not trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Guidelines are believed to exist addressing contracting in operations, however they are not made public so the level of detail they contain is unknown (Interviewee 3, 2015). There is evidence that these guidelines may be applied selectively. Questionable transactions by the Ministry of Defence were uncovered by the General Auditing Commission, where funds were dispersed for “fuel, feeding, daily subsistence allowance, communication, medical and training, repair and maintenance” without proper documentation (The NEWS Monrovia, 2015). The General Auditing Commission had also previously uncovered misappropriated funds in the procurement of rice for army barracks, which were found to have been paid for and recorded as received, despite never being delivered (Bayjay, 2011).

The Armed Forces of Liberia have very little experience in international operations. The country participated in its first peacekeeping mission since the end of the civil war when they contributed to the UN MINUSMA in Mali (the only other time the country had participated in international peacekeeping was in the 1960’s when they sent troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo). Domestically, security operations have been under the authority of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) since 2003, although the UNMIL force has begun to draw down its presence and share responsibility for domestic security with the Armed Forces of Liberia (United Nations Security Council, 2014).

More recently the AFL has been involved in internal operations, including helping to secure the border with Ivory Coast as part of Operation Restore Hope (Parley, 2015), and providing security and contributing to the construction of medical facilities during the recent Ebola outbreak. There is evidence that the military was at least aware of corruption as a strategic risk during these operations, and Joseph F. Johnson, a deputy minister at Liberia’s defence Ministry, highlighted the importance of the AFL earning the trust of the people through good behaviour during the Ebola crisis (Cooper, 2014).

In regards to training, Armed Forces of Liberia personnel that participated in the UN mission in Mali underwent rigorous pre-deployment training that was tailored to the risks that would be faced in Mali. Under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the training included courses in humanitarian law, ethics and human rights. The soldiers were also trained in the UN peacekeeping code of conduct, which addresses anti-corruption in its ‘Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets. In addition, the AFL's new generation of commanders are typically trained at military academies overseas - often in the United States - and it is likely that they receive training on corruption issues at these institutions (Cooper, 2014; Interviewee 3, 2015). However, it is not known whether any of this training covered corruption risks in contracting.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The use of PMCs in Liberia represents a peculiar experience, because instead of a PMC being hired by a nation’s armed forces, in Liberia the PMCs were hired to build the nation’s armed forces.

Following the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the United States State Department contracted DynCorp International, a private defence contractor, to “demobilize and rebuild the Armed Forces of Liberia and its Ministry of Defence, the first time in 150 years that one sovereign nation hired a private company to raise and develop another sovereign nation’s military” (McFate, 2013). Another private defence contractor, Pacific Architects & Engineers (PA&E) was also hired by the U.S. State Department to conduct training, although PA&E played a lesser role than DynCorp (McFate, 2013).

While both DynCorp and PAE are no longer operating in Liberia, there is no evidence that the country has since implemented any oversight mechanisms for PMCs. It should also be noted that Liberia is not a member of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers’ Association (ICoCA), the voluntary international body that is responsible for overseeing private security service providers and promoting the industry code of conduct.

The government of Liberia exercised limited oversight and control over these PMCs, as Liberia was essentially a collapsed state at the time these companies were contracted, and therefore the United States, and to a lesser extent the international community, took primary responsibility for the hiring, funding and control of these PMCs. This resulted in a situation where these PMCs were accountable to the United States government, who was funding them, and not to the Liberian government (Beswick, 2014; Phillips, 2007; McFate, 2013; Kwaja, 2011). In fact, the Liberian government had such limited input into the security sector reform process taking place in its own country that even the Minister of Defence did not have a copy of DynCorp's contract to reform the Armed Forces of Liberia (McFate, 2013;.Phillips, 2007).

Allegations of corruption and mismanagement by PMCs was prevalent during this period. Both PAE and DynCorp were accused of spending over $172 million without any input from the Liberian government (Kwaja, 2011). While attempts were made by Liberia's parliamentary committees to obtain information from DynCorp regarding its role in Liberia’s security sector reform process, as well as the suspected mismanagement of funds, these attempts at accessing information were rebuffed by the companies and by the United States, without consequence (Kwaja, 2011; Jaye, 2012).

There is no evidence that any sanctions have since been put in place to ensure oversight of PMCs in Liberia and punish corrupt PMCs, and no instances could be found of PMCs being prosecuted for such behaviour.

As a result, a score of 1 has been awarded as there is no evidence that oversight mechanisms or sanctions for corrupt PMCs have been put in place, both of which are key criteria for a score of 2. Evidence of significant corruption in the past, and a lack of new controls to prevent this from reoccurring, justifies a score of 1.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Liberia has a strong legal framework in place covering public procurement, the foundation of which is the Public Procurement and Concessions Act (PPC Act, 2010) and its accompanying Procurement Regulations. The legislation creates “a clear, standardized, and transparent system” for public procurement (U.S. Department of State, 2013) and establishes the Public Procurement Complaints Commission (PPCC), which has a mandate to prevent corruption in the procurement process. The Act also allows for bidders to be debarred for convictions for bribery and corruption.

Despite the strong framework provided by the PCC Act, defence procurement is largely exempt from its provisions. The PCC Act does not apply to procurement related to national security or national defence if the procurement is deemed by the minister of National defence to require “the application of special procedures” [PCC Act, Section 5(a), 2010]. It is unlikely that these exempt procurement are independently scrutinized. defence related procurement of items such as “uniforms, stationery, office equipment and ordinary vehicles for the military or security agencies” are not covered by this exemption [PCC Act, Section 5(b), 2010].

In addition to defence related exemptions, the country’s procurement laws also fall short due to resource and implementation challenges.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: There is no evidence that a defence procurement cycle is disclosed to the public. It is possible none has been formalised as there is no evidence that aspects such as needs assessment, contract implementation, in-life support or asset disposal are formally planned for.

According to the FAQ section on the website of the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission, each procuring unit “ shall prepare an annual procurement plan for goods, works, and services in accordance with the Procuring Entity's approved programs and budget and furnish it to the Procurement Committee for review and approval.“ This procurement plan should be reviewed on a quarterly basis, or as needed.

However, there is no requirement in the PCC Act for information on these procurement plans to be made public, and there is limited public access to information about the procurement process, including tenders advertised, contracts awarded and dispute resolution. It is concluded that the procurement phase is not systematically reported nor regularly made available to the public.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The Public Procurement and Concession Commission (PPCC) is an autonomous government entity that has a “mandate to oversee, regulate and monitor all forms of public procurement and concessions practices in Liberia” (See http://www.ppcc.gov.lr/). However, the PPCC has faced many challenges, such as a lack of resources, which has limited its ability to consistently review and monitor all contracts. In addition, government ministries and agencies rarely follow public procurement regulations, and on May 15, 2014, the Executive Director of the Pubic Procurement and Concessions Commission resigned over the refusal of heads of public corporations to follow procurement procedures. In recent years the government of Liberia has taken steps to strengthen the PPCC, including increasing its staff by 30% and acquiring suitable technical capabilities (i.e. computer equipment). Despite these improvements, the majority of defence and security procurement is permitted to be exempt from the PCC Act, as well as PPCC oversight, meaning there is no oversight over the majority of defence procurement.

As mentioned in Question 15, the vast majority of defence procurement is exempt from the oversight of the General Auditing Commission as well.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Although one of the mandates of the PPCC is to increase transparency in the public procurement system, defence and security procurement is for the most part exempt from the PCC Act and PPCC oversight. Section 5(a) of the PCC Act states: “Where the Minister responsible for defence, or the head of any national security agency with the prior approval of the President and the National Security Council, determines that any procurement related to national defence or national security requires the application of special procedures, the procedures set out in this Act may be modified by the Commission for the specific procurement, but the modification shall be governed strictly by considerations relating to defence or security. “ While the Act specifies that minor defence related procurement such as the purchase of office equipment and uniforms “shall not be classified as related to national defence or national security procurement,” (Section 5[b]) it fails to clearly define the security justification to be used to exempt larger scale procurement. It also fails to establish independent oversight over the exempt procurement.

Information regarding defence and security related procurement in Liberia is made public sporadically, sometimes by the Liberian government and sometimes through other sources. The National Budget only includes aggregate spending for minor purchases, such a fuel, office materials and property rentals or leases. The deputy defence minister Joseph Johnson has noted that the Liberian national budget is inadequate to support the equipment, training and logistical needs of the Liberian armed forces, and the country is therefore dependent on foreign assistance to meet such needs (Nkala, 2015). As a result, defence and security related procurement is primarily handled by foreign donors. For example, the United States government has in the past donated equipment to the Liberian Armed Forces, including $2.2 million worth of equipment in 2014, along with $1 million for additional operational procurement (Nkala, 2014), and in January 2015 China donated $3.3 million for the acquisition of new military equipment (Nkala, 2015), although no specific information could be found on any procurement resulting from this grants. In the case of the donation by the United States, it was made public by the United States government. The donation from China was announced by the Liberian government.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Under the PCC Act, the procuring entity (government ministry or agency) is responsible for determining the qualifications a bidder must possess to be eligible to bid on public procurement projects; there are no mandated requirements and the qualification criteria are determined solely by the procuring entity. Although the legislation promotes anti-corruption and states that companies convicted of bribery or corruption are banned from bidding on government contracts, in practice, no company has been blacklisted, despite reports of wrongdoing.

As most defence and security procurement is exempt from the laws and regulations governing public procurement, it is not known what kind of requirements are imposed on companies involved in defence and security related procurement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: While Liberia has a national security strategy, it was only introduced in February 2014. In addition, defence and security procurement is for the most part exempt from the laws and regulations governing public procurement (Amended at Restated Public Procurement and Concessions Act, 2010), meaning defence procurement is for the most part not made public. It is therefore not known whether procurement requirements are effectively derived from the national security strategy. There is no evidence to suggest that the strategy is audited.

It is important to note here that Liberia has been under a UN Security Council arms embargo since 1992. From 2003-2009, the embargo allowed for transfers to the UN Peacekeeping Force (UNMIL), as well as the Liberian government and security forces. The embargo was lifted in 2009, however the embargo on arms to non-governmental forces, as well as the requirement to notify the Liberian government in advance of any shipments, remains in place (SIPRI, 2015).

It is also worth noting that much of Liberia’s defence and military equipment is donated. Liberian deputy defence minister Joseph Johnson has stated that the Liberian national budget is inadequate to support the equipment, training and logistical needs of the Liberian armed forces, and the country is therefore dependent on foreign assistance to meet such needs (Nkala, 2015). As a result, China provided Liberia with $3.3 million to finance the acquisition of new military equipment and to meet the logistical demands of the AFL (Nkala, 215); likewise the United States government has in the past donated equipment to the Liberian Armed Forces, including $2.2 million worth of equipment in 2014, along with $1 million for additional operational procurement. The primary equipment in this package was two patrol boats for the Liberian coast guard (Nkala, 2014).

Due to the fact that most procurement is dependent on foreign assistance, defence procurement in Liberia can be said to be opportunistic. A score of 1 has been chosen to reflect the fact that Liberia has a national security strategy in place, however procurement is often outside of the national strategy and opportunistic in nature.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Although there are formal procedures in place governing procurement, defence and security procurement is for the most part exempt from these laws and regulations and most defence procurement is not made public (Amended at Restated Public Procurement and Concessions Act, Section 5[a]). It is therefore not known if a formal procedure is in place for defining requirements.

However, Liberian deputy defence minister Joseph Johnson has noted that the Liberian national budget is inadequate to support the equipment, training and logistical needs of the Liberian armed forces, and the country is therefore dependent on foreign assistance to meet such needs (Nkala, 2015). As a result, defence and security related procurement is primarily handled by foreign donors. For example, the United States government has in the past donated equipment to the Liberian Armed Forces, including $2.2 million worth of equipment in 2014, along with $1 million for additional operational procurement (Nkala, 2014), and in January 2015 China donated $3.3 million for the acquisition of new military equipment (Nkala, 2015), although no specific information could be found on any procurement resulting from such grants.

Therefore, while it is not known if a formal procedure is in place for defining purchase requirements, it can be inferred that procurement tends to be opportunistic in nature as Liberia is primarily dependent on foreign donors for defence procurement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: As the majority of defence and security procurement is not audited and the details of most agreements are not made public, it is difficult to know the extent to which defence and security procurement is conducted through sole sourcing. However, observers have noticed that despite the fact that the PCC Act strictly limits the use of sole sourcing and requires advertised competitive bidding (Amended at Restated Public Procurement and Concessions Act, 2010; U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2012), single sourcing is used frequently by other government institutions as a result of the decentralization of the procurement process to the procuring entities, who lack the capacity to operationalize effective procurement planning (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2013).

It is important to note here that Liberia has been placed under a UN Security Council arms embargo since 1992. From 2003-2009, the embargo allowed for transfers to the UN Peacekeeping Force (UNMIL), as well as the Liberian government and security forces. The embargo was lifted in 2009, however the embargo on arms to non-governmental forces, as well as the requirement to notify the Liberian government in advance of any shipments, remains in place (SIPRI, 2015). The Liberian deputy defence minister Joseph Johnson has also stated the Liberian national budget is inadequate to support the equipment, training and logistical needs of the Liberian armed forces, making the country dependent on foreign assistance to meet such needs (Nkala, 2015).

As a result, the evidence suggests that defence procurement in Liberia has principally been handled by external donors, including the USA and China. For example, China recently provided Liberia with $3.3 million to finance the acquisition of new military equipment and to meet the logistical demands of the AFL; further information regarding the use of these funds in defence and security procurement in Liberia could not be found (Nkala, 2015). In addition, the United States government has in the past donated equipment to the Liberian Armed Forces, including $2.2 million worth of equipment in 2014, along with $1 million for additional operational procurement (Nkala, 2014).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: No information could be found about the rules and regulations governing tender boards in Liberia. However, the majority of defence and security procurement is not conducted through tender boards as it is not made public. A thorough review of bids posted on the PPCC website and on Liberian tender boards found no tenders related to defence and security.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The PCC Act prohibits collusion and allows for a bidder to be debarred from participation in public procurement for collusion or for interfering “with the participation of competing bidders” [Section 44.2(c)], and one of the mandates of the PPCC is to eliminate monopolies and foster competitiveness in the public procurement process.

These provisions do not apply to defence procurement however, as the PCC Act exempts such procurement at the discretion of the Minister of Defence or the head of the National Security Agency, with the approval of the President and the National Security Council (Section 5[a]), and according to Transparency International “no company has ever been blacklisted, despite suspicions of wrongdoing” (Transparency International, 2013).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Although the PCC Act provides for mandatory training for all procurement officials, until recently little training has been provided. One of the priorities of the government in strengthening the public procurement system has been to increase the capacity of procurement personnel to fight corruption and receive value for money through targeted and extensive training. For existing employees, this has included a short program on basic procurement as well as ongoing monthly procurement training sessions focused on practical procurement skills. For new employees, a procurement school has been established which offers an intensive one year program for 25 students per year.

Recent initiatives have included working group sessions on procurement planning, transparency and accountability in procurement, compliance requirements, bid evaluations and record keeping. A variety of procurement officials have participated in these training sessions, from heads of entities, comptrollers and procurement directors. It is unclear to what extent the defence sector specifically has been covered.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The PCC Act established the Complaints, Appeals and Review Panel (CARP), where unsuccessful bidders can challenge the PPCC decisions.

The Public Procurement & Concessions Complaint Procedures - A Step By Step Guide, outlines the complaints procedure, which begins with a formal complaint to the procuring entity (government ministry or agency). If unsatisfied with the response from the procuring entity, the aggrieved party can request that the case be reviewed by the CARP. If the CARP does not issue a decision within the required 45 days, the aggrieved party “may proceed directly to a court of competent jurisdiction for judicial review” (see Public Procurement & Concessions Complaint Procedures - A Step By Step Guide, 2012). The PPCC is supposed to make public all decisions of the CARP, although this does not always occur (International Monetary Fund, 2012).

There is evidence that the complaints procedure is utilized by companies (see PPCC website). While no specific evidence was found of reprisals towards complaining companies, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are not protected from recrimination or other negative consequences (Global Integrity, 2011). As a result, it is reasonable to assume reprisals take place given the high levels of corruption within the whistleblowing system.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Companies found guilty of major violations of procurement regulations are susceptible to fines of up to $100,000 and suspension from participation in public procurement. If the act is deemed to be criminal, prosecution and prison time of up to 5 years can result.

Despite the provision of strong sanctions, the investigation and punishment of wrongdoing in public procurement is an area that has been identified as being in need of further development (Global Integrity, 2011; U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2013). Highlighting this gap is the fact that while the law provides for the blacklisting of companies who have committed wrongdoing, no companies have yet been added to the list (Global Integrity, 2011; U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2013).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Extensive research has revealed no information on government offset contracts. Interviewee 1 is not aware that they exist in Liberia. This is not surprising considering the secrecy that surrounds the defence and security sector in Liberia, where most defence related procurement is not made public, and the defence and security sector are for the most part exempt from oversight, including audits. Give the lack of transparency surrounding the defence and security sector in Liberia, it is unlikely that the government imposes stringent due diligence requirements on contractors during offset contract negotiations, or that it follows up on offset contract performance with audits.

As mentioned in Question 76, Liberia is not in a position to conduct defence acquisitions on a significant scale and as such, it is highly unlikely it engages in offset contracts.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Extensive research has revealed no information on government offset contracts. Interviewee 1 is not aware that any exist in Liberia. This is not surprising considering the secrecy that surrounds the defence and security sector in Liberia, where most defence related procurement is not made public, and the defence and security sector are for the most part exempt from oversight, including audits. Give the lack of transparency surrounding the defence and security sector in Liberia, it is unlikely that the government imposes stringent due diligence requirements on contractors during offset contract negotiations, or that it follows up on offset contract performance with audits.

As mentioned in Question 76, Liberia is not in a position to conduct defence acquisitions on a significant scale and as such, it is highly unlikely it engages in offset contracts.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Extensive research has revealed no information on government offset contracts. Interviewee 1 is not aware that they exist in Liberia. This is not surprising considering the secrecy that surrounds the defence and security sector in Liberia, where most defence related procurement is not made public, and the defence and security sector are for the most part exempt from oversight, including audits. Give the lack of transparency surrounding the defence and security sector in Liberia, it s unlikely that the government imposes stringent due diligence requirements on contractors during offset contract negotiations, or that it follows up on offset contract performance with audits.

As mentioned in Question 76, Liberia is not in a position to conduct defence acquisitions on a significant scale and as such, it is highly unlikely it engages in offset contracts.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: The PCC Act allows the use of agents and intermediaries, but there does not seem to be a specific policy governing their use. There are some stipulations regarding conflicts of interest (i.e. if the agent has a relationship with a procurement agent) in the PCC Act, but there is no additional vetting or scrutiny.

Considering most defence and security procurement is exempted from the PCC Act, it is not likely that these controls are enforced in practice. Interviewee was unaware of any details surrounding the use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle for defence and security institution, confirming the lack of transparency surrounding this issue.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Extensive research has revealed no information on any major arms deals signed by Liberia. This is not surprising considering the secrecy that surrounds the defence and security sector in Liberia. This secrecy means that most defence procurement is not made public, and that a significant portion of the defence and security sector are for the most part exempt from oversight, including audits (Interviewee 1).

In addition, the UN and numerous countries have imposed sanctions on Liberia that include arms embargoes, although the embargo has been temporarily lifted for the Liberian government and security forces. As a result of the arms embargoes, Liberia does not export weapons, and the only weapons imported are those approved by the UN Security Council, brought in by the country’s partners (Nigeria and the United States) and for use only by Special Security Services, Police and the Military. All transfer of weapons within Liberia also requires the approval of UNMIL.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Extensive research has revealed no information on whether Liberia imposes requirements on contractors in regards to any subcontractors that may be used. This is not surprising considering the secrecy that surrounds the defence and security sector in Liberia (Interviewee 1). This secrecy means that most defence procurement is not made public, and that the defence and security sector are for the most part exempt from oversight, including audits.

Considering the lack of anti-corruption initiatives throughout the defence and security institutions of Liberia, the fact that there is no known anti-corruption training for personnel, and evidence that officers engage in, or turn a blind eye, to corrupt activities (MacDougall, 2014), it is reasonable to assume that the government likely does not require or encourage contractors to ensure subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3885: Currently, Liberia is not in a position to conduct defence acquisitions on a significant scale. This is a result of both budgetary considerations as well as ongoing international sanctions which include an arms embargo. As a result, most of the AFL’s military needs are met through international donations, primarily from the United States, and to a lesser degree China.

However, it is reasonable to expect that once Liberia has the capacity to increase its defence acquisitions, the United States will be in a position to exert great influence over these decisions. The United States has been the primary facilitator of the process to disband and rebuild the AFL from the ground up. The United States has provided funding, ongoing training, equipment and expertise to the AFL. DynCorp, an American defence contractor, was awarded the contract to rebuild the AFL, primarily through recruitment and training. The American embassy in Monrovia continues to provide ongoing assistance. As a result, the influence the United States has had, and will likely continue to have, over the defence and security sector in Liberia cannot be overstated.