Nigeria

Researcher4114: Part X of the Public Procurement Act 2007 (PPA) provides for the Disposal of Public Property. Section 3 PPA states that; &quoute;The open competitive bidding shall be the primary source of receiving offers for the purchase of any public property offered for sale.&quoute; However, Section 15 (2) states that; &quoute;The provisions of this Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods; works and services involving national defence or national security unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained.&quoute; &quoute;Special Purpose Goods&quoute; is defined in Section 60 of the PPA (Interpretation) as &quoute; ...any objects of armaments ammunition mechanical electrical equipment or other thing as may be determined by the President needed by the Armed Forces or Police Force as well as the services incidental to the supply of the objects;&quoute;

The above provisions of the PPA indicate that disposal of military assets are not prima facie subject to the framework of controls, public information and transparency set out under the Act, except specifically authorized by the President. Information on any such Presidential authorization of military assets disposal is not publicly available.

Magbadelo (2012) notes that the Nigerian military has income generating resources that are not accounted for in the budget. Omitoogun and Oduntan (2006. p. 177) include &quoute; ... proceeds from the sale of scrap&quoute; as part of the military's extra-budgetary revenue. Sale of scrap by the military is not captured in sufficient detail in the military budget for purposes of public scrutiny and oversight. The indication is that there is no effective control over such transactions, and where there are controls they are weak and not transparent.

From the assessor's own professional experience, it is unlikely that landed assets and houses are among assets available for disposal by the military. The Ministry of Defence requisitioned many private properties for use and occupation by different service units and formations, and are still constructing barracks to relocate military personnel, and releasing the the requisitioned property to their owners. I am not aware of any media or CSO activities with respect to disposal of military assets.

Researcher4114: The Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), which regulates both procurement and disposal of assets, is mandated, amongst other things, to publish details of major contracts in the prescribed outlet and to submit its reports to the National Assembly. In practice, the law is of limited application to the military. Defence assets disposal is generally unreported or under-reported in the budgeting process and as such, public scrutiny and parliamentary oversight is limited.

Public criticisms of the Public Procurement Act, which also impinge on the independence of the Bureau of Public Procurement, include the Presidential waiver of some projects and selective implementation of provisions of the Act such as the non-establishment of the National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP) as envisaged under the Act. The functions of the NCPP include approving the appointment of the Directors of the BPP and receiving/considering/approving the audited accounts of the BPP (Fayomi: 2013).

Section 15 (2) of the Public Procurement Act provides inter alia &quoute;The provisions of this Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods; works and services involving national defence or national security unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained. The above provisions of the PPA indicate that disposal of military assets are not prima facie subject to the framework of controls, public information and transparency set out under the Act, except where such disposals are specifically authorized by the President.

In response to the question, an interview insisted that information is &quoute;available through published gazettes from the various arms of the Defence Services and from the Ministry of Defence.&quoute; However, it proved impossible to verify this information as no such gazettes could be identified.

Researcher4114: Funds for &quoute;policy matters&quoute; are generally not included in the Ministry of Defence's budget and are funded directly by the federal government from off-budget accounts. Auditing of off-budget accounts are also not within the purview of the Office of the Auditor General of the Federation. The percentage of secret items within defence and security budget expenditure is generally not known, although one account has it that most military hardware procurement are not captured in the defence budget, and are therefore not subject to parliamentary oversight and public scrutiny.

In response to the question, an MOD official claimed in interview that they did &quoute;not know the statistics.&quoute; When a National Assembly member was interviewed, they also admitted that they did not know details. According to Magbadelo (2012. p. 263) &quoute; ... the bulk of military hardware procurement is not provided for in the annual budget of the MOD, it is sourced from off-budget facility which is never reflected in the budget. This practice shields the military from the prying eyes of the public and parliament.&quoute;

Wezeman et al (2011. p. 20) reports that, the purchase of 15 F-7M combat aircraft by Nigeria did not follow the established procurement processes and was not discussed publicly. In the wake of a secret $15 million cash-for-arms deal with South Africa, the Nigerian government insisting that such cash transactions are normal (THISDAY: 2015). However, an attempt by the House of Representatives to conduct a hearing on the matter was rejected on grounds of national security (BBC: 2014).

Defence acquisition particularly of arms are shrouded in secrecy attributed to national security interest. This reasoning is fairly accepted in society and hardly challenged. Nigeria's defence spending has increased significantly with the challenge of terrorism, militancy, and other forms of violent internal conflicts (DefenceWebb: 2012). the increase in defence spending is likely to lead to increased spending on secret items.

Researcher4114: Funding for secret items (also referred to as policy matters, strategic acquisitions, or special purpose goods) are not included in defence budget and are therefore not subject to legislative oversight. The line between &quoute;secret&quoute; and &quoute;non-secret&quoute; items in military spending is very thin, as military issues are generally shrouded in secrecy.

Magbadelo (2012. p. 263) notes that most military hardware procurement is not reflected in the budget of the MOD because they are purchased from off-budget facility, hence they are shielded from legislative scrutiny. Omitoogun and Oduntan (2006. p. 166) point out that &quoute;strategic&quoute; acquisitions are not included in the capital budget of the MOD.

Section 15 (2) of the Public Procurement Act (PPA) 2007 also exempts the procurement of &quoute; ... special goods; works and services involving national defence or national security&quoute; from the fundamental principles of procurement outlined under the Act. Section 59 (4) of the PPA defines &quoute;Special Purpose Goods&quoute; as &quoute; ... any objects of armaments ammunition mechanical electrical equipment or other thing as may be determined by the President needed by the Armed Forces or Police Force as well as the services incidental to the supply of the objects;&quoute;

The implications of the foregoing are that the President has wide discretionary powers to determine what falls within the category of secret items and once that determination is made, the effect is to place such items outside the scope of legislative enquiry.

Civil Society Organizations have decried the non-disclosure of national security budgetary spending, maintaining that such practice fuels corruption and is of no practical use since the same information being shielded by Nigerian officials are mostly available from foreign governments and contractors and often disclose over-bloated contract terms (Nyager: 2015).

The new Senate President Mr. Bukola Saraki has charged the newly appointed Service Chiefs to &quoute;provide a new direction for Nigeria on matters of security and fight against corruption in the military.&quoute; Speaking during the confirmation of their appointments, Mr. Saraki advised the Service Chiefs to ensure that they fight corruption in the procurement procedure as according to him, corruption had permeated the process of purchase and supply of military equipment and other logistics. He further stated that the Senate has a role to play in assisting the military through its oversight functions, while giving necessary support to military operations (Newsport: 2015).

Researcher4114: In interview it was suggested that &quoute;the yearly audited accounts of all the ministries including Defence are sent to the public accounts committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives for further scrutiny, which sometimes lead to queries to some ministries, departments and agencies for further explanations. In some cases, the committees have ordered for refund of inappropriately spent monies and called for the reprimand of the officer(s) involved or recommended their prosecution in the law court.&quoute;

However, there is no express mention of &quoute;secret items&quoute; in government records made available for public scrutiny and details of sensitive defence procurements such as arms are not made available to the public on grounds of national security. However, &quoute;secret&quoute; expenditures can be inferred from political statements showing Government's progress against terrorists or from press revelations. Examples include the award of nearly $500 million defence contract for purchase of refurbished helicopters (Sahara Reporters: 2015) or the botched $15 million secret arms purchase from South Africa (Newspunch: 2014).

The exigency of fighting Boko Haram provides more impetus for the non-disclosure of defence spending especially on arms, in a situation where Government is already shielded by loopholes in such laws as the Public Procurement Act and the Freedom of Information Act that exempt items and information with a link to national security from being disclosed.

Civil Society Organizations have decried the non-disclosure of national security budgetary spending, maintaining that such practice fuels corruption and is of no practical use since the same information being shielded by Nigerian officials are mostly available from foreign governments and contractors and often disclose over bloated contract terms (Nyager: 2015).

The new Senate President Mr. Bukola Saraki has charged the newly appointed Service Chiefs to &quoute;provide a new direction for Nigeria on matters of security and fight against corruption in the military.&quoute; Speaking during the confirmation of their appointments, Mr. Saraki advised the Service Chiefs to ensure that they fight corruption in the procurement procedure as according to him, corruption had permeated the process of purchase and supply of military equipment and other logistics. He further stated that the Senate has a role to play in assisting the military through its oversight functions, while giving necessary support to military operations (Newsport: 2015).

Researcher4114: It was suggested in interview that &quoute;no off-budget expenditure is permitted under our Constitution for any ministry, including the Defence Ministry.&quoute; Section 80(3) of the Nigerian constitution provides that; &quoute;No moneys shall be withdrawn from any public fund of the Federation, other than the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, unless the issue of those moneys has been authorised by an Act of the National Assembly.&quoute;

The Constitution confers powers and control over public funds on the legislature, and arrangements are also made for contingency expenditures. In practice, the government does not account for all extra-budgetary income, and off-budget military expenditures, also known as &quoute;policy matters&quoute;, take place on a fairly regular basis without requisite parliamentary oversight or public scrutiny.

It is reported that the government has often resorted to funds from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for procurement of parts for the Nigerian Navy &quoute;without regard to tender or competitive bidding&quoute; (Diesesruvwe: 2014). The same source was allegedly used to fund the supply of 193 Cobra Armored vehicles for the Nigerian Army by Singapore Kinetic Ltd., without due process.

Magbadelo (2012. p. 263) states that &quoute; ... the bulk of military hardware procurement is not provided for in the annual budget of he MOD, it is sourced from off-budget facility which is never reflected in the budget.&quoute; Omitoogun and Oduntan (2006. p. 176 et seq.) note that &quoute;The government has several accounts that are outside the purview of law, which it uses to augment its spending.&quoute; They include special accounts that are either set up by law or created for administrative purposes. Example of a special account set up by law is the Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Fund established in May 2011. Senate hearings revealed the operation of a foreign account by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation with J. P. Morgan Chase, contrary to the Constitution which provides that all revenues accruable to the Federal Government should be paid to the Federation Account (Premium Times: 2015).

Transparency International UK Defence and Security Programme (2011. p. 25) reports that the Nigerian government &quoute;actively&quoute; makes off-budget military expenditures from oil reserve accounts, leading to the call by Transparency International (2014) that &quoute;The defence ministry should open itself up to oversight and publish the defence budget in full, including off-budget defence expenditure.&quoute;

Researcher4114: There have been instances of off-budget military expenditures relating to national security exigencies and there is evidence linking such expenditures to illicit economic activity. It is difficult to control military expenditures due to the accessibility of off-budget funds.

A defence official reported during interview that &quoute;there are off-budget military expenditures. But there is no clear-cut evidence that this involves illicit economic activity.&quoute; Another interviewee added that they were &quoute;not aware of any such expenditure. If the President allows it, it is unconstitutional and amounts to an impeachable offence. You may see Sections 80, 81, and 83 of the Constitution of Nigeria.&quoute;

Magbadelo (2012: p. 263) states that &quoute; ... the bulk of military hardware procurement is not provided for in the annual budget of the MOD, it is sourced from off-budget facility which is never reflected in the budget.&quoute; Omitoogun and Hutchful (2006: 234) remark that, &quoute;In Nigeria the level of off-budget military expenditure is significant. There is a practice of providing for arms purchase outside the approved budget and without legislative approval.&quoute; Willet (2009) observes that an estimated $12 billion Nigeria spent in peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 1999 derived from oil revenue cash-calls, which did not appear in Defence accounts. More recently, Wezeman et al (2011. p. 20) reports that, &quoute; ... the purchase of 15 F-7M combat aircraft by Nigeria,&quoute; did not follow the established procurement processes and was not discussed publicly.

Despite interviewee evidence, the propensity of off-budgetary military expenditures being channelled towards illicit economic activity including corruption is high for several reasons including urgency created by the Boko Haram insurgency resulting to lowered scrutiny (Justice Africa: 2014), secrecy arising from national security, and privileging of the military institution (Freeman and Solmirano: 2012). Information on secret arms deals obtained by the media or CSOs under the Freedom of Information Act indicates gross inflation of contract figures (Nyaeger: 2015).

Researcher4114: Section 11(1) of the Freedom of Information Act provides that; &quoute;A public institution may deny an application for any information the disclosure of which may be injurious to the conduct of international affairs and the defence of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.&quoute; The Act further provides for the lifting of such restriction where the greater public interest will be served, as determined by the courts. However, the law does not provide a regulating mechanism or classification scheme for restriction of information on grounds of national security, hence the process is likely to be discretionary.

Section 4 of the Act provides for 7 days within which information requested under the Act is to be made available. The results have been mixed with some public institutions granting information requested within the stipulated time, while others delay, or ignore the request (Ezeamalu: 2014).

Section 20 of the Act provides for an applicant who has been denied information under the Act to apply to court for a review. The courts have ruled in favour of applicants request for information in a number of cases, including defence related cases.

However, out of a list of 67 public institutions surveyed for transparency in terms of public expenditure information related to procurement process and contract implementation by the Public and Private Development Center (PPMC), the Ministry of Defence was ranked in 7th position and with seven other institutions on a scale of 1 (most compliant) to 32 (least compliant), with no proactive disclosure, taking up to 111 days to respond to request, and offering full level of disclosure.

The blanket exemption given to information that may be &quoute;injurious to the conduct of international affairs and tdefence,&quoute; confers wide and unchecked discretionary powers on public officials such as the National Security Adviser (NSA). All three requests for information made to the Office of the National Security Adviser in March, April, and May of 2014 were turned down on grounds that they were either available in the public domain, or that their release may be injurious to national security [4].

The Ministry of Police Affairs did not respond to requests for information on records of payments for capital projects made in March 2014 and January 2015 respectively [5].

There is a subsisting need to regulate the mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, especially as most information classified as such in Nigeria are publicly available from foreign governments and contractors (Nyaeger: 2015).

Researcher4114: It was revealed in interview that, &quoute;the military has co-operative businesses for the benefit of the members of the various services especially in the areas of acquisition of merchandise for its members who cannot afford to deal with the open market. The operations of such co-operative societies are usually transparent being managed by a carefully selected Board of Trustees to manage its affairs. They are externally appointed auditors who report and manage the affairs of such cooperatives.&quoute;

The Nigerian Naval Dockyard and Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria are commercial businesses owned by the Ministry of Defence. Neither of these businesses has been yielding profits, and both receive subsidies from the MOD budget. While aspects of the operations of the Naval Dockyard and DICON are public, details of their financial transactions were not readily available at the time of research. The Chief Executive of the Naval Dockyard is the Admiral Superintendent who is responsible to a Board of Directors which has the Chief of Naval Staff as the Chairman.

The Aeronautical and Technical Services Limited (AETSL) of the Nigerian Air Force recently embarked on commercial charter flights in a Public-Private Partnership. The venture currently enjoys pioneer status tax breaks, but details of its operations and finances were also not available at the time of research. In addition, the military has cooperative societies catering to its members needs.

Score 1 awarded on the basis that research could not determine the extent of these entities' commercial activity.

Researcher4114: The budget of the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) - established in 1964 for the production of small arms and ammunitions - is open to parliamentary scrutiny (Newsdiaryonline: 2012). The Nigerian Naval Dockyard Lagos and the Naval Shipyard in Port Harcourt reports directly to the Chief of Naval Staff.

Omitoogun and Oduntan (2006) enumerate several ways military spending is monitored, including internal auditing by the unit concerned, annual external auditing by the Auditor-General, and parliamentary supervision.

In his description of the manpower organization of the Nigerian Naval Dockyard (NND), Olunloyo (2011) states that, &quoute;The Chief Executive is the Admiral Superintendent who is responsible to a Board of Directors which has the Chief of Naval Staff as the Chairman.

Militarily owned businesses are not subject to international standards of scrutiny. The relevant service chief usually has the final say with respect to their audited account. Unfortunately, not much information is available in the public domain on transparency and accountability in military owned businesses.

Researcher4114: There are reports of officers' involvement in personal businesses, such as contractual work. The Ministry similarly awards petty supply contracts to junior staff members, ostensibly to augment their base income. There is some amount of ambivalence over the legality of these private businesses, and no apparent willingness to stamp them out.

It was reported in interview that &quoute;unauthorized private enterprise by military or other Defence Ministry employees are commonplace. The government has done little or nothing in this area as it does not have an effective profiling system to check such activity.&quoute;

Section 1. Fifth Schedule Part I Code of Conduct for Public Officers, which also applies to members of the Armed Forces provides that; &quoute;A public officer shall not put himself in a position where his personal interest conflicts with his duties and responsibilities.&quoute; Involvement by public officials in private enterprises is likely to result in a conflict of interest with their primary duties. However, the evidence suggests that military and defence officials participate in private enterprises.

Omede (2012: 301) quoting a section of the National Defence Policy 2006, lists among the threats that the military poses in a democracy as; &quoute;Practicing unauthorized military or commercial activities and politicization of the military.&quoute; IHS Jane’s 360 (2014) notes that political connections by Nigerian senior military personnel is a factor in major contract bidding which deepens the involvement of African militaries in the private sector beyond its gatekeeping roles.

Dietrich (2000) notes that Nigerian soldiers do not typically draw a distinction between career soldiering and an entrepreneurship at home reflecting in numerous coups, deep involvement in the Nigerian economy as well as during external deployment. He further notes that; “Junior officers became engaged in entrepreneurial schemes to bolster salaries with and without the authorization of their superiors.” Similarly, Yaroms (2011) states that, &quoute; ... non political officers are involved in contracts, running their own businesses and engaging in other means of gratification ... &quoute; &quoute; as a means to sustain and cushion those not holding political appointments from planning coups.&quoute;

It is for the incumbent administration to clarify its position vis-à-vis the law and in practice with regards to involvement of military and/or defence officials in private enterprises.

Researcher4114: A search of online media did not reveal any commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Minister/Ministry, or the respective Service Chiefs. However, corruption, as it affects Nigeria's fight against terrorism was one of the issues the National Security Adviser (NSA) Sambo Dasuki addressed during his speech in Chatham House in January 2015. According to Premium Times (2015), the NSA stated that, &quoute; For Nigeria to address the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism leading to insurgency, the cancerous menace of corruption must be fought with all elements of its national power.&quoute; Although the NSA noted progress being made with the establishment of various domestic anticorruption agencies (ACAs) in the country, he made no specific reference to anti-corruption or integrity measures in the Ministry of Defence or the Armed Forces.

Various groups have called for probe of the Ministry of Defence in view of the huge budgetary allocations it receives and the abysmal performance of the military against the Boko Haram insurgency. One of such groups - Civil Society Network Against Corruption (CSNAC) in a letter to the House of Representatives dated 16th May 2014 and signed by its Chairman Olarewaju Suraju called on the House Committee, &quoute; ... to launch an investigation into the utilization of funds allocated to the Defence Ministry, especially for the year 2008 - 2013 with a view to unveiling circumstances responsible for the inanity and inability of Nigeria's military to respond appropriately to the insurgency ... (Anyalewechi: 2014)&quoute;

Such probes are however unlikely to be carried out on grounds of national security. A motion in the House of Representatives to investigate Nigeria's $9.3 million secret arms deal which was busted by the South African government was quashed on grounds of national security (Ameh: 2014).

Response to peer reviewer:
In view of the new evidence provided by Peer reviewer 2 accrediting the statement; &quoute;The military is taking every necessary measure to check corruption and indiscipline by troops,' to the former Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant-General Kenneth Minimah (Bloomberg: 2014) and commitment to routing out corruption from the military expressed by the new administration of President Muhammadu Buhari, the score has been revised from 0 to 1 (The Street Journal: 2015, News Rescue: 2015).

Researcher4114: A number of high level civilian Ministry of Defence officials have been dismissed and prosecuted for corruption-related offences, while some military officers at the Defence Headquarters, as well as top Naval officials, have similarly been court-martialed for corrupt practices. However, such disciplinary measures have been few and far between despite the opinion expressed during interview that &quoute;there are effective disciplinary measures, there are public evidence for the application of the measures.&quoute;

The Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 prohibits and prescribes punishment for corrupt practices and other related offences. The Act among others, sets out offences and penalties, and establishes a Commission which has powers to among others, receive reports, investigate allegations, and prosecute offenders in appropriate cases. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is responsible for the investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, futures market fraud, computer credit card fraud, contract scam, etc.

The Armed Forces Act does not provide specifically for the offences of bribery and corruption, but Section 114 of the Act extends liability for other civil offences not contained in the Act to service personnel. Section 18 of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Offences Commission Act 2000 provides inter alia, :Any person who offers to any public officer, or being a public officer solicits, counsels or accepts any gratification as an inducement or reward ... (is) guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to five (5) years imprisonment with hard labour.&quoute; There are reported cases involving the arraignment of paramilitary personnel by the ICPC (Ayansina: 2015)

Researcher4114: Section 27 et seq. of the Freedom of Information Act 2011 provides immunity from civil and criminal prosecution for whistleblowers. However, it is unclear how far this applies to information that is considered to have a national security dimension, as the release of such information is restricted under the same act. In any case, the practice is frowned upon in the Military, with possibilities for reprisals.

An army officer stated during interview that &quoute;whistleblowing is not encouraged due to the level of corruption and this may be carried out as a witch-hunt. A likely whistle blower is also afraid of likely reprisal attack because his/her cover may be blown by men in authority. As the military is a microcosm of the FGN, same can be said to be applicable.&quoute;

A defence official recounted that &quoute;whistle-blowing in the military and defence ministry has never been encouraged in any form. The government has never provided any form of protection against reprisals for exposing evidence of corruption in law and practice.&quoute;

The Freedom of Information Act 2007 is still relatively new and the public is not sufficiently enlightened on its provisions. The Official Secrets Act 1962 and the National Security Agencies Act 1986 which broadly requires information on Defence and National Security to be kept as Official Secrets have been in force for a relatively longer period.

A celebrated case of whistleblowing in Nigeria involved the former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria who alleged in December 2013 that $20 billion of oil revenue was not remitted to the Bank in 2012 - 2013 (The Guardian: 2014). The Central Bank of Nigeria Governor was &quoute;suspended&quoute; from office, and was accused of &quoute;financial recklessness&quoute; (The Independent: 2014).

Sahara Reporters (2015) provides details of a military Board of Inquiry (BOI) composed of 6 officers set up by a Brigadier General to investigate an army captain who allegedly exposed plans to rig a state election in 2014. The whistleblower, according to the report, audio-taped a meeting between army officers and politicians to rig the election. The news report also has it that the convening Brigadier General ordered the arrest, detention and torture of the whistleblower's 15-year old sibling, purportedly to force him from hiding (Sahara Reporters: 2015a).

A more recent report has it that the convening Brigadier General under whose watch the plan to rig election was hatched, has been transferred out of his former position (Sahara Reporters: 2015b). This may be an indication by the new administration of President Muhammadu Buhari that whistleblowers will be protected under the law and not be subjected to persecution.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Many thanks for these useful additions, I have integrated them into my response above.

Researcher4114: A defence official reported during interview that &quoute;special attention is paid to Defence personnel in sensitive positions, be it in the Army, Navy or Air-force through oversight functions of the various Directorates in the Ministry in charge of the various strategic units like the Directorate of Army, Directorate of Navy, Directorate of Air-force and Directorate of Joint Services Division (JSD) of the Ministry of Defence. The various committees of the Federal House of Representatives and the Senate in charge of the various service units also provide oversight functions of personnel in those sensitive positions.&quoute;

However, an army officer stated that the &quoute;selection of officials (both civil and personnel into defence procurement, contracting, financial management) is done politically and based on who is who. Even when personnel are picked to oversee certain aspects that involve anything in procurement, it is done based on the gain expected or to be reaped by the Godfather who does the selection.&quoute;

Sanusi (2011:189, 190) states that one of the shortcomings in the structure of the civil arm of the Ministry of Defence is the constraint imposed by the &quoute;pooling system whereby highly experienced middle and top management personnel are periodically moved around the ministries.&quoute; He insists that this policy does not aid professionalism and global competitiveness.

Magbadelo (2012: 262) further attributes the problem of bureaucratic tardiness in the Ministry of Defence to, &quoute;the indiscriminate deployment of pool officers to MOD by the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation which has responsibility for the career management of Administrative Officers and other cadres across the Federal Civil Service.&quoute;

A former Chief of Defence Staff stated that seniority, experience, specialization, and previous deployment are considered during deployment of military personnel, but also noted that there are compromises based on political consideration and quota system for deployment to special positions. Azazi (2011: 179) further notes that, &quoute;Retention of personal staff by some commanders and irregularities in deployment associated with manual record keeping have caused overstay in one deployment or location.&quoute;

IHS Global Limited (2014:11) observe that, &quoute;Soldiers are said to be lobbying their senior commanders to be sent to the Niger Delta&quoute; because of the high reward-to-risk ration in the oil rich Niger Delta as compared to the insurgents infested Northeastern part of the country.

Researcher4114: Staff auditing is currently a work in progress in most government ministries, institutions and parastatals. An estimated number of military and civilian personnel is issued occasionally to the public.

Magbadelo (2012: 259), at the time the Deputy Director (Planning, Research and Statistics) at Ministry of Defence Headquarters, provided an estimate of the Nigerian military active duty personnel as 76,000 of which the Army is 60,000, the Nigerian Navy 7,000, and the Nigerian Air Force is 9,000. Omitoogun and Oduntan (2006: 174) put the number of Nigerian armed forces at 80,000 stating also that &quoute; ... an accurate census of serving officers and men has not been undertaken&quoute; and &quoute;The ministry has often had to use personnel audit and staff pay-appearance to check for 'ghost' workers.&quoute;

When interviewed, an anonymous officer reported that the figures &quoute;are not accurate&quoute;, although an interviewed defence official contradicted that by stating that reliable figures &quoute;are publicly available through the Directorate of Defence Information of the Joint Services of the Defence Headquarters (DHQ) and also through the office of Directorate, Joint Services Division of the Ministry of Defence.&quoute; A peer reviewer for this project tried to find these figures but without success.

The government announced in 2013 that it had saved N118.9 billion and weeded out 46,639 non-existent &quoute;ghost&quoute; workers from 215 Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) through its implementation of the Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System (IPPIS). The statistics indicated that &quoute;the number of genuine workers in some of the MDAs is lower than 50% of those on the payroll, even though 321 MDAs were yet to be incorporated into IPPIS. It has been suggested that the scale of &quoute;ghost&quoute; workers in the Nigerian public service, &quoute; ... has all the trappings of organized crime, with insiders in government agencies as arrow-heads (The Sun: 2014)&quoute; Again, the failure of the government to prosecute the Accounting and other responsible officers in MDAs involved, is seen as a tacit endorsement of corruption (Onyekpere: 2014).

The National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki while addressing issues on soldiers complaint and direct feedback as well as morale and confidence of troops during his presentation at Chatham House in January 2015 admitted that &quoute; There was a problem in the recruitment process and we admit it ... We've had a lot of people who joined just because they wanted a job not because they wanted a career in the military. Most of them are the ones who are running away and who are telling stories of poor equipment and stuff like that (Ibekwe: 2015).&quoute;

Researcher4114: Some information on pay rates is available through the media although this generally does not include allowances. Part of the ongoing transformation of the military is a focus on improving salaries, as well as the living and training conditions for military personnel.

During interview, an army officer noted that &quoute;salaries are published but they are not encouraging. Security personnel are among the lowest income earners in the country, and considering the sensitive nature of the job, there is tendency to be tempted and get corrupted by the environment in which they find themselves.&quoute;

The National Salaries Income and Wages Commission established under Decree No. 99 of 1983 has the statutory function of among others, to &quoute;advice the Federal Government on national income policy (Section 3.a).&quoute; According to Information Nigeria (2010), the President effected a harmonized salary increase in July 2010. Under the new salary structure core civil servants of Salary Grade Level 01 - 16 received an increase of 58.37%. The salaries of Directors in Federal Ministries and Agencies were increased by at least 1/3 of the salary of a Permanent Secretary, while Directors were to receive at least 1/3 of the salary of a Permanent Secretary.

The new pay package was extended to the Armed Forces, Police, Paramilitary, Intelligence community (State Security Services, Nigerian Intelligence Agency etc.), as well as parastatals, and research institutes. Minimum wage was pegged at around N17,000.

Yaroms (2011: 127) notes that, &quoute; ... salaries of officers and men have been skyrocketed, above that of civil servants, with further increase in wages ...&quoute; in line with general review of salaries and wages in the country. However, a local newspaper reported disaffection among top ranking military officers following the President's approval of a review of the Consolidated Armed Forces Salary Structure (CONAFSS) in July 2010 (allAfrica: 2013). The report notes a wide disparity in the salary structure between one rank and another in the top military echelon.

Researcher4114: During interview an army officer reported that &quoute;pay is occasionally delayed. The department in charge of pay (Finance) is also fraudulent; what is published is different from what is paid to the personnel.&quoute; However, an interviewed defence official maintained that &quoute;the system of payment is regular and well established.&quoute; On the MOD site it states that there is a Central Pay Office responsible for &quoute;revenue collection and all cash and bank payments&quoute;, but there is no additional information available. The Nigerian Navy Central Pay Office has a website, but it is unclear what the payment process consists of except that it is computerised.

There have been reported incidents of peacekeeping troops getting underpaid, officers appropriating the welfare packages of soldiers, and retired officers and men struggling to receive their pensions. IHS Global Limited (2014: 11) reports protests in July 2008 by Nigerian Army soldiers involved in 6 months peacekeeping tour of duty under the UN Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL) over underpayment of their salaries noting that &quoute;Nigerian soldiers involved in peacekeeping have routinely complained of being short-changed.&quoute;

Soldiers deployed on the counter-terrorism front complain of at least one occasion when their salary was cut by as much as 50% (Mbachu: 2014). The National Security Adviser refuted this claim during his presentation at Chatham House in January 2015, insisted that such complaint must come from a Unit and not an individual to have credibility. Other complaints coming from Nigerian troops in the battle front include insufficient medical care and welfare package (Idowu: 2014).

Over 1000 staff in the medical department of the Ministry of Defence protested to various authorities including the Minister of Defence, the National Assembly and the anti-corruption agencies over more than two years of unpaid salaries (Kanu: 2012). A source at the Ministry of Defence Headquarters is quoted as saying that; &quoute;The MOD will cut your salaries and allowances all the time and they just pay basic and the rest is taken by the cabal that runs the Ministry. It has been going on for ages. That has been the practice over the years.&quoute; Investigations by National Daily allege that the office of the Permanent Secretary, the Director of Human Resources, and the Office of the Director of Finance and Account are part of suspected fraud going on the Ministry.

The Nigerian Government had signed a World Bank sponsored $4.9 million contract for the provision of an Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information System (IPPIS) in the public sector, which is expected to facilitate payment of salaries and eliminate the high incidence of ghost workers (Aginam:2006).

The new administration is said to have approved a comprehensive relief package valued at over N400 billion to &quoute;put an end to the lingering crisis of unpaid workers salaries&quoute; in the country (Vanguard: 2015).

Researcher4114: During interview, an army officer reported that &quoute;there are bodies for promotion in the military. Army, Naval, and Air Council oversee promotion in the system. Though the middle level is based on examinations and a good record, the top management level is based on quota which is extremely political.&quoute; The interviewee states elsewhere that, &quoute; ... 20 to 25 percent of postings at any level in the Armed forces are bribery/Godfathers induced.&quoute;

A defence official stated during interview that &quoute;there is an established independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at the middle and top management levels. We have the Army Promotional Council, the Navy Promotional Council, and the Air-force Promotional Council comprising of senior members of the Armed Forces, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence Agency, the Minister of Defence and some key Directors in the Ministry of Defence.&quoute;

Section 218 (2) of the Constitution confers power on the President to appoint the Chief of Defence staff, the Chief of Army Staff, the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of Air Staff and heads of any other branches of the armed forces of the Federation. By Section 218 (4) (b) of the Constitution, the National Assembly is empowered to regulate the President's power over, &quoute; the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control of members of the armed forces of the Federation.&quoute; Section 217 (3) of the Constitution provides that; &quoute;The composition of the officer corps an other ranks of the armed forces of the Federation shall reflect the federal character of Nigeria.&quoute;

Officers are appointed to a commission in the Armed Forces upon recommendation of a Board of Officers set up by the appropriate Service Chief. The promotion of senior officers is based on examination, but there are also political considerations such as the need for national spread (quota system). According to Azazi (2011: 177), the recruitment of soldiers and selection of officers encourages a fair representation of all States in Nigeria including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). It also takes into consideration the requirement of the Federal Character Commission.&quoute;

Federal character principles are provided for under Section 14(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN). &quoute;The composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria ... thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies.&quoute;

In practice, the enlistment of personnel into the Nigerian Armed Forces does not always follow a transparent process, and there has been some concern about recent appointments not following due process. Azazi (2011: 177) admits that the system of enlistment into the Nigerian Armed Forces, &quoute; ... is fraught with many abnormalities.&quoute; The principle of federal character is known to have been flouted on numerous occasions (THISDAY: 2014).

Writing on the nature and character of Nigerian political culture, Yaroms (2011:123) notes that, &quoute; ... the imbalanced nature of recruitment into the military creates fear, insecurity and estrangement among some segments of the country.&quoute;

Premium Times (2015) reports that Government's appointment of a Service Chief in 2012 was challenged in court as not following constitutional requirements of confirmation by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. It further reported an official acknowledgement of the mistake in the appointments by the media aide to the President. Ezeamalu (2013) reports that A Federal High Court nullified the President's appointment of the Chief of Army Staff in 2010, the Chief of Air Staff in 2012, and Chief of Naval Staff in 2012, on grounds that the appointments were made without confirmation of the National Assembly, contrary to Sections 18(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act and Section 315 of the Constitution.

Iroegbu and Andrews (2014) report that President Jonathan's last appointment of Service Chiefs followed the due process of Parliamentary oversight, gave consideration to the principle of federal character, and also took cognizance of the challenge of terrorism facing the country.

President Buhari maintains that his recent appointment of new Service Chiefs and National Security Adviser was purely on merit and based on their records. A newspaper report states that another candidate for the post of National Security Adviser lost out on account of petitions of financial impropriety leveled against him (Premium Times: 2015a). However, the new appointments have been criticized as being not only lopsided and negating the federal character principle enshrined in the constitution, but also as marginalizing the South East zone of the country because of their voting pattern during the 2015 general elections (Champion Newspapers: 2015).

Researcher4114: Under the Armed Forces Act, each of the Services has a body statutorily charged with matters regarding command, discipline and administration - the Army Council (S. 10), the Nigerian Navy Board (S. 12), and the Air Council (S. 15). The Service Chiefs set up boards to recommend the appointment of Officers (S. 23) and such appointment must be published in a Gazette. Section 26 provides inter alia, &quoute;The President may make regulations governing the commissioning of Officers, their terms of service, promotion, retirement, resignation, dismissal and such other matters concerning Officers of the Armed Forces as may seem to him necessary.&quoute;

A former Chief of Army Staff clarified that &quoute;each promotion (in the Army) is conducted by a board which has members reflecting geopolitical/ethnic divides and &quoute;(a)ll the proceedings of the board have to go through the Army Council for ratification (Daily Post 2013).&quoute; He further stated that factors taken into consideration in conducting annual promotion exercises include the promotion regulations, federal character, harmonized armed forces terms and conditions of service, promotion boards, and Army Council.

It would seem that the Service Chiefs have overriding powers over the respective bodies in the Services charged with promotion and retirement, hence parties aggrieved of real or imaginary lopsidedness in promotions petitioned the National Assembly (The Nation: 2013).

An army officer stated during interview that &quoute;there are personnel who have served up to 12 years in the service but are still Privates, while some of same duration may be a Sergeant or Staff Sergeant or of higher ranks in the Navy and Air Force. In the officer cadre, promotion is based on examinations and some set are promoted together until they attain the rank of Colonel where there is introduction of political state quotas.&quoute;

Researcher4114: The Armed Forces Act does not contain provision for compulsory conscription. Recruitment is voluntary and the minimum age of recruitment is 18 years. Nigeria's National Security Adviser confirmed volunteer nature of the Nigerian Armed Forces in his presentation at Chatham House in January 2015 (Ibekwe: 2015)

Researcher4114: There is no legislation providing for conscription into the Nigerian Armed Forces. Enlistment into the armed forces is voluntary and the minimum age of recruitment is 18 years.

The immediate past National Security Adviser emphasized on the &quoute;voluntary&quoute; nature of recruitment into the Nigerian military while answering questions on the poor performance of the troops against Boko Haram during his speech at the Chatham House; &quoute;There are people who will give every excuse in this world not to fight. If you don’t want to fight it’s not your fault get out of the army. It’s a volunteer army nobody is saying you should be there; it is not by force. But if you’re there, there are certain things you’re expected to do and for now fighting is one of those things&quoute; (Ibekwe: 2015).

The service corp scheme established under the National Youth Service Corps Decree No. 51 1993 requiring graduates below the age of 30 years to serve the country for a period of one year has among its objectives, to; inculcate discipline in Nigerian youths by instilling in them a tradition of industry at work, and, of patriotic and loyal service to Nigeria in any situation they may find themselves&quoute; (Section 1.3.a). Aspects of orientation course for the scheme involves physical and mental training, instilling discipline, and imbibing collective responsibility on the corp members, but does not include training in the handling of arms or of a purely military nature.

Researcher4114: Staff auditing is work in progress at various Ministries including the MOD. One account has it that a number of dead and dismissed soldiers have remained on the military pay-roll, and there have been instances of unverifiable pension applications.

An army officer reported during interview that &quoute;there are [ghost soldiers]. The finance corps of the military is the most corrupt. Dead and dismissed soldiers in most cases are still on the pay roll while retired soldiers are being cheated of their pensions and gratuities.&quoute;

Omitoogun and Oduntan (2006) note that the Ministry of Defence has often had to use personnel audits and staff pay-appearance to check for 'ghost' workers.&quoute; They also observe that in the course of Army verification of retirement claims by pensioners, &quoute; ... well over 70 per cent of pension applications were found to be unverifiable ...&quoute;

Udo (2014) reports that a Freedom of Information request filed by a CSO - Centre for Social Justice revealed that 46,639 ghost workers were uncovered between 2007 and 2012 in government ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) accounting for N118.9 billion losses in public funds. The highest number of ghost workers were recorded as follows:

1. Ministry of of Education - 9,463
2. Ministry of Works - 5,167
3. Ministry of Defence - 4,457

The Report further noted that the fraud came to light after government launched the Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System (IPPIS) between 2007 and 2012. Remarkably, while a number of agencies including the Police Service Commission recorded zero ghost workers, others like the Finance Ministry, the Budget Office, the Office of the Accountant General, as well as the Office of the Auditor General surprisingly recorded a large number of 'ghost' workers. The most worrying trend, as the Report notes, is that government was yet to prosecute those involved after four months.

Vanguard (2012) also reported the discovery of 5,000 ghost workers among military ranks excluding pensioners in October 2000 and another 24,000 ghosts workers in the pensions unit of the Ministry in July 2003. The Minister of Defence adopted a payment method of &quoute;pay parade&quoute; meaning that any pensioner who does not show up for payment would be considered a &quoute;ghost&quoute; worker (VANGUARD: 2003).

Researcher4114: An army officer reported during interview that chains of command and chains of payment &quoute;are separate.&quoute;

According to Azazi (2011), the Nigerian Defence Policy 2006 envisages a &quoute; ... chain of command for planning and conduct of military operations (that) flows from the National Defence Council (NDC) to the Honourable Minister of Defence to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to either the Service Chiefs or the Commander Joint Task.&quoute; He notes that in practice, there is improper integration of the civilian and military components of the Ministry of Defence as well as jointness within Armed Forces. Yoroms (2011: 123 et seq.) writing in the historical context of the Nature and Character of Nigerian Political Culture observes the embezzlement of staff allowance, welfare packages, and pension benefits by &quoute; ... officer's corps who had no opportunity to occupy political office.&quoute;

In terms of payment, the Ministry of Finance releases money for military operations including personnel costs, overheads and capital expenditure through the Ministry of Defence (Odebode: 2014). According to the Finance Minister, Government released N130.7 billion to the Ministry of Defence for military operations between January and April 2014. Out of this amount, N85.9 billion was for personnel costs. Recurrent costs, of which staff salaries constitute the main item, take up as much as 80% of defence allocations - no doubt padded by 'ghost' workers, leaving a relatively smaller amount in capital allocations for the purchase of weapons and other military hardware (African Defence: 2014).

Clarifications by the Minister indicate that, &quoute; ... the military handled the payment of salaries of its personnel, as they (the respective Services) had not been captured under the Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information System (IPPIS).&quoute; IPPIS is a new payment system through which employees would receive direct payment of salaries into their account, thereby circumventing the fraud-prone manual payment method (Odebode: 2014). However, it has been alleged that on some occasions, &quoute;money would be released on paper&quoute; by the Ministry of Finance to the military but without a cash back-up, and on other occasions, &quoute; ... some senior civil servants insisted on getting a certain percentage of approved funds before they could be released (Odebode: 2014).&quoute;

Researcher4114: An army official stated during interview that &quoute;there is Armed Forces Decree 105 for all the three arms of the military. This document has all the offences and punishments. Also, it is being reviewed by the legal department as at when due.&quoute;

The Constitution provides for a Code of Conduct for Public Officers to be regulated by a Code of Conduct Bureau, with a Code of Conduct Tribunal to try offences. Public officers within the scope of the Constitution include the Chief of Defence Staff, Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Air Staff and all members of the armed forces of the federation. A Department of Investigation and Monitoring was added to the Bureau during President Obasanjo's administration, enabling it to investigate complaints from members of the public. The Bureau has not been consistent in investigating and forwarding cases to the Tribunal for trial.

A Code of Conduct Tribunal is empowered under the Constitution to punish any public officer found guilty of contravening any of the provisions of the Act. Punishments that the Tribunal may impose include vacation from elected or nominated office, disqualification from holding public office, and seizure of corruptly acquired property. These are without prejudice to other arising criminal punishment.

The Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides for the Code of Conduct for Public Officers (military and civilian). The offences of bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities are provided for in the Code of Conduct. The Constitution and the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act Vol. 2 Cap C15 LFN 2004 gives power to the Bureau to make declarations of assets of all public officers available for inspection by every Nigerian citizen on such terms and conditions as the National Assembly may prescribe. However, no such conditions have been prescribed and citizens are yet to be allowed to inspect declarations of Assets in Nigeria (Uddoh: 2013). The United States through the U. S. Nigeria Bi-National Commission has urged Nigerian public officials to make their assets declaration public (Adebo: 2012).

The Bureau's website provides a statistical representation of all cases sent to the Code of Conduct Tribunal for year 2012, as follows:
No. of cases - 296
No. convicted 4
No. discharged and acquitted - 165
No. of defaulters death - 11
No. adjourned - 116

The Bureau's website also indicates that fresh charges were being drafted by the legal department (See 6b, above)

Chairman of the Code of Conduct Tribunal notes that inadequate funding is the greatest challenge facing the Code of Conduct Tribunal in its efforts towards fighting corruption in Nigeria (AllAfrica: 2012).

Researcher4114: The Code of Conduct Bureau was overhauled during President Olusegun Obasanjo's regime, and the Department of Investigation and Monitoring was empowered to receive and investigate complaints from the public, as well as indicted persons before the Tribunal. The Bureau has been able to secure some convictions, but has not been consistent in subsequent years. The most recent annual report of the legal department of the Bureau as displayed on its website is for 2012. This could be an indication of ineffectiveness or other systematic problems of the Bureau.

The Nigerian Code of Code Bureau (CCB) and Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT) have faced a number of criticisms in their operations (Vanguard: 2011). They include the following:
- that the CCB does not have a standard procedure handling cases it wishes to prosecute at the CCT
- the CCB lacks funds to conduct its operations, including payment of prosecuting lawyers fees
- that clerical officers of CCB are hoarding forms for assets declaration
- that functions of the CCB is hindered by internal disagreements among its Commissioners (Ajani: 2011), and
- allegations of bribery and corruption against Chairmen of the CCT (Ibeh: 2014)

One of the most well-known cases before the CCT involved a former governor of Lagos State Chief Bola Tinubu who was charged with operating foreign bank accounts while in office contrary to provisions of the Code of Conduct and Bureau Act 2004 and punishable under the Nigerian Constitution. The case was dismissed for lack of diligent prosecution (Sahara Reporters: 2011).

Researcher4114: Such anti-corruption training is rare. From time to time, seminars are held by the various security agencies on generalized security issues, which may also touch on anti-corruption. In the military, it does not take place as a formal training but as a &quoute;durbar&quoute; - a forum in which commanders address their subordinates, but this is not always regular.

This is corroborated by an interview with an army officer, who stated that &quoute;Not in a training manner but as a durbar, a forum in which Commanders address their subordinates. It is not always regular.&quoute; Two academics went on to state in interview that &quoute;from time to time, seminars are held by the various security agencies on generalized security issues that also touch on anti-corruption issues.&quoute;

In their answer to another related question, the Academics state that &quoute;there are regular briefings for Commanders being deployed to the field of operations on general conduct, which will also cover issues of corruption; but there is hardly any scientific measurement to show the extent to which they have applied the instructions given.&quoute;

The Executive Chairman of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, had advocated regular anti-corruption training for military personnel across the country as part of efforts at curbing the menace of corruption in Nigeria (EFCC: 2013). There is no evidence of such training taking place to date.

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Researcher4114: An army officer reported during interview that &quoute;most trials are Court Martials and may be done in secrecy; defendants are now allowed to choose their counsels from within the military or civil counsels. On rare occasions, cases may become open due to the level of the offence. E.g. Case of the missing impounded tanker vessel from the berth in Lagos in 2004. Four top Navy officers were court martialed.&quoute;

A defence official confirmed during interview that, &quoute;there is no policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of Defence services personnel for corrupt activities. Such publications are only made within the confines of the military establishment directly involved in the corrupt practice.&quoute;

There does not seem to be any deliberate policy to publicize the prosecution of defence service personnel for corrupt activities and there is no indication of such a policy from information available to the public. There have been a number of occasions in the past when defence officials involved in corrupt practices were prosecuted and dismissed, while military officers involved in corrupt practices were similarly court-martialed.

What is reported in the public media in recent times are court martialing of soldiers for offences related to the counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria's northeast. They include refusal to fight Boko Haram (Ibeh: 2015), mutiny (BBC: 2014), and giving weapons to Boko Haram (Wienner: 2014). There does not seem to be any recent prosecution in the military involving corruption charges.

Nevertheless, the recent counterterrorism-related prosecutions in the military are themselves clouded by allegations of corruption in the military, which robs soldiers and combatants of the wherewithal to execute the fight against Boko Haram. President Buhari noted in an interview on CNN that &quoute;The performance of the military was, and is still being affected by corruption in the system (Youtube: 2015).&quoute; Beyond the appointment of a Presidential Advisory Committee on Anticorruption, the new administration has not rolled out any comprehensive anticorruption policy for the country or its military, and neither has it addressed the specific alleged case of military involvement in rigging the 2015 general elections (ThisDay: 2015, BBC: 2015, Sahara Reporters: 2015).

Researcher4114: The Armed Forces Act does not provide for the offence of facilitation payments specifically, but Section 114 extends liability as well as corresponding punishment to service personnel for other civil offences not listed in the Act. Section 18 of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 provides inter alia, &quoute;Any person who offers to any public officer, or being a public officer solicits, counsels or accepts any gratification as an inducement or reward ... is guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to five (5) years imprisonment with hard labour.&quoute;

Bribery and facilitation payments are rampant in Nigeria. According to the Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency International: 2013), &quoute; ... one in four say they have paid a bribe to access a key service ...&quoute; Nigeria along with five other countries ranked the 15th most corrupt worldwide according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2014.

Not many cases of facilitation payments are likely to go to court because of the endemic nature of corruption in the country. The anticorruption agencies (ACAs) charges with the prosecution of such cases including the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), as well as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) face several challenges including lack of independence from executive and political influence, insufficient resources in terms of capital and manpower, lack of cooperation from ancillary institutions including the office of the Attorney General, and delays in the court system (Uddoh: 2013).

A case involving military officers in bribery or facilitation payment was in 2004 when Navy officers were court martialed for aiding the escape from custody of a tanker vessel MV African Pride which was arrested for illegal oil bunkering activities. A naval officer testified that he and other officers were offered huge sums of money to facilitate the off-loading and escape of the Vessel (IRIN: 2015).

Similarly, a whistleblower exposed alleged facilitation payments to some military personnel to participate in election rigging in June 2014. The facilitation was variously described as &quoute;token&quoute; &quoute;welfare&quoute; or &quoute;Ghana must go&quoute; (Sahara Reporters: 2015). Beyond the appointment of a Presidential Advisory Committee on Anticorruption, the new administration has not rolled out any comprehensive anticorruption policy for the country or its military, and neither has it addressed the specific alleged case of military involvement in rigging the 2015 general elections (ThisDay: 2015, BBC: 2015, Sahara Reporters: 2015).

Researcher4114: An army officer stated during interview that &quoute;every offence and punishment is contained in the Armed Forces Decree 105 which controls all disciplinary issues in the military. The decree also acts as check and balances in operations but may have an extension when it affects United Nations operations.&quoute;

There is no indication that corruption is being addressed as a strategic issue in operations. The National Defence Policy recognizes endemic corruption as one of the most potent threats to national security, but is silent on how this threat is to be addressed (NDP: 2006). The country is in the process of developing a national military strategy and joint operational doctrine (Azazi: 2011).

Azazi (2011: 175, 176) a former National Security Adviser (NSA) writing under the topic Military Systems and the Nigerian Armed Forces,&quoute; commented on the absence of a commonly identified national military strategy to influence combat doctrines and joint operational capabilities among others. Azazi who was also one time Chief of Army Staff (COAS) notes that proposals for transformation of the Nigerian military in 2007 including the Nigerian Armed Forces Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (PSOs) aimed at not only reducing friction and ensuring cohesion in multi-national operations, but also enabling Nigerian troops to &quoute; ... uphold their professional ethics as well as act within defined legal limits in the conduct of PSOs.&quoute;

Magbadelo (2012) also notes that the &quoute;Development of a National Military Strategy and Joint Operational Doctrine&quoute; was part of the recommendations of the Armed Forces Transformation Committee (AFTC) constituted in 2007. He notes also that Ministry of Defence held an International Seminar on Peace Support Operations on 2 - 3 August 2010, followed by the drafting of a PSO Policy which the President was yet to approve. Magbadelo (2011: 256) notes that, &quoute;The absence of a policy on PSO provided an alibi for the mismanagement of ... funds (derived from Nigeria's PSOs).&quoute;

IHS Global Limited (2014: 6) notes that currently, &quoute;The Nigerian military has no discernible doctrine or strategy ...&quoute; even though this lapses are being addressed by the on-going transformation process.They also note that government has designated broad-spectrum changes, which aims among others, at &quoute; ...improving salaries, living and training conditions for military personnel and eliminating corrupt practices.&quoute;

Activities relating to the Nigerian Armed Forces transformation are held mainly within Defence and military circles, and as such are not made publicly available although they are quoted in specialized writings in the public realm.

Researcher4114: The Army Officer interviewed states that, &quoute;Periodically, training is being carried out.&quoute; The position of the two Academics is, &quoute;There are regular briefings for Commanders being deployed to the field of operations on general conduct, which will also cover issues of corruption; but there is hardly any scientific measurement to show the extent to which they have applied the instructions given.&quoute;

Although there are no available specifics on corruption instruction to Commanders during deployment in the public realm, various reports suggest that corruption hinders the performance of Nigerian troops in their operations against Boko Haram which in itself may indicate ineffectiveness of any such instructions. Troops deployed in the Northeastern heartland of the Boko Haram insurgency have complained of rationing of bullets, lack of kits, and pay-cuts by as much as 50%, and hold the belief that this is as a result of corruption in Defence Headquarters (Mbachu: 2014, Ahmed and Eckel: 2014).

Researcher4114: Two academic interviewees confirmed that there is no deliberate or coherent policy on the deployment of professionals to monitor corruption risks in the field, even though the Nigerian military participates in the peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities of the United Nations, African Union, and ECOWAS on a considerably large scale. An army officer confirmed during interview that visitors to field operations monitor troops' combat readiness and welfare, as well as other issues pertaining to the Armed Forces Act.

Beyond the appointment of a Presidential Advisory Committee on Anticorruption, the new administration has not rolled out any comprehensive anticorruption policy for the country or its military (ThisDay: 2015, BBC: 2015).

Researcher4114: There appear to be general guidelines on corruption. An army officer stated during interview that &quoute;guidelines are always based on unethical practices, which are enshrined in the Armed Forces Act addressing multiple offences.&quoute; The academic interviewees confirmed the existence of, guidelines on general conduct that also touch on corruption. However, there do not appear to be guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.

A Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (PSO) was formulated in 2007 and a PSO Desk created in the Ministry of Defence. The policy highlights aspects of joint force in a multinational PSO environment, and aims in part to provide better management of accruals from Nigeria's peacekeeping activities. Magbadelo (2015: 256) notes that while a draft of the policy on PSO is awaiting Presidential approval, &quoute;(t)he absence of a policy on PSO provided an alibi for the mismanagement of ... &quoute; funds derived from Nigeria's engagement in PSOs. It is my considered opinion that the policy on PSO is likely to address in some form corruption risks in Peace Keeping Operations.

According to THISDAY (2010), a Communique issued at the end of a seminar on peace support operations organized by the Ministry of Defence states that, &quoute;Nigeria lacks a national policy on peace support operations (PSO) that would define the strategy for its participation. The Communique called for a national policy on PSO &quoute; ... which would take into account the national interest, clear mandate, capacity building which demands the establishment of a peace-keeping institution to train members of the armed forces, diplomats and civil servants.&quoute; The Communique also sought a procurement policy that would be in line with the United Nations standards and that would enable the Nigerian private sector to engage in PSO activities.

Researcher4114: The administration of President Goodluck Jonathan awarded national security contracts to private security companies as well as former militant groups, especially in the Niger Delta region. The contracts ranged from protecting oil pipeline installations to importing military items into the country. For instance, a private security company - Global West Vessel Specialist Agency Ltd reportedly owned by ex-militant Government &quoute;Tompolo&quoute; Ekemupolo secured a $103 million contract with Government to protect Nigeria's waterways (Gambrell: 2012). The same Company also acquired six Norwegian fast-speed Hauk-class guided missile boats re-armed with new weaponry reportedly to fight piracy in Nigeria's waterways (Falayi: 2014)

Not only has the propriety of awarding national security contracts which are traditionally within the domain of the Nigerian Navy been questioned, but the manner in which they are awarded - outside procurement laws, with huge potentials for corruption and no apparent controls or scrutiny is also worrisome. According to 247 Reports, a human rights organization - HURIWA, notes that, &quoute; ... the selective award of juicy security contracts to friends of the Presidency is not only a violation of established laws that protect competition and transparency but amounts to bribery of the most unprecedented dimension.&quoute;

It was reported that London's Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit (OACU) and their Norwegian counterpart - Okokrim arrested two British businessmen for allegedly bribing a Norwegian civil servant to the tune of over $150,000 in connection with purchase of the warships by the Nigerian private security company (Iriekpen: 2015).

Fanoro (2015) reports that the Nigerian government has recently terminated the oil pipeline protection contracts with the former militants upon their lapsing. Nigeria continued to lose over 400,000 barrels of oil per day to the activities of bunkerers and vandals in spite of the existence of contracts with the ex-militants.

In a related development, it was widely reported that the Nigerian government hired mercenaries from South Africa and other countries to engage in the fight against Boko Haram including a fully operational air wing (Nossiter: 2015, YouTube: 2015). The Nigerian government however insists that the foreigners are military advisers involved in technical support and training of Nigerian troops on the use of new weapons. The conditions for hiring these private security contractors are not made available to the public, and the question of their scrutiny for corruption lies at best in the realm of speculation.

The new administration of President Muhammadu Buhari has pledged to fight corruption in the country including the military. The President had fired and replaced the military service chiefs, and appointed an advisory committee on anticorruption (ThisDay: 2015). However, the administration is yet to unroll its full anticorruption policy for the country and its military (BBC: 2015).

Researcher4114: The principal legislation with regards to procurement in Nigeria is the Public Procurement Act, 2007. However, defence procurement is exempted by default as the law does &quoute;not apply to procurement ... involving national defence or national security unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained&quoute; (Section 15.2). Procurement of &quoute;Special Purpose Goods&quoute; or needs of the Armed Forces and other incidental services are also exempt from the law, subject to the discretion of the President (Section 60).

The interviewed defence procurement specialist responded that &quoute;the country has legislation covering defence and security procurement (See PPA, Part 111 3.1) 1 and 2 provide that all procurement of the Federal Government and its Agencies are subject to the Public Procurement Act 2007. According to PPA 2007, goods works and services involving national defence or security are exempted from PPA processes unless authorized by the President.&quoute; The Public Procurement Act 2007 on which the interviewee based his comments is a publicly available piece of legislation.

In September 2014, the Nigerian Senate approved an extra budgetary request by the President to borrow $1 billion to procure weapons and training for the Nigerian military. Premium Times (2014) reports that some Senators had during the debate expressed their concerns that &quoute;appropriate procedures&quoute; and &quoute;process&quoute; were not followed. Similarly, the then opposition party stated their position, that &quoute; ... the National Assembly must summon security and military chiefs to explain how the huge funds allocated to the security sector in the past have been spent, before more funds can be pumped into the sector. They must be asked what happened to the military equipment said to have been procured in recent years (Leadership: 2014).&quoute;

There is no evidence that defence and security procurements are subject to any other form of independent scrutiny, and the sector is not always forthcoming with requests made under the Freedom of Information Act 2011 on grounds of national security (Nyaeger: 2015). During confirmation hearing of the newly appointed Service Chiefs, the Senate President reiterating the oversight functions of the National Assembly noting that; “It is very important also that we emphasize the issue of the procurement procedure in the armed forces. It is an area that they must work hard to root out corruption.” (Ogunmade and Oyedele: 2015)

Contracts which were bared from disclosure in Nigeria on grounds of national security but details of which were nevertheless obtained from overseas include a public relations contract involving an American company - Levick,and News Agency of Nigeria, domiciled in the Office of the National Security Adviser, and WISE intelligence surveillance by Israeli contractor ELBIT (Nyager: 2015). Leaked military documents also revealed the award of almost $500 million in defence contracts to Triax Company Limited, a company purportedly owned by a family friend of former President Goodluck Jonathan (Sahara Reporters: 2015).

Researcher4114: The absence of a precise national military strategy is believed to hamper many aspects of the Nigerian military system, including procurement policies. Defence procurement and asset disposal are generally exempted from the application of the Public Procurement law, except as otherwise authorized by the President, and the public may only inspect unclassified procurement documents. However, there is limited public scrutiny and disclosure of minor defence procurement through legislative oversight and annual appropriations act.

An interviewee confirmed that the defence procurement cycle process is &quoute;not known to the public since their solicitation processes are restricted and contrast to the Public Procurement Act 2007.&quoute;

Section 15 (2) of the Act states inter alia, &quoute;The provisions of this Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods; works and services involving national security unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained.&quoute; Section 60 of the Act defines &quoute;Special Purpose Goods&quoute; as , &quoute; ... any objects of armament ammunition mechanical electrical equipment of other thing as may be determined by the President needed by the Armed Forces or Police Force as well as the services incidental to the supply of the objects;&quoute;

Therefore, by law the military procurement and disposal processes are not disclosed to the public except with the President's express consent. In practice, non-sensitive items are disclosed to the public by way of open competitive tenders (4) and the Appropriations Act published by the Budget Office of the Federal Ministry of Finance. Government may or may not disclose larger strategic procurement to the public. Plans to procure 12 nos. M135 Helicopters were disclosed during Senate deliberation (Premium Times: 2014), while the President's award of about $500 million defence contract to a Nigerian businessman was only revealed by online media (Sahara Reporters: 2015).

Researcher4114: A defence official confirmed during interview that &quoute;there are procurement oversight mechanisms in place through the establishment of committees at various levels of procurement to oversee the process and ensure its transparency.&quoute;

When interviewed, a procurement specialist added that &quoute;there are defence procurement oversight mechanisms. Firstly, the Senate and House of Representatives (National Assembly) related Committees like Public Procurement Committee, Committees on Army, Navy, Airforce, National Intelligence, oversee security agencies activities, including their procurement. Also, defence and security procurement are usually sent to the Bureau of Public Procurement reviews before the issuance of &quoute;Certificate of No Objection&quoute; and awards. The oversight is active but the transparency of the mechanism cannot be established since they are not subjected to public scrutiny.&quoute;

A National Assembly interviewee stated that &quoute;the National Assembly is robust in their oversight functions.&quoute;

Section 88(1)(b)(ii) of the CFRN empowers the National Assembly to investigate the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged with the responsibility for administering moneys appropriated by the National Assembly. The National Assembly carries out this oversight function through the relevant Defence and Service committees in both the Senate and House of Representatives. Section 85 (2) of the CFRN provides for the appointment of an Auditor General of the Federation who shall receive public accounts of all offices of the Federation and submit his report to the National Assembly. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the National Assembly is responsible for enforcing the report of the Auditor General. Section 13(4) of the PPA provides for the auditing of the accounts of the Bureau for Public Procurement in line with guidelines provided by the Auditor General.

In practice however, while the Defence and Services Committees in the National Assembly as well as the PAC are actively in place, they have been observed to have lapses in the conduct of their oversight functions. Dokubo (2011: 70) notes that the legislature lacks expertise and access to information when it comes to national security matters. A study by Okpala (2013: 113) observes that while recent audit findings include over-invoicing, non-retirement of cash advances, lack of internal audit inspection, payment for jobs not done, double-debiting, contract inflation, and lack of supporting documents to back up various purchases etc., there has not been appropriate action to address them, and if there is any, they are not made public. The study recommends regular training of PAC members by professional financial consultants.

Researcher4114: An interviewee responded that &quoute;in the interest of national security, such actual and potential defence purchases are not made public,&quoute; while another interviewee confirmed that &quoute;they are not made public since they are subjected to direct and selected tendering processes ...&quoute;

Section 15 (2) of the Public Procurement Act 2007 states inter alia, &quoute; The provisions of this Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods; works and services involving national defence or national security unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained.&quoute;

Whether defence purchases are published or not largely depends on the nature of goods or services involved. The Ministry of Defence as well as the Services publish invitations to tender for non-sensitive goods such as office equipment and furniture, civilian vehicles, generators, or construction of buildings, etc. This is not the case with strategic arms and weapons acquisitions. Wezeman et al (2011: 30) note that many of the arms procurement projects in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2006-10 were not subjected to public scrutiny, &quoute; ... the purchases of 15 F-7M combat aircraft by Nigeria ... &quoute; according to them, was not discussed publicly in any detail by the government.

The Official Secrets Act 1962 and the National Security Agencies Act 1986 broadly require information on Defence and National Security to be kept as Official Secrets. Section 11(1) Freedom of Information Act provides inter alia, &quoute;A public institution may deny any information the disclosure of which may be injurious to the conduct of international affairs and the defence of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Nyager (2015) notes that &quoute; ... the absence of disclosure, backed by law and practice effectively makes the security sector the most prone to contract inflation and ineffective service delivery.&quoute; Government had refused FOI requests on a $1.5 million public relations contract between LEVICK Communications LLC - a Washington DC based Company and the News Agency of Nigeria on grounds that the contract was domiciled in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), and the ONSA similarly refused to disclose information about the WISE intelligence surveillance contract entered with ELBIT - an Israeli Company (Nyager: 2015). The National Security Adviser (NSA) refused an FOI request to release details of Security Contracts and CCTV cameras mounted in Abuja - the Federal Capital Territory, on grounds that disclosure of such information may be injurious to national security (Procurement Monitor: 2014).

The courts have ruled in the above FOI cases that release of the information sought is not injurious to national security. There is no observed change in publication of defence purchases of recent.

Researcher4114: The response of the procurement specialist is that &quoute;the procedures and standards for companies for Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces procurement are the same for other MDAs except from the bid solicitation procedures.&quoute;

The Public Procurement Act sets out the requirements for any bidder, in addition to other requirements in the solicitation document. They include professional and technical qualification, Section 16(6)(a)(i), financial capacity (ii), equipment and infrastructure (iii), and adequate personnel (iv). The bidder must also possess legal capacity Section 16(6)(b), not be in receivership, insolvent or bankrupt (c), fulfilled its tax obligations and fiscal obligations (d), not have an ex-convict director (e), and submit a sworn affidavit disclosing any directors' interest in the procurement agency, and the veracity of all bidding information (f). A bidder may also have its bid or tender excluded if, among other grounds, it is found to have unduly influenced any procurement with monetary inducement Section 16(8)(a).

The key distinction in defence procurement is that it is exempted from the provisions of the Public Procurement Act. Section 15(2) states inter alia, &quoute;The provisions of this Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods; works and services involving national defence or national security unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained.&quoute; I am not aware of any document which records the exercise of the President's discretion in defence procurement.

It is not possible to state whether there are &quoute;no corruption&quoute; clauses in defence contracts, since the details of such contracts especially pertaining to core military procurement such as arms is not made public. However, the Public Procurement Act is replete with anti-corruption provisions particularly in Part IV - Fundamental Principles for Procurement. Section 34 (1) PPA 2007 provides for domestic preferences.

Researcher4114: Nigeria does not have a national military strategy that would influence procurement policies. The 2006 National Defence Policy apart from not being publicly debated is probably obsolete, and could not have envisaged the current Boko Haram insurgency that took roots about six years ago. A procurement professional confirmed under interview that &quoute;procurement audits are not open (to) public scrutiny but are subjected to the Bureau of Public Procurement routine audit and national defence and security internal audit systems.&quoute;

It appears that military procurement in Nigeria is not strictly guided by a national defence and security strategy, and procurements are driven by current exigencies and other considerations which may give rise to opportunistic contracts. Azazi (2011) notes that, : ... we do not have a commonly identified national military strategy. If properly articulated, this will influence our combat doctrines, combat systems, procurement policies and even our manpower planning to objectively improve joint operational capabilities.&quoute;

Strategic military procurement in the past few years appear to have been driven primarily within the context of challenges posed by the Boko Haram insurgency, and the results are mixed with some success stories as well as concerns about opportunistic procurement. It is widely recognized that defence procurements during periods of active conflict are even more prone to corruption (Justice Africa: 2014)

Nigeria's military successes against Boko Haram from February 2015 is attributed to massive procurement of weapons from China, Russia and Czech Republic, as well as training from foreign advisers with the assistance of regional troops. A government spokesperson was quoted as saying, &quoute;What we never had, we now have ... We have troops, we have aircraft, we have APCs (armoured personnel carriers) and so on... (AP/Fox News: 2015).

Sahara Reporters (2015) notes a &quoute;scandalously inflated&quoute; contract awarded to a private company for purchase of refurbished helicopters, among others at the end of 2014. Complete with leaked correspondence between the Office of the Chief of the Air Staff, the National Security Adviser, as well as the private company, the report chronicled a hastily put together arms deal invoiced at $466,500 including &quoute;antiquated&quoute; helicopters and C-130 planes that are not in &quoute;combat-ready condition.&quoute;

Auditing of core military procurement also appear to be problematic. Magbadelo (2012: 263) notes complaints lodged by the Measurement and Evaluation Unit of the Ministry of Defence, &quoute; ... about the intransigence of the Services which continuously prevented the monitoring teams from sighting core military items such as arms and ammunition, pyrotechnic and battle weapons, etc. Citing the Report of a Defence Retreat, Magbadelo (2015: 263) notes that, &quoute;There had been instances when some procurement for the Services was carried out for political considerations without any input of the end-users ... In some other instances, concealed procurement was only effected in the records but never actually procured.&quoute;

The new administration of President Muhammadu Buhari has convened a 13-member investigative committee under the Office of the National security Adviser (NSA) on the procurement of hardware and munitions in the Armed Forces from 2007 till date (Premium Times: 2015). A press release by the government spokesman states that; “The committee will specifically investigate allegations of non-adherence to correct equipment procurement procedures and the exclusion of relevant logistics branches from arms procurement under past administrations, which, very often resulted in the acquisition of sub-standard and unserviceable equipment.

Researcher4114: An interviewee suggested that &quoute;defence purchases are based on clearly identified and quantified requirements as provided for in direct and selective tendering processes except the bid solicitation processes unless authorized by the President.&quoute;

There are internal processes within each of the services for purchase planning and some coordination at the level of joint services (Sanusi: 2011). However, the bulk of military hardware procurement is not reflected in the budget, and instead are financed from off-budget sources Magbadelo (2012). There are also indications of political influence in military procurements without requisite input from the end users, leading to costly and/or unnecessary equipment (Magbadelo: 2012).

Researcher4114: The Public Procurement Act makes provision for special and restricted methods of procurement, such as restricted tendering and emergency procurement. The law also provides for direct requests for procurement of consultant services in the interest of national defence and security, or similar reasons of confidentiality. The bulk of military hardware procurements are either not done using competitive bidding or are restricted within defence circles. There are also limitations with regards to advertisement of bids. In practice, identification of needs is followed by either open advertisement or restricted invitation letters.

A defence official reported during interview that &quoute;defence procurements are usually advertised within Defence circles and contractors are invited to bid. Such procurement bids are usually sealed and a deadline for the submissions is set. The bids are then opened immediately after the closing of submissions in the presence of bidders, officials and relevant stakeholders. It is usually a very competitive and transparent process.&quoute;

However, a procurement specialist confirmed during interview that &quoute;technically, it is not conducted as open competition since the procurement is not advertised either nationally or international for interested bidders to participate in the bidding processes.&quoute;

Section 16 (1) (c) of the Public Procurement Act 2007 states that all public procurement shall be conducted by open competitive bidding. However, Section 40(1) of the PPA also makes provisions for restricted tendering, while Section 42(1) provides for direct procurement such as during emergencies. The extent to which the PPA applies to defence procurement is limited by Section 15 (2) of the Act.

In practice, the procurement of non-sensitive items like infrastructure, office equipment, civilian vehicle supply, and drugs are publicly advertised and bidding is conducted through National or International Competitive Bidding in line with the provision of the Act. In terms of strategic procurements such as arms, Government exercises its discretionary powers to conduct either open or restricted bidding (7).

There is no publicly available data on the quantity of single source military procurement, but Magbadelo (2012) notes that, &quoute; ... the bulk of military hardware procurement is not provided for in the annual budget of the MOD, it is sourced from off-budget facility which is never reflected in the budget. This practice shields the military from the prying eyes of the public and parliament.&quoute;

Researcher4114: The interviewee suggested that tender boards either at the ministerial or agency levels are subject to regulations and codes of conduct, as provided under the Public Procurement Act. Their decisions are subject to independent audit, as well as procurement complaint mechanisms. The Bureau of Public Procurement also conducts public reviews and auditing of procurement to ensure due process and fairness.

It is evident from provisions of the Public Procurement Act 2007 that Tender Boards are subject to regulations and codes of conduct and their decisions are subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness. Part XI of the PPA provides for Code of Conduct for public procurement.

Section 22 of the Public Procurement Act 2007 provides for the establishment of Tender Boards in procuring entities. The conduct of all persons involved with public procurement are expected to be governed by ' principles of honesty, accountability, transparency, fairness and equity (S. 57.2). The Bureau of Public Procurement may review and recommend for investigation any matter related to the conduct of public procurement (S. 53.1). Section 54 (1) of the PPA also provides that, &quoute;A bidder may seek administrative review for any omission or breach by a procuring or disposing entity under the provisions of the Act ...&quoute;

However, the over-riding concern is that military procurement is exempted from the provisions of the PPA 2007 by virtue of Section 15(2).

Researcher4114: The PPA 2007 provides for sanctions to discourage the offence of collusion in section 58 (1-2).

The PPA was enacted into law by the National Assembly on 4th June 2007. Collusion and all other forms of corrupt and fraudulent practices are punishable under the PPA. Section 58(4)(a) includes as offences under the Act, &quoute;entering or attempting to enter into a collusive agreement, whether enforceable or not, with a supplier, contractor or consultant where the price quoted in their respective tenders, proposals or quotations are or would be higher than would have been the case had there not been collusion between the persons concerned&quoute;. Punishment for offences under the PPA include terms of imprisonment for persons including company Directors, dismissal for government officials, debarment and fines for legal persons - Section 58 (6) et seq.

Section 15 (2) provides that; &quoute;The provisions of the Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods; works and services involving national defence or national security unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained.&quoute;

THISDAY (2013) reports that the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) had blacklisted about 13 companies and was introducing the debarment procedure under which defaulting contractors could be barred from doing business in the country for up to five years, including payment of a fine equivalent at 25 per cent of the value of the procurement in question.

Note however that the likelihood of sanctions being applied to defence procurement is reduced by the application of Section 15 (2) of the PPA which in effect removes &quoute;goods, works and services involving national defence or national security, from the purview of the Act except the President grants express permission. Note also the concern among procurement stakeholders that the enforcement of criminal sanctions in the procurement process is weak and has not had the deterrent effect that was intended of them (Ekwekwuo: 2012).

I am not aware of any specific case studies dealing with collusion in Nigerian defence procurement and this may not be unconnected with the exemption of military procurements from the provisions of the Public Procurement Act 2007 (Section 15).

Researcher4114: An interviewee reported that &quoute;the Bureau of Public Procurement conducts general training for procurement officers but I am not aware of any special training for defence and security procurement officers for that purpose.&quoute;

Sections 5 (k) and (s) of the Public Procurement Act 2007 (PPA) empowers the Bureau of Public Procuement (BPP) to organize training and development programmes for procurement professionals&quoute; ... and to &quoute;co-ordinate relevant training programs to build institutional capacity.&quoute;

The BPP on its official website reports that the Defence Headquarters recently organized &quoute; ... a three-day procurement awareness seminar for the various personnel of the armed forces responsible for procurement operations.&quoute; The report further stated that the seminar which was attended by personnel from both BPP and Defence was themed &quoute; Understanding Public Procurement Policy Towards Efficient Defence Procurement in Nigeria&quoute; (BPP: 2014). In his speech during the seminar, the Director of Defence Procurement at the Defence Headquarters (now the Chief of Army Staff) hinted that understanding the difference between Public and Defence Procurement functions and procedures would enhance Defence Procurement Procedure for the Armed Forces of Nigeria.

Senior military and defence personnel have also benefited from US sponsored training in defence budgeting in the past (IHS Global Limited (2014).

However, the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation operates a &quoute;pooling&quoute; system whereby middle and senior level management staff of disparate qualifications are intermittently posted to different ministries including Defence, thereby mitigating against specialization (Magbadelo: 2012). The Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply Management of Nigeria (CIPSMN) in a communique issued at the end of their 2014 annual conference observed that &quoute; ... the continuous use of unskilled individuals as procurement professionals in the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) and in the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) is responsible for poor procurement performances and budget implementations ...&quoute; I am not aware of any specific cases in the public domain involving defence procurement staff.

There have been various reports of &quoute;unnecessary delays, wrong or defective equipment purchase, or outright stealing of monies&quoute; in defence procurement, as a result of &quoute;the opaque and often corrupt procurement practices prevalent in the military&quoute; (Atuanya: 2014). These include inflation of contract sums, and the supply of obsolete and unserviceable equipment (Daniel: 2012).

There is nothing in the public domain to indicate that procurement staff are holding defence contractors to account on their obligations on reporting and delivery. Section 15 (2) of the Public Procurement Act 2007 which states that; &quoute;The provisions of this Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods; works and services involving national defence or national security unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained,&quoute; is likely a limiting factor. The Senate President specifically tasked the Service Chiefs during their confirmation hearing on the issue of corruption in defence procurements, “It is very important also that we emphasise the issue of the procurement procedure in the armed forces. It is an area that they must work hard to root out corruption” (Ogunmade and Oyedele: 2015)

Researcher4114: An interviewee confirmed that &quoute;there are enough mechanisms for complaints by companies via the PPA Section 51(1) and (2). Companies do not feel protected as they generally entertain fears of being blacklisted by the Agencies if they complain or petition against unjust treatment or malprocurements.&quoute;

The Public Procurement Act 2007 provides for administrative reviews of procurement (Section 54). An aggrieved bidder may lodge a complaint with the accounting officer of the procuring or disposing entity, failing that, by complaint to the Bureau of Public Procurement, and failing that by appeal to the Federal High Court. Williams-Elegbe (2015) notes that the fact that complaints must be filed with the procuring authority itself leads to a potential for reprisal by the authority in question. Second, the timeline granted to companies submitting a complaint, and in particular the passage referring to “when he or she should have been aware” of the wrongdoing, lends itself to a great deal of discretion on the part of the authorities receiving the complaint.

Daniel (2012) reports the case of a defence contractor who petitioned the presidency over government procurement of &quoute;un-manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) known as drones and aerial surveillance balloons,&quoute; the cost of which he claimed was inflated. The same contractor also alleged government procurement of faulty UAVs from Israeli contractors at inflated costs. There is no information in the public domain of how and if government dealt with the petition. In a related development, President Jonathan reportedly ordered investigation of a petition for non-performance of a contract award for the supply of patrol boats for the Nigerian Army (Alade: 2012).

In practice, companies do not feel protected and they entertain fears of being blacklisted by the agencies if they complain or petition against unjust treatment or malpractice in procurement. William-Elegbe (2015) concurs that; “In spite of these extensive rules on dispute resolution, the dispute resolution system is not being used for a variety of reasons. Some are the fear of retaliation in the form of the loss of future business and others include the fact that Nigeria does not possess a strong culture of complaining or litigation generally, and contractors instead prefer to accept their losses in the hope that the next time the procurement process would turn out in their favour.”

Given that Section 15 (2) PPA exempts defence procurements from the application of the Act except with the President's consent, it seems from the reported cases that complaints against malpractices in defence procurements are channeled directly to the President, but it is not clear how efficaciously the complaints are being dealt with.

Response to peer reviewers:
Many thanks for your insights, I have incorporated some elements into my response above.

Researcher4114: Sanctions include terms of imprisonment, debarment from public procurements and fines. However, in practice such sanctions are rarely applied, with exception to international reciprocal debarment.

According to the Defence procurement specialist interviewed, &quoute;A supplier, as legal person, convicted of corrupt practices, is punishable under section 58 (6-7) of the PPA 2007. The punishments include debarment, fines, and at least 3 years imprisonment for the company Directors.&quoute;

Businessday of July 16, 2013 reported the debarment by the Nigerian government of 10 companies from doing business in the country as a result of their alleged corrupt practices.

It is unclear whether any of these companies were defence companies, or how far the rules under the PPA will apply to the defence sector.

Researcher4114: The interviewee confirmed that &quoute;these [due diligence requirements] are optional to the procuring entity.&quoute;

Offsets are mandatory reciprocal compensations or benefits required by foreign governments when purchasing weapon systems and services. According to the Global Offset and Countertrade Association (GOCA), these benefits may be through local procurement, co-production, marketing assistance, investments, technology transfer, R&D, or other acceptable offset activities.

Bassey (2011: 236) provides a historical context of Nigeria's national defence imperatives giving rise to offset arrangements with some details of collaborative arrangements in weapons and military allied production in the 1970s and 1980s in partnership with the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), as well as future trends for various &quoute;offset arrangements, licensing, co-production, co-development, offshore assembly, etc.&quoute;

Several offset contracts with foreign companies and governments are known to exist for the joint production of military hardware in Nigeria, but the details are not always public. In March 2012, the Nigerian Navy (NN) announced the President's approval of the acquisition of two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) from China (IHS Global Limited: 2014). The first OPV will be built in China, while about 50% of the second ship will be completed in Nigeria. According to a Navy press release, the offset arrangement will &quoute;enhance the capacity on the NN in shipbuilding, which would equally guarantee the much needed technology transfer.&quoute;

According to Waldwyn (2015) “Following the completion of sea trials in late December 2014, the first Chinese-built Centenary-class Offshore Patrol Vessel NNS Centenary was delivered to Nigeria and commissioned in February 2015. The second Centenary-class ship, NNS Unity, was christened at Wuchang Shipyard, again in late 2014, and will be completed at Port Harcourt Shipyard in Nigeria. Through this deal, Nigeria has sought to increase its domestic shipbuilding capability, in support of a planned fleet upgrade.”

Nigerian defence contracts are generally shrouded in secrecy. The Public Procurement Act 2007 does not contain information on offset contracts, and Section 15(2) of the Act states that; The provisions of this Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods; works and services involving national defence or national security unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained.&quoute; Details of offset contracts are hardly made available to the public, except where government wants to emphasize on benefits to be derived from such contracts, such as facilitation of technology transfer and boosts in local capacity. For instance, SDI (2014) notes that; &quoute;Nigeria has not disclosed any offset obligations imposed by the country for its arms procurement.&quoute; It is generally not known what specific due diligence requirements government imposes on offset contractors, and the extent to which such requirements are enforced.

As part of the efforts of the new administration to clamp down on corruption, build industrial capacity and promote development, the Senior Special Assistant to the President announced an audit of weapons procurement and arms supply contracts under the immediate past administration in the country (Forrester: 2015). The President also announced plans for re-engineering of the DICON as a &quoute;viable mechanisms for near-self-sufficiency in military equipment and logistics production complemented only by very advanced foreign technologies.&quoute;

Researcher4114: The government announces offset contracts occasionally but the details are not made public. Nigeria has not made public any official offset obligations for military procurements (TransWorldNews: 2014).

Willet (2009: 345) defines offsets as, &quoute; ... industrial or commercial compensation practices required as a condition of purchase of defence articles and/or services.&quoute; She notes also that offset deals are very difficult to monitor and audit because of their complexity among other factors, which also provides ample opportunities for inflation of contracts.

The Interviewee's response is that, &quoute;Such details are not made public by the government, perhaps in the interest of national security.&quoute; However, in March 2012 the Nigerian Navy (NN) announced Presidential approval for the acquisition of two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) from China (IHS Global Limited (2014). According to a NN press release, the first OPV will be entirely built in China's Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan while &quoute;about 50 per cent of the second ship will be completed in Nigeria.&quoute;

Researcher4114: An interviewee confirmed that offset contracts are subjected to only inter-government contractual negotiations and agreements in the interest of national security.

According to TransWorldNews (2014) &quoute;Nigeria has not disclosed any offset obligations imposed by the country for its arms procurement.&quoute; It is difficult to determine the competitiveness of offset contracts in the absence of clear Government policy, regulation or guidelines. However, offsets generally fall within the same category as main contracts as both are exempted from &quoute;open competitive bidding&quoute; except with the President's express approval (Sections 15 (2) and 16 (1) (c) PPA).

Section 43(1)(a) of the PPA provides for emergency procurement where , &quoute;the country is either seriously threatened by or actually confronted with a disaster, catastrophe, war, insurrection or Act of God;&quoute; The ongoing war against Boko Haram may provide sufficient justification for emergency procurement by the Nigerian military.

Furthermore, publications of offset arrangements are rare and lacking in sufficient details (IHS Global Ltd: 2014). In the circumstances, it can be inferred that the level of competitiveness of offset contracts vis-à-vis main contracts in addition to limitations imposed under the PPA are also likely to be affected by national security and/or other political considerations.

Researcher4114: An interviewee stated that &quoute;to the best of my knowledge, [government control over agents and intermediaries] does not exist.&quoute;

Agents and intermediaries are not specifically barred from the military procurement process, although Section 16 the Public Procurement Act 2007 outlining the Fundamental Principles for Procurements, states that all procurements shall be conducted &quoute;in a manner which is transparent, timely, equitable for ensuring accountability and conformity with the Act and regulations deriving therefrom;&quoute; Defence and security contracts are however precluded from the application of the Procurement Act by virtue of Section 15(2) thereof. Also, the Act does not provide formal controls to regulate the use of intermediaries.

Atuanya (2014) notes that the use of agents and middlemen in defence procurement fuels corruption through inflation of contracts, bribery and kick-backs with the result that sub-standard or obsolete goods, as well as ineffective services are delivered. Citing several defence contracts that were inflated through the use of middlemen, he states that; “The use of middlemen in procurements of military hardware has left the country less secure, and increasingly unable to project its power and influence in the sub-region.” Williams (2004) describing the typical procurement process in the Nigerian defence sector, states that America and European vendors “usually have or will get Nigeria agents or middlemen to negotiate the contracts for the supply.”

It is widely reported that the new administration has considered reopening the investigation into the 1994 Halliburton contract in which top Nigerian officials were allegedly bribed with $180 million through the use of middlemen in connection with contracts to build liquefied natural gas facilities in Bonny (Onabu: 2015, Omonobia: 2015). According to US trial reports a network of secretive banks and offshore tax havens was used to funnel $182 million in bribes to Nigerian officials in exchange for $6 billion in engineering and construction work for an international consortium of companies that included a then Halliburton subsidiary.

Researcher4114: An interviewee confirmed that &quoute;such [details surrounding the financing package] are not made known to the public as they border on national security which are strictly on the doctrine of 'need to know' in the military.&quoute;

Section 37 of the Public Procurement Act makes provision for interest on delayed payments, but Section 16 of the same Act precludes the application of provisions of the Act to defence and security procurements. I am not aware of any major arms deals in which the financial details are made public.

Researcher4114: An interviewee confirmed that there &quoute;I do not possess any evidence that Government compels main contractors to subject their subsidiaries and sub-contractors to the anti-corruption programmes.&quoute;

Section 16(1)(d) of the PPA provides that all public procurement shall be conducted, &quoute;in a manner which is transparent, timely, equitable for ensuring accountability and conformity with this Act and regulations deriving therefrom.&quoute; Similarly, section 57(2) of the PPA provides that; &quoute;The conduct of all persons involved with public procurement, whether as official of the Bureau, a procuring entity, supplier, contractor or service provider shall at all times be governed by principles of honesty, accountability, transparency, fairness and equity.'

The PPA distinguishes between &quoute;unacceptable sub-contracting&quoute; which renders a bid unacceptable as a major deviation under Section 31(7)(I), and &quoute;sub-contracting that is unclear and questionable&quoute; which is considered a minor deviation and can be remedied in a bid under Section 31(10)(I). The distinguishing factor between a major and minor deviation lies on the cost - Section 31 (11)(a) and (b).

The general provisions of the PPA on anticorruption and sub-contracting does not automatically apply to defence contracts by virtue of Section 15(2) which provides that; &quoute;The provisions of this Act shall not apply to the procurement of special goods; works and services involving national defence or national security unless the President's express approval has been first sought and obtained.&quoute;

The Director of Defence Procurement at the Defence Headquarters hinted at a &quoute; ... difference between Public and Defence Procurement functions and procedures,&quoute; but details of the latter either in its general form or as pertains to sub-contracting and anticorruption provisions are not in the public domain (BPP: 2014).

Researcher4114: An interviewee confirmed that &quoute;it is common for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence due to pre-independence relationships between developing countries and the developed ones, membership of international bodies, for example the Commonwealth countries, bilateral relationship, among others.&quoute;

Wezman et al (2011:24) attribute motives of arms suppliers to Sub-Saharan Africa to &quoute; ... short- and long-term economic aims, political influence and security aims.&quoute; Such motives include to gain political influence during the Cold War (United States, former Soviet Union); to gain access to natural resources (China); or to strengthen peacekeeping, counterterrorism, as well as border protection roles (United States).

Owing to Nigeria's lack of a functional military industrial complex, it has had to depend on other nations for its weapons, arms and ammunition supplies, and this has been affected by the nature of its &quoute;political and economic relationship&quoute; with the producing/supplying countries (Sanusi: 2011: 195). The new administration has announced plans for a &quoute;modest military industrial complex ... for near-self-sufficiency in military equipment and logistics production complemented only by very advanced foreign technologies&quoute; (Reuters: 2015).

In recent times, the United States turned down Nigeria's request for cobra attack helicopters, &quoute;due to concerns about Nigeria’s ability to use and maintain this type of helicopter in its effort against Boko Haram and ongoing concerns about the Nigerian military’s protection of civilians when conducting military operations ” (Magnowski: 2014). The United States had invoked the &quoute;Leahy Laws&quoute; to impose an arms embargo against Nigeria based on allegations of human rights abuses by its soldiers in the fight against Boko Haram, some of which was chronicled by Amnesty International (Amnesty International: 2015). Following assurances of military professionalism and application of the rule of law in prosecuting its counterterrorism campaign, the US has announced plans to lift the arms embargo (Kokim: 2015).

It is also reported that multinational corporations from the industrialized nations bribe government officials in developing countries to obtain lucrative contracts (Willet: 2009). Transparency International (2011) ranks the arms, military and security sector among the top 10 most corrupt prone industries worldwide in its Bribe Payers Index (BPI).

Response to peer reviewers:
Many thanks for your informative comments, I have integrated some of the information that you have provided into my response above.