Republic of Cote d'Ivoire

Researcher4204: There is no information available on the matter of asset disposals. Côte d'Ivoire is still under UN embargo. The embargo on specific non lethal material relating to SSR efforts has been lifted while it is still ongoing regarding other types of military equipment. Officially, no military assets have been acquired or sold. However, evidence indicates that the CNS has been acquiring weapons and equipment for the military.

The CNS does not communicate its information about procurement and equipment. Being outside any scrutiny, the CNS does not report publicly, which poses a risk of a loss in accountability and integrity. With the current status of the CNS, it is impossible for the NA to scrutinise its actions.

Researcher4204: There is no indication for any scrutiny of the CNS. Côte d'Ivoire is still under UN embargo. The embargo on specific non lethal material relating to the SSR programme has been lifted while it is still ongoing regarding other types of military equipment. Officially, no military assets have been officially acquired or sold, and the UN is monitoring all activities related to asset disposals. However, evidence indicates that the CNS has been acquiring weapons and equipment for the military.

The CNS does not communicate its information about procurement and equipment. Being outside any scrutiny, the CNS does not report publicly, which poses a risk of a loss in accountability and integrity. With the current status of the CNS, it is impossible for the NA to scrutinise its actions.

Researcher4204: Secret items as well as the intelligence service spending are all under the coordination of the presidency. Secrecy and lack of transparency still prevail on this matter. There is no information available on how much of the defence and security budget is allocated to intelligence services and other secret items.

The lack of transparency and the secretive behaviour of the government can be illustrated by the fact that Côte d’Ivoire did not participate in the Open Budget Index of 2010 and 2012, while countries like Burkina Faso and Mali did.

There is also very little information available on the defence budget in general. In September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but even that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels, particularly on secret items.

Researcher4204: The legislature suffers from a lack of transparency surrounding such expenditure. Since intelligence and secret spending are under the control of the presidency, they are outside the NA's scrutiny. However the whole state budget is submitted to the NA without specific information that concerns military and intelligence secret expenditures.

In September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but even that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels.

There is no evidence of any secret expenses submitted to the NA. The lack of information surrounding this issue makes it difficult to provide specific sources.

Researcher4204: There are mechanisms in the defence and security sector which are in charge of conducting financial audits. In practice, auditing secret items or the intelligence services annual accounts is almost impossible because they are under the control of the the presidency (CNS). Moreover, there is no communication between the NA and the presidency on those matters. There is no evidence of any audit reports transmitted to the NA on those issues or of any subsequent parliamentary debate. There is therefore complete opacity surrounding the audits related to the security sector's accounts.

The ministry of defence has its own audit mechanism in charge of scrutiny. The General Inspectorate of the Army is in charge of auditing defence expenditures. However, Ouattara Raphael (2011) states “From a strictly governance point of view, like all other ministries in Côte d’Ivoire, the ministry of defence has an inspectorate department that is in charge of ensuring the proper application of management standards and procedures. This department is generally entrusted to officers at the end of their career and, like its counterparts in other ministries it is severely hampered by incompetence and corruption.“

The intelligence services in Côte d’Ivoire are exempted from any kind of independent oversight. Secrecy and opacity characterise this entity. In April 2014, the President signed a decree (Décret n° 2014-180 portant dissolution de l’Agence nationale de la Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, en abrégé ANSI) which dissolved the ANSI. Since that dissolution, the National Coordination for Intelligence (CNR), which is under the responsibility of the President's brother in charge of Presidential Affairs, is the only presidential body in charge of intelligence. Since the CNR is directly subordinate to the Presidency, it is exposed to less scrutiny than the ANSI which indicates a higher risk of a lack of integrity and accountability.

Researcher4204: In law, there are provisions for off-budget expenditures in general but not specifically related to defence and security sector.

In the past, off-budget military expenditures have been regularly carried out. By labeling expenditure as off-budget, it affords a measure of secrecy or confidentiality which allows expenditures to remain without scrutiny or any type of oversight.

Defence procurements made on the basis of “sovereignty funds” are kept behind closed doors, away from the public. The legal basis for sovereignty funds is the &quoute;finance law&quoute;. Each year a finance law is voted in by the NA. However, many lines are not openly available or detailed such as the ones related to sovereignty funds.

Although the defence budget should include all expenditures, evidence suggests that in practice, information on expenditures remains vague. For example, in September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but even that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels.

In reality, there is therefore likely to be little control over off-budget military expenditure.

Researcher4204: Off-budget military expenditures are carried out in practice, but they are not publicly announced because they often refer to secret operations. The link between illicit economic activity and the military off-budget expenditure is not that clear. However, drawing on general information on the opacity surrounding secret expenditure and the links between organised crime and the military, it can be surmised that there is a high corruption risk here.

In law, there are provisions for off-budget expenditures in general but not specifically related to defence and security sector. Defence procurements made on the basis of “sovereignty funds” are kept behind closed doors, away from the public. The legal basis for sovereignty funds is the &quoute;finance law&quoute;. Each year a finance law is voted in by the NA. However, many lines are not openly available or detailed such as the ones related to sovereignty funds.

Although the defence budget should include all expenditures, evidence suggests that in practice, information on expenditures remains vague. For example, in September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but even that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels.

In the past four years, there has been evidence that some bodies external to the defence institution were involved in businesses associated with natural resources exploitation. There have also been indications that some members of those defence institutions were involved in illicit activities which blurs the efforts made to bring transparency in defence sector, such as sensitisation policies with bodies created to fight corruption in general such as the SNGRC.

In the UN final report of the group of experts on Côte d’Ivoire in April 2014, paragraph 62 and 63 clearly demonstrate the involvement of entities and former war chiefs in obtaining revenues from the exploitation and smuggling of natural resources. Because of their controversial nature, those financial interests are not publicly stated and are exempt from scrutiny.

Reports and studies from international organisations frequently outline the fact that some members of the defence and security forces are involved in illicit activities linked to organised crime (drug and diamond trafficking, car and weapon smuggling, etc.).

The criminalisation of the defence and security sector is ongoing but it is essential to mention the efforts made by the government to stop those criminal behaviours such as the creation of the CCDO (Centre de coordination des Operations) on 11 March 2013, which is a response to fight organised crime within the defence and security forces. There has also been the reintegration of almost 58 000 former combatants at the end of the DDR process in June 2015.

Researcher4204: The law does not provide any mechanism that regulates the classification of information, meaning that information can be classified outside of any scrutiny. The lack of regulation indicates an increased risk of a lack of integrity and good governance.

Response to peer reviewer:
There is no official or media evidence that &quoute;national security&quoute; is used as a justification for non-release of defence and security related information.

Researcher4204: It is crucial to differentiate between defence and security individuals involved in commercial businesses and the defence and security institutions themselves.

Some individuals, formerly members of the 2002 rebellion and now officially members of the Republican Forces of Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI), are involved in illicit commercial businesses based on natural resources (UN Group of Expert latest report of 2014). There is no evidence of any defence and security institutions owning commercial businesses.

Response to government reviewer:
If you state that military social welfare fund is a private business, I will accept that it exists, but I cannot find any information about it at all. Score changed from 4 to 0.

Researcher4204: There are no military-owned businesses. Therefore, transparent independent scrutiny does not apply.

Response to government reviewer:
If you state that military social welfare fund is a private business, I will accept that it exists, but I cannot find any evidence of audit or scrutiny. Score changed from NA to 0.

Researcher4204: As stated in the UN Group of experts latest 2014 report, some military or other defence ministry employees, are involved in illicit commercial activities which sometimes are covered under private enterprise. Former members of the rebellion have private enterprises that do business outside of any scrutiny.

In the UN report, paragraphs 62 and 63 clearly demonstrate the involvement of entities and former war chiefs in obtaining revenues from the exploitation and smuggling of natural resources. Paragraphs 92 and 94 also link defence and security personnel with the illegal exploitation of gold. Because of their controversial nature, those financial interests are not publicly stated and are exempt from scrutiny.

There is no evidence of the government addressing this issue, despite an official ban on illicit artisanal gold mining.

Researcher4204: The anti-corruption commitments made in public by the Ministry of Defence deal largely with racketeering-related corruption cases. The Minister of Defence often publicly commits to anti-corruption and integrity measures. During visits to military bases and interviews in the media, a commitment to anti-corruption has been stated by other defence officials.

Reports indicate that cases of undisciplined and corrupt behaviour are often taken to the public sphere and the sanctions are announced publicly to make examples out of those cases exposed.

Researcher4204: There are measures in place for personnel misbehaviours related to corruption and bribery. For instance, the government created the &quoute;Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance&quoute; (the High Authority for Good Governance), which is the institution in charge of sensitising the population on corruption risks, preventing corrupt behaviour and sanctioning those who commit corrupt acts.

This new entity covers all areas and is in charge of raising moral standards within the public sphere. While it is a relatively new institution (it was established on September the 5th of 2014 but was created by decree in September 2013), early evidence suggests that there has been some effective action. Reports indicate that cases of corruption are now being publicised in greater numbers in order to show the public that sanctions are being applied to corrupt members of the defence and security forces.

Response to peer reviewer:
Media reports indicate that measures to fight against corruption are becoming more effective because many cases have been publicly dealt with. Score maintained.

Researcher4204: Evidence suggests that whistleblowing is increasingly encouraged by the government. There is a law that protects whistleblowers from any type of threat (Order N°202013-660, 20 September 2013, chapter 3). This law applies to any citizen, irrespective of them being in the defence and security sector or not.

According to reports published before the aforementioned legislation was put in place, it was considered dangerous to report corruption. It is unclear how the environment may have changed since. It is almost impossible to say whether this law offering protection is effectively applied in practice as no cases of whistleblowing have been publicly reported yet. This could indicate the effective protection of whistleblowers, but may also simply indicate that there have not been any cases of whistleblowing. While whistleblowing is encouraged in theory, it could be rather difficult in practice due to the lack of trust among military personnel following the political crisis.

Nevertheless, the legal chapter dedicated to this matter exists, so there is a law that should be applied.

Researcher4204: There is no evidence of any kind of special attention paid to personnel in sensitive positions, nor that there may be official recognition that some positions are more open to corruption than others.

Response to peer reviewers:
I could find no evidence of special attention being paid, and the government reviewer's remarks that qualification level is the only criterion that might be different for these posts only serves to substantiate the fact that there are no procedural measures in place to minimise corruption risk in specific positions. Score maintained.

Researcher4204: There are indications that the number of military and civilian personnel is known to the Ministry of Defence in Côte d’Ivoire. However, this information is not publicly available and its accuracy remains largely unknown.

According to the latest figures (made available to the assessor on a confidential basis), 60 000 people are employed in the military globally.

Below, there is a breakdown of the number of personnel in 2014:
The FRCI (Air, Navy and Army) : 22 700
Gendarmerie: 17 383
Police: 17 261
Civilians employed by the ministry of defence: unknown

The Ministry of Defence does not have the figures related to the civilian employees. However, the SSR process is helping the security and defence sector to be more accurate and open on certain issues, suggesting that further improvement is likely.

For example, from 2011 to 2012 the government obliged soldiers to personally pick up their salaries in cash within the barracks. The objective behind that one-off measure was to identify the soldiers still alive and truly enrolled in the army. The “dead or shadow” soldiers and the deserters have been removed from the army personnel records. This should improve the accuracy of personnel figures available to the establishment.

Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 1.

Researcher4204: Pay rates and allowances are clearly determined and published for all civil servants. The basis on which salaries and allowances are paid is made publicly available.

However, specific salaries or financial benefits or advantages might not be openly published, particularly for civil servants close to the presidency. Additionally, there is a lack of clarity regarding allowances.

Response to peer reviewer:
Agree. Score adjusted from 4 to 2 (comments and sources added).

Researcher4204: Correct pay is generally available on time as planned unless there are exceptional disruptions due to political crisis (2011 crisis) or financial tensions at the ministry of economy and finance. The system of payment is relatively functional and well-established. Civil servants are generally paid on time by the public treasury.

A notable exception to this was in November 2014, when soldiers took to the streets to protest the late payment of salaries and allowances. The Minister of Defence promised to pay the money owed and improve systems such as the health insurance of soldiers in exchange for them returning to their posts.

Researcher4204: Evidence indicates that military personnel are not subject to an independent, transparent and objective appointment system. Nepotism and tribalism have for the past three years affected the selection process for appointments in the military.

There is a committee in charge of appointments within the military but evidence suggests that this committee lacks independence and transparency. Most of the time appointments will be made accordingly to political orders coming from the presidency.

Since the end of the crisis in 2011, tribal biased appointments have been denounced by international NGOs such as International Crisis Group and Amnesty International.

Response to peer reviewer:
Agree. Score changed from 2 to 1.

Researcher4204: According to the regulations and mechanisms in place, military personnel are promoted through an objective and meritocratic process. There are specific committees in charge of assessing potential candidates for promotion within the defence and security institutions, in conformity with the law.

However, evidence suggests that political consideration and favouritism sometimes weaken the process. In many cases, external institutions allegedly influence decisions made by those committees which negatively affects any independent oversight on this matter.

Researcher4204: Conscription does not exist in Côte d'Ivoire.

Researcher4204: Conscription does not exist in Côte d'Ivoire. However, reports from international organisations and NGOs indicate that bribes are a common practice to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process of the defence and security forces.

Researcher4204: From 2011 to 2012, the government obliged soldiers to personally pick up their salaries in cash within the barracks. The objective behind that one-off measure was to identify the soldiers still alive and truly enrolled in the army and still in activity. The “dead or shadow” soldiers and the deserters have been removed from the army personnel.

The fact that this measure was needed indicates that there has been evidence of “ghost soldiers” or non-existent soldiers in Côte d'Ivoire, and in 2013 the government launched a wider program to dismantle cases of fictitious civil servants and soldiers. A total of 1500 ghost civil servants were identified in 2014. There is therefore quite some progress being made, however, problems with the payment system (with late payments pushing soldiers to protest on the streets in 2014) and the clarity over numbers of official personnel (with official statistics still unpublished), it is unclear whether the risk of further problems occurring has been completely dealt with.

Researcher4204: The official chain of command and the official chain of payment are in theory and in practice separated. The public treasury pays the salaries of civil servants (including soldiers) via an e-payment system. The only exception to the e-payment system was in 2011, when the government decided to pay the soldiers in cash in order to identify deserters, ghost soldiers and dead soldiers that remained on the payroll.

There might be unofficial chains that are not separated but no formal evidence exists.

Researcher4204: The Ivorian military code (Loi n° 95-695) emphasises the values, duties and rights of any soldier. However, the code does not include corruption-related issues, such as bribery, gifts, hospitality etc. It can therefore not be considered a comprehensive policy covering corruption behaviour for the military.

However, a new law applying to all civil servants was passed in 2013 and clearly states what corruption consists of and outlines the sanctions applying when these are violated (order N° 202013-660).

Researcher4204: The military code does not include corruption-related issues and there is no evidence of any prosecution due to breaches of the military code. However over the past three years, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior have arrested and prosecuted soldiers or police members who deliberately flouted the law on corruption (racketeering etc.).

The new anti-corruption law and the new “haute autorité pour la gouvernance” (order N° 202013-660), are in charge of sanctioning corruption-related cases to make the government's anti-corruption efforts more effective. The haute autorité has not yet sanctioned anyone since being put in place. However, corrupt agents have been sanctioned under the new law.

Researcher4204: There is no evidence of any training related to corruption for the military and civilian personnel that is delivered within the Ivorien military, but there has been some related training under the United Nations (ONUCI) in recent years. In addition, in 2013, the ministry of defence expressed its intention to draft an ethics charter and a deontology code. The ethics charter and deontology code drafting has been finalised but there is no evidence of their adoption yet.

Researcher4204: There is no evidence of a policy to make outcomes of prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities public. However, evidence indicates that there have been effective prosecutions of racketeering in recent years. The Ministry of Defence is under pressure from the presidency to end racketeering, and these cases have been publicly addressed and prosecuted.

Researcher4204: There is no evidence on whether or not facilitation payments specifically are illegal, however the new anti-racketeering unit's activities may discourage them.

As an additional measure to address this issue, the CCDO was created to reinforce other existing bodies such as the inspectorate. Whistleblowers are also now protected by the law. However, since these measures were only introduced in 2013, it is too early to assess their effectiveness.

There is no clear evidence to suggest that the practice of offering facilitation payments has stopped.

Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 1.

Researcher4204: The military doctrine of the armed forces is not yet available. The draft exists, but it does not specifically address the issue of corruption as a strategic matter and its influence on operations and it is not publicly available.

Moreover, the reforms of the defence sector related to the security sector reform (SSR) do not include anything related to the prevention and ending of corruption.

Response to government reviewer:
A code of conduct is largely insufficient to say that corruption is addressed as a strategic issue on operations. Score maintained.

Researcher4204: Commanders have been in recent years trained on issues related to corruption. This training was mainly conducted by the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (ONUCI).

However there is no evidence that the trainees apply that anti-corruption knowledge on the ground. Moreover, reports from the UN suggest that some commanders from the former rebellion, now members of FRCI, are involved in illicit activities and encourage corrupt activities.

Researcher4204: There are no professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field. Sources indicate that the lack of policy and clarity regarding corruption issues within the defence and security forces negatively affects possible actions related to the prevention and monitoring of corruption.

Researcher4204: There are no specific guidelines and staff training on addressing corruption risks in that context.

Response to government reviewer:
A code of behaviour is not a policy against corruption which states sanctions or guidelines on addressing corruption risks in contracting. Score maintained.

Researcher4204: For the past three years, private military companies have been used officially by the presidency to assist the defence and security ministries. There is no evidence of PMCs being subjected to the same level of scrutiny as the armed forces.

While the military contractors or private security firms have been involved in formulating policies, they have not been active in operations 'on the ground'. In Côte d’Ivoire, Jefferson Waterman International still has some experts employed by the presidency.

Researcher4204: There is a presidential decree that covers all procurement. The 2009 Code on Public Procurement provides guidelines on the tendering process, on procurement's execution, implementation, control, and regulation. The objective of that code is to bring a certain level of transparency and integrity to procurement processes and mechanisms. However, Article 8 of that code exempts defence and security procurements (equipment etc.) from scrutiny and rules applied to other sectors, for the purpose of national security.

The code does not provide any clauses related to ways of preventing corruption.

Researcher4204: Article 18.2 of the Code for Public Procurements (decree 2009-259) clearly exempts defence and security related ministries or administrations from complying with certain requirements, such as publishing information, disclosing or making the procurement cycle process available to the public. Moreover, the CNS centralises all purchases of weapons and related material (UN report).

Researcher4204: At least three bodies are in place to oversight the whole procurement process as also examined in the 2013 GI assessment. The defence inspectorate, the general inspectorate and the military prosecutor are all mechanisms entitled to oversee procurement activities. However, the researcher was unable to find more recent evidence of activity in order to assess their transparency and effectiveness.

Evidence indicates that the presidency, through the CNS, centralises defence and security procurement. Major military and security procurements must be adopted by the CNS before being executed. The centralisation of procurement related to defence and security results in more opacity.

Response to government reviewer:
The quality of oversight is impossible to determine given the general lack of information available about the activities of these bodies. I therefore feel that I cannot raise the score.

Researcher4204: Defence purchases are made public on SIGMAP if the Ministry of Defence decides to publish them. However, the law authorises the Ministry of Defence to withhold publication of their purchases (decree 2009-259). Certain categories of purchase are also not published in that system because they are considered secret purchases.

There are some general security justifications given for withholding information, but these tend to assume that defence purchases should always be secret in order to maintain an advantage over other powers.

Researcher4204: General financial, administrative and technical requirements are expected to be fulfilled by companies in order to bid for work for the ministry of defence. Those requirements are included in the code for public procurements (decree 2009-259). Anti-corruption provisions and sanctions are listed in the code (articles 184 and 187). The Code also includes conflict of interest provisions, including prohibiting individuals with personal or financial interests from participating in the tendering selection process (art. 48).

Response to peer reviewer:
I could not find any evidence of this in the public domain, so have maintained the score.

Researcher4204: Procurement requirements are not derived from a well-audited national defence and security strategy.
Evidence suggests that procurements are made on an opportunistic basis (security situations) depending on the priorities of the authorities at a specific time. In Côte d’Ivoire, it is the CNS which is responsible for validating the procurements need from the ministry of defence and the ministry of interior. Once the CNS, chaired by the president, validates the procurement needs, then the CNS takes care of the whole purchase process.

Regarding audits made, only few known audits have been carried out by international entities such as Jefferson Waterman International and the French ministry of defence. They have not been published.

The national defence policy is still at a draft level. The national security strategy was adopted by the Presidency in 2014 but not by the National Assembly. It has not been made public. A Defence and Security Programming Law is also in formulation but it has not been finalised yet.

Researcher4204: Most of the purchases made do not follow any coherent assessment mechanism which means that often, there are no clearly identified and quantified requirements. In some specific security situations, needs are identified and purchases made. Evidence indicates that these purchases are more opportunistic than thoroughly planned.

For instance the latest purchase of surveillance and war vessels does not obviously comply with the national security strategy or any other policy documents (although it is difficult to tell, given that the NSS is not public). It does however seem that the decision to purchase these maritime acquisitions derives from the need to counter maritime piracy and to show neighbouring countries the maritime capacity of Côte d’Ivoire in case of dispute or crisis.

Response to peer reviewers:
Agreed. Score changed from 1 to 0.

Researcher4204: It is difficult to make statements about the openness of defence procurement, as Côte d’Ivoire is under UN embargo. However, there is evidence of single-sourcing. Depending on their nature, some procurement processes might be conducted as open competition (military helmets etc.). However, evidence indicates that the purchasing of weapons is still largely opaque.

The final UN report of the Group of experts on Côte d’Ivoire states a company that was the intermediary for purchases made by the Presidency through the CNS.

Researcher4204: General rules and guidelines from the 2009 public procurement code also apply to the defence procurements. Article 43 of the public procurement code includes the need for the integrity and independence of tender boards.
Regarding independent auditing there is a body called National Regulatory Authority on Public Procurements (ANRMP, art.15 of the 2099 code). The ANRMP published a report in 2014 that showed irregularities in tender boards decisions between 2011 and 2013, but the defence and security ministries were not amongst the five ministries that were audited. Hence, there is no evidence of its effectiveness with regard to defence procurements yet.

Researcher4204: The 2009 code on public procurement, states forbids collusion (Article 186.2) and provides sanctions (articles 186.7 and 187.1.1) for anyone involved in such practice. That code also applies to defence and security contracts. However there is no specific legislation regarding defence and security contracts.

Article 38 of the order N°202013-660 against corruption, clearly states punishment for anyone involved in collusion. Evidence indicates that the enforcement of the code on public procurement has not yet been proven.There are no media reports about previous cases of collusion.

Researcher4204: The National Regulatory Authority on Public Procurements (ANRMP) is the entity in charge of training actors involved in public procurement, including civil servants. There is no evidence of such training being delivered to Ministry of Defence personnel, or for the effectiveness of this training.

Response to peer reviewer:
I could not find any evidence in the public domain to support the suggestion that staff rotation and training does take place. Score maintained.

Researcher4204: Order N°202013-660 against corruption and decree N° 2009-260 creating the ANRMP both provide complaints mechanisms for companies which perceive malpractice in the procurement process.

The Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) allows arbitration before the national jurisdiction in case of failure of the national non-jurisdictional body, ANRMP, to rule any issue related to infringement or malpractice cases.

The risk of retaliation against companies complaining is meant to be significantly limited because they are protected by the different mechanisms cited. However, to date there has been no evidence of companies complaining about malpractice in the procurement process.

Researcher4204: The 2009 Code on Public procurements (articles 184 and 187) makes provisions preventing corruption and provides sanctions for corruption. Moreover, order N° 202013-660 about prevention and fighting against corruption (articles 44 to 51) also makes provisions to punish corrupt activities of a supplier or anyone involved in such activities. There is no evidence regarding corrupt activities of a supplier and the sanctions applied.

Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence to back up the government reviewer's point. Score maintained.

Researcher4204: Offsets are not part of any legal framework in Côte d’Ivoire. There is no evidence available on offset contracts.

Researcher4204: Offsets are not part of any legal framework in Côte d’Ivoire. There is no evidence available on offset contracts.

Researcher4204: Offsets are not part of any legal framework in Côte d’Ivoire. There is no evidence available on offset contracts.

Researcher4204: There is no evidence of how strongly the government controls the company’s use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle. The use of intermediaries is not covered by legislation, although intermediaries are used in that cycle. This means that with regard to the use of intermediaries by companies in the public procurement process, there is a legal vacuum.

Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence to back up this point. Score maintained.

Researcher4204: Due to the confidential and sensitive nature of major arms deals, the government does not publicise any aspects of the financial packages made around arms deals.

Researcher4204: There is no specific evidence of any requirement related to anti-corruption programmes when it comes to contractors.

Apart from a very general prescriptions for public stakeholders involved in public procurement, and more general provisions on public procurement which highlight practices to avoid, there is no evidence of a specific code of conduct for contractors.

Researcher4204: Evidence suggests that it is common for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by the selling nations. Most acquisitions are made with companies belonging to countries with which the government has close ties such as Israel and France. For instance, when it comes to equipment bought from French defence companies, most of the time there has been an influence from the French authorities due to political requirements (security, technical assistance, defence agreement etc.)

Moreover, evidence indicates a sense of 'owing' France for the French military assistance during the post-electoral crisis in 2011, and for the defence agreement recently made with France which is mainly about assistance and training. However, the agreement also includes secret clauses. The document is not available to the public.