- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
Cote d’Ivoire’s GI ranking in Band F places it in the highest risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. Cote d’Ivoire’s highest risk area is Operational and Financial, followed by Procurement, Political and Personnel. Now that elections have been conducted peacefully, corruption risk needs to be tackled to reduce state fragility and improve security provision:
Reduce military predation and build the integrity of the armed forces
The smuggling of goods and natural resources has weakened troop discipline and undermined the role of the army as a protector of the civilian population.
While the reintegration of almost 58,000 former combatants at the end of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process is to be commended, strict monitoring is needed to ensure that the process has broken militia and political ties.
Flows of weapons should be tightly controlled, twinned with improvements in weapon registration systems, to reduce the opportunities for diversion.
Security cooperation and security assistance should take care not to inadvertently fuel factionalism by privileging one group to the detriment of others.
Strengthen inclusive civilian control over the defence and security sector
Despite progress made under the national Security Sector Reform (SSR) strategy, secrecy still characterises the defence and security sector in Cote d’Ivoire.
The security sector reform process obliges the government to formulate a national defence policy which is inclusive and holistic. A formal public consultation process should be carried out to ensure civil society and citizen engagement.
The Ministry of Defence should formalise a process of public consultation on other defence-related activities in order to strengthen public trust.
The legislature needs access to detailed information on defence budgets, income, and expenditure in order to fulfil the oversight functions enshrined in the Constitution.
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
1/Loi n°2000-513 du 1er août 2000 portant constitution de la côte d’ivoire, 1 August 2014, http://www.presidence.ci/presentation-detail/50/loi-n-2000-513-du-1-er-aout-2000
2/ Loidici.ci, « Cote d’Ivoire Constitution », article 71, 1 August 2014, http://www.loidici.com/constitutioncentral/codeconstitutionrapports.php
3/Clément Kouassi, « Partenariat de défense CI-France: Le projet de loi adopté à l’unanimité en commission » , Fratmat Info, 04 July 2014, http://www.fratmat.info/une/item/16997-partenariat-de-d%C3%A9fense-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-france-le-projet-de-loi-adopt%C3%A9-%C3%A0-l%E2%80%99unanimit%C3%A9-en-commission
4/Born, Hans, Jean-Jacques Gacond and Boubacar N'Diaye. “Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: ECOWAS-DCAF Guide for West-African Parliamentarians.” Geneva: DCAF, ECOWAS Parliament, 2011, p. 226, http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Parliamentary-Oversight-of-the-Security-Sector-ECOWAS-Parliament-DCAF-Guide-for-West-African-Parliamentarians
5/ Cédric Zohe, &quoute;...trois nouvelles lois votées&quoute;, L'infodrome, 10 March 2015,http://www.linfodrome.com/vie-politique/19828-cloture-de-la-1ere-session-extraordinaire-2015-de-l-assemblee-nationale-3-nouvelles-lois-votees
6/ Décret numéro 2012-786 du 8 aout 2012, portant creation...du CNS, http://www.addr.ci/down/decret.pdf?PHPSESSID=ro94ioo5forru0vi5v5o8q47m0
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Despite the existence of Parliamentary commissions, most of the executive decisions comes from the Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister's Office (Source: DDR/SSR Concept Note, UNOCI, not publicly available).
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
Researcher4204: In conformity with Côte d’Ivoire National Assembly Interior Rules (Article 13), the parliament has a “Defence and Security Committee” in charge of exercising democratic oversight over defence and security related issues. The Committee is responsible for issues relating to national defence, police, immigration, and civilian protection. It can request hearing of members of the Government. In addition, the Committee is allowed to set up an information mission to control the Government’s action within its area of responsibility (Art. 100 of NA’s Internal Rules), although there is no evidence that it has ever actually done this.
Evidence indicates that the committee is not effectively involved in the national security policy formulation process. For example, the instances of violence that occurred during the crisis between 2002 and 2011 (with a coup d'etat in 2002 and subsequent political crises and violence until 2011) in Côte d’Ivoire have not yet been addressed in depth by this committee, specifically regarding corruption issues (bribery, extortion, nepotism, tribalism) in the field of national security.
Besides, many issues and agreements made by the government related to national security are not presented to the Defence and Security Committee for debate. Furthermore, the media is not welcomed to follow and report on debates related to defence issues and public oversight is not effective. Moreover, the National Security Policy has not yet been presented to the defence and security committee for analysis.
The lack of resources related to defence policy and the lack of political will to involve the NA have undermined the oversight capacity of that committee. However some powers of scrutiny are reflected by the fact that the committee adopted a bill related to the organization of Defence and Armed Forces in 2015.
Response to government reviewer:
Indeed the Defence Committee is active but its effectiveness must be challenged. The fact that it is chaired by a retired officer shows that there is a serious lack of neutrality and questionable effective scrutiny. In addition, the committee is insufficiently called upon by the MOD. The only time that this has happened is when the committee adopted a bill related to the organization of Defence and Armed Forces in 2015. An effective committee would visit the MOD to review its actions on a democratic control basis.
1/ National Assembly Administrative Rule, “résolution n° 006 a, 1 June 2006, Portant modification du règlement de l’assemblée nationale de cote d’ivoire », Article 13, http://www.assnat.ci/docpdf/REGLEMENT%20ADMINISTRATIF%20DE%20L'ASSEMBLEE%20NATIONALE.pdf
2/L. Barro, « Assemblée Nationale / Examen du projet de loi instituant le partenariat de défense Ivoiro-Français : Des députés émettent des réserves avant d’adopter le traité », l’Intelligent d’Abidjan, 4 July 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/502301.html
3/ Diomandé Mémoué, &quoute;Réforme de l’armée: Le projet de loi adopté à l’unanimité&quoute;, Fratmatinfo, 3 March 2015, http://www.fratmat.info/politique/item/23073-r%C3%A9forme-de-l%E2%80%99arm%C3%A9e-le-projet-de-loi-adopt%C3%A9-%C3%A0-l%E2%80%99unanimit%C3%A9
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Defence and Security Committee is active and effective, chaired by a retired officer. This committee has been called on by the Ministry of Defence to scrutinize the Defence draft reforms.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Despite the main responsibilities may come from the mentioned Commission, the inefficacity on the oversight role (specially from the violent incidents between 2002 and 2011) also come from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, created in 2011, with unclear results (Source: En Côte-d’Ivoire, Vérité et Réconciliation à la peine, http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2014/09/28/en-cote-d-ivoire-verite-et-reconciliation-a-la-peine_1110434)
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
Researcher4204: A national security policy has been adopted by the CNS. This policy is not publicly available or debated unless adopted by the National Assembly. The National Assembly has not yet examined and adopted the national security and defence policy. In fact, there is no evidence that this policy has been made available to the National Assembly at all. In addition, a national security strategy which includes defence issues has been adopted by the National Council for Security (CNS), but this is not public either.
However, efforts are being made to bring issues related to national defence to the public.The security sector reform (SSR) process which began after the 2011 post-electoral crisis obliges authorities (Ministry of Defence) to formulate a national defence policy which is inclusive and holistic. For instance, the national SSR strategy is available publicly and has been debated openly (all SSR actors participated) before being adopted. On the other hand, a public consultation (survey) has not been done to date.
Response to reviewers:
Indeed there were debates related to the threats on national security and defence, but those debates were not public - the public was never informed of the NSS being debated or published, and there do not appear to be any links to documents online. In addition, a draft defence policy is not a final document, so it cannot yet be counted as an example of defence policy. This draft also does not appear to be available to the public. The only defence policy that Cote d'Ivoire currently has is in the NSS, and this is not publicly available. Score maintained.
1/ L.O, « Sécurité intérieure en Côte d’Ivoire : Le Centre de Coordination des Décisions Opérationnelles bientôt installé », Le Patriote, 21 February 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/h/452300.html
2/ Stratégie nationale RSS, http://www.rssci.org/rss/strategie-nationale.html
3/ Clément Kouassi, « Partenariat de défense CI-France: Le projet de loi adopté à l’unanimité en commission » , Fratmat Info, 4 July 2014, http://www.fratmat.info/une/item/16997-partenariat-de-d%C3%A9fense-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-france-le-projet-de-loi-adopt%C3%A9-%C3%A0-l%E2%80%99unanimit%C3%A9-en-commission
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The National Security Strategy has been adopted by the National Security Council (CNS) and published. There is also a draft Defence Policy for the next years (2015-2019). All these documents are available to the public.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Some of the CNS policies (especially in the case of major threats) were debated during 2011 and 2012 on a series of debates and seminars co-hosted between the Primature and UNOCI
(Source: ONUCI; http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/12511/127719/file/Newsletter%20RSS%20N2%2012%20octobre%202012%20%283%29.pdf)
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
Researcher4204: There is no evidence of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) or engagement of CSOs regarding sensitive issues such as defence and security institutions dealing with corruption.
However, there is evidence for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives. Indeed, the National Secretariat for Good Governance and Capacity Building (SNGRC) has organised activities involving CSOs. For example, CSOs are involved in the development and definition of anti-corruption solutions.
Response to reviewers:
Score maintained as there was no public evidence to support the engagement of CSOs by the government on issues of defence.
1/ L.S, « La lutte contre la corruption coûtera 81 milliards de fcfa à la Côte d’Ivoire », Agence de Presse Africaine (APA), 30 May 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/h/460810.html
2/ Allafrica.com, « Cote d’Ivoire : Lutte contre la corruption / Malgré les efforts et les actions déployés La Côte d’Ivoire occupe la 136 ème place sur 177 pays », 23 March 2014, http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201403240775.html
3/ undp.org, &quoute;Société civile et hommes de médias ivoiriens se forment à la lutte contre la corruption&quoute;, 5 July 2013, http://www.ci.undp.org/content/cote_divoire/fr/home/presscenter/articles/2013/07/05/soci-t-civile-et-hommes-de-m-dias-ivoiriens-se-forment-la-lutte-contre-la-corruption/
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is evidence of openness towards CSOs, i.e with the free-flowing traffic committee (Comité pour la fluidité routière). The openness of Defence and security institutions can also be seen regarding reports of independent Experts such as DOUDOU Diene or CSOs like Humans Rights Watch who in case of need regularly meet the MOD or the Chief of Staff.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The relation of CSOs sometimes is only a matter of formality but not necessarily only with the ones supportive by the government (see for example the different human rights organisations) (Source: internal documents coming from UNOCI DDR/SSR Section in 2012, not publicly available)
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Concur with the country assessor that defence and security institutions do not have a policy towards CSOs with regards to the issue of corruption, and there is little evidence to suggest openness from defence institutions towards CSOs on this matter. The government has undertaken some general anti-corruption initiatives in an effort to demonstrate to the public that it is tackling corruption, such the Anti-Racketeering Unit (ULCR) set up in 2012 by the Interior Ministry, with World Bank funding. Additionally, there are several government entities in charge of fighting corruption, including the High Authority on Good Governance, the General Secretariat in Charge of Good Governance and Capacity Building, the Board of State General Inspectors, and the Finance Ministry’s Inspector General’s Office, but the extent of their engagement with CSOs is unclear.
The government has been working to develop a new anti-corruption law, and some CSOs have been able to weigh in on the draft form of the legislation.
2014 Investment Climate Statement – Cote d’Ivoire. US State Department, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, June 2014. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/226937.htm. Accessed 19 October 2014.
Suggested score:
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
Researcher4204: In October 2012, Côte d'Ivoire ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) also known as the Merida Convention. In February 2012, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, also known as the Maputo Convention, was ratified. Côte d'Ivoire has been covered by the UNCAC review mechanism. The review period went from July 2013 to June 2014, and the result of the review is not available yet (7 October 2014).In addition, Côte d’Ivoire signed The ECOWAS Protocol on the fight against corruption on 21 December 2001.
There has been no major evidence so far of Côte d'Ivoire actually complying with the signed and ratified conventions and protocols.
1/ UNCAC, Merida Convention, 25 September 2012, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-14&chapter=18&lang=en&clang=_en
2/ Maputo Convention, 28 January 2012, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Corruption_0.pdf
3/ Ecowas protocol, no publication date available, http://archive.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_conventions/conventions_instruments/ecowas_protocol
4/ uncaccoalition.org, &quoute;Documents officiels issues de l'examen de l’application de la CNUCC&quoute;, http://www.uncaccoalition.org/fr/uncac-review/official-country-reports
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
Researcher4204: There is no active public debate related to defence issues. However consultations have been made to build national the SSR strategy, which includes defence aspects.
The Ministry of Defence often communicates on events related to defence, although this communication is rather unilateral. Evidence indicates that exchanges and debate are not encouraged by the Ministry of Defence or fostered by the National Assembly. Secrecy and lack of transparency have always characterised the debate on this matter. Only military officials and officials from the executive appear to be involved in such debates.
Response to government reviewer:
Having found no public evidence of consultations by the MOD during the process of building a national defence strategy, the score has been maintained.
1/ Stratégie nationale RSS, références P.43, March 2010, « Enquête ENSEA sur les aspirations des populations en matière des Défense et de sécurité », http://www.rssci.org/rss/strategie-nationale.html
2/ DL, « Paul Koffi Koffi, ministre de la Défense :“Nous sommes aptes pour les interventions internationales”, Nord-Sud, 5 July 2014, http://www.nordsudquotidien.com/paul-koffi-koffi-ministre-de-la-defence-nous-sommes-aptes-pour-les-interventions-internationales/
3/ ONUCI/CNS, 2013, « La Société civile apprend à communiquer sur la Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité (RSS) », http://www.onuci.org/spip.php?article10377
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: During the process of building a national defence strategy there were public consultations by the MOD. These consultations occured in meetings with youth organiastions or village chiefs
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is important to bear in mind that during the post conflict period (before the Ouagadougou peace agreement) and after the electoral crisis there were some debates within academia.
(Source: ICIP; http://icip.gencat.cat/web/.content/continguts/publicacions/documents_i_informes/arxius/docs2010_04_fra_1811.pdf)
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
Researcher4204: Côte d’Ivoire has a public general anti-corruption policy. The National Plan for Good Governance and Against Corruption and the order N° 202013-660 of 20 September 2013 about the prevention of and the fight against corruption are the main anti-corruption instruments. They also apply to the military forces and the police.
However, there is no openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy towards the defence sector exclusively. The Military Code of Conduct and Ethical Charter, both initiated in 2013, do not specifically address corruption issues that might concern soldiers or other parts of the defence sector.
The Ministry of Defence has in the past arrested soldiers involved in racket, extortion and fraud. However, evidence suggests that efforts have yet to be made to implement the rules equally among soldiers involved in such crimes.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed, score raised from 1 to 2.
Response to government reviewer:
The Charter has already been mentioned in the comments and the defence sector itself has shown no real evidence of implementing the policy. However, the score has been raised as mentioned above, in line with the peer reviewer's challenge.
1/ National plan for good governance and against corruption, January 2013, http://www.bonnegouvernance.ci/images/pdfs/PLAN_NATIONAL_COMPLET.pdf
2/ order N° 202013-660 of 20 September 2013 about prevention and fight against corruption, http://www.bonnegouvernance.ci/images/pdfs/ordonnance_n_%202013-660_du_20_septembre_2013_relative_a_la_prevention_et_la_lutte_contre_la_corruption_et_les_infractions_assimilees.pdf
3/ Code de la fonction militaire (Military code), chapter 2 and 3, no publication date available (law of 7 September 1995), http://www.loidici.com/codefoncmilitaire/fonctionmilitaire.php
4/ P.N, « Force armée ivoirienne: Une nouvelle charte d’éthique et un code de déontologie à l’étude », Le Mandat, 14 June 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/h/462169.html
5/ koaci.com, «Côte d'Ivoire: Racket: Un policier pris la main dans le sac ! », 29 March 2012, http://www.koaci.com/cote-divoire-racket-policier-pris-main-dans--74123.html
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The government has recently created an anti-corruption Secretary whose mission is to fight public corruption for national plan against corruption. In addition there are presidential ordonnances and ministerial orders on good governance.
In the specific case of the Ministry of Defence there is the &quoute;Charte d'Ethique et de Déontologie&quoute; (Ethics and Deontology Charter) which is undertaken.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: As the country assessor notes, Cote d'Ivoire has a public anti-corruption policy currently in place, the
National Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Plan. Implementation of the Plan has already resulted in specific measures and actions, including the creation of a High Authority for Good Governance and a National Anti-Corruption Secretariat by presidential decree on November 20, 2013 and the development of communication campaigns to raise the awareness of various political, economic and social stakeholders on the deleterious effects of corruption in 2013. As such, in my view, &quoute;[t]here is an openly stated anti-corruption policy, but a lack of evidence surrounding effective implementation.&quoute;
&quoute;Cote d'Ivoire: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding,&quoute; 20 May 2014, p. 14. http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2014/civ/052014.pdf. Accessed 19 October 2014.
Suggested score: 2
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
Researcher4204: There are existing entities in charge of addressing integrity, discipline and corruption issues such as the military police, the police anti-racketeering unit, the military justice and the police inquiry council. While they are in charge of different kinds of corruption, the exposure and prosecution of racketeering is the priority. Nevertheless, evidence indicates that these entities are not particularly independent or well-resourced, and they strongly and directly depend on existing hierarchies. To date, corruption remains a taboo subject in the defence and security sector.
In 2014, the government created a centre for citizens to be able to report on cases of racketeering. According to newspaper articles, approximately 100 soldiers have been convicted for corruption crimes and around 20 trials related to extortion have been conducted. There is no evidence indicating that these trials were politically motivated or not independent.
The inspector general of the armed forces and the military prosecutor are also in charge of fighting corruption cases by denouncing them and applying the law.
1/ “Côte d’Ivoire : des mesures d’envergure pour juguler le racket », Xinhua, 5 July 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/502399.html
2/ Koaci.com, « Côte d'ivoire : Abidjan se dote d'un centre d'appel contre le racket », 10 April 2014, http://www.koaci.com/cote-divoire-abidjan-dote-centre-dappel-contre-racket-91074.html?lang=1
3/ rti.ci, « Côte d'Ivoire: Une Unité de lutte contre le racket créée et équipée », 19 June 2012, http://www.rti.ci/actualite-829-cote-d-ivoire-une-unite-de-lutte-contre-le-racket-creee-et-equipee.html
4/ hamedbakayoko.com, &quoute;Côte d’Ivoire : des mesures d’envergure pour juguler le racket&quoute;, 6 july 2014, http://www.hamedbakayoko.com/spip.php?page=article&id_article=215
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no clear evidence for those institutions
(Source: internal documents from the UNOCI SSR/DDR Section, not publicly available)
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
Researcher4204: Public trust in the ability of defence and security institutions to tackle the issue of corruption is difficult to assess since there are no official surveys.
However, a widely spread feeling in the population is that the defence establishment has made efforts to fight corruption cases compared to three years ago despite the fact that in 2013 a survey conducted by the National Secretary for good governance and Capacity Building (SNGRC) clearly demonstrated that corruption crimes were still going on. The SNGRC survey is not publicly available, and it is unclear whether it included a focus on defence and security issues.
Despite the major improvements in recent years (with more cases being dealt with publicly, for example, as well as more tangible actions being seen rather than pure rhetoric), the public is expecting more from the authorities when it comes to tackiling racketeering and bribery among the defence and security forces.
1/ “Côte d’Ivoire : des mesures d’envergure pour juguler le racket », Xinhua, 5 July 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/502399.html
2/ lebanco.net, « Le SNGRC et &quoute;Voodoo Groupe&quoute; décèlent le mal et proposent des solutions par électrochoc », 9 July 2013, http://www.lebanco.net/banconet/bco18652.htm
3/ Personal experience: SSR working group, 2011, working on SSR policy including fighting corruption.
4/ Jean Khalil Sella, &quoute;Assassinats, rackets et barrages illégaux: des Frci radiés&quoute;, Abidjan.net, 23 August 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/506126.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
Researcher4204: Regular assessments are not scheduled by the Ministry of Defence but they do make an effort to focus on specific areas such as racketeering in transportation in order to tackle the problem and identify solutions.
The Ministry of Defence does not have a clear-cut policy towards fighting corruption, which hinders conducting assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk. These include transportation, mining, agriculture, car smuggling and defence procurement within the armed forces. The actions taken are more of a sanctioning nature rather than anticipation and prevention.
Response to government reviewer:
While the establishment of an anti-racketeering unit and the progress under the SSR programme shows some awareness regarding some risk areas, there has been no comprehensive corruption risk assessment. Score maintained.
1/ UN, Final Report of the Group of experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, paragraph 58, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
2/ rti.ci, « Côte d'Ivoire: Une Unité de lutte contre le racket créée et équipée », 19 June 2012, http://www.rti.ci/actualite-829-cote-d-ivoire-une-unite-de-lutte-contre-le-racket-creee-et-equipee.html
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Ministry of Defence has put in place an anti-racketeering unit and one of the main chapters of SSR is to fight corruption in all public administrations including the MoD. There is a strong will at the MoD to fight corruption with the help of experts and external partners.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
Researcher4204: Evidence indicates that, when it comes to acquisition planning and budget related to defence expenditures in Côte d’Ivoire, secrecy often prevails.
Since 2012, the National Council for Security (CNS), chaired by the President himself, is in charge of the whole process of acquisition and procurement. The special position of the CNS (it is sovereign and outside any scrutiny) makes it prone to risks with regard to transparency, accountability and liability issues.
Defence procurements made on the basis of “sovereignty funds” are kept behind closed doors, away from the public. Defence procurements based on central government allocation, however, are publicly available online, on the “Integrated System for Public Procurement Management” (SIGMAP) website.
For the past four years, the security sector reform (SSR) programme launched by the national council for security (CNS) has been meant to bring transparency in all issues related to defence and security. Within the reform, the formulation and adoption by the NA, the ministry of defence and the ministry of security of a defence and security programming law (DSPL) is planned. That law is supposed to bring coherence and transparency to the budget and the resource allocation for the acquisition process. To this date, the DSPL has not been formulated.
Response to government reviewer:
As the DSPL has not yet been published, there is no defined process for acquisition planning in place. Score maintained.
1/ Stratégie nationale RSS, références P.23, http://www.rssci.org/rss/strategie-nationale.html
2/ Système Intégré de Gestion des Marchés Publics (SIGMAP), http://www.sigmap.gouv.ci/cgi-bin/search.cgi?Title=Link&catid=3&so=DESC&sb=PPR_EPL_CODE&t=dmp&g=PREPARATION_DES_DAO%2FPlanning_de_passation_des_march_eacute_s%2Findex.html&PPR_MIN_COD=26&PPR_MIN_COD-opt=%3D
3/ connectionivoirienne.net, &quoute;Côte d’Ivoire – Le Conseil national de sécurité « cadeaute » la Gendarmerie&quoute;, 19 January 2014, http://www.connectionivoirienne.net/95540/cote-divoire-le-conseil-national-de-securite-cadeaute-la-gendarmerie
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The process of acquisition planning is defined by the Budget Ministry and this includes oversight mechanisms and the respect of accountability and oversight procedures.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
Researcher4204: The defence budget is highly aggregated and is broken down into just two broad headings: ordinary expenditures and investments expenditures.The allocation of resources to military expenditures is largely unclear.
In September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but even that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels.
In addition, based on personal experience, the gap between the annually allocated resources and the actual expenditure is significant, with the actual expenditure amounting to approximately double the initial resource allocation.
Response to government reviewer:
Without more detail available on the budget, the score cannot be raised.
1/ Communiqué to the council of ministers, September 2013, p.12, paragraph 7, p.14 table, p. 17, paragraph 3, http://www.finances.gouv.ci/index.php/fr/elements-de-gouvernance/execution-budgetaire.html
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Military equipment is mostly secret and the budget cannot be largely explicit.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
Researcher4204: In theory, the NA Security and Defence Committee is the entity in charge of defence budget scrutiny and analysis. In practice, there is no evidence of the effectiveness of this committee when it comes to oversight and analysis.
Given the tradition of secrecy in defence-related issues, one can assume that the lack of collaboration between the Ministry of Defence and the NA negatively affects the Security and Defence Committee in executing its duty. To reinforce this statement, Ouattara states that &quoute;the national assembly approves the general state budget but it is clear that the real budget allocated to the defence forces is considered a defence secret. Indeed, the same applies to information about the available arsenal, the numbers of troops and the real salaries of senior officers. Nevertheless, the minister of defence, like any other member of government, may be summoned by the national assembly to give explanations about issues relating to his ministry”.
There is no indication that this situation has improved in recent years.
1/ Ouattara, Raphael, Côte d Ivoire, in Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa. Realities and Opportunities, edited by Alan Bryden and Boubacar N'Diaye, p. 81. Geneva: Lit Verlag, 2011, http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Security-Sector-Governance-in-Francophone-West-Africa-Realities-and-Opportunities
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
Researcher4204: The defence budget is theoretically available to the public like any budget voted in by the NA. The finance Law, which includes some information on defence expenditure, is made public on the internet (NA or ministry of economy website). In practice, access to the details of the defence budget is more problematic. The press has not yet published anything relating to the defence budget.
In September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels.
Defence institutions may question the intentions of anyone requesting information on the defence budget, leading to a certain reluctance among the public to request such information.
Response to reviewers:
The governmental information bulletins that the government reviewer makes reference to do not appear to be public. The information referenced by the peer reviewer is also not public. Score maintained.
1/ Ministry of Economy and Finance, http://www.finances.gouv.ci/images/pdf/loi-des-finances-2014.pdf
2/ Communiqué to the council of ministers, September 2013, p.12, paragraph 7, p.14 table, p. 17, paragraph 3, http://www.finances.gouv.ci/index.php/fr/elements-de-gouvernance/execution-budgetaire.html
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The defence budget is available to the public and it can be seen on the internet and in governmental information bulletins.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The access difficulties may be related with the type of organisation who makes the demand, distinguishing between international and national ones.
(Source: internal documents from the UNOCI SSR/DDR Section, not publicly available)
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
Researcher4204: Officially, there are no other sources of income for the Ministry of Defence apart from the government allocation. Côte d’Ivoire does not have a defence industry which is why other sources of income do not exist. All official incomes are made available to the public.
Defence procurements made from central government allocations are published online in a national system called “Integrated System for Public Procurement Management” (SIGMAP).
It is important to clarify that not all government allocation is central government allocation. It is unclear to what extent there are sources of income not provided by the central government, for example, defence procurements made on the basis of “sovereignty funds” are kept behind closed doors, away from the public.
1/ Système Intégré de Gestion des Marchés Publics (SIGMAP), http://www.sigmap.gouv.ci/cgi-bin/search.cgi?Title=Link&catid=3&so=DESC&sb=PPR_EPL_CODE&t=dmp&g=PREPARATION_DES_DAO%2FPlanning_de_passation_des_march_eacute_s%2Findex.html&PPR_MIN_COD=26&PPR_MIN_COD-opt=%3D
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
Researcher4204: The Ministry of Defence has its own audit mechanism in charge of scrutiny. The General Inspectorate of the Army is in charge of auditing defence expenditures. However, there are questions surrounding its effectiveness. Ouattara Raphael (2011) states &quoute;This department is generally entrusted to officers at the end of their career and, like its counterparts in other ministries it is severely hampered by incompetence and corruption.&quoute;
In addition, parliamentary scrutiny is not carried out and defence issues remain largely taboo among the legislature. Moreover, there are severe questions over the quality of information that exists on defence expenditure that could be audited. For example, in September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but even that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels.
Response to government reviewer:
Score maintained on the basis that there is no public evidence of an active audit system, parliamentary scrutiny, or transparency.
1/ Ouattara, Raphael, Côte d Ivoire, in Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa. Realities and Opportunities, edited by Alan Bryden and Boubacar N'Diaye, p. 81-82. Geneva: Lit Verlag, 2011, http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Security-Sector-Governance-in-Francophone-West-Africa-Realities-and-Opportunities
2/ Communiqué to the council of ministers, September 2013, p.12, paragraph 7, p.14 table, p. 17, paragraph 3, http://www.finances.gouv.ci/index.php/fr/elements-de-gouvernance/execution-budgetaire.html
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a process of internal audit called the 'General Control of Defence Administration', which is conducted in addition to the General Inspectorate of Army. Both of these two administrations' actions have to be completed by parliamentary scrutiny.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The fact that the General Inspectorate of the Army is in charge of auditing defence expenditures already suggests a conflict of interest and a lack of separation of powers- as to whether or not this General's audit is subject to a further review I do not know.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
Researcher4204: The heritage of secrecy and the lack of transparency characterising defence expenditures are likely to prevent any sort of effective external audit.
However, two major external audits of the defence and security forces have been carried out, one by an American company and the other by French Ministry of Defence experts. There is, however, no evidence of the effectiveness of these external audits - moreover, they are not made public and are therefore not transparent.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score changed from 0 to 1.
1/ africaintelligence.fr, &quoute;Charles Waterman audite le dispositif de sécurité ivoirien&quoute;, 17 November 2011, http://www.africaintelligence.fr/LC-/diplomatie-d-influence/2011/11/17/charles-waterman-audite-le-dispositif-de-securite-ivoirien,94521192-BRE
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: This is a tricky one as i wonder whether the score should be '1' given the existence of these two external audits you mention. Equally I recognise that by failing to publish such external audits you could score '0'.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
Researcher4204: It is important to distinguish the defence institutions from the individuals employed at those institutions.
In the past four years, there has been evidence that some bodies linked to defence institutions were involved in businesses associated with natural resources exploitation. There have also been indications that some members of those defence institutions were involved in illicit activities which stands against efforts made to bring transparency to defence sector, such as sensitisation policies with bodies created to fight corruption in general such as the SNGRC.
In the UN final report of the group of experts on Côte d’Ivoire in April 2014, paragraphs 62 and 63 clearly demonstrate the involvement of entities and former war chiefs in obtaining revenues from the exploitation and smuggling of natural resources. Paragraphs 92 and 94 also link defence and security institutions with the illegal exploitation of gold. Because of their controversial nature, those financial interests are not publicly stated and are exempt from scrutiny.
1/ UN, Final Report of the Group of Experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, from paragraph 62 to paragraph 113, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Evidence suggests that some members of the state security forces have interests in the country’s natural resource exploitation, and these interests are not publicly stated and scrutinized. In the final report of the UN Group of Experts on Cote d’Ivoire (S/2014/266), the Group observed that some members of state security forces still have economic interests in the smuggling of cashew nuts (para. 89). It noted that although the Government of Cote d’Ivoire issued a decree to end illicit gold mining on 18 October 2013 (para. 90), exploitation has persisted, “most notably near the industrial mining sites in the north, center and west of the country, with the complicity of some national and local military authorities (para. 92). Moreover, the Group gathered “information from multiple credible sources indicating that the chain of command authorizing illegal artisanal gold mining leads to important members of the Cote d’Ivoire security forces in Abidjan.” (para. 94) UN, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on Cote d’Ivoire,” 14 April 2014.
Suggested score:
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
Researcher4204: There is no official evidence of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector. However, reports and studies of international organisations frequently outline the fact that some members of the defence and security forces are involved in illicit activities linked to organised crime (drug and diamond trafficking, car and weapon smuggling, etc.).
The criminalisation of the defence and security sector is ongoing but it is essential to mention the efforts made by the government to stop those criminal behaviours such as the creation of the CCDO (Centre de coordination des Operations) on 11 March 2013, which is a response to fight organised crime within the defence and security forces. There has also been the reintegration of almost 58 000 former combatants at the end of the DDR process in June 2015.
In 2014, the government created a centre for citizens to be able to report on cases of racketeering. According to newspaper articles, approximately 100 soldiers have been convicted for corruption crimes and around 20 trials related to extortion have been conducted.
1/ Marc Dossa, « Lutte contre la criminalité et le grand banditisme: Les défis du Ccdo », Nord-Sud, 15 March 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/492806.html
2/ UN, Final Report of the Group of experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, from paragraph 170 to paragraph 175, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
3/ Abidjan.net, &quoute;Le CCDO fait son bilan 100 jours après sa creation&quoute;, 5 July 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/p/143450.html
4/ allafrica.com, &quoute;Cote d'Ivoire: Youssouf Kouyaté, coordonnateur du CCDO - &quoute;Nous n'avons pas droit à l'erreur &quoute;, 11 September 2014, http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201409111390.html
5/ Hermance KN, &quoute;Comment le racket grippe les efforts du gouvernement&quoute;, l'infodrome, 12 November 2014, http://www.linfodrome.com/economie/17827-comment-le-racket-grippe-les-efforts-du-gouvernement
6/ &quoute;Désarmement et réinsertion : Fin de mission pour l'ADDR avec 90% des objectifs atteints&quoute;, lebabi.net, 29 June 2015, http://www.lebabi.net/actualite-abidjan/desarmement-et-reinsertion-fin-de-mission-pour-l-addr-avec-90-des-objectifs-atteints-49781.html
7/ “Côte d’Ivoire : des mesures d’envergure pour juguler le racket », Xinhua, 5 July 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/502399.html
8/ Koaci.com, « Côte d'ivoire : Abidjan se dote d'un centre d'appel contre le racket », 10 April 2014, http://www.koaci.com/cote-divoire-abidjan-dote-centre-dappel-contre-racket-91074.html?lang=1
9/ rti.ci, « Côte d'Ivoire: Une Unité de lutte contre le racket créée et équipée », 19 June 2012, http://www.rti.ci/actualite-829-cote-d-ivoire-une-unite-de-lutte-contre-le-racket-creee-et-equipee.html
10/ hamedbakayoko.com, &quoute;Côte d’Ivoire : des mesures d’envergure pour juguler le racket&quoute;, 6 july 2014, http://www.hamedbakayoko.com/spip.php?page=article&id_article=215
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is evidence of some penetration due mainly to the crisis that the country has gone through. But the government, alongside the military court, is taking actions to contain these risks. Campaigns to discourage temptation are actively organized in military camps.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
Researcher4204: There are policing mechanisms to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services. The CCDO, military police, the anti-racketeering unit, the military prosecutor, the police inquiry council, and the anti-racketeering call centre were set up to investigate and fight corruption. This does at least indicate a political will to increase integrity and transparency in the defence and security sector.
Evidence indicates that there has been action taken against corruption by these institutions. For instance the military tribunal and the CCDO are often covered by the media. There has also been the reintegration of almost 58 000 former combatants at the end of the DDR process in June 2015.
In 2014, the government created a centre for citizens to be able to report on cases of racketeering. According to newspaper articles, approximately 100 soldiers have been convicted for corruption crimes and around 20 trials related to extortion have been conducted.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed, but as some action has been seen, score has been maintained.
1/ Marc Dossa, « Lutte contre la criminalité et le grand banditisme: Les défis du CCDO », Nord-Sud, 15 March 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/492806.html
2/ acturoutes.info, « Abidjan: le CCDO gagne la bataille contre les barrages routiers », 26 May 2013, http://www.acturoutes.info/page.php?p=1&id=3557
3/ ivoirebusiness.net, « insécurité à Cocody : 4 militaires mis aux arrêts ; Voici celui qui a démantelé leur réseau », 10 August 2012, http://www.ivoirebusiness.net/?q=articles/ins%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-%C3%A0-cocody-4-militaires-mis-aux-arr%C3%AAts-voici-celui-qui-d%C3%A9mantel%C3%A9-leur-r%C3%A9seau
4/ jeuneafrique.com, &quoute;Côte d'Ivoire : avec le CCDO, la sécurité d'Abidjan se militarise&quoute;, 12 march 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20130312073538/
5/ imatin.net, &quoute;Tribunal militaire d’Abidjan: point de presse du commissaire du gouvernement &quoute;, 22 august 2014, http://www.imatin.net/article/communiques/tribunal-militaire-d-rsquo-abidjan-point-de-presse-du-commissaire-du-gouvernement_22044_1408728955.html
6/ &quoute;Désarmement et réinsertion : Fin de mission pour l'ADDR avec 90% des objectifs atteints&quoute;, lebabi.net, 29 June 2015, http://www.lebabi.net/actualite-abidjan/desarmement-et-reinsertion-fin-de-mission-pour-l-addr-avec-90-des-objectifs-atteints-49781.html
7/ “Côte d’Ivoire : des mesures d’envergure pour juguler le racket », Xinhua, 5 July 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/502399.html
8/ Koaci.com, « Côte d'ivoire : Abidjan se dote d'un centre d'appel contre le racket », 10 April 2014, http://www.koaci.com/cote-divoire-abidjan-dote-centre-dappel-contre-racket-91074.html?lang=1
9/ rti.ci, « Côte d'Ivoire: Une Unité de lutte contre le racket créée et équipée », 19 June 2012, http://www.rti.ci/actualite-829-cote-d-ivoire-une-unite-de-lutte-contre-le-racket-creee-et-equipee.html
10/ hamedbakayoko.com, &quoute;Côte d’Ivoire : des mesures d’envergure pour juguler le racket&quoute;, 6 july 2014, http://www.hamedbakayoko.com/spip.php?page=article&id_article=215
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Although there are mechanisms to investigate corruption and organized crime that cover the defence forces, there is little evidence to suggest that these mechanisms are consistently applied or effective. Over the last year, the focus of the military prosecutor/criminal police has been on efforts to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of violent crimes committed during the post-election crisis. Indeed, the military prosecutor had announced that all such trials would be concluded by 2013, but despite the priority given this task, as of December 2013, none of these trials had even started. (para. 14, S/2013/761) Given this situation, it is unlikely that these mechanisms have sufficient resources to effectively investigate corruption and organized crime.
More generally, Cote d'Ivoire's police sector lacks capacity. A May 2014 report from Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire found the country's police and gendarmerie to be &quoute;partially operational throughout the country. Only in Abidjan, Bouake and Daloa were the security services adequately equipped and resourced, limiting in most areas their ability to conduct investigations and fight crime.&quoute; (para 26) It also noted that &quoute;prosecution of alleged FRCI perpetrators remained infrequent, contributing to a perception among the public of impunity and undermining confidence.&quoute; (para 38) S/2014/342, “Thirty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire,” 15 May 2014.
Suggested score: 1
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
Researcher4204: The intelligence services in Côte d’Ivoire are exempted from any kind of independent oversight. Secrecy and opacity characterise this entity. Until October 2012, the National Agency for Strategy and Intelligence (ANSI), created in 2005, was in charge of conducting intelligence activities. This intelligence body was free of any scrutiny from the NA and other institutions and was directly attached to the Presidency. Its budget and policies and administration were kept secret.
On the 18th of October 2012, President Ouattara signed a decree (Décret n°2012-1016 du 18 octobre 2012 portant création, missions et organisation de la Coordination Nationale du Renseignement, en abrégé CNR), which created a new intelligence service. The creation of a new intelligence service resulted in two competing presidential agencies in the intelligence sector.
In April 2014, the President signed a decree (Décret n° 2014-180 portant dissolution de l’Agence nationale de la Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, en abrégé ANSI) which dissolved the ANSI. Since that dissolution, the National Coordination for Intelligence (CNR), which is under the responsibility of the President's brother in charge of Presidential Affairs, is the only presidential body in charge of intelligence.
Since the CNR is directly subordinate to the Presidency, it is exposed to less scrutiny than the ANSI which indicates a higher risk of a lack of integrity and accountability.
Response to peer reviewer:
Audits carried out by international bodies cannot qualify for evidence of independent parliamentary oversight. Score maintained.
1/ africaintelligence.fr, &quoute;Alassane Ouattara dissout l’ANSI&quoute;, 12 june 2014, http://www.africaintelligence.fr/LC-/alerte-lc/2014/06/12/alassane-ouattara-dissout-l-ansi,108026796-ART
2/ Journal Officiel N° 19 du jeudi 08 mai 2014 (08 May 2014), http://www.abidjan.net/JO/JO/16002014.asp
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There has been some external assessment and oversight, especially by the French Embassy as well as Jefferson Waterman Intl., private company.
(Source, check the &quoute;Clients&quoute; Section from the Jefferson Waterman International website: http://www.jwidc.com/record/clients-jefferson-waterman-jwi/)
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
Researcher4204: Most of the information related to the ANSI and CNR is not published and openly available. Thus, there is no sufficient information on the recruitment process.
Evidence suggests that senior positions within the intelligence services are not filled on the basis of objective selection criteria. The appointees at the head of the intelligence services for the past three years were all from the North of Côte d'Ivoire from the Dioula ethnic group (just like the president), and some are former members of the rebellion of 2002 who are close to the president. This indicates that there is no formal vetting process prior to appointment but that there is the risk of bias in the recruitment process.
Appointments are made in most cases on an ethnic basis, and it has been reported that this is an intentional attempt to redress the balance after the Gbagbo regime, when the Dioula were largely excluded from major appointments.
1/ panafricain.com, « Cote-divoire – l’ex rebelle Vetcho patron intérimaire de l’Intelligence contre-espionnage », 17 January 2014, http://www.panafricain.com/index.asp?page=detail_article&art=86736&lang=fr&pi=11#
2/Vincent N’ZAKILIZOU, &quoute;Scandale – Côte d’Ivoire: Ouattara préfère les nominations à caractère ethniques et tribales, porteuses de division. Voici quelques exemples&quoute;, ivoirebusiness.net, 28 May 2015, http://www.ivoirebusiness.net/?q=articles/scandale-%E2%80%93-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-ouattara-pr%C3%A9f%C3%A8re-les-nominations-%C3%A0-caract%C3%A8re-ethniques-et-tribales
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
Researcher4204: Côte d'Ivoire signed the ATT in June 2013 and ratified it on the 26 February 2015. However, there is no evidence of any compliance with ATT anti-corruption provisions.
Côte d’Ivoire does not officially export arms. However there are illegal arms exports due to the successive crises that struck the country. Moreover, arms proliferation is a major issue of concern for the government.
Evidence indicates that the national commission against small arms proliferation is making an effort to eradicate small arms proliferation. While Cote d’Ivoire is signatory to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), it is unclear whether it has been ratified
Côte d’Ivoire is currently under UN embargo. Many violations of that embargo have been identified by the UN Experts Group.
1/ UN, Final Report of the Group of Experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, from paragraph 32 to paragraph 43, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
2/ fratmat.info, &quoute;ComNat-Alpc: 8000 armes déjà détruites&quoute;, 13 July 2014, http://www.fratmat.info/politique/item/17217-comnat-alpc-8000-armes-d%C3%A9j%C3%A0-d%C3%A9truites
3/ UN, &quoute;Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2219 (2015), Security Council Extends Arms Embargo on Côte d’Ivoire, Targeted Sanctions&quoute;, 28 April 2015, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11877.doc.htm
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The term &quoute;export&quoute; supposes a process of manufacturing and selling to other destinations rather than internal markets. The proliferation of small arms is due to a crisis of the illegal penetration of these arms into the national Territory. The country is the destination point of arms introduced illegally, not the departure point. We can not then use these examples to talk of export.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
Researcher4204: There is no information available on the matter of asset disposals. Côte d'Ivoire is still under UN embargo. The embargo on specific non lethal material relating to SSR efforts has been lifted while it is still ongoing regarding other types of military equipment. Officially, no military assets have been acquired or sold. However, evidence indicates that the CNS has been acquiring weapons and equipment for the military.
The CNS does not communicate its information about procurement and equipment. Being outside any scrutiny, the CNS does not report publicly, which poses a risk of a loss in accountability and integrity. With the current status of the CNS, it is impossible for the NA to scrutinise its actions.
1/ un.org, resolution2153 (2014), 29 april 2014, from paragraph 1 to 4, http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2153 (2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: This question may not be applicable in the Cote d'Ivoire context. As the country assessor notes, Cote d'Ivoire has been under a UN arms embargo since 2004, which was partially eased on 29 April 2014, when the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that ease the arms embargo to allow government forces to buy light weapons without the approval of a UN committee.
Given the arms embargo, and characterizations of Cote d'Ivoire's defence sector as having persistent deficits in military equipment, it is more likely that the government would be acquiring, not disposing assets. There is no publicly available information regarding procedures of asset disposal or controls that might be in place; furthermore, there have been no records of Cote d'Ivoire selling military equipment in recent history.
&quoute;U.N. Security Council lifts ban on Ivory Coast diamond exports,&quoute; Reuters, 29 April 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/us-ivorycoast-un-diamonds-idUSBREA3S0RQ20140429. Accessed 20 October 2014.
Suggested score:
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
Researcher4204: There is no indication for any scrutiny of the CNS. Côte d'Ivoire is still under UN embargo. The embargo on specific non lethal material relating to the SSR programme has been lifted while it is still ongoing regarding other types of military equipment. Officially, no military assets have been officially acquired or sold, and the UN is monitoring all activities related to asset disposals. However, evidence indicates that the CNS has been acquiring weapons and equipment for the military.
The CNS does not communicate its information about procurement and equipment. Being outside any scrutiny, the CNS does not report publicly, which poses a risk of a loss in accountability and integrity. With the current status of the CNS, it is impossible for the NA to scrutinise its actions.
There are no sources available on that matter.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
Researcher4204: Secret items as well as the intelligence service spending are all under the coordination of the presidency. Secrecy and lack of transparency still prevail on this matter. There is no information available on how much of the defence and security budget is allocated to intelligence services and other secret items.
The lack of transparency and the secretive behaviour of the government can be illustrated by the fact that Côte d’Ivoire did not participate in the Open Budget Index of 2010 and 2012, while countries like Burkina Faso and Mali did.
There is also very little information available on the defence budget in general. In September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but even that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels, particularly on secret items.
1/ internationalbudget.org, &quoute;Rankings&quoute;, http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/rankings-key-findings/rankings/
2/ Communiqué to the council of ministers, September 2013, p.12, paragraph 7, p.14 table, p. 17, paragraph 3, http://www.finances.gouv.ci/index.php/fr/elements-de-gouvernance/execution-budgetaire.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
Researcher4204: The legislature suffers from a lack of transparency surrounding such expenditure. Since intelligence and secret spending are under the control of the presidency, they are outside the NA's scrutiny. However the whole state budget is submitted to the NA without specific information that concerns military and intelligence secret expenditures.
In September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but even that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels.
There is no evidence of any secret expenses submitted to the NA. The lack of information surrounding this issue makes it difficult to provide specific sources.
1/ Loi n°2000-513 du 1er août 2000 portant constitution de la côte d’ivoire, 1 August 2014, http://www.presidence.ci/presentation-detail/50/loi-n-2000-513-du-1-er-aout-2000
2/ Loidici.ci, « Cote d’Ivoire Constitution », article 71, 1 August 2014, http://www.loidici.com/constitutioncentral/codeconstitutionrapports.php
3/ Clément Kouassi, « Partenariat de défense CI-France: Le projet de loi adopté à l’unanimité en commission » , Fratmat Info, 04 July 2014, http://www.fratmat.info/une/item/16997-partenariat-de-d%C3%A9fense-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-france-le-projet-de-loi-adopt%C3%A9-%C3%A0-l%E2%80%99unanimit%C3%A9-en-commission
4/ Born, Hans, Jean-Jacques Gacond and Boubacar N'Diaye. “Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: ECOWAS-DCAF Guide for West-African Parliamentarians.” Geneva: DCAF, ECOWAS Parliament, 2011, p. 226, http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Parliamentary-Oversight-of-the-Security-Sector-ECOWAS-Parliament-DCAF-Guide-for-West-African-Parliamentarians
5/ Communiqué to the council of ministers, September 2013, p.12, paragraph 7, p.14 table, p. 17, paragraph 3, http://www.finances.gouv.ci/index.php/fr/elements-de-gouvernance/execution-budgetaire.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
Researcher4204: There are mechanisms in the defence and security sector which are in charge of conducting financial audits. In practice, auditing secret items or the intelligence services annual accounts is almost impossible because they are under the control of the the presidency (CNS). Moreover, there is no communication between the NA and the presidency on those matters. There is no evidence of any audit reports transmitted to the NA on those issues or of any subsequent parliamentary debate. There is therefore complete opacity surrounding the audits related to the security sector's accounts.
The ministry of defence has its own audit mechanism in charge of scrutiny. The General Inspectorate of the Army is in charge of auditing defence expenditures. However, Ouattara Raphael (2011) states “From a strictly governance point of view, like all other ministries in Côte d’Ivoire, the ministry of defence has an inspectorate department that is in charge of ensuring the proper application of management standards and procedures. This department is generally entrusted to officers at the end of their career and, like its counterparts in other ministries it is severely hampered by incompetence and corruption.“
The intelligence services in Côte d’Ivoire are exempted from any kind of independent oversight. Secrecy and opacity characterise this entity. In April 2014, the President signed a decree (Décret n° 2014-180 portant dissolution de l’Agence nationale de la Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, en abrégé ANSI) which dissolved the ANSI. Since that dissolution, the National Coordination for Intelligence (CNR), which is under the responsibility of the President's brother in charge of Presidential Affairs, is the only presidential body in charge of intelligence. Since the CNR is directly subordinate to the Presidency, it is exposed to less scrutiny than the ANSI which indicates a higher risk of a lack of integrity and accountability.
1/ Decree no 95-973 of 20 December 1995 determining the general and permanent mandate of inspection and control of the State
2/ Décret N° 2012-786 du 8 aout 2012, portant creation...du CNS, http://www.addr.ci/down/decret.pdf?PHPSESSID=ro94ioo5forru0vi5v5o8q47m0
3/ Wikipedia.org, http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agence_nationale_de_strat%C3%A9gie_et_d'intelligence
4/ Journal Officiel N° 19 du jeudi 08 mai 2014, http://www.abidjan.net/JO/JO/16002014.asp
5/ Ouattara, Raphael, Côte d Ivoire, in Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa. Realities and Opportunities, edited by Alan Bryden and Boubacar N'Diaye, p. 81-82. Geneva: Lit Verlag, 2011, http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Security-Sector-Governance-in-Francophone-West-Africa-Realities-and-Opportunities
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
Researcher4204: In law, there are provisions for off-budget expenditures in general but not specifically related to defence and security sector.
In the past, off-budget military expenditures have been regularly carried out. By labeling expenditure as off-budget, it affords a measure of secrecy or confidentiality which allows expenditures to remain without scrutiny or any type of oversight.
Defence procurements made on the basis of “sovereignty funds” are kept behind closed doors, away from the public. The legal basis for sovereignty funds is the &quoute;finance law&quoute;. Each year a finance law is voted in by the NA. However, many lines are not openly available or detailed such as the ones related to sovereignty funds.
Although the defence budget should include all expenditures, evidence suggests that in practice, information on expenditures remains vague. For example, in September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but even that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels.
In reality, there is therefore likely to be little control over off-budget military expenditure.
1/ Loi de finances 2015, p. 24, p. 34, http://www.budget.gouv.ci/assets/files/budget/budget-2015/loi-de-finances-portant-budget-de-l-etat-pour-l-annee-2015.pdf
2/ Final Report of the Groups of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire to the Security Council, S/2011/272, 27 April 2011, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/272
3/ Global Witness, Hot Chocolate: How cocoa fuelled the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, June 2007, http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/cotedivoire.pdf
4/ Loi de finances portant budget de l’État pour l’année 2015, p.35, http://www.budget.gouv.ci/assets/files/budget/budget-2015/loi-de-finances-portant-budget-de-l-etat(rapport-de-presentation-).pdf
5/ Annexe des institutions, Loi des Finances 2015, http://www.budget.gouv.ci/assets/files/budget/budget-2015/annexes-des-institutions.pdf
6/ Communiqué to the council of ministers, September 2013, p.12, paragraph 7, p.14 table, p. 17, paragraph 3, http://www.finances.gouv.ci/index.php/fr/elements-de-gouvernance/execution-budgetaire.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Unable to find up to date sources on legal provisions for off-budget expenditure.
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
Researcher4204: Off-budget military expenditures are carried out in practice, but they are not publicly announced because they often refer to secret operations. The link between illicit economic activity and the military off-budget expenditure is not that clear. However, drawing on general information on the opacity surrounding secret expenditure and the links between organised crime and the military, it can be surmised that there is a high corruption risk here.
In law, there are provisions for off-budget expenditures in general but not specifically related to defence and security sector. Defence procurements made on the basis of “sovereignty funds” are kept behind closed doors, away from the public. The legal basis for sovereignty funds is the &quoute;finance law&quoute;. Each year a finance law is voted in by the NA. However, many lines are not openly available or detailed such as the ones related to sovereignty funds.
Although the defence budget should include all expenditures, evidence suggests that in practice, information on expenditures remains vague. For example, in September 2013, the Ministry of Economy published a communiqué to the council of ministers that showed the expenditure of the defence and security ministries, but even that did not contain a detailed breakdown of the allocation of resources. For instance, the national council for security appears to be listed under the heading “post-crisis expenses”, which makes it extremely difficult to ascertain actual spending levels.
In the past four years, there has been evidence that some bodies external to the defence institution were involved in businesses associated with natural resources exploitation. There have also been indications that some members of those defence institutions were involved in illicit activities which blurs the efforts made to bring transparency in defence sector, such as sensitisation policies with bodies created to fight corruption in general such as the SNGRC.
In the UN final report of the group of experts on Côte d’Ivoire in April 2014, paragraph 62 and 63 clearly demonstrate the involvement of entities and former war chiefs in obtaining revenues from the exploitation and smuggling of natural resources. Because of their controversial nature, those financial interests are not publicly stated and are exempt from scrutiny.
Reports and studies from international organisations frequently outline the fact that some members of the defence and security forces are involved in illicit activities linked to organised crime (drug and diamond trafficking, car and weapon smuggling, etc.).
The criminalisation of the defence and security sector is ongoing but it is essential to mention the efforts made by the government to stop those criminal behaviours such as the creation of the CCDO (Centre de coordination des Operations) on 11 March 2013, which is a response to fight organised crime within the defence and security forces. There has also been the reintegration of almost 58 000 former combatants at the end of the DDR process in June 2015.
1/ Final Report of the Groups of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire to the Security Council, S/2011/271, 27 April 2011, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/271
2/ Final Report of the Groups of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire to the Security Council, S/2011/272, 27 April 2011, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/272
3/ Global Witness, Hot Chocolate: How cocoa fuelled the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, June 2007, http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/cotedivoire.pdf
4/ UN, Final Report of the Group of Experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, from paragraph 62 to paragraph 113, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
5/ Marc Dossa, « Lutte contre la criminalité et le grand banditisme: Les défis du Ccdo », Nord-Sud, 15 March 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/492806.html
6/ Abidjan.net, &quoute;Le CCDO fait son bilan 100 jours après sa creation&quoute;, 5 July 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/p/143450.html
7/ allafrica.com, &quoute;Cote d'Ivoire: Youssouf Kouyaté, coordonnateur du CCDO - &quoute;Nous n'avons pas droit à l'erreur &quoute;, 11 September 2014, http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201409111390.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
Researcher4204: The law does not provide any mechanism that regulates the classification of information, meaning that information can be classified outside of any scrutiny. The lack of regulation indicates an increased risk of a lack of integrity and good governance.
Response to peer reviewer:
There is no official or media evidence that &quoute;national security&quoute; is used as a justification for non-release of defence and security related information.
1/ Assalé, Philippe, Reconstruire les forces de défense et de sécurité en Côte 'Ivoire. Contribution citoyenne. Paris: L'Harmattan, Paris, 2011, p. 223.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The classification of information is informal, and is done on the basis of protecting national security. Legal actions are being undertaken under the auspices of SSR.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
Researcher4204: It is crucial to differentiate between defence and security individuals involved in commercial businesses and the defence and security institutions themselves.
Some individuals, formerly members of the 2002 rebellion and now officially members of the Republican Forces of Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI), are involved in illicit commercial businesses based on natural resources (UN Group of Expert latest report of 2014). There is no evidence of any defence and security institutions owning commercial businesses.
Response to government reviewer:
If you state that military social welfare fund is a private business, I will accept that it exists, but I cannot find any information about it at all. Score changed from 4 to 0.
1/ UN, Final Report of the Group of experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, from paragraph 62 to paragraph 113, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The military social welfare fund is a private business subject to audit and scrutiny
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
Researcher4204: There are no military-owned businesses. Therefore, transparent independent scrutiny does not apply.
Response to government reviewer:
If you state that military social welfare fund is a private business, I will accept that it exists, but I cannot find any evidence of audit or scrutiny. Score changed from NA to 0.
There are neither sources nor references available on that matter.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The military social welfare fund is a private business subject to audit and scrutiny.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
Researcher4204: As stated in the UN Group of experts latest 2014 report, some military or other defence ministry employees, are involved in illicit commercial activities which sometimes are covered under private enterprise. Former members of the rebellion have private enterprises that do business outside of any scrutiny.
In the UN report, paragraphs 62 and 63 clearly demonstrate the involvement of entities and former war chiefs in obtaining revenues from the exploitation and smuggling of natural resources. Paragraphs 92 and 94 also link defence and security personnel with the illegal exploitation of gold. Because of their controversial nature, those financial interests are not publicly stated and are exempt from scrutiny.
There is no evidence of the government addressing this issue, despite an official ban on illicit artisanal gold mining.
1/ UN, Final Report of the Group of experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, paragraphs 67, 68 and 69, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As the country assessor notes, some military authorities at the local and national level are involved in illegal commercial activities. This is particularly egregious in the illicit gold mining sector; despite the government’s ban on illicit artisanal gold mining, exploitation persists, with the complicity of some national and local military authorities. The 2014 UN Group of Experts report states that “the chain of command authorizing illegal artisanal gold mining leads to important members of the Cote d’Ivoire security forces in Abidjan,” (para. 94) suggesting insufficient government will and action to tackle this issue. UN, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on Cote d’Ivoire,” 14 April 2014.
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Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
Researcher4204: The anti-corruption commitments made in public by the Ministry of Defence deal largely with racketeering-related corruption cases. The Minister of Defence often publicly commits to anti-corruption and integrity measures. During visits to military bases and interviews in the media, a commitment to anti-corruption has been stated by other defence officials.
Reports indicate that cases of undisciplined and corrupt behaviour are often taken to the public sphere and the sanctions are announced publicly to make examples out of those cases exposed.
1/hamedbakayoko.com, « Côte d’Ivoire : des mesures d’envergure pour juguler le racket », 6 July 2014, http://www.hamedbakayoko.com/spip.php?page=article&id_article=215
2/ Abidjan.net, « Tournée du ministre Paul Koffi Koffi contre le racket : Plusieurs éléments des Frci interpellés », 31 July 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/h/466847.html
3/ lintelligentdabidjan.ci, &quoute;Côte d'Ivoire: policiers, gendarmes et militaires en conclave contre la corruption&quoute;, 25 august 2014, http://lintelligentdabidjan.ci/politique/806-3186/1694-cote-d-ivoire-policiers-gendarmes-et-militaires-en-conclave-contre-la-corruption
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Researcher4204: There are measures in place for personnel misbehaviours related to corruption and bribery. For instance, the government created the &quoute;Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance&quoute; (the High Authority for Good Governance), which is the institution in charge of sensitising the population on corruption risks, preventing corrupt behaviour and sanctioning those who commit corrupt acts.
This new entity covers all areas and is in charge of raising moral standards within the public sphere. While it is a relatively new institution (it was established on September the 5th of 2014 but was created by decree in September 2013), early evidence suggests that there has been some effective action. Reports indicate that cases of corruption are now being publicised in greater numbers in order to show the public that sanctions are being applied to corrupt members of the defence and security forces.
Response to peer reviewer:
Media reports indicate that measures to fight against corruption are becoming more effective because many cases have been publicly dealt with. Score maintained.
1/ Fulbert Koffi , « Côte d’Ivoire: CCDO, une nouvelle police pour lutter contre le grand banditisme », 12 March 2013, http://oeildafrique.com/cote-divoire-ccdo-une-nouvelle-police-pour-lutter-contre-le-grand-banditisme/
2/ L.O, « Cote d'Ivoire: Tribunal militaire - 5 policiers condamnés pour racket », 6 July 2014, http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201407071207.html
3/ Jean Khalil Sella, &quoute;Assassinats, rackets et barrages illégaux: des Frci radiés&quoute;, Abidjan.net, 23 August 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/506126.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Ouattara administration promulgated two ordinances in September 2013 designed to strengthen the legal framework for curbing corruption and to establish a High Authority for Good Governance. As yet, it is too early to determine the effectiveness of these mechanisms. (Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2014 – Cote d’Ivoire,” 2014. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/c-te-divoire-0#.VEiFItR4qzA)
Prior, measures taken were primarily geared at curbing extortion and racketeering by members of the defence and security forces, notably, with the creation of a special anti-racket unit. However, that unit largely operates in and around Abidjan. According to an official from the Prime Minister’s Office interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the military prosecutor has brought cases against some soldiers engaged in extortion and racketeering. (Human Rights Watch, “Cote d’Ivoire, Security Force Extortion,” 1 July 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/01/cote-d-ivoire-security-force-extortion) However, in the absence of news reporting/reliable statistics on disciplinary sanctions, it is quite difficult to determine whether sanctions are effective or consistently applied.
Suggested score: 2
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
Researcher4204: Evidence suggests that whistleblowing is increasingly encouraged by the government. There is a law that protects whistleblowers from any type of threat (Order N°202013-660, 20 September 2013, chapter 3). This law applies to any citizen, irrespective of them being in the defence and security sector or not.
According to reports published before the aforementioned legislation was put in place, it was considered dangerous to report corruption. It is unclear how the environment may have changed since. It is almost impossible to say whether this law offering protection is effectively applied in practice as no cases of whistleblowing have been publicly reported yet. This could indicate the effective protection of whistleblowers, but may also simply indicate that there have not been any cases of whistleblowing. While whistleblowing is encouraged in theory, it could be rather difficult in practice due to the lack of trust among military personnel following the political crisis.
Nevertheless, the legal chapter dedicated to this matter exists, so there is a law that should be applied.
1/ order N° 202013-660 of 20 September 2013 about prevention and fight against corruption, chapter 3, http://www.bonnegouvernance.ci/images/pdfs/ordonnance_n_%202013-660_du_20_septembre_2013_relative_a_la_prevention_et_la_lutte_contre_la_corruption_et_les_infractions_assimilees.pdf
2/ Sofia Wickberg, “Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Côte d’Ivoire,” Transparency International, 19 April 2013, http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in_cote_divoire
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
Researcher4204: There is no evidence of any kind of special attention paid to personnel in sensitive positions, nor that there may be official recognition that some positions are more open to corruption than others.
Response to peer reviewers:
I could find no evidence of special attention being paid, and the government reviewer's remarks that qualification level is the only criterion that might be different for these posts only serves to substantiate the fact that there are no procedural measures in place to minimise corruption risk in specific positions. Score maintained.
1/ Presidential Decree no 2009-259 of 6 August 2009 relating to the Code for Public procurement, accessed March 10, 2012, http://www.droit-afrique.com/images/textes/Cote_Ivoire/RCI%20-%20Code%20marches%20publics%202009.pdf
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive position according to their qualifications but there is no objective criteria for the time in post
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: In my opinion, the fact of not having public information doesn't allow us to verify whether there is a system for this.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
Researcher4204: There are indications that the number of military and civilian personnel is known to the Ministry of Defence in Côte d’Ivoire. However, this information is not publicly available and its accuracy remains largely unknown.
According to the latest figures (made available to the assessor on a confidential basis), 60 000 people are employed in the military globally.
Below, there is a breakdown of the number of personnel in 2014:
The FRCI (Air, Navy and Army) : 22 700
Gendarmerie: 17 383
Police: 17 261
Civilians employed by the ministry of defence: unknown
The Ministry of Defence does not have the figures related to the civilian employees. However, the SSR process is helping the security and defence sector to be more accurate and open on certain issues, suggesting that further improvement is likely.
For example, from 2011 to 2012 the government obliged soldiers to personally pick up their salaries in cash within the barracks. The objective behind that one-off measure was to identify the soldiers still alive and truly enrolled in the army. The “dead or shadow” soldiers and the deserters have been removed from the army personnel records. This should improve the accuracy of personnel figures available to the establishment.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 1.
1/ National Council for Security, Anonymous contribution but reliable, latest figures from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior. (not publicly available)
2/ koaci.com, « Côte d'Ivoire : Le paiement main à main des salaires des militaires continue! », 29 November 2012, http://www.koaci.com/articles-78839?lang=2
3/ abidjan.net, nord-sud, « Paiement main en main, appel nominatif… : Le piège de Ouattara aux Frci », 10 September 2012, http://news.abidjan.net/h/440468.html
4/ connectionivoirenne.net, « Les militaires absentéistes menacés de radiation », 24 September 2012, http://www.connectionivoirienne.net/75896/cote-divoire-les-militaires-absenteistes-menaces-de-radiation
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: During some periods there was a clear evidence of low profile staff circulating around with no clear role. (Source: internal reports from the UNOCI SSR/DDR Section, not publicly available)
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Given that the country assessor was provided figures for 2014 confidentially, and notes that this information is &quoute;not publicly available&quoute; and &quoute;its accuracy remains largely unknown,&quoute; in my view, &quoute;The number and military is available from the establishment; however the numbers are believed to be incorrect and incomplete&quoute; is more accurate.
Suggested score: 1
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Researcher4204: Pay rates and allowances are clearly determined and published for all civil servants. The basis on which salaries and allowances are paid is made publicly available.
However, specific salaries or financial benefits or advantages might not be openly published, particularly for civil servants close to the presidency. Additionally, there is a lack of clarity regarding allowances.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agree. Score adjusted from 4 to 2 (comments and sources added).
1/ Abidjan.net, « Côte d’Ivoire : 12% d’augmentation des salaires des fonctionnaires », 16 January 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/484664.html
2/ Abidjan.net, « Côte d’Ivoire: une nouvelle grille salariale pour les fonctionnaires est à l’étude », 3 February 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/486217.html
3/ Le Statut du Cadre de la Gendarmerie Nationale, Decret N° 61-96 Du 12 Avril 1961 &quoute;Portant Statut du Cadre de la Gendarmerie Nationale de la Côte d'Ivoire&quoute;, http://www.loidici.com/Statutgendarmerie/statutsgendarmesremuneration.php
4/ Internal reports from the UNOCI SSR/DDR Section, not publicly available
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Sometimes there was lack of clarity on allowances.
(Source: internal reports from the UNOCI SSR/DDR Section, not publicly available)
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
Researcher4204: Correct pay is generally available on time as planned unless there are exceptional disruptions due to political crisis (2011 crisis) or financial tensions at the ministry of economy and finance. The system of payment is relatively functional and well-established. Civil servants are generally paid on time by the public treasury.
A notable exception to this was in November 2014, when soldiers took to the streets to protest the late payment of salaries and allowances. The Minister of Defence promised to pay the money owed and improve systems such as the health insurance of soldiers in exchange for them returning to their posts.
1/ connectionivoirenne.net, &quoute;Poste de Côte d’Ivoire: Les agents en colère , menacent&quoute;, 29 June 2013, http://www.connectionivoirienne.net/86826/poste-de-cote-divoire-les-agents-en-colere-menacent
2/ Abidjan.net, &quoute;Défense : Des soldats réclament leurs frais de mission&quoute;, 25 October 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/h/478592.html
3/ &quoute;Ivory Coast soldiers ordered to end pay protests&quoute;, BBC, 18 November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30100512?ocid=socialflow_twitter
4/ Le Monde, &quoute;Manifestations de militaires en Côte d'Ivoire&quoute;, 18 November 2014, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2014/11/18/tensions-en-cote-d-ivoire-a-la-suite-de-manifestations-de-militaires_4525543_3212.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
Researcher4204: Evidence indicates that military personnel are not subject to an independent, transparent and objective appointment system. Nepotism and tribalism have for the past three years affected the selection process for appointments in the military.
There is a committee in charge of appointments within the military but evidence suggests that this committee lacks independence and transparency. Most of the time appointments will be made accordingly to political orders coming from the presidency.
Since the end of the crisis in 2011, tribal biased appointments have been denounced by international NGOs such as International Crisis Group and Amnesty International.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agree. Score changed from 2 to 1.
1/ jeuneafrique.com, « Côte d'Ivoire : Ouattara promeut officiellement d'ex-comzones dans la nouvelle armée », 4 August 2011, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20110804153444/
2/crisisgroup.org, « Côte d’Ivoire : faire baisser la pression », Rapport afrique n°193, 26 November 2012, paragraphe 2 et 6, http://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/regions/afrique/afrique-de-louest/cote-divoire/193-cote-divoire-defusing-tensions.aspx
3/bbc.co.uk, « RCI: nominations polémiques dans l'armée », 9 November 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/afrique/region/2012/11/121109_ivory_army.shtml
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: It's important to state that it's not published, especially for low ranks.
(Source: internal reports from the UNOCI SSR/DDR Section, not publicly available)
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
Researcher4204: According to the regulations and mechanisms in place, military personnel are promoted through an objective and meritocratic process. There are specific committees in charge of assessing potential candidates for promotion within the defence and security institutions, in conformity with the law.
However, evidence suggests that political consideration and favouritism sometimes weaken the process. In many cases, external institutions allegedly influence decisions made by those committees which negatively affects any independent oversight on this matter.
1/ Law No 2001-479 of 9 August 2001 relating to the Statute of the Personnel of the National Police, http://www.loidici.com/Statutpolice/statutspoliciers.php
2/ Alassane Ouattara, interview by Vincent Hugeux, Côte 'Ivoire: Ouattara veut &quoute;protéger les minorités&quoute;, L'Express, 25 January 2012, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/cote-d-ivoire-ouattara-veut-proteger-les-minorites_1075076.html
3/ bbc.co.uk, « RCI: nominations polémiques dans l'armée », 9 November 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/afrique/region/2012/11/121109_ivory_army.shtml
4/ ivoirebusiness.net, &quoute;Côte d’Ivoire - FRCI Rattrapage ethnique: Voici la liste complète des officiers et chefs de guerre promus aux grades supérieurs par Ouattara&quoute;, 24 January 2014, http://ivoirebusiness.net/?q=articles/c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-frci-rattrapage-ethnique-voici-la-liste-compl%C3%A8te-des-officiers-et-chefs-de
5/ eburnienews.net, &quoute;DÉSORDRE AU SEIN DES FRCI:SOUMAÏLA BAKAYOKO AU COEUR DE LA BROUILLE&quoute;, 6 august 2014, http://eburnienews.net/desordre-au-sein-des-frcisoumaila-bakayoko-au-coeur-de-la-brouille/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Researcher4204: Conscription does not exist in Côte d'Ivoire.
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Researcher4204: Conscription does not exist in Côte d'Ivoire. However, reports from international organisations and NGOs indicate that bribes are a common practice to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process of the defence and security forces.
1/ Mark, Monica, Côte d'Ivoire torn apart but thrown together, The Africa Report, 14 November 2011, http://www.theafricareport.com/News-Analysis/cote-divoire-torn-apart-but-thrown-together.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
Researcher4204: From 2011 to 2012, the government obliged soldiers to personally pick up their salaries in cash within the barracks. The objective behind that one-off measure was to identify the soldiers still alive and truly enrolled in the army and still in activity. The “dead or shadow” soldiers and the deserters have been removed from the army personnel.
The fact that this measure was needed indicates that there has been evidence of “ghost soldiers” or non-existent soldiers in Côte d'Ivoire, and in 2013 the government launched a wider program to dismantle cases of fictitious civil servants and soldiers. A total of 1500 ghost civil servants were identified in 2014. There is therefore quite some progress being made, however, problems with the payment system (with late payments pushing soldiers to protest on the streets in 2014) and the clarity over numbers of official personnel (with official statistics still unpublished), it is unclear whether the risk of further problems occurring has been completely dealt with.
1/ koaci.com, « Côte d'Ivoire : Le paiement main à main des salaires des militaires continue! », 29 November 2012, http://www.koaci.com/articles-78839?lang=2
2/abidjan.net, nord-sud, « Paiement main en main, appel nominatif… : Le piège de Ouattara aux Frci », 10 September 2012, http://news.abidjan.net/h/440468.html
3/ connectionivoirenne.net, « Les militaires absentéistes menacés de radiation », 24 September 2012, http://www.connectionivoirienne.net/75896/cote-divoire-les-militaires-absenteistes-menaces-de-radiation
4/ &quoute;Côte d’Ivoire : plus de 1500 fonctionnaires fictifs demasqués&quoute;, Oeilafrique.com, 03 October 2014, http://oeildafrique.com/cote-divoire-1500-fonctionnaires-fictifs-demasques/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
Researcher4204: The official chain of command and the official chain of payment are in theory and in practice separated. The public treasury pays the salaries of civil servants (including soldiers) via an e-payment system. The only exception to the e-payment system was in 2011, when the government decided to pay the soldiers in cash in order to identify deserters, ghost soldiers and dead soldiers that remained on the payroll.
There might be unofficial chains that are not separated but no formal evidence exists.
1/ koaci.com, « CI: Paiement des fonctionnaires: Les guichets des banques pris d'assaut », 24 November 2011, http://www.koaci.com/paiement-fonctionnaires-guichets-banques-pris-dassaut-68524.html
2/ Abidjan.net, FRCI/Salaires main à main: La grogne gagne les casernes, L'Intelligent d'Abidjan, 4 August 2011, accessed March 14, 2012, http://news.abidjan.net/h/406676.html
3/ Honoré Kouassi, &quoute;Militaires, gendarmes, policiers... Paiement des salaires : Ce qui se passe dans les casernes&quoute;, 6 June 2011, http://news.abidjan.net/h/400795.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
Researcher4204: The Ivorian military code (Loi n° 95-695) emphasises the values, duties and rights of any soldier. However, the code does not include corruption-related issues, such as bribery, gifts, hospitality etc. It can therefore not be considered a comprehensive policy covering corruption behaviour for the military.
However, a new law applying to all civil servants was passed in 2013 and clearly states what corruption consists of and outlines the sanctions applying when these are violated (order N° 202013-660).
1/ order N° 202013-660 of 20 September 2013 about prevention and fight against corruption, http://www.bonnegouvernance.ci/images/pdfs/ordonnance_n_%202013-660_du_20_septembre_2013_relative_a_la_prevention_et_la_lutte_contre_la_corruption_et_les_infractions_assimilees.pdf
2/Loi n° 95-695 du 7 septembre 1995 portant code de la fonction militaire, 7 September 1995 Livre 1, Titre1, chapitre 2, http://www.loidici.com/codefoncmilitaire/fonctionmilitaire.php
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is an effort from authorities mainly from the MOD in these last three years to fight corruption and the message is being understood.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
Researcher4204: The military code does not include corruption-related issues and there is no evidence of any prosecution due to breaches of the military code. However over the past three years, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior have arrested and prosecuted soldiers or police members who deliberately flouted the law on corruption (racketeering etc.).
The new anti-corruption law and the new “haute autorité pour la gouvernance” (order N° 202013-660), are in charge of sanctioning corruption-related cases to make the government's anti-corruption efforts more effective. The haute autorité has not yet sanctioned anyone since being put in place. However, corrupt agents have been sanctioned under the new law.
1/ order N° 202013-660 of 20 September 2013 about prevention and fight against corruption, http://www.bonnegouvernance.ci/images/pdfs/ordonnance_n_%202013-660_du_20_septembre_2013_relative_a_la_prevention_et_la_lutte_contre_la_corruption_et_les_infractions_assimilees.pdf
2/ Abidjan.net, « Condamnation des soldats FRCI avant-hier : Vous avez dit justice des vainqueurs ? », 4 May 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/h/458759.html
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There are actions taken in coordination with external partners to help to put in place an anti-corruption plan.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
Researcher4204: There is no evidence of any training related to corruption for the military and civilian personnel that is delivered within the Ivorien military, but there has been some related training under the United Nations (ONUCI) in recent years. In addition, in 2013, the ministry of defence expressed its intention to draft an ethics charter and a deontology code. The ethics charter and deontology code drafting has been finalised but there is no evidence of their adoption yet.
1/ Xinhua, abidjan.net, « Côte d’Ivoire : l’armée fait sa mue pour renforcer son efficacité », 21 August 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/h/469541.html
2/ Human Rights Watch. Côte d'Ivoire: Positive steps help combat roadblock extortion. 16 September 2012. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/16/c-te-d-ivoire-positive-steps-help-combat-roadblock-extortion
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
Researcher4204: There is no evidence of a policy to make outcomes of prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities public. However, evidence indicates that there have been effective prosecutions of racketeering in recent years. The Ministry of Defence is under pressure from the presidency to end racketeering, and these cases have been publicly addressed and prosecuted.
1/ Abidjan.net, « Condamnation des soldats FRCI avant-hier : Vous avez dit justice des vainqueurs ? », 4 May 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/h/458759.html
2/ Abidjan.net, « Tournée du ministre Paul Koffi Koffi contre le racket : Plusieurs éléments des Frci interpellés », 31 July 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/h/466847.html
3/ koaci.com, « Côte d'Ivoire : Le procès du commissaire de police Atsin Viviane s'ouvre demain », 10 February 2014, http://www.koaci.com/cote-divoire-proces-commissaire-police-atsin-viviane-souvre-demain-89728.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
Researcher4204: There is no evidence on whether or not facilitation payments specifically are illegal, however the new anti-racketeering unit's activities may discourage them.
As an additional measure to address this issue, the CCDO was created to reinforce other existing bodies such as the inspectorate. Whistleblowers are also now protected by the law. However, since these measures were only introduced in 2013, it is too early to assess their effectiveness.
There is no clear evidence to suggest that the practice of offering facilitation payments has stopped.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 1.
1/ abidjan.net, « Activités du président de la république : Le chef de l’Etat Alassane Ouattara visite le centre de coordination des décisions opérationnelles (CCDO) », 11 March 2013, http://news.abidjan.net/h/453924.html
2/ order N° 202013-660 of 20 September 2013 about prevention and fight against corruption, http://www.bonnegouvernance.ci/images/pdfs/ordonnance_n_%202013-660_du_20_septembre_2013_relative_a_la_prevention_et_la_lutte_contre_la_corruption_et_les_infractions_assimilees.pdf
3/ “Côte d’Ivoire : des mesures d’envergure pour juguler le racket », Xinhua, 5 July 2014, http://news.abidjan.net/h/502399.html
4/ Koaci.com, « Côte d'ivoire : Abidjan se dote d'un centre d'appel contre le racket », 10 April 2014, http://www.koaci.com/cote-divoire-abidjan-dote-centre-dappel-contre-racket-91074.html?lang=1
5/ rti.ci, « Côte d'Ivoire: Une Unité de lutte contre le racket créée et équipée », 19 June 2012, http://www.rti.ci/actualite-829-cote-d-ivoire-une-unite-de-lutte-contre-le-racket-creee-et-equipee.html
6/ hamedbakayoko.com, &quoute;Côte d’Ivoire : des mesures d’envergure pour juguler le racket&quoute;, 6 july 2014, http://www.hamedbakayoko.com/spip.php?page=article&id_article=215
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: In my opinion, with the recent creation of the CCDO, it's too early to estimate the effectiveness.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
Researcher4204: The military doctrine of the armed forces is not yet available. The draft exists, but it does not specifically address the issue of corruption as a strategic matter and its influence on operations and it is not publicly available.
Moreover, the reforms of the defence sector related to the security sector reform (SSR) do not include anything related to the prevention and ending of corruption.
Response to government reviewer:
A code of conduct is largely insufficient to say that corruption is addressed as a strategic issue on operations. Score maintained.
1/ Lamoussa Kone Lansina, Magazine officiel de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité, N°27, June-July 2014, P.24
2/ Stratégie nationale RSS, http://www.rssci.org/rss/strategie-nationale.html
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is an active campaign aimed at military personnel involved in operations and the Chief of Staff has produced a code of behaviour.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
Researcher4204: Commanders have been in recent years trained on issues related to corruption. This training was mainly conducted by the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (ONUCI).
However there is no evidence that the trainees apply that anti-corruption knowledge on the ground. Moreover, reports from the UN suggest that some commanders from the former rebellion, now members of FRCI, are involved in illicit activities and encourage corrupt activities.
1/ UN, Final Report of the Group of experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, from paragraph 62 to paragraph 113, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no known anti corruption campaign for commander but the code of behaviour helps in reducing the risks
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
Researcher4204: There are no professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field. Sources indicate that the lack of policy and clarity regarding corruption issues within the defence and security forces negatively affects possible actions related to the prevention and monitoring of corruption.
1/ Interview with Interviewee 1: Ministry of Defence Official, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 11 July 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
Researcher4204: There are no specific guidelines and staff training on addressing corruption risks in that context.
Response to government reviewer:
A code of behaviour is not a policy against corruption which states sanctions or guidelines on addressing corruption risks in contracting. Score maintained.
1/ Interview with Interviewee 1: Ministry of Defence Official, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 11 July 2014.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: For external operations the Chief of Staff produces a code of behaviour to discourage corruption.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
Researcher4204: For the past three years, private military companies have been used officially by the presidency to assist the defence and security ministries. There is no evidence of PMCs being subjected to the same level of scrutiny as the armed forces.
While the military contractors or private security firms have been involved in formulating policies, they have not been active in operations 'on the ground'. In Côte d’Ivoire, Jefferson Waterman International still has some experts employed by the presidency.
1/ Interview with Interviewee 1: Ministry of Defence Official, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 11 July 2014.
2/ Client list on the JWIC website, http://www.jwidc.com/record/clients-jefferson-waterman-jwi/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I would review in the case of the intervention of Jefferson Waterman International.
(Source, check the &quoute;Clients&quoute; Section from the Jefferson Waterman International website: http://www.jwidc.com/record/clients-jefferson-waterman-jwi/)
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: According to a 2012 Small Arms Survey report, during the post-electoral crisis of 2010-11, Cote d’Ivoire’s private security sector expanded significantly and without restrictions: “More than 400 private security companies currently employ more than 50,000 people. This sector, a financial boon to many, is not subject to any effective regulation. Most of the companies possess firearms illegally. …The authorities have begun to take steps to regulate the sector, but the statutory provisions are still far from rigorously enforced.” (Savannah de Tessieres, “A National Survey of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cote d’Ivoire - Executive Summary,” Small Arms Survey, ComNat-CI, ECOWAS, and UNDP, April 2012)
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
Researcher4204: There is a presidential decree that covers all procurement. The 2009 Code on Public Procurement provides guidelines on the tendering process, on procurement's execution, implementation, control, and regulation. The objective of that code is to bring a certain level of transparency and integrity to procurement processes and mechanisms. However, Article 8 of that code exempts defence and security procurements (equipment etc.) from scrutiny and rules applied to other sectors, for the purpose of national security.
The code does not provide any clauses related to ways of preventing corruption.
1/ decret n° 2009-259 du 06 aout 2009 portant code des marches publics, http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
Researcher4204: Article 18.2 of the Code for Public Procurements (decree 2009-259) clearly exempts defence and security related ministries or administrations from complying with certain requirements, such as publishing information, disclosing or making the procurement cycle process available to the public. Moreover, the CNS centralises all purchases of weapons and related material (UN report).
1/ decret n° 2009-259 du 06 aout 2009 portant code des marches publics, 6 August 2009, article 18.2, http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
2/ UN, Final Report of the Group of experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, from paragraph 32 to paragraph 40, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
Researcher4204: At least three bodies are in place to oversight the whole procurement process as also examined in the 2013 GI assessment. The defence inspectorate, the general inspectorate and the military prosecutor are all mechanisms entitled to oversee procurement activities. However, the researcher was unable to find more recent evidence of activity in order to assess their transparency and effectiveness.
Evidence indicates that the presidency, through the CNS, centralises defence and security procurement. Major military and security procurements must be adopted by the CNS before being executed. The centralisation of procurement related to defence and security results in more opacity.
Response to government reviewer:
The quality of oversight is impossible to determine given the general lack of information available about the activities of these bodies. I therefore feel that I cannot raise the score.
1/ linfodrome.com, &quoute;des commandes déjà passes&quoute;, 31 august 2012, http://www.linfodrome.com/vie-politique/4438-apres-la-reunion-du-conseil-national-de-securite-larmee-se-blinde
2/ UN, Final Report of the Group of experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, from paragraph 32 to paragraph 40, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
3/ Ouattara, R. Côte d'Ivoire in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin (Eds.). DCAF. LIT Verlag 2008. http://www.dcaf.ch/Chapter-Section/Ch.4-Cote-d-Ivoire . accessed: 5 May 2012&quoute;
4/ Transparency International, &quoute;Government Defence Anticorruption Index 2013: Cote d'Ivoire&quoute;.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Oversight mechanisms are in place but they are not efficient enough.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
Researcher4204: Defence purchases are made public on SIGMAP if the Ministry of Defence decides to publish them. However, the law authorises the Ministry of Defence to withhold publication of their purchases (decree 2009-259). Certain categories of purchase are also not published in that system because they are considered secret purchases.
There are some general security justifications given for withholding information, but these tend to assume that defence purchases should always be secret in order to maintain an advantage over other powers.
1/ decret n° 2009-259 du 06 aout 2009 portant code des marches publics, 6 August 2009, article 18.2, http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
2/ Système Intégré de Gestion des Marchés Publics (SIGMAP), http://www.sigmap.gouv.ci/cgi-bin/search.cgi?Title=Link&catid=3&so=DESC&sb=PPR_EPL_CODE&t=dmp&g=PREPARATION_DES_DAO%2FPlanning_de_passation_des_march_eacute_s%2Findex.html&PPR_MIN_COD=26&PPR_MIN_COD-opt=%3D
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
Researcher4204: General financial, administrative and technical requirements are expected to be fulfilled by companies in order to bid for work for the ministry of defence. Those requirements are included in the code for public procurements (decree 2009-259). Anti-corruption provisions and sanctions are listed in the code (articles 184 and 187). The Code also includes conflict of interest provisions, including prohibiting individuals with personal or financial interests from participating in the tendering selection process (art. 48).
Response to peer reviewer:
I could not find any evidence of this in the public domain, so have maintained the score.
1/ decret n° 2009-259 du 06 aout 2009 portant code des marches publics, 6 August 2009, articles 48,49,50, 184 and 187, http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I would say that, at least in some cases, there is a non corruption clause.
(Source: internal reports from the UNOCI SSR/DDR Section, not publicly available)
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
Researcher4204: Procurement requirements are not derived from a well-audited national defence and security strategy.
Evidence suggests that procurements are made on an opportunistic basis (security situations) depending on the priorities of the authorities at a specific time. In Côte d’Ivoire, it is the CNS which is responsible for validating the procurements need from the ministry of defence and the ministry of interior. Once the CNS, chaired by the president, validates the procurement needs, then the CNS takes care of the whole purchase process.
Regarding audits made, only few known audits have been carried out by international entities such as Jefferson Waterman International and the French ministry of defence. They have not been published.
The national defence policy is still at a draft level. The national security strategy was adopted by the Presidency in 2014 but not by the National Assembly. It has not been made public. A Defence and Security Programming Law is also in formulation but it has not been finalised yet.
1/ National Security Strategy, Presidency, National Council for Security, 2014.
2/ Lamoussa Kone Lansina, Magazine officiel de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité, N°27, June-July 2014, P.24
3/ La Lettre du continent, in its no 623 of 17 November 2011, pp. 1-2; - 29th of the UN Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Cote 'Ivoire (UNOCI), S/2011/807, 30 December 2011, para. 32, p. 9; - Crisis Group, &quoute;Cote 'Ivoire: Continuing the Reco
4/ UN, Final Report of the Group of experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, from paragraphs 32 and 38, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
Researcher4204: Most of the purchases made do not follow any coherent assessment mechanism which means that often, there are no clearly identified and quantified requirements. In some specific security situations, needs are identified and purchases made. Evidence indicates that these purchases are more opportunistic than thoroughly planned.
For instance the latest purchase of surveillance and war vessels does not obviously comply with the national security strategy or any other policy documents (although it is difficult to tell, given that the NSS is not public). It does however seem that the decision to purchase these maritime acquisitions derives from the need to counter maritime piracy and to show neighbouring countries the maritime capacity of Côte d’Ivoire in case of dispute or crisis.
Response to peer reviewers:
Agreed. Score changed from 1 to 0.
1/ re.ivoire-blog.com, « Le gouvernement Ouattara achète 3 navires de guerre », 5 June 2014, http://re.ivoire-blog.com/archive/2014/06/05/le-gouvernement-ouattara-achete-3-navires-de-guerre-446208.html
2/ meretmarine.com, « Raidco Marine livre à la Côte d’Ivoire son premier RPB 33 », 6 June 2014, http://www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/raidco-marine-livre-la-cote-divoire-son-premier-rpb-33
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The purchases are the result of consultation with commanders regarding the internal or external threats
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I would say that, sometimes, are opportunistic purchases.
(Source: internal reports from the UNOCI SSR/DDR Section, not publicly available)
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The country assessor notes that in some situations, defence purchases are made based on identified requirements; however, the example provided (i.e. the recent purchase of surveillance and war vessels) was, as the assessor notes, indicates that the purchase was made on an opportunistic basis. Therefore, in my view, &quoute;Purchases are not based on quantification of requirements. They are often opportunistic in nature&quoute; is a more accurate assessment.
Suggested score: 0
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
Researcher4204: It is difficult to make statements about the openness of defence procurement, as Côte d’Ivoire is under UN embargo. However, there is evidence of single-sourcing. Depending on their nature, some procurement processes might be conducted as open competition (military helmets etc.). However, evidence indicates that the purchasing of weapons is still largely opaque.
The final UN report of the Group of experts on Côte d’Ivoire states a company that was the intermediary for purchases made by the Presidency through the CNS.
1/ UN, Final Report of the Group of experts on Cote d’Ivoire, 14 April 2014, from paragraph 33, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_266.pdf
2/ Personal experience: Prime Minister's Office, 2007, defence working group member.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
Researcher4204: General rules and guidelines from the 2009 public procurement code also apply to the defence procurements. Article 43 of the public procurement code includes the need for the integrity and independence of tender boards.
Regarding independent auditing there is a body called National Regulatory Authority on Public Procurements (ANRMP, art.15 of the 2099 code). The ANRMP published a report in 2014 that showed irregularities in tender boards decisions between 2011 and 2013, but the defence and security ministries were not amongst the five ministries that were audited. Hence, there is no evidence of its effectiveness with regard to defence procurements yet.
1/ decret n° 2009-259 du 06 aout 2009 portant code des marches publics, 6 August 2009, articles 15 and 43, http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
2/ decret n°2009-260 du 06 aout 2009 portant organisation et fonctionnement de l’autorite nationale de regulation des marches publics (ANRMP), 6 August 2009, http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
3/ allafrica.com, &quoute;Cote d'Ivoire: Malversations dans les marchés de gré à gré - Où sont les sanctions ?&quoute;, 26 September 2014, http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201409261765.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
Researcher4204: The 2009 code on public procurement, states forbids collusion (Article 186.2) and provides sanctions (articles 186.7 and 187.1.1) for anyone involved in such practice. That code also applies to defence and security contracts. However there is no specific legislation regarding defence and security contracts.
Article 38 of the order N°202013-660 against corruption, clearly states punishment for anyone involved in collusion. Evidence indicates that the enforcement of the code on public procurement has not yet been proven.There are no media reports about previous cases of collusion.
1/ decret n° 2009-259 du 06 aout 2009 portant code des marches publics, 6 August 2009, articles 186.2, 186.7 and 187.1.1, http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
2/ order N° 202013-660 of 20 September 2013 about prevention and fight against corruption, article 38, http://www.bonnegouvernance.ci/images/pdfs/ordonnance_n_%202013-660_du_20_septembre_2013_relative_a_la_prevention_et_la_lutte_contre_la_corruption_et_les_infractions_assimilees.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
Researcher4204: The National Regulatory Authority on Public Procurements (ANRMP) is the entity in charge of training actors involved in public procurement, including civil servants. There is no evidence of such training being delivered to Ministry of Defence personnel, or for the effectiveness of this training.
Response to peer reviewer:
I could not find any evidence in the public domain to support the suggestion that staff rotation and training does take place. Score maintained.
1/ decret n°2009-260 du 06 aout 2009 portant organisation et fonctionnement de l’autorite nationale de regulation des marches publics (ANRMP), 6 August 2009, http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I would emphasize the sporadic training and habitual rotation of the staff.
(Source: internal reports from the UNOCI SSR/DDR Section, not publicly available)
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
Researcher4204: Order N°202013-660 against corruption and decree N° 2009-260 creating the ANRMP both provide complaints mechanisms for companies which perceive malpractice in the procurement process.
The Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) allows arbitration before the national jurisdiction in case of failure of the national non-jurisdictional body, ANRMP, to rule any issue related to infringement or malpractice cases.
The risk of retaliation against companies complaining is meant to be significantly limited because they are protected by the different mechanisms cited. However, to date there has been no evidence of companies complaining about malpractice in the procurement process.
1/ order N° 202013-660 of 20 September 2013 about prevention and fight against corruption, http://www.bonnegouvernance.ci/images/pdfs/ordonnance_n_%202013-660_du_20_septembre_2013_relative_a_la_prevention_et_la_lutte_contre_la_corruption_et_les_infractions_assimilees.pdf
2/ decret n°2009-260 du 06 aout 2009 portant organisation et fonctionnement de l’autorite nationale de regulation des marches publics (ANRMP), http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
3/ decret n° 2009-259 du 06 aout 2009 portant code des marches publics, 6 August 2009, articles 166, 167 and 168), http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The fact that no companies have complained of malpractice in the procurement process suggests the mechanisms cited are not effective and/or there is significant apathy in terms of the equality of the process.
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
Researcher4204: The 2009 Code on Public procurements (articles 184 and 187) makes provisions preventing corruption and provides sanctions for corruption. Moreover, order N° 202013-660 about prevention and fighting against corruption (articles 44 to 51) also makes provisions to punish corrupt activities of a supplier or anyone involved in such activities. There is no evidence regarding corrupt activities of a supplier and the sanctions applied.
Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence to back up the government reviewer's point. Score maintained.
1/ order N° 202013-660 of 20 September 2013 about prevention and fight against corruption, articles 44 à 51, http://www.bonnegouvernance.ci/images/pdfs/ordonnance_n_%202013-660_du_20_septembre_2013_relative_a_la_prevention_et_la_lutte_contre_la_corruption_et_les_infractions_assimilees.pdf
2/ decret n° 2009-259 du 06 aout 2009 portant code des marches publics, articles 166, 167 and 168), 6 August 2009, http://www.anrmp.ci/textes-91094/decrets-28246
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Sanctions for procurement are available but not always applied.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
Researcher4204: Offsets are not part of any legal framework in Côte d’Ivoire. There is no evidence available on offset contracts.
There are neither sources nor references available on that matter.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
Researcher4204: Offsets are not part of any legal framework in Côte d’Ivoire. There is no evidence available on offset contracts.
There are neither sources nor references available on that matter.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
Researcher4204: Offsets are not part of any legal framework in Côte d’Ivoire. There is no evidence available on offset contracts.
There are neither sources nor references available on that matter.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Researcher4204: There is no evidence of how strongly the government controls the company’s use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle. The use of intermediaries is not covered by legislation, although intermediaries are used in that cycle. This means that with regard to the use of intermediaries by companies in the public procurement process, there is a legal vacuum.
Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence to back up this point. Score maintained.
1/ Personal experience: Prime Minister's Office, 2007, defence working group
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is some degree of control and scrutiny of intermediaries.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
Researcher4204: Due to the confidential and sensitive nature of major arms deals, the government does not publicise any aspects of the financial packages made around arms deals.
There are no sources available on that matter.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
Researcher4204: There is no specific evidence of any requirement related to anti-corruption programmes when it comes to contractors.
Apart from a very general prescriptions for public stakeholders involved in public procurement, and more general provisions on public procurement which highlight practices to avoid, there is no evidence of a specific code of conduct for contractors.
1/ Presidential Decree no 2009-259 of 6 August 2009 relating to the Code for Public procurement, accessed March 10, 2012, http://www.dmp.finances.gouv.ci/pdf/Arrete106.pdf
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
Researcher4204: Evidence suggests that it is common for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by the selling nations. Most acquisitions are made with companies belonging to countries with which the government has close ties such as Israel and France. For instance, when it comes to equipment bought from French defence companies, most of the time there has been an influence from the French authorities due to political requirements (security, technical assistance, defence agreement etc.)
Moreover, evidence indicates a sense of 'owing' France for the French military assistance during the post-electoral crisis in 2011, and for the defence agreement recently made with France which is mainly about assistance and training. However, the agreement also includes secret clauses. The document is not available to the public.
1/ &quoute;Sécurité XXL pour Ouattara&quoute;, in La Lettre du continent, n° 630, 1 March 2012, Paris, p. 5.
2/ meretmarine.com, « Raidco Marine livre à la Côte d’Ivoire son premier RPB 33 », 6 June 2014, http://www.meretmarine.com/fr/content/raidco-marine-livre-la-cote-divoire-son-premier-rpb-33
3/Clément Kouassi, « Partenariat de défense CI-France: Le projet de loi adopté à l’unanimité en commission » , Fratmat Info, 4 July 2014, http://www.fratmat.info/une/item/16997-partenariat-de-d%C3%A9fense-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-france-le-projet-de-loi-adopt%C3%A9-%C3%A0-l%E2%80%99unanimit%C3%A9-en-commission
4/ fratmat.info, « Côte d’Ivoire-Israël: Des accords de coopération et de défense intérieure signés », 13 June 2014, http://www.fratmat.info/politique/item/16375-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-isra%C3%ABl-des-accords-de-coop%C3%A9ration-et-de-d%C3%A9fense-int%C3%A9rieure-sign%C3%A9s
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Although it is likely that Cote d’Ivoire’s special relationship with France would be factored into defence acquisition decision-making, Cote d’Ivoire has not really been in the business of making significant defence acquisitions, with the exception of the period right after the failed military coup in 2002. From 2002 to 2003, Cote d’Ivoire acquired second-hand conventional weapons (including combat helicopters, transport aircraft, armored personnel carrier, etc.) from Angola, Belarus, and Bulgaria. (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database) Those purchases were likely motivated by considerations of affordability rather than based on the political influence of the selling nations.
Suggested score:
Researcher4204: There is a formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy in Côte d’Ivoire (Article 71 of the Constitution). However, in practice, that provision is limited because the national Defence Policy formulation process itself is not mentioned in the Constitution as being part of the National Assembly (NA) mandate for scrutiny.
Article 71 of the constitution stipulates that only “Military Personnel status”, “Police status” and “Defence organisation” are all subjected to NA inputs. This restriction limits the actions of the NA, which ideally would be able to scrutinise national defence policy as a whole and not only these three components of the defence and security sector.
The budget is also mentioned in Article 71. It is the responsibility of the NA to vote on the national defence budget before it is implemented. However, to this date there is no evidence of such a vote being carried out over the past four years.
Despite the fact that the legislative scrutiny is referred to in the Constitution, the influence of the NA on defence policy formulation has always been very limited if not ineffective. This is because the new National Security Strategy, which covers defence matters, was not presented to the NA for adoption. Instead, the CNS adopted it. Moreover, the NA is not represented in the CNS. The National Council for Security (CNS) is chaired by the President himself. The special position of the CNS (it is sovereign and outside any scrutiny) makes it prone to risks with regard to transparency, accountability and liability issues.
However on March 9th, 2015, the NA adopted a bill related to the organization of Defence and the Armed Forces. This bill concerns reorganizing the Defence Forces, something which is a consequence of the National Security Strategy. This shows some limited involvement in defence issues.
The national security strategy was formulated and adopted under President Ouattara in 2013 as part of the SSR process.