Researcher4320: There is no available information on the procedures for asset disposals in military establishments.

Researcher4320: No information could be found on independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments or whether or not the reports of such scrutiny were public.

Researcher4320: The percentage of defence and security expenditure allocated to secret items related to national security and the intelligence services is not disclosed to the public. Only a few generic expenditure items for the Ministry of the Armed Forces is presented in the national budget. According to the International Budget Partnership and its Open Budget Questionnaire, &quoute;information provided in the budget proposal does not allow one to calculate the percentage of the budget that is composed of secret expenditure.&quoute;

Researcher4320: The budget presented to the legislature tends to have only information limited to a few categories such as equipment costs and personnel costs. No information on any secret items related to national security or military intelligence are present. There is no evidence to suggest that secret programs are subject to specific audits so the legislature cannot obtain information on secret items through an audit process either.

Researcher4320: Audit reports of the procurement process, implementation, monitoring (administrative, financial and technical) and control of contracts issued by the Ministry of Armed Forces have been conducted for the years 2008-2012 (the 2012 budget audit was done in July 2014 indicating the process is running behind). However, no information could be found on secret programs. The reports are publicly available so it is entirely possible for and within the powers of members of the legislature to raise issues concerning the annual accounts of the security sector. However, there tends to be little discussion on matters of defence as members within the committee of defence and security or the national assembly are not necessarily well-versed in these issues. According to evidence presented by Boubacar N'Diaye, members of the CDS appear to have a knowledge gap compared to the executive branch on issues of general defence and security strategies.

Researcher4320: No information could be found to assess whether or not off-budget or secret military expenditures occur in Senegal. As a result, determining if off-budget military expenditures involves economic activity could not be determined.

In the absence of further information it must be assessed that the risk may be high.

Researcher4320: No information could be found to assess whether or not off-budget or secret military expenditures occur in Senegal. As a result, determining if off-budget military expenditures involves economic activity could not be determined.

In the absence of further information it must be assessed that the risk may be high.

Researcher4320: No provisions on regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security could be found in Senegal.

Researcher4320: No information could be found confirming or denying that national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses.

Researcher4320: No information could be found confirming or denying that national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses so it is not possible to determine if military-owned businesses (if they exist) are subject to independent scrutiny. No legislation regarding military-owned businesses in Senegal could be identified.

Researcher4320: The recent release of two books by Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw has brought forth allegations of corruption against the Senegalese Gendarmerie. The author alleges upper echelons fostered a mafia-like culture where gendarmes were required to obtain money in order to put it in brigade funds, which were then redistributed with higher ranked officers receiving a significant amount of the profits. The author also accused members of the Gendarmerie of transferring funds to rebels in the Cassamance region. The response to the allegations has mostly consisted of negative sentiment expressed on the part of the Ministry of the Armed Forces towards Colonel Ndaw. However, in an interview with Voice of America, President Macky Sall stated the allegations were being taken under consideration and that the Inspector-General of the armed forces would conduct an investigation.

Researcher4320: There is little evidence of any public commitment by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs to anti-corruption and integrity measures, and there is no evidence that any such commitments are made by senior ministry of defence or armed forces staff. The Minister of defence did state that the allegations of Colonel Abdoulaye Ndaw would be investigated, but his focus appears to be denouncing the Colonel for revealing state secrets instead of speaking out against corruption.

Researcher4320: The 1965 penal code, which applies to all citizens of Senegal, military and civilian alike, does have a section outlining punishments for those caught accepting bribes. The code lists punishments/fines for corruption but does not provide details on the dismissal (although it can be inferred that imprisonment means dismissal) nor on prosecution. The penal code also specifically mentions what individuals can be punished for. However, there is no public evidence that these measures are actually carried out.

Researcher4320: According to the penal code, those who are aware of corruption and/or a crime being committed can be prosecuted by association. However, the punishment can be mitigated or eliminated if said individual denounces the criminal before they committed the crime or before too much damage has been done. However, the penal code gave no indication if whistleblowers were protected from reprisal.

In Colonel Ndaw’s book, he describes that members of the Gendarmerie would use intimidation when he would speak out against corruption. Furthermore, The reaction of the executive branch to the allegations made by Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw has been mixed. He was placed under arrest for 60 days because of these allegations, which is not a very good indication that whistleblowers are protected. However, the media has placed a spotlight on his detention (and the lack of detention of the general he accuses) which generated a response from the President Macky Sall that the allegations would be looked into.

Researcher4320: There is no evidence that special attention is paid to the selection of personnel in sensitive positions including officials and personnel in areas of defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. Furthermore, there is no evidence of recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.

Senegal is the first West African Economic and Monetary Union country to have adopted a transparency code in 2012. Part of the implementation was a legal requirement for public officials to declare assets. An asset declaration law was passed by Parliament in March 2014 and in November 2014, a decree defined those subject to it. This includes the President and the Premier Questeur of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister, Ministers, the President of the Economic, Social and Environmental Committee and directors of credit, authorising officers of revenue and expenditure and public accountants involved in operations amounting to or more than an annual sum of one billion CFA francs. Ministers were firstly to declare assets by the end of November 2014. There have reportedly been some obstacles in the implementation of the law although it is reported that they are being addressed. The website of the National Anti-Corruption and Fraud Office states that the President has declared his assets as well. It is unclear if implementation until now has included the remaining officials subject to this law.

Researcher4320: No official source could be found that gave an accurate number of civilian and military personnel. The Senegalese Armed Forces currently has a website that is said to be under construction. As a result, one must rely on outside sources to determine personnel numbers, however, these numbers appear to vary. One website, Trading Economics, states that there were approximately 18,600 members of the Senegalese armed forces in 2010. Another website, Army Recognition claimed that the Army was composed of 9,000 soldiers, and that the Gendarmerie was composed of 6000 personnel. The most comprehensive (and most recent) number of the armed forces was provided by defenceWeb which provides a numbers for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and paramilitary (Gendarmerie). According to the website, the Army has 11900 personnel, the Air Force has 770, the Navy has 950, and the paramilitary branch has 5000 for a total of 18620. Given the variety of numbers and lack of official sources, the score zero has been chosen.

Researcher4320: The Senegalese pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel are not openly published or easily accessible. However, several non-official websites have been able to successfully get information on salaries although numbers vary by website. No information on civilian personnel in the defence sector could be found.

Researcher4320: No information could be found on whether personnel receive the correct pay on time in Senegal. I could not find any information on the payment system with the exception of the pay rates I had mentioned in the previous question. I could also not find the any information on the general pattern of payments in Senegal either.

Researcher4320: While a system for the appointment of military personnel does exists, it is not published). Furthermore, there are media accusations that appointments are not based purely on merit (SeneNews, Le Quotidien). According to these and other sources, during the President Wade's regime as officers appointed to the Presidential palace received more benefits than those who were not (Xibar, Bagayoko-Penone). These sources allege officers were promoted to the rank of general in order to obtain their support (Xibar). In some cases, younger officers were elevated over their commanders to the rank of general.

In July 2013 (Le Quotidien), eight officers were elevated to the rank of general, a move that was publicly questioned by the political party M.S.U. France. The group pointed out that many retired generals still receive substantial benefits and that unless the government was planning to increase the size of the army, then the promotion of 8 more generals seemed was not justified.

Researcher4320: In Senegal, there historically has not always been an openly transparent and meritocratic process in the promotion of officers. President Wade was alleged to have promoted younger men over their commanding officers to the ranks of general causing frustration among the more experienced officers who were supposed to qualify as generals prior to their subordinates. Furthermore, media reports indicate that in July 2013, eight officers were elevated to the rank of general, a move that was publicly questioned by the political party M.S.U. France. The party pointed out that many retired generals are still receiving substantial benefits and that unless the government was planning to increase the size of the army, then the promotion of 8 more generals was not justified.

Researcher4320: In addition to voluntary service, Senegal has selective conscription although no evidence could be found on policies regarding the acceptance of bribes for conscription. As a result, no appropriate procedures could be found dealing with bribery.

Researcher4320: No information could be identified regarding a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process. As a result, appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery could not be identified.

Researcher4320: There is no concrete evidence of ghost soldiers; however, the lack of information on the Armed Forces in Senegal suggests that the phenomenon could possibly occur. The possibility that there could be ghost soldiers is reinforced by the fact that, after an internal audit where the government froze tens of thousands of public employee salaries until the individuals proved their identity, it was revealed that thousands of individuals had been receiving money from the government that shouldn't have been. The details of the audit were not available from the government, only from the press.

Researcher4320: The Senegalese pay rates and allowances are not openly published or easily accessible. As a result, no evidence could be found that either support or deny command chains being separate from chains of payment.

Researcher4320: A code of conduct for the armed forces does exist although it has been undergoing reform in recent years. However, whether or not the military code of justice specifically has guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities is unclear as the actual text of the military code of justice could not be accessed. However, the penal code, which applies to all citizens of Senegal, military and civilian alike, does have a section outlining punishments if public officials or members of private companies are caught accepting bribes: specifically Paragraph III “Corruption of public officials and employees of private companies”, forbids corruption and lays out punishments depending on the severity of a public official’s crime.

Researcher4320: Historically, any judicial pursuit of members of the military is hampered by article 60 of the code of military justice, which states that judges are required to obtain a prosecution order from the Minister of Defence before interviewing members of the armed forces. Likewise the Ministry of the Interior also has this veto ability when dealing with police officers. The minister of the armed forces can veto the prosecution of a member of the military by not allowing the judiciary to obtain a prosecution order, resulting in few prosecutions of members of the military. In fact, a common practice for dealing with members of the military faced with crimes is simply to deploy them elsewhere instead of prosecuting them.

Prosecutions are rare and publicly available results of prosecutions are equally hard to come by. The exception seems to occur in high profile cases where members of the media and civil society have widely reported on a crime committed by members of law enforcement or the military. In June 2008, the brutal beating of two journalists by police officers received widespread headlines but the Ministry of the Interior blocked judicial proceedings for two years. Public pressure eventually led to three of the officers finally being brought before a court. The officers were charged and then provisionally released.

Researcher4320: Since President Macky Sall has come to power, anti-corruption policies are said to have been regularly enforced. Several anti-corruption agencies exist: the Ministry for the Promotion of Good Governance (Ministère de la Promotion de la Bonne Gouvernance), the National Anti-corruption Office (Office National de Lutte Contre la Fraude et la Corruption), the Commission Against Non-Transparency and Corruption (Commission Nationale de Lutte Contre la Non-Transparence, la Corruption et La Concussion), the National Commission on Restitution and Recovery of Ill-gotten Assets (Commission nationale de restitution des biens et de recouvrement des avoirs mal acquis), and the Court of Repression of Economic and Financial Crime.

While there are several institutions that deal with corruption, evidence of anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel was not available.

Researcher4320: There are no examples of outcomes being made public although the allegations brought forth by Colonel Abdoulaye Ndaw may put pressure on the Senegalese government to make public the outcome of any prosecution against Ndaw’s commanding officer General Abdoulaye Fall. However there is no policy that the outcomes of prosecutions must be made public. There are some examples of prosecutions available in the public domain over recent years, for example Karim Wade, son of the former President Wade, who was accused of embezzling over one billion dollars.

The exception seems to occur in high profile cases where members of the media and civil society have widely reported on a crime committed by members of law enforcement or the military. In June 2008, the brutal beating of two journalists by police officers received widespread headlines but the Ministry of the Interior blocked judicial proceedings for two years. Public pressure eventually led to three of the officers finally being brought before a court. The officers were charged and then provisionally released. However, in November 2014, the Special Prosecutor in charge of the case was replaced.

Researcher4320: While the acceptance of bribes is technically illegal according to the Senegalese penal code, its practice is widespread in Senegal: 66% of people surveyed in the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer felt that corruption was still a serious problem in the country, and many of those surveyed indicated that they had been obligated to pay a bribe in the past year. There was little information on the effectiveness of measures in place but the fact that 66% of people surveyed by Transparency International felt that corruption was a serious problem demonstrates that measures to counter corruption do not appear to be very effective, at least in the public's eyes.

The 1965 penal code, which applies to all citizens of Senegal, military and civilian alike, does have a section outlining punishments for those caught accepting bribes. The code lists punishments/fines for corruption but does not provide details on the dismissal (although it can be inferred that imprisonment means dismissal) nor on prosecution. The penal code also specifically mentions what individuals can be punished for. However, there is no public evidence that these measures are actually carried out.

Facilitation payments are reported to be commonplace in Senegal and there is a lack of clarity regarding their legal status.

Researcher4320: The country has no known military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in operations.

Researcher4320: Senegal has no known training in corruption issues for commanders. The accusations of Colonel Abdoulaye Ndaw allege that officers engaging in and/or turned a blind eye to corrupt activities in the Gendarmerie. Whether or not this may occur in other branches of the armed forces is unclear.

Researcher4320: It is unclear whether or not corruption monitors are deployed to the field with Senegalese soldiers.

Researcher4320: No relevant guidelines or trainings could be identified. If they do exist, then they are not available to the public.

Researcher4320: No information could be found on whether or not PMCs were employed within Senegal or if they are subject to the same level of scrutiny of the armed forces. However, Senegal has recently been part of the discussions on increasing accountability of PMCs operating in foreign countries, having recently (June 2014) hosted a regional seminar (organized by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and &quoute;Lumière Synergie pour le Développement&quoute;, with support from the Swiss Foreign Ministry) to discuss the Montreux document, which provides a list of recommendations of good practice for states regarding the military operations undertaken by private security companies during armed conflict. Despite hosting the seminar, Senegal has not indicated whether or not it would sign the document. Furthermore, support for the Montreux document does not necessarily translate to similar levels of scrutiny as the armed forces.

Researcher4320: There is a public procurement code and while the word “corruption” is never used, Article 145 of the code states that sanctions would be placed against companies trying to influence the bidding process either directly or indirectly. Articles 76 and 77 are of the most pertinence to transparency in the defence and security sectors as they allow the state to engage in direct contracting with a company (no competition) if it deems it in the state’s security interest and/or the purchase should be a state secret. Article 75 also states that companies that engage in direct contracting are to face greater financial scrutiny from the Senegalese state.

Researcher4320: The defence procurement cycle is disclosed only in a very abbreviated or general way, mostly through limited disclosure of the budget. Furthermore, the budget is discussed within the National Assembly, particularly the Committee of Defence and Security. Legislators are presented with a few vague line items (available to the public online) such as personnel and equipment costs, which does not go into any detail about the procurement process.

Researcher4320: Oversight mechanisms formally exist in the legislative branch of government, but they are highly inactive and lack transparency. Legislators may perform oversight by interviewing members of the armed forces if they questions on anything related to the defence and security sectors, including procurement. However constraints exist, namely, the ministry has to give permission for members of the armed forces (or the ministry itself) to go before the defence committee. Furthermore, legislators often lack knowledge regarding security and procurement issues and thus they tend to question defence issues very little (N'Diaye).

The ARMP also conducts audits of defence purchases and can indicate if violations were made regarding regulations concerning public procurement as well as provide recommendations to the armed forces on how to better conduct procurement itself. However, these audits do not verify 100% of purchases, only a sample size which can range in some categories from 100% of contracts to 50% of the contracts in other categories (general trend from analysing N'Diaye, Business System Consulting Group and Cabinet sources).

Researcher4320: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute makes a point of publishing arms transfers including defence purchases. Currently, any weapons purchased by Senegal from other countries can be identified in this database. Furthermore, Audits of the defence sector coordinated by the ARMP are published 1-2 years after the purchases are made.

No information could be found on forward purchases or exemptions either. However, it should be noted that the SIPRI database obtained its information somehow. Whether this was done by requesting numbers form the government or obtaining it from a secondary source is unclear.

Researcher4320: No requirements are placed on companies. The US State Department warned in its Annual Investment Climate Statement that foreign companies will face corruption at lower levels in the Senegalese bureaucracy and it is up to the companies themselves to assess corruption risks and develop effective compliance programs or measures to detect and prevent corruption.

Researcher4320: While purchases are audited, the formulation of procurement requirements is not derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy. Since 2000, many of Senegal’s military purchases from other countries have been predominately aircraft and helicopters although it is unknown if these purchases reflect any particular strategy on behalf of the Senegalese military. After purchasing three aircraft from Brazil in 2013, the press speculated that the role of the planes would be for improved border security and surveillance as well as improving the capabilities of the air force.

Researcher4320: No quantified requirements of defence purchases could be found and thus it must be assumed that purchases are not based on quantification of requirements.

Researcher4320: Audits conducted by ARMP indicate that some defence procurement occurs through open competition while others are more restricted. Direct contracting with an individual company without competition can occur if it falls under Articles 76 and 77 of Senegal’s public procurement code, which allows for direct contracting for national security and state secret reasons. However, in audit year 2011, no direct contracting was performed while audit year 2012 saw direct contracting for only 2 out of 33 contracts (only 6% of total contracts). Both of the direct contracts concerned pharmaceutical supplies. The 2012 audit noted that the Armed Forces Ministry had not given a justification for the 2 purchases in accordance with Articles 76 and 77.

Researcher4320: Specific regulations for tender boards could not be identified. However, members of a tender board are subject to the penal code of Senegal (specifically Paragraph III “Corruption of public officials and employees of private companies”), which forbids corruption and lays out punishments depending on the severity of a public official’s crime.

Researcher4320: Article 145 of the public procurement code specifically states that any potential bidder of a contract that has practiced collusion could face sanctions by the Senegalese government through the Committee on Regulations of Disputes and Public Procurement (approximate translation from “Comité de Règlement des Différends de l’Organe chargé de la Régulation des Marchés Publics.”). It is likely to be only weakly enforced because evidence presented by audits of the Armed Forces (cabinet source) have hinted that collusion has occurred in certain bids in the past with little consequence. It specifically notes that certain companies have placed bids without providing warranty bids, which could be evidence of collusion.

Researcher4320: No information could be found on procurement staff and whether or not project and contract managers were specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery.

Researcher4320: Companies may take their case to the Committee for the Settlement of Disputes (Comité de Règlement des Différends) according to article 146 of the public procurement code if they feel that they are incorrectly being perceived as performing malpractice. The committee receives information regarding irregularities both during and after the execution of a public contract. The responsibilities of the mission are threefold. Firstly, it tries to reconcile the parties of the dispute and decide on irregularities and infringements that were committed. Secondly, it orders any precautionary, corrective, or suspensive measures deemed necessary for procurement procedures. Thee execution of a contract may be suspended if the committee deems it necessary. Finally, the committee provides advice as part of the settlement procedure for disputes relating to the performance of public contracts and public service contracts. If it is determined that violations have occurred in a public contract, the committee can recommend disciplinary action (it does not specify what exactly except that violations are a criminal offense). No information could be found about how impartial the committee is.

Researcher4320: The list of sanctions to punish a supplier can be found in article 146 of the public procurement code. Sanctions include confiscation of collateral pledged by the supplier under the procurement procedures that had been agreed upon, as well as the exclusion of the right to compete for public procurement, outsourcing of public services and partnership contracts for a fixed duration depending on the seriousness of the misconduct. These penalties may be extended to any company that owns a majority stake in the delinquent company or delinquent individual whose company owns a majority stake in the collusion determined by Committee for the Settlement of Disputes. If found guilty of violations, supplier may face cancellation of contract or replacement by another company.

No information could be found on whether or not these sanctions were applied in practice.

Researcher4320: No information could be found on whether or not the government imposes anti-corruption due diligence or auditing requirements on offset contracts or if the Senegalese government actually engages in offset contracts.

Given the lack of transparency associated with defence and security procurement, it cannot be ruled out that there are no offset contracts. The score has been selected accordingly.

Researcher4320: It is unclear if the Senegalese government engages in offset contracts as no information could be found about them.

Given the lack of transparency associated with defence and security procurement, it cannot be ruled out that there are no offset contracts. The score has been selected accordingly.

Researcher4320: It is unclear if the Senegalese government engages in offset contracts as no information could be found about them.

Given the lack of transparency associated with defence and security procurement, it cannot be ruled out that there are no offset contracts. The score has been selected accordingly.

Researcher4320: No information could be found on government control of the company’s use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle.

Researcher4320: Details of the financing package are not available to the public. No information could be found on whether a financing package exists at all for arms purchases for Senegal. Occasionally, a production timeline may be established by looking at the media (particularly those who report on defence purchases) as well as the press releases of contractors who may list a delivery date of their product to Senegal, but no information includes a payment timeline.

Researcher4320: There is no evidence of the government formally requiring the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, nor is there evidence of the government encouraging this informally.

Researcher4320: It is highly likely that defence acquisitions are based on the political influence of selling nations. Senegal is a former colony of France, the country who has sold more military equipment and hardware to Senegal than all other sellers combined. Another major contributor in defence acquisitions has been South Africa since 2004, a potential indication of this country’s growing influence as a leader on the continent.