Uganda

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (PPDA) of 2003 regulates the disposal of public assets and how such information is disclosed.

The PPDA states that defence and other security organs are granted the powers to manage their asset disposals separately and according to a dual list, one of which is made public upon request, while the other relates to classified information. The restricted list is subject to a classified audit that is then submitted to Parliament, while a separate contracts committee approved by the Secretary to the Treasury is appointed to oversee the disposal of classified items. The PPDA amendment took effect in March 2014, and is aimed at improving the act in several respects, including: increased promotion of local businesses, improved efficiency in public procurement, increased transparency, and greater accountability from both public and private officials involved in procurement by making them liable for their actions and the establishment of a PPDA tribunal to prosecute offenders.

Appointments to the contracts committee are likely to be heavily influenced by the executive and are unlikely to undergo a free and fair recruitment process, increasing the risk that disposals are not properly scrutinised. Evidence suggest that the President has attempted to push long-standing military members in the background in favour of a younger generation from whom he could win individual loyalties. This has allowed him to retain control over these institutions at the expense of their independence. Trends in the appointments to the Contracts Committee have displayed similar dynamics. Moreover, there have been cases where the Contracts Committee was deliberately sidestepped by UPDF officers. For example, a deal to purchase cement for a project in the north of the country was met with criticism in 2012 after it emerged that UPDF cement had found its way into the project without going through the contracts committee.

A 2010 PPDA study found that suppliers spend 10-20% of the contract amount in bribery payments, which was an increase of 5-10% compared to the previous year. Meanwhile, although procurement in the defence sector also adheres to the PPDA, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act 2005 stipulates that the Minister of Defence has the power to override PPDA restrictions in cases where it is deemed “necessary or convenient for ensuring the discipline and good administrations of the Defence Forces.” While the minister’s decisions are subject to consultation with the Defence Forces Council, the lack of transparency in the ministry as a whole suggests these powers are unlikely to enjoy a high degree of accountability. These shortcomings are the product of a failure to apply the PPDA rather than any inherent inefficiency in the act.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Auditor General is mandated with the task of monitoring and reporting on asset disposals in general, including by defence establishments. The office of the Auditor General makes audit results public in an annual report. Under the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (PPDA) Amendment of 2014 this process is due to be stepped up in light of reports that companies have been paid in full despite failing to satisfactorily complete the assigned tasks.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Intelligence budgest to not appear to be public. An article from November 2013 states that the intelligence budget is part of the president's budget and &quoute;classified&quoute;.

More generally, information on secret spending is also limited. Although the defence budget is published each year, with the latest figure for 204/15 hitting the 1 trillion Ugandan shillings mark, the allocation of these funds are not disclosed. As such, although some information on expenditure for items such as fighter jets can be found in the media once the items are purchased, the majority of the budget is not disclosed to the public, though the Open Budget Survey of 2010 reported that 7.6% of the defence budget is stated for secret expenditures.

In the 2013/14 budget, secret expenditures are estimated to have made up one third of the total defence budget. While the Open Budget Survey of 2012 gave Uganda an overall score of 65%, in contrast to 55% for 2010, it recommended that Parliament be provided with audit reports on secret expenditures. In fact, although Uganda scores well on overall budget transparency, this trend is not extended to the defence sector. This prompted Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to call for a special committee in June 2014 to monitor classified expenditure for defence and intelligence as part of a new Public Finance bill currently under consideration by Parliament. CSOs claim that secret expenditures in the past have allowed for gross misuse of public funds by government officials, and that the current bill does not go far enough in addressing these concerns. CSOs also expressed some concerns that the new bill aims to disband Parliament’s budget committee, which they believe would undermine parliament’s ability to oversee expenditures. The new bill would also repeal and consolidate the Public Finance and Accountability Act of 2003 and the Budget Act of 2001, which currently monitor expenditure.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: A parliamentary Budget Committee exists to review general budget expenditures. However, the new Public Finance Bill of 2012, currently under consideration, proposes to disband this committee. Currently, the Public Finance and Accountability Act of 2003 and the Budget Act of 2001 are set up to provide for the scrutiny of spending. However, matters relating to national security and military intelligence do not undergo this process, as there is only limited sharing of this information with the legislature, and it tends to be after the spending has already taken place. For example, when $740m were spent on six military jets in 2011, legislative approval for the expenditure was only sought after the deal had gone through.

Nevertheless, legislators do have some influence over spending, and there are occasions where they are consulted for budgetary approval. For example, the Ministry of Defence in June petitioned parliamentary approval for a supplementary defence budget of sh170 billion (US$ 65 million). The amount is intended to plug spending gaps in defence and support “regional security”. However, legislators expressed concern that the request is being made in order to support Ugandan troop deployment in South Sudan. This suggests that the Ministry of Defence has not sufficiently informed legislators of how it plans to use the supplementary funds. In fact, a parliamentary inquiry ordered in December 2013 by a speaker of parliament failed to gain traction, suggesting there has been limited to no oversight over spending for the South Sudan mission.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: According to Article 163(3) of the Constitution and sections 13 and 19 of the National Audit Act of 2008, the Auditor General is required to audit the accounts of all public offices. The Directorate of Central Government in the office of the Auditor General is responsible for auditing the accounts for the ministries, including the Ministry of Defence. According to Article 163(4) of the Constitution, the report must then be submitted to Parliament by March 31 each year. With these provisions in place, there is evidence that audits of the security sector have been carried out and associated reports released. Nevertheless, with respect to the Ministry of defence and other intelligence organisations, the reports remain vaguely worded and lack the necessary detail to conduct appropriate parliamentary debate. For example, the Annual Report of the Auditor General for the Year ended June 30, 2011 noted that the Ministry of Defence’s annual work plan was too vague with respect to logistical support and welfare of troops to allow for proper evaluation. It stated that recruitment and training of soldiers had taken place, but it did not specify how many were trained. Without a clear measure of indicators, the auditing process remains incomplete. The auditor general report for the year ending June 2013 makes no mention of the security sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: According to Chapter 9, Article 156 of the Constitution, “any moneys [that] have been expended for any purpose in excess of the amount appropriated for that purpose or for a purpose for which amount has been appropriated by that Act, a supplementary estimate showing the sums required or spent shall be laid down before Parliament and in the case of excess expenditure, within four months after the money is spent”. The Executive has made extensive use of this clause. In February and May 2014, the Finance Ministry requested two supplementary budgets of US$ 90 million and US$ 100 million respectively. These requests were filed retrospectively, after the government called upon the Article 156 clause, known as the Appropriation Bill. A similar tactic was used when the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) were deployed to South Sudan in December 2013, and when the President spent US$ 740 million on six fighter jets in 2011 despite the fact that it risked harming the economy.

This highlights how frequent off-budget expenditures are and how poorly they are controlled by the legislature. Although on some occasions, parliamentary approval is sought beforehand, this is likely to be a formality, and the reasons for the request often remain classified. Shortly after the 2014/15 budget was proposed on 12 June 2014, the Ministry of Defence requested Parliament to approve a supplementary budget of US$ 65 million for unspecified “regional security” reasons.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Off-budget military expenditures are common. As mentioned in previous indicators, a process for making expenditures ahead of parliamentary approval is enshrined in the Constitution, so long as approval is then sought within four months of the expenditure. This has occurred on numerous occasions, including when US$ 740 million was spent on six fighter jets in 2011 and when 1,600 Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) troops were deployed to South Sudan in December 2013. On both these occasions, the orders to proceed with the payment and the deployment were executed prior to parliamentary approval. There is also evidence that expenditures end up serving illicit purposes. For example, UPDF officers serving in the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have been accused of selling food, weapons and training – all purchased for use by the UPDF – to Somalis. Twenty-four UPDF officers are currently on trial for this offence.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Finance Bill 2012, that is currently under consideration by Parliament, stipulates under section 20, subsection (2) that money appropriated for national security purposes will be marked as classified expenditure, which is to be presented as a single line item to Parliament, meaning only certain information will be submitted for scrutiny. Currently, there is no independent body able to determine which information is classified. Although the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) has some oversight over budget and procurement, it is not authorised to determine what purchases or expenditures are to be made available to the public.

In August 2013, the Committee of Internal Affairs and Defence expressed concern at the growing amount of funds being allocated to classified expenditure in the Ministry of Defence. The Committee proceeded to suggest the formation of a subcommittee tasked with the responsibility to scrutinise classified information. In the 2012/13 budget, the defence ministry was allocated a total of 127 billion Uganda shillings for classified expenditure and demanded 295 billion Uganda shillings in 2013/14. This highlights that there is currently no effective scrutiny regulating what is classified and what is not. Along with this increase came a rise in the percentage of classified expenditure items, meaning an even greater percentage of the defence budget is unaccountable to Parliament – due to secrecy reasons – in 2013/14 than in 2012/13.

Given the further increase in the defence budget for the 2014/15 financial year, it is likely that an even greater percentage of the budget – as well as funds in real terms – will be used outside of legislative scrutiny. Moreover, only limited explanations, such as vaguely stated security threats, were given by the government for the increase in the defence budget for 2014/15. Although Parliament is in theory required to investigate details of security threats for the purposes of discussing the budget, MPs are typically thwarted by high ranking defence officials who claim the information they need is classified.

Please see the 2013 assessment for additional information regarding the Information Act and the Secrecy Law (1958). Section 32 of the access to information act states that exemptions can be made for defence, security and international relations.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: National defence and security organisations are involved in private commercial business activity, but in many cases, these are not transparent or even legal. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) are widely reported to have been involved in illegal minerals smuggling from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These activities are likely to have been financed through UPDF budgetary channels, likely within the classified expenditures sections. Several UPDF officers have also been found to be linked to a company called Trinity Investments Limited, which was involved in the export of gold and other commodities without paying taxes. Moreover, in February 2014, Human Rights Watch reported that UPDF officers stationed in Uganda’s Karamoja region were exploiting gold mines in the area for personal profit. Spouses and female officers of the police and UPDF in May 2014 also received 1.5bn Ugandan shillings (£350,000) from the government to initiate large-scale agricultural production in an effort to inject new energy and innovation into the country's wider agricultural sector. Funds were released prior to June 2014, and large-scale production has not yet commenced.

Further, the military owns commercial businesses and conducts business through its commercial arm, known as the National Enterprise Corporation (NEC). For example, the UPDF owns Luwero industries, which manufactures bullets and other military equipment. According to the National Enterprise Corporation Act 1989 the NEC's accounts much be audited by the Auditor General after year financial year. It is not clear whether findings are expected to be made public.

See the 2013 assessment for additional information regarding &quoute;Wazalendo&quoute;.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Although, according to the Constitution, the Auditor General is mandated to audit all expenditures associated with the defence and other departments, including classified expenditure, this does not extend to the private sector, even in the case of military-owned businesses. A Linkedin profile confirms that Saracen, a private security company owned by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF)’s General Salim Saleh, employs an internal audit manager, though there is no evidence to suggest this follows independent or recognized international auditing standards. Reports that Trinity Investments Limited, a company associated with several UPDF officers, allegedly did not pay taxes, suggest that the scrutiny of military-owned businesses is limited.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act (UPDF) 2005 states that “Officers and militants of the Defence forces may be attached or seconded to any department or agency of the Government, any public or private institution, private industry or any other body” and that in doing so, they would continue to be full fledged members of the defence forces. In this sense, private enterprise by members of the defence forces is not unauthorised. However, UPDF members are reported to have engaged in several illegal private activities at home and abroad. For example, the UPDF was accused of illegally selling arms, food and training to Somalis in 2013, while other members are reportedly engaged in illegal mining activities in Karamoja region. The majority of the reports are not investigated or followed up by the relevant authorities. However, in cases where media attention is heightened, such as the case of UPDF soldiers selling food in Somalia, the government has appeared to have taken action. For example, 24 UPDF soldiers are currently undergoing court martial for their offences in Somalia. This highlights the lack of impunity for defence personnel engaging in illegal private business activity. The UPDF in fact has long been accused of involvement in the exploitation of minerals in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, an activity that is believed to be sanctioned by the government.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Although Uganda espoused a zero tolerance approach to corruption in 2006, this rhetoric has largely died down since then, and there is limited public talk of anti-corruption reform in government in general, and in the defence sector in particular. In fact, an interviewee reported that the opposition is likely to campaign on an anti-corruption platform in the 2016 general elections, as it would contrast sharply with the lack of anti-corruption initiatives spearheaded by the current regime in recent years. The President's overarching influence on Uganda's institutions suggests that without the executive driving an anti-corruption reform agenda, other ministries, including the ministry of defence, are unlikely to take the lead. Moreover, evidence suggests the Ministry of Defence is unlikely to possess the political will to lead on anti-corruption reform. For example, legislators including members of the Committee for Defence and Internal Affairs, have indicated that the classified expenditures within the defence ministry are likely to be used by members of the ministry to siphon public funds for corrupt purposes. Although the Defence Minister is reported in the media to have occasionally mentioned his support for the fight against corruption, he has made few specific claims that he will make anti-corruption a priority in the future. Additionally, in a December 2011 interview, the Chief of Military Doctrine for the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), spoke out against corruption without however outlining any coherent strategy the UPDF espouses.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Uganda has relatively strong anti-corruption legislation on paper. For example, a court martial system exists for Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) found to have violated Uganda’s laws, including corruption. For example, 24 UPDF officers are currently on trial for illegally selling food and weapons in 2013 during their deployment to the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This is covered widely in the media. However, a number of other allegations against the defence sector have not been investigated, and no high ranking official has to date been prosecuted. For example, “ghost soldiers” – or non-existent officers on the payroll – collecting pay led the government to lose an estimated US$ 324 million over the course of 20 years. However, no high profile convictions have occurred, suggesting the measures in place against corruption are not implemented despite legislation existing on paper.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Whistleblowing is ostensibly encouraged by the government, which in 2010 passed the Whistleblowers Protection Act. The act is intended to protect individuals who report corrupt practices. It applies to individuals in both the public and private sectors who wish to disclose evidence of impropriety both internally and externally. It also waives penalties for the disclosure of secret information, suggesting that in theory, whistle-blowers in the defence sector would be covered by this act.

In practice, the most high profile defence member to act as alleged whistle-blower was the former intelligence coordinator who in April 2013 leaked a letter to the press alleging that the President was planning to place his son at the helm of the country in a dynastic succession. In response, Ugandan police arrested at least two activists and used teargas to disperse others protesting against the government's seizure of a newspaper that published an army general's letter about an alleged plot for the president's son to succeed him. Police said they would leave the newspaper's premises only after getting a copy of the letter in which General David Sejusa urged the internal security service to investigate reports that those opposed to the political rise of President Yoweri Museveni's son risk assassination. More than two weeks after Sejusa's letter was leaked Museveni announced changes in the military that saw army chief General Aronda Nyakairima and his deputy ousted. Nyakairima, who had been cited in Sejusa's letter among those opposed to the rise of the first son, was given a civilian post as interior minister. His deputy, Lt Gen Ivan Koreta, was made an ambassador.

However, this case is not necessarily indicative of the Act, which does not protect people who leak information directly to the press. Despite the promulgation of the Act and frequent reporting of corruption, the lack of public understanding of the Act limits its effectiveness because the public is not aware of where it can go to report offences and many fear that reporting them will expose them to negative consequences such as harassment by the officials they report.

Uganda has yet to pass the related Witness Protection Bill, which aims to protect witnesses in court. The bill was first tabled in 2012, but is likely to have been delayed due to the government prioritising more populist legislation such as anti-homosexuality related bills - which are widely supported by the public - or oil and gas legislation. With the general elections approaching in 2016, the ruling party likely prefers to focus government efforts on these highly visible reforms that will stand them in good stead with voters.

Moreover, the office of the Inspector General (IG) lacks capacity to deal with all the whistle blowing cases it receives. For example, it received 2,876 new cases in 2013, 327 of which were referred to other agencies for investigation. The outcome of these cases remains unclear, though the continued lack of prosecution of high-level government officials for corruption suggests they may not be seriously investigated. The IG also allegedly suffers from corruption in its own ranks, limiting its credibility in investigating cases.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is some special attention paid to personnel in sensitive positions. For example, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003 stipulates that the Minister of Finance can terminate a member of the procurement board for offenses such as corruption and incompetence. Similarly, the board can terminate the executive director for the same offenses. According to the same document, the defence and security organs are mandated to comply with the Act and its provisions. However, there is no publicly available information that the Ministry of Defence and the Armed forces comply with these provisions in practice. Additionally, the Act does not stipulate a process of selection for procurement positions.

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003 also stipulates, in section 93(1) that public procurement officers must sign the Code of Ethical Conduct. (The above provisions are stipulated under section 16(1) and 17(4) respectively).

The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) Act of 2005 stipulates that command appointments within the UPDF are made by the Battalion Commander or the President in consultation with the Chief of Defence Forces. Source 7 indicates that the President is the ultimate arbiter of military dynamics, and is likely to make unilateral decisions based on a need to ensure personal loyalties. In the lower ranks, the UPDF Act stipulates that the unit commander makes the appointments in consultation with the military Chief of Staff. Source 6 reports that a significant number of sensitive positions in the military and elsewhere have been filled unilaterally by the President, allegedly increasingly individual support among a younger generation of intelligence and defence professionals, as well as to divide various defence offices from each other to prevent them from functioning without him, as indicated by Source 1. In this way he is able to keep final control over these institutions. Within this context, the selection and time in office of personnel in sensitive positions is likely to be arbitrary or according to the president's personal political interests.

Evidence also shows wider vetting procedures are slow and inadequate. For example, media reported that the President appointed a General as Minister of Internal Affairs in May 2013 without undergoing the standard vetting procedures. Parliament suspended the vetting in June 2013 due to constitutional constraints. According to the Constitution, army officers must first be discharged from the military before taking up public office. The Minister of Internal Affairs has remained in post despite these issues.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: No specific figures are available, but the Ugandan army is estimated to number approximately 45,000 troops. Reports by the Auditor General, tasked with overseeing the defence budget, indicated that the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) is consistently vague about its activities, resulting in budget reports that cannot be accurately assessed. For example, the Auditor General has complained that although the UPDF mentions that it recruited and trained new officers, if fails to mention how many or give exact figures. Although the number of troops deployed to specific missions is sometimes released to the media, there are no public figures indicating the exact size of the army.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Personnel salaries are openly published, while notifications of pay increases and other remuneration are released to the media. Salaries and allowances made by Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) soldiers deployed abroad, for example serving with the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are also published. According to figures released in the media in August 2013, the lowest paid soldier in the UPDF, a private earns 310,000 Ugandan shillings per month, while the highest paid, a General, earns 1,600,000 Ugandan shillings.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The system of payment, involving direct bank transfers from the central bank, is occasionally published in the media. For example, when the government in 2013 awarded a 4% pay rise to the military, the salaries of each rank was detailed in the local Daily Monitor newspaper. Moreover, the Uganda People's Defence Forces Act of 2005 details the guidelines and procedures of payment under sections 70 and 71. However, there is evidence of late payments occurring over the past two years. For example, in August 2013 around 1,000 Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) soldiers gathered outside the UPDF Savings and Credit Cooperative to protests the delayed payment of their allowances from participation in the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The protest came after only 348 out of 2,100 soldiers had been paid after four days from the planned date of the allowance payment. An army spokesman blamed the delay on bureaucratic procedures. In June 2014, local news reported that thousands of government employees, including soldiers, had gone several months without receiving their monthly salaries. According to the Finance Ministry, this was a result of an ongoing effort in the ministry to clean up the salaries register following years of reports of ‘ghost employees’, the latest figure from June 2014 being at 8,000 non-existent employees on the payroll. Nevertheless, the payment of soldiers is unlikely to see consistent and lengthy delays as this would be likely to cause widespread discontent and related protests. Source 6 assessed that the president has been increasingly concerned about losing control over the military, who he fears may perpetrate a coup. Failure to pay UPDF salaries or allowances would increase this threat. Given there have been two known occasions of late payments within the span of a year, score 1 has been selected.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) Act of 2005 stipulates that command appointments within the UPDF are made by the Battalion Commander or the President in consultation with the Chief of Defence Forces. The Act also provides for a Commissions Board mandated to &quoute;give advice to the President in respect of appointment of persons to commissions in the Defence Forces&quoute;. However, the board is made up entirely of defence personnel, and is not independent of the institution. Job descriptions for high-ranking appointments do not appear to be published.Additionally, aside from what is set out in the UPDF Act of 2005, there does not appear to be further evidence of an established appointments system.

Additionally, evidence exists suggesting the UPDF lacks independence from the President, who is free to make appointments at all levels at will. Reports also show the president is suspected of favouring members of his Western region for important posts, though evidence suggests this practice is declining.

Evidence suggests the President is increasingly appointing a younger generation of officers to positions they are not necessarily qualified for. For example, in August 2012 his son Muhoozi was promoted to Brigadier despite having served only 12 years in the military. By contrast, media commentary indicates an average of 20 years for other serving officers to have reached a similar level. Reports also suggest that many officers who fought alongside Museveni in the bush war that brought him to power in 1986 are increasingly disgruntled because they have not received promotions in years, while a younger generation is bypassing them. This system is believed to promote individual, rather than regional, loyalties to the President, whereby the younger officers owe their positions, and therefore their loyalty, solely to the President and not to individual merit.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The system of promotions at the top levels of the military is not transparent or independent of the President's unilateral decisions. Although the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) Act of 2005 states that a commission board and a unit promotion board are tasked with promoting officers, and that officers must undergo promotions examinations after the completion of the requisite courses, there is evidence to suggest these procedures are not followed, particularly in the more senior ranks. Such committees would in fact be undermined by Source 1's report that senior officers from different service lines are discouraged and sometimes prevented from meeting each other in case they do so to discuss plans to undermine the President's position.

A range of reports point to a tactic of increasingly alienating an older generation of officers in favour of a younger generation that can rise alongside the Presiden'ts son. This has sidestepped traditional patterns of promotions within the armed services, and it has resulted in many younger officers rising above older, more experienced ones. Source 6 has commented that more traditional patterns of promotion followed seniority - or the length of time an officer had been in the army - and regionalism. However, they stated that this tactic also lacked a meritocratic basis as it favoured those who had fought alongside Museveni in the bush war that brought him to power in 1986, rather than skills or leadership qualities. It also favored officers from the Western region as the president has typically preferred to surround himself with individuals with whom he has a regional connection.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Compulsory conscription does not occur in Uganda.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Uganda does not have mandatory or voluntary conscription. All soldiers entering the UPDF do so voluntarily.

There is a wider risk of corruption to gain preferred postings however. Despite provisions in the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) Act of 2005 prohibiting any form of corruption, reports indicate that soldiers have paid bribes to attain specific positions. In particular, bribes have exchanged hands within the UPDF to deploy soldiers to the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This is a lucrative mission because soldiers are paid over $700 per month, in contrast to less than $120 a month’s salary for a private in the regular army.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The government is estimated to have lost a total of US$ 324 million over the course of 20 years as a result of ‘ghost soldiers’ on the payroll. The scandal was first uncovered in 2003, after which the President set up a commission of inquiry to address the problem. Nevertheless, further scandals were uncovered in 2007, when 3,000 ghost soldiers were discovered during a payroll cleanup exercise. This is likely to have caused the Ministry of Defence to introduce the nationwide computer system that now keeps track of the payroll, and no new cases of ghost soldiers have been reported, though cases of ghost workers in other sectors continue to emerge. However, efforts to address payroll discrepancies throughout the government remain sluggish, creating further opportunities for ghost employees or soldiers to remain on payrolls.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Chains of command and chains of payment are generally separate, with salaries for soldiers and other employees being paid directly into individuals’ bank accounts through the central bank, though the Ministry of Defence is responsible for facilitating payment. However, there does not appear to be any published policy that specifically regulates this practice. In fact, media reports suggest that soldiers deployed to Somalia receive their payments in the form of allowances, which are issued by the European Union and African Union, but are handled by the UPDF before reaching the soldiers. There have been several instances over the past years where soldiers received their pay up to six months late, while some soldiers have reported that a part of their salaries were siphoned by UPDF officials despite this being a breach of contract. These incidents suggest chains of command within the UPDF do exert some influence over the chains of payment.

According to the Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act, 2005, defence forces on secondment are not entitled to receive pay from the Ministry of Defence during the period of their secondment, though the Ministry may facilitate payment. The exception to this is when an officer is simultaneously a defence forces representative in Parliament, in which case the individuals can opt to receive payment either from parliament or the defence forces.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act of 2005 (schedule 7) provides for a Code of Conduct to be followed by all UPDF personnel. Provisions include, among others, prohibitions against stealing property and insulting the public. They do not mention guidelines regarding bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest or post-separation activities. The Leadership Code Act likewise does not make overt stipulations against corruption or bribery, though it does have an oversight mechanism, in the form of an Inspector General mentioned in the original response.

There is evidence of codes of conduct not being enforced or observed. For example, Human Rights Watch in September 2014 accused Ugandan troops in Somalia of sexual offenses, despite the UPDF Act 2005 stating that troops shall not engage in abuses against civilians.The Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act of 2005 states that all forms of corruption are prohibited. However, the act does not specify what constitutes corruption, causing it to lack clarity and specificity. According to the Leadership Code Act of 2002, the Inspector General of Government (IGG) is tasked with ensuring UPDF officers do not have corrupt influence or have entered into a corrupt agreement with any public or private body. Moreover, all senior officers are required to declare their wealth to the IGG, in accordance with the code. However, there appears to be little control on the application of the code, which has allegedly been applied without fair trial, or in ways that were disproportionate to the offence. Moreover, the IGG itself has faced allegations of corruption, somewhat undermining its credibility as corruption watchdog.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is evidence to suggest that breaches of the code of conduct are addressed in some cases. For example, when 24 Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) soldiers were accused of illegally selling food and fuel to civilians in Somalia they were recalled to Uganda for court martial. The trial is ongoing, and is routinely covered in the media. However, it appears that the code of conduct is most frequently called upon to convict individuals who have offended the state, rather than to prosecute those who may have been involved in corruption. For example, in January 2013, the government asked for a Brigadier to be convicted for making &quoute;offensive remarks&quoute; on a talk show in 2005. He was accused of spreading propaganda in violation of the Uganda People’s Defence (UPDF) Act of 2005. The government deemed his statements to be prejudicial to good order and discipline. The extremely vague nature of the accusations suggest they may have been politically motivated rather than driven by a genuine crime. In another incident, Minister of Internal Affairs accused the former chief of intelligence (a General) in May 2013 of breaching the UPDF code of conduct by making what he called ‘false statements’ in the media. These are likely to have referred to the latter's accusations in April 2013 that the President is attempting to engineer a dynastic succession. Although corruption trials for UPDF officers occur and are reported in the media, no high-ranking official has so far been convicted of corruption.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Although the Inspector General of police in 2012 reportedly requested an anti-corruption training programme following a review of corruption in the police, there is no evidence to suggest that this was implemented, nor that the request expanded to the intelligence or defence establishment.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Prosecutions of Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) officers and other ministry of defence officials accused of various offenses, including corruption, are routinely reported in the media. According to the UPDF Act of 2005, military trials are open to the public so long as this does not endanger public safety, defence or public morals, though the parameters for what constitute these categories remain unclear.

Evidence regarding the number of trials not open to the public could not be found. However, there is evidence to suggest that widespread corruption continues to occur in the defence forces with impunity, indicating that many cases of misconduct are not brought to trial in the first place, particularly against senior officials. In particular, opposition MPs have accused the defence ministry of using the classified expenditures system in the defence budget to hide corrupt activities. For example, although the fighter jets scam of 2011 was widely reported in the media, few outlets picked up on reports that the jets should only have cost US$ 327 million. This means that US$ 413 million remained unaccounted for. There have been no public reports of this issue being investigated or of anyone being prosecuted for the missing funds.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Facilitation payments are not defined in Ugandan Law.

The Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act (UPDF) of 2005 states that all forms of corruption are prohibited, and specifies that UPDF members are prohibited from demanding or accepting compensation or other personal benefits for carrying out defence duties. The acceptance of gift or other compensation during any business related to defence is also prohibited. The Anti-Corruption Act of 2009 also prohibits the bribery of public officials, while the Leadership Code Act of 2002 proscribes any activity that could lead to corruption in public affairs. Despite these measures, reports of UPDF demands for facilitation payments or bribes continue to surface and are in many cases not addressed. Most recently, UPDF soldiers conducting night patrols in Gulu, in the north of the country, were accused of extorting local residents.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: In a December 2011 interview, the Chief of Military Doctrine for the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), spoke out against corruption without however outlining any coherent strategy the UPDF espouses. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act of 2005 also does not mention corruption as a strategic operational issue. Likewise, the Leadership Code Act of 2002 addressed corruption but this is not specific to the defence sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: As with the lower levels of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) addressed in question 49, there are no known anti-corruption training programmes in place for commanders. Despite an initial request for anti-corruption training in the police, this has not yet taken shape, nor has the request been extended to the defence forces. This is evident in frequent reports of the UPDF engaging in corruption during missions abroad. For example, UPDF officers were suspected of illegally selling food and logistics resources to civilians in Somalia, resources that had been slated for the UPDF’s role in the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM). UPDF members at multiple levels of the military hierarchy were suspected of being involved, though no convictions have been reported as yet for this offense.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The defence forces do not have specific personnel trained to monitor anti-corruption compliance in the field. However, members of the defence forces have been, as part of their mandates, involved in such monitoring and have exposed cases of corruption. For example, it was the Chief of Military Intelligence who first reported on the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) troops involved in the sale of food and logistics slated for the army to Somali civilians in September 2013. According to the Uganda People's Defence Forces Act 2005, the Inspector General of Defence Forces is responsible for ensuring 'accountability and transparency within defence forces'.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: An internet search reveals no mention of any guidelines for addressing corruption in contracting at home or abroad. Frequent reports of faulty defence equipment being sold to the UPDF has led to widespread suspicions that defence spending in procurement is one of the conduits used to funnel corrupt money from tax revenue into private accounts. Moreover, a United Nations fraud detection unit in November 2014 reported finding corruption in contracting relating to pre-paid fuel cards issued to the UN Operation in Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), leading UN fuel to be distributed on the black market. Although Uganda was not specifically mentioned in this report, it contributes by far the most troops to AMISOM, suggesting UPDF troops deployed to Somalia were likely involved.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There appears to be regulations in place governing relationships between the police and private security organisations. According to the Companies Act 2012, private security providers must register as a company on the recommendation of the Inspector General of Police, who then issues an operating licence. According to this procedure, all private security organisations must be vetted and approved by the district security committee in which they operate. However, this procedure does not appear to extend to the defence sector.

Private military contractors are employed by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) in Uganda and abroad, but there is no mention in the Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act 2005 of a requirement for them to undergo any particular scrutiny, for corruption or otherwise, before being employed. Reports indicate that the UPDF has employed a number of private security firms with questionable credentials. The UPDF also works closely with President Museveni’s brother’s private security firm Sarecen, which operates in Uganda’s oil region of Lake Albert. Reports indicate that some vetting procedures are in place for contractors working with the UPDF, including vetting from the External Security Organisation or the Chief of Military Intelligence. However, it is not clear to what extent the vetting scrutinises corruption risks. The Security Organisations Act of 1987 makes no mention of private security organisations, nor does the Public Procurement Disposal of Public Assets Act Amendment of 2014.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: According to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, the defence forces “shall manage their procurement and disposal on the basis of a dual list, covering items subject to open and restricted procurement or disposal methods respectively.” The restricted list is to be decided upon in consultation between the defence ministry and the public procurement authority and submitted for classified audit. However, reports suggest that, although classified audits are to be submitted annually before parliament, this does not necessarily occur, which has prompted parliament to call for greater access to information with regards to classified expenditures. Moreover, although oversight of these mechanisms is the responsibility of a contracts committee within the defence and national security sector, appointments to the contracts committee are likely to be heavily influenced by the executive and are unlikely to undergo a free and fair recruitment process. For example, the President’s increasing attempts to sideline long-standing military members in favour of a younger generation from whom he can win individual loyalties has seen him reshuffle the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) and other security outfits.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act states that ‘copies of the act, registration, guidelines and forms made under this Act, standard bidding documents and decisions of the Authority shall be made accessible to the public by the Authority.’ However, this clause does not specify whether it applies to all sections of the Act, such as the defence sector. In fact the Act also states that procurement and disposal of assets are to be managed under a dual list, one of which is to remain classified. This is likely to have been the provision used to keep the procurement of several defence assets from the public.

For example, the purchase of military jets has on several occasions been kept from the public and only revealed once the jets had been delivered, or once foreign media reported their Uganda’s purchase. The initial needs assessment also appears to be obscured from public view. This was highlighted by the defence committee's request in September 2014 for the Ministry of Finance to provide funding for the continuation of a UPDF mission in South Sudan after the initial budget proposal was submitted in June 2014. This comes on the back of the mission in South Sudan facing controversy after it was deployed in December 2013 without prior parliamentary approval and associated budget discussion. This series of events suggests that a proper needs assessment for the defence ministry in general and the mission in South Sudan specifically may not have been carried out.

In terms of the bidding process, the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority, which was ratified in 2003, is responsible for scrutinizing public procurement contracts, including classified items. Within this context, a Contract Committee, whose duties and composition is set out by the Act, is responsible for evaluating bidders. Items discussed by the Contract Committee are submitted for inspection by the Accounting Officer, Chief Finance Officer, Head of Internal Audit, Council’s Standing Committee responsible for Finance, Auditor General, Inspector General of Government, Ministry of Local government and the Authority. Classified information however, as pertaining for example to the Ministry of Defence, is subject to less scrutiny on grounds of national security, while in many cases the defence ministry has bypassed contract committees altogether. This highlights the lack of transparency in the nature of the procurement cycle process.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Defence procurement oversight mechanisms for unclassified procurement are in place under the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act. The Act states in section 42 that the defence and security organisms must comply with it for unclassified items, but that classified items are subject to classified audits that are presented to Parliament. The Act (section 28) further states that procurement processes come under the purview of the Contracts Committee, which is approved by the Secretary to the Treasury. However, appointments to the Contracts Committee are likely to be heavily influenced by the executive and are unlikely to undergo a free and fair recruitment process. They are therefore unlikely to be independent or transparent. Moreover, there have been cases where the Contracts Committee was deliberately sidestepped by UPDF officers, suggesting procurement oversight is not always active or transparent. For example, a deal to purchase cement for a project in the north of the country was met with criticism in 2012 after it emerged that UPDF cement had found its way into the project without going through the Contracts Committee.

Therefore, while there is a legal framework for oversight of defence procurement, the effectiveness of the relevant institutions is greatly reduced by political interference and deliberate avoidance of UPDF.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Defence purchases are rarely made public before the transaction is complete and sometimes even after. The defence ministry cites reasons of national security for keeping purchases secret. For example, shortly after the 2014/15 budget was proposed on 12 June, the Ministry of Defence asked Parliament to approve a supplementary budget of US$ 65 million for unspecified “regional security” reasons. In another example, the purchase of military jets has on several occasions been kept from the public and only revealed once the jets had been delivered, or once foreign media reported their Uganda’s purchase. Although the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act states that standard bidding documents are to be made accessible to the public, this does not apply to classified procurement lists, and many defence purchases fall under this category.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: According to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) Act, bidders in all sectors must meet the following qualifications: the bidder must have the legal capacity to enter into a contract; must not be insolvent, in receivership or bankrupt; the business activities must not have been suspended; the bidder must not be undergoing legal proceedings related to insolvency, receivership or bankruptcy; and the bidder fulfills tax and social security obligations according to law. However, there is no mention in the PPDA Act or the Companies Act of 2012 of a requirement of bidding businesses to have specific compliance or business conduct programmes in order to bid for contracts, nor are the obligations set out in the Act specific to the defence sector. Nevertheless, evidence indicates that the Ministry of Defence requires bidding companies to refer to Open Domestic Bidding procedures found in the PPDA Act 2003.

See also the GI 2013 assessment.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Defence procurement is referenced in the White Paper on Defence Transformation. Procurement requirements for the defence sector also appear to be derived from those set out in the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) Act of 2003. Despite the presence of these guidelines, investors report that government officials often require companies interested in bidding to provide facilitation payments in person. Investors have also complained of a lack of transparency in government bidding processes and have said they suspected government officials to have conflict of interests with private businesses in tendering processes, suggesting the procurement process in government is opportunistic.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The White Paper on Defence Transformation references defence procurement needs. The national budget framework paper (FY 2015/2016) also includes procurement spending targets. However, the The Ministry of Defence's and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF)'s requirements for defence purchases are being increasingly questioned by Parliament, the media and the public amidst reports that President Museveni is expanding his regional ambitions. For example, Ugandan involvement in South Sudan, where approximately 1,600 UPDF troops are currently stationed to support President Salva Kiir against militant rebels, is routinely questioned by Parliament and the public, particularly after troops were deployed without prior parliamentary approval. There are growing rumours that Museveni is looking to expand the UPDF and its military capabilities in order to deploy it in regional conflicts, thus placing himself in a position of greater influence regionally. The reasoning behind UPDF purchases do not appear to be derived from clearly identified and quantified requirements. Examples of purchases include six fighter jets purchased in 2011 without parliamentary oversight. The reason given for the purchase was not clearly defined and referred simply to Uganda needing to ‘deal with any eventuality arising from threats to Uganda’s security.’

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The PPDA Act of 2003, section 51, stipulates that a procuring entity shall use open competitive bidding as its preferred method of procurement and disposal. The Act applies to all areas of government, including the Defence forces, indicating that open competition is indeed provided for in legislation with reference to defence. However, section 42 also states that the defence and security sector will manage its procurement according to a dual list, covering open and restricted procurement. The document does not specify whether restricted procurement must follow open competitive bidding.

Defence procurement is open to competitive bidding in theory, and the Ministry of Defence regularly issues public tenders. However, reports suggest that in practice the bidding process is often circumvented. For example, Parliament in April 2012 asked the defence ministry to account for its inflated utility bills for the 2010/11 financial year. An Auditor General report from that year indicated that the ministry paid a 10.2 billion Ugandan shilling utility bill for military barracks that often lack water and power, and 3.3 billion Ugandan shillings for the procurement of uniforms without adherence to procurement guidelines. In particular, the Auditor General reported that the defence ministry had not conducted open competitive bidding as required by the guidelines, suggesting single sourcing occurs for the majority of contracts. Although special waivers from the Executive Director of the PPDA Authority can be sought for cases of single sourcing, the Auditor General’s report revealed that this waiver was not pursued. The 2011 purchase of fighter jets at a cost of US$740 million from Russia also reportedly bypassed the legislature and was not submitted for open competitive bidding.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority was ratified in 2003, in order to replace the previous central tender board system. It is responsible for scrutinising public procurements, including classified items. A Contract Committee, whose duties and composition is set out by the PPDA Act, is responsible for evaluating bidders. According to the Act, the chairperson of a contract committee is responsible for ensuring that the Committee abides by the legal requirements and code of conduct set out by the Authority. Items discussed by the Contract committee are submitted for inspection by the Accounting Officer, Chief Finance Officer, Head of Internal Audit, Council’s Standing Committee responsible for Finance, Auditor General, Inspector General of Government, Ministry of Local government and the Authority. Classified information is subject to less scrutiny however, on grounds of national security, while reports indicate that in many cases the defence ministry has bypassed contract committees altogether.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: According to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Guidelines, bidders or providers will have committed fraud if they &quoute;collude with other businesses and organisations with the intention of depriving a procuring and disposing entity of the benefits of free and open competition&quoute; and/or &quoute;enter into business arrangements that might prevent the effective operation of fair competition.&quoute; A report by the Inspectorate of Government in 2012 found that 9.4% of contract values was spent on corrupt payments in government procurement.

Although there are a number of laws against collusion in tendering, these are not specific to defence, and they are frequently either not enforced or are circumvented. As stipulated by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority Act of 2003, the Authority is mandated to undertake compliance monitoring and investigate “any breach, wrongdoing, mismanagement or collusion that has been alleged, reported or proven against a procuring and disposing entity or a tenderer”. However, the 2014 amendment to the Act gave the Authority a stronger mandate to investigate and prosecute procurement offences, including collusion.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) Authority has a training and capacity building department that is responsible for conducting specialised training courses, building procurement and disposal capacity by training trainers and developing training modules and evaluation methods for individuals involved in the procurement and disposal process. The PPDA has been criticised in the past for hurting service delivery due to its staff’s ignorance of public procurement laws and the failure to appoint managers to oversee procurement contracts. In response, the Authority intensified countrywide training exercises, including in contract management, while the PPDA amendment Act of 2014 included the launching of public procurement and contracts management training manuals which will be used to address existing procurement shortcomings. While these plans are to be rolled out to procurement for all government departments, there is no mention of specific provisions for the defence ministry.

A 2004 country procurement assessment report conducted in partnership with the World Bank recommends to the Authority to assert itself over the Ministry of Defence, implying limited to no authority was being asserted. With frequent procurement scandals in the defence sector, such as the US$ 740 million jet scam mentioned in previous indicators, there is no evidence to suggest that this deficiency was addressed.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: According to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act of 2003, companies can submit their complaints in writing to the Public Procurement Authority within twenty one working days from the date the Authority became aware of the dispute. The Authority is then mandated to express its decision in writing within twenty one working days from the receipt of the complains. Moreover, Uganda’s justice system includes access to mediation for commercial disputes through the commercial court, which operates with relative efficiency. In addition, Uganda is a signatory to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Centre of Arbitration for Dispute Resolution (CADER). However, some foreign investors have reported that Uganda’s commercial court favours local companies, and that it has at times been vulnerable to political pressures in terms of deciding the outcomes of certain cases. Moreover, although a procurement complaints handling mechanism exists, only about 30 complaints are received annually as many companies have reported they fear to be denied future business opportunities if they complain. This grievance does not appear to have been specifically addressed in the 2014 amendment to the act.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: According to the Public Procurement Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) Act of 2003 the Authority may suspend a supplier from engagement in the public procurement or disposal process if they are found to have violated one or more of a series of provisions including breaching the code of ethics for providers and being convicted of a corrupt or fraudulent practice under the Act. A list of suspended providers is updated and published on the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets website.

Media reports also suggest perpetrators have faced sanctions. For example, three former ministers in July 2012 faced sanctions for their role in bypassing open competitive bidding mechanisms in the tendering of the National Identity Cards project. The Act does not recommend the prosecution or debarment of providers who are in violation of the Act, though according to the Act, the Authority does reserve the right to suspend a provider that was debarred from an international institution of which Uganda is a member.

Score 2 has been selected since publicly available information is lacking regarding companies that operate in the defence sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: An internet search revealed no mention of Uganda making use of offset contracts in the defence sector. However, there is one mention of an offset agreement suggested by World Bank in 2001, which was reportedly not respected by the Ugandan government.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: An internet search revealed that the government has previously entered into offset agreements on at least one occasion. However, the agreement does not appear to have involved the defence or security sector. The agreement was reportedly signed in 2001 with the World Bank over financing of the Bujagali hydro electric power plant. No details of the agreement have been made public.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no mention of offset contracts in the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003. There is therefore no known policy on competition regulation. Although the government appears to have entered into an offset agreement on at least one occasion, there is no evidence of offset contracts taking place in the defence ministry.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: The use of arms brokers is not specifically regulated by law. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) Act makes no mention of agents or intermediaries in the procurement cycle. The Firearms Act of 1970 prohibits the sale of arms by any persons not registered under the act as a firearms dealer. Anyone deemed to have contravened this section faces no more than five years in prison, a fine not exceeding 20,000 Ugandan shillings or both. No individual or business can sell arms without a licence. However, there is no mention of vetting procedures to determine who can register as a firearms dealer. Under the Act, the registration of a licence to sell firearms is granted at the discretion of the chief licensing officer alone. Although a new firearms law was drafted in 2012, this made no mention of strengthening oversight of the procurement cycle, and it has yet to come into effect. This has resulted in a number of corrupt deals being carried out, including in the defence sector. For example, reports suggest several arms deals between Uganda and Chinese or Russian dealers have been affected by corruption, including a US$ 740 million deal in 2011 that saw Uganda purchase six fighter jets without parliamentary approval. Given the Firearms Act extends some control only over the procurement of firearms but not major conventional weapons or other non-equipment procurement, score 0 has been selected.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: Aspects of the financing package for major arms deals are not made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts. In fact, the purchase of major defence equipment is often classified until after the deliveries have been received. When the government in 2011 purchased six fighter jets for US$ 740 million, it did so without first seeking legislative approval, and it only confirmed the sale after foreign media first reported on it.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is no mention in the Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act of 2005 or in the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003 of a requirement to vet or hold accountable sub-contractors of arms dealers. However, the local governments (public procurement and disposal of public assets) regulations of 2006 states that subcontracting must be approved by the client, and that a subcontractor ‘must be eligible, in the same way as a main provider; and the obligations or conditions imposed on a main provider, shall also be imposed on a sub-contractor.’ However, there is no mention of anti-corruption requirements.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4110: There is some evidence that defence purchases are in part influenced by selling nations. For example, reports suggest that Russia pursues a policy of selling arms to African governments, including Uganda, in order to boost its diplomatic and economic influence in the region. China is reportedly pursuing a similar strategy. This trend is likely to grow as Uganda’s oil production picks up in the coming years. In fact, Russia in February 2015 won the deal to build Uganda's first oil refinery, which may suggests that Russia's status as Uganda's main arms importer played a role in the awarding of the contract. This was highlighted by reports that &quoute;Within days of the refinery deal announcement, Uganda media claimed the army was requesting $168m to buy military equipment and the Ministry of Defence had already negotiated a procurement loan of $170m from a bank in Russia with help from Rosoboronexport.&quoute; The military denied that the refinery contract was linked to the weapons deal, but details remain classified.

However, the majority of purchases are likely to be due to the government's apparent preference for increasingly deploying the military on missions abroad. This is likely to be part of the government's strategy to engage in regional conflicts for greater regional influence. For example, the December 2013 deployment of 1,600 Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) troops to South Sudan to support its President against rebel insurgents is likely to have been part of that strategy, as the involvement was not supported by Parliament nor the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), of which Uganda is a member, and which has been involved in mediating the South Sudan conflict. Military purchases relating to these activities are frequently justified as being in the interest of ‘regional security’.