Zimbabwe

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Adverts are placed in state owned newspapers, a public auction then follows. Interviewees suggested that high ranking officials emerge as highest bidders, but regularly pay less than the asked price. There is no accountability and transparency in the purchasing process.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The first interviewee highlighted that there is lack of transparency in this process since there is no clear identity of who deals with asset disposals within the army. The interviewee hinted that the Comptroller and Auditor General are tasked with this duty, as enshrined in the Defence Procurement Act. However, a review of some documents from the Comptroller General shows that the Comptroller General's Office does not receive information on asset disposal from the army.

According to a journalist interviewed, asset disposals are not published, thereby making it difficult to have checks and balances on asset disposal within the defence sector.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The defence and security budget is not open to the public. Matters regarding national security budgets are not available for legislative scrutiny either. The Official Secrets Act makes it an offence to attempt to gather information on defence and other state security institutions.

The national budget statement does not contain any information on defence spending. The only information on Peace and Security is about a de-mining programme (for which the treasury is setting
aside US$500 000, whilst appealing to the international community to support the country complete the de-mining exercise). There is no information on the Ministry of Defence website on budgets.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The Official Secrets Act, Chapter 11:08, Amended 31 December 2004, makes it impossible for information regarding national security (military) to be shared with the public. The interviewed government official stated that the exact budget is not made available to the government and any efforts to ask for it entails significant risk.

In an interview with The Zimbabwe Independent newspaper, the Minister of State Security Sydney Sekeramai, in May 2013 did not divulge information regarding remuneration of intelligence services personnel and their packages, arguing that the issues cannot be discussed as they are protected by the Official Secrets Act. Therefore it can be safely noted that the legislature is not given any information on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence.

The national budget statement does not contain any information on defence spending. The only information on Peace and Security is about a de-mining programme (for which the treasury is setting
aside US$500 000, whilst appealing to the international community to support the country complete the de-mining exercise). There is no information on the Ministry of Defence website on budgets.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The legislature is not given any reports on audited reports, due to the secretive nature surrounding the military and intelligence services. In an interview conducted by The Independent newspaper, the Minister for Security Cde Sydney Sekeramai said that issues to do with packages and remunerations within the intelligence services are confidential and can not be discussed.

The Home Affairs and Defence Committee only exercises oversight over the police and the military but not on the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). Audits are required by law by the Public Finance Management Act (chapter 22:19). However, the military is not audited in public.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There is no express provision for off-budget expenditures. Section 113 of the Defence Act, however, provides for the making of regulations by the Defence Minister which, “in his opinion are necessary or convenient for securing the discipline and good governance of the Defence forces, providing for the conditions and service of members thereof and generally for the better carrying out of the objects and purpose of this Act.” The provision for off - budget expenditures and any other provision for that matter may thus be included in the framework of the defence forces.

In interview, it was suggested that off-budget expenditure does occur but is difficult to control.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There is evidence of off-budget expenditure occurring, for example a report in 2009 by Zimbabwe Today indicated that Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) was deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) despite not having adequate foreign currency reserves to support the deployment. The secrecy surrounding the sector suggests that there may be more examples of off-budget expenditure that aren't as visible to the general public. An interviewee confirmed that off-budget expenditure is difficult to control in Zimbabwe.

It is possible that off-budget expenditure involves illicit economic activity as the involvement of the defence sector in extractive industries is not open to public scrutiny. In 2012 the Deputy Mines Minister, Gift Chimanikire, confirmed after investigation that the Zimbabwe Defence Industry has a 40% stake in a diamond mining company, Anjin Investments. To date, this has been the only public admission that any part of defence industry has controlling or financial interests in Zimbabwe's extractive industry.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) prohibits the publication of certain information on individuals. The Official Secrets Act amended by Act 22 of 2001 prohibits communication of information which would be perceived to be classified and of national interest.

The court can contest a ruling of whether a certain case is treasonous or not. However, the judiciary system in Zimbabwe is argued to be not independent. This compromises the outcomes of certain cases brought to it for consideration.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) is believed to be run by members of the military, as evidenced by the appointment of a retired Colonel as the chief executive of ZDI.

Marange Resources is a joint venture believed to be owned by the Military and Chinese investors.

Tambudzai (2005) reports that the revenue raised and spent by defence companies such as ZDI is not accounted for in defence statements. The Military Intelligence Unit (MIU) is believed to be running business ventures in conjunction with Russian and Chinese firms, but information on such allegations is not made available.

In 2012 there were fall-outs between the former Finance Minister and Anjin Investments over a failure to submit funds to the Treasury. Anjin is a diamond mining company owned by the Military and Chinese investors.

In 2015 Transparency International Zimbabwe held a policy dialogue meeting on the low transparency, accountability and profits of State Owned Enterprises. One of the core problems pushing this poor performance was reported to be the militarisation of many SOEs. The score has been selected on the basis that there is a risk that there may be ownership of such businesses at the institution level.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There is no evidence of scrutiny of military owned enterprises, and as such there is no transparency at recognised international standards. Jean Damu, a blogger with the San Francisco Bay, reported that Zimbabwe Defence Forces are involved in diamond mining operations in Congo at a mine called Kasai Occidental. These records are not published by the army as they treat their involvement in Congo secretively.

The construction of a US $84 million shopping mall called Long Cheng Plaza by Anjin Investments was a joint venture diamond mining company in Chiadzwa revealed Zimbabwe's military-owned businesses. Only the government-owned 'The Herald' newspaper revealed Anjin as the company bankrolling construction of the plaza. Other publications were made to believe that it was Zimbabwe Tourism Authority and some local entrepreneurs involved in the construction of the plaza.

An interviewee concluded that defence statements do not contain expenditures and revenue collected from these businesses. The score has been selected on the basis that there is a risk that there may be ownership of such businesses at the institution level.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: A range of evidence indicates that unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees has been occurring for a long time in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Institute reported in June 2008 that 'the military has become a significant part of the domestic bourgeoisie class and many top commanders have teamed up with politicians and businessmen to form political and economic interests'.

More recently, the sacking of two senior military officers from the Save Conservancy by government is an indicator that defence ministry workers are involved in unauthorised enterprises by military groups venturing into lucrative business ventures, such as platinum and gold mining. To date the government has reigned in the Save Conservancy case but no action has been taken pertaining to mining enterprises. It appears highly likely the government is benefiting from such activities.

Media reports indicate many of these mining ventures are owned by senior military officials. Commentators have expressed concern over the appointments of retired army commanders into commercial positions acting as a way for serving chiefs to secure their interests in diamond mining, as in the case of the board chairperson for Marange Resources. The Finance minister has stated that the Treasury has not yet received any tax revenue from Marange operations in 2013. In 2012, the then finance minister was forced to cut the country's national budget from $4 billion to $3.4 billion after $600 million of expected Marange diamond tax revenue was never received. Senior army officers have also been implicated in the allocation of mining grants in the Chiadzwa diamond fields as they own shares in those companies.

Other ventures have been linked to senior personnel. Zimsafe, a company owned by the former wife of Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) commander Constantine Chiwenga, supplies reflectors and reflective jackets to ZDF. During divorce proceedings Chiwenga and his former wife Jocelyn were fighting over ownership of the company, exposing him as running an unauthorised private enterprise.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: It can be construed from a search of media reports and articles that there is no evidence of any commitment to fight corruption by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence or Single Service chiefs. This is attributed to a lack of reports and speeches which seek to combat corruption.

The only reference to corruption comes from the former Minister of Defence who is now the Justice Minister. In the media he stated that everyone found indulging in corruption will face the law. References to corruption in the defence sector seems to be merely an afterthought, as evidence by a sole reference to anti-corruption integrity. By itself, it is hard to count as credible evidence that senior ministry staff have made a commitment to anti-corruption.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The Defence Act does not specifically provide measures for sanctioning personnel found to have taken part in acts of bribery and corruption, although certain offences may be interpreted to encompass acts of bribery and corruption. Chapter 11:02, Paragraph 208, gives rules of conduct for members of the security services, some of which indirectly cover acts of corruption:

&quoute;(2) Neither the security services nor any of their members may, in the exercise of their functions -
(a) act in a partisan manner; (b) further the interests of any political party or cause; (c) prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause; or (d) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person.&quoute;

This is tied specifically to defence forces conduct in Paragraph 211 - &quoute;(3) The Defence Forces must respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all persons and be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional and subordinate to the civilian authority as established by this Constitution&quoute;.

In theory, these rules of conduct should prevent the armed forces from extorting or discriminating against citizens, and should ensure that security provision is equally distributed. They do not, however, specifically outlaw bribery or mention corruption as a specific behaviour to avoid.

Despite the lack of specific measures, there are some reports of corrupt riot police officers being arrested for corruption.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Zimbabwe has no legislation set in place to facilitate whistleblowing, and there is no protection from reprisal offered for reporting corruption. Alongside this, Zimbabwe's Military and Defence sector also have no legal instruments in place to promote whistleblowing.

There is no protection of whistleblowers in case of lawsuits against them, intimidation, harassment, dismissal and unjustified demotions. Similarly, there is no compensation offered to those who suffer victimization for revealing corruption in the military and defence sector. There are many cases in which whistleblowing in the military and defence sector has been classed as a possible breach of army discipline and the military code of conduct.

For instance on September 16, 2011 there was the case of the army generals who spoke out against the political allegiances of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) commander. The generals themselves were subject to investigation and were not protected from possible intimidation or victimization for whistleblowing.

More recently, Business Insider published a story of an Anonymous whistleblower with the alias Baba Jukwa being hunted down for posting leaks of officials' corruption and brutality in government and the defence and military sector.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There is no substantial information to verify whether there is special attention given to the oversight of personnel in sensitive positions.

In law, Chapter 11 of the Defence Act requires that the Defence Forces Service Commission &quoute;employ qualified and competent persons to hold posts or ranks in the Defence Forces&quoute; and &quoute;to ensure the general well-being and good administration of the Defence Forces and their maintenance in a high state of efficiency&quoute; (Paragraph 218), but there is no special oversight function mentioned.

There is, however, no evidence that those taking up senior positions are not qualified for their posts.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The number of civilian and military personnel is not available from official government sources, and external estimates are believed to be unrepresentative and incomplete.

&quoute;Zimbabwe Military Statistics&quoute;, for example, indicates a number of personnel recruited. However, it has been argued by the former Minister of Finance Tendai Biti that in 2011 there were inconsistencies in reports of the numbers of recruits from the Ministry of Defence. This therefore suggests that the number of military personnel in the army is not known.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Military personnel and all civil servants are paid by the Public Service Commission under the Uniformed Forces Agency. The exact figures for how much the military and security personnel are paid is not known, and it is difficult to generalise the range of payments due to different ranks that are within the sector. However, there have been some reports of large salaries for Army Chiefs/Generals (as much as US$10,000 basic salary per month) while regular soldiers earn a monthly average of US$370, before transport and housing allowances.

Similarly, information on allowances is not known, although it is clear that they exist as the Defence Forces Service Commission is named in the Defence Act to be in charge of fixing and regulating &quoute;salaries, allowances and other benefits, of members of the Defence Forces&quoute; (Paragraph 218).

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Since the beginning of 2014, there have been reports that the government has gone through several revision of pay dates for the civil servants. The last revision was published on June 14, 2014 in which the army has a different day of payment from July to December. The postponement in pay reportedly led to low morale among troops, and is cited to be a response to the general financial constraints facing the government. Mugabe has blamed the poor economic situation on economic sanctions imposed by the West.

In 2012 there was another liquidity crisis which faced the government and which adversely affected defence operations, including delays in paying members of the armed forces their salaries. On December 17, 2013 they were reports of riots over cash shortages. A group of civil servants, some in military attire, were allegedly reported to have attacked bank staff together with the manager after failing to get their money.

At the height of the country’s economic crisis in 2008 soldiers rioted in Harare after becoming frustrated with queuing to withdraw cash from banks.

There is also a more general lack of information available about the system of payment for defence personnel. The Salary Services Bureau (SSB) and Zimbabwe Army Pay and Records are meant to be in control of this process, but they have reported in the past that they were unable to deduct outstanding advances from personnel's salaries.

This underlines the fact that the military pay is not carried out through a system that is robust against crises and disruptions.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There is appears to be system of appointment for middle and high ranking military personnel, but it is not published. An interviewee indicated that when a vacancy arises in a particular rank, officers who are interested in and qualified for the post must then go for promotion examinations, suggesting an established system of appointment.

In September 2013 the first female Brigadier General, Shailet Moyo, was promoted to her position by the President. Seven other Lieutenant Colonels were promoted to the rank of Colonel. Their rankings were conferred by Zimbabwe National Army Commander Lieutenant.

However, the army is often reported to be a partisan force. The security services have regularly supported the ruling party, most notably in 2010 when senior officers declared that they &quoute;would not apologise for backing Zanu-PF&quoute; [8]. More recently, it was reported that “people who were assigned to campaign for Zanu (PF) are still on the army’s payroll and continue to receive other benefits like air time and luxury cars” [9]. This suggests a heightened risk that top military personnel are selected on the basis of political allegiances rather than merit alone.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There are formal processes in line for promotion however there is evidence which suggests that these processes are undermined. There are reports which contends that the leadership of Zimbabwe National Army is very political and is aligned to ZANU PF. The President is the Commander-In-Chief of the defence forces, and is responsible for the promotion of all commissioned officers. The lowest rank in the commissioned officers is Second lieutenant, followed by a lieutenant, captain, Major, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier General, Major General, Lieutenant General and lastly General. The ranks are referred to as political ranks because it is the President who personally chooses soldiers for promotions. In this context promotion in the Defence is no longer on merit but on political proximity to the ruling party.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There is no conscription in Zimbabwe.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There is no conscription in Zimbabwe. However, there is no known evidence of any policies relating to bribery for soliciting preferred posting in recruitment more broadly. Speculative evidence and analysis from the interview suggests that there is a lot of corruption, nepotism and bribery which takes place during conscription.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: According to 2009 news articles,the then Public Service Commission Inspector General discovered that there were ghost workers within the army and police forces. It emerged that soldiers who went away without official leave and resignation were still on the government payroll. There were reports that Senior army officials may have pocketed the salaries of these ghost workers, and that former employees were still receiving salaries long after they stop serving. 19, 519 ghost workers have been estimated to have been 'employed'.

More recently, it was reported that “people who were assigned to campaign for Zanu (PF) are still on the army’s payroll and continue to receive other benefits like air time and luxury cars” [4]. This report also states that government recently embarked on an enormous exercise to get rid of of an estimated 70 000 ghost workers on its payroll, but does not name any specific measures for the defence forces.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: In Zimbabwe, the National Armed Forces fall under the payroll of the Public Service Commission. Within the Commission there is uniformed forces agency which manages the payment of the military personnel. However, it is not clear whether high ranking military officials also get their salaries through the uniformed forces agency under the public service commission, nor is the time frame within which they get paid. There have been some reports of large salaries for Army Chiefs/Generals (as much as US$10,000 basic salary per month).

According to 2009 news articles,the then Public Service Commission Inspector General discovered that there were ghost workers within the army and police forces. It emerged that soldiers who went away without official leave and resignation were still on the government payroll. There were reports that Senior army officials may have pocketed the salaries of these ghost workers, and that former employees were still receiving salaries long after they stop serving. 19, 519 ghost workers have been estimated to have been 'employed'.

More recently, it was reported that “people who were assigned to campaign for Zanu (PF) are still on the army’s payroll and continue to receive other benefits like air time and luxury cars” [7]. This suggests that there is at least some crossover between chains of command and chains of payment, as there are clearly some who are profiting from payroll and personnel fraud in the country.

There is also a more general lack of information available about the system of payment for defence personnel. The Salary Services Bureau (SSB) and Zimbabwe Army Pay and Records are meant to be in control of this process, but they have reported in the past that they were unable to deduct outstanding advances from personnel's salaries.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Some form of code of conduct exists, but it is unclear how it is distributed to personnel. Chapter 11:02, Paragraph 208, of the Defence Act gives rules of conduct for members of the security services, some of which indirectly cover acts of corruption:

&quoute;(2) Neither the security services nor any of their members may, in the exercise of their functions -
(a) act in a partisan manner; (b) further the interests of any political party or cause; (c) prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause; or (d) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person.&quoute;

This is tied specifically to defence forces conduct in Paragraph 211 - &quoute;(3) The Defence Forces must respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all persons and be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional and subordinate to the civilian authority as established by this Constitution&quoute;.

However, although some provisions may be interpreted to cover things such as extortion, predation, and the solicitation of bribes from the public, this is not explicitly stated. There are also no enforcement mechanisms stated in the Act.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Chapter 11, Paragraph 208, of the Defence Act gives rules of conduct for members of the security services, but none of them directly cover acts of corruption:

&quoute;(2) Neither the security services nor any of their members may, in the exercise of their functions -
(a) act in a partisan manner; (b) further the interests of any political party or cause; (c) prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause; or (d) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person.&quoute;

The results of prosecutions of military personnel are not often publicly available. There is also evidence that enforcement is selective. For instance, two police officers were arrested on suspicion of murder, but the Zimbabwe security forces have been implicated numerous cases of human rights abuses and torture which breach the rules and have not been sanctioned.

For example, in the run-up to the 2013 elections it was reported how &quoute;Zimbabwe’s military and other security forces have interfered in the country’s political and electoral affairs in support of President Robert Mugabe and his political party, ZANU-PF, preventing Zimbabweans from exercising their rights to free expression and association and to vote.&quoute; [4]

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: According to an interviewee, corruption training takes place for both civil and military personnel. All staff receive this training during the period of basic military training, which last for 6 months. Thereafter, members of the army are periodically trained on corruption issues. There is no other evidence of such training, and it is therefore impossible to verify.

There is some evidence that personnel from the Zimbabwe National Defence College have attended courses at the Peace Operations Training Institute, some of which might have contained a corruption element, but this is also impossible to verify.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There seems to be no policy of making outcomes of the prosecution of corrupt officials public, and there is no evidence that corruption has been systematically penalised. However, there are signs that President Robert Mugabe has made tackling corruption a more prominent part of his politics in recent years, with some high-level prosecutions being reported. It is too early to tell whether or not this strategy will successfully discourage corruption among his most staunch reporters, particularly in the defence sector.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There are no measures in place specifically to discourage facilitation payments. What does exist is embedded in the Code of Ethics policy of the Government of Zimbabwe, which states that the Government of Zimbabwe believes that the proper administration and contact of its programmes and activities its employees must &quoute;be independent of external influences or pressures, be impartial and responsive to the public, not to use their position for personal gain, and that the public may have confidence in the integrity of the public service.&quoute;

There are also no direct measures to combat facilitation payments in the procurement process, although the Procurement Act (Chapter 22:14) stipulates (s.3) bribery as a ground for disqualification in the tender process (s.39).

However, the Defence Procurement Act does not refer to bribery. In addition, the measures in place and their implementation are ineffective and inefficient, as is evidenced by the I Paid A Bribe website.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: In the wake of the new constitution and recent corruption scandals, issues of corruption have become topical in Zimbabwe in general, but there is no specific doctrine to combat corruption within the armed forces.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The interview source indicated that the anti-corruption measures form part of the curriculum but that lack of further training, legislative support and sanction measures means they are not upheld in practice. This is highlighted by the numerous allegations that have been leveled against the defence forces by various civil society organisations and the media without any investigation. The existence of training was impossible to verify.

There is some evidence that personnel from the Zimbabwe National Defence College have attended courses at the Peace Operations Training Institute, some of which might have contained a corruption element, but this is also impossible to verify.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: There seem to be no evidence showing that the military has been deployed on corruption monitoring assignments. While the military has been deployed on peace keeping missions, it is not clear whether these missions included corruption monitoring. A report by the United Nations in showed that while on a mission in DRC, Zimbabwean soldiers (in particular high ranking officials) were involved in corruption deals involving diamonds. Report by Human Rights Watch witness also shows that even in Zimbabwe while maintaining security at Chiadzwa diamond area, the military has been involved in corruption through forming syndicates with the illegal miners

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Issues of corruption are dealt with in a generic manner and not specifically targeted at any area. There is no evidence of guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: PMCs operate analogous to most wings of the armed forces but there is no monitoring body or legislative base for their operations. They are, in theory, governed by the law applicable to most companies and are bound to the contracts they operate under. However, they have appeared largely free to engage in corrupt activities without fear of backlash. Probes into their activities are generally discouraged because of the fear the PMCs inspire in people, as they often operate under the same banner as the armed forces.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Procedures on procurement by the military are outlined in the Defence Procurement Act (Chapter 11:03). However such legislation does not cover corruption risks. The powers of the Minister of Defence seem to override the legislation in practice. There are no possibilities of exemptions in the Defence Procurement Act.

In 2012 the State Procurement Board testified that a directive from President Robert Mugabe, who is the Commander in Chief, gave a tender directly to a Chinese company to construct a Defence College. This is an example of the legislation being bypassed.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The Procurement Act (Part IV, Procurement Proceedings) prescribes a procurement cycle process, which is not disclosed to the public. There is a Procurement Act specific to defence and it is available online.

Sources claimed that there is no public information in regard to this issue.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: According to a senior member of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, there are no defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place. Even the Home Affairs and Defence committee is not updated with information pertaining to defence procurement.There is no official /media source available on defence procurement

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The military is protected under the Defence Procurement Act, which gives the Minister of Defence powers to purchase equipment for the military off-budget. The Defence Procurement Act thus permits military budget details not to be available, as it states that the Minister of Defence, through his powers, can purchase equipment necessary for the functioning of the military. The Official Secrets Act protects military purchases as they are viewed to be secretive.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: According to an interviewee, a company should have tax clearance and a company profile in order to bid to supply the military. However, the interviewee also suggested that personal connections with high-ranking officials are crucial in the bidding process.

There are no known standards and procedures that companies are required to have in place.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The procurement process is done in secret, despite the existence of the Defence Procurement Act. There is no known strategy, aside from the couple of paragraphs available on the Ministry of Defence website, which cannot be considered to constitute a strategy to drive procurement requirements.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Sources gave contradictory comments on this matter, they were not sure on the process for quantifying requirements, and there is no information available in the public domain against which to verify their claims.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: In the literature reviewed and the interview undertaken, it was inferred that there is no evidence on how procurement takes place.

The Competition Act (Chapter 14:28) illustrates anti-competitive practices in all procurement, which can be attributed to defence procurement as well. There is no information available that specifically deals with defence procurement, nor is there evidence of what occurs in practice.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Tender boards are subject to the regulations articulated in the Procurement Act 9s.33; (Procurement Regulations), although it is unclear whether or not this also applies to defence procurement. Section 28 of the Procurement Act states :

(1) the accounts of the State Procurement Board shall be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who for the purpose shall have all the functions conferred on him by section 8 and 9 of the Audit and Exchequer Act (chapter 22:03) as though the assets of the board were public moneys and the members, employees and agents of the board were officers as defined in that Act.

(2) Any member, employee or agent of the state procurement board who (a) fails or refuses to provide the Comptroller and Auditor-General with any explanation or information required by him for the purpose of an audit in terms of subsection (1); or hinders or obstructs the Comptroller and Auditor-General in the conduct of an audit in terms of subsection (1); shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level four or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

Section 29 of the Procurement Act also states: section 19 of the Audit and Exchequer Act (chapter 22:03) shall apply, to the appointment of an internal auditor to the State Procurement Board in all respects as if the board were a department of the ministry for which the minister is responsible. There is also a provision for the investigation of procuring and supplying entities in the Procurement Act (s.46; investigation by state procurement board) as well as the audit of the State Procurement Board (s.23). These provisions are not specific to defence. It must be noted that there are concerns over the effectiveness and independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General's Office.

Audits by the office of the Auditor General are not done in time for instance, it was in 2014 that the Auditor General produced an Audit report for Parastatals for the financial year 2012. They are also concerns over the independence of the Auditor General s office.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The Competition Act (Chapter 14;28) lists collusion arrangements between bidders as &quoute;unfair business practices&quoute;. This legislation is yet to be used, as there are no cases were it has been put to use. The interviewee disclosed that collusion issues are dealt with at personal levels by superiors involved in procurement as they have personal interests. It is unclear how far the Act applies to the defence sector.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: According to an interviewee, procurement staff are organized into a professional staff department. The Department is called the Department of Procurement Research and Administration and its responsibility is that of ensuring timely procurement of goods and services required for the efficient functioning of the Defence Forces.

In this respect, the Department negotiates and approves all supply contracts of the Defence Forces, scrutinizes tender evaluations and makes recommendations to the State Procurement Board as well as handling complaints from clients. The Department also monitors the Procurement Departments of the ZNA and the AFZ-to ensure that tender procedures are properly followed and that all purchases are done in accordance with the Procurement Act and Regulations. With respect to research, the Department is charged with the responsibility of exploring ways of effecting import substitution in collaboration with local industries. The Department is also responsible for the administration of the Ministry's assets.

The interviewee also stated that that the Portfolio committee on Defence does not receive information on defence procurement, and provides limited oversight as decisions are made by the Executive, in particular the President and high level army generals -that parliament can only rub stamp their decisions. Previous media reports have indicated how the Zimbabwe National Army used to buy military uniforms from the former wife of the Army General Constantine Chiwenga. This is undue influence in the procurement process

There are no further media reports regarding this question.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The Prevention of Victimisation, under the Prevention of Corruption Act, is not specific as to whether it applies to companies or security institutions. The interviewee was of the view that since companies which get defence tenders are usually associated with high ranking officials, then if any complaints arise these companies would report to the superiors. More so, some companies do not report in fear of losing contracts to supply the defence sector.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The Procurement Act expressly makes the act of bribery a ground for disqualification in the tender process (s.39). The Zimbabwe Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 9:23), Part iv (General), s. 14 'Prevention from Victimization', criminalises victimization. The Zimbabwe Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 9:16) criminalizes acts of bribery (at Part II (Prevention of corruption)s.3-4). The Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (Chapter 9:23) in Chapter IX (Bribery and Corruption) expressly criminalises acts of bribery and corruption (s.170). This is applicable to all sectors, and suppliers as well as debtors.

However, there is limited evidence of such sanctions being successfully applied in practice, and it is unclear whether the Act applies to the defence sector.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The interviewee did not render any information on this issue as these are centralised government matters. There is no public information available.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Information is not readily available. The interviewee inferred that such issues are top government matters that cannot be publicly disclosed for security reasons.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: No information is available on the subject of offset contracts.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The interviewee was of the opinion that the use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle is not expressly controlled by government. However, the government has influence in the use of agents and intermediaries in procurement, as they often deal with them in one way or the other. While Defence Procurement is guided by the State Procurement Act, there are no known ethical standards required of suppliers and there is no evident strategy to guide procurement:

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: Some procurement signings are not published, hence there is no information after their signings. Such information is difficult to access even through the media mainly because it is regarded as classified information.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: The interviewee contends that this topic is regarded as internal government issues and not available to the public, as per Zimbabwe's law. The score has been selected on the basis of this lack of transparency and on the basis of the lack of strong guidelines and regulation in the sector. From our inquiry there is no here is no evidence of the government formally requiring the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, nor evidence of the government encouraging this informally

Researcher + TI Reviewer3944: As a result of the unilateral and regional arms embargo passed on to Zimbabwe by EU member states, Zimbabwe has been getting weapons mainly from China and Russia. In 2008 China and Russia vetoed a UN arms embargo. Jeuck (2011) argues that for the period 2000–2009, China remained the largest supplier, accounting for 39 per cent of Zimbabwean imports of major conventional weapons, followed by Ukraine (35 per cent) and Libya (27 per cent). Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have exported a small volume of major conventional weapons to Zimbabwe since 2000, while Czechoslovakia was an exporter during the early 1990s.

Through interviews and document review it emerged that it is highly likely for defence decisions to be driven by political influence by seller nations, in particular China and Russia. The government has never justified such defence purchases at all. In actual there is lack of information on what arms the government is getting from the Chinese and Russian. In December 2014, it was reported that the Environment Minister and ZANU PF Commissar had travelled to Ukraine’s contentious Crimea province to buy weapons.

China is Zimbabwe’s leading arms supplier, providing at least $66 million worth of small arms during Zimbabwe’s involvement in the civil war in the DRC (1998-2002). Since 2004, China has sold Zimbabwe 139 military vehicles and 24 combat aircraft. Last year it was reported that Zimbabwe had taken delivery of 20, 000 AK-47 assault rifles from China, together with other military and civil security equipment. The report “Arms-for-minerals trades exposed in Zim” cites high level sources within the country’s security and mining sectors, and names the Justice Minister and deputy Foreign Affairs Minister as two of the facilitators of the deals.