Bahrain

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Because of the constitutional lack of transparency related to defence and security expenditure, asset disposal is not itemised within any budget.

The financial authorities in the Audit Court therefore cannot oversee or scrutinise asset disposal. Lastly, although the MOF appears to have asset disposal guidelines, it is unclear how these relate to the military and security sectors.

There is no other public information available.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: As the defence establishment top positions are staffed by members of the Alkhalifa family, it is off limits to independent and transparent scrutiny in any form. According to the BCHR, the Supreme Defence Council &quoute;consists of the King, the Crown Prince, the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Royal Court and ten others from the King’s family who occupy leading political and security posts in the country.&quoute;

There is no evidence that there is any independent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by any part of the government. Asset disposals may be discussed by the defence committee of the Shura Council, though this is not an independent body.

The fact that the defence establishment is constitutionally off limits to scrutiny and the limited nature of press freedom in Bahrain means that military equipment and infrastructure is never discussed. Before 2011, the opposition in Parliament did question the size of the defence budget, but the Parliament has no power to scrutinise defence spending at any depth, because of the aforementioned constitutional protection.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: The first assertion that 'any assets to be disposed of are discussed in the Shura Council and government' is not verifiable to an appropriate standard. The second assertion that this 'innately allows for scrutiny' is not supportable, noting the limited independence structured into these bodies. Score changed from 0 to 1 to reflect that there is a non-independent body that could scrutinise asset disposal.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Allegations of secret budgets for defence expenses were raised around the time of the 2011 uprising, primarily by opposition leaders and the newspaper al-Wasat. Some opposition parliamentarians suggested that perhaps the real figure was higher than stated because the budgets were not transparent.

The editor of al-Wasat was dismissed temporarily and opposition leaders who voiced the concerns were jailed, such as Ebrahim Sharif, the most prominent Sunni leader to be given a lengthy jail sentence for his criticism of the government.

The SIPRI Fact Sheet on Gulf military spending also notes that “In many cases—notably Bahrain and Iran—not all military expenditure appears in the official figures”.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is no indication that any part of the Bahraini legislature is informed about secret budget expenditure.

Questions on secret budget in 2010 and 2011 by opposition MPs were met with silence, and contributed to the frustration that saw al-Wefaq boycott parliament following the February 2011 uprising.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Decree Law 16 of 2002 on the Office of Financial Supervision (whose National Audit Court produces a yearly report for the legislature to scrutinise) makes it clear that the Ministry of Defence (BDF), MOI, National Guard and NSA are all excluded from the purview of the remit of the Office.

The NAC report therefore excludes all military spending, making it impossible for the legislature to scrutinise fairly. For the police, the Ministry of Interior general budget is looked at by the legislature, but there is no itemised breakdown, and the legislature is particularly limited since the last electoral boycott by the opposition at the end of 2014.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: The Financial Committee of the Shura Council only has authority over the budget submitted to the legislature, which excludes military and security spending. Since no details of what the military budgets are spent on, it could be argued that all military spending is 'off budget'. Since we don't know what is authorised within the defence budget, because the government doesn't release details of expenditure, we can't say that there is anything which is not authorised.

Sometimes reports in the media provide evidence for the kinds of weapons that Bahrain is buying, such as teargas and missiles, but we cannot say that these are off budget, as all of Bahrain's military expenditure is secret, unless somehow leaked to the public.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Due to the fact that the military budget is not itemised, it is impossible to say what is part of the budget and what is not. A leaked document in 2013 showed a tender for 1.6m canisters of CS gas, for instance. There is thus no way of knowing whether off-budget items exist.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There does not seem to be explicit legal provision for any mechanism to classify information on the grounds of national security. However, Bahrain implemented a State Security Law from 1974 until 2001, and placed the country under a State of National Security for about 3 months in 2011, which effectively allowed a wide range of repressive policing and judicial measures. There is no Official Secrets Act or any similar legislation in Bahrain because all military affairs are classified as secret under the constitution, where Article 33(g) states that &quoute;The Defence Force is directly linked to the King, and maintains the necessary secrecy in its affairs.&quoute;

Theoretically, Bahrain’s Press Law of 2002 guarantees the right of journalists to access information freely. In practice, this right is severely limited by the Penal Code of 1976. The US Embassy report on Bahrain’s human rights situation in 2013 notes that “The law does not provide citizens access to government-held information.”

No public information on extra provisions or oversight is available. Recent laws passed on the protection of state secrets seem intended as a warning to anybody who might leak sensitive information to organisations critical of the government.

Score 0 selected to reflect that information is classified at the discretion of the individuals, parties, or groups in power with no specific or clearly defined legal basis. There is considerable evidence of individuals or agencies persistently being able to influence decisions.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: The royal family of Bahrain own both state businesses and control the military, and so all state resources are controlled by military leaders to this extent.

Royal family members do not generally declare their private interests, though these sometimes surface with the suggestion of malpractice, as when the Prime Minister was accused of buying reclaimed land from the state for 1BD in 2011. A further in depth report by the Financial Times provides good evidence of corrupt business practices by companies controlled by the King and other ministers who control the military.

In authoritarian Gulf states, it is important to not make a strict Western-model distinction between individuals and institutions. Because of the tribal basis for alliances and government structure (see Khuri, 1980), the appearance of Western-looking government institutions can be quite shallow, and hide the power of individuals underneath. For this reason, although this question refers to defence and security institutions, it is important to consider the extent to which these are projections of the authority of particular leaders, such as Prime Minister Khalifa Alkhalifa, the longest-serving Prime Minister in the world, who has been in his post since 1971.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is no evidence that the private business interests of top BDF officers are audited or scrutinised in any way. In fact such audits are legally off-limits to the financial authorities. The National Audit Commission is a state institution and as such, given the lack of separation of powers, is not independent of the rest of the government.

The BDF, when it does release any public ‘reports’, only tends to report on its accomplishments and capabilities, as shown by the article cited from the government-controlled media. The timing of this report at the end of 2011 just after the publication of the critical BICI report indicates that it is intended to counter negative criticism of the conduct of the armed forces during the 2011 uprising.

Recent reporting by the Financial Times shows that companies linked to the Alkhalifa family get preferential treatment in land acquisition from the state in an untransparent way which indicates corrupt practices.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is some evidence of private enterprise by members of the monarchy who have influence over the army. The Prime Minister has significant influence over the King, who is the nominal head of the military. Due to the position of such officials, scrutiny of their commercial activities is off-limits to the legislature or any other authority.

One interesting fact emerging from an interview with a Gulf politics expert was about the Alba case, in which Alba sued a representative of a US competitor, Alcoa, for bribing Bahraini officials for preferential treatment with contracts. This move by Alba occurred after the Crown Prince took over some economic policy areas which previously had been the remit of the Prime Minister. The implication is that the Crown Prince wanted the domestic company, Alba, to bid for contracts on a fair basis.

However, it must be noted that unauthorised private enterprise by members of the Royal family who have influence over the armed forces is different from the enterprise of those people who are employed by military institutions. There is no evidence that the government outlaws such private enterprise. Score selected to reflect the criteria that the government does not explicitly outlaw private enterprise under the umbrella of the state’s defence and security operations, though it might publicly discourage it, and there are no, or trivial, repercussions for those who engage in it.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: The only public mention of anti-corruption activities has been from the office of the Crown Prince, who is now also one of the Deputy Prime Ministers. He has announced periodically during 2013 anti-corruption campaigns. However, these seem to be to raise awareness of bribery of low-level officials, and the defence sector remains off-limits to any auditing mandates. As part of this campaign, a General Directorate of Anti-Corruption, Economic and Electronic security was set up in the MOI to take phone calls about corrupt practices. This body has recommended some cases for prosecution, but has no authority over the military or security forces.

However, the Crown Prince has little or no authority over the army, which is under the command of the King and the army commander in chief, Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa. Once again, because of the constitution, and the continual threat of arrest to those who criticise top officials, there is little call for the defence institutions to make statements committing to anti-corruption efforts. There is thus no evidence that senior military staff commit to anti-corruption efforts.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: The peer reviewer should note the question is examining the Defence Ministry/Minister, Chief of Defence and Single Service Chiefs. NB: the Deputy Prime Minister is also the Deputy Supreme Commander of the defence force, however in practice this title is related to his position as the Crown Prince rather than a day-to-day role such as the Commander in Chief holds. See also Washington Institute policy Analysis in sources list. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Following the recommendations of the BICI report, the office of the Attorney General was made into an Ombudsman’s office, nominally independent of the MOI but including staff closely tied to the government. Serious concerns have been raised about the office's effectiveness, with allegations that complainants have been attacked in retaliation and that the office has ignored submissions from critical organisations.

Although the Ombudsman has been receiving complaints against police officers over the past two years, the recommendations for prosecutions arising out of this have yet to translate into credible convictions. There is no evidence that any corruption is investigated. It should be noted that these prosecutions are not for corruption but for torture and other serious violent crimes against citizens.

Few security forces have been prosecuted, and convictions are usually considerably reduced on appeal. Only two police officers were convicted of torturing to death Ali Saqer, an opposition affiliated journalist, and their convictions were reduced to three years on appeal. But sentences of up to five years can be given to those found guilty of insulting the King or any state institution.

The BDF seems to be off limits to the office of the Ombudsman, who has never made any attempt to investigate corruption allegations against top government officials, for example the allegations that members of the Alkhalifa family have appropriated public land and entered into construction deals which they personally benefit from.

In 2011, a proposal in parliament to introduce an independent anti-corruption body was rejected by government loyalists in parliament. There is a provision in the military penal code which theoretically criminalises fraud in recruitment practices, but no evidence that officers are ever held accountable for corruption.

Freedom House’s 2012 report notes that “Despite multiple scandals in which members of the ruling family were implicated in bribery or money laundering, Bahrain has shown no willingness to investigate such claims, guaranteeing de facto legal immunity for even junior royals&quoute;.

A good example of this was the bribery case involving Bahrain's aluminium producer Alba, and payments made to government officials by a foreign official to secure contracts. These payments were confirmed to be authorised by a government official, suggesting that facilitation payments are not seen as a corrupt practice.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is no legal protection for whistleblowers. It would appear, given recent leaks about procurement of tear gas from South Korea, that the government is actively seeking to clamp down on possible whistleblowing. This seems to be confirmed by a law passed to criminalise the leaking of state secrets.

The Shura Council defence committee convened in January 2014 to discuss tightening laws for ‘computer crimes’. The vagueness of this law, “to identify and criminalize dangerous actions that occur on computer’s system” [sic], indicates that it is being prepared to apply to a whole range of leaking and other hacking activities which may affect Bahrain’s government. Reports by the BCHR show that whistleblowing on corruption in state industries was difficult even before the 2011 crisis. While reports from 2010 suggest Bahrain was talking to the UK about forming some kind of anti-corruption authority, the only outcome of this seems to have been the anti-corruption hotline in the MOI mentioned previously.

More recently, whistleblowing about the government hiring foreign mercenaries in the BDF was followed by a government campaign to find the source, with a panel convened to investigate and prosecute those involved in the leak. The panel resulted in some arrests, showing the government's intolerance of leaks of sensitive information.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: High-level posts are awarded on the basis of familial connections, which can be inferred from the fact that the entire Supreme Defence Council is made up of members of the Alkhalifa family. The head of the NSA was replaced by the King in 2011 after criticism of the NSA's role in repressing the 2011 uprising, but the official, a cousin of the King, was then promoted to the Supreme Defence Council.

There is no evidence of special vetting or rotation of posts in sensitive procurement positions. The procedures and procurement systems in the defence sector are completely opaque, and there is thus little information available about how appointments are made to positions in the military.

There is little evidence about how the defence procurement process works. However, senior military officials, often from the Royal family, are often seen at military trade shows, and it is likely that they have a large say in procurement. There do not appear to be any publicly available rules relating to how appointments are made in the military.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: According to the World Bank, (see Trading Economics), the total was 19,460 in 2013. It is difficult to tell exactly how accurate non-official statistics are, however, because the Bahraini government itself does not publish its own statistics.

One reason why the government may be unwilling to release employment numbers is because employment within the BDF and MOI is such a sensitive issue at the moment, and a source of great anger among the Shia community, who are policed by foreigners while many in their own communities are unemployed. They are particularly angered by the employment of foreign security personnel from Sunni communities, such as Baloch people from Pakistan, who often cannot speak Arabic.

Estimates of employment in the MOI are given as around 12,000 (see US Dept of State, 2011), but there is no detailed breakdown available publicly. A plan to employ 20,000 civilians in non-sensitive positions in the MOI from 2011 seems to have been dropped, as so has Recommendation 1722(e) of the BICI report, to employ personnel from all sectors of society in the security forces. The government says it has employed 500 community police from all sectors of society, but these officers are said to have been marginalised, and are not enough to offset the level of non-Bahraini officers in the police.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: The government has in the past published details of some salaries (Al-Wasat, June 2011). This is not done in a systematic way and there is no full public disclosure of salaries at all levels, particularly not at the higher level positions.

It is also known that Pakistani recruits to the BDF were promised salaries of about $1,000 (presumably per month) in 2013. In 2011, the MOI publicised a scheme to employ 20,000 local police with salaries starting at BD325 as a way to placate the Shia community, who suffer from higher levels of poverty and political disenfranchisement.

A local source in Bahrain also mentioned a couple of related cases in which “one guy was sentenced 5 years for only publishing names in 2008 and another is on trial for publishing salaries this year”. He/she referred to a website about one of the arrested men, Hasan Salman (see above). In a more recent case, a man was arrested for publishing names and salaries of Jordanian officers in the BDF and MOI (Al-Wasat, May 2014).

There is no evidence that any information on allowances is published by the government.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Research found no evidence that the government publishes salaries of employees in any systematic or public way and there do not seem to be any media reports about this. Those employed in the defence sector generally do appear to get paid on time, and it is likely they are seen as an important, loyal constituency that the government wants to remain satisfied.

There is some evidence to suggest that the MOI and BDF have been increasingly employing Pakistanis and other Gulf nationalities to join the Army. Human rights groups and opposition bodies have strongly criticised this practice and it is unclear what pay structures apply to these individuals or groups nor if the system of payment is well-established and routine. It is published, as per previous answer. Evidence also suggests the security institutions have applied similar conditions as afforded to other expatriate workers in the construction industry, which indicates reasonable risk personnel may not always receive their pay on time.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: N/A would not be appropriate in this instance.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Research found no transparent institutional mechanisms for objectively making official appointments in any senior state office.

Decree-Law No. (32) for the year 2002, stipulates that the King appoints the Commander in Chief. Article (26) states that the king appoints officers in the Defence Force by a royal decree according to a proposal from the Commander in Chief after the recommendation of the Higher Committee Officers. It cannot be said that this system is in any way transparent or independent. There is no evidence that this system involves independent oversight or objective criteria. The stated appointment system is minimal and clearly open to nepotism, as demonstrated by the appointment of the King's cousin, who had been the head of the NSA, as Secretary General of the Supreme Defence Council. Family connections play a large role in appointments to top military jobs.

There are no sources available about mid-level appointments, but from the researcher's experience there is a widely held public view that political loyalty and sectarian bias play roles in deciding who receives politically sensitive positions within state institutions. Bahrain Watch notes that “Corruption has indeed developed as custom and practice in Bahrain, not among ordinary people but among government officials that work in an autocratic and nepotistic political system that blurs the lines between public and private, state and family business, personal relations.”

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Accepted. Score changed from 1 to 0.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Decree Law 32 of 2002 contains a mechanism for promoting individuals on the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, as long as they have the requisite qualifications (what these are is not specified).

In the context of the constitutional secrecy of the military establishment and the ongoing lack of transparency exhibited by the government, it is not possible to say that this process is either meritocratic or objective, as it is up to the discretion of officers, whose decisions are not published or subject to independent scrutiny. It is important to note that this is within the context whereby the military establishment is constitutionally off limits to scrutiny.

A report in the state-run Gulf Daily News shows that over 1500 officers were promoted by the BDF Commander in Chief, but there is no information about how such promotions were decided on. The news organisation states that &quoute;The move is part of festivities marking the 45th anniversary of the BDF, which falls today.&quoute; This indicates that promotion is done on a rather arbitrary basis, and not on the merits of particular officers. Because there seems to be no evidence of promotion boards within this system, it is clear that the authority for promotions is not separate from the chain of command.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is no compulsory conscription in Bahrain.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Sources added.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is no voluntary or compulsory conscription in Bahrain.

There appears to be a provision in the Military Penal Code for entering into the military under false pretences or &quoute;violated any law or regulations regarding the system of recruitment&quoute;, which presumably could include bribery to gain preferential advantage, though the law is vague and this is not stated specifically.

There is no evidence that these laws provide an effective deterrent, and there is no evidence that prosecutions are brought for such offences.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is no evidence of non-existent soldiers being registered to increase budgets.

Since the budgets of the defence sector are not listed or scrutinised, it would not be necessary to increase the defence budget in this way. However, as the sector also does not publish the number of its employees, it is equally impossible to say that this does not happen.

Although there are weaknesses in the payment system, there is no evidence that these weaknesses are exploited to create ghost soldiers. However, this would certainly be an argument for having a more thorough auditing system which could report on defence spending. For instance, there is lack of distinction between chains of command and chains of payment (see Q46), a weakness that implies that it is possible for ghost soldiers to be inserted. It is possible that the higher command of the army do receive itemised reports, but these are not publicly available, so it is not possible to say whether there is a risk of ghost soldiers existing.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: N/A would not be appropriate here, it is only applicable in situations where the original context of the question cannot be applied to the country at hand.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: According to Decree Law 32, there does not seem to be any distinction between the chain of command and of payments&quoute;

'Article (6) The Commander in Chief shall be appointed by Royal decree, and assume the leadership of the Defence Force in directives issued under the orders of the supreme commander, and the implementation of the policy of military, administrative, economic and financial plans of the Defence Force, and is linked directly with the Supreme Commander. '

This same law states that the control of all top military jobs is the prerogative of the King, and looking at the Supreme Defence Council, where all the members are from the Alkhalifa family, shows that the government is largely a family-run enterprise. According to BCHR, the Supreme Defence Council is made up of 'the King, the Crown Prince, the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Royal Court and ten others from the King’s family who occupy leading political and security posts in the country.'

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1:There is no evidence that chains of command are separated from chains of payment. Auditing is a separate question, please see response in Q15. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There does not seem to be any code of conduct for officers in the BDF.

Following the recommendations of the BICI report in November 2011, the Bahraini government introduced a code of conduct for police officers within the MOI. However, Bahrain Watch notes that “The code requires police to uphold the rule of law without prejudice, remain loyal to the King, use force only as a last resort, and never engage in torture or other ill-treatment, even if ordered to by a superior officer”. These measures do not cover corruption. The MOI code covers the conduct of officers dealing with civilians, and doesn't have any bearing on civilian interactions or bribery of officials.

The enforcement mechanism is supposed to lie with the Ombudsman's office, but this has come in for extensive criticism about its effectiveness in responding to claims of torture by public officials. Human rights groups like ADHRB have claimed that those giving evidence to the Ombudsman have been targeted and threatened into silence after making allegations (see BCHR report, June 2015).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: The MOI Code of Conduct does not cover civilian personnel and does not contain anti-corruption provisions.

There is good evidence that the first article of the MOI Code of Conduct, an injunction on torture, is regularly breached without any repercussion for perpetrators. The Ombudsman has been in office for over a year now, and has received numerous complaints about police conduct (Trade Arabia).

ADHRB notes in its review of the Ombudsman’s first yearly report that “[it] chooses to ignore pressing human rights issues like torture, which it mentions only to say that it is the office’s responsibility to investigate claims.” Even the author of the 2011 BICI report, noted that &quoute;We're dealing with about 300 cases of torture, we were dealing with deaths under torture, at least five cases that were completely documented. These cases have not been adequately investigated, they have not been adequately prosecuted. The two prosecutions and one conviction that came about were very, very meagre and modest.”

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: The police force has received ‘human rights and public order’ training, as part of its effort to reform how the police deal with protests.

However, there does not seem to be any record of specific anti-corruption training for any military or civilian personnel, even within the framework of the Crown Prince’s most recent anti-corruption efforts.

The BNA news report from May 2014 about a 10-day anti-corruption campaign by the MOI’s General Directorate. However, it is entirely vague what this campaign entailed. The report states that &quoute;Police personnel are being trained in advanced procedures to ensure that investigations are professional and that they serve the needs of all citizens and residents... [the training] covered public order, skill development and rights of suspects.&quoute;

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: I have not found any evidence that the anti-corruption training involves the military, only that it involves the police. Score maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There are no public cases relating to financial corruption or bribery. A small number of cases of physical abuse by members of the police have been referred to courts, with only a few prosecutions and minimal sentences for these.

It certainly cannot be said that there is a policy to make prosecution outcomes public. There is little publicly available information on the outcome of prosecutions arising from misconduct allegations against government officials. In the past, the government publicised prosecutions of officials said to be responsible for some of the deaths in custody, then significantly reduced the sentences awarded on appeal. Out of 11 deaths investigated by the Ombudsman in 2013/14, “One case resulted in a six month prison sentence and fines for the officer involved.”

The fact that the Ombudsman's remit does not extend to the military is another indication that the army is constitutionally immune from scrutiny, even in extreme cases of corruption and abuse. This naturally creates a moral hazard where abuse may be more likely to happen because members of the armed forces know that there will be no repercussions for their actions.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: According to Blakes, the Penal Code of 1976 &quoute;makes it a criminal offence for a civil servant or officer who is entrusted with a public duty to request or accept for himself or for others a gift or privilege of any kind – or to accept a promise of the same – in exchange for performing, or refraining from performance of, his official duties&quoute;.

In practice, Freedom House states there is &quoute;de facto legal immunity for even junior royals&quoute;, and Bahrain has shown &quoute;no willingness to investigate&quoute; claims of bribery or money laundering. The Freedom House documents note that the UK High Court named Finance Minister Isa bin Ali Alkhalifa as a co-conspirator in the Aluminium Bahrain (Alba) trial, which ended with the Alba board acknowledging that it knew about the payments made to senior executives in return for contracts. The assessor contends that this in itself can be considered tantamount to admission that ‘commission’ or ‘facilitation payments’ are not illegal in Bahrain or considered to constitute bribery, including at the highest levels.

There are occasional corruption prosecutions of public officials for offences like embezzling public funds, but otherwise there is little to suggest authorities make much effort to prosecute corruption in the public sector.

Due to the level of constitutional immunity within the military, it is hard to get an accurate picture of whether facilitation payments exist and to what level, but judging by their presence within other branches of government, it is highly likely that they do, and the onus should be on the government of Bahrain to increase transparency to prove otherwise.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Research found Bahrain has no public military doctrine, let alone anything related to combating corruption.
Although the government has ratified the UNCAC, there is no indication that it has been implemented in any way.

A systemic problem at the root of many of these transparency issues is the constitutional immunity given to the military, due to the lack of separation of powers between the executive and armed forces (as well as the legislative and judicial branches). Without changes to these systemic problems, it is unlikely the military will be forced to confront issues of corruption and malpractice within its ranks.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is no evidence that senior military commanders receive any kind of corruption training. Although the Bahraini army receives some training from the US and UK military, there is no suggestion that this training involves anti-corruption activities.

There have also been no investigations or prosecutions of any BDF or NSA officers, despite evidence in the media that at least 2 deaths during the 2011 uprising were caused by army personnel, for example that of Abdul-Redha Buhmeid caught on video (BCHR).

The recent investigation into alleged corrupt activities by companies owned by members of the Alkhalifa family indicates that corruption may exist at the highest levels of the army command in Bahrain.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: I could not find evidence that Western training of the Bahraini army involves any training on anti-corruption issues.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is no evidence suggesting that the government has any officers trained to monitor corruption on operational deployments.

This may become a more pressing issue in future assessments as the GCC becomes more militarily involved in conflicts in the region, especially the current participation of Bahrain in bombing missions in Syria and Yemen.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Due to the lack of transparency in military and security service affairs, there is no available evidence that such guidelines or training practices exist whatsoever. However, one analyst interviewed commented that “assuming the BDF has some [people] involved in purchasing, and given the FTA with the US, there might be some level of anti-corruption training”. No evidence showed that the Free Trade Agreement with the US has any anti-corruption element to it however. The TI 2013 country assessor for Bahrain also noted, based on an interview with an anonymous government official that “although the defence forces receive different trainings from the United States and other developed countries, these exercises do not include any relevant information on countering corruption”.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is some evidence that Bahrain employs private contractors in security roles. The company G4S has offices in Bahrain and conducts security training. One of my interviewees noted that whether Bahrain employs contractors to carry out military training is a 'million dollar question', though they certainly do employ contractors like G4S for security training.

However, as part of the GCC's military cooperation agreement, military officers are stationed in Bahrain from other GCC countries. Although Bahrain does not technically employ private military contractors, Bahrain effectively employs forces from allied countries in the region to assist with domestic policing, and these officers are subject to the same legal framework as its own forces. Human rights groups have also strongly criticised Bahrain for taking in military personnel from other countries like Yemen and Pakistan who are then made into naturalised Bahrainis. Whilst these are not private companies, it is noted that these are effectively independent mercenaries.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments accepted. Score changed from 1 to 2.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Research indicates the country does not have legislation covering defence and security procurement. Decree Law 36 of 2002 contains some basic regulation surrounding tendering and procurement for government services, but this is not applicable to the defence and security sector, as their tenders and purchases are off-limits to the tender board and financial auditing service.

According to the Association of Corporate Counsel, 'The Tenders Law applies to ministries, government administrative bodies, public institutions, government wholly owned companies and any government authorities that have an independent or supplementary budget (save for security and defence authorities and any other authority exempted by law).'

Other defence and security related procurement framework, if existing, are kept secret.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Although Decree Law 36 specifies a tendering process, this does not appear to apply to the defence and security sector at all, since their procurement practices are not covered or reported by the tender board.

Furthermore, Article 3 of Decree Law 36 states:
&quoute;An exemption from the scope its application shall be given to the Bahrain Defence Force, Public Security forces and the National Guard with respect to the purchase of goods, constructions and services of a military, security or confidential nature or these required by the public interest not to be announced or not to apply the procedures stipulated under this Law.&quoute;

It therefore cannot be confirmed that a formal tendering process exists for defence procurement. The available evidence suggests disclosure of planned purchases has only ever been by accident or by the reporting of the selling company.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is no evidence of defence or security procurement oversight, except what is conducted by the Supreme Defence Council, a 14 member body consisting entirely of the most senior members of the Alkhalifa family. This body meets in private and there are no records of what is discussed except when on occasion reported by state media, such as a BNA report from 2005 which states: &quoute;HM the King and Supreme Commander of the BDF reviewed with the members of the Supreme Defence Council, the plans and programs of renovating and developing defence and security capabilities in the Kingdom.&quoute;

It is the members of this inner circle who meet with representatives of arms companies and government agencies like the UK Defence and Security Organisation’s Trade and Investment body, who are promoting the sale of BAE Typhoon jets to Bahrain. The Interior Minister, another member of the Alkhalifa family, also attends 'internal security' trade fairs like the Milipol Arms Exhibition in Paris in 2013.

The defence and security sectors are legally off limits to auditing bodies. Decree Law 16 of 2002 on the Office of Financial Supervision (whose National Audit Court produces a yearly report for the legislature to scrutinise) makes it clear that the Ministry of Defence (BDF), MOI, National Guard and NSA are all excluded from the purview of the remit of the Office.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Information on defence purchases are usually only publicly available when they are in coordination with another state whose media report the deal, i.e. UK.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: The second reviewer has stated that domestic procurements are made public, but he appears to be referring to non-defence procurements which are listed on the tender board. These are outside of the scope of this question.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Research found no publicly declared procedures and standards that apply for defence contracts.

However, Article 32 of Decree Law 37 of 2002 states that companies should have the “necessary qualifications”, “the legal capacity to enter into the purchase contract”, “shall not be insolvent, bankrupt or under liquidation”, “shall not have been convicted for financial or professional offences” and have to prepare necessary tender documents.&quoute;

There are no standards of anti-corruption enforcement which they have to meet to tender, and these regulations do not apply to the defence sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Bahrain lacks a public or independently audited defence policy and purchasing plan. It is not known whether there is a private defence strategy. Bahrain is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council however and has shown some long-term foreign policy commonality with Saudi Arabia in particular (Cordesman, 2003) evidenced most recently by participation in bombing campaigns against ISIS in Syria and the Houthis in Yemen.

While the Supreme Defence Council may have a private defence strategy, it is not publicly declared, and what is known about procurement practices indicates a level of opportunism in sourcing hardware. This is indicated by the recent courting of Russian arms companies by Bahrain's military procurers, a move a number of commentators noted as highly likely to have harmed its relationship with the US (World Tribune, Human Rights First).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Research found no evidence of a formal process for defence procurement. As noted by the BCSL, “By virtue of a historical legacy overlapping with the traditional nature of the political system, it is very difficult to determine the real structure of the military establishment and identify the sources of the actual decision.“ The author refers to the tribal political structure of Gulf Arab countries, wherein members of one family occupy many of the major offices of state.

Decree Law 9 of 1989 provides for the Supreme Defence Council to advise the King on tactical, organisational and financial matters. It appears likely that many defence purchases have been decided upon by the high command of the Army, police and intelligence services, who are all members of the same family. Because of the lack of transparency inherent in this structure, it is impossible to say to what extent defence purchases, such as the Typhoon jet deal with the UK, were based on assessed needs. It did appear at the time of research that Bahrain is gearing up to take a more active role in regional military operations, and that purchases of aircraft are intended to support Bahraini involvement in bombing campaigns such as in Yemen. Whether or to what extent purchases were based on a formal requirements assessment could not be determined due to the lack of transparency in Bahrain's system.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is little evidence of open competition, noting the tender board does not list defence sector tenders.

Due to Bahrain’s geopolitical importance in the Middle East, and its longstanding alliances with the US and UK, it appears possible defence competition might be influenced by political favouritism, noting the much higher level of trade with the UK and US than with other nations. Sources such as the SIPRI arms transfers database and Bahrain Watch’s Arms Watch project indicate that the US, UK, Turkey and Germany are the main sources of Bahraini weapons and other military hardware. Reports also indicate that when the US and UK cancelled some defence contracts to Bahrain in 2011, it sought other suppliers, notably Russia and South Korea. This suggests it is possible defence procurement may be conducted on a somewhat ad-hoc basis or with limited opportunity for suppliers to engage.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: A Tender Board does exist although it has no power to regulate defence contracts.

Article 3 of Decree Law 36 of 2002 stipulates that the mandate of the Tender Board shall not apply to the “Bahrain Defence Force, Public Security forces and the National Guard with respect to the purchase of goods, constructions and services of a military, security or confidential nature or these required by the public interest not to be announced or not to apply the procedures stipulated under this Law”.

The Tender Board lists basic requirements for companies tendering for contracts, but as these do not relate to military institutions, it is not possible to say that Bahrain has any legal regulations related to defence procurement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Research found no laws relating to collusion in defence contracts. Article 204 of the Penal Code states that imprisonment or a fine can be applied to “every civil servant or officer entrusted with a public service who has intervened for his own account or for the account of a third party in contracts, supplies, actions, tenders or other transactions” however. But there are is no legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts.

There have been some reports in the Bahraini press about malpractice of bidding companies in tenders for government projects (see Al-Wasat), and it appears that there is likely to not be any penalties for companies which violate the above mentioned part of the Penal Code. More widely, malpractice in contracts on state land awarded by a private company owned by members of the Alkhalifa family was recently uncovered by the Financial Times. It does not appear as though there was any tendering process conducted for these contracts, presumably because they are counted as private business deals, rather than state contracts.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: The defence process lacks transparency in staff appointments, just as it is legally exempt by the constitution from all other forms of transparent, independent oversight. It is unclear what procurement roles even exist within the defence sector, given the lack of transparency within Bahrain's military institutions. It seems likely that procurement is the prerogative of the high army command, all of whom are senior members of the Alkhalifa family.

There is some evidence of training and assessment of the procurement staff of the Bahrain Tender Board. As previously indicated, however, the Tender Board does not scrutinize procurement in defence.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Article 57 of Decree Law 36 of 2002 allows companies to complain about bias in bidding procedures, but as the defence sector is constitutionally off-limits to appropriate scrutiny, it cannot reasonably be concluded that complaints may be raised appropriately about military procurement processes.

Research found no information was readily available indicating whether companies do indeed make complaints in relation to military procurement or how/if these were responded to.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: There is no public procurement regime for the defence sector, due to the constitutionally mandated secrecy of the military and its legal exclusion from auditing. The regulations that are available and referred to below are only for procurement in the public sector.

Irregularities revealed by the National Audit Court report can be referred for prosecution by the MOI’s anti-corruption body, though it is not clear what sanctions are legally required to be imposed for corrupt activity.

A Bahraini analyst noted in an article that “Due to restrictions on its mandate, the report omits some of the major instances of corruption committed by government officials, some of which have eventually made themselves known to the public. Over the years, this has afforded the report the semblance of impotence.” The main restriction on the mandate of the NAC relevant here is that it does not audit the defence sector.

In terms of suppliers, the trial of a businessman for making commission payments to Bahraini officials running the Alba aluminium company shows that there are no sanctions for officials who accept commission payments. State officials received large sums of money in exchange for preferential treatment in contracts, and this behaviour was authorised by a senior member of the Alkhalifa family. It seems likely that if this is normal in Bahrain, commission payments may also be a normal aspect of defence contracts.

However, this case would not have come to light if some government officials had not filed bribery cases against Alba in the first place, which indicates (according to one source interviewed) that some within the Bahraini government disagreed with the bribery that other parts of the government were allowing to take place.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: As of 2010, according to the Frost & Sullivan report, Bahrain &quoute;has no specific offset policy&quoute;. The report also notes that &quoute;The average offset in Middle East is about 30%.&quoute; A 2013 report by ATKearney takes an average Gulf offset agreement as being around 35%. Bahrain has the smallest defence industry in the Gulf, which may partially explain why there is not more information available.

The researcher assesses a larger part of the reason is likely to be the lack of domestic or international scrutiny of Bahraini arms deals. Bahraini human rights activists have also alleged that Bahrain 'bought [the] British Government's silence' on its human rights violations through its arms sales, which indirectly suggests increased corruption risks may exist in this area. Lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess this conclusively.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Due to the lack of transparency in how Bahrain arranges its defence contracts, no evidence was available to the researcher on whether the government signs offset programmes as part of its agreements with contractors or if there are current, active offset agreements.

According to Frost & Sullivan, Bahrain had 'no specific offset policy' as of 2010. The management consulting firm A.T. Kearney reported in 2013 that the GCC defence offset programs represent a 'trillion dollar opportunity' to unlock economic development in the region however, suggesting an average offset of 35%. Given the available information, it is very likely that Bahrain may be involved in some kind of offset agreements, but does not make any details surrounding them public.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: No public information was found on whether/what offsets have been required within arms deals, in turn meaning it was not possible to assess whether any competition regulation has been applied, it is unlikely.

It is assessed from the available sources examining the general trend of offset contracts within the GCC that Bahrain is likely to have engaged in offset contracting to some degree as they look to bring investment to other sectors within the country.

The rules that exist for companies bidding for tenders to the public sector are minimal. It is assessed unlikely that suitable formal regulations are applied to military procurement given the nature of defence procurement in Bahrain and the lack of appropriate scrutiny over the military sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: As noted by the 2013 TI anti-corruption index report on Bahrain, there is no available information on how agents and brokers operate, though it can be assumed due to the legal obscurity of the defence sector that there is no legal framework governing their behaviour.

It is generally accepted that agents and brokers do operate in Gulf procurement systems. The Alba case, which revealed commission payments being made by the agent Victor Dadaleh to Bahraini officials, or the famous investigation of BAE Systems by US and UK prosecutors, are prominent examples showing that bribery has been considered a normal means for agents to secure state contracts in the Gulf.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Because defence sector spending is off limits to the NAC report, and there is no budgetary breakdown in spending, there is no information made available about the Bahraini government’s major arms deals.

Anything known about the financial aspects of these deals would be made public by the contracting company, as BAE Systems is required to do to UK authorities.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: The reviewer has raised a reasonable point, however the question is examining the extent that the target government itself (in this case Bahrain) is transparent about the financing aspects of their own arms deals. The researcher has found no relevant details have been released by Bahrain, which is why a score of 0 is necessarily awarded.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: The researcher found no evidence of a legal framework for contracting companies to adhere to when bidding for defence contracts. There is no further evidence to suggest the Bahraini government encourages contractors to adopt anti-corruption programmes. Defence contracts are a matter of national security and the sector is constitutionally off-limits to independent oversight, including from the Tender Board and National Audit Court.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4322: Bahrain has a Defence Cooperation Agreement with the UK, which was signed in 2012 to ‘increase military cooperation’, and the UK recently announced expanding its naval presence in Bahrain. The UK government has stated that its goal is to retain control over the Strait of Hormuz, where oil from Iraq leaves the Persian Gulf.

These agreements are indicative of the UK’s leading role in the security and defence of Bahrain’s political system, which the US and UK see as a buffer to Iranian influence. There is no doubt that the influential role of these two countries in the stability of the Bahraini political system guarantees them influence in defence contracting.

Bahrain is the smallest military force within the GCC countries, and as it is allied with Saudi Arabia, the US and UK, does not need a large army. However, as US power in the Middle East has weakened in recent years, regional powers like Saudi Arabia are starting to assert themselves militarily, as can be seen by the bombing campaigns against ISIS and the Houthis in Yemen. It may be for this reason that Bahrain is looking to expand its airforce by purchasing British Typhoon jets. However, the government maintains secrecy in military affairs in accordance with the constitution and rarely comments publicly on such purchases. The government feels no need to defend its military purchasing decisions to its domestic audience.

When the US and UK cancelled some defence contracts in response to public pressure after the 2011 uprising, Bahrain switched to purchasing missiles and crowd control weapons such as tear gas from other nations who it does not traditionally have strong alliances with, such as Russia and South Korea. This indicates Bahrain has been willing to look elsewhere for suppliers as it wishes. For this reason, purchasing decisions are not made solely under political influence but out of necessity from wherever they can source the materials they want.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agree with comments, however purchases of weapons from countries which Bahrain is not traditionally allied with show that decisions are not solely made based on political influence. Score maintained.