- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
Yemen’s GI ranking in Band F places it in the highest risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. Yemen’s highest risk area is Financial, followed by Personnel, Operations, Procurement and Political. Poor centralised control over the armed forces and competition between different branches of the military contributed to the implosion of the Yemeni army and the capture of large swathes of territory by Houthi rebels. Once an inclusive peace settlement is reached, corruption risk will need to be tackled to reduce state fragility and improve security provision:
Strengthen inclusive civilian control over the defence and security sector:
A combination of factional Yemeni armed forces, and the weak role of parliament in scrutinising the sector, led to the collapse of the army in the face of a more cohesive Houthi threat.
- International efforts to reform defence and security need to focus on building the capacity of the MOD and parliament, while an inclusive national dialogue is needed to discuss the role of the security services and establish mechanisms for CSO oversight.
- DDR should focus on building a truly national Yemeni army that breaks militia and political ties, while SSR should be designed to reduce the potential for the co-option of troops. Security cooperation and security assistance should take care not to inadvertently fuel factionalism by privileging one group to the detriment of others.
Reduce military predation and build the integrity of the armed forces:
The fact that Yemeni troops were heavily engaged in smuggling oil, trading illegal arms and drugs, and trafficking humans undermined troop discipline and failed to establish the army as a protector of the civilian population.
- Systems need to be established to punish soldiers who predate, while dealing with the root causes of this behaviour, such as a lack of basic pay, and the theft of salaries by those higher up the command chain.
- In addition, the protection of civilians and integrity building should be central to military training.
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
Yemeni Parliament Watch &quoute; Defence and Security Committee tasks&quoute;, accessed on April 27, 2014 http://www.ypwatch.org/governance.php?id=1031
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Politician 1, April 2014
NBA online &quoute;النائب عبد المعز دبوان: مقابل تغطية فساد ميزانية البرلمان يتم تمرير موازنة الدولة بكامل فسادها&quoute;, July 16, 2014 http://nbaonline.org/proccess-newss-191027.html
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Essentially a functional legislature does not exist, so I would reduce the score to 0. If the South decides to secede from Yemen, it would change the balance of power in North Yemen, where the Houthis are currently the only military force in general control. This military is totally separate from that of the President and the state of Yemen itself, and it is therefore difficult to say what the situation will be going forward. This answer is adequate for the previous state affairs, but not for the current one, as we do not know what character the Parliament or Military will have in future.
Suggested score: 0
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
There is a defence and security committee in the parliament and it is mandated to exercise oversight on all issues related to defence and security. However, all the interviewees have confirmed that this committee is not active at all and is not provided with the information required.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015. Essentially a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Yemeni Parliament Watch 'defence and Security Committee tasks', accessed on April 27, 2014, http://www.ypwatch.org/governance.php?id=1031
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I would like to suggest adding this reference from the Inter-Parliamentary Union website, which corroborates the above score as it shows no information on the powers or composition of the Defence Committee.
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2353_F.htm
Suggested score:
Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
The interviewee has stated that the national defence policy exists but as a draft. The policy was drafted in 2013 and sent to the president for approval but the president has neither approved it yet nor sent any comments or feedback on the draft policy. Given the current turmoil, progress is unlikely. There is no such policy available from the Yemeni Ministry of Defence and there is no information available about it in the public domain.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Although there is no stated defence policy, I would argue that it is a de facto reality of Yemen's weak state that it had to accept the US drone assassination programme which was operating on its territory. This was debated by the Yemeni parliament and US drone operations were banned in a non-binding vote by the parliament. I would suggest that this constitutes some kind of basic discussion of military policy and that it might be worth adding a link such as this from Reuters and a paragraph explaining it.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/15/us-yemen-drones-idUSBRE9BE0EN20131215
Suggested score:
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
The engagement of Civil Society Organizations is not mentioned in the strategy or regulations of the defence or security institutions. According to an NGO worker, defence institutions have started to accept invitations to participate in some of activities aimed at fighting corruption. Security institutions have also agreed to take part in some anti-corruption activities. Recently, Transparency International Yemen has been involved in many activities with both institutions.
TI-Yemen and Yemeni Observatory for Human rights have held a number of meetings with the defence ministry and the Head of the Reforms Team has accepted a list recommendations and has formed a small committee to convert these recommendations into a road map. On June 5, 2014, the MOD spokesperson held the first ever press conference addressing issues raised by the media.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The process of CSO inclusion in the anti-corruption frameworks of the Yemeni state is lacking at best. CSO representatives are not well known within the parliamentary system and are thus not included or they do not feel safe enough in participating within the process or factional/party/tribe favoritism dictates those who are included. Co-option thus takes root in such elite capture situations.
United Nations Development Programme. September 2013 &quoute;Partnership Framework between the Government of Yemen and Civil Society Organizations.&quoute; Retrieved from http://www.ye.undp.org/content/dam/yemen/DemDov/Docs/UNDP-YEM-GoY-CSO%20EN.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: USAID produced this corruption assessment report on Yemen in 2006 which you should consider adding as a reference:
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf
Consider referring to p53/54 which talk about non-state actors and criticism of governmental corruption.
There is also some evidence that corruption is endemic in aid projects, and that aid workers even collude with CSO officials to carry out corrupt actions, as noted in this report:
http://www.irinnews.org/report/100005/despite-new-era-anti-corruption-agenda-struggles-in-yemen
The report notes that TI's local affiliate has also been harassed by the military and one of its project leaders was shot after giving a speech on anti-corruption.
Suggested score:
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
Yemen signed the UNCAC on 11 December 2003 and the parliament ratified it in June 2005. According to sources interviewed the ratification was followed up by issuing the &quoute;law 30 of 2006 on the asset declaration&quoute;. The parliament then issued the &quoute;law 39 of 2006 on combating corruption&quoute; and in 2012, issued the &quoute;law 13 of 2012 on the right to access information&quoute;. Yemen has also signed the UNTOC on 15 Dec 2000 and ratified it on 8 Feb 2010.
Though all these conventions have been signed or ratified by Yemen, the interviewees have indicated that Yemen has not taken any actions on the field to ensure their implementation.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed and score lowered from 3 to 2.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Untied nations Office on Drugs and Crime, &quoute;United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 2 April 2014&quoute;, reached at 30 April 2014 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
United Nation Treaty Collection,&quoute;The date of signature and ratification of UNTOC&quoute;, reached at 30 April 2014
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=xviii-12&chapter=18&lang=en
&quoute;مواءمة القوانين اليمنية مع اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لمكافحة الفساد&quoute;, SNACC Yemen, 15 August 2012.
&quoute;هيئة مكافحة الفساد تقيم مع جهات رسمية مدى تطبيق اليمن لاتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لمكافحة الفساد&quoute;, September 26 Daily, 8 January 2008.
Samir Hussein &quoute;مركز الدراسات والإعلام الاقتصادي نظم ندوة بصنعاء وناقش مدى التزام اليمن بتطبيق الاتفاقية الدولية لمكافحة الفساد&quoute;, Ahrar News, 30 December 2013
&quoute;إتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لمكافحة الفساد ودور اليمن في تنفيذها&quoute;, SNACC Yemen, 25 March 2008
http://26sep.net/news_details.php?sid=36860
http://www.snaccyemen.org/?ac=3&no=509&d_f=42&t_f=0&t=5&lang_in=Ar
http://ahrar-tagheer.com/index.php/2012-10-20-20-27-38/2312-2013-12-30-16-36-27
http://www.snaccyemen.org/?ac=3&no=151&d_f=42&t_f=0&t=5&lang_in=Ar
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Evidence of effective implementation is scarce if one is defining effectiveness based on decreased incidents of corruption and/or prosecutions. A majority of prosecutions have been low level when they have occurred. The Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption is the body responsible for referring cases of corruption and developing programs to address the issue. The process for ensuring independence involves members being selected by the Shura Council, these candidates then need to be approved by parliament, and are to serve only 5 years (something the president has been known to extend, i.e. 2012). In the 2012-2013 period 100 cases were referred for prosecution, but no sentences were handed out by the end of the year, which represents a critical gap in follow through within Yemen's legal system. Overall, accountability and transparency of Yemen's commitments under anti-corruption instruments has been underwhelming, but there have been attempts to achieve compliance even if those attempts are largely ineffective.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. State Department. 2013. &quoute;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Yemen.&quoute; pp. 27-30. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220595.pdf
Anti-Corruption Authorities. June 2012. &quoute;Profiles: Yemen.&quoute; Retrieved from https://www.acauthorities.org/country/ye
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I would consider reducing the score to 2, because of the weakness of the central authority in Yemen and the attested rise in corruption since the 2011 uprising. Passing laws is not enough to adhere to the spirit of UNCAC, and there seems to be little evidence of any state anti-corruption bodies pursuing prosecutions against corrupt officials.
The World Bank was quite positive about steps that Yemen made in 2007 towards setting up a body called SCACC to combat corruption. However, these gains seem to have been reversed by the breakdown of authority in 2011:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMNAREGTOPGOVERNANCE/Resources/Jan08ArunonYemen.pdf
Suggested score: 2
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
None of the interviewees had any evidence of public consultation on defence and security issues. One interviewees mentioned that national security issues are kept away from the public domain as they are considered to be highly sensitive.
The National Dialogue Conference, held over the period of March 2013 to January 2014, included a working group on the military and security sectors, please see peer reviewer responses for further information on this.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: While the statements on the absence of regular public debate are valid, it is also worth noting that the National Dialogue Conference, held over the period of March 2013 to January 2014, did include a working group on the military and security sectors. How inclusive and representative of the public these working groups were is up for debate. Nevertheless, it still stands that no regular public debate with government truly exists on this issue.
National Dialogue Conference website: http://www.ndc.ye/issue.aspx?show=7
International Crisis Group. 04 April 2013. Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?&quoute; Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/139-yemens-military-security-reform-seeds-of-new-conflict.aspx
Maged Almadhaji. 16 January 2014. &quoute;Yemen’s “Political Isolation” Proposal: The Road to Constitutional Ruin?&quoute; Retrieved from http://english.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=578&lang=en
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Should you consider mentioning the National Dialogue? Although it was not strictly a dialogue with the public, it was surely one of the first political discussions between multiple groups in Yemen which included steps to de-politicise the military.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25835721
Suggested score:
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
Yemen has a general anti-corruption policy presented in the &quoute;Law 39 of 2006 on Combating Corruption&quoute; and reinforced by the &quoute;Presidential Decree no 19 for the year 2010 on Executing the law on Combating Corruption&quoute;. This law is not made specially for the defence sector, but the ministry of defence has created a new position in the ministry of defence called&quoute; The General Inspector&quoute;, mandated to oversee that all the staff and processes in the MOD are complying with anti-corruption laws and regulations. An NGO worker has stated that the anti-corruption law is not fully implemented.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Anti-Corruption Law 39 (2006), http://www.pogar.org/publications/ac/compendium/yemen/anticorruption/anti-corruption-%20law-06-en.pdf
Presidential Decree no 19 (2010) Executing Anti-Corruption Law 39 (2006). http://www.snaccyemen.org/?ac=3&no=399&d_f=33&t_f=0&t=5&lang_in=Ar
&quoute;President Hadi issues new army restructuring decisions&quoute;, Yemen Observer, 11 April 2013 http://yemenobserver.com/front-page/357-president-hadi-issues-new-army-restructuring-decisions.html
&quoute;استحداث منصب المفتش العام في الهيكل الجديد للقوات المسلحة اليمنية&quoute;, Yemenat, 31 March 2013 http://www.yemenat.net/news32854.html
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is very little transparency or apparent evidence surrounding effective implementation of anti-corruption policy specifically in the Yemeni defence sector. In assessing Yemen's general progress in implementing anti-corruption policy across government there certainly seems to be a lack of enforcement for the adopted policies and laws that are in place, the involvement of civil society has not been sufficient or meaningful, and generally mechanism are subject to elite capture.
TRACK, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. &quoute;Legal Resources for Yemen: Anti-Corruption authorities.&quoute; Retrieved from http://www.track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/pages/LegalResources.aspx?country=Yemen [Copies of the strategy documents and laws provided on link's website]
United Nations Development Programme. April 2013. &quoute;Options for future form of Government and Decentralization in Yemen.&quoute; Retrieved from http://www.ye.undp.org/content/dam/yemen/DemDov/Docs/UNDP-YEM-Policy%20Paper.pdf
United Nations Development Programme. September 2013 &quoute;Partnership Framework between the Government of Yemen and Civil Society Organizations.&quoute; pp. 29-52. Retrieved from http://www.ye.undp.org/content/dam/yemen/DemDov/Docs/UNDP-YEM-GoY-CSO%20EN.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: This is a very useful overview of SNACC which provides information on their budget and number of cases handled which you should consider adding to your sources:
https://www.acauthorities.org/country/ye
Suggested score:
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
A new position has been created in the Ministry of Defence, this position is &quoute;the General Inspector&quoute; which is mandated to exercise oversight on all staff and processes in the Ministry of Defence to assure the full implementation of the law and regulations. It is also tasked with building integrity and fighting corruption by launching investigations for any wrongdoing in the MOD and then raising the case to the military judiciary. Unfortunately, there are not many open data sources relating to these topics in Yemen and this is due to the lack of transparency or openness of the defence institutions.
There are no other bodies tackling the matter of integrity in the MOD. The General Inspector's office is updated with all information required for the office to start working but the office is not well-equipped. The independence of the office is not clear as it is working under the command of the the Chief of Staff.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
&quoute;President Hadi issues new army restructuring decisions&quoute;, Yemen Observer, 11 April 2013
&quoute;استحداث منصب المفتش العام في الهيكل الجديد للقوات المسلحة اليمنية&quoute;, Yemenat, 31 March 2013
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Within the tumultuous political environment of Yemen right now, at the tail end of 2014, skepticism regarding the effective implementation of new policies and laws is forgivable. with the delayed implementation of the National Dialogue Conference recommendations and the tenuous power dynamics around the government and Houthi rebel ceasefire it is yet to be seen just how much leeway any reform programs will garner. Consider this and the relatively new role of the General Inspector, only time will tell us whether the position will be able to exercise effective oversight within Yemeni defence structures going forward.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I would add a caveat to this question noting that the future state of Yemen's military is uncertain, given that the Houthi forces have overrun Sanaa and that the South may secede. We will have to wait a few more days to see what direction the government will take; whether there can be a unity government established or whether the Houthi forces will decide to take control of the state themselves.
Suggested score:
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
There is limited evidence that the public trusts that the MOD and the president will take actions against corruption in defence institutions. However there is general disgruntlement and according to the interviewee, this will reach a stage where the public will lose their trust in the MOD and the president.
The interviewee stated that before 2011 the public did not believe that the MOD leaders were doing anything to fight corruption but after the uprising in 2011 the public have regained their trust in the MOD leaders and believe that they intend to fight corruption in the institution. Yet this may be ephemeral as the perception is that the MOD officials talk about fighting corruption but there is very little action.
There are reports that frustration with government corruption fueled the Houthi insurgency, for example this report from the Middle East Monitor: &quoute;Taking advantage of the frustration felt by many Yemenis as a result of the lack of social justice during Saleh's presidency, the Houthis' main propaganda claimed that they were launching an anti-corruption campaign and their rule would bring justice to Yemen. They played with this narrative during the 2011 protests especially, to give them legitimacy and support.&quoute;
In addition, military reforms under Hadi that were aimed at breaking patronage systems and strengthening counter-terrorism operations in the region were seen to disproportionately benefit the new regime, resulting in mass desertions, providing the Houthi rebels with trained troops and heavy weaponry.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
&quoute;Public support to reform the military and to fight corruption in Yemen&quoute;, Swissinfo, 30 April 2014, http://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/detail/content.html?cid=34576602
Middle East Monitor, “Beyond the Sunni-Shia narrative in Yemen”, 12 May 2015, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/18556-beyond-the-sunni-shia-narrative-in-yemen
Sasha Gordon, “Mutiny in the Yemeni Military,” Critical Threats, 10 July 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Florence Gaub, “Whatever Happened to Yemen’s Army?” EUISS, April 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Is it worth considering that the the number of armed tribal groups in different parts of Yemen constitutes one of the most obvious pieces of evidence that many areas have little confidence or loyalty to the state and its military forces? Especially in Sanaa, where many people now feel they have to carry their own weapons to protect themselves from violence and lawlessness, there seems to have been a complete breakdown in law and order:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/opinion/in-yemen-violence-pays.html?_r=0
Suggested score:
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
There is no assessment of the risks carried out by the Ministry of Defence or any other government agency, and none of the interviewees have any knowledge about any formal measures for mitigating such risks. The Supreme National Agency for Combating Corruption (SNACC) is mandated by law 39 of 2006 to investigate in any claims or reports about corruption incidents in any public institution, therefore, SNACC can help the MOD in such assessments but none of the interviewees has mentioned the existence any requests from the MOD to SNACC.
The interviewed Defence Official mentioned that during the National Dialogue Conference, a visit of the Defence and Security Committee was conducted. The committee conducted some interviews and field visits to assess the risks of corruption in the ministry of Defence and followed up with a list of recommendations to be applied to mitigate those risks. However, these recommendations have not been implemented yet.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Reports showing the activity during the NDC
Visit to military academy:
فريق الأمن والجيش يزور الأكاديمية العسكرية - Al Watan 07 May 2013, http://www.alwatanye.net/74164.htm
Visit to the military hospital: فريق الأمن والجيش يزور المستشفى العسكري للاطلاع على أوضاعه - NDC Website, 23 July 2013, http://www.ndc.ye/ar-news.aspx?id=1345
Visit to air forces: لجنة فريق الجيش والأمن ينفذا نزولا ميدانيا للقوات الجوية والدفاع الجوي - NDC website, 21 July 2013, http://www.ndc.ye/ar-news.aspx?id=1310
Visit to military camps in Hodaidah province:
لجنة اسس بناء الجيش والامن تزور عددا من الوحدات العسكرية والامنية في الحديدة - NDC Website, 14 May 2013, http://www.ndc.ye/ar-news.aspx?id=531
Visit to military camps in Aden province: مجموعة الأمن والجيش بعدن تطلع على مهام وجاهزية المنطقة العسكرية الرابعة - NDC Website, 27 May 2013, http://www.ndc.ye/ar-news.aspx?id=657
Visit to military camps in Hadhrmout province: فريق بناء الجيش والأمن بمؤتمر الحوار يزور المنطقة العسكرية الثانية بحضرموت - Saba News, 14 May 2013, http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news309880.htm
Visit to Moral Guidance Department:
مجموعة أسس بناء الجيش يزورون دائرة التوجيه للقوات المسلحة - Saba News, May 21 2013, http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news310776.htm
Visit to the Reforms Committee:
فريق الأمن والجيش يلتقي لجنة إعادة الهيكلة في القوات المسلحة - NDC Website, 6 May 2013, http://www.ndc.ye/ar-news.aspx?id=392
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It does not seem that many Yemenis have faith that reporting corruption would have any effect. However, there is some evidence that local press report on corruption in the public sector. However, it may be that it is harder or more dangerous to see where corruption occurs in the military, and recent collapse of state authority and the weakness of the national army contributes to this lack of defence sector transparency.
http://www.albawaba.com/business/yemen-corruption-473644
Suggested score:
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
According to the interviewee, the oversight applied is insignificant and there is no formal mention or evidence of it. The process for acquisition planning is so informal that the president may be involved sometimes and at other times the MOD leaders or the commanders of the units are involved instead. The interviewee is of the opinion that there is no transparency at all regarding acquisition planning and details are not publicly available.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Leaked cable which mentions that Yemen has no defence acquisition strategy:
Cable 05SANAA1534, YEMEN: FUNDING FOR THE CSF-CTU, 2005/07/06, http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/06/05SANAA1534.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Is it worth mentioning that it is likely that the Houthi militias will be integrated into the state military forces? The Houthis get weapons from Iran, so defence acquisition will likely be affected by these political ties.
http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/0b19b5f6-680a-4914-9fe5-dd672b7ab034
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215
Suggested score:
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
The budget is shown as one budget line in the national budget approved by the parliament. The budget shows some information about the key items of expenditure such as fuel and personnel but lacks detail. The budget is transparent in a very limited way as it is just published as a part of the national budget without details of the breakdowns. According to one of the interviewees, the budget was published in the newspaper for the first time in 2014.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
رئيس الجمهورية يصدر قوانين ربط الموازنة العامة للدولة وموازنات الوحدات المستقلة والاقتصادية للسنة المالية 2014م - Saba News, 16 January 2014, http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news338352.htm
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: You might consider adding a reference to the Global Security assessment of Yemen's military, which states:
&quoute;While the military's budget appears as a single line item, security sector budgets are even less transparent. Security sector monies come in large measure through discretionary budgets. End of fiscal year supplementary budgets are especially large in Yemen and entirely discretionary, expanding opportunities for corrupt behavior.&quoute;
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/yemen/military-intro.htm
A 2006 USAID report also states that:
&quoute;There is no meaningful oversight of the budget provided by Parliament, which, in any case, is only allowed an up or down vote on the budget.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf
Suggested score:
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
There are two legislative committees, one in Al-Shoura Council and the other one is in the parliament but a defence official has stated that neither the parliament nor Al-Shoura Council is practicing their authorized rights to exercise scrutiny or analysis on the defence budget in an effective way. According to one of the interviewed politicians, the defence and security committee in the council is not receiving enough updated information to enable the committee to perform its duties. He also mentioned that the building of Al-Shoura Council was attacked and damaged in 2011 and since then the council has been working in the presidential secretariat office instead and that is hindering their work. As for the parliamentarian committee, the parliament is susceptible to political influence and is working under the mandate of the Gulf Countries Council Initiative.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015. Essentially a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Politician 1, April 2014
Interview with Politician 2, April 2014
The committees and their tasks:
Al-shoura committee:
تكوينات مجلس الشورى, http://www.yemen-nic.info/sectors/politics/detail.php?ID=8435
Parliamentary Committee:
اختصـــاصـــات اللـــجنة - House of Parliament Website, http://www.parliament.gov.ye/commitees/Defaa.htm
الرقابة البرلمانية على الموازنة العامة - دراسة حالة - National Information Center, 2008, http://www.yemen-nic.info/contents/studies/detail.php?ID=20956
حلقة نقاشية حول &quoute;واقع الرقابة المالية&quoute; في اليمن - Arab Anti-Corruption Organization, http://arabanticorruption.org/article/24259/حلقة-نقاشية-حول-واقع-الرقابة-المالية-في-اليمن
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is also perhaps worth putting the caveat that the Parliament is currently suspended, and any unity government which emerges will likely incorporate the Houthi militias, and it is unknown whether they will make their budgets transparent, given that they are said to receive funding from Iran.
Suggested score:
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
The only time that the budget was published in the print media was 2014. However its continued availability is not guaranteed and there are no formal mechanisms for the media, civil society or citizens to request for information. The accessibility of the information may vary according to the identity of the individual or organization requesting the information. It is likely that if information is provided, it will not be detailed.
In 2012, parliament issued law 13 on the right to access information and this law obligates all public institutions to proactively publish detailed budgets however, there are limited examples of compliance with this law. In addition, a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
The Yemeni right to access information law, law 30 of the year 2012, Article 11
The right to access information showing depends on the identity of the individual requesting the information (page 33): http://action.transparency.org/yemen/yemen-resources
&quoute;IT BELONGS TO YOU: PUBLIC INFORMATION IN YEMEN&quoute; (p. 33, 2013), Transparency International - Yemen, http://www.transparency.org/files/content/activity/2013_ACTION_Yemen_EN.pdf
رئيس الجمهورية يصدر قوانين ربط الموازنة العامة للدولة وموازنات الوحدات المستقلة والاقتصادية للسنة المالية 2014م - Saba News, 16 January 2014. http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news338352.htm
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: You might consider adding this link and quote from the article:
&quoute;Mustafa Nassar, Chairman of Studies and Economic Media Centre (SEMC), said that the defence budget suffers from huge corruption, pointing out that it is not monitored by any authority, not even the Central Organization for Controlling and Auditing. &quoute;
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1572/report/850/Military-spending-after-the-revolution.htm
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
According to the interviewed defence official there is no publication of non-central government sources of funds. Further, such funds are not subject to scrutiny in spite of the fact that certain committees have the responsibility to scrutinize the process of disposal of assets. These committees are not effective and their performance is questionable.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015. Essentially a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Once again, this might change if the Houthi militias are incorporated into the army, or if the Houthis take over the military rule of Yemen entirely.
It's also likely that before December 2014 Saudi Arabia was funding the Yemeni government military.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/04/us-yemen-saudi-aid-idUSKCN0JI10V20141204
Also, the US provides 'development and transition assistance' to Yemen, some of which may be likely to end up as military spending.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196136.htm
Suggested score:
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
There is a process of internal audit by certain committees however, according the interviewees the process is ineffective. The parliament does not practice any oversight on these committees. All interviewees have denied hearing about any reports pertaining to internal audits by the above mentioned committees.
Essentially a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Department of supervision and inspection, http://www.yemen.gov.ye/portal/modefence_stoped/الهيكلواللائحةالتنظيمية/tabid/2376/Default.aspx?PageContentID=560
Information about a committee which was sent to the Aviation college to investigate corruption allegation:
http://www.yemeress.com/altagheer/37867
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The World Bank provided financing for a Public Finance Modernization project &quoute;to improve the efficiency and transparency of management of public finances by providing decision-support systems and building capacity of public finance management institutions&quoute;
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/04/17649655/yemen-public-finance-modernization-project-additional-financing
You could also reference this US Embassy report which notes that &quoute;the military budget is reportedly a single line item in the national budget, thus eliminating oversight or accountability&quoute; on page x.
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf
Suggested score:
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
All interviewees have stated that there is no evidence of such an audit process. According to the interviewed government official, the Central Organization for control and Audit (COCA) is mandated by law to practice an annual audit process on all public institutions including the defence and security institutions, however, the COCA is not able to access the records of the Ministry of Defence. He mentioned that ten years ago, the COCA was tasked with conducting an external audit of the Yemeni Economic Company, which is owned by the military, and at the time the information provided by the Ministry of Defence was insufficient and there was a lack of transparency.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Government Official, April 2014
&quoute;جهاز المحاسبة: وزير الدفاع يمنع الجهاز من فحص صندوق التقاعد ودائرة التموين العسكرية&quoute;, Saadah Net, 5 May 2014, http://saadanet.net/post/1009
&quoute;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 - Yemen&quoute;, US Dept. of State, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper
Article No 3 of the COCA law No 39 for the year 1992, http://womenpress.org/articles.php?id=207
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: You could mention the financial assistance from the US for better financial auditing processes:
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/04/17649655/yemen-public-finance-modernization-project-additional-financing
However, the conflict and political insecurity of the past year means that any gains from this programme are likely to have been ineffective.
Mustafa Nassar, Chairman of Studies and Economic Media Centre (SEMC), said that the defence budget suffers from huge corruption, pointing out that it is not monitored by any authority, not even the Central Organization for Controlling and Auditing.
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1572/report/850/Military-spending-after-the-revolution.htm
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
According to the interviewed NGO worker, the ministry of defence owns a number of large farms where they produce vegetables and fruits and sell them in the local market to citizens. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence distributes large quantities of harvest to military camps. The military also has a number of ranches and slaughterhouses from where they provide meat (mutton, chicken and beef) to the local market and to MOD officials.
There is a widely-held public belief that the military owns these properties but the public doesn't know anything other than that. The ministry of defence owns large spaces of lands in Yemen. Despite the comments of the interviewed NGO worker, the interviewed defence official maintained that he was unaware of the military owning any such businesses.
Please see peer reviewer comments for further evidence from the oil and gas sectors to support this score.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Algomhoriah, جيش وطني قوي 2-2 , http://www.algomhoriah.net/atach.php?id=17560
Yemen Economical Corporation which is owned by the military:
http://www.yeco.biz/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=13
http://www.yeco.biz/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=26
http://www.yeco.biz/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=16
http://www.yeco.biz/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=18
http://www.yeco.biz/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=24
http://www.yeco.biz/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=116
http://www.yeco.biz/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=19
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: You should mention the oil and gas sectors. This NOREF briefing notes that &quoute;Until Salih resigned from office, all oil revenues were largely appropriated by him and used to enhance his power through a highly personalised patronage system that extended his influence throughout the country.&quoute;
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/1630404e1a2c92bff47e10ff0a8f92cc.pdf
It seems that part of the instability in Yemen comes from the government's exploitation of oil and gas at the expense of local tribes in whose areas the fields lie.
A 2006 USAID report also notes that:
&quoute;Yemen’s military controls an extensive array of commercial activities, some legal and some extra-legal.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - p V
This article also states that: &quoute;Faqih said that leaders affiliated with the Ministry of defence have shares in highly profitable oil and telecommunications companies and that the Ministry of defence itself possesses private enterprises.&quoute;
http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/9746
Suggested score:
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
The sources provided suggest that the military has been involved in organised crime such as diesel and oil smuggling, illegal arms trade, drugs, and human trafficking. The Chatham House Report indicates that the military-run YECO was among the key beneficiaries of this involvement. Oil-related corruption is also endemic in the military, with officers benefiting directly from fuel allocated to their units and using military transport infrastructure to move it both within Yemen and to foreign markets.
According to the defence official interviewed the government has taken some action to stop this penetration by replacing some military leaders and enhancing the equipment of the coast and border guards.
However, while the government has shown some attention to this issue there is a belief that some of the ministry leaders are not willing to tackle it and trying to hinder the reforms with the intention of safeguarding their personal interests. Military reforms aimed at breaking patronage systems and strengthening counter-terrorism operations in the region were seen to disproportionately benefit the new regime, resulting in mass desertions, providing the Houthi rebels with trained troops and heavy weaponry.
Yemeni Modern Left, 'Topics on Smuggling', accessed on 30 April 2014, http://ysar.hooxs.com/t354-topic
Mareb Press, 'Yemen: close collapse', accessed on 30 April 2014, http://marebpress.net/articles.php?id=22825&lng=arabic
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Chatham House Report, 'Yemen Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict' p. 21, 2013
Sasha Gordon, “Mutiny in the Yemeni Military,” Critical Threats, 10 July 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Florence Gaub, “Whatever Happened to Yemen’s Army?” EUISS, April 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The government's substantial reliance on tribal structures and patronage systems increases the risk that the military and security sectors may be drawn into the activities of organised crime. These activities usually take the form of illicit trafficking in narcotics, arms, resources, and persons.
Lewis, Alexandra. 14 May 2013. &quoute;Violence in Yemen: Thinking About Violence in Fragile States Beyond the Confines of Conflict and Terrorism.&quoute; Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2(1):13. pp.10-11. Retrieved from http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.az/56
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: You could use this reference in a 2012 US State Department report which states that &quoute;The threat of regional terrorism dramatically overshadows that of organized crime.&quoute;
https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=12223
Suggested score:
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
All interviewees agree that there is known involvement of military officers in trafficking operations to and from Yemen. Trafficking includes but is not limited to human trafficking, drugs and oil trafficking. However, none of the interviewees possess any clear evidence to back up these claims. According to the media report mentioned above, many military officers are involved with goods and commodities trafficking. From the interviewees' perspective, it's clear that there is no policing function exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organized crime.
Military reforms aimed at breaking patronage systems and strengthening counter-terrorism operations in the region were seen to disproportionately benefit the new regime, resulting in mass desertions, providing the Houthi rebels with trained troops and heavy weaponry.
Albald news, 'Mocha Coast under the control of sheikhs and officers smuggling and an evidence of the state breakdown and its corrupt bodies', accessed on 30 April 2014, http://www.albaldnews.com/news5712.html
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Sasha Gordon, “Mutiny in the Yemeni Military,” Critical Threats, 10 July 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Florence Gaub, “Whatever Happened to Yemen’s Army?” EUISS, April 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats project notes that Hadi has not had much success in dismantling the corrupt patronage networks that Saleh created:
&quoute;Hadi’s efforts to dismantle entrenched patronage networks and to professionalize a force long accustomed to personal rule have met resistance&quoute;
http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Suggested score:
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
The interviewees have stated that there is no information of any internal or external oversight on intelligence services or any policies, administration, or budgets related to the intelligence services. The Central Organization for Control and Audit (COCA) is mandated by law to practice oversight on all key items of expenditure in all the budgets of all the public institutions but the COCA is not practicing any oversight on the budget of intelligence services.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015. Essentially a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Government Official, April 2014
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: You might want to include a reference to this Global Security report:
&quoute;Corruption among the police in Yemen was reportedly rampant. Most often, this seemed to take the form of petty bribery. The Yemen Polling Center's survey on bribery found that 59% of respondents identified security bodies as among the most corruption-prone public sector institutions or sectors in the country. As with many government employees, low salaries appear to contribute heavily to police corruption.&quoute;
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/yemen/index.html
In addition, Mustafa Nassar, Chairman of Studies and Economic Media Centre (SEMC), said that the defence budget suffers from huge corruption, pointing out that it is not monitored by any authority, not even the Central Organization for Controlling and Auditing.
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1572/report/850/Military-spending-after-the-revolution.htm
Suggested score:
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
According to the interviewees, all senior positions within the intelligence services are filled on the basis of political favoritism and family ties. Once appointed, no investigation of their suitability and prior conduct is undertaken. The media reports in the sources box confirm this practice.
Please see the peer reviewer comments for more information on partisanship in Yemen.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
&quoute; مراقبون: المشكلة ليست في الولاء كمبدأ.. لكن في تقديمه على الولاء للوطن &quoute;, Althawra News, 20 May 2014. http://althawranewspaper.net/print.php?id=83175
&quoute;التعيينات في الجيش والأمن خضعت لمعايير الولاء بدلاً عن الكفاءة - الخبير الاستراتيجي علي الذهب: الجيش مخترق من قبل القاعدة&quoute;, Almontasaf, 17 April 2014. http://www.almontasaf.net/PrintNews.aspx?NewsID=92ae9f5a-7187-4607-94d6-4ad14b8c1248.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Global Security also suggests that there are a number of interests which affect military loyalty and possibly appointments:
&quoute;units continued to be influenced by members of specific interest groups, however, from both former president Saleh’s family and other tribal and party entities&quoute;
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/yemen/index.html
International Crisis Group also note that: &quoute;some of Hadi’s appointments smack of his own brand of partisanship&quoute;
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/139-yemens-military-security-reform-seeds-of-new-conflict.aspx
Suggested score:
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
Yemen has not signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty and is unlikely to sign it because of some articles which require Yemen to prepare reports on the procurement and distribution and use of arms. There is no evidence of scrutiny of arms exports or even distribution. Yemen abstained from voting for or against on Arms Trade Treaty in The UN General Assembly of 2 April 2013.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
United Nations, &quoute;Yemen abstained to vote along with 22 other countries&quoute; , accessed on 30 April 2014 http://www.un.org/disarmament/update/20130402/ATTVotingChart.pdf
United Nations, &quoute;The Arms Trade Treaty&quoute;, accessed 23 September 2015, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Wikipedia suggests that there are some local variants of weapons produced for the Yemeni military but I am not sure where this information comes from.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemens_Military_Industry
Suggested score:
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
There are some procedures to control the disposal of assets but still these procedures are not effective. The commander of the unit or the Minister of Defence forms committees that are responsible for the disposal process. These committees are not transparent and there are always doubts about whether the assets are being sold for the benefit of the commander. Due to the lack of transparency surrounding the whole process, there is no public knowledge about the procedure of asset disposal nor of the controls.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Ali Saeed and Mohamed Bin Sallam, ”Counting Yemen’s Military Assets,” Yemen Times, April 5, 2012
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Could the fact that asset disposal is up to individual commanders reflect the fact of centralised authority within the Yemeni military, and the relative power and influence of regional tribal groups?
Suggested score:
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
There is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinized by an oversight body of any form. Since 2012 the Military and Technical Committee has been working on an inventory of all assets owned by the military but this committee has not published any reports yet.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Kuwaiti News Agency, ' الرئيس منصور هادي يطلب حصر ممتلكات الجيش اليمني ' , http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2225769&Language=ar
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
None of the interviewees had heard of an allocated percentage or a specific number dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services. According to the interviewed defence official the outcomes and recommendations produced by the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) has not mentioned such items but the NDC has stated that the budget must be distributed as 45% for salaries, 15% for technical and administration needs, 15% for preparation of the operations field, 15% for training, 1% for scientific researches, 9% for health insurance.
Please see peer reviewer comments for further information on defence budgets in Yemen.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Journalist, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Recommendations of the NDC (p.123-151), 2013-2014, http://www.ndc.ye/ndc_document.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Some sources like this 2007 US diplomatic cable report that:
&quoute;The Central Bank of Yemen historically underreports oil revenues so that the ROYG has extra money to spend on supplemental budgets at the end of the year.&quoute;
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07SANAA1138_a.html
It could be inferred that the reason for this is due to corrupt payments to individuals or for secret budgets of some kind.
The following article from 2012 notes that:
&quoute;Wafi asserts that much of the money which military leaders siphon from the defence budget slips through accounting loopholes as a result of the Yemeni parliament’s vague bookkeeping. Speaking on the 2012 budget, he said, “In the second part of the budget, fifty-nine billion Yemeni riyals ($275 million) is marked ‘other expenses.’ What are ‘other expenses’?”&quoute;
http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/9746
Suggested score:
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
According to all the interviewees, neither the parliament nor the Al-Shoura Council are provided with any information regarding expenditure on secret items relating to national security and military intelligence. Further, the Ministry of Defence classifies such information and endeavors to keep it away from the legislature.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015. Essentially a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Journalist, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Politician 1, April 2014
Interview with Politician 2, April 2014
البرلمان اليمني يبدأ إجراءات سحب الثقة عن حكومة &quoute;الوفاق&quoute; - Khabar News Agency, 30 April 2014. http://www.khabaragency.net/news12288.html
وزير الدفاع يرفض الحضور.. البرلمان يكلف لجنة الدفاع والامن بمتابعة ما انجزته اللجنة العسكرية - Barakish, 29 April 2012. http://barakish.net/news02.aspx?cat=12&sub=11&id=29485
وزير الدفاع يتغيب عن البرلمان ونواب يجددون رفضهم لرفع سعر الديزل - Saada Press, 29 April 2012. http://www.saadahpress.net/news/news-4111.htm
في حوار حول البرلمان والأمن - النائب عبد المعز دبوان: مقابل تغطية فساد ميزانية البرلمان يتم تمرير موازنة الدولة بكامل فسادها - NBA online, 16 July 2014. http://nbaonline.org/proccess-newss-191027.html
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Once there is a decision about the future parliamentary structure in Yemen, a note should be added specifying whether there is any greater likelihood of there being more auditing or military transparency in these issues.
Suggested score:
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
All interviewees have agreed that no auditing process is applied on the budget of the MOD at all except a process of internal audit in the shape of committees. However these committees are ineffective. There is no oversight on these committees neither by the parliament nor by the Al-Shoura Council. According to the interviewees there is no evidence of any reports provided by these committees.
Further, the cited media report shows an interview with a member of the parliament who stated that &quoute;there is no transparency or scrutiny in the defence sector and that means there is no accountability&quoute; and he added that the Parliament Chair does not dare to debate defence issues.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015. Essentially a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Politician 1, April 2014
Interview with Politician 2, April 2014
في حوار حول البرلمان والأمن - النائب عبد المعز دبوان: مقابل تغطية فساد ميزانية البرلمان يتم تمرير موازنة الدولة بكامل فسادها - NBA online, 16 July 2014. http://nbaonline.org/proccess-newss-191027.html
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It seems that both the US and German institutions have given money to improve auditing in government financial affairs. Like other Gulf countries, the military remains off limits, and is likely to do so without political stability improving.
https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/17093.html
Suggested score:
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
Whilst the interviewees had varied levels of information on the issue, all were of the opinion that off-budget expenditures do exist and were derived from the presidential budget. It must however be noted that the researcher was unable to find any law that dealt with the permissibility of off-budget expenditure. Due to the lack of transparency, a score of 0 has been awarded.
Interview with Defence Official, April 2014
Interview with NGO worker, April 2014
Interview with Politician 2, April 2014
أخطاء الجيش تربك الرئاسة اليمنية - Erem News, 15 May 2014. http://www.eremnews.com/?id=41094
50 وثيقة من وثائق وزارة الدفاع السرية لعام 2012 وتشمل فاتورة حرب أبين وبعض مصروفات الحرس الجمهوري والخاص واللواء الثالث مدرع والمنطقة الجنوبية - Mohamed Alabsi's Blog, 25 March 2013. http://mohamedalabsi.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/2012.html
The Relevant letters from the blog above are:
1) http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-McTN9KgrVks/UU_LhKBhAiI/AAAAAAAAFHM/X9LfRLwVZ9s/s1600/22.jpg
2) http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-jwDlqfKoT7A/UU_II2Cs5OI/AAAAAAAAFGM/9kpJf9aQJFU/s1600/5.jpg
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: A number of sources say that oil and gas revenues are underreported and this could lead to the existence of secret budgets, though it's not possible to verify this.
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07SANAA1138_a.html
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/1630404e1a2c92bff47e10ff0a8f92cc.pdf
Suggested score:
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
The interviewees are of the opinion that there are signs of off-budget expenditures and there are always questions about these expenditures' involvement in illicit economic activities. Yet due to lack of transparency in the defence sector, it is very hard to find any clear evidence on such illicit activities.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO worker, April 2014
Interview with Politician 2, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
ويكيليكس: الميزانية العسكرية في اليمن غير شفافة والإنفاق العسكري لا يخضع لأي مراجعة من خارج وزارة الدفاع - Almasdar Online, 1 October 2011. http://almasdaronline.com/article/24032
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: With the recent government collapse, it is likely that there is an increase in graft as different factions vie for control. However, it is very difficult to judge the situation on the ground at the moment until a new national government has been formed. I suggest updating this with an assessment of whether the next government is likely to be equally compromised by corruption as the last.
Suggested score:
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
According to the draft Yemeni Access to Information (ATI) law, there will be formal mechanisms to classify information in the defence and security sector. Article 24 of the ATI law states that all information about the defence sector can be accessed except information containing details of weapons, defensive tactics and strategies, military forces, secret military operations aimed at protecting the homeland and any confidential information related to foreign policy affairs for defence and military alliances.
The law does not address the scrutiny of these mechanisms. It must also be noted that this law is not in action yet and no government body has complied to it.
It is uncertain as to if, or when, this law will be adopted.The current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Article 24 of the Yemeni Access to Information law, law 13 of the year 2012, Article 24 - (p. 22) http://www.transparency.org/files/content/activity/2013_ACTION_Yemen_EN.pdf
TI-Yemen:
http://www.transparency.org/files/content/activity/2013_ACTION_Yemen_EN.pdf
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Until the release of US diplomatic cables in 2010, Yemen had a secret deal with the US to allow the US to bomb al-Qaeda militants. Although this was revealed, the US has unilaterally continued the practice despite opposition by the last Yemen government. If the Houthis take control now, there is some likelihood that they will continue to cooperate with the US against al-Qaeda.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11918037
http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-strategic-shift-u-s-draws-closer-to-yemeni-rebels-1422576308
Suggested score:
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
It's formally declared to the public that the government owns Yemen Economic Corporation (YECO) which is known to be one of the largest economic entities in Yemen due to its involvement in many industries such as food, clothes, medicines, electronics and others. However, YECO is a renaming of the old Military Economic Corporation (MECO), and it's widely believed that the military still de facto controls it.
YECO started as a company providing subsidized products to soldiers but has expanded and is today involved in a wide range of activities e.g. imports of: basic food goods, military supplies and clothing, motor vehicles, ammunition, office and home furniture, electronics and computers, livestock and building material. YECO is widely exempted from paying taxes, customs or duties on its imports. Apart from import YECO is involved in food processing, storage and goods transportation. YECO also owns the largest pharmaceutical production in the country, several state farms, 50 per cent of all former state owned companies in the south, major shipping fleets and fishing licenses. YECO has a privileged access to government procurement contracts and has frequently been accused of extortion schemes against other companies, including foreign investors, not paying suppliers and directly forcing other companies bankrupt.
This corporation severely lacks transparency it is extremely onerous to obtain information about it.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Politician 2, April 2014
&quoute;Yemen Military&quoute;, Global Security, 26 July 2013. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/yemen/military-intro.htm
نشأت و تطور المؤسسة - Yemen Economical Corporation, 2013, http://www.yeco.biz/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=6
&quoute;Sectors&quoute; - Yemen Economical Coproration, http://yeco.biz/yecoeng/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=20
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Given the collapse of the Yemeni military and the takeover of Sanaa by the Houthi rebels, it is unclear exactly where revenues from oil and gas resources are going currently, but it might be worth talking to some of the sources interviewed to know if the Central Bank is still receiving payments from the companies who are working the oil and gas fields.
Suggested score:
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
According to the interviewees, no scrutiny is applied to military-owned businesses. During the 1990s, the Central Organization for Control And Auditing (COCA) attempted to carry out an audit of the Yemeni Economic Corporation (YECO), however, it was unable to obtain the required information. The interviewed defence official stated that even when the MOD tries to apply scrutiny, its efforts fall considerably short of international standards.
The following link shows that demands to put the YECO under scrutiny never happened:
http://almasdaronline.com/article/58953
In addition, there is evidence that the MOD minister is stopping the COCA from applying scrutiny:
http://www.akhbaralyom.net/news_details.php?sid=79080
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Government Official, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
ويكيليكس: الميزانية العسكرية في اليمن غير شفافة والإنفاق العسكري لا يخضع لأي مراجعة من خارج وزارة الدفاع - Almasdar Online, 1 October 2011. http://almasdaronline.com/article/24032
وداعاً صخر، مرحباً صخر - Almasdar Online, 16 June 2014. http://almasdaronline.com/article/58953
في مذكرة رفعت إلى رئيس الجمهورية شكا فيها رفض اللواء ناصر وعدم تعاون مسؤولي صندوق التقاعد العسكري..
جهاز المحاسبة: منع وزير الدفاع قيام الجهاز بدوره الرقابي يعكس للمانحين عدم جدية الحكومة في محاربة الفساد - Akhbar Alyom, 5 May 2014. http://www.akhbaralyom.net/news_details.php?sid=79080
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It's difficult to see what power the state military has anymore, considering the capture of checkpoints by secessionists in the south and the demands of the Houthi rebels to incorporate their forces into the police and army.
http://www.aawsat.net/2015/02/article55341054
http://www.indileak.com/pro-secession-gunmen-seize-military-sites-in-yemen/
It may be that we have to wait to see what the state military still controls when a new government is formed.
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
None of the interviewees has knowledge of a law forbidding private enterprises by military or other defence ministry employees. The interviewees have stated that it's known to the public that many military commanders are the owners of security companies, oil contractors, lands, hospitals and malls. Media reports mention such ownership as well. The government is not taking any actions to stop these officers because it is not outlawed in practice.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Politician 2, April 2014
فيما أبناء حضرموت وشبوة يعانون..الكشف عن مراكز قوى ومسئولين ومشائخ بصنعاء متورطين بالتوكيلات غـير المشروعة مع شركات النفط - Aden Almnarh, http://adenalmnarh.com/Print/1536464
اليكم قائمة باسماء المتنفذين والمهيمنين على الشركات النفطية في مارب وشبوة وحضرموت - Mareb News, 26 May 2013. http://www.marebnews.com/news26677.html%20%D9%88%D8%A3%D9%8A%D8%B6%D8%A7%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF..%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Additional source on a historical instance of for-hire armed escorts to commercial vessels by the Yemeni Navy (2011).
Coker, Margaret. 04 January 2011. &quoute;U.S. Military Aid Is Available for Hire in Yemen.&quoute; Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204204004576049660513491614
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The existence of military owned businesses is likely to be part of the long tradition of Saleh's patronage network which has resulted in him retaining significant power despite being deposed in 2011. The rivalry between the Saleh and Hadi wings of the People's Congress Party have also resulted in an even weaker government which has been overpowered by rebels on two fronts.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/01/07/Yemen-s-former-president-holds-down-his-fort.html
The 2006 USAID report on corruption in Yemen also notes that:
&quoute;Yemen’s military controls an extensive array of commercial activities, some legal and some extra-legal....In addition to the budget process, military elites are rewarded financially through their control of extensive commercial enterprises.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - p V-VI
Suggested score:
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
All interviewees maintain that there is a lack of such commitments by the Ministry of Defence.
Many senior officers were expected to make greater commitments to fighting corruption due to the uprising in 2011. Taking advantage of the frustration felt by many Yemenis as a result of the lack of social justice during Saleh's presidency, &quoute;the Houthis' main propaganda claimed that they were launching an anti-corruption campaign and their rule would bring justice to Yemen. They played with this narrative during the 2011 protests especially, to give them legitimacy and support&quoute;, as reported by Middle East Monitor.
Military reforms aimed at breaking patronage systems and strengthening counter-terrorism operations in the region were seen to disproportionately benefit the new regime, resulting in mass desertions, providing the Houthi rebels with trained troops and heavy weaponry. No commitment to anti-corruption is therefore in evidence.
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Sasha Gordon, “Mutiny in the Yemeni Military,” Critical Threats, 10 July 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Florence Gaub, “Whatever Happened to Yemen’s Army?” EUISS, April 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf
Middle East Monitor, “Beyond the Sunni-Shia narrative in Yemen”, 12 May 2015, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/18556-beyond-the-sunni-shia-narrative-in-yemen
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Despite the turmoil in Yemen, the SNACC is still operating, sending a recent delegation to India:
http://nationalyemen.com/2015/01/16/yemen-anti-corruption-officials-to-visit-india/
The justice minister also recently met with the World Bank to discuss judicial changes to combat corruption:
http://www.sabanews.net/en/news384256.htm
Despite anti-corruption protests in 2012, former President Saleh enjoys immunity from prosecution over his corrupt disposal of state assets. Such impunity does not encourage the military, or what is left of it, to make statements about their commitment to combating corruption.
http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/10/01/264455/yemenis-hold-anticorruption-rallies/
The Houthi militias have made promises to combat corruption which remained in tact despite the 2011 transition. Whether they will be able to do this is questionable, considering that they have themselves benefited from corrupt tribal allegiances with the Yemeni government.
http://www.mei.edu/content/article/yemens-houthi-takeover
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
There are some measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption. However, these measures are not enough and often implemented on ordinary and low ranked personnel rather than on high-ranking officials. The Military Judiciary System, where these cases are forwarded, is known to be ineffective due to a lack of oversight. This weakness is inherent in the entire judicial system and in the unstable political and security situation.
COCA and SNACC are mandated to refer cases of corruption to prosecution, but COCA is not allowed to audit the military and security establishments and SNACC has historically refrained from investigating cases within these establishments due to fear of political reprisals. In addition, due to the current turmoil, it is unclear whether any of these measures are still in place.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Yemen Press, القضاء العسكري يستدعي ضابط كبير في الأشغال العسكرية للتحقيق في قضايا فساد ونهب للمال العام , May 2014, http://yemen-press.com/news30920.html
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Perhaps the attempt to remedy the issue of ghost soldiers using biometric registration is relevant here?
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/yemen-reforms-corruption-ridden-public-payroll-1.1372192
This LSE blog notes that: &quoute;The Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC) lacks the teeth to implement much needed anti-corruption measures. &quoute;
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2014/03/03/yemens-negotiated-transition-between-the-elite-and-the-street/
Part of the reason for the public support of the Houthis is their stated commitment to doing something about corruption in Yemen:
&quoute;“The revolutionaries must run the controlling and auditing agencies, and anti-corruption committee, and public fund prosecution offices and the general prosecution office,” said Mr Aklan of the Houthi revolutionary committee.&quoute;
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/115964/World/Region/Yemens-domestic-crisis-worsened-by-recent-UN-sanct.aspx
Suggested score:
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
All interviewees report that there is an absence of any legislation or mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel to facilitate corruption reporting. It is general practice to retaliate against whistle-blowers by relieving them of their posts, threatening physical harm and depriving deserved promotions and bonuses.
Some cases have been reported to the Supreme National Agency for Combating Corruption (SNACC) but SNACC has not taken these cases up due to the sensitive nature. In law, the law no 7 for the year 1996 has encouraged whistle-blowing in articles 17 and 18.
A series of anti-corruption protests within different institutions, including military units, in late 2011 and early 2012 was hoped to contribute to a process of change in the professional standards within military and defence institutions. However, the subsequent military reforms aimed at breaking patronage systems and strengthening counter-terrorism operations in the region were seen to disproportionately benefit the new regime, resulting in mass desertions, providing the Houthi rebels with trained troops and heavy weaponry.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Politician 2, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
The Yemeni Military Penal Procedures law, law 7 for the year 1996, articles 17 and 18.
Yemen Press, فساد دائرة الأشغال العسكرية , http://yemen-press.com/file2.html
Yemen Press, فضيحة فساد بالمليارات للمؤسسة الاقتصادية اليمنية , September 2013, http://yemen-press.com/news22873.html
Sasha Gordon, “Mutiny in the Yemeni Military,” Critical Threats, 10 July 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Florence Gaub, “Whatever Happened to Yemen’s Army?” EUISS, April 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Consider including this reference from IRIN:
&quoute;the anti-corruption agenda is still grappling with a culture of impunity in which people are reluctant to blow the whistle out of fear of losing their jobs, donor funding or worse.&quoute;
http://www.irinnews.org/report/100005/despite-new-era-anti-corruption-agenda-struggles-in-yemen
Suggested score:
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
There is no evidence that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions. High ranking positions, including procurement officers and financial managers, are being filled according to the wishes of the president and the assignments in these sensitive positions are not subject to any integrity requirements or educational qualifications because it's up to the preferences of the president and the MOD minster and political or tribal loyalty, whilst lower positions are due to the personal preference of the commander.
Military reforms aimed at breaking patronage systems and strengthening counter-terrorism operations in the region were seen to disproportionately benefit the new regime, resulting in mass desertions, providing the Houthi rebels with trained troops and heavy weaponry.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Sasha Gordon, “Mutiny in the Yemeni Military,” Critical Threats, 10 July 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Florence Gaub, “Whatever Happened to Yemen’s Army?” EUISS, April 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The USAID report notes that the northern tribes especially have been progressively taking over important military positions, and this could help to explain how the Houthis have broken free of government control and now essentially form a large part of the Yemeni military:
&quoute;At an accelerating pace since 1994, state resources have been increasingly taken over by tribal elites, either in their capacity as tribal leaders or through their domination of the upper echelons of the military and security forces.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - p2
It seems likely that if the Houthi militias are now integrated into the Yemeni military, that they will occupy increasingly important positions within military institutions.
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1836/news/4614/defence-minister-calls-for-Houthi-integration-into-security-forces.htm
Suggested score:
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
There is no evidence that the number of civilian and military personnel is accurately known. The MOD often raises the issue of ghost soldiers claiming that they must clean the ministry records from all ghost soldiers. The MOD has a plan to start a fingerprint system to eliminate ghost soldiers and the president has approved this plan which is to be implemented starting from August 2014. The interviewee has stated that no one is aware of the accurate number of staff at the MOD.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Please see peer reviewer comments for more information on how ghost soldiers have been a long-standing problem in Yemen.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
&quoute;Military Budget Keeps Increasing&quoute; - National Yemen, 12 January 2013. http://nationalyemen.com/2013/01/12/military-budget-keeps-increasing/
وزارة الدفاع اليمنية تشكل لجاناً لحصر عدد القوات المسلحة لأول مرة منذ خمسين عاماً - Al Sharq, 6 October 2012. http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2012/10/06/521403
90 ملياراً كانت تصرف سنوياً لضباط وجنود وهميين في في الحرس الجمهوري
قائد عسكري: قوام الجيش اليمني حالياً لا يقل عن 700 ألف وصيف 94 أنهى نصفه - Yemen Press
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Due to past government approaches towards the integration of tribesmen and sheikhs to military and internal security forces, personnel to the defence sector is both quite murky and extensive. The number of soldiers employed by sheikhs/colonels in the tribal areas can range from a handful to over one hundred. The practice of ghost soldiers, as mentioned by the country assessor, has only exacerbated the challenges in accurately accounting for personnel in the armed services. The Yemeni government's agreement with Houthi rebels in late October 2014 after a lengthy and destabilizing conflict will likely restrict any progress towards gaining a more accurate count of security forces. This is due to the pressure to integrate Houthi fighters and commanders into the internal security forces and military, both to aid in the battle with al-Qa'ida and to secure rebel influence in future government policies.
International Crisis Group. 04 April 2013. &quoute;Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?&quoute; Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 239. pp. 27-32. Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Yemen/139-yemens-military-security-reform-seeds-of-new-conflict.pdf
Al-Sakkaf, Nasser and Brett Scott. 16 October 2014. &quoute;Rebels in disguise.&quoute; Yemen Times. Retrieved from http://www.yementimes.com/en/1825/report/4457/Rebels-in-disguise.htm
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I have seen estimates between 100,000 and 130,000, but these figures are likely to be very inflated due to the number of ghost soldiers:
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=yemen
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - p4
In addition, the government's military forces have essentially collapsed, so the number is likely to have fluctuated dramatically in the last 6 months since the 5-6 months since the Houthis occupied Sanaa.
Suggested score:
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
There is a lack of sufficient information about the payment and allowances rates for civilian and military personnel. Soldiers and others within the defence sector may have this information however it is not openly published in the public domain. According to interview, the minister can grant bonuses to some officers at his discretion.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: To build on to the comments of the country assessor, in reference back to the single line budget publications, there is no publicly available breakdown of the defence budget in terms of personnel costs either.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The extent of corruption is a good reason why the rates of pay are not published. The military budget is very high in order to buy the loyalty of regional tribal leaders. According to USAID:
&quoute;The tendering process could easily become a means to reward favored allies with lucrative contracts. In addition to the budget process, military elites are rewarded financially through their control of extensive commercial enterprises. Other resources allocated to military elites via the phenomenon of ‘ghost soldiers’ are reportedly resold on the open market for profit. The GPC distributes resources to regional and other elites in order to keep them in the political fold.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - p VI
Suggested score:
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
Personnel receive payment on time with only few days delay at most. However, personnel do not receive the entire payment due since the unit commander receives payments for the entire unit and then distributes this further at his discretion. The soldier interviewed claims that he does not know what his salary really is due to deductions made by the senior officers in the unit when they deliver the salaries in cash. Such instances of deductions are confirmed by media reports. The system of payment is not published or even known to the soldiers.
It should be noted that in August 2014 the MOD launched the first phase of distributing salaries through post-offices and banks. However, due to the ongoing turmoil, it is unclear whether or not this is still in place.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with a Military Soldier
احتجاجا على استقطاعات طالت رواتب عدد كبير من الجنود من أبناء القبلية في اللواء.. -Al Sahwa, 7 May 2010. http://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/arabic/subjects/1/2010/7/5/2164.htm
قوات حفظ السلام اليمنية تعتزم مقاضاة مسؤولين ونافذين في وزارة الدفاع - Yemen Press, 28 September 2012. http://yemen-press.com/news12939.html
أفراد من الأمن العام بلحج يشكون استقطاعات غير قانونية من رواتبهم الزهيدة - Aden Life, 3 March 2013. http://www.muad.adenlife.net/news/18944/
استقطاع (5) آلاف ريال من رواتب منتسبي أمن عدن بطريقة غير قانونية - Sahafah, 12 December 2011. http://www.sahafah.net/show554184.html
جنود اللواء 22 حرس جمهوري سابقا ينتفضون على البخيتي بعد خصم رواتبهم - Almashhad-Alyemeni, 13 March 2013. http://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/news27615.html#sthash.cO3ZwOHf.dpuf
وزارة الدفاع تدشن صرف مرتبات منتسبي الجيش عبر البريد - Yemen Press 12 August 2014. http://yemen-press.com/news33995.html
تدشين المرحلة الأولى من صرف المرتبات لديوان ودوائر وزارة الدفاع عبر البريد - Saba News, 1 September 2014. http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news366427.htm
تدشين المرحلة الأولى من صرف المرتبات لديوان ودوائر وزارة الدفاع عبر البريد - October 14, 2 September 2014. http://www.rasd24.net/newsdetails.aspx?id=1495778
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: You might include a reference to this article which states that there are &quoute;regular reports that units are rebelling because troops’ salaries have not been paid or because of questions of unit management. These mutinies are not confined to the military alone, but also occur within units of Yemen’s security organizations.&quoute;
http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Suggested score:
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
According to the interviewees, there is no established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management. The process relies heavily on patronage, family ties, or personal relations with the president. Nepotism and favoritism is widespread in the military, and qualifications and jobs descriptions do not seem to be of concern in this process. Open data sources confirm these observations.
According to the interviewed defence official, the inspector general's office and the reform committee have developed a draft of an appointment system that is dependent on the qualifications of applicants. However, military reforms aimed at breaking patronage systems and strengthening counter-terrorism operations in the region were seen to disproportionately benefit the new regime, resulting in mass desertions, providing the Houthi rebels with trained troops and heavy weaponry.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Journalist, April 2014
&quoute;LEGAL AFFAIRS MINISTER SAYS ‘NO’ TO NEPOTISM IN GOVERNMENT HIRING&quoute; - Yemen Times, 19 JUly 2012. http://www.yementimes.com/en/1591/news/1166/Legal-Affairs-minister-says-%E2%80%98no%E2%80%99-to-nepotism-in-government-hiring.htm
&quoute;Gotta love Yemeni nepotism&quoute;, The Global Intelligence Files, Wikileaks, 10 September 2013. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/27/2769092_gotta-love-yemeni-nepotism-.html
وضاح المودع: الرئيس يدير البلد بالصراعات وقراراته مناطقيه - Al Ahale, 26 March 2014. http://alahale.net/article/15733
تعيينات هادي تؤجج النار الطائفية بين اليمنيين, Middle East Online, 22 September 2012. http://www.middle-east-online.com/?id=139627
تعز.. المسجلين في الكليات العسكرية يشكون من الوساطة والمحسوبية وبيع كروت التسجيل وتدخل قيادات نافذة - Yemenat, 23 August 2013. http://www.newssum.net/details.php?id=111628
Sasha Gordon, “Mutiny in the Yemeni Military,” Critical Threats, 10 July 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Florence Gaub, “Whatever Happened to Yemen’s Army?” EUISS, April 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The USAID report from 2006 notes that &quoute;Leaders of key tribes constitute the lion’s share of top military and security officers. A similar pattern is found in the security forces.&quoute;
Mediation of competing tribal interests since the 1970s seems to have resulted in privileging to tribal politics within the state, and the appointments system seems to have become a victim of this process.
Suggested score:
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
According to the interviewee, most personnel are promoted through nepotism, favoritism and personal relationships with decision makers. This is confirmed by open data sources as well. There is no evidence of formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process, though the law does make provisions for the existence of these mechanisms in law 67 (1991) with regards to the military and security service in article 8.
Military reforms aimed at breaking patronage systems and strengthening counter-terrorism operations in the region were seen to disproportionately benefit the new regime, resulting in mass desertions, providing the Houthi rebels with trained troops and heavy weaponry.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
The Yemeni Military and Security Service law, law 67 of the year 1991, article 8
&quoute;Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict&quoute;, Chatham House, 1 September 2013 http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/194239#sthash.PTBSCAEr.dpuf
زواج السياسة بالاقتصاد:صالح الذي سيطر على الدولة و محسن الذي سيطر على القسم الأكبر من الجيش والشيخ الأحمر وسيط السعودية لدفعات المحسوبية الواردة لرعايا قبائل اليمن - Al Fjer Al Gadeed 11 April 2014. http://alfjeralgaaded.net/news_details.php?sid=1177
تعز.. المسجلين في الكليات العسكرية يشكون من الوساطة والمحسوبية وبيع كروت التسجيل وتدخل قيادات نافذة - Yemenat, 23 August 2013. http://www.yemenat.net/news38741.html
Sasha Gordon, “Mutiny in the Yemeni Military,” Critical Threats, 10 July 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Florence Gaub, “Whatever Happened to Yemen’s Army?” EUISS, April 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: A 2006 USAID report notes that:
&quoute;There are five main elite groups that profit from the structure of corruption in Yemen. The two most important are also the two with the most overlap: tribes and the military-security establishment. Leaders of key tribes constitute the lion’s share of top military and security officers. A similar pattern is found in the security forces.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - page V
Suggested score:
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Yemen stopped compulsory conscription on 16 May 2001.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Asharq Al-Awsat, مجلس الدفاع الوطني اليمني يجمد التجنيد الإجباري ويلغي البدل النقدي وبفتح الباب للتطوع , May 2001, http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=38532&issueno=8206#.U5DY8nKSySo
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Yemen stopped compulsory conscription on 16 May 2001 but it is unclear whether voluntary conscription is in place.
The MOD occasionally forms some Popular Committees of &quoute;tribal gunmen&quoute; to fight Al-Qaeda in some provinces. These are not recruited as soldiers, they are volunteers and the MOD will stop using them when the fights with Al-Qaeda is over. The MOD pays 30,000 Yemeni Rial to each tribal gunman on a monthly basis.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed, although situation on the ground is currently unclear.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
يتحدث عبد اللطيف السيد قائد اللجان الشعبية في ابين لأخبار اليوم:
بعد تسريحي من اللجان سأعود الى عملي مزارعا وراعي &quoute;نوب&quoute; - Akhbar Alyom, 30 November 1999. http://www.akhbaralyom.net/news_details.php?sid=69196
Asharq Al-Awsat, مجلس الدفاع الوطني اليمني يجمد التجنيد الإجباري ويلغي البدل النقدي وبفتح الباب للتطوع , May 2001, http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=38532&issueno=8206#.U5DY8nKSySo
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I would consider changing the score to 0, because the preferred positions are themselves a form of bribery to various tribal groups.
Suggested score: 0
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
According to the interviewees, there is a clear evidence of the existence of the ghost solders on payroll for the last 30 years. The Ministry of Defence has started to examine payment systems with the human resources department in the ministry with the intention to remove ghost soldiers.
The last incident of erasing ghost solders was apparently four months ago according to interviewees, however no publicly evidence of this was found. It should also be noted that in August 2014 the MOD launched the first phase of distributing salaries through post-offices and banks. Due to the ongoing turmoil it is unclear whether or not this is still in place.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Yemen Times newpaper, YEMEN’S INSECURITY DILEMMA:
http://www.yementimes.com/en/1754/opinion/3471/Yemen%E2%80%99s-Insecurity-Dilemma.htm
وزارة الدفاع تدشن صرف مرتبات منتسبي الجيش عبر البريد - Yemen Press 12 August 2014. http://yemen-press.com/news33995.html
تدشين المرحلة الأولى من صرف المرتبات لديوان ودوائر وزارة الدفاع عبر البريد - Saba News, 1 September 2014. http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news366427.htm
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Some have estimated that of Yemen's approximately 100,000 soldiers more than one third are ghost soldiers. The prescription to the ghost soldier problem identified by the country assessor, direct payment of soldiers through post offices, is generally viewed as a best practice for eliminating the phenomenon in Yemen by limiting the influence of sheikhs and make full-time employment as a soldier an attractive option to tribesmen.
Ghost workers are also a problem in the wider government bureaucracy. The government of Yemen set to implement a biometric identification card system in 2006, which was backed by a Presidential Decree. However, in a 2010 assessment it was found that 170,000 employees, of which a majority were part of the security and military services, had still not be enrolled and only 3,792 double dippers were removed out of an estimated 60,000. Further evaluations of how effective reforms have been in addressing ghost soldiers, particularly in the post National Dialogue Conference period, was not found in a review of open sources.
Fattah, Khaled. 11 February 2014. &quoute;Yemen's Insecurity Dilemma.&quoute; Yemen Times. Retrieved from http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/02/11/yemen-s-insecurity-dilemma/h1v5 [original article link: http://www.yementimes.com/en/1754/opinion/3471/Yemen%E2%80%99s-Insecurity-Dilemma.htm]
Robinson, Glenn E., Oliver Wilcox, Stephen Carpenter, and Abdul Ghani Al-Iryani. 25 September 2006. &quoute;Yemen Corruption Assessment.&quoute; Produced by ARD Inc. for review by the United States Agency for International Development. pp. ix, 4, and 21. Retrieved from http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf
International Crisis Group. 04 April 2013. &quoute;Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?.&quoute; Crisis Group Middle East Report N°139. pp. 30-32. Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Yemen/139-yemens-military-security-reform-seeds-of-new-conflict.pdf
Gelb, Alan and Julia Clark. January 2013. &quoute;Identification for Development: The Biometrics Revolution.&quoute; Center for Global Development. Working Paper 215. p. 28. Retrieved from http://www.cgdev.org/files/1426862_file_Biometric_ID_for_Development.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: USAID's 2006 report on Yemen notes that &quoute;In addition to the budget process, military elites are rewarded financially through their control of extensive commercial enterprises. Other resources allocated to military elites via the phenomenon of ‘ghost soldiers’ are reportedly resold on the open market for profit.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - pVI
It appears the government tried to institute biometric registration in 2014 to reduce the number of ghost soldiers. It is not certain how much effect this move has had.
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/yemen-reforms-corruption-ridden-public-payroll-1.1372192
Suggested score:
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
There is no evidence that the chains of command are separate from the chains of payment. According to interviewees, the higher the position that the commander reaches, the easier it is for him to influence the chain of payment. It should be noted though that in August 2014 the MOD launched the first phase of distributing salaries through post-offices and banks, although due to the ongoing turmoil it is unclear whether this is still in place.
Military reforms aimed at breaking patronage systems and strengthening counter-terrorism operations in the region were seen to disproportionately benefit the new regime, resulting in mass desertions, providing the Houthi rebels with trained troops and heavy weaponry.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
&quoute;COUNTING YEMEN’S MILITARY ASSETS&quoute; - Yemen Times, 5 April 2012. http://www.yementimes.com/en/1561/news/677/Counting-Yemen%E2%80%99s-military-assets.htm.
جنود يتمردون على قائد اللواء 105 ويحاصرونه لساعات في مقر القيادة - Yemenat, 7 November 2013. http://www.yemenat.net/news41803.html
وزارة الدفاع تدشن صرف مرتبات منتسبي الجيش عبر البريد - Yemen Press 12 August 2014. http://yemen-press.com/news33995.html
تدشين المرحلة الأولى من صرف المرتبات لديوان ودوائر وزارة الدفاع عبر البريد - Saba News, 1 September 2014. http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news366427.htm
تدشين المرحلة الأولى من صرف المرتبات لديوان ودوائر وزارة الدفاع عبر البريد - October 14, 2 September 2014. http://www.rasd24.net/newsdetails.aspx?id=1495778
Sasha Gordon, “Mutiny in the Yemeni Military,” Critical Threats, 10 July 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Florence Gaub, “Whatever Happened to Yemen’s Army?” EUISS, April 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The 2006 USAID report states that &quoute;First, important commanding officers are provided budgets based on the number of soldiers under their command... About 240,000 young males become eligible for the military each year, providing an abundant source of names. In either case, their commanding officers reportedly will receive money for their salaries, weapons, ammunition, food and blankets, and pro-rated numbers of vehicles, fuel and tires, among other items.&quoute;
The control of payments by commanders is part of how they are traditionally bribed to remain loyal to the state.
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - p4
Suggested score:
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
There is no evidence of a Code of Conduct for military and civilian defence personnel. According to the interviewed defence official, there are some guidelines for military personnel behavior in law 67 (1991) on the military and security service in articles 54,55,56,57, but they are not implemented in practice and there is a lack of oversight enforcing these guidelines.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
the Yemeni military and security service law, law 67 of the year 1991, articles 54,55,56,57
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: This article provides some evidence of 'rules and regulations' but doesn't specify what they are. There was disagreement over the control of SCUD missiles, which were under the command of Saleh's son.
The Ministry of Defence stated that &quoute;targeting leading military figures such as the defence minister and the chief of general staff, 'aims at disrespecting the heroic roles of these two figures in restoring security and stability and preserving the cohesion and unity of the armed forces. In addition, it affects their strenuous quest to enforce military laws, rules and regulations to purge the armed forces of corruption.' &quoute;
Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/politics/2012/12/yemen-politicians-divided-over-military-control.html##ixzz3QfgeyF2N
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
There is no evidence of any Code of Conduct for military and civilian defence personnel.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Politician 2, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As USAID noted in 2006, the tribes essentially control the military, not the other way around. Such a situation creates impunity for the officers in charge, and this is why there is no evidence of anyone being punished for breaches of regulations, as well as the fact that there are no clear regulations.
Hadi did order a military trial for Saleh's half-brother in 2012 after he refused orders to step down from his position as commander of the Air Force, but other than disobeying Presidential orders, it doesn't seem that there's much that would lead an officer to be put on trial.
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/yemen-president-orders-military-trial-for-salehs-rebelling-half-brother
Suggested score:
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
No anti-corruption training takes place in the Ministry of Defence and there is no institutionalized anti-corruption training for military personnel either. However, Transparency International – Yemen and the Ministry of Defence have initiated conversation regarding the introduction of anti–corruption training courses for military personnel.
In the Presidential Decree 19 for 2010 on Execution of the Anti-Corruption Law chapter II article 84(6) it says that educational material on prevention of corruption should be designed for education institutions including military academies, however it was not possible to verify if such material has been designed and trainings being held for military personnel.
There is no evidence that anti-corruption has been a part of the strategy of donor countries engaged in training and capacity building of the defence and military sector in Yemen.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Civil Society Organization leader
Presidential Decree 19 for 2010 on Execution of the Anti-Corruption Law (39) 2006.
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Security Sector Reform Resource Center notes that following serious abuses by the Yemeni military in 2013, &quoute;There is an urgent need for international actors to work with Yemen’s CSF on managing civil unrest in a manner which dampens rather than fuels tensions.&quoute;
The report continues: &quoute;In the country’s north, the failure of donor-provided technical assistance to Yemen’s security services – and to the country’s Houthi rebels – has undermined security. Here the problem is less about security sector restraint and human rights and more to do with ceasefire-oriented training for state and non-state actors alike.&quoute;
http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2014/07/03/security-sector-reform-as-conflict-prevention-in-yemen/
Suggested score:
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
According to the interviewees, there is no such policy. In fact, when prosecutions have taken place they have been hidden from the public in order to not damage MOD reputation.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
According to the interviewed defence official, there are some measures to discourage facilitation payments. However, these measures are conveyed through speeches and lectures. There is no approved policy mandating the unit commanders to perform such speeches or lectures. The interviewee also stated that the ministry of defence is looking to raise the rates of salaries and wages as a preventive measure. The interviewed NGO worker states that the occurrence of facilitation payments is likely to be widespread. Though there are some legal measures for preventing these payments, they seem to be ineffective in practice.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Journalist, April 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As USAID noted in 2006, bribery is an essential part of the patronage system in Yemen, and changing this to a proper institutional structure is complex and difficult.
&quoute;Grand corruption is essential for political stability in the short term. The essential problem, however, is that this system of social control is fatally flawed and likely to implode in about a decade’s time.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - p6
It is easy to find information online describing how bribes are expected by officials at many levels of society simply for doing their jobs. For example:
&quoute;Bribes (aka baksheesh) are common here. Case in point. The other [day] a man from the electric company (an employee) was in our “complex.” He told our masul (like a superintendent) that the power was scheduled to be turned off for the building and that for a small fee, he could TRY to hold that order off.&quoute;
https://tjyemen.wordpress.com/2009/04/03/corruption-in-yemen/
Suggested score:
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
There is no such doctrine. Corruption is a common practice in the military and has penetrated all levels of the hierarchy.
Military reforms aimed at breaking patronage systems and strengthening counter-terrorism operations in the region were seen to disproportionately benefit the new regime, resulting in mass desertions, providing the Houthi rebels with trained troops and heavy weaponry.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Sasha Gordon, “Mutiny in the Yemeni Military,” Critical Threats, 10 July 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-mutiny-yemeni-military-july-10-2013
Florence Gaub, “Whatever Happened to Yemen’s Army?” EUISS, April 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The process of restructuring the Yemeni Army to remove the possibilities for corruption may take some time, as this article notes:
&quoute;Wafi asserts that much of the money which military leaders siphon from the defence budget slips through accounting loopholes as a result of the Yemeni parliament’s vague bookkeeping. Speaking on the 2012 budget, he said, “In the second part of the budget, fifty-nine billion Yemeni riyals ($275 million) is marked ‘other expenses.’ What are ‘other expenses’?”&quoute;
http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/9746
Suggested score:
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
The interviewees have no knowledge of such training for commanders. The CNN article mentions that senior officers have been known to turn a blind eye towards corruption.
In the Presidential Decree 19 for 2010 on Execution of the Anti-Corruption Law chapter II article 84(6) it says that educational material on prevention of corruption should be designed for education institutions including military academies, however it was not possible to verify if such material has been designed and trainings being held for military personnel. It is only known that Transparency International – Yemen and the Ministry of Defence have initiated conversation regarding the introduction of anti–corruption training courses for military personnel.
There is no evidence that anti-corruption has been a part of the strategy of donor countries engaged in training and capacity building of the defence and military sector in Yemen.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Civil Society Organization Executive
&quoute;What al Qaeda's attack says about the state of Yemen’s army&quoute; - CNN World, March 9th 2012. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/09/what-al-qaedas-attack-says-about-the-state-of-yemens-army/
Presidential Decree 19 for 2010 on Execution of the Anti-Corruption Law (39) 2006.
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I think that the problems of corruption in Yemen go far deeper into the institutional structure than could be solved by simple training. There seems to have been some external training for public officials run by USAID, but none for military personnel.
http://www.counterpart.org/blog/anti-corruption-training-in-yemen
Suggested score:
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
Yemen deploys no personnel so far for corruption monitoring. The interviewed defence official stated that the Inspector General's Office had submitted a proposal to the minister to form a committee which conducts field visits to a number of units and military camps to assess the quality of performance but the minister had not approved this proposal at the time of the interview.
Interview with Civil Society Organization leader, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
All interviewees maintain that to their knowledge there are no relevant guidelines or staff training addressing corruption risks in spite of the occurrence of severe corruption in the contracting process which are confirmed by the cited media reports.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Government Official, April 2014
50 وثيقة سرية تكشف فاتورة الحرب: 3 مليارات دولار فاتورة الحرب على القاعدة في أبين - Mareb Press, 27 March 2013. http://marebpress.net/nprint.php?sid=53642
القبة الفاسدة - Mohamed Alabsi's Blog, 1 December 2012. http://mohamedalabsi.blogspot.co.uk/2012/12/blog-post.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The non-existence of corruption assessments reflects military impunity and the weakness of the state. It might be worth noting that it will be necessary to wait and see whether the new government looks likely to do anything about removing the military patronage network and reducing tribal control of the armed forces.
Suggested score:
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
There are many Private Security Providers in Yemen, some of which are employed by the armed forces. Scrutiny is low because the Private Security Providers mainly work with commercial companies, oil companies, foreign companies or embassies. However, these PSC's are considered to be commercial enterprises, which means they are treated according to the Commercial Companies Yemeni Law NO 22 of the year 1997. They have been audited and are required to comply to taxes.
In September 2014 the Interior Ministry submitted draft legislation on the issue of the private military/security industry that has become quite lucrative and competitive in Yemen. However, due to the ongoing turmoil it is unclear whether or not this was ever passed.
Response to peer reviewers:
Many thanks for your useful comments, I have integrated elements into my response above and have downgraded the score from 2 to 1 accordingly.
Interview with Defence Official, April 2014
Al-Junaid, Madiha, &quoute;The booming business of security companies in Yemen.&quoute; The Yemen Times, 30 September 2014, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1820/report/4401/The-booming-business-of-security-companies-in-Yemen.htm
CNN, &quoute;Gunmen shoot down Russian military contractors in Yemen&quoute;, 26 November 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/26/world/meast/yemen-russians-killed/
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As recently as September 2014, the Interior Ministry submitted draft legislation on the issue of the private military/security industry that has become quite lucrative and competitive in Yemen. The legislation is said to address the need for non-military and police guards to be distinguishable in uniform from the Yemeni government security forces, to require authorization for firearm use, ensure proper training of PMC personnel, and to ensure a more cooperative relationship between state security officials and private security companies.
Al-Junaid, Madiha. 30 September 2014. &quoute;The booming business of security companies in Yemen.&quoute; The Yemen Times. Retrieved from http://www.yementimes.com/en/1820/report/4401/The-booming-business-of-security-companies-in-Yemen.htm
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I would consider reducing the score to 1. There is evidence that the military itself employs PMCs, and this makes sense because it cannot trust the sections of the army with tribal loyalties, as seen by the defection of the Houthis. This CNN report notes that:
&quoute;The two victims were advising Yemen's army as private security contractors, said the police officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity. They were walking out of their hotel when they were shot.&quoute;
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/26/world/meast/yemen-russians-killed/
Suggested score: 1
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
Yemen has legislation covering MOD procurement: law 23 of the year 2007 on Tenders, Auctions and Government Storehouses. Law 23 article 4 states that the law covers a) Ministries' headquarters and b) public establishment and authorities etc. In addition to that, Article 5 c) stated that the MOD shall prepare special regulations to manage procurement, supplies and other military works, and these regulations will not be effective unless they have been approved by the Cabinet. Article 5 d) gives the right and privilege to the High Authority For Tender Control (HATC) to practice oversight on tenders and auctions in the defence sector. Though the legislation exists, open data sources suggest that it is not widely implemented.
Interview with Defence Official, April 2014
law 23 of the year 2007 on Tenders, Auctions and Government Storehouses, http://www.htb.gov.ye/userfiles/file/Laws%20and%20regulations/Tender%20Law%20No_%20(23)%20for%20the%20year%202007EN.pdf
مناقشة إجراءات مناقصات المؤسسة الاقتصادية ووزارة الدفاع - HATC Website, 8 May 2014, http://www.hatcyemen.org/news/detail.php?ID=1697
التقى رئيس الهيئة مع الاخ/ مدير دائرة الأشغال العسكرية - HATC Website, 17 August 2014, http://www.hatcyemen.org/news/detail.php?ID=1764
القبة الفاسدة - Mohamed Alabsi's Blog, 1 December 2012, http://mohamedalabsi.blogspot.com/2012/12/blog-post.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: USAID noted in 2006 that procurement practices were getting slightly better:
&quoute;While reform is starting to occur in the procurement process, in recent history procurements were very often done without open and competitive bidding, and with little transparency or accountability. The tendering process could easily become a means to reward favored allies with lucrative contracts.&quoute;
The report continues: &quoute;The government’s National Agenda, adopted in January, 2006, includes key reforms on procurement. In addition, the government approved a 10- year PFM strategy in August 2005 that contains provisions for procurement reform.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism also notes that &quoute;Pilots cannot fly at night because corruption in military procurement means ‘they don’t have the navigation instruments’. In 2011, Yemeni officials supported this assertion when they confirmed a July 14 strike was carried out by US drones, telling the Associated Press Yemeni planes are not equipped for night strikes.&quoute;
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/03/29/barely-functional-why-us-is-likely-to-be-behind-yemens-precision-airstrikes/
Suggested score:
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
According to all interviewees, the defence procurement cycle is not disclosed to the public. In fact, there is no evidence that the defence procurement cycle is disclosed to the MOD soldiers or junior officers due to the lack of transparency at upper levels of the hierarchy.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Journalist, April 2014
ويكيليكس: الميزانية العسكرية في اليمن غير شفافة والإنفاق العسكري لا يخضع لأي مراجعة من خارج وزارة الدفاع - Almasdar Online, 1 October 2011. http://almasdaronline.com/article/24032
في حوار حول البرلمان والأمن
النائب عبد المعز دبوان: مقابل تغطية فساد ميزانية البرلمان يتم تمرير موازنة الدولة بكامل فسادها - NBA Online, 16 July 2014. http://nbaonline.org/proccess-newss-191027.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As with many other undemocratic Gulf states, the procurement cycle only becomes public when the Western contractor involved has to declare it within its own national laws. For example this US UAV system sold to Yemen in 2014:
http://militaryedge.org/articles/insitu-wins-11-million-contract-procure-scaneagle-uav-yemen/
Due to the political crisis since 2011, it is likely that the reforms noted by USAID in 2006 have had little effect and that the current situation has changed little from that of the past:
&quoute;A second prominent mechanism for the distribution of payoffs to privileged elites is the tendering process for major procurements. The process is not transparent, appears to regularly award large tenders with at least the appearance of favoritism, and for the largest procurement tenders, directly involves the cabinet in decision making. Such direct politicization of the procurement process further erodes public trust in the honesty and fairness of the process.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - p10
Suggested score:
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
There is consensus among the interviewees that there are no mechanisms in place but there are some laws stating that there should be oversight on the defence procurement. The two laws highlighted state that the COCA and the High Authority for Tender Control (HATC) have the right to exercise oversight on financial issues in all public institutions, and that includes the MOD.
The following link shows how the COCA was prevented from carrying out its tasks in the MOD:
http://saadanet.net/post/1009
In addition, the following article shows the difficulties faced by the parliament in overseeing the defence sector:
http://nbaonline.org/proccess-newss-191027.html
Lastly, this shows that HATC is not doing its job in the defence sector:
http://mohamedalabsi.blogspot.com/2012/12/blog-post.html
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Government Official, April 2014
Interview with Journalist, April 2014
Law of bids and Government Stores, law 23 of the year 2007
Law of the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA), law 39 of the year 1992
جهاز المحاسبة: وزير الدفاع يمنع الجهاز من فحص صندوق التقاعد ودائرة التموين العسكرية - Sadaa Net, 5 May 2014 http://saadanet.net/post/1009
في حوار حول البرلمان والأمن
النائب عبد المعز دبوان: مقابل تغطية فساد ميزانية البرلمان يتم تمرير موازنة الدولة بكامل فسادها - NBA Online, 16 July 2014. http://nbaonline.org/proccess-newss-191027.html
القبة الفاسدة - Mohamed Alabsi's Blog, 1 December 2012, http://mohamedalabsi.blogspot.co.uk/2012/12/blog-post.html
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
Most defence purchases, as a general rule, are not made public in any sort of detail. The few that are severely lack detail as only the total cost is made public. Even though an aggregate total spend may be disclosed, it is still questionable whether this represents the actual spend.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Journalist, April 2014
Alkhabar now, &quoute;China is manufacturing new uniforms for the Yemeni army with a cost of 13 million dollars&quoute;, accessed on 2 May 2014, http://www.alkhabarnow.net/news/48044/2013/04/24/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Once again, military sales generally become public when reported by the country selling them. A lot of Yemen's weapons come from Russia, whose media sometimes report on the success of Russia's arms export industry:
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/yemen-plans-more-arms-purchases/477986.html
Suggested score:
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
All interviewees have stated that there are no procedures or standards in place for companies to meet to in order to be able to bid for work by the Ministry of Defence or armed forces. It is worth mentioning that most approvals are made based on the commander's prerogative, or in the case of high value bids, the approval of the president or relevant minster.
As reported by the peer reviewer, there is evidence that external donors like USAID have tried to improve the oversight process but these initiatives seem to have had little impact.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
مدير دائرة الأشغال العسكرية يقوم بإجراءات تصحيحية لمكافحة الفساد - Yemen Now, 8 May 2014, http://yemennow.net/news104942.html
القضاء العسكري يستدعي ضابط كبير في الأشغال العسكرية للتحقيق في قضايا فساد ونهب للمال العام - Yemen Press, 27 October 2014, http://yemen-press.com/news30920.html
USAID, &quoute;Yemen Corruption Assessment&quoute;, 2006, http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: External donors like USAID tried to improve the oversight process in 2006 but they seem to have had little impact, largely due to the control of various tribal leaders over the military and their resistance to reform:
&quoute;The RoYG has recently adopted a strategy of public finance management (PFM) reform that includes general budget reform, enhancement of control and financial accountability, reform of the system of bids and procurement and improvement of competence and skills. In order to assist the RoYG with implementation of this sweeping reform strategy, a multi-donor group has developed a Public Financial Management Reform Action Plan. However, the RoYG has implemented these reforms slower than expected. Current deficiencies and mechanisms of financial corruption and political patronage: the budget setting process is little more than ad hoc bargaining ministry by ministry; there is only limited parliamentary oversight;&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf
Suggested score:
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
There is no national defence and security strategy. The MOD issues a procurement order when there is a need for some equipment or where there is a chance of foreign grants or funding. According to an interviewed defence official, the reform committee had prepared a draft national defence strategy and sent it to the president for approval but the president had not replied at the time of the interview. It's also known that neither the parliament nor the government have any scrutiny strategy to be applied on the MOD.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015. Essentially a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
nbaonline website, interview with a member of the parliament, reached at 12 October 2014:
http://nbaonline.org/proccess-newss-191027.html
Cable of wikileaks, cable 05SANAA1534, YEMEN: FUNDING FOR THE CSF-CTU, 7 June 2005, reached 12 October 2014:
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/06/05SANAA1534.html
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Is it worth mentioning that there has never been a clear strategy because of the extent to which the military is controlled by tribal interests? Is it also worth noting that the future strategy will depend quite a lot on the extent to which the Houthis are now in charge of North Yemen, and whether the south secedes, and seems likely to me, given that Saudi Arabia will probably encourage that so they can at least have influence over the south.
Suggested score:
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
All interviewees have stated that defence purchases are based on opportunism or foreign donation/fund allocated for such items. Even in cases when purchases are based on a need, opportunism still exists. Further, the process lacks accuracy and transparency. From what the interviewees have said, it's obvious that the MOD does not purchase based on clearly identified and quantified requirements but based on opportunism or foreign donations/funds since there isn't a defence acquisition strategy.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
&quoute;YEMEN: FUNDING FOR THE CSF-CTU&quoute; - Wikileaks, 7 June 2005 http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/06/05SANAA1534.html
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: USAID notes many possibilities for corruption in the bidding process which have certainly not been resolved, and possibly contributed to the breakdown of order as the Houthis decided to take control partly because of the continuation of corruption (if you take their statements at face value):
&quoute;Major problems which promote corruption include ministries that rush procurement decisions and use ‘time constraints’ to justify limiting competition or sole sourcing contracts, a lengthy process that invites corruption at critical junctures, an underdeveloped complaint mechanism, uncertain commitment to procurement reform by the government and an overly personalized system. Renegotiating contracts with winning bidders has also been common, leading to long delays and suspicions of corruption before, during and after the bidding process.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - p X
Suggested score:
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
The interviewee stated that defence procurement severely lacks competition. Most procurement is single-sourced with presidential or ministerial approval barring small procurement requests.
Reports covering Yemeni procurement until 2013 give no indication of whether or not contracts were competed for or not. France, Italy, Iran, Jordan, Russia, Spain, the US and the UK are all listed as providing weaponry or military assistance between 2009-2012, but there is no public information on these contracts.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
INSS, &quoute;Yemen&quoute;, 2013, http://heb.inss.org.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Yemen seems to procure arms primarily from the US and Russia, which is quite unusual as most states would only buy from one. However, due to the tribal influence on Yemen's military, and the Cold War history of the country, where the US and USSR supported different sides in the Civil War, this makes some sense, as different tribal groups may have different international loyalties.
http://www.tacticalreport.com/view_news/Yemen_the_Pentagon_and_arms_procurement_programme/1419
This summary of the Yemeni army also provides good information on arms purchases and military cooperation agreements:
http://heb.inss.org.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/yemen.pdf
Suggested score:
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
Yemen does not conduct competitive tenders. According to the interviewee and the link above, tender boards are formed by the minster but their decisions are believed to be influenced by the minster and other senior officers. This committee travels to the seller country with the minster which undermines the independence of the committee.
Reports covering Yemeni procurement until 2013 give no indication of whether or not contracts were competed for or not. France, Italy, Iran, Jordan, Russia, Spain, the US and the UK are all listed as providing weaponry or military assistance between 2009-2012, but there is no public information on these contracts.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Alkhabar now, &quoute;China is manufacturing new uniforms for the Yemeni army with a cost of 13 million dollars&quoute;, accessed on 2 May 2014, http://www.alkhabarnow.net/news/48044/2013/04/24/
INSS, &quoute;Yemen&quoute;, 2013, http://heb.inss.org.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I would consider reviewing this question once a new government is installed in Yemen to see whether the new administration makes any declarations about its intent to reduce corruption in the military sector.
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
Law 23 (2007) on tenders, auctions and government storehouses includes some articles which discourage corruption practices in the bidding process and discourage and punishes collusion between bidders in general. It is not specific to defence and security institutions. However, it is worth mentioning that the law addresses all public institutions, this includes defence and security institutions.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. Enforcement is therefore difficult to judge. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
The Yemeni Tenders, Auctions and Government Storehouses law, Law 23 of the year 2007, articles 98.2, 98.6 and 111.
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: USAID noted in 2006 that:
&quoute;More recently, however, reform efforts have started going after the bigger picture, with efforts to establish a new High Tender Board (HTB) for major procurements. If implemented appropriately, such a reform could deny income to major beneficiaries of corruption while creating new sources of revenue for the state by inspiring confidence in new potential investors.&quoute;
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf
Suggested score:
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
According to the interviewee, there is no institutionalized training given to the procurement staff but the MOD has recently asked the High Authority for Tenders Control (HATC) to provide professional training to them. He states that the procurement department is tasked with ensuring that defence contractors meet their obligations but it has significant staff shortages.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Darem, Faisal. 09 January 2014. &quoute;Yemen tender control authority fights all forms of corruption.&quoute; Retrieved from http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/2014/01/09/feature-03
World Bank. 23 April 2014. &quoute;Yemen - Public Finance Modernization Project : additional financing.&quoute; pp. 5-6. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/04/17649655/yemen-public-finance-modernization-project-additional-financing
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Additional sources stating either the intention or capacity building efforts to enhance HATC's training abilities:
Darem, Faisal. 09 January 2014. &quoute;Yemen tender control authority fights all forms of corruption.&quoute; Retrieved from http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/2014/01/09/feature-03
World Bank. 23 April 2014. &quoute;Yemen - Public Finance Modernization Project : additional financing.&quoute; pp. 5-6. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/04/17649655/yemen-public-finance-modernization-project-additional-financing
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The High Authority for Tender Control states that it conducts training, though there are no details about what kind:
http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/2014/01/09/feature-03
Suggested score:
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
There are no formal mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. The procurement department has drafted a regulation which include such mechanisms but at the time of this assessment this draft has not been approved from the cabinet.
An interviewee reported that recently, there was a company which complained about debarment from future procurements. The department's handling of the case was described as professional because they explained to the company the reasons behind the decision.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015.
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: USAID noted in 2006 that there was an &quoute;an underdeveloped complaint mechanism&quoute;.
http://yemen.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/reports/yemen-corruption-assessment.pdf - p X
An article about the High Authority for Tender Control in 2014 trumpeted their achievements, noting that:
&quoute;During their first four year term, authority members reviewed 400 tenders that were subject to complaints, pinpointed problems and put solutions in place, he said.&quoute;
http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/2014/01/09/feature-03
Suggested score:
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
All interviewees maintain that there are no examples of sanctions applied on a supplier, except for one recent case where the company was put onto the newly prepared blacklist. This came about because a company was supposed to provide one machine with specific standards but instead of providing the machine in one piece, it was combined of different machines.
The procurement department alerted the company of this violation but the company insisted that this machine is the one they agreed upon, so, the contract was terminated and the company was reportedly blacklisted. It is unclear whether the use of the blacklist has been codified into law, or whether it still exists given the current crisis.
None of the interviewees have heard of the existence of a system to punish suppliers. The interviewed officer has mentioned that draft regulation was sent to the cabinet for approval and he said that the draft includes a number of sanctions.
The High Authority for Tender Control has reported some sanctions that it has applied, although it is unclear whether or not these relate to the defence sector or not.
Response to peer reviewer:
Many thanks for this information, I have integrated it into my response. However, I have maintained the score as it is unclear whether the HATC ever operated in the defence sector, or whether it still exists given the current turmoil.
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with NGO Executive, April 2014
Interview with Politician 1, April 2014
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I would consider raising the score to 1, based on the statements of the head of the High Authority for Tender Control who has said:
&quoute;The authority accepts a complaint if it meets set requirements, including its submission by a party to the tender within the set legal period of 10 days from the date of notification of the list of bidding applicants. The complaint is accepted if accompanied by documents that support it. The authority's board of directors takes the decisions and appropriate corrective actions for each case.
Such actions include annulling the tender award and reconsidering the tenders submitted. The authority has decided to annul tender award decisions and ordered the issuance of a new invitation to tender in 24 cases. It has also issued a decision to alert a party to a violation and ordered rectifications in 60 cases; referred four tenders to the Supreme National Anti-Corruption Commission on suspicion of corruption; and referred 34 cases to the Public Funds Prosecution.&quoute;
http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/2014/01/09/feature-03
However, it is quite unlikely that these sanctions are applied to the military, but mostly refer to public sector procurement.
Suggested score: 1
When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
All interviewees stated that the offset contracts do not take place in Yemen. However, they also mentioned that most of the equipment is presented to Yemen as gifts or grants. Although it is assessed unlikely that any offsets currently exist, there is also a significant lack of transparency and high corruption risk for this area.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In following-up the country assessor's statement, one instance of gifts/aid can be seen in U.S. assistance to the Yemeni government.
Sharp, Jeremy M. 06 February 2014. &quoute;Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations.&quoute; Government Accountability Office. Retrieved from http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I wouldn't take the word of defence officials at face value. They have an incentive to deny that corrupt offsets happen. I would assume that offsets do happen, and that the 'gifts' you have noted basically constitute offsets.
For example, this summary of Yemen's military capabilities lists a gift of $36m military aid from the US.
http://heb.inss.org.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/yemen.pdf
Suggested score:
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
All interviewees stated that the offset contracts do not take place in Yemen. However, they also mentioned that most of the equipment is presented to Yemen as gifts or grants. Although it is assessed unlikely that any offsets currently exist, there is also a significant lack of transparency and high corruption risk for this area.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It seems likely to me that offsets in some form do occur. Having said this, it could be a function of Yemen's corrupt tribal patronage system that offsets are not required as defence officials are happy to just take bribes in exchange for contracts.
Suggested score:
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
All interviewees stated that the offset contracts do not take place in Yemen. However, they also mentioned that most of the equipment is presented to Yemen as gifts or grants. Although it is assessed unlikely that any offsets currently exist, there is also a significant lack of transparency and high corruption risk for this area.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It seems likely to me that offsets in some form do occur. Having said this, it could be a function of Yemen's corrupt tribal patronage system that offsets are not required as defence officials are happy to just take bribes in exchange for contracts.
Suggested score:
How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
The interviewee argues that he is unaware of any government control on agents and intermediaries. Furthermore, the government does not discourage the use of these agents or intermediaries. Indeed, according to some online sources and articles, Yemen is dealing with brokers.
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Pages 4 and 16 of &quoute;Beyond Viktor Bout: Why the United States needs an Arms Trade Treaty &quoute;, 6 October 2011, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp156-arms-trade-treaty-061011-en.pdf
&quoute;Combating Yemen's Gray Market In Small Arms And Light Weapons&quoute;, Wikileaks, 8 February 2005. https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=05SANAA269
&quoute;USG POLICY TOWARD YEMENI ARMS ACQUISITIONS&quoute;, WIkileaks, 9 January 2013. http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/cablegate/7/wikileaks-cable-usg-policy-toward-yemeni-arms-acquisitions/16966/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: This US diplomatic cable suggests that the US thought that Yemen stopped using arms brokers in 2005, but uncovered evidence to the contrary:
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE130330_a.html
Suggested score:
Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
All interviewees agree that there is a fundamental lack of transparency in the whole defence sector in general. Nothing is made public except one single budget line as a part of the national budget.
There is no public information on the financing packages surrounding major arms deals, nor on the existence of major arms deals. France, Italy, Iran, Jordan, Russia, Spain, the US and the UK are all listed as providing weaponry or military assistance between 2009-2012, but there is no public information on these contracts.
Interview with Defence Official 1, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Interview with Journalist, April 2014
INSS, &quoute;Yemen&quoute;, 2013, http://heb.inss.org.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/yemen.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Although the deals are not made public by Yemen, arms companies in contracting countries like the US have to reveal details, and these are possible to find out, such as the information in this document which shows that the US has sold Yemen:
UH-1H helicopters (2011), upgrading Mi-17 helicopters (2010), HMMWV vehicles (2010), 26m PBs (2010), C-130 aircraft (2012), CN-235 aircraft (2012), RQ-11 Raven UAVs (2012), C-208 aircraft (2012)
http://heb.inss.org.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/yemen.pdf
Suggested score:
Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
All interviewees agree that in practice that there is no evidence that the government requires the main contractor to ensure that subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes . The MOD leaders have not addressed the issue of corruption in public. One of the interviewed politicians stated that the Parliament had requested defence leaders for increased transparency and cooperation but the request was ignored. The interviewee also stated that the parliament is totally immersed in the current political conflict and not active at all.
However there is some evidence that the parliament is trying to introduce some transparency in the defence sector. According to the high ranked officer, there is a draft procurement regulation which includes anti-corruption requirements to be met in all contracts.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015. Essentially a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Interview with Politician 1, April 2014
Interview with Politician 2, April 2014
BBC News, “President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue”, 17 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32078817
BBC News, “Yemen crisis: President Hadi 'returns to Aden from exile'”, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34323078
Reuters, “Yemen's Houthis dissolve parliament, assume power: televised statement”, 6 February 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-yemen-crisis-idUSKBN0LA1NT20150207
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
According the interviewees, there is no evidence of influence on acquisition from the seller nations but it might happen in small-scale purchases. One of the interviewees stated that Yemen has purchased weapons from countries where the prospects for the MOD leaders to receive commissions from the seller are high however. Apart from this Yemen has mainly purchased from Russia and received grants from US.
There is evidence that procurement has been organised by different tribes with different allegiances. US military assistance, for example, went mainly to elite units in the Republican Guard.
Response to peer reviewer 2:
Disagree. Most procurements appear to have been made with US military assistance (such as purchase of 250 Qutaish-2 APVs) and appear to be relatively transparent. The evidence cited shows that between 2009-2012 Yemen procured or received assistance from 8 different countries with a range of political interests. SIPRI records for the 2012-2014 period point to two transfers from earlier sales (92x T-80 tanks from Belarus and 5x OT-90 APCs from Czech Republic) that could not be verified however. US embassy cables from 2009 suggest clear concerns regarding these purchases but there is no indication they were politically driven. Score maintained.
Critical Threats, &quoute;Insurgency in Yemen: The New Challenge to American Counter-Terrorism Strategy&quoute;, 19 March 2012, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/insurgency-yemen-american-counter-terrorism-strategy-march-19-2012
SIPRI, &quoute;Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2012 to 2014&quoute;. Last generated for Yemen: 15 October 2015. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php
Guy Martin, &quoute;More details on South African arms exports for 2014&quoute;, DefenceWeb, 27 March 2015 http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=38561
&quoute;US embassy cables: US fears Yemen arms purchases could end up on the black market&quoute;
Monday 6 December 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/241318
Interview with Defence Official, April 2014
Interview with Defence Official 2, April 2014
Interview with NGO worker, April 2014
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Some additional resources on arms transfers and military expenditures towards Yemen.
Government Accountability Office. March 2013. &quoute;U.S. Assistance to Yemen: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Emergency Food Aid and Assess Security Assistance.&quoute; pp. 33-34. Retrieved from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pcaac445.pdf
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. &quoute;Arms Transfers Database.&quoute; Retrieved from http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php [Database search for imports to Yemen. Database's most current year for data is 2013.]
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I think that it may appear that because Yemen sources arms from Western nations as well as Russia and Iran that political influence does not exist, the reality is that procurement is organised by different tribes with different allegiances. The majority of arms come from the West, however, and the fact that the US operates a drone assassination programme in Yemen shows the level of influence the US has there. These are the countries listed as supplying weapons to Yemen:
France • Assistance
Italy • Arms transfers
Iran • Assistance
Jordan • Military training • Arms transfers
Russia • Arms transfers
Spain • Arms transfers
UK • Military training
US • Arms transfers
http://heb.inss.org.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/yemen.pdf
Suggested score: 1
According to the interviewees, there is an independent legislature and some legislative provisions give the right to this legislature to exercise some scrutiny on defence policy. However, the national defence policy exists but as a draft. The policy was drafted in 2013 and sent to the president for approval but the president has neither approved it yet nor sent any comments or feedback on the draft policy. Due to the current instability it seems unlikely that there will be an established defence policy soon. There is no such policy available from the Yemeni Ministry of Defence and there is no information available about it in the public domain.
An interviewee said that the parliament may not be effective in these issues due to national security concerns. According to the link provided above, you can see the tasks of the parliamentary Defence and Security Committee.
It must be noted that the current situation in Yemen is highly volatile and it is difficult to determine the exact situation on the ground. President Hadi has spent the last six months in Saudi Arabia following Houthi control of the capital, Sanaa. Hadi only returned to Yemen in September 2015. Essentially a functional legislature does not exist at the moment, as the Houthis have dissolved Parliament.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed and score lowered from 1 to 0.