This country is placed in Band F

Myanmar is located in Band F, which indicates critical corruption risk in its national defence and security establishments. No branch of the state - the legislative, executive, or judicial branches - may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” In practice, Myanmar has two parallel power structures: the civil government and the military, with the latter also having significant influence in the former. There is a complete lack of transparency regarding military activities and no public disclosure of any key information on defence spending, strategy, or procurement plans - precluding any opportunities for civilian oversight and scrutiny. TI suggests the following reforms of the security sector to minimise corruption risk.

Build mechanisms for independent oversight of corrupt military activity

In Myanmar, the military has ownership of two major enterprises that dominate the economy - the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC). The transfer of control of these businesses took place quickly during 2009 and 2010, and there is no transparency of ownership. Furthermore,  there is evidence that businesses are not only closely tied to substantial off-budget military expenditures but that they involve illicit economic activity.

There is also evidence of military units involved or complicit in organised crime, conscription of child soldiers, and forced labour.  Militias set up under the supervision of the Army in areas where rebel groups operate have been implicated in both the trade and production of narcotics. There are allegations that crimes go unpunished, and the military acts with impunity. While the president established a 15 member Action Committee Against Corruption in 2014, it is not yet wholly independent or effective.

We recommend a review of the current laws regulating the military and its commercial activities and a prohibition of private enterprise by defence and security institutions and personnel.  These laws should be overseen by a robust and independent enforcement agency, such as by strengthening and allocating further resources to the Office of the Auditor General, with strong sanctions in place for offenders to ensure that military personnel cannot act with impunity.

Enhance Budgetary Scrutiny  

It is positive that a defence budget was provided to Parliament for the first time in 2013, though there’s evidence suggesting MPs appointed to the Budget Committee may have been encouraged not to raise issues. There is no institution for external audit of defence expenditures in place in Myanmar. An assessment by the World Bank states that the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) is having a significantly positive impact on the management of public finances in Myanmar. However, it does not have jurisdiction over military expenditure. We recommend the powers of the OAG be extended to allow for scrutiny of all military economic activity, including asset disposals, legal and illegal military businesses, procurement, defence expenditure, and defence tender board decisions to help ensure that the military is fulfilling its proper role and that the defence budget is spent on arms and equipment that actually meet Myanmar’s strategic needs.

Comply with international anti-corruption instruments and regional cooperation

Myanmar signed UNCAC in 2005, and ratified in December 2012. However, there has been limited evidence of compliance with the Convention. In November 2013, Myanmar joined the ASEAN Memorandum of understanding on Cooperation for Preventing and Combating Corruption. The MOU pledges Myanmar to work together with other ASEAN states to combat corruption through information sharing and capacity building.  As with UNCAC, however, there needs to be further evidence of political will and activity on the part of the Myanmar authorities to show compliance with these instruments.

Leadership 30
01.
score
0

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and laws the assessor was unable to find publicly available sources indicating the existence of formal rights for legislative oversight of defence policy. Nor could evidence be found indicating that the legislature has had substantive influence over defence issues. The significant presence of military officials within parliament has contributed to evidence that parliamentary scrutiny of defence is undermined.

Currently all military affairs, including those related to procurement, budget and policy, remain outside the control of the civilian authorities. The 2008 Constitution grants the defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [4] What this means in practice is that Myanmar has two parallel power structures, the civil government and the military, with latter also having significant influence in the former [6,8]. According to Chapter XIV, Article 445 of the Constitution, defence Forces are also guaranteed blanket immunity and amnesty for all military actions, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and accords the Commander-in-Chief sole power over administering any legal proceeding. [4,6]

Further military influence over civil decision making occurs within the parliament where 25 % of seats (166 out of 664) are reserved for serving military officers directly appointed by the commander in chief. Currently another 50 % (336 out of 664) of the seats in parliament are occupied by the Union Solidarity Development Association/Party, an entity which was created by the military as a mass mobilization vehicle prior to being turned into a political party.

Formal regulations state that Defence and Security Committees can be created, according to need, in either or both houses of Parliament. In describing their role, the 2008 Constitution states: &quoute;When the occasion arises to have studies made and submitted on defence and security matters or Military affairs, the [parliamentary body] shall form the Defence and Security Committee with the representatives who are the Defence Services personnel, for a limited time. The Defence and Security Committee so formed may, if necessary, be included suitable representatives who are not the Defence Services personnel in accord with the volume of work.&quoute; [4] The wording in the Constitution indicates that these 'Parliamentary bodies' are made up of the military representatives in parliament. There are no public records of the deliberations of these committees available. Parliament does maintain a website in Burmese [2]. It does not currently provide information on the deliberations of parliamentary oversight committees.

Whilst the parliament approves the budget, weak legislative oversight leaves most items untouched, particularly military spending. The budget for military expenses is supplied as a block figure within the national budget by the military. How this figure is arrived at is not open to public scrutiny, and is unknown. It is known that representatives of the military sit with members of the Ministry of Planning in a single closed door session of which no record is available to the public. An informant noted that the defence budget has been allowed to be discussed in parliament, but very sparingly, and it has passed without change each time. [1] According to another informant, legislative oversight and scrutiny is haphazard on all budget items, at best. Most parliamentarians lack staff or the personal capacities to provide oversight. [5]

For the first time, in early 2015, Parliament was able to request the military to answer a question on issues of land confiscations and corruption. The questions were responded to by a senior defence official. [7] However, other than being able to ask questions and get information, it ends there. Since parliament has asked, there could be a change of policy by the military, should the military care to do so, but the Parliament cannot legislate policy for the military.

COMMENTS -+

1. Email communication from Source 8, CSO activist based in Myanmar, 12 December 2014.

2. Myanmar Parliament. Homepage, 2014, accessed September 01, 2015. http://www.myanmarparliament.gov.mm/

3. Open Myanmar Initiative. Homepage, 2014, accessed September 01, 2015. www.omimyanmar.org

4. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Ch.XIV, Article 445, Article 20 (b), Article 147 (b) [Amyotha Hluttaw] & Article 115 (b) [Pyithu Hluttaw], www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

5. Email communication with Source 10, former Government Consultant, 22 March 2014.

6. Global Justice Center. &quoute;The 2008 Constitution Breaches Myanmar/Burma’s Binding Obligations under International Law Including the United Nation’s Charter&quoute;, November 2012, accessed 21 July 2015. http://globaljusticecenter.net/index.php?option=com_mtree&task=att_download&link_id=165&cf_id=34

7. ALTSEAN Burma. &quoute;12th Session of Parliament, National Assembly/Amyotha Hluttaw&quoute;, January 2015, accessed July 21, 2015. http://www.altsean.org/Research/Parliament%20Watch/Legislative/National%20Assembly/Sessions/Session12.php

8. Bertelsmann Stiftung. &quoute;Myanmar Country Report&quoute;, 3014, accessed September 02, 2015. http://www.bti-project.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Myanmar.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
1

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Whilst Myanmar does have identifiable parliamentary defence and security committees, sources indicate that their effectiveness, independence, and role in oversight is highly questionable.

Sources indicate that Parliament in general does not exercise its functions in an independent manner. While Chapter IV, Article 11 the Constitution states that “The three branches of sovereign power namely, legislative power, executive power and judicial power are separated, to the extent possible, and exert reciprocal control, check and balance among themselves,” no publicly available information indicates that this independence is put in practice. [4] It should be recalled that all military affairs, including procurement, budget and policy, remain outside the control of the civilian control and the 2008 Constitution states that no branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Moreover, a 2014 report by BTI states that “Although the influence of the military in daily governance and policy-making has declined, it still is using its channels in parliament and the government to influence politics.” [6]

In terms of formal provisions, Defence and Security Committees can be created, according to need, in either or both houses of Parliament. In describing their role, the 2008 Constitution states: &quoute;When the occasion arises to have studies made and submitted on defence and security matters or Military affairs, the [parliamentary body] shall form the Defence and Security Committee with the representatives who are the Defence Services personnel, for a limited time. The Defence and Security Committee so formed may, if necessary, be included suitable representatives who are not the Defence Services personnel in accord with the volume of work.&quoute; The Constitution indicates that these Parliamentary bodies are made up of the military representatives in parliament, plus others if and only if the military representatives request it. [4] No additional sources could be found indicating the mandate or formal rights afforded to committees or whether it can ask expert witnesses to appear in front of it.

In practice, while Defence and Security Committee exists in both houses of parliament, information about the functioning of these committees is not publicly available. Source 8 noted that these Committees do not have terms of reference stipulating their roles and responsibilities and that their mandate is essentially determined by the parliamentarians on the committee [3]. This is supported by comments made by Source 2 who stated that, in 2014, the Chair of the Committee issued instructions not to raise objections regarding the military budget for the sake of national interest. [1] Moreover, the Constitution states that, beyond studies on matters related to defence and security, the Parliamentarians on the committee “shall determine the number of members, duties, powers, rights, and terms of […] Committees”. [4] One of the few public assessments regarding the functioning of parliamentary committees is a Rule of Law Assessment by the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights. This report states that parliamentary committees are generally reportedly hampered by a lack of staff and parliamentarians allegedly lack the experience and capacity to provide effective oversight. [2]

Though parliament does maintain a website in Burmese [5], it does not currently provide information on the deliberations of parliamentary oversight committees. While committee meetings are not publicized, neither are they confidential. [2] The Assessor could not find any publicly available information regarding the resourcing and staffing of these committees.

COMMENTS -+

1. Telephone interview with Source 2, Myanmar Politician I, 15 May 2014.

2. Myanmar Rule of Law Assessment, Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, March 2013, accessed September 02, 2015, pp. 22-23. http://www.jbi-humanrights.org/files/burma-rule-of-law-assessment.pdf

3. Email correspondence with Source 8, CSO activist based in Myanmar, 12 December 2014

4. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), and Chapter IV, Article 11, Articl 115 (d), Article 147 (b). www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

5. Myanmar Parliament. Homepage, 2014, accessed September 01, 2015. http://www.myanmarparliament.gov.mm/

6. Bertelsmann Stiftung. &quoute;Myanmar Country Report&quoute;, 3014, accessed September 02, 2015. http://www.bti-project.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Myanmar.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
0

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to locate information suggesting that a defence policy exists, or that there is a process for formulation of a defence policy that involves consultation with a broad range of stakeholders.

The National defence and Security Council (NSDC), which is effectively governed by the military, sets the budget. This may also mean that the NDSC sets the defence policy though that could not be confirmed through any publicly available sources. [3] According to a source from 2009, little has been made public about the defence policy and missions of Myanmar’s armed forces. Only in 1999, for the first time ever, “did the Tatmadaw quietly declare its defence policy and its missions. The declared policy outlined the doctrine of “total people’s defence” for the Union of Myanmar which had already been agreed to two years earlier. [4] Even when the policy and missions were established, there was no official document released for public consumption, nor information published related to doctrine and strategy, force structure, armament and training. There is no information to suggest that a more recent defence policy has been created and is made publicly available.

In 2014, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces reportedly released a six-point policy to support the ongoing peace talks with internal armed groups. Whilst these six points were made public through the media, these points can not be considered a defence policy, nor is there evidence to suggest that the policy was used in public consultation.[5]

One media article in the domestic press states that the Defence Ministry, which is fully controlled by the Army, is responsible for formulating defence policy. [1] This aligns with Constitutional provisions stating that military affairs remain outside the control of the civilian government. The 2008 Constitution grants the defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government including the legislative branch may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [2] The sole body in Parliament concerned with military affairs is the defence and Security Committee. To date it is only known to have considered the military budget, not other policies of the military.

There is little evidence to suggest this debate occurs. Where debate has occurred over sensitive issues, it appears that dissenting voices are ruled out. For instance, in August 2015 key figures including the parliament’s Speaker were removed from their posts amid tensions within ruling party the USDP. This came after a recent petition backed by military officials which sought to impeach the Speaker for his role in proposing amendments to the military-drafted constitution and for close affiliation with the opposition. [6] Furthermore, also in August 2015, Myanmar’s Union Election Commission (UEC) announced that policy statements by political parties ahead of the November 8 elections would be limited to 15 minutes on state-controlled radio and television and then republished in state-controlled newspapers, and could not criticize the Tatmadaw (armed forces) or the 2008 constitution. [7]

No further public documents outlining Myanmar's national defence policy are available nor that they are routinely updated. Myanmar has not provided a defence white paper. Interviewees could not find or provide additional information.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Since the IISS report &quoute;The Military Balance: 2015&quoute; is only accessible with payment, it is not considered as a publicly available source for this assessment.

COMMENTS -+

1. Renaud Egreteau, “Continuity and change: Myanmar’s foreign policy”, Myanmar Times, 13 September 2013. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/opinion/8178-continuity-and-change-myanmar-s-foreign-policy.html accessed 24 July 2015

2. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

3. Global Security. &quoute;Myanmar - defence Spending,&quoute; no date, accessed September 01, 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/myanmar/budget.htm

4. Maung Aung Myoe. Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948. Institute of South East Asian Studies. 2009, accessed September 02, 2015. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=g4bA3Oasvn4C&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=myanmar+defence+policy&source=bl&ots=wvzhVSqkkQ&sig=AyAmQw88devncVdLXgJgQElvz4o&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CEEQ6AEwBWoVChMI7vmr1e_YxwIVpWfbCh2bQA33#v=onepage&q=myanmar%20defence%20policy&f=false

5. Agence France Presse. Tatmadaw outlines 6-point policy for peace talk. September 23, 2014, accessed September 01, 2015. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Tatmadaw-outlines-6-point-policy-for-peace-talk-30243970.html

6. Simon Lewis. Turmoil in Burma's military-backed ruling party as leaders are deposed. The Guardian. August 13, 2015, accessed September 02, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/13/burmese-forces-surround-ruling-party-headquarters-and-confine-mps-report

7. Human Rights Watch. &quoute;Burma: Parties Ordered Not to Criticize Army&quoute;, August 31, 2015, accessed September 02, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/31/burma-parties-ordered-not-criticize-army

There was no further publicly available information relating to Myanmar's military or defence policy or debates on it.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the comment and score, but this source and IISS Military Balance 2015 (due to be published in 2015) would be good to cite here.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
0

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

A very modest level of engagement with civil society on issues of corruption and transparency has been reported, though none of this has been specific to the defence sector. However, the seriousness of government’s commitment to engagement is highly questionable. Defence and security institutions, in particular, have no known policy of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption, in fact the following evidence indicates it eschews and criminalises the activities of much civil society, particularly the media.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) have been tightly regulated in Myanmar. Reports indicate that civil society has stayed clear of issues regarding the military out of fear since the recent past has shown that media scrutiny of the military has resulted in lengthy prison sentences under harsh conditions [3].

One of the key laws used to suppress investigation is the Official Secrets Act (OSA). Section 3.1 of the OSA allows for the imprisonment of 3 – 14 years for “any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the Union of Burma approaches, inspects, passes over or is in the vicinity of, or enters, any prohibited place,.. any work of defence, arsenal, naval, military or air force establishment or station, mine, minefield, factory, dockyard, camp, ship or aircraft or otherwise in relation to the naval, military or air force affairs of Union of Burma”. As an example, in 2014 journalists revealing land confiscation by the Directorate of defence Industries, a part of the Ministry of defence, were seized under the Official Secrets Act [3]. In September 2014 UNSR stated there had been “...reports of the continued application of outdated legislation, such as the State Secrets Act of 1923 or the Emergency Provisions Act of 1950, as well as other legislation such as the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act, to criminalize and impede the activities of civil society and the media” and that “this has increased the number of political prisoners and that sentences imposed are disproportionately high.” [4]

While these comments are focused on the media, they apply to other parts of civil society who may exercise self-imposed restrictions for reasons of safety. Previous to July 2014, penal sanctions existed for civil society groups unrecognized by the authorities. A new law abolishing penal sanctions against civil society groups was debated in Parliament and made law on 20 July 2014. [5] It is yet to be seen how this new law changes the climate of fear regarding CSO interaction with government institutions more broadly, let alone the powerful defence sector.

Engagement with the media has been marked by controversy. According to local media sources, the torture and extrajudicial killing of freelance Burmese journalist in October, “an incident the military initially owned up to but then dissembled into a defence of “shot while trying to escape,” has not been resolved, and the Tatmadaw refuses to cooperate with any investigation”. Early in 2015, the rape and murder of two schoolteachers allegedly carried out by locally deployed army personnel evinced strong denials and even threats of lawsuits by the Tatmadaw to anyone who publicly claimed the army was involved.” [11] The United Nations Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on the situation of human rights in Myanmar wrote in a recent report to the UN Human Rights Council that the Tatmadaw actively pursues “criminal proceedings for defamation or providing false information when making allegations against the military,” intimidating any civilian who makes claims of killings, sexual violence in conflict and other serious crimes. [10]

There is some precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives. The Open Myanmar Initiative is a CSO which is advocating for transparency in government and laws guaranteeing the public right to know and the freedom of access to information. [6] However, the assistant director of the Open Myanmar Initiative has stated, “It is certain that the current government will not issue information. What the government does let us know is by press release only. And the government has kept back all the information. So it cannot be assumed that the government’s press releases are genuine ‘information’. It shows that the government has no transparency.” [7].

The Regional body South East Asia Parties against Corruption (SEA-PAC) reported in July 2015 that it held a workshop on the UNCAC Review Mechanism in July 2015 which reportedly included the attendence of 70 senior-level officials from Union Ministries, non-governmental organizations, states/regional governments, representatives from UNODC and representatives from ACC Myanmar. This could not be verified by other sources nor was there information related to the independence of the NGOs present.

Myanmar's application to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was approved for candidacy by the EITI board in July 2014, following a consultation process involving government, industry and civil society stakeholders [8,9]. Burmese civil society groups, however, reportedly hold serious doubts over the government’s commitment to ensuring a safe environment for NGOs that are supposed to participate in the international scheme. MATA, an umbrella organization for 470 national and community-based NGOs, had stated that the government had failed to guarantee necessary civil society freedoms. [12]



RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: As long as there is no engagement between 1) the military and CSOs at all or 2) the government and CSOs on military corruption, score should remain 0

COMMENTS -+

1. Government of Myanmar. Official Secrets Act, Section 3.1, 1923, accessed May 13, 2014. http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Myanmar/secrets.pdf

2. United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, A/HRC/25/64, April 2, 2014, accessed May 13, 2014. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session25/Documents/A-HRC-25-64_en.doc

3. Reuters, Myanmar journalists on trial for reporting alleged chemical weapons factory, February 16 2014, accessed September 03, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/16/us-myanmar-journalists-idUSBREA1F03D20140216

4. United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, A/69/398, September 23, 2014, accessed July 24, 2015. http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/69/398&Lang=E

5. International Center for Non-Profit Law, “NGO Law Monitor: Myanmar (Burma)” Report, last updated November 5, 2014, accessed July 24, 2015. http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/Myanmar.html

6. Open Mynamar Initiative, homepage information, no date, accessed 11 August 2015. http://www.omimyanmar.org

7. Eleven Myanmar. “Rights group pushes for freedom of information law” , undated, accessed 30 July 2015. http://elevenmyanmar.com/politics/rights-group-pushes-freedom-information-law

8. Natural Resources Governance Institute. &quoute;EITI Myanmar, Civil Society Debates the Extractive Industries for the First Time&quoute;. October 8, 2013, accessed September 03, 2015. http://www.resourcegovernance.org/news/blog/eiti-myanmar-civil-society-debates-extractive-industries-first-time

9. Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative. &quoute;Myanmar admitted as EITI Candidate&quoute;, July 2, 2014, accessed September 03, 2015. https://eiti.org/news/myanmar-admitted-eiti-candidate

10. United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, A/69/398, March 23, 2015, accessed July 24, 2015. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/060/75/PDF/G1506075.pdf?OpenElement

11. The Irrawaddy. &quoute;Burma’s Military Milestone&quoute;, March 30, 2015, accessed September 03, 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/contributor/burmas-military-milestone.html

12. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. &quoute;Comprehensive Security Sector Development in Myanmar&quoute;, September, 05 2014, accessed September 03, 2015. http://apcss.org/comprehensive-security-sector-development-in-myanmar/

13. The Irrawaddy. &quoute;Burma Accepted for EITI Scheme, But NGOs Remain Concerned&quoute;, July 3, 2014, accessed September 3, 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/business/burma-accepted-eiti-scheme-ngos-remain-concerned.html

14. SEA PAC. &quoute;Workshop for Focal Point and Governmental Experts and Stakeholders Participation in the Review Mechanism for the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)&quoute;, July 28, 2015, accessed September 03, 2015. http://www.sea-pac.org/?p=5295

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Myanmar's application to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was approved for candidacy by the EITI board in July 2014, following an extensive consultation process involving both government, industry and civil society stakeholders.

A modest level of constructive engagement with civil society initiatives dealing with issues of corruption and transparency can therefore be reported, with evidence of government openness towards and active participation in certain CSO initiatives.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
2

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Myanmar signed the UNCAC in 2005, and ratified it on 20 December 2012, with the treaty coming into force in Myanmar on 19 January 2013. [8] No evidence has been found indicating compliant activity of UNCAC or other relevant conventions.
As of September 2015, it is unclear whether Myanmar has undergone a compliance review under the UNCAC. No review documents specific to Myanmar could be located. According to the UNCAC country profile page, Myanmar is in the first cycle of the UNCAC review mechanism, which is due to occur from 2015-2015 and cover chapter III on criminalisation and law enforcement and chapter IV on international cooperation. [8,9] According to the head of the Counter Corruption Commission, Myanmar must complete its first review in 2015. [10] A May 2015 UNCAC document states that Myanmar has undergone 1 review though this could not be supported by any other publicly available documentation. [14]
In August 2013, Parliament passed law No. 23 of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Anti-Corruption Law. The law claims to implement the 2005 UNCAC, though it does not define corruption directly, but focuses on bribery offences and requires asset disclosure by public office holders. [1]

In January 2014, an Action Committee Against Corruption was created by presidential order. The committee is comprised of members of the Office of the President, the Minister for Home Affairs, and the Office of the Attorney General. It is not clear what the scope or functions of this committee are, nor what, if any, connection this committee has to the 15 member Anti-Corruption Commission formed by Parliament in February 2014. [2,3] It is not known if the Anti-Corruption commission meets the guidelines set by the UNCAC, as their mandate has not been made public, however one of the members of the commission headed the Myanmar delegation to the June 2015 meeting of the Implementation Review Group meeting of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

In September 2014, Parliament heard a report on the working of the Anti-Corruption Commission. An opposition Member of Parliament doubted the independence of the commission which took legal action on only 3 out of 533 cases received in the previous 5 months. By comparison, the Rule of Law Committee of Parliament, headed by the leader of an opposition party, had received 11,259 complaints over the previous year, many of which involved corruption. [11, 12]

The Regional body South East Asia Parties against Corruption (SEA-PAC), which consists of countries of South East Asia to fight corruption, held a workshop on the UNCAC Review Mechanism in July 2015 which reportedly included the attendance of 70 senior-level officials from Union Ministries, non-governmental organizations, states/regional governments, and representatives from UNODC and representatives from ACC Myanmar. [15] In November 2013, Myanmar joined the ASEAN Memorandum of understanding on Cooperation for Preventing and Combating Corruption. The MOU pledges Myanmar to work together with other ASEAN states to combat corruption through information sharing and capacity building. [6]

Prior to the aforementioned initiatives, most anti-corruption measures date back to the colonial era penal code, specifically the penal code chapter on Offences by or relating to Public Servant and the 1948 Suppression of Corruption Act. Investigation for bribery and corruption was to be carried out by the Bureau of Special Investigation of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Designated Law Officers at the Union Attorney General office were to undertake prosecution based on evidence supplied by the Bureau of Special Investigations in the Courts. It also passed a Control of Money Laundering Law in 2002. [4,13]

In the past, corruption cases were mostly pursued during purges within the military elite, such as in October 2004 when a former Prime Minister of the country was eliminated from the previous military regime. [5] A retired senior officer explained that any counter corruption measures passed by the civilian government today would not affect the military, but that the military would implement regulations of their own which would mirror the civil government’s laws. The military parallel regulations would not be subject to civil oversight but solely by the Commander in Chief. [7]

As of July 2015, Myanmar had not joined the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. No evidence detailing implementation or compliance was found. Score changed from 3 to 2 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Anti-Corruption Law, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Law No. 23, 2013, accessed May 15, 2014. http://pwplegal.com/documents/documents/f3142-Anti-Corruption-Law-%28PWP-Unofficial-English-Translation%29.pdf

2. Nan Tin Htwe. &quoute;Myanmar forms anti-corruption committee&quoute;, Myanmar Times. January 14, 2013, accessed May 15, 2014. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/3773-anti-corruption-committee-formed.html

3. Win Naung Toe, Nay Myo Tun and Ba Aung, Myanmar Parliament Appoints Commission to Battle Graft, RFA, February 25, 2014. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/commission-02252014181203.html

4. Clemence Gautier, Michael Ramirez. &quoute;Overview of ASEAN anti-corruption legislation: the uneven road to harmonisation,&quoute; Newsletter of the International Bar Association Legal Practice Division, Vol 19, No 2, September 2012, accessed May 15, 2014. http://www.tilleke.com/resources/overview-asean-anti-corruption-legislation-uneven-road-harmonization

5. BBC. &quoute;Burma's prime minister 'arrested'&quoute;, October 19, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3755052.stm

6. Jakarta Post. &quoute;Regional anti-corruption meeting kicks off&quoute;, November 15, 2013. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/11/15/regional-anti-corruption-meeting-kicks.html

7. Meeting with a retired Senior military officer in Myanmar, Source 9, 25 October 2014

8. UNODC. &quoute;Myanmar becomes the 165th State Party to UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)&quoute;, January 10, 2013, accessed September 03, 2015.
https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/myanmar/2013/01/165-uncac/story.html

9. UNODC, Country Profiles, accessed 24 July 2015. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/country-profile/index.html

10. Pyae Thet Phyo, “'Slap on the wrist': corruption goes unpunished” Myanmar Times, February 26, 2015, accessed July 24, 2015. http://www.burmanet.org/news/2015/02/26/myanmar-times-slap-on-the-wrist-corruption-goes-unpunished-pyae-thet-phyo/

11. Nyein Nyein, “MPs Voice Doubts Over Burma’s Anti-Corruption Commission” the Irrawaddy, 24 September 2014, accessed 24 July 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/mps-voice-doubts-burmas-anti-corruption-commission.html

12. Nyein Nyein, “Interference in Judicial System Harming Burmese People: Lawmakers”, the Irrawaddy, 14 August 2013, accessed July 24, 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/interference-in-judicial-system-harming-burmese-people-lawmakers.html

13. Statement by Myanmar, 4th IAACA Seminar, Dalian, China, 25-28 June 2012, accessed May 15, 2014. http://www.iaaca.org/documents/Presentation/TheFourthIAACASeminar/201207/P020120713589758115256.pdf

14. UN. &quoute;United Nations Convention Against Corruption
Status of ratifications and reviews performed,&quoute; May 5, 2015, accessed September 03, 2015. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/1-5June2015/V1503089e.pdf

15. SEA PAC. &quoute;Workshop for Focal Point and Governmental Experts and Stakeholders Participation in the Review Mechanism for the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)&quoute;, July 28, 2015, accessed September 03, 2015. http://www.sea-pac.org/?p=5295

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The commentary is largely correct but Myanmar has not signed up to all relevant instruments (e.g. OCED anti-bribery convention) so it cannot be said to have signed up to all relevant instruments.

The analysis needs to be updated until the end of 2014 e.g. the efficacy of the Action Committee Against Corruption has been widely criticised (see http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/mps-voice-doubts-burmas-anti-corruption-commission.html).

Suggested score: 2

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
1

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

There is minimal public debate on issues of defence and security.

The 2008 Constitution mandates that military affairs remain outside the control of the civilian government and grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states that “The Defence Services [have] the right to independently administer […] all affairs of the armed forces.” [6] This implies that there is little debate with academia and CSOs on defence issues, since the legislature is forbidden from engaging in the subject.

Additionally, the serving military officers currently occupy 25% of the seats in both houses in the legislature. The constitutional requirement to reserve a quarter of the seats in parliament for the military has been questioned by the opposition, in particular the National League for Democracy. However, a Constitutional Review Committee recommended no change in this constitutional requirement. [8] According to Source 3, in 2014 the Chair of the parliamentary committee reportedly issued instructions to the MPs on the committee not to raise objections regarding the military budget for national interest. [2]

While greatly improved media freedoms allow for more sophisticated campaigning and detailed reporting of issues, no evidence could be found indicating academics or CSOs within the country have launched a debate or forums on defence and security. Exiled CSOs routinely voice opinions on defence and security matters; however they do so mainly through documentation of human rights abuses by the military forces.

The media has provided some information on elements of the military budget, peace talks, elections, and levels of public trust (4,5,9, 100, 11, 12, 13). However, a review Myanmar news sources reveal a very limited coverage of defence issues overall. Some news outlets also appear to operate in exile which make it unclear how much of the debate in the media can be attributed to Myanmar based news outlets (who are subject to media restrictions). There is a MoD website, however this website provides no information on military policy and practices. [3]

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has, on numerous occasions, stated that “journalists operate under “[a] prevailing climate of uncertainty, intimidation and fear of arrest, particularly if reporting dealt with issues too close to the interests of the military ...” [7]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Score changed from 0 to 1 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1.Myanmar Rule of Law Assessment, Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, March 2013, pp. 22-23.

2. Email communication with Source 3, Myanmar Politician II, 15 May 2014.

3. Myanmar Ministry of Defence, Info, http://www.modins.net/myanmarinfo/ministry/defence.htm

4. Tha Lun Zaung Htet, Burma Parliament Approves Controversial defence Budget, the Irrawaddy, March 01, 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/ceasefire-keywords/burma-parliament-approves-controversial-defence-budget.html

5. The Economist. &quoute;Myanmar’s army and the economy, The road up from Mandalay, In the sticks, the army’s business activities are all too present,&quoute; April 21, 2012, accessed September 03, 2015. http://www.economist.com/node/21553091

6. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Ch.XIV, Article 445, Article 20 (b), Article 147 (b) [Amyotha Hluttaw] & Article 115 (b) [Pyithu Hluttaw], www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

7. United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, A/HRC/25/64, April 2, 2014, accessed May 13, 2014. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session25/Documents/A-HRC-25-64_en.doc

8. Hnin Yadana Zaw. &quoute;Myanmar military retains veto after constitution change vote fails,&quoute; Reuters, June 25, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/25/us-myanmar-politics-idUSKBN0P50Q820150625

9. Nyein Nyein. &quoute;Burma defence Ministry Puts Forward Budget Request,&quoute; The Irrawaddy, January 15, 2014, accessed September 03, 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-defence-ministry-puts-forward-budget-request.html

10. Lawi Weng. &quoute;Fighting Flares in Northeast as High-Level Peace Meeting Nears,&quoute; August 28, 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/fighting-flares-in-northeast-as-high-level-peace-meeting-nears.html

11. The Irrawaddy. &quoute;Burma Army Chief Meets Thai Top Brass in Bangkok,&quoute; August 28, 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-army-chief-meets-thai-top-brass-in-bangkok.html

12. Aung Hla Tun. &quoute;Burma's Military Chief Says Armed Forces Will Respect Vote,&quoute; Reuters, August 25, 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/election/news/military-chief-says-armed-forces-respect-vote

13. Eleven News. &quoute;Myanmar has the lowest level of trust in military, police and courts: ABS,&quoute; 2015, accessed September 03, 2015. http://elevenmyanmar.com/politics/myanmar-has-lowest-level-trust-military-police-and-courts-abs

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The scoring is understandable but there is patchy public debate on defence and security issues, albeit heavily restricted and limited, and the evidence needs to be updated.

For example, the Myanmar Times (published in country) has discussed the budget (Military spending still dwarfs education and health, Mar 2014, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/10000-military-spending-still-dwarfs-education-and-health.html). The media out of the country has reported on the military budget more recently than suggested, too (e.g. Irrawady, Burma defence Ministry Puts Forward Budget Request, Jan 2015 http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-defence-ministry-puts-forward-budget-request.html), indicating at least a semi-public parliamentary debate on budget requests.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
0

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to locate further information to indicate the existence of an implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector, nor is there any publicly available to suggest that a broader government anti-corruption policy is in existence.

U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre reported that the country has a set of anti-corruption laws and since as early as 1948, corruption is officially a crime that can carry a jail term. [5,7,10] Parliament passed the Anti-Corruption Law in August 2013. It is applicable to “any public entity formed under any existing law.” Unlike some other laws (e.g. OAG Law), the military is not exempt from the 2013 Anti-Corruption Law which applies to all citizens and residents of the country, without exception. [2] According to one global law group, as of September 2014, the implementing regulations for Myanmar's Anti- Corruption Law have not been promulgated. [7] Myanmar's Anti-Corruption Law lacks preventive measures. One business law group analysis notes that it does not have articles addressing the types of accounting and record keeping standards to which companies in the country should be held and does not put companies on notice to keep books and records using reasonable detail to accurately reflect payments and transactions and clearly identify the purpose of such events. [8]

Moreover while the law mandates the creation of a bribery eradication commission, now generally referred to as the Anti-Corruption Commission [2], no evidence could be found to suggest that the Myanmar government actually has an anti-corruption policy or plan in place that outlines priorities for reform with timelines – this is different from an anti-corruption law which stipulates crimes and punishment.


Response to Peer Reviewer 1: The information is not relevant to this score as the question inquires about policy, not institutions or legislation.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: The information is not relevant to this score as the question inquires about policy, not institutions or legislation.

COMMENTS -+

1. Burma's prime minister 'arrested', BBC, 19 October 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3755052.stm

2. Anti-Corruption Law, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Law No. 23, 2013 http://pwplegal.com/documents/documents/f3142-Anti-Corruption-Law-%28PWP-Unofficial-English-Translation%29.pdf

3. &quoute;Myanmar Parliament Appoints Commission to Battle Graft&quoute;, Radio Free Asia, 25 February 2014, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/commission-02252014181203.html

4. &quoute;President urges anti-corruption commission to act freely&quoute;, Eleven Myanmar, 11 June 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6420:president-urges-anti-corruption-commission-to-act-freely&catid=44:national&Itemid=384

5. Myanmar's Ministry for Home Affairs. Letter to United Nations office on Drugs and Crime, 10 April 2013. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup4/2013-August-26-28/Responses_NV/Myanmar_EN.pdf

6. Kyaw Kha, “Thein Sein Admits Corruption, Bribery Are ‘Chronic’ in Burma” the Irrawaddy, 22 August 2014. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/thein-sein-admits-corruption-bribery-chronic-burma.html accessed 11 August 2015

7. Norton Rose Fulbright, Business ethics and anti-corruption laws: Myanmar, September 2014. http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/121098/business-ethics-and-anti-corruption-laws-myanmar accessed 24 July 2015

8. Edwin Vanderbruggen and Adam Miller, Myanmar implements new Anticorruption Law, VDB-Loi Client Briefing Note, 30 April 2014. http://www.vdb-loi.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Client-briefing-Note_anticorruption_VDB-Loi-Client-Briefing-Note_30Apr14.pdf accessed 15 May 2014

9. Nyein Nyein, “MPs Voice Doubts Over Burma’s Anti-Corruption Commission” the Irrawaddy, 24 September 2014. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/mps-voice-doubts-burmas-anti-corruption-commission.html accessed 24 July 2015

10. U4 Anti Corruption Resource Centre. &quoute;Overview of Corruption in Burma,&quoute; October 01, 2012, accessed September 03, 2015. http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/349_Overview_of_corruption_in_Burma.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The scoring and commentary are fair - not aware of military cases relating to the military/MOD which could have been pursued since the new commission was formed in early 2014.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The implementing regulations for the Anti-Corruption Law of 2013 have not been promulgated.

A lack of political and budgetary support has undermined the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Law, which is dependent on the limited efficacy of the Anti-Corruption Commission. The number of cases investigated by the Commission remains very low, with three investigations resulting in legal action out f 533 complaints received, according to one source (22 September 2014, 'Question to be raised about lack of work done by Anti-Corruption Commission', Eleven Myanmar).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
1

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to locate publicly accessible information regarding the existence of any independent institution within defence and security tasked with countering corruption. An anti-corruption law and Commission exists for the civil sector but there is lack of evidence indicating it has been active, particularly in the defence sector. [2]

Within the civil sector, an Action Committee Against Corruption was created by presidential order in January 2013. [1,5,6] The committee is comprised of members of the Office of the President, the Minister for Home Affairs, and the Office of the Attorney General. This Committee has a mandate which includes information gathering, investigation, legal advice, interrogation, prosecution, and asset recovery. The body was also tasked with scrutinising the accuracy of complaint letters and if necessary take legal action against those submitting fraudulent complaints. [4] However, there have been concerns over the committee’s composition, with no non-government representatives. [1] Sources indicate that by 2014, the nine-member anti-corruption committee had not released any findings or activities. [7]

A 15 member Anti-Corruption (or Anti-Bribery) Commission formed by Parliament in February 2014 under the Anti-Corruption Law. [4,8] The committee mentioned appears to be focused solely on the civil service. In one report by a government officer sent to a UNCAC training meeting, he reported that in 450 cases of corruption placed before the committee, 95% were addressed through civil service administrative procedures or transfers. [4] Members of the commission are required to disclose money, property, assets and liabilities of their family including beneficial ownership. No member of the commission has the right to serve for more than two terms, must be between 45 and 70 years old, and he or she shall not be an official or servant of a government organization. No information could be find indicating these regulations are enforced. The 15 member Commission too is tasked with the investigation of corruption cases and recovery of lost state assets.

There is no publicly available information indicating how and whether areas of overlap or duplication between the Action Committee and the newer Commission are resolved. [7] Moreover, according to an international law group, if the Commission is convinced that a person has committed bribery, and “if the accused party is a political position holder, the inquiry team or the chief investigator must obtain the consent of the Government to commence legal proceedings”. [2] This seems to imply that there is significant opportunity for external and political influence in the Commission’s activities. Given the overwhelming presence of old regime figures on the commission there is little public confidence in its ability to function [9,10]

No further publicly available was found regarding the activities of the aforementioned anti-corruption bodies.



Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agreed. Score changed from 0 to 1 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Nan Tin Htwe, &quoute;Myanmar forms anti-corruption committee&quoute;, January 14, 2013, accessed May 15, 2014, Myanmar News. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/3773-anti-corruption-committee-formed.html

2. Edwin Vanderbruggen and Adam Miller, “Myanmar implements new Anticorruption Law”, VDB|Loi Client Briefing Note, 30 April 2014, accessed 4 August 2015. http://www.vdb-loi.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Client-briefing-Note_anticorruption_VDB-Loi-Client-Briefing-Note_30Apr14.pdf

3. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, 25 May 2014

4. Myo Khaing Swe, Director, Bureau of Special Investigations, Ministry of Home Affairs, 16th UNAFEI UNCAC Training Programme Participants Papers, accessed 24 July 2015. http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pages/RMS/No92_22PA_Swe.pdf

5. VDB|Loi &quoute;Myanmar Legal Wire,&quoute; January 14, 2013. http://www.vdb-loi.com/mlw/myanmar-sets-up-action-committee-against-corruption/

6. Zin Linn. &quoute;Burma’s corruption committee: Real change or another false dawn?&quoute; Asian Correspondent, January 10, 2013. http://asiancorrespondent.com/95146/can-burma-defeat-corruption-after-forming-of-anti-corruption-committee/

7. Zin Linn. &quoute;Is Burma's anti-corruption commission helpful?&quoute; Asian Tribune, February 26, 2014. http://www.asiantribune.com/node/72427

8. Anti-Corruption Law, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Law No. 23, 2013 http://pwplegal.com/documents/documents/f3142-Anti-Corruption-Law-%28PWP-Unofficial-English-Translation%29.pdf

9. &quoute;Myanmar Parliament Appoints Commission to Battle Graft&quoute;, Radio Free Asia, 25 February 2014, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/commission-02252014181203.html

10. &quoute;President urges anti-corruption commission to act freely&quoute;, Eleven Myanmar, 11 June 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6420:president-urges-anti-corruption-commission-to-act-freely&catid=44:national&Itemid=384

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The commentary is fair and there is limited evidence the committee has been effective (it is a 15-member committee inclusive of former generals with little perceived appetite to bring about charges or investigations in the defence/security sector).

For this reason, the scoring must be 1 not 0. While the committee is ineffective, there is evidence the institution exists and could, legally, hold those in the military and security sector to account.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
0

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to locate any specific data regarding public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption.

Prior to 2011, Myanmar ranked near the bottom of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. From 2004-2010 Myanmar scored between 0.48 and 1.94 for Control of Corruption (scale 0-100). Since 2011 it has moved up the rankings, but still comes in very low, scoring 12.44/100 in 2013. [1]

Since 2003 when it was added to the Index, Myanmar consistently ranked near the bottom of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). In 2011, Myanmar ranked 180 out of 182 countries. However, by 2014 Myanmar had a score of 21 and ranked 156/175 in the CPI. [2,3,4,6]

The Myanmar police force (MPF) reportedly started to address corruption within their ranks through EU-sponsored training and capacity building. In 2001 and 2013 the MPF public arrested a number of regional commanders. However, according to risk-analysis firm, the MPF lack the public support it needs to ensure its reforms are effective.[7] A 2014 Asia Foundation survey also suggests the public holds the defence and security forces of Myanmar in low regard with the police receiving the lowest positive rating of trust, followed by the courts and the army. [8] The Asia Foundation Survey also notes that only 2% of the public felt the police had “very high integrity”—and the strongest negative response, with 21% of respondents believing the police to be of “low integrity,” and 10% of “very low integrity.” Public perception of the army was mixed, with a somewhat positive integrity rating (5% “very high integrity,” 32% “high integrity”) challenged by negative integrity responses (12% “low integrity,” 5% “very low integrity”). [8]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: This question inquires about perceptions. It cannot be assumed that simply because certain anti-corruption laws and structures have been established that this has affected public perception. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank, accessed 15 May, 2014. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home

2. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, Myanmar results, 2011. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results

3.Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, Myanmar results, 2010. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results

4. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, Myanmar results, 2009. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2009/results

5. Myanmar Egress and ActionAid Myanmar. Public Opinion Poll on National Budgeting Process: Pre-budgeting Opinion Poll,&quoute; Yangon, sourced in Myanmar Budget Brief: 2014-15 FY, Public Preference, Sector Allocation and Planning, 2014.

6. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, Myanmar results, 2014. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results

7. Rhys Thompson. &quoute;Corruption and police reform in Myanmar,&quoute; the Interpreter, February 18, 2015. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/18/corruption-police-reform-Myanmar.aspx

8. Asia Foundation. &quoute;Myanmar 2014: Civic Knowledge and Values in a Changing Society,&quoute; 2014. http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/MyanmarSurvey20141.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Is there not more recent evidence for this score? I would suggest that this score is accurate but it could be 1 even if minor changes (such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, Feb 2014) have been set up since the previous TI indices were published.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
0

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to find any evidence that areas of corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel have been identified by the defence ministry or other relevant institution. Although two new anti-corruption entities have been put in place, it is not clear whether they have a mandate to undertake corruption risks assessments of the military [1,2,3] .

It is unlikely that another government agency will identify corruption risks in the military sector since all military affairs, including procurement, budget and policy, remain outside the control of civilian organs of government. The 2008 Constitution grants the defence Forces complete autonomy from civil administration. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [4]

COMMENTS -+

1. Nan Tin Htwe, Myanmar forms anti-corruption committee, undated news item, Global Conference of Parliamentarians Against Corruption, accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.gopacmanila2013.com/blog/2013/01/myanmar-forms-anti-corruption-committee also Win Naung

2. Toe, Nay Myo Tun and Ba Aung, Myanmar Parliament Appoints Commission to Battle Graft, RFA, 25 February 2014. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/commission-02252014181203.html

3. Edwin Vanderbruggen and Adam Miller, “Myanmar implements new Anticorruption Law”, VDB|Loi Client Briefing Note, 30 April 2014. http://www.vdb-loi.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Client-briefing-Note_anticorruption_VDB-Loi-Client-Briefing-Note_30Apr14.pdf accessed 4 August 2015

4. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
1

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

The process for acquisition planning is not made public, only the results of that process are announced as part of the information made available in the military section of the national budget process. There was also no publicly available information indicating any degree of oversight over acquisition planning processes.

The year 2013 was the first year significant information on military acquisitions was made available to parliament when it was, for the first time provided details on the defence budget. Macro details were provided, including that the budget included acquisition plans of $631.1 million on military hardware, with about $200 million going to aircraft, $93 million on ships, $30 million on military vehicles, $195 million on military accessories, $112 million on military industries and $1.1 million on weapons. Reportedly the remainder of the budget went to construction projects, including the building of army bases, roads, military-owned businesses and maintaining military universities and schools. [1]

In 2014 it was made public that of the $2.36 billion requested for the total defence budget this year, $2.282 billion would go toward military projects, including the building infrastructure for military camps, building roads to connect bases, purchasing vehicles and equipment, offering training and sending trainees abroad. Much of the $40 million reduction in the total defence budget in 2014 came from salaries. [4] Source 2 noted that in 2014 the defence budget was delivered in a stack of 3 volumes to parliamentarians. This could possibly imply that there was more information available on the military budget (and acquisition plans) in 2014 than 2013 though that cannot be verified through additional public sources. The interviewee did not know of anyone who had read the contents.

Myanmar's Ministry of Defence reportedly proposed a 2015 defence budget of $2.5 billion in January 2015. The figure represents a year-on-year nominal increase of 10%. [5] Local media reported that about 51 percent of his expanded budget was earmarked for salaries and allowances, while 29 percent was reserved for military hardware such as vehicles, warships and weaponry. [6]

In addition to the official budget, the Ministry of defence can use funding from a range of military-backed businesses, including the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings. [3] Under the Constitution, the army also under certain circumstances has powers to allocate more defence funds. [6] This suggests that there may be planned acquisitions outside of the official defence budget and therefore exempt to oversight.

Media research did not turn up any further significant information regarding details of acquisitions or respective plans in recent years.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: I have added the evidence and sources related to extra-budgetary funding. Whilst the information you provide adds interesting context it is not entirely relevant to this question as it does not relate directly to acquisition planning but rather of overall government debt. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. Tha Lun Zaung Htet, Burma Parliament Approves Controversial defence Budget, the Irrawaddy, 1 March 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/ceasefire-keywords/burma-parliament-approves-controversial-defence-budget.html

2. Telephone interview with Source 2, Myanmar Politician I, 15 May 2014.

3. Nyein Nyein. &quoute;Burma defence Ministry Puts Forward Budget Request&quoute;, The Irrawaddy, 15 January 2015, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-defence-ministry-puts-forward-budget-request.html

4. Nyein Nyein. &quoute;Burma defence Ministry Puts Forward Budget Request,&quoute; January 15, 2014. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-defence-ministry-puts-forward-budget-request.html

5. Jon Grevatt. &quoute;Myanmar announces 2015 budget of USD2.5 billion,&quoute; IHS Jan'es 360. January 27, 2015. http://www.janes.com/article/48370/myanmar-announces-2015-budget-of-usd2-5-billion

6. Yen Snaing. &quoute;Govt Proposes 20% Budget Rise Boosting Education, defence and Health,&quoute; The Irrawaddy, January 30, 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-proposes-20-budget-rise-boosting-education-defence-health.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Nyein Nyein, Burma defence Ministry Puts Forward Budget Request, the Irrawaddy, 15 January 2015, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-defence-ministry-puts-forward-budget-request.html

&quoute;In addition to the official budget, the Ministry of defence can use funding from a range of military-backed businesses, including the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings&quoute;.

In light of the budget release, and its large allocations to military spending, a report on the country's public debt is to be submitted to the Public Expenditure Committee as well the Auditor General, prior to a parliamentary review. Thein Htaik, the Myanmar Auditor General, is a retired Army Major General who has also served as an Inspector General in the Ministry of defence.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
0

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

After further consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to discover a public copy of the defence budget, nor was the assessor able to obtain a copy through non-public methods. The few details that were located in the press indicate that the defence budget figures are unreliable, and while they do offer a breakdown of information on budget items, there is no indication that this information is comprehensive nor could it be verified through government publications.

In terms of budget formulation, recent years have shown increasingly robust participation by parliament in the budget drafting process. [10,11] However, no evidence shows that this participation is also translated into influence and most year the budgets appear to pass without change.

It is unclear to what extent the figures presented in the media are accurate. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) lists military expenditures in Myanmar, in billions of kyat (for the financial year), as 1,294 in 2011, 2,104 in 2012, 2,245 in 2013 and 2,366 in 2014. [6] No figures were available from SIPRI for the 2015 financial year. News reports in Myanmar give different figures with 1,181 billion kyat proposed in 2011-2012, 1,887 billion kyat in 2012-2013, 2.222 billion kyat in 2013-2014, and K2.613 trillion in 2014-15. The military has sought approval for a total of K2.750 trillion budget for the 2015-2016 financial year but it’s unclear whether parliament has approved this figure. [7] News media sources also conflict on whether the 2014 budget declined very slightly to 2,360 billion kyat or increased to 2,613. [7,8] News media quotes the reduction as coming predominantly from salaries. Figures quoted in the news report do not appear credible, however, since it would mean that the military cut salaries by 50%. This is also complicated by information from a separate article wherein the Defence Minister reportedly stated that just over half of the 2015 budget proposal was allocated to salaries. [7]

In terms of budget detail, the assessor could locate only two local sources that indicate any breakdown of the defence budget. Even then, the information presented consisted of budget proposal submitted from the government to the parliament and do not reflect final approved budgets. The year 2013 was the first year significant information on the defence budget proposal was made available to parliament. Macro details were provided, including potential expenditure of $631.1 million on military hardware, with about $200 million going to aircraft, $93 million on ships, $30 million on military vehicles, $195 million on military accessories, $112 million on military industries and $1.1 million on weapons. Reportedly the remainder of the budget went to construction projects, including the building of army bases, roads, military-owned businesses and maintaining military universities and schools. [1] In 2014 it was made public that of the $2.36 billion requested for defence, $2.282 billion would go toward military projects, including the building infrastructure for military camps, building roads to connect bases, purchasing vehicles and equipment, offering training and sending trainees abroad. [4] Source 2 noted that in 2014 the defence budget was delivered in a stack of 3 volumes to parliamentarians. This could possibly imply that there was more information available on the defence budget in 2014 than in 2013 though that cannot be verified through additional publicly available sources.

In January 2015 Myanmar's Ministry of Defence reportedly that the proposed defence budget for 2015-2016 represents a year-on-year nominal increase of 10%. [9] Local media reported that about 51 percent of this expanded budget was earmarked for salaries and allowances, while 29 percent was reserved for military hardware such as vehicles, warships and weaponry. [6] This could not be verified through official government publications.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed, whilst figures detailing the government’s defence budget proposal to parliament are made available through news articles, this data could not be verified. The information also lacks detail and does not represent the final approved budget. Score changed from 2 to 0 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1 Tha Lun Zaung Htet, Burma Parliament Approves Controversial defence Budget, the Irrawaddy, 1 March 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/ceasefire-keywords/burma-parliament-approves-controversial-defence-budget.html

2. Telephone interview with Source 2, Myanmar Politician I, 15 May 2014.

3. &quoute;Myanmar allocates 1/4 of new budget to military&quoute;, Associated Press, 1 March 2011. http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9LMDOSO1.htm

4. SIPRI, 2012 report, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milexdata1988-2012v2.xsls note 54

5. Email communication from Source 8, founder of a non-profit organisation based in Myanmar, 12 December 2014

6. SIPRI. Military Expenditure Database. accessed 30 July 2015. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex-data-1988-2014

7. Htoo Thant, “Military proposes 5.5pc budget increase”, Myanmar Times, 30 January 2015, , accessed 30 July 2015. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/12953-military-proposes-5-5pc-budget-increase-for-soldier-pay-rises.html

8. Nyein Nyein, “Burma defence Ministry Puts Forward Budget Request”, the Irrawaddy, 15 July 2014, , accessed 30 July 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-defence-ministry-puts-forward-budget-request.html

9. Jon Grevatt. &quoute;Myanmar announces 2015 budget of USD2.5 billion,&quoute; IHS Jan'es 360. January 27, 2015. http://www.janes.com/article/48370/myanmar-announces-2015-budget-of-usd2-5-billion

10. US Department of State. Fiscal Transparency Report. 2014. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/oma/235938.htm

11. Aye NaiI. Military spending challenged in parliament. DVB, February 19, 2013. http://www.dvb.no/news/military-spending-challenged-in-parliament/26476

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Good analysis and a fair score, but 1 would be fairer given the context and commentary.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
1

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

After further consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to find any public record of the deliberations and actions of a legislative committee which undertakes scrutiny and analysis of the defence budget, nor could evidence be found suggesting the committee is provided with detailed, accurate, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget.

Both the upper and lower houses of Parliament have Defence and Security Committees. There is no publicly available information on the scope or mandate of the Defence and Security Committees nor any evidence indicating their required involvement in defence budget scrutiny and analysis. The assessor was not able to determine the relationship between the Parliament Budget Committee and the Defence and Security Committees. One of the few public assessments regarding the functioning of parliamentary committees is a Rule of Law Assessment by the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights. This report states that parliamentary committees in general are reportedly hampered by a lack of staff and parliamentarians allegedly lack the experience and capacity to provide effective oversight. [3]

In terms of budget deliberation, Source 8 indicates that the defence budget has been allowed to be discussed very sparingly in parliament, though the budget has also reportedly passed without change each time. [4] Source 2, however, commented that there had been no discussion regarding the military budget in Parliament. [2] No publicly available information was found which could support either claim.

Regarding the provision of information on the defence budget, a few media sources make references to macro-level budgetary detail contained within the government defence budget proposal to parliament. [1, 6, 7] It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the parliament receives at least the same degree of detail as is presented in the local media. However, as has been stated, the accuracy of these figures is uncertain and often conflict. According to source 2, the 300 page budget document was submitted in 3 volumes. One MP was reportedly appointed to the Budget Committee to examine the Military Budget, however that MP was requested by the Chair of the Committee not to object to anything due to national interest.

Outside committee scrutiny, in March 2013, one MP submitted a proposal in the National Parliament for the national military expenditure be reduced to 17% of the total government budget. The proposal was rejected by vote, 445 -60. [5]

Moreover, the Special Funds Law of 2011 facilitates the allocation of additional funds to the defence budget by the commander-in-chief. The law enables the commander-in-chief to allocate undisclosed and theoretically unlimited funds to the military budget, without requiring prior notice or allowing for parliamentary oversight. [8] According to the media article, a leaked document of the Special Funds Law includes the following provision: &quoute;For the spending of the Special Funding, no person or organisation can question, propose and audit&quoute;.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 0 and sources added.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed. However, the lack of information surrounding the defence committees mandate or related oversight activity and inconsistent data on defence budget proposals indicate that while committees exists in law, in practice they receives potentially misleading or inaccurate information on proposed defence expenditures, and have no impact on decision making. Score changed from 2 to 0 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Tha Lun Zaung Htet, Burma Parliament Approves Controversial defence Budget, the Irrawaddy, 1 March 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/ceasefire-keywords/burma-parliament-approves-controversial-defence-budget.html

2. Telephone interview with Source 2, Myanmar Politician I, 15 May 2014

3. Myanmar Rule of Law Assessment; New Perimeter, Perseus Strategies, and the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights; March 2013 ;Pg. 22-23.

4. Email communication from Source 8, founder of a non-profit organisation based in Myanmar, 12 December 2014

5. Parliament Watch, 7th Session, http://www.altsean.org/Research/Parliament%20Watch/Legislative/National%20Parliament/Sessions/Session7.php, accessed 30 July 2015

6. Htoo Thant, “Military proposes 5.5pc budget increase”, Myanmar Times, 30 January 2015, , accessed 30 July 2015. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/12953-military-proposes-5-5pc-budget-increase-for-soldier-pay-rises.html

7. Nyein Nyein, “Burma defence Ministry Puts Forward Budget Request”, the Irrawaddy, 15 July 2014, , accessed 30 July 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-defence-ministry-puts-forward-budget-request.html

8. Wai Moe, Than Shwe Grants Himself Power to Access 'Special Funds', the Irrawaddy, March 4, 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20878

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Special Funds Law of 2011 facilitates the allocation of additional funds to the defence budget by the commander-in-chief.

The law enables the commander-in-chief to allocate undisclosed and theoretically unlimited funds to the military budget, without requiring prior notice or allowing for parliamentary oversight.

According to the Irrawaddy (Wai Moe, Than Shwe Grants Himself Power to Access 'Special Funds', the Irrawaddy, 11 March 2011), a leaked document of the Special Funds Law includes the following provision: &quoute;For the spending of the Special Funding, no person or organisation can question, propose and audit&quoute;.

Information on defence spending tends to be aggregated and while legislative bodies are able to scrutinize the budget to some extent, the effectiveness of their oversight remains inconsistent.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
0

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to find any indication that the approved defence budget is made available to the public by the government.

In practice, citizens, civil society, and the media cannot access information on the budget. Myanmar has no Freedom of Information laws access to government officials and the military is inconsistent. The 2008 constitution provides for freedoms of expression and of the press, while at the same time setting out broad and ambiguous conditions under which these rights may be curtailed. [5] Freedom House also reports that despite several years of reforms and improvements, “conditions for the media in Myanmar grew worse overall during 2014,” with the introduction of controversial laws that would authorise the formation of a council to regulate and oversee television and radio broadcasting, with the power to fine outlets and revoke licenses. Freedom House indicates that “[w]hile the media sector continued to be vibrant, independent outlets struggled for financial sustainability, and journalists faced increased pressure in the form of criminal prosecutions, travel restrictions, and physical violence.” [4]

While some macro elements of the defence budget are reported in the press. For instance, in 2015 the Defence Minister was reported to state to parliament that 51% of the defence budget was for salaries and allowances 33% for 'military expenditure', 9% for construction, 4% for military education and healthcare and an undefined portion for debt repayment and office equipment. The Defence Minister said 29% of the defence budget would be used for vehicles, warships, armoured cars and heavy weapons. [3] However, the accuracy of these figures cannot be verified and also do not appear to be available directly from a government source.

Htin Kyaw Aye, assistant director of the Open Myanmar Initiative has stated, “It is certain that the current government will not issue information. What the government does let us know is by press release only. And the government has kept back all the information. So it cannot be assumed that the government’s press releases are genuine ‘information’. It shows that the government has no transparency.” [6]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Whilst the context is useful, this question inquires about the level of information made available to the public.

COMMENTS -+

1. Telephone interview with Source 2, Myanmar Politician I, 15 May 2014.

2. Reuters, Myanmar journalists on trial for reporting alleged chemical weapons factory, 16 Feb. 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/16/us-myanmar-journalists-idUSBREA1F03D20140216

3. Htoo Thant, “Military proposes 5.5pc budget increase”, Myanmar Times, 30 January 2015, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/12953-military-proposes-5-5pc-budget-increase-for-soldier-pay-rises.html, accessed 30 July 2015

4. Freedom House. Myanmar. 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/myanmar#.Velz8xHBzRY

5. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. 2008, accessed 24 May 2014www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

6. “Rights group pushes for freedom of information law” Eleven Myanmar, undated, accessed 30 July 2015. http://elevenmyanmar.com/politics/rights-group-pushes-freedom-information-law

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The overall position is fair but greater context needs to be given. In 2012, parliamentarians debated the budget for the first time in decades and continues to decrease in overall size (caveats aside about the extent of military economic interests outside state funds). See http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-defence-ministry-puts-forward-budget-request.html.

The sources need bolstering. See IISS Military Balance 2014, 2015 for its take.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
0

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to find any sort of oversight of sources of defence income outside of central budget allocation. As no official defence budget has been made public it is also not possibly to verify whether income derived from sources outside central government allocation (such as revenues from military/defence owned companies) is published or included in a defence budget.

There is no publication of non-central government sources of funding. The military owns at least two major economic enterprises that have dominated the economy, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) focused on banking, trade, tourism and precious stones) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) with interests in heavy industry and commodities. [5] According to the 2014 BTI report on Myanmar, a wave of privatization of state assets and enterprises came suddenly in 2009 – 2010. However, the process was neither transparent nor competitive, since the government allegedly sold the assets very quickly to a handful of enterprises with close military ties and to UMEHL and MEC. In the 2010-2011 financial year UMEHL reportedly earned profits of $48 million. Whilst this data is not recent, it indicates the potential for a vast sum of defence income that is not subject to oversight. [7]

Military owned businesses do rank among the countries top tax payers, according to internal revenue department records, so as such it is possible that, through income from taxation, they do contribute to central government funds which are allocated by parliament. [4,7] Military owned UMEHL subsidiary company Myawaddy Trading is listed as the highest paying company. Military owned MEC subsidiary company Dagon Beverages is listed as the countries second highest taxpayer. Other subsidiary companies are also listed separately. The US Government maintains economic sanctions on both UMEHL and MEC. [2,3]

However, it is unclear what happens to the business revenues and whether they are included in the defence budget. According to source 5, military owned companies profits accrue to certain departments within the military, and in the case of UMEHL, to high military officers who own shares, and as such are not included in the budget. [6] This is confirmed in part by a 2014 report which states that “MEC is operated by the Ministry of defence Quartermaster’s General Office, with its private shares exclusively owned by active-duty military personnel”. [7] A 2015 source indicates that the army’s holding companies are owned by serving and retired military officers. [8] The International Crisis Group reports that &quoute;much of the revenue from military business does not flow to the Tatmadaw itself – UMEHL mostly finances its shareholders (in the main, retired senior military officers) and the military’s pension fund&quoute;. [1]

Previously, the military promoted a policy of self-reliance for military commanders within their region of command, which required them to generate revenue, which manifested as informal forms of taxation, selling of concessions of state or appropriated resources and regionally owned military businesses or farms. Under the 2008 constitution, new chief ministers have assumed the administrative powers previously used by the military commanders to run economic enterprises which has led to fewer profit making activities by regional military units. [1] A 2013 news report indicated that certain sources inside parliament noted that while the new budget is likely to include some natural resource revenue, not all of it will be included. [9] Reports also indicate, however, that the military remains heavily involved in large-scale cultivation and sale of opium poppies in the region, as well the smuggling of teak [8] suggesting an additional non-centrally-allocated source of funding.

The aforementioned information indicates that there is no publication of non-central government sources of funding, let alone substantive scrutiny of these activities.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: While the information is useful, you have not provided any sources which can substantiate the claim that corporate business records relevant to defence income are published. Score maintained.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Since the sources could not be verified, the information was not included.

COMMENTS -+

1. International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks?, Asia Briefing No. 143, Yangon/Brussels, 22 April 2014, p. 9-10

2. Myanmar Times, Reporting rules for US firms revealed, Vol. 23, No. 635, 16-22 July, 2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/2012/news/635/news63502.html

3. US Department of Treasury. Specially Designated Nationals and Sanctions List. Accessed September 04, 2015. http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/ctrylst.txt

4. Ministry of Finance, Internal Revenue Department, 2013-2014 top 1000 tax payments. Accessed 30 April 2015. http://www.irdmyanmar.gov.mm/PDF/TaxPayers1000%28CT%292_29_46_Ameng.pdf or http://www.irdmyanmar.gov.mm/ird/Download.aspx

5. Bertelsmann Stiftung. &quoute;Myanmar Country Report&quoute;, 3014, accessed September 02, 2015. http://www.bti-project.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Myanmar.pdf

6. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

7. Institute of Developing Economies: Japan External Trade Organization. &quoute;Chapter 6.
Business Conglomerates in the Context of Myanmar's Economic Reform&quoute; in Myanmar's Integration with Global Economy: Outlook and Opportunities, 2014, accessed September 04, 2015. http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Brc/pdf/13_07.pdf

8. Richard Cockett. &quoute;Burma: How It Has Changed, and How It Will Change Asia,&quoute; July 2015. p. 103. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=X4d2CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA103&lpg=PA103&dq=myanmar+economic+corporation,+union+of+myanmar+economic+holdings+limited&source=bl&ots=bSjP0tO39U&sig=tIlscnXw9fN1glEQhqg47ejoKUM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDUQ6AEwBjgKahUKEwiRvPiyod3HAhXRCNsKHVhoDQM#v=onepage&q=myanmar%20economic%20corporation%2C%20union%20of%20myanmar%20economic%20holdings%20limited&f=false

9. Aye Nai, &quoute;Military spending challenged in parliament,&quoute; DVB, 19 February 2013. http://www.dvb.no/news/military-spending-challenged-in-parliament/26476

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Corporate business records are available in Myanmar and can be accessed through the Chamber of Commerce or solicitors. The information includes partial information on beneficial ownership and revenues. These are unsatisfactory but they are a semblance of records of non-central government funding sources.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Agree with assessment that no sources of funding other than central government are published. Unofficial documentary footage of Burmese army defectors interviewed in exile in Thailand has claimed funding, technical assistance and collaboration has been provided by both North Korean and Russian regimes, with a view to enhancing eventual nuclear capabilities of the Myanmar public defence sector. It was not possible to verify these sources, however.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
0

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

No public information is available on the internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure. Even if such a process exists it is not known in the public domain.

If there was an internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure, it is unlikely that these reports or such a process would be subject to parliamentary oversight given that military affairs largely remain outside the mandate of the civil government. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [1]

Moreover, the Special Funds Law of 2011 enables the commander-in-chief to allocate undisclosed and theoretically unlimited funds to the military budget, without requiring prior notice or allowing for parliamentary oversight. [2] According to the media article, a leaked document of the Special Funds Law includes the following provision: &quoute;For the spending of the Special Funding, no person or organisation can question, propose and audit&quoute;.

COMMENTS -+

1. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

2. Wai Moe, Than Shwe Grants Himself Power to Access 'Special Funds', the Irrawaddy, March 4, 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20878

3. Tim McLaughlin, “Military firm wins arbitration battle with Fraser & Neave” Myanmar Times, 31 October 2014. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/12137-military-firm-wins-arbitration-battle-with-fraser-neave.html accessed 3 August 2015

There was no further publicly available information on this subject.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is little evidence of auditing of the defence budget but it is not beyond parliament or other committees to do so by law.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
0

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

There is no publicly available information indicating external auditing of military defence expenditure actually takes place. Given the degree of influence by the military and lack of overall civilian oversight, it is likely that the external audit process is fully undermined. External audits are not made publicly available. [9]

The Office of the Auditor General was constituted in its current form under the Law of the Auditor General of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar of 2010. The OAG is a semi-independent body reporting to the Parliament through the President’s Office. The OAG has purview over all the public sector, except for the Ministry of Defence. (1, 3) All OAG staff must be certified public accountants. [8]

The Controller of Military Accounts is responsible for audits in the military sector. The CMA is authorized to audit in Myanmar, but is not a certified public accountant. Generally, information regarding the Controller of Military Accounts is not publicly available. An audit of shares of a brewing company by the Controller of Military Accounts was at the center of a dispute between the military owned conglomerate UMHEL and a foreign investor. [8] After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any evidence in the public domain regarding the independence of the CMA or any public reports of the entity.

Moreover, military affairs remain outside the mandate of the civil government. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [4] This is supported by source 3 who noted that parliamentarians on the oversight committee were instructed not raise questions. [2]

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to find any evidence to suggest there is another body responsible for auditing the MoD and armed force.

Moreover, the Special Funds Law of 2011 enables the commander-in-chief to allocate undisclosed and theoretically unlimited funds to the military budget, without requiring prior notice or allowing for parliamentary oversight. [7] According to the media article, a leaked document of the Special Funds Law includes the following provision: &quoute;For the spending of the Special Funding, no person or organisation can question, propose and audit&quoute;.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: While the information is useful, the OAG’s mandate still excludes the Ministry of Defence and therefore it cannot be said that external auditing takes place. Score maintained and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Public Financial Management, Performance Report, March 2012 World Bank Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessment team. www.pefa.org/en/assessment/files/1129/rpt/8131

2. Email communication with Source 3, Myanmar Politician II, 15 May 2014.

3. The Union of Myanmar. The State Peace and Development Council. The Auditor General of the Union Law. &quoute;The State Peace and Development Council Law No. 23 / 2010&quoute;. Chapter VI, article 39. October 28, 2010, accessed July 8, 2015. http://www.oag.gov.mm/sites/default/files/legislation/2013/12/auditor_general.pdf

4. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

5. The Law Amending the Auditor General of the Union Law (The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No.3/2013)
21st January, 2013 can be found at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs18/2013-Law_Amending_the_Auditor-General_Law-23-en.pdf

6. The Law Amending the Auditor General of the Union Law (2014) (The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No.43, 2014) 10 October 2014 can be found at: http://www.oagmac.gov.mm/content/law-amending-auditor-general-union-law-2014

7. Wai Moe, Than Shwe Grants Himself Power to Access 'Special Funds', the Irrawaddy, March 4, 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20878

8. Tim McLaughlin, “Military firm wins arbitration battle with Fraser & Neave” Myanmar Times, 31 October 2014. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/12137-military-firm-wins-arbitration-battle-with-fraser-neave.html accessed 3 August 2015

9. US Department of State. Fiscal Transparency Report. 2014. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/oma/235938.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Auditing functions have improved in Myanmar but their impact and teeth are certainly lacking. See more recent report from the World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/Myanmar/Myanmar_Economic_Monitor_October_2013.pdf.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
0

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

The military sector in Myanmar has extensive business interests. There is no comprehensive list of how many military owned businesses exist, however a significant number are related to natural resource exploitation.

Large scale unsanctioned or controlled exploitation of natural resources within the country, and cross-border transit of exploited resources is unlikely to occur without the knowledge and acquiescence of the military. An environmental researcher noted that since the military has stepped back from absolute rule, their role in the illegal trade in exploited resources is more opaque and often routed through several layers rather than direct. [1] Much of the area's teak, for instance, has been cut down and smuggled over the border to China, often with the help of the army. [5] The trade has an estimated value of $6 billion in timber alone. [1] A 2013 article stated that a number of its sources inside parliament had indicated that while the budget is likely to include some natural resource revenue, not all of it will be included. [7]

In the past the military promoted a policy of self-reliance for military commanders within their region of command, which required them to generate revenue, which manifested as informal forms of taxation, selling of concessions of state or appropriated resources and regionally owned military businesses or farms. Under the 2008 constitution, new chief ministers have assumed the administrative powers previously used by the military commanders to run economic enterprises which has led to fewer profit making activities by regional military units. [2] However, a 2015 report by Global Witness documents how military, political and business cronies are still engaged in conspiracies to confiscate land from ethnic-minority villagers in order to establish commercial rubber plantations. According to the report, “in many cases the army has merely swapped its uniforms for suits, with military officials and their cronies retaining firm control of the country’s land sector”. [4]

Northern Star Trading has long been reported to be able to access mining concession through close cooperation with the military. In 2012, villagers who had to flee their villages due to military conflict in the area of the Myitsone Dam in Kachin State said that all gold mining in the region was subsequently controlled by Northern Star. A 2004 report states that Northern Star Trading was owned by the Northern Military Command, and was also involved in jade mining. [3]. In 2012 it was reported that the army reportedly was heavily involved in the large-scale cultivation and sale of opium poppies in the region. [5] In 2015, it was reported that the army does not necessarily have any direct involvement in production. Instead, “the army taxes the militias for the security the army provides and the permission it gives to use government-controlled roads to export narcotics. Burmese officers take a personal cut out of these taxes, making an army posting in the Golden Triangle highly desirable despite the ongoing conflict.” [6]

There is no evidence to suggest that the aforementioned interests are publicly stated, or subject to scrutiny.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: While the information is useful, you have not provided any sources which can substantiate the claim that corporate business records relevant to defence income are published. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. Email communication with Source 4, Environmental Researcher, 12 May 2014

2. International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks?, Asia Briefing N°143, Yangon/Brussels, 22 April 2014, p. 9-10.

3. Jason Motlagh and Steve Sapienza. “Blood and Gold: Inside Burma's Hidden War”, People & Power series, Al Jazeera, 4 October 2012, beginning at 07:40. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2012/10/20121031172469210.html

4. Global Witness. &quoute;Guns, Cronies and Crops: How Military Political and Business Cronies conspired to grab land in Myanmar,&quoute; March, 2015, accessed 30 July 2015. https://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/land-deals/guns-cronies-and-crops/

5. The Economist. &quoute;Myanmar’s army and the economy: The road up from Mandalay,” April 21, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21553091

6. Niels Larsen. &quoute;On Patrol With Myanmar Rebels Fighting Both the Army and Drug Addiction,&quoute; April 23, 2015. https://news.vice.com/article/on-patrol-with-myanmar-rebels-fighting-both-the-army-and-drug-addiction

7. Aye Nai, &quoute;Military spending challenged in parliament,&quoute; DVB, 19 February 2013. http://www.dvb.no/news/military-spending-challenged-in-parliament/26476

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As noted in the previous answer, corporate records for military-owned business are available upon request of the Chamber of Commerce and through other SMEs focusing on corporate intelligence.

Source: Correspondence with Civil Society Representative (Dec 2014), Private Sector Employee (Jan 2015).

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
0

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

There is extensive evidence of involvement by the defence sector in organized crime. While the government more broadly has made some minor steps in attempting to address issues related to issues of organised crime, no evidence could be located indicating they have had any impact or that this awareness is widespread, or that there is indeed a willingness to address this issue in the defence sector.

One major area of organised crime is human trafficking for forced labour. The military has reportedly been involved in trafficking civilians and forcing them into labour as military porters. [3] In &quoute;2011, the International Labour Organization (ILO) [office in Yangon] reported to Human Rights Watch (HRW) that it had received 236 complaints of under-age forced recruitment, and that 57 child soldiers had been released or discharged in response to ILO complaints.&quoute; [2] The most recent figures indicate that the ILO office in Yangon received 338 such complaints were received between September 2013 and September 2014. Of these complaints, there were 232 individual cases of under-age recruitment, 42 forced labour complaints with multiple complainants, 22 allegations of human trafficking, and 42 complaints of forced adult recruitment.” [8] The ILO also notes that it continues to receive complaints alleging forced labour in association with land confiscation.

The Myanmar military has reportedly enabled the development of the narcotics trade in recent years. In 1989, it signed an armistice with the United War State Army (Wa), creating the Wa Special Region which exists still today. One of the conditions of the armistice was that the Wa were free to pursue business and administer their area of control without government interference. Money from the drug trade, predominantly in Wa areas has fuelled Wa-run business, This business exists throughout the country, includes one of the national airlines -- these businesses were not sanctioned by the military regime or the current government. [10,11] The military has refused to crack down on the organization for reasons of 'national security'. [4] There are also consistent reports of military's direct involvement in the drug trade. It is difficult to ascertain direct income, however militias set up under the supervision of the Army in areas where rebel groups operate are highly implicated in both the trade and production of narcotics. [6,7] While reports from suggested that the army was heavily involved in the large-scale cultivation and sale of opium poppies in the region [11], more recent reports indicate that the army does not necessarily have any direct involvement in production. Instead, “the army taxes the militias for the security the army provides and the permission it gives to use government-controlled roads to export narcotics. Burmese officers take a personal cut out of these taxes, making an army posting in the Golden Triangle highly desirable despite the ongoing conflict.” [12].

Military commanders have been accused of directly seizing land or facilitating the seizure of land by others. According to a UN Habitat Guidance Note, the Myanmar Constitution states that the State owns all land and can evict, relocate, and displace people from land more or less at will. [13] Land seizures by the military were the norm under the military government and have continued. One of the most recent evictions occurred at Letpadaung in central Myanmar. Thousands of people were displaced from a massive tract of land by the military owned UMEHL company for a copper mine. Mass protests by farmers were reportedly crushed by force including use of white phosphorous weapons. [14] Land seizure backed by military force has also been reported in Shan and Kachin states. [15]

After further consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and laws, the assessor was unable to find any public information that the defence ministry is actively working to remain alert to and prepared for this risk. The government more broadly has made some minor steps in attempting to address issues related to the infiltration of organised crime; however no evidence could be located indicating they have had any impact.

The Government of Myanmar and UNODC signed an agreement marking the creation of Country Programme for 2014-2017 which would involve collaboration to strengthen the rule law and address significant crime and drug issues. [18] However, the details of what the program will entail are not fully known though the Country UNODC website seems to indicate it includes a review of Drug Law, work with the Border Security and the development of Threat Assessment of trafficking corridor. UNODC has also provided training to the Myanmar Police Force. The Australian Federal Police has conducted courses focused on combating transnational crime such as narcotics trafficking and people smuggling, including criminal intelligence training. [17] It is unknown what impact the aforementioned activities have had, to date, on policing capacities within Myanmar regarding corruption and organised crime.

With regard to the aforementioned issue of land seizures, the military stated in July 2013 that it would return about 6% of the land it had seized since 1989. [16] With regards to the associated use of forced labour, both Parliament and the government are addressing legislative and land use management shortcomings, with an official complaints mechanism. However, allegations of confiscation and wrongful acquisition of land by the military and others persist. Moreover, despite the issuance of multiple directives advising that the use of force labour by military personnel will be considered a criminal offence under the Penal Code as well as a breach of military regulations, information received by the ILO suggest that the military use of civilians for portering and construction, and demands for provision of construction materials continue in conflict areas. [8]

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Sources add.

COMMENTS -+

1.Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Geneva, 2 July 1998. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50012:0::NO:50012:P50012_COMPLAINT_PROCEDURE_ID,P50012_LANG_CODE:2508280,en:NO

2. IRIN News. &quoute;Myanmar: No more child soldiers?&quoute; 25 July 2012. http://www.irinnews.org/report/95947/myanmar-no-more-child-soldiers

3. IRIN News. &quoute;Myanmar: Military porters 'worked to death',&quoute; 13 July 2011. ttp://www.irinnews.org/report/93220/myanmar-military-porters-worked-to-death

4. Organized Crime: An International Encyclopaedia. ABC-CLIO, 2008, Santa Barbara, p. 70

5. US Congressional Research Service. Report for Congress: Burma and Transnational Crime, updated August 2008. p3. www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA486483

6.Frances Wade, The shady players in Myanmar's drugs trade, Al Jazeera, 26 September 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201292295654887542.html;

7. Charles Campell, Obstacles Ahead in Burma’s Opium War, Time, 19 March 2013. http://world.time.com/2013/03/19/obstacles-ahead-in-burmas-opium-war/

8. ILO, Update on the operation of the complaint mechanism in Myanmar, 20 September 2014, accessed 30 July 2015. GB.322/INS/INF/2 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_315215.pdf

9. Thomas Fuller, “Profits of Drug Trade Drive Economic Boom in Myanmar”, New York Times, 5 June 2015, accessed 30 July 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/world/asia/profits-from-illicit-drug-trade-at-root-of-myanmars-boom.html?_r=0,

10. C. S. Kuppuswamy, Myanmar: United Wa State Army, South Asia Analysis Group, 27 November 2013, accessed 30 July 2015. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1417

11. The Economist. &quoute;Myanmar’s army and the economy: The road up from Mandalay,” April 21, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21553091

12. Niels Larsen. &quoute;On Patrol With Myanmar Rebels Fighting Both the Army and Drug Addiction,&quoute; April 23, 2015. https://news.vice.com/article/on-patrol-with-myanmar-rebels-fighting-both-the-army-and-drug-addiction

13. UN HABITAT, Guidance Note on Land Issues, undated, accessed 31 July 2015. http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/RefDoc_Guidance%20Note%20on%20Land%20Issues%20Myanmar-UN.pdf

14. Amnesty International, Myanmar: Foreign mining companies colluding in serious abuses and illegality, 10 February 2015, accessed 31 July 2015. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/02/myanmar-foreign-mining-companies-colluding-serious-abuses-and-illegality/

15. Global Witness. &quoute;Guns, Cronies and Crops: How Military Political and Business Cronies conspired to grab land in Myanmar,&quoute; March, 2015, accessed 30 July 2015. https://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/land-deals/guns-cronies-and-crops/

16. National Parliament, Seventh Session, &quoute;defence Minister Lt Gen Wai Lwin tells the National Parliament that the Tatmadaw will return 18,300 (or 6.1%) of the 297,000 acres of land it confiscated across Burma from 1988 to 2010,&quoute; 16 July 2013, accessed 17 July 2015. http://www.altsean.org/Research/Parliament%20Watch/Legislative/National%20Parliament/Sessions/Session7.php .

17. Andrew Selth. &quoute;Burma's Security Forces: Performing, Reforming or Transforming?&quoute; Regional Outlook Paper. Griffith Asia Institute, 2013, accessed September 04, 2015. https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/559127/Regional-Outlook-Paper-45-Selth.pdf

18. UNODC. &quoute;Myanmar and UNODC sign landmark agreement to strengthen the rule of law and counter crime and drug threats,&quoute; August 18, 2014. https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/myanmar/2014/08/country-programme-signing/story.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The analysis and scoring is solid. But do note the Government signed an agreement with UNODC to strengthen rule of law, counter crime and drug threats. The impact of this agreement is as yet unknown. https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/myanmar/2014/08/country-programme-signing/story.html.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to an investigative feature published by the New York Times (Dan Levin, Searching for Burmese Jade, and Finding Misery, 1 December 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/searching-for-burmese-jade-and-finding-misery.html?_r=0), 'elite members of the military' remain in control of much of the unregulated mining of and illicit trade in jade in Kachin State. Members of the military junta preceding the 2011 instatement of the civilian government allegedly maintain links to corrupt Chinese corporations in the extractive sectors. Labour abuses occur with impunity in unregulated mines within the ethnic minority state, past military checkpoints. The state's failure to protect civilians from such violations has been interpreted as an act of wilful complicity, and &quoute;...some military officers are also involved in smuggling, extracting bribes to allow the illicit practice.&quoute;

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
0

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

There have been numerous reports indicating that the Myanmar Police Force is attempting to reform, in part to better address threats such as corruption. This has occurred mainly through training offered through international assistance. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime, for instance, has provided training to the Myanmar Police Force.

The Government of Myanmar and UNODC signed an agreement marking the creation of Country Programme for 2014-2017 which would involve collaboration to strengthen the rule law and address significant crime and drug issues. [8] However, the details of what the program will entail are not fully known though the Country UNODC website seems to indicate it includes a review of Drug Law, work with the Border Security and the development of Threat Assessment of trafficking corridor. UNODC has also provided training to the Myanmar Police Force. The Australian Federal Police has conducted courses focused on combating transnational crime such as narcotics trafficking and people smuggling, including criminal intelligence training. [7] It is unknown what impact the aforementioned activities have had, to date, on policing capacities within Myanmar regarding corruption and organised crime.

However, regardless of what the law says the national police can do, they are under the command of the military. Moreover, numerous reports indicate that the police suffer from limited resources and corruption, that police units are often under-funded, under-staffed, and poorly equipped/trained. [1,5] According to the US government, “most crimes go unreported and/or are not investigated. Police response times can be long, if at all. Lack of adequate transportation is often cited as an excuse for slow response.” [1]

Though the Anti-Corruption Committee set up in 2013 and Commission set up in 2014 both are noted to cover investigation of corruption cases, there is no evidence to indicate this has been particularly effetice nor that is has involved military officials. [6] The Union Military Police Act of 1948 does allow for prosecution for corruption [3] and soldiers have been detained by military authorities when accused of local crimes, [4] but this cannot be considered systematic investigation of corruption or organized crime within the military.

Through consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any instances of policing to investigate corruption or organised crime within the military.

COMMENTS -+

1. US Dept. of State, OSAC, Burma 2015 Crime and Safety Report, 11 February 2015. https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17098 accessed 31 July 2015

2. Andrew Selth. &quoute;Burma's Security Forces: Performing, Reforming or Transforming?&quoute; Regional Outlook Paper. Griffith Asia Institute, 2013, accessed September 04, 2015. https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/559127/Regional-Outlook-Paper-45-Selth.pdf

3. The Union Military Police Act, Burma Act II, 1948, http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Myanmar/MM_Union_Military_Police_Act.pdf accessed 31 July 2015

4. Si Thu Lwin, “Soldiers, civilian arrested after death in Mandalay” Myanmar Times, 26 September 2014. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/mandalay-upper-myanmar/11753-two-soldiers-civilian-arrested-after-death.html accessed 31 July 2015

5. Rhys Thompson. &quoute;Corruption and Police Reform in Myanmar,&quoute; the Interpreter. February 18, 2015. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/18/corruption-police-reform-Myanmar.aspx

6. Myo Khaing Swe, Director, Bureau of Special Investigations, Ministry of Home Affairs, 16th UNAFEI UNCAC Training Programme Participants Papers, no date, accessed 24 July 2015. http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pages/RMS/No92_22PA_Swe.pdf

7. Andrew Selth. &quoute;Burma's Security Forces: Performing, Reforming or Transforming?&quoute; Regional Outlook Paper. Griffith Asia Institute, 2013, accessed September 04, 2015. https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/559127/Regional-Outlook-Paper-45-Selth.pdf

8. UNODC. &quoute;Myanmar and UNODC sign landmark agreement to strengthen the rule of law and counter crime and drug threats,&quoute; August 18, 2014. https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/myanmar/2014/08/country-programme-signing/story.html

There is no further publicly available information on this subject.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
0

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

After the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988, the resources devoted to Burma's intelligence agencies greatly increased. Under the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence, more attention was given to purely military intelligence, but there was also closer surveillance of both the armed forces and the civilian population. Since late 1997, this policy continued under the State Peace and Development Council. Several perceived intelligence failures, however, raised serious questions about the ability of even this expanded apparatus to meet all the demands being placed upon it. The formal names of the military regime which ruled Burma following the demise of the Burma Socialist Party Programme were the State Law and Order Restoration Council from 1988-1997 and the State Peace and Development Council from 1997 to 2011. Neither exists any longer, but their laws still do.

According to a paper by Andrew Seth published in 1998, since it regained its independence in 1948, Myanmar developed a complex structure of intelligence and specialized security agencies. After General Ne Win's coup d'etat in 1962, and led by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), this apparatus was completely dominated by the armed forces, which used it not only to gather combat‐related intelligence but also to stamp out any challenges to continuing military rule. This paper argues that the MIS became so powerful that, at times, it was seen as a threat to the Ne Win regime, and purged of key personnel.

In 2004 however, the intelligence apparatus were reportedly abolished after the intelligence chief was purged from the junta, as the entire organization was seen as serving his interests. [3]

Today there is no evidence in publicly available documents that the intelligence services are subject to any independent oversight. As the new national intelligence structure is under the military[1], it is reasonable to assume it receives a similar lack of oversight. The Constitution also establishes the military, including its intelligence services are outside the domain of the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [4]

There is no public information regarding the budgets or administration of the Military Security Affairs, Myanmar's intelligence organization.

COMMENTS -+

1. Burma Forms New Intelligence Unit, the Irrawaddy, May 3, 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21223

2. Burma's intelligence apparatus, Andrew Selth, Intelligence and National Security Volume 13, Issue 4, 1998, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529808432504#.VCwVcxb-uW8

3. BBC, “Burma's prime minister 'arrested'” 19 October 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3755052.stm accessed 15 May 2014

4. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
0

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

A close observer of Burmese Intelligence, and one of the few authors on the agency in the past, wrote in 2013, “Little definite is known about developments in Burma’s intelligence community since 2011. As always, observers are dependent on unconfirmed news reports, anecdotal evidence, rumours and unverifiable claims.” [5]

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any evidence in the public domain regarding the basis of selection criteria for any positions within the intelligence services nor any investigations of their suitability or prior conduct. There is no evidence what-so-ever that these positions are a gift, however zero was the lowest ranking available on the scale, and as the situation is totally opaque, this is the appropriate score.

It should be recalled that the 2008 Constitution establishes the military, including its intelligence services, are outside the domain of the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [6]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Sources have not been added as they do not address appointment processes for the intelligence services.

COMMENTS -+

1.Irrawaddy, Burma Forms New Intelligence Unit, 3 May 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21223

2. &quoute;Than Shwe disciple to head Burma’s intelligence&quoute;, DVB, 6 July 2011. https://www.dvb.no/news/than-shwe-disciple-to-head-burma%E2%80%99s-intelligence/16460

3. &quoute;Myanmar’s new security chief appointed&quoute;, Thai PBS, 10 September 2014. http://englishnews.thaipbs.or.th/myanmars-new-security-chief-appointed]

4. International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks?, Asia Briefing No. 143, Yangon/Brussels, 22 April 2014, p. 9-10. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/b143-myanmar-s-military-back-to-the-barracks.pdf

5. Andrew Selth, “Burma's Security Forces: Performing, Reforming or Transforming?” Griffith Asia Institute, Regional Outlook Paper No. 45, 2013. https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/559127/Regional-Outlook-Paper-45-Selth.pdf accessed 31 July 2015

6. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is very limited evidence about the selection process for key positions within the intelligence services, either publicly available or from primary sources. The assessment of the reviewer is correct here.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Melissa Crouch, 'Myanmar: civil-military relations and constitutional reform', 21 June 2013. www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/06/21/myanmar-civil-military-relations.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
0

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Myanmar has no known, publicly available process for arms export decisions. Law governing arms exports dates from the colonial era (Arms Act of 1 October 1878), and are contained in the 2001 publication.

Myanmar is not a signatory to the ATT. A Statement by the Myanmar government at the UN indicated the country would not be joining the ATT any time soon, stating that it had “the right to self-defence and protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity”. [11] There have been extensive media exposes on some of Myanmar's arms deals. [8] However they are mainly related to importation, not export. There is only one known export of 'parts and accessories to weapons' from Myanmar to China in 2002 with a value of less than $3000. [9] Hence, the article of the ATT related to export controls is less relevant as Myanmar is not an exporter of arms.

Exports would certainly require the approval of the military and it should be remembered that the 2008 Constitution establishes that military matters are outside the domain of the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [6]
Articles 11.5 and 15.6 on diversion and transfer of conventional weapons are more relevant but Myanmar would be hesitant to support them as they have been under an embargo on military equipment for decades. [10] Customs regulations in Myanmar do not include certification of the intended end user of any small arms or ammunition transfer, and/or a written declaration of its intended end use. [7]

It was explained to the assessor by a source that the military has had to develop ways to bypass the arms embargo in order to obtain military wares. [5]. As the embargo is ongoing, these practices are likely still occurring. [12] There is also trade in arms among armed groups in Myanmar who are outside state control, and who control a substantial amount of Myanmar's borders with China, India and Thailand. [13,14,15]

In 2004, Myanmar acceded to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, but did not ratify the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Firearms Protocol).

Myanmar did accede to the additional Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Additional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Myanmar has only attended one Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, in October 2010.

Myanmar has also not joined the International Instrument on Marking and Tracing. Myanmar has further not participated in the UN transparency measures regarding military expenditures, the UN register on conventional arms transfers, or provided its national legislation body information regarding transfers of arms or military equipment, or any confidence building measures relating to the same with which it has been involved. Myanmar is not a member of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and has never submitted a voluntary report to the UN program of action on small arms.

COMMENTS -+

1. Documentation on UN ODA's website: http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/,

2. The UN Programme of Action website: http://www.poa-iss.org

3. Overview of Myanmar's laws regarding import and export is available at: K. Kramer, Legal Controls on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southeast Asia, Occasional Paper No. 3, Small Arms Survey, July 2001. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP03-Southeast-Asia.pdf

4. Arms Trade Treaty Negotiation Mapping Database, &quoute;Arms Treaty Issues - Myanmar,&quoute; no date, accessed July 10, 2015. Available on [http://armstreaty.org/state/myanmar/]

5. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

6. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

7. Gun Policy.org, Myanmar- Gun Facts, Figures and Laws, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/myanmar accessed 31 July 2015.
[assessors note, gunpolicy.org has a link for Myanmar's regulations which is defunct, for this reason, the aforementioned 2001 link which has these regulations is provided]

8. Mathew Pennington, “US Blacklists Burma Firms for North Korea Arms Trade” the Irrawaddy (AP) 18 December 2013. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/us-blacklists-burma-firms-north-korea-arms-trade.html accessed 27 May 2014

9. Comtrade Data, NISAT Database. http://nisat.prio.org/Trade-Database/Researchers-Database

10. SIPRI. &quoute;EU arms embargo on Myanmar (Burma),&quoute; June 16, 2015. http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/myanmar

11. The Union of Myanmar. Statement by Mr. Ko Ko Shein Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations New York at the First Committee Thematic Debate on Conventional Weapons, October 30, 2013. Http://www.un.org/disarmament/special/meetings/firstcommittee/68/pdfs/TD_30-Oct_CW_Myanmar.pdf

12. Scott Snyder. &quoute;North Korea's Illicit Arms Trade Unmasked,&quoute; Forbes. March 9, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2014/03/19/north-koreas-illicit-arms-trade-unmasked/

13. Al Jazeera. &quoute;Smuggling of China-made weapons in focus,&quoute; February 4, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2014/02/smuggling-china-made-weapons-focus-20142463722679830.html

14.Dutta Choudhury. &quoute;Smuggling of weapons from Myanmar worries authorities,&quoute; The Assam Tribune, July 13, 2014. http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=jul1413/at094

15. Samudra Gupta Kashyap. &quoute;As Modi visits Myanmar, border districts join hands to curb smuggling, boost border trade,&quoute; The Indian Express, November 13, 2014. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/as-modi-visits-myanmar-border-districts-join-hands-to-curb-smuggling-boost-border-trade/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Source: also see statement from Republic of Myanmar to the UN on ATT.

http://www.un.org/disarmament/special/meetings/firstcommittee/68/pdfs/TD_30-Oct_CW_Myanmar.pdf

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
1

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

There is little public knowledge about the procedures of asset disposal, nor of the controls that might be in place.

There have been some reports in the media about asset sales or transfers which occurred in 2010. These articles document some cases when just prior to the change of regime the former military dictatorship disposed of some state enterprises and land in undisclosed deals. Some of these cases reportedly involve military holding companies, but details were not disclosed to the public. [1] In early 2010, the Wall Street Journal article reported that the military junta would sell a number of major assets, including a network of state-owned gas stations, and ports handling a large percentage of the country's trade, and also planned to sell factories, cinemas and warehouses, and the country's international airline, among other assets. Public information on the sale of assets was not available. Many were expected to be purchased by large private conglomerates with close ties to the military regime, including Htoo Trading and Asia World, both on US sanctions lists.[3]

Some state assets have been put up for tender by the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC), which is headed by a military officer. A draft 2015 law sets out the role of the commission. Asset sale/disposal was not found in the draft law text. The MIC is required to make reports, no specified time frame, on matters of foreign investment issues, to the President and to Parliament. The President can appoint or remove its members at will. [5] Controversy has existed about some historic properties that have been put up for tender by the MIC in 2010 though this does not appear to relate directly to suspicions of corruption. [4]

Due diligence is still difficult in Myanmar. A large foreign company that spent an enormous sum on due diligence still missed that their local director had financial ties to a military holding company under US government sanction. [6]

There are some claims that corporate record information is available which indicates ownership of major businesses in the country even though lines of beneficial ownership are blurred. However, this information could not be verified through publicly available information. A report by the NGO Global Witness which investigated the ownership of 46 international and Burmese companies that were awarded oil and gas blocks by the Myanmar Ministry of Energy revealed that the ownership of five international and seven Burmese companies operating in the extractives sector could not be determined/was not publicised. [9]

Foreign investment in Myanmarese business is subject to significant regulation [7,8]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Score changed from 0 to 1 and sources added.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed. Score changed from 0 to 1 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Myanmar’s Ruling Junta Is Selling State’s Assets, New York Times, 7 March 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/world/asia/08myanmar.html?_r=0

2. Aung Thet Wine, Junta Transferring State Enterprises to Holding Company, Irrawaddy, 10 March 2010. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18002

3. &quoute;Myanmar Moves to Privatize Key State Enterprises&quoute;, Wall Street Journal, 18 February 2010. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704269004575073021237781744

4. Zaw Win Than, “Secretariat left off hotel tender list” Myanmar Times, 26 December 2011, accessed 1 August 2015. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/1531-secretariat-left-off-hotel-tender-list.html

5. Myanmar, the Investment Law of 2015: Consolidating and Replacing The Myanmar Citizens Investment Law, Pyidaungsu Htluttaw Law No. 18 of 29 July 2013 and The Foreign Investment Law, Pyidaungsu Htluttaw Law No. 21, 2012, 2 November 2012 and associated regulation. Undated, accessed 3 August 2015. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/2015-Myanmar-Investment-Bill-V2-24-02-2015.pdf

6. Global Witness. &quoute;Who are you really doing business with? Learning lessons from Coca Cola’s experiences in Myanmar”, Global Witness Blog, 1 July 2015, accessed 3 August 2015. https://www.globalwitness.org/blog/who-are-you-really-doing-business-learning-lessons-coca-colas-experiences-myanmar/

7. Norton Rose Fulbright. &quoute;M&A law in Myanmar,&quoute; no date, accessed September 04, 2015. http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/ma-law-in-myanmar-117780.pdf

8. KPMG. &quoute;Myanmar Tax Profile,&quoute; November 2013. http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/services/Tax/regional-tax-centers/asia-pacific-tax-centre/Documents/CountryProfiles/Myanmar.pdf

9. Global Witness, 'The shell starts to crack? Real owners of Myanmar's oil and gas blocks come forward', October 2014. https://www.globalwitness.org/reports/shell-starts-crack/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The commentary here (and my own analysis) suggests that there is some knowledge of asset disposal in Myanmar. As stated in earlier answers, and noted here, corporate record information is available which indicates ownership of major businesses in the country even though lines of beneficial ownership are blurred.

Foreign investment in Myanmarese business is subject to greater regulation, as noted in this report on M&A law in Myanmar by Norton Rose Fulbright (http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/ma-law-in-myanmar-117780.pdf).

Other sources.

KPMG Report on Tax in Myanmar. Discusses tax architecture in the country, no information about specific corruption cases. http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/services/Tax/regional-tax-centers/asia-pacific-tax-centre/Documents/CountryProfiles/Myanmar.pdf

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In October 2014, independent NGO Global Witness published a report (Global Witness, 'The shell starts to crack? Real owners of Myanmar's oil and gas blocks come forward', October 2014), investigating ownership of 46 international and Burmese companies awarded oil and gas blocks in the country by the Myanmar Ministry of Energy.

Ownership of five international and seven Burmese companies operating in the extractives sector could not be determined/was not publicised.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
0

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

There is no evidence of scrutiny of asset disposals.

The Controller of Military Accounts is responsible for audits in the military sector and thereby can be said to have an oversight role. However, no evidence could be found indicating it is active in this regard. Generally, information regarding the Controller of Military Accounts is not publicly available. The CMA is authorized to audit in Myanmar, but is not a certified public accountant. An audit of shares of a brewing company by the Controller of Military Accounts was at the center of a dispute between the military owned conglomerate UMHEL and a foreign investor. [3] After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any evidence in the public domain regarding the independence of the CMA or any public reports of the entity.

Some military owned enterprises, such as UMEHL allow senior military officers to purchase shares. Other shares are owned by various segments of the military. Printed copies of UMEHL's annual reports are provided to high level shareholders, others have to read it on the notice board outside the meeting hall, according to source 6. [5] Annual reports are therefore not considered to be publicly available.

Observers state that very little public information is available regarding Myanmar State owned enterprises. [4]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: This question inquires about scrutiny of asset disposals whereas the preceding questions inquires about control over asset. While regulations may exist, there does not appear an active oversight body overseeing the implementation of such regulations. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. Myanmar’s Ruling Junta Is Selling State’s Assets, New York Times, 7 March 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/world/asia/08myanmar.html?_r=0

2. Aung Thet Wine, Junta Transferring State Enterprises to Holding Company, Irrawaddy, 10 March 2010. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18002

3. Tim McLaughlin, “Military firm wins arbitration battle with Fraser & Neave” Myanmar Times, 31 October 2014. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/12137-military-firm-wins-arbitration-battle-with-fraser-neave.html accessed 3 August 2015

4. Natural Resources Governance Institute, Parliamentary Briefing, April 2015, State Participation in Oil, Gas and Mining. http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_state-owned_Briefing_Eng_20150310.pdf accessed 3 August 2015

5. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 5 May 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As noted in earlier questions, there is very limited evidence (but not no evidence) that there would be oversight of defence assets. Corporate record information is available which is available to the Myanmar Investment Committee. A Norton Rose Fulbright paper on M&A law also indicates that a regulatory environment does exist around all industry, which businesses owned by the military would have to adhere to on a legal basis (even though in practice this is seldom adhered to and poorly implemented).

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
0

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public domain regarding the budget of the intelligence sector.

In March 2011, the government reportedly passed the Special Fund Law. Copies of the special fund law, or its full name, are not known. The law was reportedly compiled in a 2 page document prior to the first sitting of parliament, and promulgated by the former military junta. The law, dated 17 January 2011 was confidentially distributed among government officials on on 11 February 2011. The law reportedly gives the Army Commander-in-Chief the ability to request additional funds outside the official defence budget. Reportedly the law states, “For the spending of the Special Funding, no person or organization can question, propose and audit” but does require that the military chief report about the use of the additional funds to the President at the end of the fiscal year. [1]

The citation of the special fund may be a source for secret projects, but this cannot be verified either way since the fund is not open to audit. The existence of the special fund does mean that any stated figure is probably inaccurate since the military can requisition funds at will without oversight or accountability checks in place.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: The source referenced, while interesting, does not provide additional information related to the spending on secret items.

COMMENTS -+

1. Wai Moe, Than Shwe Grants Himself Power to Access 'Special Funds', Irrawaddy, 4 March 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20878

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is very little public evidence about the breakdown of the military budget. Figures from SIPRI via Trading Economics show military expenditure and arms exports but the amount spent on 'secret items' is unclear.

http://www.tradingeconomics.com/myanmar/military-expenditure-current-lcu-wb-data.html

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The lack of evidence of expenditure on national security and intelligence services may suggest that these are not included in the official defence budget. I have not been able to locate any public information to confirm nor reject this assumption.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
0

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information regarding whether the legislature is given information on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and/or military intelligence.

In March 2011, the government reportedly passed the Special Fund Law. Copies of the special fund law, or its full name, are not known. The law was reportedly compiled in a 2 page document prior to the first sitting of parliament, and promulgated by the former military junta. The law, dated 17 January 2011 was confidentially distributed among government officials on on 11 February 2011. The law gives the Army Commander-in-Chief the ability to request additional funds outside the official defence budget. Reportedly the law states, “For the spending of the Special Funding, no person or organization can question, propose and audit” but does require the military chief report about the use of the additional funds to the President at the end of the fiscal year. [1] The special fund may be a source for secret projects, but this is not known since it is not open to audit. The existence of the special fund does mean that any stated figure is probably inaccurate since the military can requisition funds at will unaccountably.

This is further substantiated by an article from 2013 which stated that opposition MPs expressed concern surrounding the secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding the budget, suggesting that oversight into domestic security and intelligence issues might be limited. [2]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Whilst the legislature appears to be provided with a basic breakdown of the defence budget, no sources could be found indicating that this breakdown also includes secret items nor is this explicitly stated in the article you reference. Score maintained.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed. Sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Wai Moe, Than Shwe Grants Himself Power to Access 'Special Funds', Irrawaddy, 4 March 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20878

2. Aye Nai, &quoute;Military spending challenged in parliament,&quoute; DVB, 19 February 2013. http://www.dvb.no/news/military-spending-challenged-in-parliament/26476

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find further information on this subject.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As noted in the previous question, there is very limited information about funds for secret items. The analysis also correctly notes that the Special Fund Law gives the president the capacity to use resources in &quoute;performing his duties&quoute; to protect the constitution.

However, several media articles have suggested that the military has had to fight for its share of the budget since the country's transition to democracy started and disclose details of its budget to parliamentarians (e.g. http://www.irrawaddy.org/military/burma-parliament-approves-controversial-defence-budget.html). Thus, the scoring should be 1 and not 0.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It could not be verified whether the detailed information on the 2013-2014 military budget as provided to parliamentarians included expenditure on national security and intelligence related items.

According to Aye Nai, 'Military spending challenged in parliament', DVB, 19 February 2013, the secrecy surrounding the 2013 budget's allocation of funding in 'conflict-rich and resource-torn' areas, and the government's failure to account for their activities in these areas, was deemed especially problematic by MPs, suggesting that oversight into domestic security and intelligence issues, at least, might be limited.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
0

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information regarding whether the legislature is given audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector or other secret programs.

The assessor could find no record that any such audit report was the subject to parliamentary debate. Moreover, in 2014 the US Department of State reported that &quoute;Burma does not yet have comprehensive and institutionalized procedures for budget execution, monitoring, and reporting,&quoute; making it unlikely that audits of secret programs are shared with the legislature. [3]

In March 2011, the government reportedly passed the Special Fund Law. The law reportedly gives the Army Commander-in-Chief the ability to request additional funds outside the official defence budget. Reportedly the law states, “For the spending of the Special Funding, no person or organization can question, propose and audit” but does require that the military chief reports about the use of the additional funds to the President at the end of the fiscal year. [1]

COMMENTS -+

1. Wai Moe, Than Shwe Grants Himself Power to Access 'Special Funds', Irrawaddy, 4 March 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20878

2. Bill to audit govt’s off-budget spending, Eleven News Media, 25 June 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6567:bill-to-audit-govt-s-off-budget-spending&catid=32:politics&Itemid=354

3. US Department of State. Fiscal Transparency Report. 2014. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/oma/235938.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
0

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

Besides the state enterprises, military-owned holding companies and special funds mentioned elsewhere in this report, further information on off-budget expenditures is not known. It is however reported that the that the procurement division of the military owned a 40% stake in the company which is used to buy weapons[1]

A World Bank assessment of Myanmar's public financial management notes that “Other Accounts” held in the Myanmar Economic Bank are not fully reported in fiscal reports. There may also be other sources and uses of funds which are managed outside of the official process entirely (i.e., outside of MEB). [3] “Other Accounts”(OA) are essentially accounts held by ministries and state enterprises in the MEB for management of their own-source revenues.

By definition the funds held in OAs are extra-budgetary, in that they are not reported on or accounted for in budget documentation. The Ministry of Defence holds the largest number of Other Accounts. The total number of Other Accounts (as of June 2012) held by ministries at the Union level was 8,417 and the total number of OAs (as of June 2012) held by state enterprises at the Union level was 4,319.
The Office of the Auditor General also found that there may be accounts held outside of the MEB and that some revenues generated from joint ventures, as well as from natural resources, could also be extra-budgetary. The PFM assessment also noted that it seems likely that the level of unreported extra-budgetary expenditure of line ministries constitutes more than 10 percent of total expenditure and that “Ministries can use the funds in their OAs very freely” [3]

In addition, in March 2011, the government reportedly passed the Special Fund Law. The law reportedly gives the Army Commander-in-Chief the ability to request additional funds outside the official defence budget. Reportedly the law states, “For the spending of the Special Funding, no person or organization can question, propose and audit” but does require the military chief report about the use of the additional funds to the President at the end of the fiscal year. [4]

Additionally, in late June 2014, a bill was submitted to parliament which would &quoute;amend the Auditor General Law so as to ensure oversight over the government’s off-budget spending.&quoute; [2] While the law says that it covers all government ministries, this likely to exclude the military since military expenditure is audited by a separate body, the Controller of Military Accounts.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Sources added.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed. Sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

2. Bill to audit govt’s off-budget spending, Eleven News Media, 25 June 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6567:bill-to-audit-govt-s-off-budget-spending&catid=32:politics&Itemid=354

3. World Bank, Republic of the Union of Myanmar. &quoute;Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Program,&quoute; Public Financial Management, Performance Report, March 2012, accessed 30 July 2015. http://www.pefa.org/en/assessment/files/1129/rpt/8131

4. Wai Moe, Than Shwe Grants Himself Power to Access 'Special Funds', Irrawaddy, 4 March 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20878

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Special Funds Law is applicable here as it could be enforced for military action the president wishes to on an extraordinary basis.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Special Funds Law may be relevant here, however, as the Law was only published in a leaked document it is not possible to verify whether it is exempt from the provision stipulated by the Bill or not.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
0

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

Evidence suggests that there are substantial off-budget military expenditures and there is evidence this involves illicit economic activity.

The military owns at least two major economic enterprises, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation. It is possible that a lot of the revenues from these enterprises are used for off-budget expenditures as it is unclear where these revenues go. These economic enterprises were a source of off-budget support for the military as an institution and give the Myanmar Army's a revolving fund which can be used for special projects without budgetary oversight. Reportedly, major foreign investments had to be through joint ventures with them. UMEHL previously dominated the rice trade, cigarette and alcohol production and distribution, and had a virtual monopoly on car imports. In 2011, the current government rolled back some of their monopolies, and both enterprises were required to pay tax for the first time. [1] According to a 2014 report by the US Department of State, Myanmar &quoute;does not yet have comprehensive and institutionalized procedures for budget execution, monitoring, and reporting, which has caused official fiscal data to be incomplete&quoute; but that it has increased in fiscal transparency in execution of tenders. [7]

A World Bank assessment of Myanmar's public financial management notes that “Other Accounts” held in the Myanmar Economic Bank are not fully reported in fiscal reports. There may also be other sources and uses of funds which are managed outside of the official process entirely (i.e., outside of MEB). [3] “Other Accounts”(OA) are essentially accounts held by ministries and state enterprises in the MEB for management of their own-source revenues.

By definition the funds held in OAs are extra-budgetary, in that they are not reported on or accounted for in budget documentation. The Ministry of Defence holds the largest number of Other Accounts. The total number of Other Accounts (as of June 2012) held by ministries at the Union level was 8,417 and the total number of OAs (as of June 2012) held by state enterprises at the Union level was 4,319.
The Office of the Auditor General also found that there may be accounts held outside of the MEB and that some revenues generated from joint ventures, as well as from natural resources, could also be extra-budgetary. The PFM assessment also noted that it seems likely that the level of unreported extra-budgetary expenditure of line ministries constitutes more than 10 percent of total expenditure and that “Ministries can use the funds in their OAs very freely” [6]

In March 2011, the government reportedly passed the Special Fund Law. Copies of the special fund law, or its full name, are not known. The law, dated 17 January 2011 was confidentially distributed among government officials and reportedly gives the Army Commander-in-Chief the ability to request additional funds outside the official defence budget. Reportedly the law states, “For the spending of the Special Funding, no person or organization can question, propose and audit” but does require that the military chief reports about the use of the additional funds to the President at the end of the fiscal year. [3]

Previously, the military promoted a policy of self reliance for military commanders within their region of command, which required them to generate revenue, which manifested as informal forms of taxation, selling of concessions of state or appropriated resources and regionally owned military businesses or farms. Under the 2008 constitution, new chief ministers have assumed the administrative powers previously used by the military commanders to run economic enterprises which has led to fewer profit making activities by regional military units though there continue to be reports of private enterprise. [1]

The extent of illicit activity through off-budget accounts is unknown. As arms deals had to avoid sanctions and some involved North Korea which is also under sanction, it appears likely that some off budget activity was illicit. [4,5]

COMMENTS -+

1. International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks?, Asia Briefing No. 143, Yangon/Brussels, 22 April 2014, p. 9-10

2. Myanmar Times, Reporting rules for US firms revealed, Vol. 23, No. 635, 16-22 July, 2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/2012/news/635/news63502.html

3. Wai Moe, Than Shwe Grants Himself Power to Access 'Special Funds', Irrawaddy, 4 March 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20878

4. Andrew Selth, “Burma and North Korea: Again? Still?” the Interpreter, 23 July 2013. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/07/10/Burma-and-North-Korea-Again-Still.aspx accessed 14 July 2014

5. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

6. World Bank, Republic of the Union of Myanmar. &quoute;Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Program,&quoute; Public Financial Management, Performance Report, March 2012, accessed 30 July 2015. http://www.pefa.org/en/assessment/files/1129/rpt/8131

7. US Department of State. Fiscal Transparency Report. 2014. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/oma/235938.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
0

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

The Official Secrets Act (dating back to the colonial era, 1923) may be used to classify information on grounds of national security. The law is vague, used frequently and not subject to any scrutiny. It can and is used absolutely arbitrarily. The act applies to the whole of the country, and applies to all citizens of the country and all servants of the Government wherever they may be for any action prejudicial to the interests of the State.

The government has used the Official Secrets Act to stop journalists investigating military projects. For instance, in 2014, the CEO of a weekly newspaper, and four journalists were sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for violating sec. 3/9 of the 1923 the Official Secrets Act. The journalists had reported on the existence of a government facility in which chemical weapons were allegedly manufactured. They were prosecuted for trespassing and for taking photographs within a restricted area. [4] In September 2014, when an opposition politician suggested that the Official Secrets Act be debated in parliament, a government official told the parliament that the law should not be amended for as it was still required to protect state security. No debate occurred. [3]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed, sources added.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed, sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. The Burma Official Secrets Act (India Act XIX, 1923), Amended as the Union of Burma (Adaptation of Laws) Order, 1948.

2. Official Secrets Act. http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Myanmar/secrets.pdf

3. Win Ko Ko Latt, MPs stay quiet on Official Secret Act debate, Mizzima, 26 September 2014. http://archive-3.mizzima.com/mizzima-news/myanmar/item/13144-mps-stay-quiet-on-official-secret-act-debate/13144-mps-stay-quiet-on-official-secret-act-debate accessed 4 August 2015

4. Al Jazeera. &quoute;Myanmar jails journalists for 10 years,&quoute; July 10, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/07/myanmar-jails-journalists-10-years-2014710113757674385.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The government has used the Official Secrets Act to stop journalists investigating military projects eg newspaper owner, U Tin San, arrested jailed in 2014 (see Al Jazeera article, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/07/myanmar-jails-journalists-10-years-2014710113757674385.html).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: U Tin Hsan, CEO of Unity, a weekly newspaper, and four journalists were sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in October 2014 for violating sec. 3/9 of the 1923 the Official Secrets Act. The journalists had reported on the existence of a government facility in which chemical weapons were allegedly manufactured. They were prosecuted for trespassing and for taking photographs within a restricted area.


Win Ko Ko Latt, MPs stay quiet on Official Secret Act debate, Mizzima, 26 September 2014 http://mizzima.com/mizzima-news/myanmar/item/13144-mps-stay-quiet-on-official-secret-act-debate

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
1

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

Observers state that very little public information is available regarding Myanmar State owned enterprises. [6]

The military sector does, however have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses, though they are not transparent. The military owns at least two major economic enterprises that have dominated the economy, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) focused on banking, trade, tourism and precious stones) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) with interests in heavy industry and commodities. [8] According to the 2014 BTI report on Myanmar, a wave of privatization of state assets and enterprises came suddenly in 2009 – 2010. However, the process was neither transparent nor competitive, since the government allegedly sold the assets very quickly to a handful of enterprises with close military ties and to UMEHL and MEC. In the 2010-2011 financial year UMEHL reportedly earned profits of $48 million. Whilst this data is not recent, it indicates the potential for a vast income that is not subject to oversight. [7]

Some military owned enterprises, such as UMEHL allow for purchase of shares by senior military officers. Other shares are owned by various segments of the military. Printed copies of UMEHL's annual reports are provided to high level shareholders, others have to read it on the notice board outside the meeting hall. [5] It is not publicly available. It is known that the procurement division of the military owns a 40% stake in UMEHL, the military holding company. UMEHL also owns 100% of the Myawaddy Bank, which has assets in excess of US 1 billion. [1,2]

UMEHL has joint agreements with foreign corporations and receives 30% of the distribution of products, in particular, beer and cigarettes, but also other products. Due to recent changes in law, UMEHL is now required to declare its profits and is taxed on them.[3] On 10 October 2014, a Law Amending the Auditor General of the Union Law - Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law 43/2014 was passed. This is the second amendment to the law. However the Ministry of defence is exempt from oversight by the AG and therefore not affected by this law.[4]

When a joint owner sought to sell its shares to another company, it was prevented by the military company they had partnered with. Shares of a brewing company are at the center of a dispute between the military owned conglomerate UMHEL and a foreign investor. [7]

Moreover, while corporate record information of these businesses is supposedly available through the Chamber of Commerce, this could not be supported by publicly available sources. The location of funds accrued from these state-owned enterprises is also difficult to trace.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

2. Frances Wade, The shady players in Myanmar's drugs trade, Al Jazeera, 26 September 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201292295654887542.html;
Charles Campell, Obstacles Ahead in Burma’s Opium War, Time, 19 March 2013.

3. Bill to audit govt’s off-budget spending, Eleven News Media, 25 June 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6567:bill-to-audit-govt-s-off-budget-spending&catid=32:politics&Itemid=354

4. Union of Myanmar, The State Peace and Development Council, The Auditor General of the Union Law, Law No. 23 / 2010, Section 39. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs18/2010-10-28-23-en.pdf

5. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 5 May 2015

6. Natural Resources Governance Institute, Parliamentary Briefing, April 2015, State Participation in Oil, Gas and Mining. http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_state-owned_Briefing_Eng_20150310.pdf accessed 3 August 2015

7. Tim McLaughlin, “Military firm wins arbitration battle with Fraser & Neave” Myanmar Times, 31 October 2014. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/12137-military-firm-wins-arbitration-battle-with-fraser-neave.html accessed 3 August 2015

8. Bertelsmann Stiftung. &quoute;Myanmar Country Report&quoute;, 3014, accessed September 02, 2015. http://www.bti-project.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Myanmar.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As noted, corporate record information of these businesses is available through the Chamber of Commerce although beneficial ownership is unclear and location of funds accrued from these businesses is difficult to trace.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
1

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

It is unclear whether military-owned businesses are subject to audits under the OAG or the CMA since some businesses are not solely owned by the military. Either way, no evidence could be found indicating that such auditing or scrutiny takes place and details are not available to the public. Given the degree of vested interests, it is likely that such processes lack independence.

A World Bank assessment states that the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) is having a significantly positive impact on the management of public finances in Myanmar. However, the OAG has purview over all the public sector, except for the Ministry of defence. [6] The Bill on the audit of government's off budget spending passed in parliament on 10 October 2014, a Law Amending the Auditor General of the Union Law. Again, this has no bearing on defence oversight since the Ministry of Defence is exempt from oversight by the AG and therefore not affected by this law. [2]

On 30 January 2015, during a parliamentary session, the Union Parliamentary Secretary presented a report by the General Auditor documenting breaches of financial regulation by state agencies in the 2013-14 financial year (which runs April to March the following year). The Auditor stated that there were issues with regards to auditing the books of state agencies and departments in border areas and more remote provinces. Military expenditure continues to be subject to the exemption from audits, as per October 2014, restricting the scope of investigations and mandate of the General Auditor. [4]

The Controller of Military Accounts is responsible for audits in the military sector. The CMA is authorized to audit in Myanmar, but is not a certified public accountant. Generally, information regarding the Controller of Military Accounts is not publicly available, indicating a low likelihood that military-owned businesses are subject to any degree of scrutiny or auditing. [5]

Military holding companies are now subject to taxation, however it is not known on what declared assets they are taxed. An export tax bypass through military holding companies, previously a source of much income has been reclaimed by the government. However, these activities would be more properly described as control rather than scrutiny.

Moreover, military affairs remain outside the mandate of the civil government. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [7]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Comments and sources added.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed. Comments and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. International Crisis Group, &quoute;Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks?&quoute;, Asia Briefing No.143, Yangon/Brussels, 22 April 2014, p. 9-10.

2. Bill to audit govt’s off-budget spending, Eleven News Media, 25 June 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6567:bill-to-audit-govt-s-off-budget-spending&catid=32:politics&Itemid=354

3 Union of Myanmar, The State Peace and Development Council, The Auditor General of the Union Law, Law No. 23 / 2010, Section 39. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs18/2010-10-28-23-en.pdf

4. Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, 2 February 2015, Govt Ministries Systematically Flouting Spending Rules: Auditor General, The Irrawaddy, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-ministries-systematically-flouting-spending-rules-auditor-general.html

5. Tim McLaughlin, “Military firm wins arbitration battle with Fraser & Neave” Myanmar Times, 31 October 2014. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/12137-military-firm-wins-arbitration-battle-with-fraser-neave.html accessed 3 August 2015

6. Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment for Myanmar, March 2012. http://www.pefa.org/en/assessment/files/1129/rpt/8131, accessed 30 July 2015

7. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The constitution would need to be amended to bring the military under formal civilian oversight.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, 2 February 2015, Govt Ministries Systematically Flouting Spending Rules: Auditor General, The Irrawaddy, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-ministries-systematically-flouting-spending-rules-auditor-general.html

On 30 January 2015, during a parliamentary session, the Union Parliamentary Secretary presented a report by the General Auditor documenting breaches of financial regulation by state agencies in the 2013-14 financial year (which runs April to March the following year).

The Auditor stated that there were issues with regards to auditing the books of state agencies and departments in border areas and more remote provinces. Military expenditure continues to be subject to the exemption from audits, as per October 2014, restricting the scope of investigations and mandate of the General Auditor.

&quoute;The Public Accounts Committee has laid blame for the breaches on a widespread lack of understanding of the current tendering system used for government outsourcing and procurement, and said that parliamentary committees were failing to exercise an effective level of accountability over their ministries.&quoute;

On the basis of open source research, it was not possible to ascertain whether alternative mechanisms for scrutiny of military-owned businesses is available, in the public domain or elsewhere.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
0

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

The military has involvement in private enterprise across the country. There is no known legislation forbidding private enterprise and the government does not appear to apply sanctions to those who engage in it. There are credible allegations that the government itself may profit from such activity.

Due to international sanctions and the impact on the economy, regional military commands were encouraged to do business in order to feed and pay their troops. According to an 2012 report in the Economist, military plantations remain evident throughout the countryside. [1] The Economist article also reported an incident in which the Army used its power to repress economic competition, until exposed by the local member of parliament. Also in 2012, popular dissent and protest broke out regarding land seizures at one military business, a mine in Monywa which was a joint venture between the Myanmar military holding company UMEHL, and the Chinese state owned arms manufacturer NORINCO. The military repelled the demonstrations causing injuries. [2]

The military has reportedly been involved in trafficking civilians and forcing them into labour as military porters which is illegal under international law. [3,4] There are also consistent reports of military's direct involvement in the drug trade. It is difficult to ascertain direct income, however militias set up under the supervision of the Army in areas where rebel groups operate are highly implicated in both the trade and production of narcotics. [5,6] While reports from suggested that the army was heavily involved in the large-scale cultivation and sale of opium poppies in the region [1], more recent reports indicate that the army does not necessarily have any direct involvement in production. Instead, “the army taxes the militias for the security the army provides and the permission it gives to use government-controlled roads to export narcotics. Burmese officers take a personal cut out of these taxes, making an army posting in the Golden Triangle highly desirable despite the ongoing conflict.” [7]. Military commanders have been accused of directly seizing land or facilitating the seizure of land by others. [8]

COMMENTS -+

1. The Economist. &quoute;Myanmar’s army and the economy: The road up from Mandalay,” April 21, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21553091

2. James Hookway, &quoute;Myanmar Reforms Challenge Military's Holdings&quoute;, the Wall Street Journal, 30 November 2012. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324705104578151061996230172

3. IRIN News. &quoute;Myanmar: Military porters 'worked to death',&quoute; 13 July 2011. ttp://www.irinnews.org/report/93220/myanmar-military-porters-worked-to-death

4. ILO, Update on the operation of the complaint mechanism in Myanmar, 20 September 2014, accessed 30 July 2015. GB.322/INS/INF/2 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_315215.pdf

5. Frances Wade, The shady players in Myanmar's drugs trade, Al Jazeera, 26 September 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201292295654887542.html;

6. Charles Campell, Obstacles Ahead in Burma’s Opium War, Time, 19 March 2013. http://world.time.com/2013/03/19/obstacles-ahead-in-burmas-opium-war/

7. Niels Larsen. &quoute;On Patrol With Myanmar Rebels Fighting Both the Army and Drug Addiction,&quoute; April 23, 2015. https://news.vice.com/article/on-patrol-with-myanmar-rebels-fighting-both-the-army-and-drug-addiction

8. Global Witness. &quoute;Guns, Cronies and Crops: How Military Political and Business Cronies conspired to grab land in Myanmar,&quoute; March, 2015, accessed 30 July 2015. https://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/land-deals/guns-cronies-and-crops/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It was not possible to verify what legal provisions are in place regarding private enterprise by the military or other defence ministry employees on the basis of English-language open source research.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
0

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any evidence of a public commitment by the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs to publicly commit to anti-corruption and integrity measures.

President Thein Sein has stated corruption is chronic within the civil service and government but has not specified which parts of the government, specifically. A few other officials, from outside the defence sector, have made passing statements on the need to address corruption. [2]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Comments and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Kyaw Kha. &quoute;Thein Sein Admits Corruption, Bribery Are ‘Chronic’ in Burma,&quoute; August 22, 2014. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/thein-sein-admits-corruption-bribery-chronic-burma.html

2. Eleven News. Corruption stunts Myanmar’s economic potential, no date, accessed September 04, 2015. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/business/corruption-stunts-myanmar%E2%80%99s-economic-potential

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find further sources of evidence to comment on this subject.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I am not aware of any evidence which indicates defence chiefs have admitted publicly to corruptuon. President Thein Sein has stated corruption is chronic within the civil service and government but has not specified which parts, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/thein-sein-admits-corruption-bribery-chronic-burma.html.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No evidence of defence chiefs making public commitments to anti-corruption and integrity measures could be found.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
1

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any public information regarding the existence of effective measures against military personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption.

The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government in its engagement in financial business. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [5] This implies that any measures to address corruption within the military would have to be developed and enforced by the military.

It is unclear whether the anti-corruption law what extent this applies to the military. [4] The law reportedly applies to any person who is recognised as a public official under an existing law. [6] However, under the Civil Servant Law from 20120, a civil servant is defined as “those employees appointed under any Government organization or department, but not including the military or police.” [4] While there have been a few cases of corruption charges brought against generals, these military personnel have been in civilian posts (i.e. no the MoD). It therefore remains in question whether those working in active duty military service, or those working for the MoD are subject to the Anti-Corruption Law. The Anti-Corruption Law states that politicians found guilty of corruption can be sentenced to a maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment while the maximum sentence for civil servants is 10 years’ imprisonment together with the loss of their positions. Other individuals found guilty of corruption activities can serve up to seven years in jail. Offenders are also liable to discretionary fines and the law applies to both citizens and foreigners. Under the new law, all members of the executive, judiciary and legislative branches of government are required to declare their assets. The legislation also reportedly establishes a framework for the investigation of bribery and corrupt activities under the Anti-Corruption Commission.

An interviewee [1] noted that some measures do exist for the military, such as the military misconduct law with penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment or death. However, this law is not publicly available. The military does not publicize misconduct trials or results. In 2004, Prime Minister was removed and a number of officers were arrested for misconduct and put into prison. However, this was more attributable to political reasons and has been labelled a purge and therefore cannot be considered to constitute effective anti-corruption action. [8]

Another interviewee [3] mentioned that &quoute;commanding officers are known to indulge in the malpractice of purchasing pension documents from soldiers leaving service due to disability&quoute;. Such cases were never addressed publicly.

While there have been reports of corruption cases involving the exploitation of migrant workers and the telecommunications industry, there have been no recent reports of investigations into military or defence personnel. [7]



RESPNSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: It remains unclear to what extent the anti-corruption law applies to military personnel. Whilst interviews have noted that some measures exist for military personnel, this could not be found in publicly available sources nor could it be corroborated by cases (which have been limited to the civil sector). Score maintained and sources added.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: This question inquires about the existence and effectiveness of measures against corrupt activity, not about the scale of the issue.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, 25 May 2014

2. &quoute;Burma's prime minister 'arrested'&quoute;, BBC, 19 October 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3755052.stm

3. Interview with Source 7: Interview with a former soldier, Yangon, June 2011

4. Edwin Vanderbruggen and Adam Miller, “Myanmar implements new Anticorruption Law”, VDB|Loi Client Briefing Note, 30 April 2014, accessed 4 August 2015. http://www.vdb-loi.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Client-briefing-Note_anticorruption_VDB-Loi-Client-Briefing-Note_30Apr14.pdf

5. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

6. Norton Rose Fulbright. &quoute;Business ethics and anti-corruption laws: Myanmar,&quoute; September, 2014. http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/121098/business-ethics-and-anti-corruption-laws-myanmar

7. Herbert Smith Freehills. Asia-Pacific Anti-Corruption Report. August, 2014. http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/-/media/Files/PDFs/2014/Asia%20Pacific%20Anti-Corruption%20Report_3rd%20edition_August%202014.pdf

8. BBC News. &quoute;Former Burmese minister on trial,&quoute; February 10, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4700698.stm

9. Shibani Mahtani. &quoute;Telecom Officials Face Corruption Probe in Myanmar,&quoute; Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2013. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323854904578261621265058066

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Anti-corruption laws state that bribery of public officials is illegal, even thought mechanism in place are poorly constructed and erratically enforced (see Myanmar: Sept 2014, Norton Rose, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/myanmar-121189.pdf)

In response to question to peer reviewers, see one case example Thein Tun, former Maj Gen (Jan 2013): http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323854904578261621265058066

Suggested score: 2

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: 1. Corruption Stunts Myanmar's Economic Potential, 9 February 2015, http://elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8981:corruption-stunts-myanmar-s-economic-potential&catid=33:business&Itemid=356

It is recognised that corruption and bribery among government officials occurs and is problematic. Ministries, immigrations and population departments, police stations and courts are all mentioned in 1), pointing to the endemic nature and large scale of the problem. Individual officials or bureaucrats are not mentioned or singled out as corrupt, but specific mention is made of the expenditure of certain ministries, including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Defence and the Ministry of Energy.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
0

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

There is no legislation or mechanism in place to protect whistleblowers within the military or government. Whistleblowers can be punished under the Official Secrets Act (OSA) and can also be taken to court under the anti-corruption law if their complaints are deemed to be false. [2,6,7] The Official Secrets Act applies to the whole country, to all citizens of the country and all servants of the Government wherever they may be for any action prejudicial to the interests of the State. [2]

Whistleblowing is not encouraged by the government. The OSA, section 3.1 allows for the imprisonment of 3 – 14 years for “any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the Union of Burma approaches, inspects, passes over or is in the vicinity of, or enters, any prohibited place,.. any work of defence, arsenal, naval, military or air force establishment or station, mine, minefield, factory, dockyard, camp, ship or aircraft or otherwise in relation to the naval, military or air force affairs of Union of Burma.”
In April 2014, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar wrote in his final report that “A change of mindset still needs to take place within all levels of Government to allow civil society, political parties and a free media to flourish beyond the limited freedoms that have currently been granted.” [1]

The media reported a case of a person within the military going public regarding the military regimes nuclear weapons programme. A mechanical engineer machining parts for the Burmese nuclear battalion, provided files and photographs describing Myanmar's experiments with uranium to foreign journalists after he fled into exile. [3]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Your sources do not reveal instances where the government has explicitly encouraged the reporting of corruption. Secondly, the scoring criteria is also based on the existence of relevant legislation, which you also confirm does not exist. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, A/HRC/25/64, 2 April 2014

2. Official Secrets Act (1923), http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Myanmar/secrets.pdf

3. &quoute;Burma 'trying to build nuclear weapon'&quoute;, BBC, 4 June 2010. http://www.bbc.com/news/10236381

4. Norton Rose Fulbright. &quoute;Business ethics and anti-corruption laws: Myanmar,&quoute; September, 2014. http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/business-ethics-and-anti-corruption-asia-pacific-laws-120953.pdf

5. Article 19. &quoute;Myanmar: Public service media needed but proposed bill inadequate,&quoute; June 26, 2013. https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37123/en/myanmar:-public-service-media-needed-but-proposed-bill-inadequate

6. US Department of State. &quoute;BURMA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT,&quoute; 2013. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220394.pdf

7. Anti-Corruption Law, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Law No. 23, 2013 http://pwplegal.com/documents/documents/f3142-Anti-Corruption-Law-%28PWP-Unofficial-English-Translation%29.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As noted in previous answers, anti-corruption laws do exist which prohibits bribery of/among public officials. The government has increasingly encouraged people to report incidents of corruption but the efficacy of reporting mechanisms and corruption within courts severely hampers investigations. Furthermore, there are no specific laws regarding whistle-blowing.

Source

1) Norton Rose, Myanmar, September 2014, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/myanmar-121189.pdf
2) Thomas Fuller, Myanmar's Opening Up Hasn't Loosened Up Graft in Courts, Oct 2014, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/myanmar-121189.pdf
3) Thein Sein Admits Corruption, Bribery are Chronic in Burma, Irrawady, Aug 22, 2014, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/thein-sein-admits-corruption-bribery-chronic-burma.html

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
1

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any public information regarding special procedures for the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, or defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. There are some indications that the the government is attempting to move away from nepotism and that the transfer of military officers into senior civil service posts has declined since 2011. [3,4] However, BTI report that in Myanmar's government “seniority still is an issue and cronyism is rife in many ministries. There is no competitive civil servant selection process in the bureaucracy, as personal connections to top bureaucrats and bribery are more important than personal capacity.” [1]

According to one interviewee, it is confirmed that sometimes special attention may be paid to personnel in sensitive position. However in keeping with the secrecy governing military affairs in Myanmar this information is not publicly available. [2]

COMMENTS -+

1. Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index: Myanmar Country Report 2014, p.29, 2014, accessed 14 July 2015. http://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2014/pdf/BTI%202014%20Myanmar.pdf

2. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May

3. Gwen Robinson. &quoute;Myanmar’s Transition: Economics or Politics? Which came first and why it matters,&quoute; Legatum Institute, November 2014. http://www.li.com/docs/default-source/publications/myanmar_ned_web.pdf?sfvrsn=6

4. International Crisis Group. &quoute;Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks?&quoute; Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°143, April 22, 2014 . http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/b143-myanmar-s-military-back-to-the-barracks.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
0

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

This number is not known to have been published within the country. According to expert Dr Andrew Selth “Almost all statistics cited in connection with Burma are suspect, few more so than those claiming to give the size of the country’s armed forces.” Selth writes that the number is probably around 350,000, but that some observers believe its closer to 300,000. Selth notes that “The difficulty of making sensible estimates of personnel numbers has been exacerbated by rampant corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and generally poor record-keeping. Tatmadaw recruiting stations are known to have falsified their records to win bonuses or to avoid punishment for poor performance. At the unit level, payrolls have been padded with non-existent personnel in order to siphon off funds and resources. Junior officers have apparently been afraid to report desertions to their seniors, for fear of retribution.” [3] Global Security.org places their estimate for Myanmar's Armed Forces at 250,000. [2]

There is also no breakdown on the number of combatant to non-combatant roles within the entity. Some civilian roles were formerly filled by forced labour. Civilians or prisoners involved in forced labour for the military were frequently reported to die in combat. [4] However the numbers of people required to do forced labour for the military has decreased in recent years due to internal monitoring by the International Labour Organization and is now mainly found in the conflict areas of Kachin and Shan States. [5]

Within the civil sector, the Auditor General reported in February 2015 that overstating staffing levels and retaining salaries was a common breach of the financial regulations by Ministries of government. [6]

COMMENTS -+

1. The Military Balance, 2010, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. p.420-421. est. Total 513,420.

2. Global Security. &quoute;World's Largest Armies,&quoute;no date, accessed 27 May 2014. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/armies.htm

3. Andrew Selth, “Burma’s armed forces: Does size matter?” East Asia Forum, 17 September 2010, accessed 4 August 2015. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/17/burmas-armed-forces-does-size-matter/

4. ILO. Report of ILO Commission of Inquiry reveals widespread and systematic use of forced labour in Myanmar (Burma), Press Release, 20 August 1998, accessed 15 May 2014. http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-centre/press-releases/WCMS_007995/lang--en/index.htm

5. ILO. Follow-up to the resolution concerning remaining measures on the subject of Myanmar adopted by the Conference at its 102nd Session (2013), GB.323/INS/4, March 4, 2015, accessed 4 August 2015, para 13. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_348466.pdf

6. Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Govt Ministries Systematically Flouting Spending Rules: Auditor General”, the Irrawaddy, 2 February 2015, accessed 4 August 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-ministries-systematically-flouting-spending-rules-auditor-general.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The analysis is correct and the score is probably fair (it could be 1 rather than 0). Rough estimates of overall figures are available, but the actual number is almost impossible to verify from the establishment.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
1

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

In the civil sector, a media report stated that &quoute;The highest tier of gazetted senior civil servants earns 130,000 kyat per month, while the lowest tier of civil servant earns 65,000 kyat per month as of a pay raise implemented by parliament in March 2012. At current exchange values these are about $130 and $65 respectively (US$ 1=1000 Kyat).&quoute; [2] An interviewee noted that pay rates and allowances for military personnel are openly published within the military institution, however these are not publicly listed. [1]

Salary figures within the civil sector are also likely to be unreliable. The Auditor General reported in February 2015 that overstating staffing levels and retaining salaries was a common breach of the financial regulations by Ministries of government. [3] Similarly, “Tatmadaw recruiting stations are known to have falsified their records to win bonuses or to avoid punishment for poor performance.” [4]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed. Score changed from 3 to 1. However, since pay rates are only available in an unreliable way and are not transparent, a score of 1 is given. Sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, 25 May 2014

2. &quoute;Myanmar raises civil service salaries as prices soar&quoute;, Asahi Shimbun, 14 March 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/around_asia/AJ201203140077

3. Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Govt Ministries Systematically Flouting Spending Rules: Auditor General”, the Irrawaddy, 2 February 2015, accessed 4 August 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-ministries-systematically-flouting-spending-rules-auditor-general.html

4. Andrew Selth, “Burma’s armed forces: Does size matter?” East Asia Forum, 17 September 2010, accessed 4 August 2015. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/17/burmas-armed-forces-does-size-matter/

5. ILO, Follow-up to the resolution concerning remaining measures on the subject of Myanmar adopted by the Conference at its 102nd Session (2013), GB.323/INS/4, 4 March 2015, accessed 4 August 2015. para 13. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_348466.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: While pay rates as they pertain to selected civilian and military personnel may be openly published; pay or the lack of thereof is not openly disseminated for personnel in forced labour.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
0

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

The assessor could not locate any publicly available evidence to show that personnel receive the correct pay on time, and that the system of payment is well-established, routine, and published. According to an interview, military personnel receive the correct pay. Reportedly this is on time, and the system of payment is well-established,. [1] However, there are no publicly available sources to support this statement. There is also no public information to indicate whether pay is discretionary or not.

Selth noted in 2010 that, “Tatmadaw recruiting stations are known to have falsified their records to win bonuses or to avoid punishment for poor performance. At the unit level, payrolls have been padded with non-existent personnel in order to siphon off funds and resources. Junior officers have apparently been afraid to report desertions to their seniors, for fear of retribution.” [4] Unpaid forced labour also still occurs, especially in conflict areas such as Kachin and Shan States. [5] No recent sources could be found to comment further on the military pay system, calling into question to what extent pay is actually disbursed in a timely, transparent manner..

There are also concerns regarding the payment system in the civilian sector. For instance, the Auditor General reported in February 2015 that within the civil sector overstating staffing levels and retaining salaries was a common breach of the financial regulations by Ministries of government. [3] Recent reporting shows that civil servants take bribes in a bid to make ends meet amid high inflation and low salaries and that “Efforts to set up electronic-government have failed despite millions of dollars spent. Civil servants still use the 60-year-old paper system rather than accepting online payments and applications, making bribery to speed up the process a common occurrence.” [6]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: There are no indications, based on the sources you provided, that personnel generally receive the correct pay on time and that there is a well-established, transparent payment system in place. Due the lack of transparency surrounding the payment systems, the score of 0 is maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May

2. Htoo Thant, “Military proposes 5.5pc budget increase”, Myanmar Times, 30 January 2015. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/12953-military-proposes-5-5pc-budget-increase-for-soldier-pay-rises.html accessed 5 August 2015

3. Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Govt Ministries Systematically Flouting Spending Rules: Auditor General”, the Irrawaddy, 2 February 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-ministries-systematically-flouting-spending-rules-auditor-general.html accessed 4 August 2015

4. Andrew Selth, “Burma’s armed forces: Does size matter?” East Asia Forum, 17 September 2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/17/burmas-armed-forces-does-size-matter/ accessed 4 August 2015

5. ILO, Follow-up to the resolution concerning remaining measures on the subject of Myanmar adopted by the Conference at its 102nd Session (2013), GB.323/INS/4, 4 March 2015, para 13. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_348466.pdf accessed 4 August 2015

6. Htun Aung Gyaw. &quoute;How the military is still fighting democratic transition in Myanmar,&quoute; The Nation. February 5, 2015. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/How-the-military-is-still-fighting-democratic-tran-30253394.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The problem here is that the overall numbers of the military are unknown (as noted in earlier questions) so it is difficult to verify whether they all receive payments on time. There are questions about those involved in forced labour and the conscription of child soldiers into army, the latter of which was reported by the Independent in 2012 (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/two-burmese-children-a-week-conscripted-into-military-7858858.html).

I have placed a score of 3 but the question is difficult to answer given the context of Burma and unknown overall military figures.

Suggested score: 3

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
1

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

After consulting a range government, non-governmental, academic and news sources, the assessor could not locate information indicating that selection of military personnel at middle and top management level is or is not carried out through an independent or transparent appointment system. The media, especially state media, publishes new military appointments, but are silent on the process by which they have been made and no details regarding the use of assessment processes or objective job descriptions could be located.

According to Source 6, there is a branch at the war office, for appointments, promotions, transfers, training and dismissal of all officers in the military. The branch is managed by a Lt. General and staff. However, in practice, all decisions are made in different kinds of boards. In the senior board, the chair person is the deputy chief of staff. Selection for the higher level posts, above Commanders of the Divisions, reportedly needs to be approved by the chief of staff. Source 6 notes that the military has established rules and regulations, however, selection of important and key posts at the higher levels is the decision of the Senior General. All members of the Boards follow the decision of the Senior General. [1]

Tatmadaw recruiting stations are “known to have falsified their records to win bonuses or to avoid punishment for poor performance. At the unit level, payrolls have been padded with non-existent personnel in order to siphon off funds and resources. Junior officers have apparently been afraid to report desertions to their seniors, for fear of retribution.” [3] The Assessor could not locate a news report which has exposed a non- meritocratic military appointment – the Assessor concludes that this may be due to fear of retribution by the military.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Whilst the information you present provide interesting context, this question inquires about the appointment system for the selection of middle and top management level military personnel (not about recruitment).

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May 2014

2. Sophie Song, “Myanmar's Military Now Recruiting Women For The First Time In History” International Business Times, 25 October 2013. http://www.ibtimes.com/myanmars-military-now-recruiting-women-first-time-history-1441700 accessed 5 August 2015

3. Andrew Selth, “Burma’s armed forces: Does size matter?” East Asia Forum, 17 September 2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/17/burmas-armed-forces-does-size-matter/ accessed 4 August 2015

4. Jerome Taylor, “Two Burmese children a week conscripted into military” the Independent, 19 June 2012. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/two-burmese-children-a-week-conscripted-into-military-7858858.html accessed 5 August 2015

5. ILO. Follow-up to the resolution concerning remaining measures on the subject of Myanmar adopted by the Conference at its 102nd Session (2013), GB.323/INS/4, 4 March 2015, para 13. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_348466.pdf accessed 4 August 2015

6. People's Military Service Law,
Law No. 27/ 2010, November 4, 2010. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/Military_Service_Law%28en%29.pdf accessed 5 August 2015

7. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. &quoute;Two senior military officers appointed as union ministers,&quoute; August 24, 2015. http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=briefing-room/orders/2015/08/25/id-5917

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The scoring and analysis is fair. The military has also opened up recruitment to women. Selection criteria do exist (see this International Business Times article http://www.ibtimes.com/myanmars-military-now-recruiting-women-first-time-history-1441700) although the transparency of this process remains unclear.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
1

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public domain which provides details on how personnel promoted, nor if the process is objective and meritocratic, or if there is use of promotion boards outside of the command chain or strong formal appraisal processes. No evidence was found indicating corruption in the promotion process -- however, this may be in part due to the secretive nature of the military and the fear of retribution by journalists for reporting on such issues.

According to Source 6, selection is not independent or transparent for key posts in the military. There is a branch at the war office, for appointment, promotion, transfer, training and dismissal of all officers in the military. The branch is managed by a Lt. General and staff. However, all decisions are made by different kinds of boards which are not declared publicly to non-military personnel. The military has reportedly established rules and regulations, according to Source 6, all members of the Board follow the decision of the Senior General. The process as described by the interviewee shows the existence of a formal appraisal process but one that is open to political manipulation. [1]

It should be noted that there would be no independent oversight of promotions as military affairs remain outside the mandate of the civil government. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [2]

News sources indicate that the government has been appointing lots of military to civilian posts in broader government over the past few years. In part it is “due to the large number of officers churned out by the Defence Services Academy, who are shunted into public service jobs if they are overlooked for promotion to the senior ranks of the Tatmadaw.” This seems to indicate that there is a process for promotion; however, whether it is objective and meritocratic could not be determined. [3]

RESPONSE TO REVIEWER 1: The information you provide is useful for other questions related to recruitment. However, this question focuses on promotions.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May 2014

2. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

3. Shwe Yee Saw Myint . “Health campaigners win backdown over military appointments,” August 12, 2015. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/15956-health-campaigners-win-backdown-over-military-appointments.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As noted in the previous question, the military has opened up recruitment to women. Selection criteria does exist (see this International Business Times article http://www.ibtimes.com/myanmars-military-now-recruiting-women-first-time-history-1441700) although the transparency of this process remains unclear.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
0

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

The assessor could not located known policies, rules or mechanisms against bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription. While it is uncertain that conscription is actually in effect, children are still forcibly conscripted into the military and there have been reports of related bribery.

In November 2010, the current government passed a formal conscription law to implement the provisions of the 2008 Constitution. Article 386 of Chapter VIII of the Constitution, titled &quoute;Citizen, Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Citizens&quoute; states: &quoute;Every citizen has the duty to undergo military training in accord with the provisions of the law and to serve in the Armed Forces to defend the Union.&quoute; The law does not include a right to conscientious objection. [2] However, sources indicate that the 2010 law has not yet entered into force. [11]

Despite a minimum age of 18 for military recruitment, over the years many hundreds of boys have been recruited, often forcibly into the national army. Media reports state that children have been inducted into the military as conscripts. [6] Following the threat of ILO sanctions, Myanmar agreed to allow the ILO to set up an office within Myanmar to receive complaints of child conscription from families within the country. In January 2014, 96 children were released from the Armed Forces through this process. [1] Since the ILO has come into the country, they have provided an opportunity for people to get minors released from military conscription - but only minors. Unpaid conscripted forced labour also still occurs, especially in conflict areas such as Kachin and Shan States. [7] In the past, it was common for village headmen or families to pay a fee to a military unit to avoid forced labour. [8] Payments to avoid conscription are technically illegal, but are common and arguably &quoute;popular&quoute;, to a certain extent for citizens as they are the only mechanism by which a family can ensure the release their child or family member from conscription. One parent informed the researcher that it was not uncommon for parents to insist on collecting their children from movie theatres after films as they would have to negotiate with military officers attempting to conscript young men from evening entertainment venues. [10]

Myanmar has a conscription law, which lists as an exemption the vague category of “Those who are exempted by order from Central Drafting Board.” [9] WRI notes, “It seems unlikely that conscription will be really universal. Already now, Burma has Armed Forces totalling more than 400,000, and universal conscription would boost this number considerable, and would be a strain on the economy of the country. There are fears that conscription will lead to more corruption, as people are trying to get an exemption from military service.” [3] In 2013 during the annual military review, the military commander-in-chief called for the military to have an available force of 1 million combatants. [4]

COMMENTS -+

1. United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, A/HRC/25/64, 2 April 2014

2. 2008, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Chapter 8, Article 386. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

3. WRI, Burma introduces conscription for men and women, 2 February 2011.

4. Aung Zaw, Putting a New Face on Myanmar’s Military, Irrawaddy, 12 July 2013. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/magazine-analysis/putting-a-new-face-on-myanmars-military.html

5. Interview by researcher with various civilians over a period of time, Yangon.

6. Jerome Taylor, &quoute;Two Burmese children a week conscripted into military&quoute;, 19 June 2012. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/two-burmese-children-a-week-conscripted-into-military-7858858.html

7. ILO, Follow-up to the resolution concerning remaining measures on the subject of Myanmar adopted by the Conference at its 102nd Session (2013), GB.323/INS/4, 4 March 2015, para 13. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_348466.pdf accessed 4 August 2015

8. Human Rights Watch, “Dead Men Walking” July 2011, p 24 & 43. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0711_OnlineVersion.pdf accessed 5 August 2015

9. People's Military Service Law, Law No. 27/ 2010, November 4, 2010. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/Military_Service_Law%28en%29.pdf accessed 5 August 2015

10.Interview with Source 11, parent requesting anonymity, Yangon 2014.

11. CIA. &quoute;Military Service Age and Obligation,&quoute; no date, accessed September 07, 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
0

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public domain regarding a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process. Just the opposite, there is a popular practice of avoiding military service by offering a bribe.

No official policy exists with reference to bribery in the conscription process. However, Source 6 notes the existence of a military misconduct law with penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment or death. There is no publicly available copy of the Military Misconduct Law, and it is unclear how it has been applied, and if it has ever been applied to conscription cases. [1]

In the past, it was common for village headmen or families to pay a fee to a military unit to avoid forced labour. [3] More recent media reports state that children have been inducted into the military as conscripts, and in these cases sometimes the military 'buys' the children. [2,8]

Myanmar has a conscription law, which lists as an exemption the vague category of “Those who are exempted by order from Central Drafting Board.” [4] WRI notes, “The law does not include any mechanism for conscription to be applied selectively - leaving it up to township drafting boards. There are fears that conscription will lead to more corruption, as people are trying to get an exemption from military service.” [5] Payments to avoid conscription are technically illegal, but are common and arguably &quoute;popular&quoute;, to a certain extent for citizens as they are the only mechanism by which a family can ensure the release their child or family member from conscription. Selth suggests that the chance of bribery during recruitment is high: “Tatmadaw recruiting stations are known to have falsified their records to win bonuses or to avoid punishment for poor performance. At the unit level, payrolls have been padded with non-existent personnel in order to siphon off funds and resources. Junior officers have apparently been afraid to report desertions to their seniors, for fear of retribution.” [7]

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May 2014

2. Jerome Taylor, &quoute;Two Burmese children a week conscripted into military&quoute;, 19 June 2012. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/two-burmese-children-a-week-conscripted-into-military-7858858.html

3. Human Rights Watch, “Dead Men Walking” July 2011, p 24 & 43. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0711_OnlineVersion.pdf accessed 5 August 2015

4. People's Military Service Law, Law No. 27/ 2010, November 4, 2010. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/Military_Service_Law%28en%29.pdf accessed 5 August 2015]

5. WRI, Burma introduces conscription for men and women, 2 February 2011. http://www.wri-irg.org/node/12138 accessed 23 May 2014

6. Interview with Source 11, parent requesting anonymity, Yangon 2014.

7. Andrew Selth, “Burma’s armed forces: Does size matter?” East Asia Forum, 17 September 2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/17/burmas-armed-forces-does-size-matter/ accessed 4 August 2015

8. Spike Johnson. &quoute;Saving Burma’s Child Soldiers,&quoute; March 3, 2015. http://www.vice.com/read/of-the-same-life-0000593-v22n3

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
0

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

The assessor found evidence of ghost soldiers in the past five years. No information or evidence could be located indicating that there have been concrete steps taken by the MOD or military against this phenomenon.

Source 6 knew of no evidence of the practice of ghost soldiers. [1] Despite this, there is good reason to believe that ghost soldiers exist due to other reports of common corruption or lack of transparency in payment systems. For instance, within the civil sector, the Auditor General reported in February 2015 that overstating staffing levels and retaining salaries was a common breach of the financial regulations by Ministries of government. [3] A 2011 report also stated that Tatmadaw recruiting stations are known to have falsified their records to win bonuses or to avoid punishment for poor performance. At the unit level, payrolls have been padded with non-existent personnel in order to siphon off funds and resources.” [4]

Unpaid forced labour still occurs, especially in conflict areas such as Kachin and Shan States, and may be relevant to the existence of ghost soldiers on the ledger. [5]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: There have been reports of ghost soldiers. Given the overall opacity of the payment system and record keeping, as well as the lack of oversight and inaccurate troop figures, a score of 0 is given to reflect major obstacles of transparency.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May 2014

2. Interview with Source 7: Interview with a former soldier, Yangon, June 2011.

3. Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Govt Ministries Systematically Flouting Spending Rules: Auditor General”, the Irrawaddy, 2 February 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-ministries-systematically-flouting-spending-rules-auditor-general.html accessed 4 August 2015

4. Andrew Selth, “Burma’s armed forces: Does size matter?” East Asia Forum, 17 September 2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/17/burmas-armed-forces-does-size-matter/ accessed 4 August 2015

5. ILO. Follow-up to the resolution concerning remaining measures on the subject of Myanmar adopted by the Conference at its 102nd Session (2013), GB.323/INS/4, 4 March 2015, para 13. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_348466.pdf accessed 4 August 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is limited evidence to suggest the existence of ghost soldiers, especially given the lack of transparency about the breakdown of the military budget and difficulty in ascertaining overall numbers. However these provide the context for lax accountability in the payments system which could lead to the practice from occurring.

Also note the complicated but well defined structure of the Tatmadaw in 'Myanmar' Global Security http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/myanmar/tatmadaw-4.htm

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
0

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public domain indicating whether the chains of command separate from chains of payment in Myanmar's military.

One interviewee stated that chains of command were separate from chains of payment. [1] However, this could not be confirmed using publicly available sources. A US based, military focused think tank has stated, “&quoute;Myanmar's Army is an army at war, and wartime armies are frequently economical with the truth when it comes to detailing details of their organization and chain of command.&quoute; [2] A reviewer for this section speculated that “the strength of the military and its network of interests mean that it is also likely to maintain secrecy over the payments structure within its ranks.”

Given other information regarding bribery and corruption within personnel processes it is unlikely that there are watertight separation between the chain of command and the chain of payment. In the civil sector alone the Auditor General reported irregularities in February 2015 in that overstating staffing levels and retaining salaries was a common breach of the financial regulations by Ministries of government. [3] Given that Constitutional regulations mandate that the military is subject to even less scrutiny than the civil sector, it is likely that there are problems in ensuring separation between chains of command and chains of payment.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Comments and sources incorporated. Do please note that this question inquires whether chains of command are separate from chains of payment and also awards scores based on the level of transparency. Score maintained at 0.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May 2014

2. Global Security. &quoute;Tatmadaw Military Structure,&quoute; Global Security.org, undated, accessed 25 May 2014. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/myanmar/tatmadaw-4.htm

3. Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Govt Ministries Systematically Flouting Spending Rules: Auditor General”, the Irrawaddy, 2 February 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-ministries-systematically-flouting-spending-rules-auditor-general.html accessed 4 August 2015

4. Andrew Selth, “Burma’s armed forces: Does size matter?” East Asia Forum, 17 September 2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/17/burmas-armed-forces-does-size-matter/ accessed 4 August 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The chains of command, services and directorates are quite well defined in Myanmar and that payment would appear to be separate from the chain of command. However, the structure of the military, as noted by Global Security and Orbat, is exceedingly complicated and the payment system may not follow that which the military suggests publicly (information of which is very difficult to ascertain).

As the article below notes, &quoute;Myanmar's Army is an army at war, and wartime armies are requently economical with the truth when it comes to detailing details of their organization and chain of command.&quoute; the strength of the military and its network of interests mean that it is also likely to maintain secrecy over the payments structure within its ranks.

Myanmar, Global Security http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/myanmar/tatmadaw-4.htm

Suggested score: 3

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
0

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public domain regarding the existence of a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes guidance regarding bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities.

According to source 6, there is a military misconduct law with penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment or death. [1] This law is not publicly available and its scope and oversight are unknown. In terms of enforcement of laws, regulations and codes, at least one human rights organization has stated a system of impunity for the military is common. “Wartime violence against civilians is continuing and the Myanmar military is increasingly using the justice system as a tool to silence critics. The authorities should ensure swift justice for misconduct by soldiers rather than shielding them from public scrutiny and accountability.” [2]

Other observations suggest that if a code of conduct exists, it is applied selectively or not at all. [3] Selth notes, for instance, that “Tatmadaw recruiting stations are known to have falsified their records to win bonuses or to avoid punishment for poor performance. At the unit level, payrolls have been padded with non-existent personnel in order to siphon off funds and resources. Junior officers have apparently been afraid to report desertions to their seniors, for fear of retribution.”

[4] While anti-corruption measures exist, on paper at least, in the civil sphere, they are not applicable to the military. [5] Military affairs remain outside the mandate of the civil government. The 2008 Constitution grants the defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [6]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Comments and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May 2014

2. Myanmar: Prosecute Perpetrators, Not Human Rights Defenders”, Fortify Rights, Press Release, 3 February 2015. http://www.fortifyrights.org/publication-20150203.html accessed 5 August 2015

3. Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Govt Ministries Systematically Flouting Spending Rules: Auditor General”, the Irrawaddy, 2 February 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-ministries-systematically-flouting-spending-rules-auditor-general.html accessed 4 August 2015

4. Andrew Selth, “Burma’s armed forces: Does size matter?” East Asia Forum, 17 September 2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/17/burmas-armed-forces-does-size-matter/ accessed 4 August 2015

5. Anti‐Corruption Law 2013, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Law No.23, 7 August 2013, Chapter 3. http://pwplegal.com/documents/documents/3976d-Anti-Corruption-Law.pdf accessed 15 May 2014

6. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The score is fair but the analysis should also include the limited provisions and legal instruments in place with regards to corruption which public officials must follow e.g. Anti-Bribery Laws (Norton Rose, Myanmar, September 2014).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
0

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public domain regarding whether there a code of conduct exists. As a result it is not possible to state if there evidence that breaches of a Code of Conduct or if they are effectively addressed. The assessor could also not locate further publicly available information indicating whether results of prosecutions related to violation of any such similar regulations are made publicly available.

One interviewee stated that there is a military misconduct law with penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment or death. [1] However there has never been any publicly reported prosecutions under this military law and the law itself is not publicly available.

Results of prosecutions of military officials in general are very rarely made publicly available. There has been one recent reporting of a soldier’s conviction in late 2014 . A civilian court sentenced a soldier to prison for a crime committed against a civilian. It did so after the military court overseeing the case, under intense pressure from local human rights groups and media, agreed to transfer the defendant to a civilian court. The Burmese law governing courts martial allows such a transfer to civilian courts when a soldier is accused of violating civilian criminal law, including sexual violence and murder. [7]

However, such cases are anomalies, and human rights organizations have stated a system of impunity for the military remains common. “Wartime violence against civilians is continuing and the Myanmar military is increasingly using the justice system as a tool to silence critics. The authorities should ensure swift justice for misconduct by soldiers rather than shielding them from public scrutiny and accountability.” [2] According OpenSecurity, “Myanmar’s military justice system is not open to the public, and civil society activists find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain reliable information about pending or completed cases. Civilians, including victims and their advocates, have no right to be present at the trial or to obtain any information about the charges, findings, or sentence.” [7]

Other observations suggest that if a code of conduct exists, it is applied selectively or not at all. Within the civil sector, the Auditor General reported in February 2015 that departments had overstated staffing levels and wrongfully retained salaries. [3] Military recruiting stations are also known to have engaged in corrupt practices (e.g. falsifying, adding non-existent personnel to payrolls) but these acts are rarely addressed, let alone in a public manner. [4]

While anti-corruption measures exist on paper in the civil sphere, they are not applicable to the military. [5] Military affairs remain outside the mandate of the civil government. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [6]

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, 25 May 2014

2. Myanmar: Prosecute Perpetrators, Not Human Rights Defenders”, Fortify Rights, Press Release, 3 February 2015. http://www.fortifyrights.org/publication-20150203.html accessed 5 August 2015

3. Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Govt Ministries Systematically Flouting Spending Rules: Auditor General”, the Irrawaddy, 2 February 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-ministries-systematically-flouting-spending-rules-auditor-general.html accessed 4 August 2015

4. Andrew Selth, “Burma’s armed forces: Does size matter?” East Asia Forum, 17 September 2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/17/burmas-armed-forces-does-size-matter/ accessed 4 August 2015

5. Anti‐Corruption Law 2013, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Law No.23, 7 August 2013, Chapter 3. http://pwplegal.com/documents/documents/3976d-Anti-Corruption-Law.pdf accessed 15 May 2014

6. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf]

7.Aileen Thomson. &quoute;Civilian justice trumps military impunity in Myanmar,&quoute; OpenSecurity. December 11, 2014. https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/aileen-thomson/civilian-justice-trumps-military-impunity-in-myanmar

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Again, there is likely not to be a code of conduct in place and the score is fair. Note military officials (especially if they own or are on boards of businesses) would legally have to follow corruption codes and legal practices.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
0

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

After consulting a variety of sources including media article, academic research, reports and government sources, the assessor was unable to find information related to anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel in the Myanmar defence sector.

According to one interviewee, training regarding corruption occurs at all command levels within the military. [1] However, details regarding the regularity of this training or the contents of the training were not publicly available.

The UK has run an officer training programme, titled Managing Defence in a Wider Security Context which teaches strategy to high ranking officers and includes section on human rights, humanitarian law and accountability. The UK has run the course for 60 officers. [4,5] However, no trainings specifically in counter-corruption are known to have occurred.

External training in International Humanitarian Law have occurred for some years and the police have undergone some training on community policing. [2,6] Training in Human Rights has been proposed by the US. [3]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. However, since the information from the interviewee is not publicly available, there is insufficient evidence to show the existence of anti-corruption training, irregular or informally. Score changed from 2 to 0 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May 2014

2. The ICRC in Myanmar, Overview, 30 June 2014. https://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/asia-pacific/myanmar/overview-myanmar.htm accessed 5 August 2015

3. “US seeks greater Myanmar military training” Alternet (AFP) undated. http://www.alternet.org/progressive-wire/us-seeks-greater-myanmar-military-training accessed 5 August 2015

4. Ben Riley-Smith, “Burmese Army gets £130,000 of taxpayer-funded training despite using child soldiers,” the Telegraph, 15 February 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11413577/Burmese-Army-gets-130000-of-taxpayer-funded-training-despite-allegedly-using-child-soldiers.html accessed 5 August 2015

5. Ben Farmer, “British to begin training Burmese military” the Telegraph, 25 December 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10531383/British-to-begin-training-Burmese-military.html accessed 5 August 2015

6. Andrew Selth. &quoute;Burma's Police: The Long Road To Reform,&quoute; The Interpreter, Dec 2012, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/12/13/Burmas-police-The-long-road-to-reform.aspx?COLLCC=3996267430&

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Based upon this analysis, sources and information in the public domain, the score should be 1 and not 2. A formal code of conduct may exist for military personnel within the military (and affiliated businesses) but there is no evidence this is delivered formally and consistently.

Also note there have been some reports that the police have received training on community policing, see A Seth, Burma's Police: The Long Road To Reform, The Interpreter, Dec 2012, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/12/13/Burmas-police-The-long-road-to-reform.aspx?COLLCC=3996267430&

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
0

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find that any policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities exists. The implementing regulations for the Anti-Corruption Law are yet to promulgated and it appears as though no additional government guidelines regarding disclosure surrounding corruption and bribery cases have been published.

There have been no recent examples of defence services personnel involved in bribery or corruption with effective prosecutions since power was handed over to the 2011 government . Whilst there have a been a few outcomes of prosecutions related to corruption made public, none of these involve defence services personnel. [6,7] Under the previous regime, the only outcomes which were made public were understood to be purges within the upper levels of the military apparatus. Although corruption of the upper levels of the military were generally perceived by the civil population to be endemic, public announcements of removal, and in some cases imprisonment of military officers, were seen as the result of inter-military power struggles rather than cases of house cleaning or a genuine will to counter corruption. The most well known of these was the removal of the former Prime Minister and head of the country's intelligence apparatus. Not only was the head of the intelligence organisation removed, but most members of the intelligence apparatus, seen as loyal to that officer, were also arrested and imprisoned on corruption charges, forced to retire, or transferred to distant posts in the infantry. [1] Human rights organizations have stated a system of impunity for the military remains common. “Wartime violence against civilians is continuing and the Myanmar military is increasingly using the justice system as a tool to silence critics. The authorities should ensure swift justice for misconduct by soldiers rather than shielding them from public scrutiny and accountability.” [8]

In June 2014, the President has called on new counter-corruption commission &quoute;to act freely in accordance with law&quoute;. Since it has former high ranking generals in its leadership, it certainly has the capacity to investigate the military, should it choose to do so. Popular perception is that the populating of the commission with former regime officials make it 'toothless'. [2,5] However, the new Counter Corruption Commission is relevant only to the civil sphere and is not likely to venture into the military realm. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [3]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Sources added.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed. Sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Burma's prime minister 'arrested', BBC, 19 October 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3755052.stm

2. &quoute; President urges anti-corruption commission to act freely&quoute;, Eleven Myanmar, 11 June 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6420:president-urges-anti-corruption-commission-to-act-freely&catid=44:national&Itemid=384

3. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

4. Burma’s Parliament Approves Anti-Corruption Bill, Irrawaday, July 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/parliament/burmas-parliament-approves-anti-corruption-bill.html

5. MPs Voice Doubts Over Anti-Corruption Commission, Irrawady, September 2014 http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/mps-voice-doubts-burmas-anti-corruption-commission.html

6. Myanmar Business Today. &quoute;Judges Dismissed on Bribery Charges,&quoute; November 27, 2014. http://www.mmbiztoday.com/articles/judges-dismissed-bribery-charges

7. Myanmar Times. &quoute;Graft Scandal Sinks Without a Trace,&quoute; June 09, 2014. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/10636-graft-scandal-sinks-without-trace.html

8. Myanmar: Prosecute Perpetrators, Not Human Rights Defenders”, Fortify Rights, Press Release, 3 February 2015. http://www.fortifyrights.org/publication-20150203.html accessed 5 August 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The score is fair - anti-corruption policy is not clear but it has not been tested by a major case since its formation. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Anti Corruption Commission has been questioned by parliamentarians.

Sources

- Burma’s Parliament Approves Anti-Corruption Bill, Irrawaday, July 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/parliament/burmas-parliament-approves-anti-corruption-bill.html

- MPs Voice Doubts Over Anti-Corruption Commission, Irrawady, September 2014 http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/mps-voice-doubts-burmas-anti-corruption-commission.html

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Anti-Corruption Law 2013 includes a clause on privileged professional communications between the accused and their lawyer, which stipulates non-disclosure to third-parties of communications between lawyer and client. However, this privilege may be waivered under exceptional circumstances, which includes cases where it can be proven that the client has committed fraud during the engagement with the lawyer. The implementing regulations for the Anti-Corruption Law are yet to promulgated and it appears as though no additional government guidelines regarding disclosure surrounding corruption and bribery cases have been published.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
0

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

There are not currently effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments.

There seems to be confusion as to whether the Anti-Corruption Law actually forbids or allows facilitation payments. An international legal firm states in its analysis of Myanmar's Anti-Corruption Law that facilitation payments are not included in the law, and are therefore not a bribe and considered acceptable. However it goes on to note that some facilitation payments may be considered illegal under the anti-corruption legislation depending on how they were classified. [2] A separate source states the Anti-Corruption Law does not expressly permit facilitation payments. Facilitation payments would be considered acts of bribery and are therefore prohibited under the Anti-Corruption Law. [3]

A survey of business owners in 2014, it was found at least 60% admitted to being required to pay bribes to carry out legitimate business activities, over and above published fees. [1]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. UNESCAP & OECD, Myanmar Business Survey 2014: Survey Results, May 2014, p.5. http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/MBS_Survey_Results.pdf accessed 12 May 2015

2. &quoute;Myanmar implements new Anticorruption Law&quoute; Client Briefing Note, VDB/Loi Law & Advisory Firm, Client Briefing Note, 30 April 2014. http://www.vdb-loi.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Client-briefing-Note_anticorruption_VDB-Loi-Client-Briefing-Note_30Apr14.pdf

3. Norton Rose, Business Ethics and Anti-Corruption Laws Myanmar, September 2014, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/121098/business-ethics-and-anti-corruption-laws-myanmar

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The score and analysis is fair. Please see this addition piece by Norton Rose about the vagueness over facilitation payments in the Burmese Anti-Corruption law.

Norton Rose, Business Ethics and Anti-Corruption Laws Myanmar, September 2014, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/121098/business-ethics-and-anti-corruption-laws-myanmar

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
0

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public domain on whether the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations.

Myanmar has never participated in UN or regional peacekeeping, or ever been deployed outside its borders. The Myanmar Army has been deployed on operations against internal insurgency since the state was born in 1948.

As the assessor was unable to find any evidence of a public commitment by the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs to publicly commit to anti-corruption and integrity measures it seems unlikely that the military has a doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue.
According to the International Crisis Group, the military, Tatmadaw, are engaging in developing new doctrine though its contents are unknown. [2] There exists a military misconduct law with penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment or death. [1] No publicly copy of the military misconduct law is available, nor information on its scope and application.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, 25 May 2014

2. International Crisis Group. &quoute;Myanmar’s Military: Back to
the Barracks? ,&quoute; April 22, 2014. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/b143-myanmar-s-military-back-to-the-barracks.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
0

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

Myanmar does not offer its commanders training specifically in counter-corruption prior to deployment. There is evidence that these officers engage in, or turn a blind eye, to corrupt activities.

Myanmar has never participated in UN or regional peacekeeping, or ever been deployed outside its borders. The Myanmar Army has been deployed on operations against internal insurgency since the state was born in 1948.There has been no training on corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment. One informant stated that training regarding corruption occurs at all command levels within the military. [1] However, details regarding the regularity of this training or the contents of the training were not publicly available.

The UK has run an officer training programme, titled Managing Defence in a Wider Security Context which teaches strategy to high ranking officers and includes section on human rights, humanitarian law and accountability. The UK has run the course for 60 officers. [5,6] External training in International Humanitarian Law have occurred for some years. [3] Training in Human Rights has been proposed by the US. [4] The European Union conducted extensive training with the Myanmar Police Force and provided some riot control equipment. After the first phase of the programme was completed, the police were involved in at least three separate actions in which they violently attacked protests, leading to popular questioning of the purpose of the EU training. [7]

There is evidence that these officers engage in corrupt activities. The army has been implicated in illegal trading and smuggling of natural resources, in narcotics trafficking and in illicit mining, force labour and land seizures. [8,9,10]

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Comments regarding EU training have been added. However, regarding your first point -- a lack of publicly available information regarding corruption on operations does not confirm this not take place – a still very suppressive reporting environment must also be taken into account. Score maintained.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: The sources you specified denote breaches and violations, however these are examples from the civil environment, not from the military operational environment.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May 2014

2. &quoute;Burma's prime minister 'arrested'&quoute;, BBC, 19 October 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3755052.stm

3. ICRC. The ICRC in Myanmar, Overview, 30 June 2014. https://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/asia-pacific/myanmar/overview-myanmar.htm accessed 5 August 2015

4. “US seeks greater Myanmar military training” Alternet (AFP) undated. http://www.alternet.org/progressive-wire/us-seeks-greater-myanmar-military-training accessed 5 August 2015

5. Ben Riley-Smith, “Burmese Army gets £130,000 of taxpayer-funded training despite using child soldiers,” the Telegraph, 15 February 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11413577/Burmese-Army-gets-130000-of-taxpayer-funded-training-despite-allegedly-using-child-soldiers.html accessed 5 August 2015

6. Ben Farmer, “British to begin training Burmese military” the Telegraph, 25 December 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10531383/British-to-begin-training-Burmese-military.html accessed 5 August 2015

7. Andrew D. Kaspar & Lawi Weng, “EU Says Police Training ‘Still Needed’ After Crackdowns Draw Criticism” the Irrawaddy, 11 March 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/eu-says-police-training-still-needed-after-crackdowns-draw-criticism.html accessed 6 August 2015

8. The Economist. &quoute;Myanmar’s army and the economy: The road up from Mandalay,” April 21, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21553091

9. iels Larsen. &quoute;On Patrol With Myanmar Rebels Fighting Both the Army and Drug Addiction,&quoute; April 23, 2015. https://news.vice.com/article/on-patrol-with-myanmar-rebels-fighting-both-the-army-and-drug-addiction

10. ILO, Update on the operation of the complaint mechanism in Myanmar, 20 September 2014, accessed 30 July 2015. GB.322/INS/INF/2 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_315215.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score of 0 is understandable and one can infer from the lack of adequate framework in place that corruption is ignored. There is no evidence of trainings being offered to the army on this area, nor is there a published code of conduct to which all personnel have signed up to. However, there is nothing in the public domain over the past 12 months to suggest corruption is explicitly ignored or turned a blind eye to within the military.

Do note that the EU has provided human rights trainings to Burmese police officers dealing with crowds and political protests, e.g. Myanmar Police Undergo Riot Training, 20 Feb 2014, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26283340

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, Govt Ministries Systematically Flouting Spending Rules: Auditor General, 2 February 2015, The Irrawaddy, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/govt-ministries-systematically-flouting-spending-rules-auditor-general.html

The Office of the Auditor General uncovered 799 breaches of financial regulations by government ministry officials during the 2013-14 financial year. This constitutes more than a 50% increase in reported breaches from the year before, when 301 such violations were documented.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
1

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public domain suggesting the existence of trained professionals who are deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field.

Myanmar has never participated in UN or regional peacekeeping, or ever been deployed outside its borders. The Myanmar Army has been deployed on operations against internal insurgency since the state was born in 1948.Given that there is likely no pre-deployment training on anti-corruption, it is likely that Myanmar also does not deploy personnel to monitor corruption.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May 2014

2. &quoute;Burma's prime minister 'arrested'&quoute;, BBC, 19 October 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3755052.stm

3. ICRC. The ICRC in Myanmar, Overview, 30 June 2014. https://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/asia-pacific/myanmar/overview-myanmar.htm accessed 5 August 2015

4. “US seeks greater Myanmar military training” Alternet (AFP) undated. http://www.alternet.org/progressive-wire/us-seeks-greater-myanmar-military-training accessed 5 August 2015

5. Ben Riley-Smith, “Burmese Army gets £130,000 of taxpayer-funded training despite using child soldiers,” the Telegraph, 15 February 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11413577/Burmese-Army-gets-130000-of-taxpayer-funded-training-despite-allegedly-using-child-soldiers.html accessed 5 August 2015

6. Ben Farmer, “British to begin training Burmese military” the Telegraph, 25 December 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10531383/British-to-begin-training-Burmese-military.html accessed 5 August 2015

7. Andrew D. Kaspar & Lawi Weng, “EU Says Police Training ‘Still Needed’ After Crackdowns Draw Criticism” the Irrawaddy, 11 March 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/eu-says-police-training-still-needed-after-crackdowns-draw-criticism.html accessed 6 August 2015

The assessor consulted a number of sources, including those listed here. There was no publicly available information on this subject.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no evidence of such monitors being deployed to the field. However, as noted in the previous question, training and monitoring of the police has been enacted in Myanmar.

Myanmar Police Undergo Riot Training, 20 Feb 2014, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26283340

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
1

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public domain suggesting the existence of guidelines addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations.

Myanmar has never participated in UN or regional peacekeeping, or ever been deployed outside its borders. The Myanmar Army has been deployed on operations against internal insurgency since the state was born in 1948 and has been accused of a range of corruption issues. [8] There has been no training on corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment. One source stated that training regarding corruption occurs at all command levels within the military. [1] If training occurs, guidelines may exist however they are not in the public domain.

Although Myanmar's military and police sectors have been the recipients of training to increase their professionalism from a variety of countries, none of those trainings are known to have focused specifically on counter-corruption. The UK has run an officer training programme, titled Managing Defence in a Wider Security Context which teaches strategy to high ranking officers and includes section on human rights, humanitarian law and accountability. The UK has run the course for 60 officers. [5,6] External training in International Humanitarian Law have occurred for some years. [3] Training in Human Rights has been proposed by the US. [4] The European Union conducted extensive training with the Myanmar Police Force and provided some riot control equipment. After the first phase of the programme was completed, the police were involved in at least three separate actions in which they violently attacked protests, leading to popular questioning of the purpose of the EU training. [7]

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 6: Retired Army Officer, Yangon, 25 May 2014

2. &quoute;Burma's prime minister 'arrested'&quoute;, BBC, 19 October 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3755052.stm

3. ICRC. The ICRC in Myanmar, Overview, 30 June 2014. https://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/asia-pacific/myanmar/overview-myanmar.htm accessed 5 August 2015

4. “US seeks greater Myanmar military training” Alternet (AFP) undated. http://www.alternet.org/progressive-wire/us-seeks-greater-myanmar-military-training accessed 5 August 2015

5. Ben Riley-Smith, “Burmese Army gets £130,000 of taxpayer-funded training despite using child soldiers,” the Telegraph, 15 February 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11413577/Burmese-Army-gets-130000-of-taxpayer-funded-training-despite-allegedly-using-child-soldiers.html accessed 5 August 2015

6. Ben Farmer, “British to begin training Burmese military” the Telegraph, 25 December 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10531383/British-to-begin-training-Burmese-military.html accessed 5 August 2015

7. Andrew D. Kaspar & Lawi Weng, “EU Says Police Training ‘Still Needed’ After Crackdowns Draw Criticism” the Irrawaddy, 11 March 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/eu-says-police-training-still-needed-after-crackdowns-draw-criticism.html accessed 6 August 2015

8. Overview of corruption in Burma (Myanmar), Anti-corruption Resource Center, updated 1 October 2012. http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-in-burma-myanmar/downloadasset/2982 accessed 12 May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
0

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public domain suggesting the existence of governmental regulations or scrutiny of private military contractors.

Some guidelines for business that employ private security contractors have been published by the non-governmental Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business. [1] In the past, foreign corporations and embassies have been known to hire private military contractors to assure mine clearance. [2]

PMCs do operate in Myanmar although the use of them in the current context is unclear. The legal instruments around their use is vague. [3] It should be noted that international arms embargoes - such as those from the USA, UK and EU - remain in effect despite the lifting of sanctions in 2012. This means that the hiring of western contractors in Burma is extremely difficult so the government would have to use PMCs from non-sanction countries. [4]

COMMENTS -+

1. Myanmar Oil & Gas Sector-Wide Impact Assessment Report, Part 4.7 Security, September 2014. http://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/pdf/SWIA/Oil-Gas/13-Security.pdf accessed 6 August 2015

2. Landmine Monitor Report 2007, Myanmar/Burma Country Report. http://www.the-monitor.org accessed 6 August 2015

3. K Govern and E Bales, 'Taking shots at private military firms: International law misses its mark,' Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.32.1.1, 2008, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2189&context=ilj

4. US Maintains Block on Military Assistance to Burma, Irrawady, October 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/us-maintains-block-military-assistance-burma-10.html


No further sources were found in the public domain regarding PMCs.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: PMCs have existed in Myanmar for over ten years (see sources below) although the use of them in the current context is unclear. The legal instruments around their use is vague.

It should be noted that international arms embargoes - such as those from the USA, UK and EU - remain in effect despite the lifting of sanctions in 2012. This means that the hiring of western contractors in Burma is extremely difficult so the government would have to use PMCs from non-sanction countries.

Source

- K Govern and E Bales, 'Taking shots at private military firms: International law misses its mark,' Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.32.1.1, 2008, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2189&context=ilj
- US Maintains Block on Military Assistance to Burma, Irrawady, October 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/us-maintains-block-military-assistance-burma-10.html

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
0

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find legislation covering defence and security procurement.

There is a defence and Security Committee in the assembly. In 2014, the Chair of the defence and Security Committee issued instructions to the MPs on the committee not to raise objections regarding the military budget for the national interest. [2] Proposal for legislation regarding military procurement would logically originate from this Committee however there is no such law in existence.

Currently military affairs, including procurement and policy, remain outside the control of the civilian government. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government including the legislative branch may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [7]

Within the civil sector, the lack of a procurement law has been raised as an issue by the Office of the Attorney General. [3] In May 2015 a workshop on drafting a law on procurement occurred though it is unclear to what extent this would also include military procurement. [8] The World Bank also noted in 2015 that Myanmar is seeking to establish a modern public procurement regime and has taken a series of actions including the issuance of two Presidential Instructions and two directives on Public Procurement to establish the basis for an open and competitive public procurement system. [9] However, it is unknown what the remit of such a regime would be and whether it would extend to the defence sector.

According to Source 5, in the past major military purchases were the sole prerogative of the senior general. Several countries would come to the Senior General with offers, and he would choose among them. This was reportedly how major purchases such as fighter jets were agreed to. [6] Conventional infantry weaponry is produced domestically by the KaPaSa, or defence Products Industries of Myanmar. KaPaSa produces, among other weapons, assault rifles and submachine guns, ammunition, grenades, mortar and mines.

In September 2013, the US government documented acquisition of weaponry by Myanmar's military from China, North Korea, Russia and Belarus, and that firms in Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand assisted in military production technology within the country. [4]

COMMENTS -+

1. Introduced laws in the People's and National Assemblies. http://www.altsean.org/Research/Parliament%20Watch/Laws.php

2. Email communication with Source 3, Myanmar Politician II, 15 May 2014.

3. &quoute;Government procurement law needed, says deputy attorney-general&quoute;, Eleven Myanmar, 30 September 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7712:government-procurement-law-needed-says-deputy-attorney-general&catid=44:national&Itemid=384

4. Report to Congress per P.L. 110-286 on Military and Intelligence Aid to Burma for 2011. 16 September 2013. http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/burmareport/214291.htm

5. Zackary Keck, &quoute;Burma to Purchase Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Fighter Jets&quoute; the Diplomat, 24 June 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/burma-to-purchase-chinese-pakistani-jf-17-fighter-jets/

6. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014

7. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf

8. “Government Procurement: Workshop On Drafting Law” MITV News, 27 May 2015. http://www.myanmarinternational.tv/news/government-procurement-workshop-drafting-law accessed 6 August 2015

9. Zhentu Liu. &quoute;Myanmar sees early progress in its public procurement reform,&quoute; February 5, 2015. http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/myanmar-sees-early-progress-its-public-procurement-reform

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
0

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

Although there is more transparency over the military’s budget than at any point since the nation’s independence, the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, contract implementation and sign-off, to asset disposal, is not disclosed to the public and may not even be formalised at all.

Details of a 'procurement cycle' are not available. End results are sometimes are made known in the form of a press report. For example the purchase of MIG jets from Russia. [4] Due to a lack of any official information on procurement plans, many rumours circulate, for example on a possible submarine force. [3]

Formerly major military procurements were reportedly the prerogative of the senior general. Source 5 notes that several countries would make offers to the senior general who would then make a unilateral decision. This applied to major weapons such as fighter jets. [1]

Conventional infantry weaponry can be produced domestically by the KaPaSa, or defence Products Industries of Myanmar. KaPaSa produces, among other weapons, assault rifles and submachine guns, ammunition, grenades, mortar and mines. In September 2013, the US government documented acquisition of weaponry by Myanmar's military from China, North Korea, Russia and Belarus, and that firms in Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand assisted in military production technology within the country [2].

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

2. Report to Congress per P.L. 110-286 on Military and Intelligence Aid to Burma for 2011. 16 September 2013. http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/burmareport/214291.htm

3. Andrew Sealth, &quoute;Is Burma really buying submarines?&quoute; Interpreter, 29 January 2014. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/01/29/Burmas-submarine-dream.aspx?COLLCC=1661497849&

4. &quoute;Russia closing deal over 20 fighter jets&quoute;, DVB, 4 August 2011. https://www.dvb.no/news/russia-closing-deal-over-20-fighter-jets/16898

5. Zackary Keck, &quoute;Burma to Purchase Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Fighter Jets&quoute; the Diplomat, 24 June 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/burma-to-purchase-chinese-pakistani-jf-17-fighter-jets

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The scoring and analysis is solid here. Note the defence procurement is not disclosed but there is more transparency over the military's budget now than at any point since independence (now seen and challenged by parliamentarians). Reinvigorated military strategic relations with Russia and China have also indicates the direction in which the military wants its procurement process to go.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
0

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm that a military procurement oversight mechanism is in place. It should be recalled that military affairs, including procurement and policy, remain outside the control of the civilian government. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government including the legislative branch may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [4]

The sole body in Parliament concerned with military affairs is the Defence and Security Committee. To date it is only known to have considered the military budget, not procurement or other policies of the military. According to Source 3, the committee chair issued instructions to the MPs on the committee not to raise objections regarding the military budget for the national interest. [3] One of the few public assessments regarding the functioning of parliamentary committees is a Rule of Law Assessment by the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights. This report states that parliamentary committees are generally reportedly hampered by a lack of staff and parliamentarians allegedly lack the experience and capacity to provide effective oversight though does not comment on the defence and security committees’’ activities specifically. [5] Though parliament does maintain a website in Burmese [6], it does not currently provide information on the deliberations of parliamentary oversight committees. The role of the Controller of Military Accounts is also not clear here.

Another interviewee notes that, in the past, major military procurements were the prerogative of the senior general. Several countries would make offers to the senior general who would make a unilateral decision. This applied to major weapons such as fighter jets. [1]

Additionally, the country appears to continue to undertake military transfers with North Korea in violation of UN Security Council Sanction 1674. The committee investigating sanctions violations states that &quoute;Despite the repeated pledges made by Myanmar authorities in 2012 that the country would abide by the resolutions, including the embargo on arms and related materiel, new information suggests possible ongoing arms-related cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.&quoute; [2] This indicates that domestic defence procurement oversight mechanisms are inactive or non-existent.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: There have been no publicly available reports regarding any activity of the defence and security committee. Score changed from 2 to 0.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

2. UNSC, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2014/147, 6 March 2014. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_147.pdf

3. Email communication with Source 3, Myanmar Politician II, 15 May 2014.

4. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

5. Myanmar Rule of Law Assessment, Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, March 2013, accessed September 02, 2015, pp. 22-23. http://www.jbi-humanrights.org/files/burma-rule-of-law-assessment.pdf

6. Myanmar Parliament. Homepage, 2014, accessed September 01, 2015. http://www.myanmarparliament.gov.mm/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The parliamentary oversight and challenge to the military's budget, in addition to the Anti-Corruption Law's rule barring bribery of public officials, is another indication that oversight mechanisms are in place.

But I have scored this 1 because although these systems are in place, the quality of their enforcement is highly debatable.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
0

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm which indicates that a policy exists to make public actual and potential defence purchases. This is in keeping with Constitutional provisions that mandate military affairs, including procurement and policy, remain outside the control of the civilian government. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government including the legislative branch may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [6]

The sole body in Parliament concerned with military affairs is the Defence and Security Committee. To date it is only known to have considered the military budget, not a policy of transparency in arms acquisitions or other policies of the military.

Very rarely, some military purchases are made known in the form of a press report of an acquisition. For example the purchase of MIG jets from Russia. [4] It is unknown how this information reaches the press. Due to a general lack of any official information on planned purchases, rumours circulate, for example on a possible submarine force. [3]

Additionally, the country appears to be involved in clandestine arms purchases, for example military transfers with North Korea in violation of UN Security Council Sanction 1674. The committee investigating sanctions violations states that &quoute;Despite the repeated pledges made by Myanmar authorities in 2012 that the country would abide by the resolutions, including the embargo on arms and related materiel, new information suggests possible ongoing arms-related cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.&quoute; [2]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: There are very few instances where information on purchases has been made public. Where it has been made public, this has been due to media reporting. It cannot be said therefore that the government has released this information, through, for example, press releases or conferences. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

2. UNSC, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2014/147, 6 March 2014. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_147.pdf

3. Andrew Sealth, &quoute;Is Burma really buying submarines?&quoute; Interpreter, 29 January 2014. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/01/29/Burmas-submarine-dream.aspx?COLLCC=1661497849&

4. &quoute;Russia closing deal over 20 fighter jets&quoute;, DVB, 4 August 2011. https://www.dvb.no/news/russia-closing-deal-over-20-fighter-jets/16898

5. Zachary Keck, &quoute;Burma to Purchase Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Fighter Jets&quoute; the Diplomat, 24 June 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/burma-to-purchase-chinese-pakistani-jf-17-fighter-jets/

6. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

7. Email communication with Source 3, Myanmar Politician II, 15 May 2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: While it is not policy to make the procurement policy or cycle public, that local media reports on major defence deals (such as the government wanting to buy Chinese-Pakistani fighter jets) indicates that some deals are made public. The military has such an extensive network of power and contacts within the media it would have the capacity to prevent (or at least delay) the publication of these deals if it wished to.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Based on open source research, it was not possible to establish whether security reasons are cited as justification when information about actual and potential defence purchases is withheld from the public.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
0

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm which indicates the requirement for procedures, standards, compliance programmes or business conduct programmes in order to be able to bid for work for work with or for the Myanmar military or defence establishment.

The military in Myanmar remains under an arms embargo by EU and North American governments which effectively prohibits a great deal of international business activity with the military. [2] It was explained to the assessor by a source that the military has had to develop ways to bypass that embargo in order to obtain military wares. [3] This may well explain why Myanmar continues to be involved in clandestine arms purchases from North Korea in violation of UN Security Council Sanction 1674. The committee investigating sanctions violations states that &quoute;Despite the repeated pledges made by Myanmar authorities in 2012 that the country would abide by the resolutions, including the embargo on arms and related materiel, new information suggests possible ongoing arms-related cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.&quoute; [4] This also denotes that there seems to be little concern by the Myanmar authorities that bidding companies need to abide by certain regulations (as their choice in suppliers is limited due to the arms embargoes).

In September 2013, the US government reported that China and Chinese companies provided both finished military equipment and military production assistance to Burma. North Korea and North Korean companies supported Burma's efforts to build and operate military-related production facilities. North Korea's arms traders bought production-related equipment for work in Burma from companies based in Taiwan and China. Russian companies or brokers continued to deliver aircraft to Burma in 2011. Russia also continued to train Burmese students in a wide range of fields with military applications. Belarus' state-owned supply company delivered helicopters and related equipment. Firms based in Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand have reportedly assisted Burma's defence industry in acquiring production technology. [5]. The report does not provide any information on the procedures, standards, compliance programmes these commercial ties might have required to fulfil to bid for Myanmar tenders.

In general, there appear to be no significant obligations placed on companies around investing in Burma. As The Economist noted in 2012, The Foreign Investment Law is &quoute;shrouded in fog&quoute; and the legal landscape re investment is unclear. [6] It is unclear whether this has changed in recent years. A World Bank Survey from 2014 seems to indicate the existence of certain regulations but it’s unknown to what extent they relate to the defence sector specific requirements, especially in the area of corruption. [8] It is working with the Myanmar government to revise its Investment Law which will also reportedly seek to address concerns raised by civil society groups surrounding human rights and environmental protections. It is unknown to what extent there will be considerations for anti-corruption safeguards in the new law. [7]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: No indication can be found that, during the bidding process, the government references the need for companies to avoid corruption. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. US Imposes Sanctions on Burmese Companies, Military Staff Officer, VOA, 18 December 2013. http://www.voanews.com/content/us-imposes-sanctions-on-burmese-companies-military-staff-officer/1813116.html

2. Maya Lester, “EU Extends Arms embargo against Myanmar/Burma” European Sanctions Blog, 30 April 2015. http://europeansanctions.com/2015/04/30/eu-extends-arms-embargo-against-myanmarburma/ accessed 7 August 2015

3. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

4. UNSC, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2014/147, 6 March 2014. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_147.pdf accessed 27 May 2014

5. Report to Congress per P.L. 110-286 on Military and Intelligence Aid to Burma for 2011. 16 September 2013. http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/burmareport/214291.htm accessed 20 May 2014

6. Myanmar's Investment Haze, The Economist, Nov 2012, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21565986-new-law-foreign-investment-not-entirely-reassuring-burmese-haze

7. The Irrawaddy. &quoute;Investment Law Delayed as Rights Concerns Linger,&quoute; September 02, 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/election/news/investment-law-delayed-as-rights-concerns-linger

8. Myanmar Eleven. &quoute;Myanmar kicks off investment law modernisation,&quoute; March 9, 2015. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Myanmar-kicks-off-investment-law-modernisation-30255535.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Based upon the limited evidence available, this would appear to score as 1 rather than 0. There appear to be no significant obligations placed on companies around investing in Burma. As The Economist noted in 2012, The Foreign Investment Law is &quoute;shrouded in fog&quoute; and the legal landscape re investment is unclear.

However, the passing of the law and establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission are widely viewed as a move by the government to encourage foreign investment. Auung San Suu Kyi and NDL representatives have stated their desire for foreign companies to adhere to human rights obligations and conduct due diligence of beneficial ownership of companies within the country.

From an international context at least, there are some rules/responsibilities around investing Burma. The relaxation of sanctions in 2012 was accompanied by stricter reporting guidelines re corporate social responsibility from international governments.

Sources

- Burma sanctions: US eases sanctions, imposes reporting requirements, ACC, July 2012, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c36d615c-4580-41a4-9c23-e13b426d0332

- Myanmar's Investment Haze, The Economist, Nov 2012, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21565986-new-law-foreign-investment-not-entirely-reassuring-burmese-haze

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
0

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm which indicates that procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy.

No public documents relating to a defence strategy exist. The military does not produce a white paper or an equivalent document. The military in Myanmar has traditionally been secretive, with significant protection of information by the Official Secrets Act. [1] While there may be policies in place, they are not publicly available. There may be a possibility that procurement requirements are audited by the Controller of Military Accounts (CMA), but there is no way to verify this due to lack of publicly available information.

The National defence and Security Council (NSDC), effectively governed by the army, sets the defence budget according US-based think tank Global Security. [8] It can therefore also be implied that the NSDC has some influence on the strategy. If such a strategy exists, it is not published. A majority of Myanmar’s forces activity revolve around fighting insurgent and rebel groups in various parts of the country. The creation and purchase of conventional weapons would perhaps seem logical.

In the past there have been reports of procurement and acquisition of jets, submarines and controversial allegations of the creation of a chemical weapons factory. [9,10,11,12] None of the aforementioned acquisitions have been justified based on any strategy or set policy.

Currently all military affairs, including those related to procurement, budget and policy, remain outside the control of the civilian authorities. The 2008 Constitution grants the defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government. No branch of the state, such as the legislative, executive and judicial branches, may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [7] The sole body in Parliament concerned with military affairs is the defence and Security Committee. To date it is only known to have considered the military budget, not procurement or other policies of the military. According to an interviewee, the committees chair issued instructions to the MPs on the committee not to raise objections regarding the military budget for the national interest. [6]

It should be remembered that the military in Myanmar remains under an arms embargo by EU and North American governments which effectively prohibits significant international business activity with the military. [2] It was explained to the assessor by an interviewee that the military has had to develop ways to bypass that embargo in order to obtain military wares. Most of these methods they developed have reportedly allowed them to evade scrutiny. [3] This may well explain secretive military activity with North Korea in violation of UN Security Council Sanction 1674. The committee investigating sanctions violations states that &quoute;Despite the repeated pledges made by Myanmar authorities in 2012 that the country would abide by the resolutions, including the embargo on arms and related materiel, new information suggests possible ongoing arms-related cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.&quoute; [4]

COMMENTS -+

No public documents relating to or detailing a national defence and security strategy are avaliable.

1. Government of Myanmar. Official Secrets Act, Section 3.1, 1923, accessed May 13, 2014. http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Myanmar/secrets.pdf

2. Maya Lester, “EU Extends Arms embargo against Myanmar/Burma” European Sanctions Blog, 30 April 2015. http://europeansanctions.com/2015/04/30/eu-extends-arms-embargo-against-myanmarburma/ accessed 7 August 2015

3. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

4. UNSC, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2014/147, 6 March 2014. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_147.pdf accessed 27 May 2014

5. Report to Congress per P.L. 110-286 on Military and Intelligence Aid to Burma for 2011. 16 September 2013. http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/burmareport/214291.htm accessed 20 May 2014

6. Email communication with Source 3, Myanmar Politician II, 15 May 2014.

7. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Ch.XIV, Article 445, Article 20 (b), Article 147 (b) [Amyotha Hluttaw] & Article 115 (b) [Pyithu Hluttaw], www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

8. Global Security. &quoute;Myanmar - defence Spending,&quoute; no date, accessed September 07, 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/myanmar/budget.htm

9. The Diplomat, &quoute;Burma to Purchase Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Fighter Jets,&quoute; June 25, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/burma-to-purchase-chinese-pakistani-jf-17-fighter-jets/

10. Jeffrey Lewis, Catherine Dill. &quoute;REPORT: Myanmar’s Unrepentant Arms Czar,&quoute; Foreign Policy, May 9, 2014 .http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/09/myanmars-unrepentant-arms-czar/

11. The Diplomat, &quoute;Pardon, Was That a Chemical Weapons Factory in Myanmar?&quoute; February 7, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/pardon-was-that-a-chemical-weapons-factory-in-myanmar/

12. The Interpreter. &quoute;Is Burma really buying Submarines?&quoute; January 29, 2014. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/01/29/Burmas-submarine-dream.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
0

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm which indicates military purchases are based on clearly identified and quantified requirements.

According to an interviewee, formerly major military procurements were the prerogative of the senior general. Several countries would make offers to the senior general who would make a unilateral decision. This applied to major weapons such as fighter jets. [1] Selth noted that after 1988 &quoute;The regime was determined to expand its inventories quickly, and chose to do so by buying large numbers of cheaper arms, rather than acquiring smaller numbers of more sophisticated – but more expensive – systems. Most are at least one or two generations behind those systems in service with the major powers and advanced regional countries... these older arms were tried and tested, and at a technological level suited to the Tatmadaw’s developing maintenance and combat skills.&quoute; [2]

According to Source 9, an annual meeting of the key military departments determines military requirements by assessing stocks, loss of material in combat and identifies requirements. It is determined what can be sourced locally, which means from the state owned military industries. There are no domestic private manufactures supplying the military in Myanmar. If the state owned defence industries can supply it they are ordered to do so. If the state industries cannot supply, or cannot supply in required quantities, external sources are sought. If the source is singular, the military enters into direct negotiations. If there are several sources it uses a competitive tendering system. The concerned branch makes an initial selection of tender, other departments check the tender commercially and it must be approved by yet other departments before an order to obtain the foreign exchange is submitted to the foreign trade bank for payment. However, the interviewee noted that the above process is not always followed. Sometimes a seller invites the military to an open display of armaments, usually accompanied by demonstrations of the wares. In this case direct negotiations on the items offered will occur on the spot. [3] The above information could not be verified through publicly available sources.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

2. Andrew Selth, &quoute;Burma’s Armed Forces: Looking Down the Barrel&quoute;, Regional Outlook Paper No. 21, Griffith's University, 2009

3. Meeting with a retired Senior military officer in Myanmar, Source 9, 25 October 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It was not possible to establish that such work is ongoing.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
0

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm which indicates that military procurement is conducted competitively or single-sourced.

Despite the lack of publicly available information, an interviewee has stated that both have occurred. Source 9 stated that if the state industries cannot supply, or cannot supply in required quantities, external sources are sought. If the source is singular, the military enters into direct negotiations. If there are several sources it uses a competitive tendering system. [6] However, this information could not be found in publicly available sources. Another interviewee notes that formerly major military procurements were the prerogative of the senior general, indicating a historical proclivity to single-sourcing. [7]

Myanmar remains under an arms embargo by the European Union, Australia, Canada, the US and Switzerland and a further eight other countries which have allied themselves with the EU arms embargo [2,3,4,5] As the country is still under international sanctions, it pursues its arms dealings quietly. In December 2013, a Myanmar government official in the President’s office reportedly said, &quoute;the government had been forced to build military relations with, and buy equipment from, countries like North Korea, China and Russia because the US and its Western allies had introduced an arms embargo, which remains in place.&quoute;[1] The decision-making process around military relations and procurement (e.g. WITH China, Russia) are opaque so it is difficult to know whether the tender the process was fair and open. [8]

The score has been selected given this lack of transparency.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Nan Tin Htwe and Tim McLaughlin, Secretive firms hit with US sanctions, Myanmar Times, 21 December 2013. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/9096-secretive-firms-hit-with-us-sanctions.html

2. SIPRI, EU arms embargo on Myanmar (Burma), Last updated 22 April 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/myanmar

3. Reuters, Australia eases some military sanctions on reforming Myanmar,Mar 18, 2013 , http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-myanmar-australia-idUSBRE92H01R20130318

4. Government of Canada, Canada Suspends Sanctions Against Burma, Helps the Country Build a Brighter Future, April 24, 2012, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/04/24a.aspx?view=d

5. Council of the European Union, Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the
European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma and repealing Decision
2010/232/CFSP , 13 May 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/137089.pdf

6. Meeting with a retired Senior military officer in Myanmar, Source 9, 25 October 2014

7. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

8. Zachary Keck, Burma to Purchase Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Fighter Jets, The Diplomat, June 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/burma-to-purchase-chinese-pakistani-jf-17-fighter-jets/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The analysis and scoring are fair. The decision-making process around military relations and procurement (e.g. China, Russia) are opaque so it is difficult to know whether the tender the process was fair and open.

K Zeck, Burma to Purchase Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Fighter Jets, The Diplomat, June 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/burma-to-purchase-chinese-pakistani-jf-17-fighter-jets/

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
0

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm which indicates that tender boards are subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness.

Myanmar authorities have claimed that they require secrecy in their purchases in order to bypass an arms embargo on the country. In December 2013, a Myanmar government official in the President’s office reportedly said, &quoute;the government had been forced to build military relations with, and buy equipment from, countries like North Korea, China and Russia because the US and its Western allies had introduced an arms embargo, which remains in place.&quoute;[1] It was also explained to the assessor by an interviewee that the military has had to develop ways to bypass the arms embargo, put in place by European and North American countries, in order to obtain military wares. Most of the methods they developed allowed them to evade scrutiny [6] This indicates that if competitive bidding occurs, and if tender boards are even used, that there are unlikely to regulations and associated codes of conduct. If it is unknown that there are audits of MoD activity overall, the audit of tender boards overseeing secretive defence purchases are likely not to take place.

While tender boards have reportedly been used in other sectors [8,9], it is unclear if a tender board exists for military and defence purchases. A source stated to the assessor that where competitive bids do take place, the MoD uses a competitive tendering system. The source also stated that internal checks and balances are in place to prohibit corruption in the tendering process. The concerned branch makes an initial selection of tender, other departments check the tender commercially and it must be approved by yet other departments before an order for payment is made. However, the source noted that the above process is not always followed. Sometimes a seller invites the military to an open display of armaments and direct negotiations on the items offered will occur on the spot. [7] The information provided by the source could not be verified through public sources.

The score has been selected given the dearth of available information and resultant lack of transparency and accountability.

COMMENTS -+

1. Nan Tin Htwe and Tim McLaughlin, Secretive firms hit with US sanctions, Myanmar Times, 21 December 2013. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/9096-secretive-firms-hit-with-us-sanctions.html

2. SIPRI, EU arms embargo on Myanmar (Burma), Last updated 22 April 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/myanmar

3. Reuters, Australia eases some military sanctions on reforming Myanmar,Mar 18, 2013 , http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-myanmar-australia-idUSBRE92H01R20130318

4. Government of Canada, Canada Suspends Sanctions Against Burma, Helps the Country Build a Brighter Future, April 24, 2012, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/04/24a.aspx?view=d

5. Council of the European Union, Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the
European Union on the alignment of certain third countries
with Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive
measures against Myanmar/Burma and repealing Decision
2010/232/CFSP , 13 May 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/137089.pdf

6. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

7. Meeting with a retired Senior military officer in Myanmar, Source 9, 25 October 2014.

8. US Department of State. Investment Climate Statement. 2015, accessed September 04, 2015. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241502.htm

9. Gwen Robinson. &quoute;Myanmar’s Transition: Economics or Politics? Which came first and why it matters,&quoute; Legatum Institute, November, 2014. http://www.li.com/docs/default-source/publications/myanmar_ned_web.pdf?sfvrsn=6

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As noted in the previous question, there has been no transparency around major military deals even since the democratic reform process begun in 2012.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
0

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm which indicates the country has legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts.

Within the civil sector, the parliament is yet to approve legislation addressing procurement. [1] There are laws regarding investments (such as those encapsulated within the Foreign Investment Law and Anti-Corruption Law), which do focus on bribery of public officials, but they do not directly address collusion or the military. Collusion between bidders is also not addressed by Myanmar's anti-corruption legislation. [2] While security sector reform is necessary, it is not within the 16 areas identified for reshaping Myanmar's policies and laws by the sectoral working groups jointly designated by the Government, donors and international organizations. [4]

The sole body in Parliament concerned with military affairs is the Defence and Security Committee. To date it is only known to have considered the military budget, not a policy of transparency in arms acquisitions or other policies of the military. According to an interviewee, the committee chair issued instructions to the MPs on the committee not to raise objections regarding the military budget for the national interest. [3] This indicates that there may be a reluctance to engage in criticisms of ongoing defence establishment activity on issues such as collusion.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Government procurement law needed, says deputy attorney-general&quoute;, Eleven Myanmar, 30 September 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7712:government-procurement-law-needed-says-deputy-attorney-general&catid=44:national&Itemid=384

2. Anti-Corruption Law, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Law No. 23, 2013 http://pwplegal.com/documents/documents/f3142-Anti-Corruption-Law-%28PWP-Unofficial-English-Translation%29.pdf

3. Email communication with Source 3, Myanmar Politician II, 15 May 2014

4. Myanmar Oil & Gas Sector-Wide Impact Assessment Report, Part 4.7 Security, September 2014 in January 2013. http://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/pdf/SWIA/Oil-Gas/13-Security.pdf accessed 6 August 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The assessment is correct. Myanmar's public procurement law is non-existent, while bids for military services are opaque. There are laws regarding investments (such as those encapsulated within the Foreign Investment Law and Anti-Corruption Law), which do focus on bribery of public officials, but they do not directly address collusion or the military.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
0

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm regarding rules or procedures for military procurement staff.

While there is Directorate of Procurement in the military, there are no indications that staff are expected to ensure defence contractors meet their obligations or that any form of training takes place. [4,5] An interviewee notes that, in the past, major military procurements were the prerogative of the senior general. [6]

There is no procurement law. Within the civil sector, the parliament is yet to approve legislation which addresses procurement. [1] Within the military sector, it is unclear if procurement practices exist, let alone if there is training on such practices. An interviewee stated to the assessor that certain procurement procedures are in place. For instance, key military departments reportedly hold an annual meeting where they determine military requirements by assessing stocks, loss of material in combat and identifies requirements. It is then determined what can be sourced locally from the state owned military industries and what needs to be brought in externally. External sources are sought either through a competitive tendering system or via direct negotiations with the single source. However, the interviewee notes that above process is not always followed. [3] The information could also not be verified through publicly available sources.

It should be recalled that military affairs, including procurement practice and policy, remain outside the control of the civilian government. The 2008 Constitution grants the defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government including the legislative branch may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [2] Further information regarding staff training, organisation, resourcing or oversight of procurement staff was not found.

Due to the lack of transparency on the subject, a score of 0 was awarded.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Government procurement law needed, says deputy attorney-general&quoute;, Eleven Myanmar, 30 September 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7712:government-procurement-law-needed-says-deputy-attorney-general&catid=44:national&Itemid=384

2. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

3. Meeting with a retired Senior military officer in Myanmar, Source 9, 25 October 2014

4. Global Security, Myanmar, Military Structure, no date, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/myanmar/tatmadaw-4.htm

5. Myanmar Government Telephone Directory & Listing,
Ministries and Government Organizations in Naypyitaw, no date, http://www.myanmarteldir.com/gov_nptb.php?mc=00700&dc=001500

6. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As noted in the previous question, there is no public procurement law in Myanmar. Legislation in place is not particularly effective in addressing collusion.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
1

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm regarding mechanisms which allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement or regulations which protect companies from discrimination if filing a complaint.

It should be recalled that military affairs, including procurement practice and policy, remain outside the control of the civilian government. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government including the legislative branch may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [1]

The military sector remains opaque regarding its procurement practices. Source 9 indicated that certain procurement procedures are in place but could not specify whether that included a complaint mechanism for companies. [2] Given that within parliament is yet to approve legislation which addresses procurement overall (and may potentially not cover defence procurement) it is unlikely that complaint mechanisms exist. [3]

Given the restrictive environment within which media and civil society operate and the secrecy surrounding issues of defence, it is likely that companies would also be disadvantaged in future procurements if they attempt to complain. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar wrote in a recent report to the UN Human Rights Council that the Tatmadaw actively pursues “criminal proceedings for defamation or providing false information when making allegations against the military,” intimidating any civilian who makes claims of killings, sexual violence in conflict and other serious crimes. [4] However, no evidence could be found indicating companies that have attempted to complain have been unfairly disadvantaged or debarred from future procurements.

COMMENTS -+

1. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

2. Meeting with a retired Senior military officer in Myanmar, Source 9, 25 October 2014

3. &quoute;Government procurement law needed, says deputy attorney-general&quoute;, Eleven Myanmar, 30 September 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7712:government-procurement-law-needed-says-deputy-attorney-general&catid=44:national&Itemid=384 accessed 13 December 2014

4. United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, A/69/398, March 23, 2015, accessed July 24, 2015. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/060/75/PDF/G1506075.pdf?OpenElement

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The lack of information given means this score is not justified. To give the score of 0, the reviewer must provide some evidence to prove that &quoute;companies that have attempted to complain being unfairly disadvantaged or debarred from future procurements.&quoute; If none can be given, the score must be 1.

Indeed, it is likely that companies which attempt to complain have been disadvantaged but there is no public evidence to support his assertion.

Sources

- Civil society representative, Myanmar, Nov 2014

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
0

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information in the public realm regarding sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier to the military.

At present, Myanmar does not have a procurement law. While there are regulations set forth in Foreign Investment Law, there are no known sanctions for corrupt activities of suppliers of defence material specifically. According to section 5(4) of the Interpretation of Expressions Laws of 1973, the general offences (as stipulated in the Anti-Corruption Law) can be committed by both individuals and companies. [10] However, it is unknown to what extent the Anti-Corruption Commission (also called the Anti-Bribery Commission) mandate extends to the defence/military sector (and respective companies)>.

Myanmar is currently under an arms embargo by the European Union, Australia, Canada, the US and Switzerland and a further eight other countries which have allied themselves with the EU arms embargo [2,3,4,5] As a result, Myanmar claims that it is required to be secretive in order to bypass an arms embargo on the country. In December 2013, a Myanmar government official in the President’s office reportedly said, &quoute;the government had been forced to build military relations with, and buy equipment from, countries like North Korea, China and Russia because the US and its Western allies had introduced an arms embargo, which remains in place.&quoute; [1] It was also explained to the assessor by an interviewee that the military has had to develop ways to bypass the arms embargo, put in place by European and North American countries, in order to obtain military wares. Most of the methods they developed allowed them to evade scrutiny. [7] Myanmar has involved itself in violating UN sanctions regarding military trade with North Korea. [8,9]

COMMENTS -+

1. Nan Tin Htwe and Tim McLaughlin, Secretive firms hit with US sanctions, Myanmar Times, 21 December 2013. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/9096-secretive-firms-hit-with-us-sanctions.html

2. SIPRI, EU arms embargo on Myanmar (Burma), Last updated 22 April 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/myanmar

3. Reuters, Australia eases some military sanctions on reforming Myanmar,Mar 18, 2013 , http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-myanmar-australia-idUSBRE92H01R20130318

4. Government of Canada, Canada Suspends Sanctions Against Burma, Helps the Country Build a Brighter Future, April 24, 2012, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/04/24a.aspx?view=d

5. Council of the European Union, Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the
European Union on the alignment of certain third countries
with Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive
measures against Myanmar/Burma and repealing Decision
2010/232/CFSP , 13 May 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/137089.pdf

6. Government procurement law needed, says deputy attorney-general&quoute;, Eleven Myanmar, 30 September 2014. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7712:government-procurement-law-needed-says-deputy-attorney-general&catid=44:national&Itemid=384

7. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

8. Aung Zaw, Burma and North Korea, Brothers in Arms, Wall Street Journal, 10 July 2009. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124716393095019071 accessed 15 July 2014

9. Andrew Selth, “Burma and North Korea: Again? Still?” the Interpreter, 23 July 2013. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/07/10/Burma-and-North-Korea-Again-Still.aspx accessed 14 July 2014

10. Norton Rose Fulbright. &quoute;Business ethics and anti-corruption laws: Myanmar,&quoute; September 2014. http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/121098/business-ethics-and-anti-corruption-laws-myanmar

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
0

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information regarding offset contracts or any mechanisms by which the government could address corruption risk by due diligence requirements on contractors.

It is not know whether Myanmar has negotiated any offset contracts. However media reports confirm their clandestine existence. Information regarding co-production in the country remains classified under the official secrets act, and journalists who have attempted to reveal information have been imprisoned and their publications shut down. [4] The nature of these reflect a high degree of corruption risk and lack of any public information relating to processes of due diligence or auditing.

According to a document leaked to the Wall Street Journal in 2009, military cooperation between Myanmar and North Korea [5,6] included provisions that entailed North Korean supervision of the construction of Burmese military facilities, &quoute;including tunnels and caves in which missiles, aircraft and even naval ships could be hidden [...] Burma will also receive expert training for its special forces, air defence training, plus a language training program between personnel in the two armed forces.” [7] These kind of activities are potential offset- programs. There is also speculation on possible co-production of a Chinese designed military jet which could carry with it risk of offset, but nothing has appeared in the domestic press which the assessor could find. [1]

Military production is done by state industries, primarily Myanmar defence Products Industries. Military production does employ advisers and technical experts from Myanmar's key military partners, Russia, China, Singapore, North and South Korea, Israel and Pakistan.

The assessor could not locate any further publicly available information regarding the potential for offset and the oversight of any such agreements that take place.

COMMENTS -+

1. Myanmar as an emerging military power, Pakistan Defence, 23 January 2014. http://defence.pk/threads/myanmar-as-an-emerging-military-power.296684/

2. Aung Zaw, Burma and North Korea, Brothers in Arms, Wall Street Journal, 10 July 2009. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124716393095019071

3. Norinco ‘sold Burma arms’ pre-copper deal, Democratic Voice of Burma, 29 June 2010. http://www.dvb.no/news/norinco-%E2%80%98sold-burma-arms%E2%80%99-pre-copper-deal/10508

4. “Myanmar journalists on trial for reporting alleged chemical weapons factory”, Reuters, 16 February 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/16/us-myanmar-journalists-idUSBREA1F03D20140216 accessed 12 May 2014

5. Aung Zaw, Burma and North Korea, Brothers in Arms, Wall Street Journal, 10 July 2009. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124716393095019071 accessed 15 July 2014

6. Andrew Selth, “Burma and North Korea: Again? Still?” the Interpreter, 23 July 2013. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/07/10/Burma-and-North-Korea-Again-Still.aspx accessed 14 July 2014

7. Aung Zaw. &quoute;Burma and North Korea, Brothers in Arms,&quoute; July 10, 2009. http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124716393095019071

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The analysis and score is fair. The nature of military deals in Myanmar mean that if there is an offset policy, it is not disclosed to the public.

Source
- Risk Analyst, SE Asia, Dec 2014

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
0

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information made available by the authorities to the public regarding offset programmes, contracts or performance.

No public information is made available by the Government on offset programmes, contracts, or performance matters. Leaked details continue to surface regarding agricultural exchanges from Myanmar to North Korea in exchange for military hardware [1] as well as minerals for arms deals with China [2].

Information regarding co-production in the country remains classified under the official secrets act, and journalists who have attempted to reveal information have been imprisoned and their publications shut down. [3] Some co-production, in violation of UN sanctions, is believed to be occurring. [1,4] Speculation on possible co-production or offset of a Chinese designed military jet has been published in the foreign media but nothing has appeared in the domestic press which the assessor could find. [5]

COMMENTS -+

1. Aung Zaw, Burma and North Korea, Brothers in Arms, Wall Street Journal, 10 July 2009. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124716393095019071

2. Norinco ‘sold Burma arms’ pre-copper deal, Democratic Voice of Burma, 29 June 2010. http://www.dvb.no/news/norinco-%E2%80%98sold-burma-arms%E2%80%99-pre-copper-deal/10508

3. “Myanmar journalists on trial for reporting alleged chemical weapons factory”, Reuters, 16 February 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/16/us-myanmar-journalists-idUSBREA1F03D20140216 accessed 12 May 2014

4. Andrew Selth, “Burma and North Korea: Again? Still?” the Interpreter, 23 July 2013. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/07/10/Burma-and-North-Korea-Again-Still.aspx accessed 14 July 2014

5. Myanmar as an emerging military power, Pakistan Defence, 23 January 2014. http://defence.pk/threads/myanmar-as-an-emerging-military-power.296684/ accessed 13 December 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As noted in the previous question, the government is likely engaged in offset contracts but the details of such deals are not made known to the public.

Source
- Political Analyst, SE Asia, Dec 2014

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
0

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find any information indicating whether offset agreements are subject to competition regulation.

No public information is made available by the Government on offset programmes, contracts, or performance matters. Leaked details continue to surface regarding agricultural exchanges from Myanmar to North Korea in exchange for military hardware [1] as well as minerals for arms deals with China [2].

Information regarding co-production in the country remains classified under the official secrets act, and journalists who have attempted to reveal information have been imprisoned and their publications shut down. [3] Some co-production, in violation of UN sanctions, is believed to be occurring. [1,4] Speculation on possible co-production or offset of a Chinese designed military jet has been published in the foreign media but nothing has appeared in the domestic press which the assessor could find. [5]

Military affairs, including offset policy, remain outside the control of the civilian government. The 2008 Constitution grants the defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government including the legislative branch may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [6]

COMMENTS -+

1. Aung Zaw, Burma and North Korea, Brothers in Arms, Wall Street Journal, 10 July 2009. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124716393095019071

2. Norinco ‘sold Burma arms’ pre-copper deal, Democratic Voice of Burma, 29 June 2010. http://www.dvb.no/news/norinco-%E2%80%98sold-burma-arms%E2%80%99-pre-copper-deal/10508

3. “Myanmar journalists on trial for reporting alleged chemical weapons factory”, Reuters, 16 February 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/16/us-myanmar-journalists-idUSBREA1F03D20140216 accessed 12 May 2014

4. Andrew Selth, “Burma and North Korea: Again? Still?” the Interpreter, 23 July 2013. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/07/10/Burma-and-North-Korea-Again-Still.aspx accessed 14 July 2014

5. Myanmar as an emerging military power, Pakistan Defence, 23 January 2014. http://defence.pk/threads/myanmar-as-an-emerging-military-power.296684/ accessed 13 December 2014

6. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
0

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find the existence of any regulations controlling use of agents, brokers or intermediaries in the military procurement cycle. While there is no law which governs the actions of private Burmese companies involved in the arms trade, most which do are considered to be personally close to the military.

Some companies which act as agents in arms procurement have been reported in media articles. Reportedly, Myanmar Avia Export Company Ltd. was an agent for Russia’s Export Military Industrial Group, and the Russian helicopter company Rostvertol. Myanmar Avia Export Company Ltd. was reported to supply the Burmese military with spare parts for its aircraft, was placed under US sanctions. [1] Another three businesses were put under sanctions by the US government for alleged involvement in facilitating weapons procurement between Myanmar and N. Korea. [2] A private company involved in the purchase of MIG fighters is known to be close to Myanmar's military leadership. [3]

It was also explained to the assessor by a source that there are many brokers in Myanmar, however there is no licensing system within the country for these individuals. [4] As there currently is no procurement legislation, the likelihood is high that this is true.

No further information was found to be publicly available.

COMMENTS -+

1. Tracking the Tycoons, Irrawaddy, September 2008, Vol. 16, No. 9. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=14151 accessed 25 May 2014

2. Sanctioned General’s Singapore Bank Accounts Reportedly Aided Arms Deals, Irrawaddy, 10 July 2013.http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/intelligence/sanctioned-generals-singapore-bank-accounts-reportedly-aided-arms-deals.html accessed 14 July 2014

3. Yan Pai, &quoute;Burma and Russia to Increase Military Cooperation&quoute;, the Irrawaddy, 21 November 2013. http://www.irrawaddy.org/politics/burma-russia-increase-military-cooperation.html accessed 13 December 2014

4. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

74.
score
0

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find the existence of information made publicly available by the authorities regarding aspects of the financing regarding major arms deals including payment time lines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements at any time in during procurement.

The government does not make publicly available information on Myanmar's financial packages relating to arms deals. However there is evidence that financial transactions are hidden. The US government has sanctioned the Director of the Directorate of defence Industries in Myanmar for arms trade in violation of UN SC 1674. Reportedly this involves opaque transfers through financial institutions in Singapore. [1].

It should be recalled that military affairs, including procurement practice and policy, remain outside the control of the civilian government. The 2008 Constitution grants the Defence Forces complete autonomy from the civilian government including the legislative branch may exercise oversight over the military. Article 20 of the 2008 constitution states, “The Defence Services has the right to independently administer ... all affairs of the armed forces.” [4]

The military sector remains opaque regarding its procurement practices, including finance. A source stated to the assessor that financial arrangements were facilitated by unspecified foreign governments to assist Myanmar in making its purchases in order to bypass sanctions by the US, European and other states. [5] However, this could not be verified with publicly available sources. The Office of the Auditor General has noted, however, that the Ministry of Defence holds many extra-budgetary accounts in both local and foreign currency which it can spend “very freely”. [6] This adds to the opaqueness regarding financial matters in arms transfers.

In addition, in March 2011, the government reportedly passed the Special Fund Law. The law reportedly gives the Army Commander-in-Chief the ability to request additional funds outside the official defence budget and allows him a great deal of financial control. Reportedly the law states, “For the spending of the Special Funding, no person or organization can question, propose and audit” but does require the military chief report about the use of the additional funds to the President at the end of the fiscal year. [7]

COMMENTS -+

1. Sanctioned General’s Singapore Bank Accounts Reportedly Aided Arms Deals, Irrawaddy, 10 July 2013. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/intelligence/sanctioned-generals-singapore-bank-accounts-reportedly-aided-arms-deals.html]

2. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.&quoute;

3. UN Security Council, Resolution 1674, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20SRES1674.pdf

4. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Article 20 (b), www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf accessed 24 May 2014

5. Meeting with a retired Senior military officer in Myanmar, Source 9, 25 October 2014

6. Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Program, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Public Financial Management, Performance Report, March 2012. http://www.pefa.org/en/assessment/files/1129/rpt/8131 accessed 30 July 2015

7. Wai Moe, Than Shwe Grants Himself Power to Access 'Special Funds', Irrawaddy, 4 March 2011. http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20878

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
0

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

After consulting a range of sources, including interviews, media articles, reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the assessor was unable to find the existence of information made publicly available by the authorities regarding contractors, subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes. It is highly doubtful that such programmes exist, especially given there is no procurement law.

Myanmar is under an arms embargo by the European Union, Australia, Canada, the US and Switzerland and a further eight other countries which have allied themselves with the EU arms embargo [1,2,3,4]
Myanmar claims that it is required to be secretive in order to bypass an arms embargo on the country.
In December 2013, a Myanmar government official in the President’s office reportedly said, &quoute;the government had been forced to build military relations with, and buy equipment from, countries like North Korea, China and Russia because the US and its Western allies had introduced an arms embargo, which remains in place.&quoute; [5] It was also explained to the assessor by a source that the military has had to develop ways to bypass the arms embargo, put in place by European and North American countries, in order to obtain military wares. Most of the methods they developed allowed them to evade scrutiny [6] Myanmar has involved itself in violating UN sanctions regarding military trade with North Korea. [7,8]

COMMENTS -+

1. SIPRI, EU arms embargo on Myanmar (Burma), Last updated 22 April 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/myanmar accessed 14 July 2014;

2. Reuters, Australia eases some military sanctions on reforming Myanmar, 18 March 2013 , http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-myanmar-australia-idUSBRE92H01R20130318 accessed 14 July 2014

3. Government of Canada, Canada Suspends Sanctions Against Burma, Helps the Country Build a Brighter Future, April 24, 2012, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/04/24a.aspx?view=d accessed 14 July 2014

4. Council of the European Union, Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma and repealing Decision 2010/232/CFSP , 13 May 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/137089.pdf accessed 14 July 2014

5. Nan Tin Htwe and Tim McLaughlin, Secretive firms hit with US sanctions, Myanmar Times, 21 December 2013. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/9096-secretive-firms-hit-with-us-sanctions.html accessed 14 July 2014

6. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014

7. Aung Zaw, Burma and North Korea, Brothers in Arms, Wall Street Journal, 10 July 2009. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124716393095019071 accessed 15 July 2014

8. Andrew Selth, “Burma and North Korea: Again? Still?” the Interpreter, 23 July 2013. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/07/10/Burma-and-North-Korea-Again-Still.aspx accessed 14 July 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
0

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

Although official information on this is not in the public realm, it appears that it is common for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations. However, Myanmar has also dealt with a number of different seller showing it is not entirely dependent on a particular seller.

Myanmar has had few options when choosing its military partners as it has been and remains under an arms embargo by the European Union, Australia, Canada, the US and Switzerland and a further eight other countries which have allied themselves with the EU arms embargo. [5,6,7,8] Myanmar claims that it is required to be secretive in order to bypass an arms embargo on the country. In December 2013, a Myanmar government official in the President’s office reportedly said, &quoute;the government had been forced to build military relations with, and buy equipment from, countries like North Korea, China and Russia because the US and its Western allies had introduced an arms embargo, which remains in place.&quoute; [4] A source stated to the assessor that sometimes a seller state invites the military to an open display of armaments, usually accompanied by demonstrations, and in these cases direct negotiations on the items offered will occur on the spot. [9]

Moreover, defence deals are reportedly also driven by geopolitical interests from those countries intending to establish a foothold in a transition country within the Asia-Pacific. A clear example is with India: &quoute;It was only in the late-1990s that India undertook a hard-nosed strategic U-turn in its policy towards Myanmar, after several years of supporting Myanmar's opposition democratic movement, when it found China had assiduously forged deep links with the country to step into the vacuum.&quoute; [10] Conversely, the Myanmar government is keen to acquire more sophisticated means to defeat insurgencies in the country but will have bought weapons that seller nations want to sell as much as it needs. [11]

In September 2013, the US government documented acquisition of weaponry by Myanmar's military from China, North Korea, Russia and Belarus, and that firms in Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand assisted in military production technology within the country. The military, which is still under international sanctions, has kept its arms dealings hidden. [1]


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. Score changed from 0 to 2 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1. Report to Congress per P.L. 110-286 on Military and Intelligence Aid to Burma for 2011. 16 September 2013. http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/burmareport/214291.htm

2. Interview with Source 5: Former Official of the Myanmar Armed Forces, 5 July 2014.

3. Andrew Selth, &quoute;Burma’s Armed Forces: Looking Down the Barrel&quoute;, Regional Outlook Paper No. 21, Griffith's University, 2009.

4. Nan Tin Htwe and Tim McLaughlin, Secretive firms hit with US sanctions, Myanmar Times, 21 December 2013. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/9096-secretive-firms-hit-with-us-sanctions.html

5. SIPRI, EU arms embargo on Myanmar (Burma), Last updated 22 April 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/myanmar

6. Reuters, Australia eases some military sanctions on reforming Myanmar,Mar 18, 2013 , http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-myanmar-australia-idUSBRE92H01R20130318

7. Government of Canada, Canada Suspends Sanctions Against Burma, Helps the Country Build a Brighter Future, April 24, 2012, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2012/04/24a.aspx?view=d

8. Council of the European Union, Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the
European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma and repealing Decision 2010/232/CFSP , 13 May 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/137089.pdf

9. Meeting with a retired Senior military officer in Myanmar, Source 9, 25 October 2014

10. Rajat Pandit. &quoute;India To Step Up Military Cooperation with Myanmar,&quoute; The Times of India, November 2013. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-to-step-up-military-cooperation-with-Myanmar/articleshow/21464912.cms

11. Zachary Keck. &quoute;Burma to purchase JF-17 Chinese-Pakistani jets,&quoute; The Diplomat, July 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/burma-to-purchase-chinese-pakistani-jf-17-fighter-jets/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The political influence of seller nations is likely to have played a major role in defence acquisition in Myanmar. This has existed for over two decades but can be seen more recently as Russia, India and China have sold weapons to the Burmese government. These defence deals are driven by geopolitical interests from those countries and to establish a foothold in a transition country within the Asia-Pacific. A clear example is with India: &quoute;It was only in the late-1990s that India undertook a hard-nosed strategic U-turn in its policy towards Myanmar, after several years of supporting Suu Kyi's democratic movement, when it found China had assiduously forged deep links with the country to step into the vacuum.&quoute;

Conversely, the Burmese government is keen to acquire more sophisticated means to defeat ethnic insurgencies in the country but will have bought weapons that seller nations want to sell as much as it needs.

Sources
- R Pandit, India To Step Up Military Cooperation with Myanmar, The Times of India, Nov 2013.
- Z Keck, Burma to purchase JF-17 Chinese-Pakistani jets, The Diplomat, July 2014

Suggested score: 2

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+