Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on asset disposals by the MoDVA in South Sudan. In addition, the country lacks a procurement and asset disposal law.

The Procurement Policy Unit of the MoFEP is mandated to provide oversight to the MoDVA in procurement and asset disposal, however there is little information to suggest that it has the capacity needed to perform its duties. According to the 2005-2008 audit report, the MoDVA also lacks an asset register, which raises questions about the effectiveness of any control measures that might exist for asset disposal.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on any independent scrutiny of asset disposals that might exist for the MoDVA in South Sudan.

The Procurement Policy Unit of the MoFEP is responsible for the oversight of procurement and asset disposal in the MoDVA, but there is little evidence to suggest that it has the capacity to effectively scrutinize the assets of the MoDVA.

The MoDVA has no asset register according to the 2005-2008 audit reports. There is also no legislation on procurement and asset management in South Sudan (3). In such circumstances, asset disposals are unlikely to be effectively scrutinized by an oversight body.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on the percentage of the budget for secret items of the MoDVA and the national security service in the office of the president in South Sudan.

Only very basic information on the budget is available, for example the audit report for the financial year ending 31st December 2008 put the percentage of the general budget that went to the MoDVA at about 25% for the financial year and 50% (security and law enforcement) in the 2013/2014 national budget. The national budgets for 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 show 40.9% and 32.28% respectively of the budget being allocated to the security sector.

Researcher4126: It is very hard to verify the availability of information on secret items to the NLA, although the fact that even the specialized standing committee on economics lacks this information suggests that they do not receive details.

Notably, the MoDVA has continually frustrated the efforts of the auditor general and the legislative assembly to subject its budget to scrutiny despite the fact that more than 49% of the national budget (see 2013/2014) is spent on security and law enforcement.

In the report &quoute;Fragility by choice,&quoute; some respondents suggested that the public sector in South Sudan is hesitant to develop a system of checks and balances because of the fear that such a mechanism would make it hard for members of the ruling regime to steal money.

The PFMA Act, 2011 provides for the classification of security expenditure items within MoDVA and the office of the president. In addition, classified expenditure is not open to the scrutiny of the NLA. All expenditures in other ministries are non-classified.

Classified expenditure is meant to be determined by the council of ministers and budgeted within the budget ceiling of the spending agency. The minister is meant to provide details of the classified expenditure to the speaker of the NLA and the chairpersons of the specialized standing committees on economy, development and finance; and approved by the speaker and president. However, there is no information available to the public as to whether the legal provisions on classified expenditure are adhered to.

Response to government reviewer:
Although secret spending is a sensitive topic, this does not preclude the sharing of this information with the legislature. As no such information appears to be released to the NLA, I have maintained the score.

Researcher4126: There is no separate audit for the annual accounts of the security sector in South Sudan. The accounts of the GoSS were jointly audited with the security sector once since 2005, covering the financial period 2005-2008.

The audit report was indeed presented to the SSLA. It showed a significant level of weaknesses in the security sector (MoDVA) namely spending more than the budgetary allocation, lack of asset register and some payrolls, etc. However, the report was aggregated and excludes information on secret programs of the security sector (see GoSS audit report 2012)

The PFMA Act, 2011 provides for the classification of security expenditure items within MoDVA and the office of the president. In addition, classified expenditure is not open to the scrutiny of the NLA. All expenditures in other ministries are non-classified.

Classified expenditure is meant to be determined by the council of ministers and budgeted within the budget ceiling of the spending agency. The minister is meant to provide details of the classified expenditure to the speaker of the NLA and the chairpersons of the specialized standing committees on economy, development and finance; and approved by the speaker and president. However, there is no information available to the public as to whether the legal provisions on classified expenditure are adhered to, or whether classified expenditure is then audited.

Researcher4126: There is no information to the public on off-budget military expenditure in South Sudan and there is no legislation about it.

As peer reviewer 1 notes, Civil society organisations like the South Sudan Law Society have called for increased transparency in the way that oil revenues are used for military spending, particularly considering the impact of corruption and poor transparency of military spending on the current conflicts (3).

Response to government reviewer:
Most defence related expenditures are not recorded in the official budget in South Sudan. According to reports, the SPLA routinely overspends its annual budget and receives additional “off-budget” funds. For instance, in the first quarter of 2015, the President's Office (which controls the national security service) overspent its allocated budget by 349%, the Ministry of defence by 150%, and the Veterans Affairs department by 113%.

The SPLA also provides virtually no information about its allocations to the public, even when required to do so. In the 2012 audit report of the government’s 2005-2008 finances, only 7 out of 40 SPLA divisions reported their payroll figures as required to the Auditor General, even when repeatedly asked to do so. I have added source 4 to support this, and have maintained the score.

Researcher4126: There is a substantial off-budget military expenditures in South Sudan. According to reports, the SPLA routinely overspends its annual budget and receives additional “off-budget” funds. For instance, in the first quarter of 2015, the President's Office (which controls the national security service) overspent its allocated budget by 349%, the Ministry of defence by 150%, and the Veterans Affairs department by 113% (2).

In addition, as peer reviewer 1 notes, Civil society organisations like the South Sudan Law Society have called for increased transparency in the way that oil revenues are used for military spending, particularly considering the impact of corruption and poor transparency of military spending on the current conflicts (3).

Peer reviewer 2 also suggests that the president has kept the financing of his paramilitary Presidential Guard away from the official defence budget, while making occasional 'personal donations' to the defence budget.

This in effect implies that there is off-budget expenditure in the military by practice, although there is no legislation about it in the country (see audit report 2012 and the PFMA Act, 2011).

Researcher4126: There are some provisions in law that regulate the classification of information in South Sudan. The PFMA Act, 2011 provides for the classification of security expenditure items within MoDVA and the office of the president.

South Sudan has a right to information law. President Salva Kiir signed the bill on Dec. 9, 2013,several months after it was passed by Parliament. Initially, the president had rejected signing it, seeking that certain changes be incorporated.

Subject to sub-section 3 (4), a public or private body must respond to a request for information &quoute;as soon as is reasonably possible and in any event within twenty working days of receipt of the request.&quoute; The communication of information, however, may &quoute;be made conditional upon payment by the person making the request of a reasonable fee, which shall not exceed the actual cost of searching for, preparing and communicating the information.&quoute; (4)

There is an Information Officer in every public body who is tasked to annually submit to the Information Commissioner a report on the activities of the public body to promote compliance with
this Act, including:
(a) the number of requests for information received, granted in full or in part, and refused;
(b) how often and which sections of the Act were relied upon to refuse, in part or in full, requests for information;
(c) appeals from refusals to communicate information;
(d) fees charged for requests for information;
(e) its activities pursuant to section 17 (duty to publish);
(f) its activities pursuant to section 19 (maintenance of records); and
(g) its activities pursuant to section 20 (training of officials).

The Information Commissioner is meant to be appointed along several guidelines that are in place to guarantee their independence:

(2) No-one may be appointed Commissioner if he or she: –
(a) holds an official office in, or is an employee of a political party, or holds an elected or appointed position in central or local government; or
(b) has been convicted, after due process in accordance with internationally accepted legal principles, of a violent crime and/or a crime of dishonesty or theft, for which he or she has not been pardoned.
(3) The Commissioner shall hold office for a term of seven years, and may be reappointed to serve a maximum of two terms, but may be removed by the President of the Government of Southern Sudan upon a recommendation passed by a two-thirds majority vote of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. (4)

As it currently stands, several provisions appear to offer the government multiple ways to avoid disclosure. For example, a body may refuse to indicate whether or not it holds a record, or refuse to communicate information, in all cases &quoute;where to do so would, or would be likely to, cause serious prejudice to national security&quoute; (Clause 29). Nevertheless, there is a public interest override, which states that &quoute;a body may not refuse to indicate whether or not it holds a record, or refuse to communicate information, unless the harm to the protected interest outweighs the public interest in disclosure.&quoute; (Clause 21).

It must, however, be noted that there is no definition or application of guidelines for what constitutes a prejudice to national security, or what determines the public interest. In reality, there are strong suspicions that the government has little control over the widespread non-disclosure of defence information. Some individuals in the ruling regime are more powerful than the state and very influential (2). Army generals are hesitant to talk to the press on issues related to security and corruption, and there is a strong suspicion that the decision to classify defence information is ultimately theirs (5).

Researcher4126: There is no public information regarding the ownership of commercial businesses by the MoDVA in South Sudan. The Anti-corruption Commission Act, 2009 outlaws the army from engaging in private enterprises.

However, as peer reviewer 2 notes, The MOD Directorate of Military Production specifically has a commercial role. It has also been suggested that the MOD / SPLA has official commercial interests in a hotel, shops and farming enterprises.

In addition, the public is aware that individual army generals have interests giant commercial businesses in the country namely estates, financial institutions, gas stations and Forex bureaus (1). It is also alleged that some of the business companies in the country are owned by army generals, including the president. In particular, it is alleged that President Salva Kiir is a major share holder in the ABC construction company that provides most of the technical road construction work in Juba (3)

Researcher4126: There is no public information regarding the ownership of commercial businesses by the MoDVA in South Sudan. While the Anti-corruption Commission Act, 2009 outlaws the army from engaging in private enterprises, the public is aware that individual army generals have interests giant commercial businesses in the country namely estates, financial institutions, gas stations and Forex bureaus (1). Given the fact that these are not publicly declared and military involvement in commerce is opaque, it is extremely unlikely that military owned businesses are independently scrutinised.

Efforts are, however, being made by the government to scrutinize individual military wealth in South Sudan. According to media reports, some army generals in the SPLA have already submitted wealth declaration forms provided by the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC). However, results have not been publicized (1, 2).

Indeed, due to ongoing problems with the SSACC, it is doubtful that such a process is widespread. There are reports that it is poorly funded and staffed, particularly following austerity measures in 2013 that cut its budget by almost 40%. As a result, the commission stopped recruiting new staff, freezing it to its existing 126 employees, who are spread across South Sudan’s 10 states (3).

In addition, there is evidence that this scrutiny is highly selective. For example, it is alleged that President Salva Kiir is a major share holder in the ABC construction company that provides most of the technical road construction work in Juba (4).

Researcher4126: Although the Anti-corruption Commission Act 2009 outlaws the military from from engaging in commerce, there is little information available to the public on the seriousness by the government to enforce the law. There is, for example, evidence of unauthorised private enterprise taking place. The public is aware that individual army generals have interests giant commercial businesses in the country namely estates, financial institutions, gas stations and Forex bureaus (7).

Efforts are, however, seemingly being made by the government to scrutinize individual military wealth in South Sudan. According to media reports, some army generals in the SPLA have already submitted wealth declaration forms provided by the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC). However, results have not been publicized (4, 5).

Indeed, due to ongoing problems with the SSACC, it is doubtful that such a process is widespread. There are reports that it is poorly funded and staffed, particularly following austerity measures in 2013 that cut its budget by almost 40%. As a result, the commission stopped recruiting new staff, freezing it to its existing 126 employees, who are spread across South Sudan’s 10 states (6).

In addition, there is evidence that this scrutiny is highly selective. For example, it is alleged that President Salva Kiir, himself an army general, is a major share holder in the ABC construction company that provides most of the technical road construction work in Juba (8).

Response to government reviewer:
While military personnel are outlawed from engaging in commerce, there is evidence that this continues to take place. In addition, there is no evidence of heavy sanctions in place to deal with offenders, which is a key criteria for a higher score. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public of any commitment by the Defence Ministry as an institution to combat corruption. Although some senior army officers have expressed the willingness to fight corruption in the army, nothing tangible has been done about it. The committee instituted by the president to investigate corruption allegations has also not concluded any investigations (2).

Response to peer and government reviewer:
The current MoDVA and the army spokesperson are some of the army officers who have expressed through the media the commitment by the government to fight graft in the military. However, this has not translated into discernible action and has simply remained lip-service. The internal audit directorate in the MoDVA might have been established, but there is no information to the public to show whether it is active or effective. Due to the lack of evidence of anything more than cursory statements about corruption, a score of 2 (which requires some evidence of commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures) or above (which would require a clear and cohesive commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry) cannot be awarded. I have, however, raised the score from 0 to 1 in recognition of the fact that there have been some public statements on the topic.

Researcher4126: There are formal measures in place to combat bribery and corruption in South Sudan. In 2008, the parliament passed a resolution to investigate the grain scandal and summoned the Minister responsible to answer questions related to the procurement of the food reserves (1).

The SSACC, a body legally mandated to investigate corruption has also investigated several cases of corruption in the country since it was instituted (2). In 2013, the president also suspended two Ministers in the MoDVA allegedly involved in corruption and appointed a committee headed by the SSACC to investigate them. A similar committee headed by the police was also set up by the president to investigate the loss of money in the office of the president. The SSACC has also called upon top generals to declare their wealth.

However, there is no report to the public on the outcome of these investigations to date. In addition, there are reports that the SSACC is poorly funded and staffed, particularly following austerity measures in 2013 that cut its budget by almost 40%. As a result, the commission stopped recruiting new staff, freezing it to its existing 126 employees, who are spread across South Sudan’s 10 states (7).

The reports of the investigation committee have not been published, and none of the accused persons have been prosecuted despite the wide spread of corruption in government. It has been observed that lack of political will by the government and lack of power by the SSACC are some of the factors responsible for the persistence of corruption in the country (4). On the surface of it, the government seems to be doing a lot on the fight against corruption, but with no tangible results (6).

Researcher4126: There is no encouragement of whistle blowing. People who have attempted to reveal corrupt practices in the army have been harassed by security operatives and the government has done nothing to protect them (3). There is no whistleblower law or mechanisms to protect whistleblowers in South Sudan. Some foreign government officials who have tried to expose corrupt practices have been expelled from the country (1).

In the last couple of months, a couple of senior government officers have resigned from their posts mainly citing the high levels of corruption in the ruling regime. They have accused the ruling regime for lack of freedom, sectarianism, marginalization and tribalism and the loss of vision of the liberation struggle (4).

Response to government reviewer:
There is no law on whistle-blowing in South Sudan. The government does not also protect whistle blowers in practice. Instead people who are critical of the government on corruption related issues are always harassed by the government. According to media reports, the government massacred more than 600 political detainees in Juba on the eve of signing the current peace accord with the rebels. Notably, most of these detainees were critical of the government on corruption-related issues. I have added source 5 to support this statement, and have maintained the score.

Researcher4126: There are some provisions for the appointment of personnel in sensitive positions namely the security, finance and procurement sectors in South Sudan. These are included in the SPLA Act, 2011, the Southern Sudan Anti-corruption Commission Act, 2009 and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011. For instance, the SPLA Act, 2011 provides for the vetting of officers, the publication of calls for recruitment and a minimum level of education among things.

However, in practice, there is no evidence to show that these guidelines are being followed. The command council has been accused of recruiting senior personnel mainly from his Dinka tribe (6). The audit report shows the accounts department of the MoDVA is filled by uniformed men who lack the basic accounting knowledge and skills (see 2012 GoSS audit report). The president also makes appointments that ignore objections from the NLA (5), suggesting that formal guidelines are not always followed.

Response to government reviewer:
I could find no public information to back up your suggestion that post rotations are in place for personnel in sensitive positions. I have maintained the score.

Researcher4126: The number of civilians and military personnel on the payroll of the MoDVA in south Sudan is not known- there is no information available to the public about it. According to media reports, peer reviewer 2, and an interviewee, the payroll of the army is full of ghost employees. The audit report for the financial period ending 31st December 2008 shows that the MoDVA also produced payroll for only seven army divisions out of forty (2 & 3).

Response to government reviewer:
There is no information available to the public on the number of civilian and military personnel in the MoDVA. As commented earlier, the audit report of 2012 covering the period 2005-2008 shows that the army failed to produce all the payrolls. It is also alleged that the government does not know the exact number of soldiers in the SPLA. I have added source 5 to support this. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on the pay rates and allowances for civilians and military personnel working with the MoDVA in South Sudan. According to the 2012 audit report and media reports, the MoDVA failed to produce all the army payrolls for audit- payrolls were produced for only seven army divisions of the 40.

Response to the peer and government reviewer:
Information on the payroll of the army might be available within the MoDVA and MoFEP. Nevertheless, it has not been made available to the public, which is the main criterion for this question. In addition, the 2012 audit report for the period 2005-2008 showed that there were no proper criteria for paying salaries and allowances to staff in all the government ministries. It was also hard for the audit to establish the amount of money paid out for allowances due to poor documentation. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There have been serious delays in paying the salaries of military personnel in South Sudan. The interviewee stated that salaries have at times been delayed by three months without any explanation from the government. According to media reports, many soldiers have also abandoned their stations of deployment due to lack of salaries. Most salaries are still been paid manually despite the introduction of electronic pay roll.

There is also a suspicion that army generals are hesitant to adhere to the electronic payroll system due to the fear that it will make it hard for them to steal money. The interviewee stated that most of the army generals in Juba got their wealth from ghost payrolls.

Response to government reviewer:
In order to score higher, I would need access to evidence that personnel receive the correct pay on time; the payment system is well-established, routine, and published; and basic pay is non-discretionary. I could find no public record of the payment system on which to judge whether it is robust or not, and the severe delays in payment referenced preclude a higher score.

Researcher4126: The system for the appointment of top and middle military officers has not been made public in South Sudan. The SPLA Act, 2009 provides basic information on the general procedure for recruitment and appointment in the MoDVA (see sections 20-24 of SPLA Act, 2009), however, most military ranks in the SPLA have not been properly commissioned.

The current army in south Sudan is a loose integration of rebel and militia groups who fought the Khartoum-based former government on different fronts. In 2005, the rebel groups joined the SPLA, the current national army. At the time, these rebels had &quoute;bush ranks&quoute; and were allowed to hold such ranks. Since then, appointments in senior military positions is used as a means to distribute resources between former rebel commanders. Senior positions in the army are also dominated by the Dinka tribe of the president (2), which undoubtedly raises a concern on the objectivity of these appointments.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Agreed that there is meant to be a system based on 'shields' - or years of entry into the army. However, the reality on the ground, as you also explain, shows strong evidence of appointment based not purely on merit. Score maintained.

Response to government reviewer:
Unfortunately, the public information that I could find on this issue does not support your statement that there is a system currently in place that rewards merit. While you suggest that a score of 4 is appropriate, I could find very little to suggest that there is an established system for the appointment of military personnel, which requires the use of objective job descriptions and assessment processes for appointments, and oversight of this process by independent personnel. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no information on the existence of formal and transparent processes through which personnel in defence are promoted in South Sudan. There is no information available to the public on the formal process for appointment and promotion in the army. There is also no information on the existence of a board specifically entrusted to handle promotions in the army.

Several rebel groups were integrated into the SPLA and given positions in the army immediately after the signing of the CPA (1). Since independence in 2011, most of the appointments to key military positions were made by the army high command without a formalized process. Most senior positions in the army are held by the Dinka tribe of the president, as confirmed by an interviewee, which raises questions on the procedure of recruitment in the MoDVA.

Response to government reviewer:
Without any public evidence of formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process, I cannot award a higher score.

Researcher4126: There is no information to the public on rules or mechanisms against bribery regarding conscription in the army in South Sudan, although there are some general measures against bribery. The SSACC, a body legally mandated to investigate corruption, has investigated several cases of corruption in the country since it was instituted (4). In 2013, the president also suspended two Ministers in the MoDVA allegedly involved in corruption and appointed a committee headed by the SSACC to investigate them. A similar committee headed by the police was also set up by the president to investigate the loss of money in the office of the president. The SSACC has also called upon top generals to declare their wealth.

The SPLA defence White Paper 2008 provides for conscription in military service. However, according to media reports, the SPLA has been conscripting south Sudanese citizens into the army to fight rebel groups since the political violence of December 2013. It is also alleged that many of the people conscripted are school children and teachers (3).

There is no clear information available to the public on compulsory conscription into the army and bribes related to conscription in South Sudan. However, considering the lack of technical oversight and wide spread of corruption in the MoDVA, forced conscription is likely to be marred with corruption.

Response to government reviewer:
I could not find any public evidence to suggest that bribery in the conscription process has ever resulted in punishment or dismissal. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on policies, rules or mechanisms against bribery for soliciting preferred positions in the military in South Sudan, although there are some general measures against bribery. The SSACC, a body legally mandated to investigate corruption, has investigated several cases of corruption in the country since it was instituted (4).

In 2013, the president also suspended two Ministers in the MoDVA allegedly involved in corruption and appointed a committee headed by the SSACC to investigate them. A similar committee headed by the police was also set up by the president to investigate the loss of money in the office of the president. The SSACC has also called upon top generals to declare their wealth. However, it is most likely that conscription is also marred by corruption considering the allegation that graft widely exists in the MoDVA.

According to media reports, the SPLA has been conducting forceful conscription into the army since the political violence of December 2013 mainly targeting school children and teachers.

Response to government reviewer:
There is no information available to the public on military personnel being prosecuted due to corruption-related cases. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: The financial audit report of 2005-2008 revealed serious problems with payroll management in the MoDVA in South Sudan. Military personnel who are dead still have their names on the army payroll. The SPLA failed to produce payrolls for 33 army divisions out of 40. It was also difficult for the audit team to verify whether salaries and allowances were paid in line with employees positions.

In the wake of reform, the government has pledged to address the issue of payroll through an electronic system, which has not yet been implemented for the defence and security sector. The government has found it hard to enforce the required reform because of the profits being generated for army chiefs considered as 'liberators' following South Sudan's independence. The government fears that such a reform might target these powerful personnel and result in a security threat to the country. The South Sudanese media is full of accusations of potential rebellions and coup plans. It is also alleged that efforts by the government to start the clean up the army payroll led to fighting among the army in March 2014 in Jebel barracks located in Juba the capital city.

The interviewee stated that most senior military officers have been accused of enlisting their family members in the army payroll. It is also reported that there is a common practice for army generals to sign for the salary of more than 100 personnel (1).

Response to peer and government reviewer:
According to media reports, the are many ghost names on the army army payroll. There is also no information available to the public on the number of military personnel in the army payroll. It is a wide public opinion that the government does not know the number of military personnel in the army payroll. Efforts by the government to improve the management of the payroll by introducing electronic payroll system did no yield any tangible result. To date, the military is still paid manually. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no segregation of duties between chains of command and payment. It is considered a common practice in the army that generals sign for the salaries of more than 100 soldiers. Salaries are distributed by army commanders.

The audit report of 2005-2008 demonstrated serious institutional weaknesses in the MoDVA. It was also reported that the accounts office in the MoDVA is also filled by uniformed men who lack basic accounting knowledge and skills and are subject to military orders from their superiors (1). The interviewee confirmed that some army commanders double as paymasters.

Response to government reviewer:
According to the available information to the public, army commanders also serve as paymasters. In circumstances where paymasters exist, they are not independent. It is also a common practice for army commanders to direct who should be paid, without following any formal procedure. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to suggest that there is a code of conduct for the personnel in the MoDVA in South Sudan that covers corruption, although there are some general measures against bribery. The SSACC, a body legally mandated to investigate corruption, has investigated several cases of corruption in the country since it was instituted (4). In 2013, the president also suspended two Ministers in the MoDVA allegedly involved in corruption and appointed a committee headed by the SSACC to investigate them. A similar committee headed by the police was also set up by the president to investigate the loss of money in the office of the president. The SSACC has also called upon top generals to declare their wealth. Notably, corruption is widespread in the army and the government in general.

For example, it is alleged that a significant number of the companies involved in the Dura scandal, in which the government paid the equivalent of nearly $1 million for cereals which were never delivered, belong to family members of senior government officials and close allies of people in government (2).

It has also been reported in the media that some officials in the MFEP took a bribe of 50,000 South Sudanese Pounds from the company that constructed the house for the presidential guard unit at Beijing Hotel in Juba (3).

Response to government reviewer:
There is no information available to the public on the code of conduct for the army. I could not find the text of the White Paper online. Considering the media allegations of widespread of corruption in the MoDVA, it is most likely that a code of conduct does not exist. If it does exist, it does not appear that it is being enforced.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to suggest that there is a code of conduct for the personnel in the MoDVA in South Sudan that covers corruption. Notably, corruption is widespread in the army and the government in general.

For example, it is alleged that a significant number of the companies involved in the Dura scandal, in which the government paid the equivalent of nearly $1 million for cereals which were never delivered, belong to family members of senior government officials and close allies of people in government (4).

It has also been reported in the media that some officials in the MFEP took a bribe of 50,000 South Sudanese Pounds from the company that constructed the house for the presidential guard unit at Beijing Hotel in Juba (3).

According to media reports, the government has taken some measures to address the issues of graft and corruption, issuing several warnings to corrupt government officials. The president also wrote letters to some government officials to return stolen money. However, there is no information to the public on the prosecution of any government official suspected of bribery.

Considering the media allegations of widespread of corruption in the MoDVA, it is most likely that a code of conduct does not exist. If it does exist, it does not appear that it is being enforced.

Response to government reviewer:
There is no information available to the public on the code of conduct for the army. I could not find the text of the White Paper online. Considering the media allegations of widespread of corruption in the MoDVA, it is most likely that a code of conduct does not exist. If it does exist, it does not appear that it is being enforced. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on formal training conducted for military and civilian personnel specifically on anti-corruption in South Sudan. However, several trainings have been conducted on governance related issues, the most recent being a three month course for local government officials in collaboration with GIZ. It is unclear whether this involved defence staff.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Although the MOD might be open to receiving such training if it was offered to them by an international donor, there is no evidence that this is being planned.

Response to government reviewer:
There is no information to the public on any training organized by the government on corruption related issues for the military. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no policy to make public the outcomes of prosecution of military personnel and security officers involved in corrupt practices in South Sudan. Despite the widespread of corruption in the country, none of the army generals suspected of corrupt practices have been convicted.

According to media reports, the ruling regime has failed to publish any of the investigation reports commissioned on corrupt army generals, which raises a question on the effectiveness of the mechanisms to combat corruption.

It has also been observed that there are several institutional weaknesses that hamper the fight against corruption in the country. For example the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC) is mandated to provide technical oversight in integrity issues. However, there are reports that it is poorly funded and staffed, particularly following austerity measures in 2013 that cut its budget by almost 40%. As a result, the commission stopped recruiting new staff, freezing it to its existing 126 employees, who are spread across South Sudan’s 10 states (3).

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on any measures in place by the ruling regime to discourage facilitation payment in South Sudan. Corruption is widespread in the public sector, for this reason it appears likely that measures to discourage facilitation payment are absent.

According to media reports the MoFEP, which has a legal mandate to provide technical oversight on financial matters, is embroiled in bribery. For instance it is alleged that in 2014, two officials in the MoFEP took a bribe of 50,000 South Sudanese pounds so as to award a construction contract to a company.

There have been a lot of complaints from foreign investors about difficulties they face to secure licenses from the ruling regime. It is also reported that foreign investors pay a lot of money to individuals in the ruling regime so as to register their businesses and win government contracts in which local contracting companies lack capacity. It is reportedly also a common practice in South Sudan for foreigners to pay bribes in order to avoid problems with authorities (1).

Response to government reviewer:
There does appear to be evidence of facilitation payments taking place, and there is no public record of legislation to control this. I have maintained the score.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on any doctrine of the military for combating corruption in operations in South Sudan. There is also no information to the public regarding mechanisms by the government to address strategic operational corruption issues.

According to media reports, the MoDVA is hugely embroiled in graft and corruption, including the loss of thousands of dollars during the procurement of vehicles for army operations (1). According to the media, hundreds of soldiers have both deserted and defected from the SPLA from their field locations because of delays in salary payment. It is also reported that the current political conflict in the country is exacerbated by corruption (3).

Response to government reviewer:
There does not appear to be a public version of the White Paper, and this question specifically concerns doctrine rather than policy. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on the training of army commanders in corruption issues in South Sudan. However, according to media reports, there is widespread corruption in the MoDVA. Notably, the millions of dollars that disappeared in the procurement of army vehicles (1), and the problems with ghost soldiers that benefit high-level personnel. According to the 2012 audit report, only 7 of 40 army division payrolls were produced by the MoDVA for audit. The expenditure in the MoDVA was more than the budgetary allocation (2 & 3).

There is therefore no known training in corruption issues for commanders, despite evidence that these officers engage in, or turn a blind eye, to corrupt activities.

Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence that training is happening, and have maintained the score.

Researcher4126: There is no evidence available to the public on deploying trained professionals to monitor corruption risk in South Sudan. The MoDVA has also not publicized any willingness to deploy personnel to monitor corruption. According to reports, the MoFEP that provides oversight in financial management to the MoDVA also lacks the required capacity to effectively combat graft . It is also alleged that there is a significant level of corruption in the MoFEP which overshadows its capacity to effectively provide technical oversight to the MoDVA on corruption (3).

Response to government reviewer:
There is no information to the public on government deployment of experts to monitor corruption. There is also no information on and willingness by the government to do so. It is alleged that corruption is the leading cause of the ensued political violence in the country. Many SPLA soldiers have defected to the rebels because of alleged nepotism and sectarianism in the army. I have added source 4 to support this.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on guidelines and staff training on addressing corruption risk in contracting during operations in South Sudan. If the guidelines exist, they are confidential within the military.

The ruling regime has organized insufficient training for army personnel since the signing of the CPA in 2005. It should be noted that the current SPLA is composed of a loose integration of former rebels and militia groups who fought during the liberation war. The SPLA defence White paper 2008 has made significant provision for the capacity building of the military through local training programs, but this has hardly been implemented.

The public is aware that a significant number of personnel in the SPLA have not attended basic military training. Most of these soldiers are former youth vigilantes who were simply mobilized by the various militia leaders to join the liberation struggle. According to media reports and interviewees, the army has poor discipline and most of its members are not well-trained.

Researcher4126: There are several private military contractors run by both foreign and local companies in South Sudan, for example G4S and the Warriors security services.

According to media reports, these companies are largely contracted by UN agencies, foreign diplomatic missions and humanitarian agencies to provide security for their offices and guest houses, among others things. It is also reported that a significant number of SPLA soldiers have been seconded to work with the private security companies.

However, there is little information available to the public on scrutiny of the services of these private military contractors in South Sudan. It is also reported that the PMSCs in south Sudan have a close working relationship with security forces, and often rely on these forces for assistance in volatile situations, which cannot be dealt with by the PMSCs alone. It appears that PMSCs in South Sudan operate with very little government oversight, as there is no specific ministry or independent body tasked with providing oversight to this industry.

It is a common practice in South Sudan to see SPLA soldiers and the police providing security for private banks and construction companies among others. It is alleged that the commanders or supervisors of such security officers receive lots of money from the private contracting authorities.

Researcher4126: There is no law on defence and security procurement in the Republic of South Sudan. The Procurement and Asset Disposal Bill, 2011 has been drafted and discussed by the NLA but not yet enacted.

While there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (3).

Monitoring and information tools are also lacking, as are resources and an adequate level of independence and authority to exercise their functions (2).

Response to government reviewer:
There are major weaknesses in all steps of the procurement process, identified in source 2. These structural weaknesses, plus the ambiguity over who controls defence procurement, preclude a higher score.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on the procurement cycle in the MoDVA in South Sudan. According to media reports, the general procurement process in the MoDVA is regulated by the PIPDR, 2008. However, this regulation has also not been publicized. According to reports, the procurement system is completely non-transparent. Information on procurement operations is unavailable and an independent complaints mechanism is lacking.

While there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (3).

Monitoring and information tools are also lacking, as are resources and an adequate level of independence and authority to exercise their functions (2).

Researcher4126: While there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (3).

Monitoring and information tools are also reportedly lacking, as are resources and an adequate level of independence and authority to exercise their functions (2).

Response to government reviewer:
There are major weaknesses in all steps of the procurement process, identified in source 2. These structural weaknesses, plus the ambiguity over who controls defence procurement, preclude a higher score. There may be confidential information that suggests that this is not the case, but it is impossible to verify this without sources.

Researcher4126: There are media reports on defence procurement in South Sudan, but no official release of information. Media information usually lacks details and there is no official statement to explain the lack of details by the government. According to the 2012 audit report, the MoDVA also lacks an asset register.

As noted by peer reviewer 1, information on defence purchases are not made public, are not released as itemized lists, and are not available for public scrutiny. Many of the weapons in South Sudan are from former Soviet States and Iran, with the majority of arms falling into militants hands coming from arms left behind by South Sudan soldiers. Reportedly, South Sudan has procured $38 million (USD) worth of munitions from China. That said, total figures or information on the type of arms and supplies are unreported.

Researcher4126: There is no information to the public on the procedures and standards required of companies beyond the provisions in the Company Act, 2013 in order to be able to bid for work in the MoDVA in South Sudan. According to media reports, procurement in the MoDVA is mainly done through single sourcing (1).

Response to government reviewer:
There is no information available to the public about any requirement by the government on compliance to integrity by companies who bid for supplies to the MoDVA. It is also alleged that some of the business companies in the country are owned by army generals, including the president. In particular, it is alleged that President Salva Kiir is a major share holder in the ABC construction company that provides most of the technical road construction work in Juba (3). As such, it is most likely that bids are awarded based on political relations, but not company integrity

Researcher4126: There is no national security policy in South Sudan. The national security service bill was passed in October 2014 by the NLA; and it awaits assent by the president. There has been no separate audit of the accounts of the MoDVA. The regulations in the IPPDR which stipulate open competition as the preferred procurement modality, are not complied with; single sourcing is the prevalent modality. In such a situation, procurement in MoDVA is more likely opportunistic.

Response to government reviewer:
There is no information to the public on any other strategy guiding procurement in the country. According to media reports, procurement needs in the MoDVA are determined by army generals (4). More so, the expenditure of the security sector has increased remarkable to more than 40% of the total national budget in 2015. The SPLA has routinely overspent its annual budget and receives additional funds that lie outside the budget plan for the MoDVA. The SPLA also virtually provides no information on its budgetary allocations. It is also reported that interference by army generals ranges from re-allocating ministry funds to disguising military transactions.

Acquisition procedures are ad-hoc and marked by corruption, major cost overruns, inadequate paperwork, and a lack of transparency. In 2014, at least two major Chinese weapons shipments came to light only after an investigative journalist from Bloomberg acquired the bill of lading and other shipping documents that showed $38 million in automatic rifles, grenade launchers, ammunition, grenades, rockets, and anti-tank weapons systems being delivered between May and June 2014 (4). Score maintained.

Researcher4126: Purchases in the MoDVA are not based on clearly identified and quantifiable requirements in South Sudan. While there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (3).

Monitoring and information tools are also lacking, as are resources and an adequate level of independence and authority to exercise their functions (2). There is no information to the public on any other strategy guiding procurement in the country. According to media reports, procurement needs in the MoDVA are determined by army generals (4). More so, the expenditure of the security sector has increased remarkable to more than 40% of the total national budget in 2015. The SPLA has routinely overspent its annual budget and receives additional funds that lie outside the budget plan for the MoDVA. The SPLA also virtually provides no information on its budgetary allocations. It is also reported that interference by army generals ranges from re-allocating ministry funds to disguising military transactions.

Acquisition procedures are ad-hoc and marked by corruption, major cost overruns, inadequate paperwork, and a lack of transparency. In 2014, at least two major Chinese weapons shipments came to light only after an investigative journalist from Bloomberg acquired the bill of lading and other shipping documents that showed $38 million in automatic rifles, grenade launchers, ammunition, grenades, rockets, and anti-tank weapons systems being delivered between May and June 2014 (4).

Researcher4126: According to media reports, the regulations in the IPPDR, which stipulates open competition as the preferred procurement modality, are not complied with; single sourcing is the prevalent modality in the MoDVA in South Sudan (1).

Acquisition procedures are ad-hoc and marked by corruption, major cost overruns, inadequate paperwork, and a lack of transparency. In 2014, at least two major Chinese weapons shipments came to light only after an investigative journalist from Bloomberg acquired shipping documents that showed $38 million in automatic rifles, grenade launchers, ammunition, grenades, rockets, and anti-tank weapons systems being delivered between May and June 2014 (4).

In addition, while there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (3).

Researcher4126: There are both national and local government tender boards in South Sudan. However, there is no information to the public on codes of conduct for tender boards, or whether tender boards operate for defence procurement.

According to media reports, The regulations in the IPPDR, which stipulate open competition as the preferred procurement modality, are not complied with; single sourcing is the prevalent modality (1).

There is no information available to the public as to whether tender boards in the country are subject to audit. The accounts of the government has so far been audited once covering the period 2005-2008. There is no information to the public as to whether the audit included the tender boards. However, it is alleged that the tendering process in the MoDVA and all other government ministries lacks transparency. it is alleged that purchases and contracts are regularly awarded without adequate bidding procedures, to well-connected companies, at inflated prices and with minimal documentation and oversight (3).

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on any legislation that outlaws collusion between bidders in South Sudan. According to media reports, the IPPDR 2008 that regulates procurement has a significant level of weaknesses. The system is completely nontransparent: information on procurement is unavailable and an independent complaints mechanism is lacking.

While there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (3).

Monitoring and information tools are also lacking, as are resources and an adequate level of independence and authority to exercise their functions (2).

Researcher4126: According to media reports, the finance unit in the MoDVA is staffed with uniformed men who lack the required capacity (see 2012 audit report).

While there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (3).

Monitoring and information tools are also lacking, as are resources and an adequate level of independence and authority to exercise their functions (2). It does not appear that the PPU has a department specifically for defence.

Response to peer and government reviewer:
It is alleged that procurement in the MoDVA is influenced by army generals (3). During the 2012 audit, it was also found that an invoice of SSP 1.8 million, or US$630,000, was allocated to purchase water tanks for the Ministry of Finance, but the letter of authorization to settle the invoice stated its purpose was to provide transport services to SPLA units. This demonstrates a significant level of undue influence from the above in the MoDVA, as well as little control or oversight of defence contractors by procurement staff. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: While there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). Monitoring and information tools are also lacking, as are resources and an adequate level of independence and authority to exercise their functions (2).

While the IPPDR provides a complaints handling procedure with time-frames (albeit long time-frames) through the head of the procuring entity and the PPU, in practice no complaints are filed. Trust in the complaints handling mechanism is likely to be very low, as the mechanism has little transparency. There are, however, no recent public reports of companies complaining about being disadvantaged in procurement.

As peer reviewer 2 reports, there were a number of instances in the past where defence contractors had complained about lack of payment, or delayed/partial payment by the MOD /SPLA. In 2013 the MOD became very conscious of the reputation damage this caused and the risks that these contractors would not work with them again. The Minister of Defence was personally engaged in the issue and raised it with the President as one of his top 100 day priorities on assuming office in late 2013.

Researcher4126: There is no information to the public of any sanctions handed out to corrupt suppliers of MoDVA in South Sudan.

Outside of defence, the Public Interim Procurement and Disposal Regulations of Southern Sudan provides for sanctions on corrupt suppliers to the government among which include cancellation of bids, prosecution and dismissal of the company from participating in future tenders. Similar provisions are also provided in the Public Procurement and Disposal Bill, 2011.

However, according to reports, the government has done nothing to punish companies involved in substandard work. For instance, it is alleged that thousands of dollars was paid to the ABC Company linked to President Salvar Kiir for road construction in Juba. It is argued that the amount of money paid to ABC does not amount to the work already done.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on offset contracts in South Sudan. According to reports, the accounts of the MoDVA have not been audited, except for the joint audit of government accounts for the period 2005-2008, which also lacks information on offset budget. The procurement system in the MoDVA is not transparent: information on procurement operations is unavailable.

While there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (3).

Monitoring and information tools are also lacking, as are resources and an adequate level of independence and authority to exercise their functions (2).

It does not seem likely, given the lack of defence procurement legislation and taking into account the weaknesses of the PPU, that the government imposes due diligence or auditing requirements on offset contracts.

Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence to suggest that the government imposes stringent due diligence requirements on contractors during offset contract negotiations, and follows up on offset contract performance with audits. Nor could I establish that specific attention is paid to ensuring integrity as a part of this action. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no information to the public on the details of offset programs in South Sudan. Basic information on general procurement or contracts is also not public. There are media reports on defence procurement in South Sudan, but no official release of information. Media information usually lacks details and there is no official statement to explain the lack of details by the government. According to the 2012 audit report, the MoDVA also lacks an asset register.

As noted by peer reviewer 1, information on defence purchases are not made public, are not released as itemized lists, and are not available for public scrutiny. Many of the weapons in South Sudan are from former Soviet States and Iran, with the majority of arms falling into militants hands coming from arms left behind by South Sudan soldiers. Reportedly, South Sudan has procured $38 million (USD) worth of munitions from China. That said, total figures or information on the type of arms and supplies are unreported.

It is therefore not surprising that details of offset programs are also not released to the public for scrutiny.

Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence to support your statement that details of offset programs, contracts, and performance are made public. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on offset contracts in South Sudan. However, as the levels of competition are reportedly extremely low in all government procurement, particularly defence, it does not seem likely that offset contracts are competitive.

According to media reports, the regulations in the IPPDR, which stipulates open competition as the preferred procurement modality, are not complied with; single sourcing is the prevalent modality in the MoDVA in South Sudan (1).

Acquisition procedures are ad-hoc and marked by corruption, major cost overruns, inadequate paperwork, and a lack of transparency. In 2014, at least two major Chinese weapons shipments came to light only after an investigative journalist from Bloomberg acquired shipping documents that showed $38 million in automatic rifles, grenade launchers, ammunition, grenades, rockets, and anti-tank weapons systems being delivered between May and June 2014 (4).

In addition, while there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (3).

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on the control measures imposed by the government on companies on the use of agents or intermediaries in the procurement cycle.

However, it seems likely that senior government officers act as agents or intermediaries of some companies. For instance, while there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (2). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (3).

As peer reviewer 1 notes, China and Middle Eastern nations are supplying arms and supplies to South Sudan's military. A total amount of $38 million (USD) is reported for arms sold from China to South Sudan. These total figures are seldomly made available to the media, and no clear procurement cycle or specific companies, intermediaries, or vetting processes are made available in these reports.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on the financing package for arms deals in South Sudan. More generally, there is no official release of information on arms deals at all.

As noted by peer reviewer 1, information on defence purchases are not made public, are not released as itemized lists, and are not available for public scrutiny. Many of the weapons in South Sudan are from former Soviet States and Iran, with the majority of arms falling into militants hands coming from arms left behind by South Sudan soldiers. Reportedly, South Sudan has procured $38 million (USD) worth of munitions from China. That said, total figures or information on the type of arms and supplies are unreported.

Researcher4126: There is no information available to the public on the government's stance on corruption for subsidiaries and sub-contractors in the MoDVA in South Sudan. There is a general lack of transparency surrounding the procurement process, and considerable evidence of procurement procedures being bypassed.

While there is a Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) in the MoFEP which is legally mandated to provide procurement oversight to the MoDVA in South Sudan, there is a reported lack of unambiguous legislative and regulatory framework establishing and assigning functions and procedures (1). It is not clear to what extent the PPU has actual control over defence procurement. For instance there are accusations of defence ministers procuring army vehicles through single sourcing against the advice of the MoFEP (4).

There is also no information to suggest that the government informally encourages anti-corruption programs among contractors, but the lack of anti-corruption controls on procurement more generally suggest that this is not in place.

Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence to suggest that the government requires the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes. Score maintained.

Researcher4126: The government of south Sudan has on some occasions justified purchases of arms based on the country's continual stand-off with Sudan over the pending issues in the CPA and other security concerns (1).

However, according to media reports, the recent arms deal between the government of South Sudan and the Ugandan and Chinese governments all significantly politically motivated (2, 3). According to available reports, because of the political and economic interests of both Uganda and China in South Sudan, both countries have exhibited double standards (supplying arms and supporting the peace process) in the on-going IGAD peace initiated process in Addis-Ababa in Ethiopia (4).

Response to peer reviewer 2:
According to media reports, military acquisition or procurement is still driven by the SPLA’s recent history as a guerilla army and the continuing political violence in the country. Acquisition procedures are ad-hoc and marked by corruption, major cost overruns, inadequate paperwork, and a lack of transparency. It is reported that in 2014, at least two major Chinese weapons shipments came to light only after an investigative journalist from Bloomberg acquired shipping documents that showed $38 million in automatic rifles, grenade launchers, ammunition, grenades, rockets, and anti-tank weapons systems being delivered. More so, China has also been accused of interference in the on-going war. The bulk of evidence suggests that purchases are driven by political influence by seller nations. Score maintained.