Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is limited to no publicly accessible information on the way assets are handled (for ex., the media report from 2013 relates very high-level info on the claimed 2014 budget but nothing else).

The way the public powers including the army as well as the family of Gabon's President actually acquire land is better documented. The process is referred to as &quoute;déguerpissement&quoute; in French (I was not able to identify English-language literature on this topic) and describes the process of forcibly expropriating entire families, districts and even villages. The research piece linked to above explores the way such practice restructures the public space in Gabon's capital city of Libreville; the Gabon Review news report tells how President Bongo's mother has personally threatened and given ultimatums to families in a Libreville district; she is always accompanied by army personnel when doing so.

Lastly, I have not been able to identify speculations re: asset management, in the media. Most possibly, the topic is not discussed at all.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is no mention of supervision or oversight of any sort on the Defence Ministry and the Parliament's websites. The Parliament has a Commission, entitled &quoute;Commissions des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération Internationale et de la Défense Nationale&quoute; (Commission for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and National Defence&quoute;) but no information on its deeds is available.

The State Audit Institution (Cour des Comptes), which is a sub-entity related to the Supreme Court, does not publish or make available in any way any examination of asset disposals.

As mentioned in the previous indicator, media reports speculating or addressing this topic were not identified. It is likely they do not discuss assets at all.

PEER REVIEWERS - If possible, please provide information regarding existing oversight controls over asset disposals and whether the results of these are published? Information from civil society organisations or NGOs would be incredibly useful here.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: This percentage is not available to the public. Media sources in Gabon rarely discuss defence budget matters (and when they do, they strictly stick to numbers provided from the government). In such cases (such as the media report linked to above), the information on the claimed 2014 budget remains very high-level but there is no opinion or speculation beyond what was provided by the authorities. No report was found which even mentioned spending on secret items.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The Parliament has a Commission, entitled &quoute;Commissions des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération Internationale et de la Défense Nationale&quoute; (Commission for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and National Defence&quoute;) but there is no available information regarding their work.

The legislature does not seem to be provided with any information whatsoever on spending on defence/security, let alone secret items. No alternative reports (from media or civil society) were found which even mentioned secret items spending.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is no mention of supervision or oversight of any sort on the Defence Ministry and the Parliament's websites. The Parliament does have a Commission,entitled &quoute;Commissions des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération Internationale et de la Défense Nationale&quoute; (Commission for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and National Defence&quoute;) but it does not make records of its work publicly available .

The State Audit Institution (Cour des Comptes) is a subentity related to the Supreme Court and tasked with governmental oversight; however none of its reports mention &quoute;defence&quoute; or defence-related expenditure. Offset spending is not published or communicated in any way.

The legislature does not seem to be provided with any information whatsoever on audit reports on defence/security spending, let alone secret items. I was not able to identify any evidence that such audit reports exist at all.

Reviewers: Could you comment and provide further sources where possible on:Are legislators provided with audit reports related to the security sector and other secret programs?
If so:
What is the level of detail of these reports? Is there evidence that there are omissions?
Is there evidence that these reports are subject to parliamentary consideration and debate? If so, is such debate comprehensive or limited?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: I was not able to identify any legal provision authorising or prohibiting off-budget expenditure. Yet it is actually performed as illustrated by SIPRI research: all the military expenditure figures for Gabon they have (which are also used by the World Bank) &quoute;exclude off budget spending financed by the Provisions pour Investissements Hydrocarbures (PIH), an investment fund based on tax revenues from foreign oil companies active in Gabon. The figures for 2007 are highly uncertain.&quoute; The role of the PIH here is extremely murky; SIPRI's mention is the only one I identified where PIH and off-budget military expenditure are linked.

The media reports above only speak about amendments to the energy sector. It is therefore unclear how exactly PIH relates to off-budget military expenditure. Overall, off-budget military expenditures are not reported on.

Reviewers: Could you comment and provide further sources where possible on:
Is off-budget military expenditure legally permitted?
If so:
Are they permitted in exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled? For example, military involvement in natural disaster relief efforts.
Are any of the expenditures permitted classified as state secrets? If so, is this classification done through adequate and well-established legal processes?
Are off-budget expenditures recorded in the respective budgets? Please comment on the detail of such recording.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Off-budget military expenditure seems to exist as illustrated by SIPRI research: all the military expenditure figures for Gabon they have (which are also used by the World Bank) &quoute;exclude off budget spending financed by the Provisions pour Investissements Hydrocarbures (PIH), an investment fund based on tax revenues from foreign oil companies active in Gabon. The figures for 2007 are highly uncertain.&quoute;

The role of the PIH here is extremely murky; SIPRI's mention is the only one I identified where PIH and off-budget military expenditure are linked. The media reports above only speak about amendments to the energy sector. It is therefore unclear how exactly PIH relates to off-budget military expenditure.

Reviewers: Could you comment and provide further sources where possible on:
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures?
If so, what is the evidence relating to the extent of this phenomenon? Are they widely practiced or few or is their extent unclear?
Is there evidence that such expenditures only involve licit economic activity or is there any evidence that suggests this involves illicit economic activity?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No legal provisions were identified. Gabon does not have an access to information law. Yet, a recently signed defence treaty between France and Gabon specifies (Art. 17) that classified information will be exchanged between them. This therefore suggests that classified information exists in Gabon, but it is not available easily to the Gabonese people.

Given how strongly the President and his close circle control the defence and security sector, I have assumed that information is classified at their discretion.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The political establishment and the Bongo family are known for their pervasiveness in business and close ties to French state elites and businesses.

There does not seem to be a law that prohibits military personnel participation in enterprises. As corruption and personal enrichment are known to be common practice among the Bongo family and their close collaborators, the idea of their profiting from such defence-related lucrative activities seems straightforward.

For example, the media report linked to above briefly outlines the activities of two of the closest advisers to the current Gabonese President -- who were also serving his father and are in parallel involved in a wide range of business activities.

The Gabon Review piece linked to above elaborates on new members of the govt appointed in Jan 2014. The focus is on the Ministers of Defence and Interior as well as on the Deputy Minister of Interior. The Defence Minister is Ali Bongo's cousin and has been his personal advisors twice before Ali Bongo became president. The Interior Minister is also a very close collaborator to the President Bongo, and the Deputy Interior Minister is known as a favourite business partner to Bongo.

The Libé piece is again on the same big investigation on real estate properties of the Bongo family in France. The purchases are reported to have been a way to launder corrupt gains.

Overall, these businesses are not publicly declared and are wholly non-transparent.

Reviewers: Could you comment and provide further sources where possible on:
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses?
If so:
What is the extent of this ownership? Is the ownership equivalent to 1 % of the defence budget or less?
Are these businesses publicly declared?
Are details of their operations and finances transparent, fully disclosed and with standards of governance equivalent to publicly owned commercial enterprises?
If there is no available information, is there evidence or is it known that national defence and security institutions have ownership of commercial businesses?
Are defence and security institutions removed such ownership in legislation

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The political establishment and the Bongo family are known for their pervasiveness in business and close ties to French state elites and businesses. There does not seem to be a law that prohibits military personnel participation in enterprises. As corruption and personal enrichment are known to be traditional business of the Bongo family and their close collaborators, thus them profiting from such defence-related lucrative activities seems straightforward. (See sources provided above and explanations in question #30).

The Bongo family is thus known for having business interests which profit from the country. Only one of these reports quote defence-related purchases: an AFP newsbrief republished on Gabon Libre website, elaborates on a document published by the US Senate on 5 Feb 2010 which indicates that the former President, Omar Bongo, and his son, Ali, then Minister of Defence, have spent 18 millions USD on a lobbyist, Jeffrey Birrell. The aim was to purchase six armoured vehicles and six military planes C-130. The backstory is unclear but this seems to be one of the rare mentions of defence-related activities of the Bongo establishment.

Overall, positions within the highest levels of the ruling establishment in Gabon seem quite flexible; it is thus unclear who owns defence/military related business as businesses are not publicly declared and are wholly non-transparent. No evidence was identified that any scrutiny over such businesses exists; even the investigation led by France (into properties acquired with corruption money on French territory) seems to have stalled and has never been explicitly linked to corruption anyway.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The political establishment and the Bongo family are known for their being heavily involved in both the military and commercial enterprises, and have close ties to French state elites and businesses. There does not seem to be a law that explicitly prohibits military personnel from participation in enterprise. As the Bongo family and their close collaborators are under investigation for corruption and personal enrichment, there is a risk that the political elite may also profit from defence-related corruption (See sources provided above and explanations in questions #30-31).

The Libé piece is again on the same big investigation on real estate properties of the Bongo family in France. The purchases are reported to been acquired with corruption money (the purchases have reportedly mainly been performed under Ali's father rule, Omar).

Overall, positions within the highest levels of the ruling establishment in Gabon seem quite flexible; it is thus unclear who owns defence/military related business as businesses and individual business activities by the Bongo family and close circle are not publicly declared and are wholly non-transparent, with no evidence suggesting that these are subject to oversight. No mention whatsoever has been identified regarding sanctions by the government, which, given the deep involvement of high-level politicians in such illicit activities, seems highly unlikely.

Reviewers: Could you comment and provide further sources where possible on:
Is private enterprise legally permitted? If so, it is well regulated and controlled? Is there evidence that the government itself may profit from it?
If there is no legislation or policy in relation to this, is there any indication that the government at least publicly discourages it? Is there evidence that the government itself may profit from it?
If it is legally disallowed, are there sanctions in place to deal with offenders? Are the penalties strong or weak? Is there evidence that these sanctions are consistently enforced

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The President has committed to such measures, especially after the publication of a UNDP-supported anti-corruption initiative several months ago. Yet, the initiative makes no mention of defence/security activities as possible targets for the anti-corruption measures; there is little to no evidence that defence officials even speak to the media about their work. There is no evidence that any such commitments are made by senior ministry of defence or armed forces staff either.

The Gabon Review piece from 29 Jan 2014 (linked to above) elaborates on new members of the government appointed in Jan 2014. The focus is on the Ministers of Defence and Interior as well as on the Deputy Minister of Interior. The Defence Minister is Ali Bongo's cousin and served as his personal advisor twice before Ali Bongo became President. The Interior Minister is also a very close collaborator to the President, while the Deputy Interior Minister is also one of his favourite business partners.

These personalities have not been identified as publicly engaging in the fight against corruption (see for ex. the Gabon Review report from 16 Apr 2014 full of quotes by the Defence Minister). Quite the contrary: given the close ties between the political establishment and the parallel, non-transparent business activities they are involved while holding office, commitment by senior political figures seems unlikely.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Gabon has, with input from the UNDP, composed a national strategy for the fight against corruption (full text linked to in the &quoute;Sources&quoute; section). However, it does not contain any provisions that specifically target the defence sector, and no such measures were identified for the examination period.

In its 2013 edition of the Gabon Human Rights report, the US State Dept notes: &quoute;Some police were inefficient and corrupt. Security force members sought bribes to supplement their salaries, often while stopping vehicles at legal roadblocks to check vehicle registration and identity papers. In 2011 the Minister of the Interior implemented an internal sanctions system meant to combat such extortion. Police officers were required to wear a badge with an identity number to aid citizens seeking to report extortion attempts. Those measures reportedly reduced the frequency and severity of petty corruption among police.&quoute;

This suggests thus that some sort of retaliation happens internally against corrupt policemen. Yet as outlined by the media report above, &quoute;the police, the judiciary and the army are the main sources of insecurity for the Gabonese.&quoute; The piece discusses grave violations by these, including corruption but reaching far beyond (theft, assault, extortion). This media report is more recent than the Gabon Human Rights report and points towards a situation where, despite declared decrease of corruption-related actions by security personnel, these still occur to an extent that damages the country.

Reviewers: Could you comment and provide further sources where possible on:
Are there formal disciplinary sanctions in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption? Do they include dismissal and prosecution? If not, are there informal measures in place?
Is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Is there evidence these measures are applied consistently/effectively?
Is there any evidence that action has not been taken against personnel despite evidence of bribery and corruption?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: According to the Gabon Human Rights report by the US Dept of State for 2013: &quoute;The law provides whistleblower protection to some categories of public employees, such as magistrates, parliamentarians, and diplomats. There are restrictions on taking legal action against and dismissal of persons in these positions for criticizing the government or revealing government fraud or waste. The government reportedly did not implement the law effectively to protect whistleblowers from retaliation.&quoute; (see the press release by Survie linked above).

In addition, a website, AfriLeaks, has been launched offering protection to those from African countries (incl. Gabon) who would be willing to release corruption-related documents but fear retaliation if they did. No whistleblower protection legislation exists in Gabon that covers the defence and security sector.

According to the Guardian article, &quoute;Minsta, who in 2010 won Transparency International's Integrity award, says he lost his job as a civil servant when he began campaigning against corruption in Gabon.&quoute;




Reviewers: In Q35 the CA states, &quoute; In its 2013 edition of the Gabon Human Rights report, the US State Dept notes: &quoute;Some police were inefficient and corrupt. Security force members sought bribes to supplement their salaries, often while stopping vehicles at legal roadblocks to check vehicle registration and identity papers. In 2011 the Minister of the Interior implemented an internal sanctions system meant to combat such extortion. Police officers were required to wear a badge with an identity number to aid citizens seeking to report extortion attempts. Those measures reportedly reduced the frequency and severity of petty corruption among police.&quoute;
-Is this relevant to this question, were they reported via a whistleblower mechanism? are you able to provide a source for the law the CA refers to?


Reviewers: Could you comment and provide further sources where possible on:
Is there legislation relating to whistleblowing which is applicable to military and official personnel? Does this include protection for whistleblowers?
Is there evidence that institutionalised mechanisms are in place to facilitate reporting of corruption by personnel?
In practice, are the legislation and mechanisms implemented? What is the evidence in relation to their effectiveness?
Is there any other evidence to suggest whistleblowing is encouraged or taken seriously by the government?
Is there evidence to suggest there is little trust amongst officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is no evidence that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions. The case of 3,000 beneficiaries holding no official state jobs in Gabon in September 2013 highlights weaknesses in this topic. Furthermore, no publicly available information was identified regarding procedures applicable to the nomination of intelligence personnel.

Regarding officials in the defence and security sector, the Gabon Review piece referenced above elaborates on new members of the government appointed in January 2014. The focus is on the Ministers of Defence and Interior as well as on the Deputy Minister of Interior, all of whom were very close to Ali Bongo through family ties, previous collaborations and business partnerships respectively before being appointed to office - clear signs that they were hand-picked for their roles due to their previous personal relationships to the President.

Finally, Interviewee 1 confirmed that positions are given to people who have &quoute;privileged relationships with the President and his friends in power&quoute;.

Reviewers: Could you comment and provide further sources where possible on:

Is there evidence that there is recognition by the government that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others? Are such positions openly declared? This can include officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management
Are there rules of conduct associated with such positions? Do they relate to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel? Are they made public?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There are no official sources on the number of civilian and military personnel. Information is available either on defenceWeb or on Wikipedia, but no source is indicated in these factsheets and the numbers they introduce are not always consistent with one another. No information is given on the Ministry of Defence website.

Figures from defenceWeb are below:
-Army: 3 100
-Army Light Aviation: 250
-Air Force: 600
-Navy: 500
-Paramilitary: 2 000

Figures from Wikipedia: &quoute;about 5,000 personnel, divided into army, navy, air force, gendarmerie, and national police&quoute;. No paramilitary is mentioned here. Additionally, no breakdown of forces is provided, making cross-comparison checks impossible.

Lastly, the CIA Factbook entry for Gabon does not provide any detail whatsoever on the country's military (or civilian) personnel.

Reviewers: Could you comment :

Is the investigation -&quoute;Gabon has 3,000 fake civil servants receiving salaries, say prosecutors&quoute;, The Guardian, 6 Sept 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/06/gabon-fake-civil-servants-receiving-salaries - relevant to mention and consider for the score here?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Gabon's army is a professional one, and yet there are no official sources on pay-rates and allowances. No information is given on the Ministry of Defence website, and no media reports were identified discussing related numbers either.

Reviewers - Is the investigation -&quoute;Gabon has 3,000 fake civil servants receiving salaries, say prosecutors&quoute;, The Guardian, 6 Sept 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/06/gabon-fake-civil-servants-receiving-salaries - relevant to mention and consider for the score here?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is no publicly available information that discusses systems of payment and how well they operate. However, there is evidence which suggests that it is not hugely reliable - the recent scandal regarding 3,000 ghost civil servants (see cited article) is indicative that &quoute;ghost employees&quoute; may also occur in the defence sector. The score of 1 is based on a lack of transparency surrounding payments, and the likelihood that there are weaknesses within this system.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is no public evidence that such system exists, and it seems unlikely that this is the case.. As outlined by the media report above, &quoute;the police, the judiciary and the army are the main sources of insecurity for the Gabonese.&quoute; The piece discusses grave violations by these, including corruption but reaching far beyond (theft, assault, extortion).

As reported by media (see Gabon Review piece from 29 Jan 2014), the President personally selects high-ranking figures. President Ali Bongo seems to not have changed the proceedings from his father's time presidency, as outlined in the Jeune Afrique piece. It appears that nominations are done by the President and/or his close circle with no hint of a standardised procedure. Also, as discussed before, nominations in the government are quite arbitrary, too: for example, until September 15, the Minister of Education was Léon Nzouba, a medic and a military (see media source 4); he was sacked by the President but the media reports do not cite any reason for the sacking.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No evidence was found which identified systems of promotion boards, independent oversight or formal appraisal processes involved with promotion. BAsed on current evidence it seems unlikely that such systems do exist.

As reported by media (see Gabon Review piece from 29 Jan 2014), the President personally selects high-ranking figures, and has hand-picked ministers who had previously held close personal relationships with him. President Ali Bongo seems to not have changed the proceedings from his father's time presidency, as outlined in the Jeune Afrique piece. It appears that nominations are done by the President and/or his close circle, far from a meritocratic or objective process.

Nominations in the government are quite arbitrary, too: for example, until September 15, the Minister of Education was Léon Nzouba, a medic and a military (see media source 4); he was sacked by the President but the media reports do not cite any reason for the sacking.


Reviewers: Could you comment and provide further sources where possible on:
Is there evidence of formal appraisal processes for personnel promotions? Are these publicly declared? Please comment on their strength.
Is there evidence of promotions boards for personnel promotions? Are they publicly declared? Are they outside of the command chain?
Is there evidence of independent oversight of such processes?
Is there potential for inappropriate conduct in the promotions process? Is there evidence to suggest this occurs?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Gabon does not practice military conscription, hence the score here is 'not applicable'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Gabon has neither compulsory nor voluntary conscription; hence this question is listed as 'N/A'.

In general, efforts are made by the government to bolster military enrolment as a means to fight youth criminality. No evidence was identified any rules exist regarding the fight against bribery in the military. The Aeries Guard piece cited above is extremely sympathetic to the Génie militaire, a branch of the Gabonese defence forces, making it impossible to define internal rules from such testimonials.

Given the pervasiveness of corruption in the country though, one might assume that bribery is widely practised. The recently introduced &quoute;Code of Honour&quoute; for defence and security services mentions faithfulness to the nation and such likes along with &quoute;you should not engage in drug dealing&quoute; but no mention seems to exist regarding bribery.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is no available information on how the military is ruled. No publicly available information was identified regarding payroll either, suggesting a lack of enforced accountability in payment systems. The recent scandal regarding 3,000 ghost civil servants (see The Guardian's piece) is however indicative that &quoute;ghost employees&quoute; may also occur in the defence sector, perhaps more within its civilian branch (the military is a professional one, which may suppose that 'ghost soldiers' would quickly be spotted).

Reviewers:

According to the article, &quoute;Gabon is known for its bloated civil service – with 70,000 members in the tiny country of just 1.5 million people. &quoute;About 10 years ago there were 33,000 civil servants,&quoute; said Gregory Mintsa, a former civil servant who works with global anti-corruption coalition Transparency International. &quoute;How it's possible to go from that number to 70,000 in such a short period of time, I don't know.&quoute;

The piece also details that, &quoute;the government says it is taking measures to reform the sector. In 2009, Gabon launched an overhaul of the civil service, firing 800 employees. Last year, President Ali Bongo Ondimba used a trip to London to announce new performance contracts for civil servants, in a further effort to trim the sector.
Gabon estimates there are up to 10,000 fraudulent state employees remaining on the books, costing the nation about $50m every year.&quoute;

While it doesn't specifically mention defence could you comment on how likely it is that these problems also occur in the MoD, and any further evidence on:

Is there evidence of ‘ghost soldiers’, or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
If so:
Have there been cases of ghost soldiers reported in the past five years?
Is there evidence that steps are being taken to reform payment systems to prevent this phenomenon?
I
Please comment on the strength and transparency of payment systems and associated oversight. On the basis of this, is it likely that the phenomenon could occur or does occur?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: This indicator is difficult to grade as publicly accessible information regarding payroll, chains of payment and command were not found.The Gabonese military is also said to be a professional one which implies such separation. Yet the lack of transparency around its functions makes it plausible that the two chains are not supported. At present, we cannot say with certainty what the situation is.


PEER REVIEWERS - Is there any evidence to suggest that procurement can often be opportunistic? More sources for this question would be very helpful.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is no evidence of any Code of Conduct for Defence Ministry personnel which covers conduct with specific respect to corruption, and it is very unlikely that there is one. Corruption is not adequately recognised nor addressed within defence establishments. If there is a Code of Conduct for Defence Personnel, information with respect to its content, transparency, application, and distribution is not made available. The recently introduced &quoute;Code of Honour&quoute; for defence and security services mentions faithfulness to the nation and suchlikes along with &quoute;you should not engage in drug dealing&quoute; but no mention seems to exist regarding bribery. (I was not able to locate the Code of Honour fulltext online)

According to the Gabon Human Rights report by the US Dept of State for 2013: &quoute;Some police were inefficient and corrupt. Security force members sought bribes to supplement their salaries, often while stopping vehicles at legal roadblocks to check vehicle registration and identity papers. In 2011 the minister of interior implemented an internal sanctions system meant to combat such extortion. Police officers were required to wear a badge with an identity number to aid citizens seeking to report extortion attempts. Those measures reportedly reduced the frequency and severity of petty corruption among police.&quoute;

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is no evidence of any Code of Conduct for Defence Ministry personnel which covers conduct with specific respect to corruption, and it is very unlikely that there is one. Corruption is not adequately recognised nor addressed within defence establishments. If there is a Code of Conduct for Defence Personnel, information such as its content, transparency, application, and distribution is not made available.

The recently introduced &quoute;Code of Honour&quoute; for defence and security services mentions faithfulness to the nation and suchlikes along with &quoute;you should not engage in drug dealing&quoute; but no mention seems to exist regarding bribery. Although the Code of Honour has been introduced nearly a year ago, there is no evidence it has been applied. (I was not able to locate the Code of Honour fulltext online)

According to the Gabon Human Rights report by the US Dept of State for 2013: &quoute;Some police were inefficient and corrupt. Security force members sought bribes to supplement their salaries, often while stopping vehicles at legal roadblocks to check vehicle registration and identity papers. In 2011 the minister of interior implemented an internal sanctions system meant to combat such extortion. Police officers were required to wear a badge with an identity number to aid citizens seeking to report extortion attempts. Those measures reportedly reduced the frequency and severity of petty corruption among police.

On February 16, the chief of police had six police officers arrested for abusing civilians and corruption. On June 19, the chief of police dismissed 11 officers for illicit acts of violence and drug use.&quoute;

Outside the widely reported on case of prosecution of six police employees (in 2012), no recent reports have been identified that publicly report on prosecution of defence and security personnel on the basis of corruption.

Thus, the Code of Conduct seems to exist within police forces but not in the military.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Specific anti-corruption training does not seem to be provided to military, security or civilian personnel.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is no evidence of prosecution for Defence Ministry personnel focused on charges of corruption. Corruption is not adequately recognised nor addressed within defence establishments - even the recently introduced &quoute;Code of Honour&quoute; for defence and security services mentions faithfulness to the nation, and an anti-drug policy, but does not touch upon the issue of widespread bribery. (I was not able to locate the text of the Code of Honour online)

Outside the widely reported on case of prosecution of six police employees (in 2012), no other reports were found dealing with the prosecution of defence and security personnel on the basis of corruption.

According to the Gabon Human Rights report by the US Dept of State for 2013: &quoute;Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judiciary was inefficient and remained susceptible to government influence. The president appoints and may dismiss judges through the Ministry of Justice, to which the judiciary was accountable. Corruption was a problem.&quoute; This indicates that defence personnel may enjoy impunity.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Facilitation payments do not seem to be discouraged or prohibited. Indeed, the National strategy discusses the limited definition of the current Penal Code provisions on corruption (pp. 11-12 of the Strategy) but there is no publicly available information suggesting that these precise legal frameworks have been amended to include the criminalisation of facilitation payments.

Given the pervasiveness of corruption in Gabon (exemplified in the referenced news articles which discuss the growth of corruption in the country), such payments appear to be common practice.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No military doctrine was identified. Furthermore, there is no indication that corruption is addressed as a strategic issue on operations.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No evidence for such training was identified. Corruption in its different flavours plagues all domains of the public sector (see Gabon Review piece).

According to the Gabon Human Rights report by the US Dept of State for 2013: &quoute;Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judiciary was inefficient and remained susceptible to government influence. The president appoints and may dismiss judges through the Ministry of Justice, to which the judiciary was accountable. Corruption was a problem.&quoute; This indicates that defence personnel may enjoy impunity.

Lastly, as mentioned in previous indicators, no publicly available reports were identified to indicate that corruption is actually acknowledged and addressed in the defence and security sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No evidence was identified that such professionals operate in Gabon, or are deployed alongside military personnel.

The only report mentioning the deployment of security/defence personnel to handle corruption is the one cited, which references an audit showcasing grave misuse of public funds by public sector servants. In this case, President Bongo has asked the gendarmerie to investigate the findings of the audit. Yet, there is no mention of the fact that this investigation includes monitoring corruption risk, nor any details on how the gendarmerie were trained to lead such an investigation. The article itself mentions that, for the gendarmerie to be leading the investigation, the chances are big that President Bongo himself has ordered it. This anecdotal report does not however affect the score to the current indicator as it does not relate to monitoring corruption in the field.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No such operational guidelines were identified. The closest is the recently introduced &quoute;Code of Honour&quoute; for defence and security services, which mentions values such as faithfulness to the nation and promotes abstinence from drugs nevertheless does not mention the problems of bribery. (The code of honour is not available in its full form online).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The interviewee confirmed that PMCs are indeed widely employed and he was not aware of any examination of his company's deeds.There were no easily accessible sources which could independently verify these assertions.

PEER REVIEWERS: Could you please comment on how widespread corruption amongst these PMCs is likely to be, and specify how they have been taken up by the relevant authorities? If possible, add relevant sources to the reference section. Many thanks!

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The provisions outlined in the Code for Public Procurement are never identified as applicable to defence procurement; similarly, the Code does not specify any requirement for defence/security companies.

According to the GlObserver piece, a Public Procurement Authority &quoute;is expected to assist the government in setting policy and regulations on public procurement, develop sector training mechanisms, implement independent technical audit procedures, penalise firms that fail to comply with regulation and ensure out-of-court settlement of any disputes arising from public contracts.&quoute;

The agency's website being inaccessible, no evidence regarding rules on defence procurement was identified. Similarly, no evidence regarding exemptions was found. Lastly, no evidence of the activity of the Public Procurement Authority was identified at all, and it is never mentioned in relation to defence procurement anyway.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The Code for Public Procurement does not contain provisions applicable to defence procurement, and it remains unclear whose position that is. The lack of transparency and overall mention of defence contracting by media and various institution communication instances signals a wholly non-transparent defence procurement cycle which may have not been formalised.

The Public Procurement Regulatory Agency's website being inaccessible, no evidence regarding defence procurement was identified. In addition, no reports on procurement cycle were found neither, whether through media, government or through institutions. No evidence was identified of activities by the Public Procurement Authority either.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: There is no mention of supervision or oversight of any sort. No information on the official institutions' deeds is available. A State Audit Institution (Cour des Comptes) exists, and is a sub-entity related to the Supreme Court. Yet in none of its attributions one sees a mention of &quoute;defence&quoute; or defence-related expenditure.

According to the the GlObserver piece, the Public Procurement Authority &quoute;is expected to assist the government in setting policy and regulations on public procurement, develop sector training mechanisms, implement independent technical audit procedures, penalise firms that fail to comply with regulation and ensure out-of-court settlement of any disputes arising from public contracts.&quoute;

The agency's website is inaccessible and no publicly accessible report on it was located. Thus, no evidence regarding oversight of defence procurement by Ministerial/Parlementarian/Procurement Authority entities was identified.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Purchases are not made public and the amount paid for them is kept undisclosed. No acquisition planning details were identified neither. As per SIPRI data, Gabon does not seem to be a huge arms consumer, but France features as one of the most prominent sellers.

According to the SIPRI's data, since 2012, only two purchases were performed, one from France and one from South Africa. No evidence was identified about a bidding process, and close links with France suggest the procurement is mostly single-sourced as defence agreements between France and Gabon instaure military &quoute;technical and operational cooperation&quoute; as per the agreement. It is quite difficult to cross-check these numbers with summary statistics released by French Ministry of Defence. In addition, no publicly available information was identified in Gabon corresponding to these purchases.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: According to the the GlObserver piece, the Public Procurement Authority &quoute;is expected to assist the government in setting policy and regulations on public procurement, develop sector training mechanisms, implement independent technical audit procedures, penalise firms that fail to comply with regulation and ensure out-of-court settlement of any disputes arising from public contracts.&quoute; The agency's website is inaccessible.

The Code for Public Procurement contains no mention regarding defence/security procurement although other tenders are subject to regulations codified in the Code. The latter has provisions regarding candidates (Chapter 3, Section 1 in general, art. 11 more particularly). Art. 11 indicates that candidates who have been subjects to penal prosecution cannot bid; yet the conflict of interest related restriction is solely on the person responsible for the procurement from the emitting public administration.

No evidence regarding rules on defence procurement in general and requirements for companies in particular was identified. I was unfortunately not able to reach out to people agreeing to be interviewed on this topic.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Gabon does not seem to have a military doctrine. Nor does it seem to adopt a dedicated &quoute;military programme&quoute; law (France traditionally does so, given the historic close ties between the two countries, one might be interested to search for such a law).

Coherently, no procurement requirements were identified at all that could originate from defence strategy.

PEER REVIEWERS - Is there any evidence to suggest that procurement can often be opportunistic? More sources for this question would be very helpful.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No acquisition planning was identified. No procurement requirements were identified at all that could originate from defence strategy or related clear guidelines.

As mentioned in other indicators, close and long-standing links with France suggest defence procurement is opportunistic in nature. Indeed, as outlined by official documents from French Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, France and Gabon maintain advantageous military cooperation agreements. The latter pose that France provides &quoute;technical and operational military assistance&quoute; to Gabon. Given the frequent common training and intervention events between the French military stationed in Gabon and the Gabonese army, one might imagine defence purchases are essentially motivated by the needs stemming from this sort of activities.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: According to the SIPRI's data, since 2012, only two purchases were performed, one from France and one from South Africa. Close links with France suggest the procurement is mostly single-sourced. Historically, links between Gabon and France are extremely strong (the unfamous Françafrique system) and they continue to be pervasive even today. Indeed, defence agreements between France and Gabon instaure military &quoute;technical and operational cooperation&quoute; (as per the agreement).

Purchases are not made public and the amount paid for them is kept undisclosed. No acquisition planning details were identified neither. No evidence was identified about a bidding process in any of the aforementioned cases (according to data by SIPRI).

The Gabonese Code for Public Procurement contains no mention regarding defence/security procurement. The Code was updated in 2012, but the media reports mention nothing on defence procurement.

It is quite difficult to cross-check these numbers with summary statistics released by French Ministry of Defence. In any event, no publicly available information was identified in Gabon corresponding to these purchases. It is thus impossible to defend the view that an open competition system operates in the country.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Only three tender boards were identified, all originating from the &quoute;Gabon émergent&quoute; project launched by the President shortly after his investiture. These boards are: Gabon Industriel, Gabon Vert and Gabon des services. (N.B. The website hosting these boards seems to be down in February 2015)

When surveyed in September 2014, none of these boards contained tenders, neither open nor closed, nor completed. No information was identified on these tender boards regarding regulations and codes of conduct nor related to independent audit. By February 2015, these boards are not accessible anymore. Even if these boards are still functional, the chances are slim they would contain defence-related tenders; indeed, the project &quoute;Gabon émergent&quoute; focuses on the economic development of the country, and its description contains no mention of defence or security.

The Code for Public Procurement contains no mention regarding defence/security procurement although other tender boards are subject to regulations codified in the Code. The latter has provisions regarding open tendering (Subsection #1 in general, art. 21 more particularly). No actual evidence has been identified regarding the application of these legal provisions.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The Public Procurement Authority &quoute;is expected to [...] penalise firms that fail to comply with regulation and ensure out-of-court settlement of any disputes arising from public contracts&quoute; (GlObserver ). The agency's website is however inaccessible.

The Code for Public Procurement contains no mention regarding defence/security procurement although other tenders are subject to regulations codified in the Code. The latter has provisions regarding candidates (Chapter 3, Section 1 in general, art. 11 more particularly). Art. 11 indicates that candidates who have been subjects to penal prosecution cannot bid; yet the conflict of interest related restriction is solely on the person responsible for the procurement from the emitting public administration.

No evidence regarding rules on defence procurement in general and requirements for companies participating to defence procurement in particular was identified. Similarly, no mention outlawing collusion was identified. Conversely, the Code for Public Procurement contains a rule authorising the buyer to restrain the tender process to pre-defined bidders (Chapter 3, Section 2, art. 39-41). Lastly, Chapter 3, Section 5, art. 43-44 explicitly authorises the buyer to designate the provider in some cases.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No evidence was identified regarding such training. The recently uncovered &quoute;ghost civil servants&quoute; suggest that even basic oversight and training on the public sector human resources suffers shortcomings.

No evidence regarding rules on defence procurement were identified either. Similarly, no publicly available information regarding defence tenders (open, completed, closed) were found. Whatever the actual format of the purchase process, I was not able to identify public servants responsible for this. As outlined in previous indicators, it is likely that defence procurement is handled by the highest level government officials. With this respect, a staff department is unlikely to exist. All in all, there is no oversight of who performs the defence contracting and how this exactly materialises.

Such lack of transparency along with Gabon's notoriously corrupt political establishment point in the direction of secret contracting performed without specific rules and dedicated staff.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: According to the the GlObserver piece, the Public Procurement Authority &quoute;is expected to assist the government in setting policy and regulations on public procurement, develop sector training mechanisms, implement independent technical audit procedures, penalise firms that fail to comply with regulation and ensure out-of-court settlement of any disputes arising from public contracts.&quoute; The agency's website is inaccessible.

The Code for Public Procurement contains no mention regarding defence/security procurement although other tenders are subject to regulations codified in the Code. The latter has provisions regarding complaints (art. 114-119 more particularly). Complaints may be addressed through the hierarchy of the respective public administration and/or before the dedicated Conflict Council. No other evidence exists regarding this Council.

No evidence regarding rules on defence procurement in general and requirements for companies in particular was identified. I was not able to establish whether the complaint mechanism is used and, if so, whether this has any impact on companies filing such complaints. Overall, no evidence of the activity of the Public Procurement Authority was identified at all.

Reviewers: Could you comment and provide further sources where possible on:
Are there formal mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement?
Are companies protected formally from discrimination when they use these mechanisms for genuine (non-malicious) complaints? Is there evidence of companies that have attempted to complain being unfairly disadvantaged or debarred from future procurements or is it likely that they will be?
Is there any evidence of the extent that these mechanisms are used by companies?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: According to the the GlObserver piece, one of the Public Procurement Authority's duties is to &quoute;penalise firms that fail to comply with regulation and ensure out-of-court settlement of any disputes arising from public contracts.&quoute; (The agency's website is currently inaccessible).

The Code for Public Procurement contains no mention regarding defence/security procurement although other tenders are subject to regulations codified in the Code. The latter has provisions regarding candidates (Chapter 3, Section 1 in general, art. 11 more particularly). Art. 11 indicates that candidates who have been subjects to penal prosecution cannot bid; yet the conflict of interest related restriction is solely on the person responsible for the procurement from the emitting public administration. No provisions mentioning corrupt activities of the supplier exist in the Code.

Lastly, the Code in its Chapter 8 contains a list of sanctions: Section 1 concerns public servants responsibles for attributing the contract to excluded bidders or to mismanaging the contract execution; Section 2 concerns the 'client' and the provider. In this case, the provider can be demised if corrupt practices are proved that have helped the provider to obtain the contract or to execute it (Art. 129). This provision is however vaguely worded: &quoute;corruption&quoute; is not explicitly defined, sanctions are not clearly determined and no precise authority is named that should be tasked with monitoring, investigating and eventually punishing misconduct/fraud. One may assume that this is what the Public Procurement Authority should do.

The provisions outlined above are never identified as applicable to defence procurement; similarly, the Code does not specify any requirement for defence/security companies.

Overall, no evidence of the activity of the Public Procurement Authority was identified at all. This implies that no application of the Authority's mandate (to penalise firms failing to comply with regulation) was identified. This lack of activity most probably explains the lack of enforcement as no such report (institutional or media) was located.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No evidence has been identified matching allegedly imposed due diligence/audit on offsets during the examination period. Information on arms exports from France to Gabon for example is extremely superficial and scarce. Even the French Ministry of Defence's report to the Parliament remains very high-level; e.g., it notes that a total of 98 preliminary agreement demands for export have been filed by Gabon and accepted since 2009 but mentions no further information (p. 54). The situation is identical when listing the numbers and amounts of arms exports since 2009 (p. 58).

Media (even specialised outlets) and NGOs are silent on this topic as well. It is thus impossible to assess what requirements -- if any -- are imposed on offset contracts.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No detail on defence procurement by Gabon is known. As outlined in the previous indicator, it is also impossible to know whether offsets are performed and what strings are attached (if any). Thus, I have chosen the N/A here as all other scores seem to present a speculation compared to the current knowledge on the topic. Insights from the peer review process are more than welcome.

PEER REVIEWERS - Can you make a reasoned assumption based on exsting evidence, as to whether Gabon and its government do accept offset contracts from defence companies? It seems clear that no evidence is published on it officially, but any knowledge you have on this matter that could contribute to a score would be very helpful.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No detail on defence procurement by Gabon is known. As outlined in the previous indicator, it is also impossible to know whether offsets are performed and, if so, how they are dealt with. Thus, I have chosen the N/A here as all other scores seem to present a speculation compared to the current knowledge on the topic. Insights from the peer review process are more than welcome.

PEER REVIEWERS - Similar to question 71, is there any more evidence you can find of offset contracts existing? Based on your current knowledge of Gabon and its defence sector, is it likely that offset contracts do exist, but the details of them are not made publicly available? Any information you can offer would be helpful here.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The Agency's website being inaccessible, no evidence regarding restrictions or rules in general was identified. I was not able to identify details regarding policies that control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle. No evidence was found regarding any scrutiny of these processes.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: No related information was identified. The media report linked to above highlights some specific equipment being recently acquired but does not state the seller nor the amounts sold, suggesting that occasionally information about acquisition can be published. However, there is still no evidence to suggest that the financial details of such purchasing packages are made public through any official or media source.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: The Agency's website being inaccessible, no evidence regarding restrictions or rules in general was identified. No evidence was identified elsewhere that suggests such a requirement exists. As neither tenders nor contracts are publicly available, it is impossible to assert that a formal requirement exists from the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer3933: Purchases are not made public and the amount paid for them is kept undisclosed.

No acquisition planning details were identified neither. Gabon does not seem to be a huge arms consumer anyway (at least, this is what SIPRI data suggests). France features as one of the most prominent sellers, according to SIPRI.

Historically, links between Gabon and France are extremely strong (due to the infamous Françafrique system) and they continue to be pervasive even today (see The Guardian's piece above for background). France thus continues to be not just arms supplier but also one of the main (and potentially the only) training provider for the Gabonese army having established a dedicated entity in Libreville and conducting regular training sessions as exemplified by some of the reports linked to above.

Overall, France has long-lived cooperation agreements with multiple African countries, including Gabon. In the Gabon case, the agreement dates back to 1960 and poses French intervention to defend the country. Although these agreements have been reviewed (e.g., with Cameroon), they remain unchanged with Gabon. The military agreements on technical issues have not been reviewed: they include easy transit and logistics support, info exchange, supply of materials and weaponry. Influence by selling nations (France here) in the case of Gabon seems thus obvious against the backdrop of these details.