Democratic Republic of the Congo

Researcher4306: The defence sector suffers from serious shortcomings in managing and controlling its assets, including arms, ammunitions and related equipment. It is defined by a lack of transparency in marking, tracing, identification, storing and record keeping of arms. The public is not kept informed about asset disposals, including any knowledge of where the proceeds of asset disposals go.

Theft and diversion of arms to rebel groups is a very common phenomenon. The United Nations Group of Experts found in late 2011 that “[a]rmed groups continue to obtain most of their arms, ammunition and uniforms from FARDC. Leakage from FARDC stocks, whether through small-scale barter, larger transactions, abandonment or seizure on the battlefield, is widespread and largely uncontrolled.”

Researcher4306: The management and disposal of defence assets is not subject to transparent, independent institutional control. Assets such as arms, ammunitions and related equipment are often not marked, traced, stored and recorded. No evidence of an existing audit system for the disposal of assets seems publicly available.

The United Nations Group of Experts found in late 2011 that “[a]rmed groups continue to obtain most of their arms, ammunition and uniforms from FARDC. Leakage from FARDC stocks, whether through small-scale barter, larger transactions, abandonment or seizure on the battlefield, is widespread and largely uncontrolled.”

Researcher4306: Interviewee 11 was quite certain that “at least 20%” of the defence and security expenditure is spent on secret items. While secret items related to national security are listed on the budget, interviewee 24 stated that would be hard to check the accuracy of the budget lists due to military procurement usually being conducted in a non-transparent manner solely by those in the presidency.

However, it was impossible to find evidence to support this from the public domain, and as peer reviewer 3 notes, this information is not included (even in aggregate) in any public budgetary documents. Interviewee 7 asserted that the defence budget was not at all transparent and overly complex, adding that there seemed to be a lack of political will aimed at making it transparent.

No information was publicly available at the time of writing that details the percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services.

Researcher4306: Interviewee 11 stated that the legislature was not provided with full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items. Interviewee 24 – currently sitting in parliament – corroborated this, saying such information had not been made available to them in a professional capacity. Interviewee 17 expressed similar doubts, while Interviewee 8 concluded that, even were such information to be made available to the legislature, it was doubtful whether their oversight would make much of an impact on the budget or decisions surrounding it.

Interviewee 17 specified that while the legislative committees officially do scrutinize and analyse the defence budget, there are no practical results, stating that the commissions were somewhat ineffective and vulnerable to political considerations. They added that these committees do not receive information on a regular basis regarding the defence budget. By contrast, Interviewee 25 said that to the best of their knowledge, the budget is indeed made available “but only in broad terms.&quoute;

As a general note, the DRC is seriously under-reported on and only interviewees can provide the necessary in-depth details to authoritatively inform this study.

Researcher4306: There is no publicly available evidence that shows whether or not secret budget items get audited, however the available evidence suggests it is unlikely. Interviewee 11 and 17 argue that legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items, which interviewee 24 also confirmed.

A Bertelsmann Foundation report in 2012 states that “[v]irtually none of the mechanisms associated with the effective bureaucratic administration of human and financial resources, including monitoring, evaluation and auditing procedures, is in place&quoute;. The report notes that auditing and expenditure tracking is the exception, although it offers no evidence that this applies to secret items. The report also points out that public auditors’ reports are often ignored by policy makers and that offenders whose actions have drawn significant public attention are often simply transferred.

As peer reviewer 3 notes, there has never been an audit of the army. The only recent scrutiny has come from a report from the UN on the illicit exploitation of natural resources in DRC, which puts the spotlight on military personnel.

Researcher4306: At the time of writing, no public information was available on this subject. No evidence suggests that off-budget spending is reported on.

According to Interviewee 2, there is a lot of off-budget military financing in the DRC, with none of the foreign military assistance or equipment appearing on the formal budget. The interviewee noted that China was believed to have delivered such assistance without notifying the UN's Sanctions committees.

Interviewee 25 confirmed that off-budget spending is neither explicitly allowed nor outlawed by law but that the budgets show that the practice is widespread - military equipment bought recently by DRC goes far beyond the annual $400 million budget of the army. Interviewee 11 was unsure as to the legal status of the off-budget spending which occurs, but stated that while the situation could feasibly be improved, the DRC lacked the political will to do so.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I disagree - there is no evidence provided that off-budget spending is actually reported on, which is the key distinction between scores 0 and 1.

Researcher4306: It is likely that off-budget military spending occurs and may be linked to illicit economic activity. Information on the volume of illegal economic activities by the Congolese army is not available and too dangerous for the researcher to gauge. The subject area is highly confidential and requires investigative reporting for which Congolese media lacks the capacity and institutional protection. International media coverage is too sparse and selective to report on off-budget military spending, while academic and think tank research does not appear to have examined the topic.

No interviewee was available to give a clear estimate. According to Interviewee 2 however, off-budget military financing is common in the DRC, with no mention of foreign military assistance or donated equipment appearing on the formal budgets. The interviewee further stated that China used to carry out this practice without even notifying the UN's sanctions committees. Interviewee 25 specified that the army would be underfunded (it is currently not) if the published figures, showing a military budget of roughly $400 million a year out of a $8 billion national budget, were correct.

Interviewees 11 and 25 pointed out that the official budget did not at all match the size and scale of a country such as the DRC, making it likely that they are inaccurate. Both interviewees indicated there is a great likelihood that this off-budget spending involves substantial corruption and illicit activity. DRC has not submitted data on its military expenditures to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, however according to SIPRI, the country increased its annual military spending annually between 2009 and 2014, growing from 1.1% of GDP (2009) to 2.3% in 2013. This corresponds to totals of US$122m (2009), US$184m (2010), US$239m (2011), US$308m (2012), and US$428m (2013).

Military spending as a percentage of overall government spending also steadily increased from 4.1% (2009) to 6.7% (2013). SIPRI's figures differ minimally from the CIA's, which state that the Government of Congo spent 1.72% of its GDP on military matters in 2012, 1.53% in 2011 and 1.72% in 2010.

Researcher4306: No evidence was found during research to indicate what formal or informal systems may exist for classifying information.

Interviewee 11 argued that most information surrounding the military was automatically considered to be restricted information, rather than being taken through initial levels such as &quoute;limited&quoute; or &quoute;confidential&quoute;. Interviewees 8, 9 and 24 doubted that the classification system for information was subject to effective scrutiny, with Interviewee 7 specifying that there is “no real system” for classifying information, let alone for assessing it.

All interviewees believed that there is a measure of discretion involved in classifying information, but it is hard to ascertain whether or not individuals or agencies outside of the military chain of command can persistently influence decisions surrounding classification, as the process is not disclosed publicly.

As a general note, the DRC is seriously under-reported on and only interviewees can provide the necessary in-depth details to authoritatively inform this study.

Researcher4306: The government explicitly outlaws unauthorised private enterprises of elements in the defence and security sector. According to the November 2002 military penal code (Art. 78), elements of the army are punishable for a prison term between five to ten years and a monetary fine for the supervision or control of a private enterprise, the awarding of a contract to a private enterprise or private individual on behalf of the state, and working, giving advice to and investing into a private company or person for the period of five years after service in the army.

Interviewees 11, 18, and 19 said that while defence and security institutions as such do not explicitly have beneficial ownership, there are instances of individuals having such interests. The United Nations Group of Experts confirms that certain individuals inside the army own a number of different businesses. There is a wide level of consensus that high-level military personnel have had large stakes in commercial businesses, particularly in mining in the east.

The lack of formal military-owned businesses is perhaps a reflection of the fragmentation of the army itself - it is unlikely to be sufficiently organised to own and run large-scale enterprise. However, the risks associated with opaque military business are not controlled at the moment given the poor levels of scrutiny over the sector as a whole, and a low score has been selected to reflect this.

Researcher4306: The government explicitly outlaws unauthorised private enterprises of elements in the defence and security sector. According to the November 2002 military penal code (Art. 78), elements of the army are punishable for a prison term between five to ten years and a monetary fine for the supervision or control of a private enterprise, the awarding of a contract to a private enterprise or private individual on behalf of the state, and working, giving advice to and investing into a private company or person for the period of five years after service in the army.

Interviewees 11, 18, and 19 said that defence and security institutions as such do not have beneficial ownership but that certain elements of the military have high stakes in commercial enterprises and even own some businesses. Reporting by the United Nations Group of Experts confirms this.

Despite reporting by international non-governmental organizations and international outcry, enterprises owned by individual army elements are not subjected to transparent independent scrutiny, let alone to scrutiny at a recognised international standard, according to the United Nations Group of Experts, Global Witness, and the Enough Project.

Researcher4306: The government explicitly outlaws unauthorised private enterprises of elements in the defence and security sector but evidence shows it seriously lacks enforcement of the provision.

According to the November 2002 military penal code (Art. 78), elements of the army are punishable for a prison term between five to ten years and a monetary fine for the supervision or control of a private enterprise, the awarding of a contract to a private enterprise or private individual on behalf of the state, and working, giving advice to and investing into a private company or person for the period of five years after service in the army.

That said, elements of the Congolese defence and security institutions are engaged in a wide range of different economic activities and suffer hardly any repercussions, with interviewee 2 estimating that many FARDC staff members are involved in such side-businesses, from selling cigarettes to importing stolen cars.

There is a wide level of consensus that high-level military personnel have had large stakes in commercial businesses, particularly in mining in the east. This military entrepreneurism is widespread, according to the United Nations Group of Experts, the Enough Project, IPIS and other research organizations.

More generally, “[…] FARDC is an economic network with wide geographical coverage,” according to Verweijen adding later that ”[…] civilians and the military have become highly economically interdependent.”

As peer reviewer 3 notes, the fact that troops are badly paid means that they are often pushed towards engaging in external enterprise to subsidise their living costs. As the government is aware of this situation, the fact that it closes its eyes to the problems that it is creating almost equates to the government sanctioning private enterprise.

A score of 1 has been selected given the widespread nature of such phenomena.

Researcher4306: In September 2009, President Joseph Kabila, as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Art. 19, Law of Armed Forces), publicly declared zero tolerance to corruption, a mission statement later repeated by other ministries including the defence sector. (Note that interviewee 7 could not recall statements made publicly by the Ministry of defence, neither could interviewees 11 and 19). A month later, Kabila established the Financial Intelligence Unit to fight money laundering and corruption in the public sector.

In its 2012 country report for DRC, the Bertelsmann Foundation argued that “[t]he population is growing more and more aware of high-level corruption through the “naming and shaming” of suspects.” Addressing the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2013, Kabila pledged to reform the security sector and public financing.

Following the national consultations held in Kinshasa from 7 September and 5 October 2013, the President pledged to “a fight against all forms of corruption, fraud, and embezzlement of public funds” during a speech in front of the two houses of parliament on 23 October 2013. During his State of the Nation address on 15 December 2013, he further committed to professionalize his army. (Note, however, that on 30 June 2014, the United Nations Secretary-General reported “[p]rogress on army reform continued to be limited.”)

On 8 April 2014, the provincial commissioner of the national police in Kinshasa Célestin Kanyama pledged on national public radio to fight corruption. According to interviewee 18 who participated in many army parades, “during each parade, commanders call for good behaviour.” The problem is the implementation [of such statements], however.”

Researcher4306: Formally, measures are in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption. For example, in positive developments, the President promulgated the law on the Constitutional court on 15 October 2013, which will have jurisdiction over the prosecution of the President and Prime Minister.

Evidence suggests that in practice this law and other anti-corruption laws are being enforced only occasionally. As reported by Bertelsmann Foundation in 2012, “[d]espite the existence of anti-corruption laws, most officeholders who exploit their offices for private gain have gone unpunished. The prosecution of corrupt officeholders was usually motivated by the desire to weaken political competitors rather than promote the rule of law, per se. However, there are signs that total freedom to abuse power no longer exists […]. The population is growing more and more aware of high-level corruption through the “naming and shaming” of suspects. In general, however, the rule of law remains seriously undermined by political corruption.”

For example, over the last two years, the most prominent case was of the former Chief of Land Forces, who was suspended by President Kabila on 22 November 2012 after a UN Group of Experts report implicated him of illegal mineral extraction and partnering with poachers and armed groups. However, the Major General was never actually arrested and authorities cleared him of all charges on 31 July 2014 without giving further details about its investigation, as reported by the Enough Project. Civil society groups in DRC have denounced this action.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, military staff cannot be prosecuted by civilian courts but only by military courts. This leads to a heightened sense of impunity for defence personnel.

Researcher4306: Asked about the existence of mechanisms to encourage whistle blowing, Interviewees 7 and 19 stated that there were none in place, with Interviewee 19 adding that with no incentives, it was unlikely that any potential whistleblowers would come forward.

In its 2013 human rights report for the DRC, the US State Department asserted that “[n]o law exists to provide protection to public and private employees for making internal disclosures or lawful public disclosures of evidence of illegality.” Further, it argued that “[p]ublic criticism,[…] of government officials and government conduct or decisions regarding matters such as […] corruption sometimes resulted in harsh responses […]. Certain regulating bodies restricted freedom of the press and intimidated journalists and publishers into practicing self-censorship.” In this environment, whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries are not afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption. Subsequently, there have not been any known cases of whistleblowing in the ministry of defence and/or army.

Generally speaking, freedom of speech and press is not adequately protected, making whistle-blowing a dangerous undertaking. Reporters Without Borders ranked DRC 151 out of 180 countries surveyed. In 2013, Freedom House found the press not to be free. “Reporters exposing high-level corruption are at particular risk,” according to scholar Theodore Trefon. In 2012, Bertelsmann Foundation claimed that “[m]edia editors have become increasingly reluctant to report cases of corruption, fearing repressive responses from the perpetrators.”

Nevertheless, outside of defence the Ministry of Finances has created a special email address for whistleblowers ([email protected]) so that the public can report instances of corruption and fraud (12). In addition, in June 2015 it was announced that Joseph Kabila had filed his first complaints against corrupt officials, through the new special adviser for counter-corruption, counter-money laundering and counter-terrorism (conseiller spécial pour la lutte contre la corruption, le blanchiment et le terrorisme).

The complaints are reportedly the result of information provided by whistleblowers, although it is unclear whether they were submitted with evidence that could be used as a basis for prosecution (14). It therefore appears that, outside of defence, there might be an improving climate for whistleblowers. Until this is replicated in the defence sector, however, a higher score cannot be awarded.

Researcher4306: On the basis of the Bertelsmann Foundations' Transformation Index, there is no evidence to suggest that the appointment system for the selection of government officials at middle and top management level in the defence sector and beyond is independent, transparent, objective nor necessarily based on meritocracy. Neither is there evidence that certain positions are recognized as more open to corruption opportunities.

According to Interviewee 5, there is no special attention paid to vetting, rotation or post-retirement restrictions for personnel in sensitive positions in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. Officials often remain in these positions for a very long time despite reported inefficiencies, the interviewee added.

Researcher4306: In February 2012, EUSEC completed a nationwide census of the Congolese armed forces. Earlier in 2011, it completed a national police census. Interviewee 7 stated that the number of civilian and military personnel is known by the defence establishment and international partners but not actively shared publicly.

No publicly accessible information was available on the number of civilian government employees. However, public documents issued by other institutes give relatively fair estimates of the numbers for military personnel. For instance, the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in DRC (EUSEC) reportedly believes that the total number of army personnel stood at 105,000 men and women in April 2012, of which 60% are deployed in North and South Kivu provinces. The Rift Valley Institute estimated hat the number of FARDC troops was between 120,000-130,000 in February 2013.

As for the number of police, EUSEC says it is around 100,000. Rift Valley Institute estimates the number of the men in the presidential guard to be between 10,000-15,000. The number of female soldiers in the spring of 2013 was estimated to be less than 2%, according to the Social Sciences Research Council.

According to Interviewee 7, a certain number of ghost soldiers remain on the payroll of the military, albeit at a much, much smaller number than just years before.

The fact that no figures are released by the government or the defence ministry precludes a higher score.

Researcher4306: The latest and most formally accurate pay rates are apparently known by the defence sector and international partners but not published, according to Interviewee 7. An international partner called the researcher's request to access the information “delicate.” For citizens in the DR Congo, it is a more difficult undertaking to acquire his information.

It is thus not a common practice to publish the rates. However, a number of NGO reports have mentioned a few figures in recent years. For instance, according to the Social Science Research Council, the official income for soldiers was around $70 a month in spring 2013, insufficient to sustain a family in Congo. A joint NGO report on Security Sector Reform in Congo in 2012 asserted that the monthly income for rank-and-file in police and army was around $40 and $60 for a general.

Researcher4306: In late 2012, the UN Secretary-General announced that EUSEC would initiate salary payments directly to individual soldiers through an electronic bank transfer system. However, the establishment of a rigorous banking system is “still ongoing” and is not as of yet established in the provincial regions, Interviewee 7 asserted. Recent complaints surrounding the late payment of salaries were linked to the transition to an electronic system, with the majority of complaints reportedly coming from commanding officers who are now unable to withdraw salaries on their soldiers' behalf (7).

Overall, there are occasional indications of late payment, which interviewee 7 calls “still reasonable,” adding that irregularities in payment only affect a minority. “It will take another 3-5 years for all personnel to receive pay on time.” Interviewee 9 acknowledged that payment trends had definitely improved. Payments at the moment are generally the correct amount but they are sometimes delayed and/or subject to discretionary commissions.

According to EUSEC, the official income for rank-and-file soldiers was around $70 a month in spring 2013, insufficient to sustain a family in Congo. (A joint NGO report on Security Sector Reform in Congo in 2012 asserted that the monthly income for rank-and-file in police and army was around $40 and $60 for a general). Officially, there is a clear and structured payment scheme, although this is not made public by the government or the defence ministry.

Apart from payment, personnel often receive little material support, including but not limited to accommodation, ammunition, education, equipment, food, medicine, and social benefits. This among other reasons explains why members of the security services often commit theft, extortion and are corrupted, as reported by the Rift Valley Institute. Note that according to a survey of more than 5,000 randomly selected adult residents conducted by Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and the UN Development Program in late 2013, 27% and 26% of the respondents remarked that the FARDC and PNC respectively need to be paid for security to improve.

Response to peer reviewer 1:
Without sources to support your suggestion that delays of up to three months are frequent, I cannot raise the score.

Researcher4306: A system for appointment does exist, according to article 20 of the Décret Loi n° 003-2003 portant création et organisation de l’Agence nationale de renseignements and articles 7-14 of the Loi 81-003 du 17 juillet 1981 portant statut du personnel de carrière des services publics de l’État,

However, the appointment system for the selection of military and civilian personnel at middle and top management level in the defence sector is characterized by nepotism, favoritism, and political calculations. In addition, as noted by peer reviewer 2, the last decade saw a lot of uncontrolled integration of militia, armed groups, rebels within the FARDC including at senior levels.

According to the Rift Valley Institute, the Congolese government has for years now allotted army positions to pay off and/or secure the buy-in of rebel leaders and deserters. With parallel command structures in place, positions frequently matter more than ranks. “Appointments based on connections rather than merit have […] diminished FARDC’ fighting capabilities. Subordinates lose respect for incompetent commanders, leading to insubordination and the refusal to obey orders.”

Note that on 24 December 2013, President Kabila signed a five-year police reform to establish criteria for recruitment, and promotion for police officers. It is actively bolstered by MONUSCO and EUPOL. Note also that the Bertelsmann Foundation remarked in 2012 that “[t]ere are no competitive recruitment procedures […]” across public sectors in DRC.

No evidence suggests that there is oversight over appointments nor that recruiting guidelines are published and assessed.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
The system for the appointment of military personnel is not published in full - only the legal requirements for there to be a system could be found. This precludes a higher score.

Researcher4306: No meritocratic system is in place. Instead, a 2013 study by the Social Science Science Research Council shows that positions have often been given to corrupt and unqualified army elements and rebel factions, leading to demoralization of troops, lack of cohesion and even sabotage, causing poor performances from the troops. According to the Social Science Research Council, “[s]ystematic favoritism” is &quoute;common,” which interviewee 5 confirmed.

Interviewee 19 also denied that there was a meritocratic system in place, implying that it was possible to become a commander or colonel in the army without having completed high school education or building up a long service record. Bertelsmann Foundation remarked in 2012 that “[t]here are no competitive recruitment procedures […]” across public sectors in DRC.

Researcher4306: No conscription exists in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Art. 53 of the Law of Armed Forces stipulates that it is a professional army. Note that Art. 2.12, 7-11 allow for general mobilization of both sexes aged 18 or above in times of crisis. While crises are very frequent in the eastern part of the country, the government has not yet evoked the clause. Given the prevailing culture of bribery, it is very likely that citizens would be able to opt out.

Researcher4306: Neither compulsory nor voluntary conscription exists in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Article 53 of the Law of Armed Forces stipulates that it is a professional army.

Art. 2.12, 7-11 allow for general mobilization of both sexes aged 18 or above in times of crisis. While crises are very frequent in the eastern part of the country, the government has not yet evoked the clause. Given the prevailing culture of bribery, it is very likely that citizens would be able to opt out.

Researcher4306: In October 2009, authorities have launched a biometric identification system for personnel in the defence and security sector to combat the problem of ghost soldiers. The issuing of biometric ID cards is said to have reduced the number of ghost soldiers by 220,000, according to an estimate gathered by the Rift Valley Institute in February 2013.

According to the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in DRC (EUSEC), in April 2014,”35% of all military personnel have been through multiple biometric ID checks. Distribution of military ID cards, now the sole piece of Congolese military identification, also continues. To date, 80% of all personnel possess their military ID card.” The process remains ongoing, but the large numbers of ghost soldiers identified does show the extent of the problem in DRC.

According to Interviewee 7, while there is a willingness to combat the phenomenon of ‘ghost soldiers’, and an acknowledgement that it would benefit people across the industry, there is much resistance to reform, and progress on the matter remains fragile. In addition, as peer reviewer 2 notes, although EUSEC did its best to complete the biometric military census, its efforts were complicated by the dissolution of various battalions and the partial reallocation of their troops to other units. This led to a new disorder in the staff lists and payroll.

Researcher4306: Following a request from the Government of Congo, the European Union decided on 1 December 2005 to assist the government in modernizing its payment system for armed forces and separate the chain of command (General HQ, HQ Forces, Military Region, Region Brigades, Battalions) from the chain of payment (budget finance directive, finance director MR, Regiment/Bdes Accountant, Battalion Paymaster). The separation of the two chains is a published policy, stipulated in two instructions by the Ministry of defence, namely N0600/MDNACIGG-DEF/DBF 2013 and N 001/EMG/FARDC/COMDT /2013.

While the Rift Valley Institute states that “[o]ne of the main achievements of the army reform projects backed by EUSEC has been the separating of the chain of payments from the chain of command,” implementation remains a challenge in certain locations: For example, given that only 6% of the 30,000 soldiers serving in North Kivu are paid through commercial banks, the so-called Chef de l’administration, or Chef S1, continues to be involved in distributing cash to his subordinates, who are frequently compelled to pay commission, a phenomenon called ‘rapportage.’ As an officer of the chain of command, the S1 should officially not be involved in the payment and be replaced by a battalion paymaster. Interviewee 11 stated that while this was not an ideal system, it was not currently seen as a grave problem.

There is confusion regarding chains of command and payment in the Ministry of defence, according to Interviewee 7, who says there are problems with it daily. Nevertheless, they acknowledged that evident and very serious progress was made in this regard. Interviewees 11 and 17 shared the sentiment that the chains are generally separated. Recent complaints surrounding the late payment of salaries were linked to the transition to an electronic system, with the majority of complaints reportedly coming from commanding officers who are now unable to withdraw salaries on their soldiers' behalves (5).

Researcher4306: A military code of conduct exists but is not made publicly available. A copy was obtained during research however. The Ministry of defence published the only and most updated code of conduct for military and civilian personnel in the defence sector in December 2009. It does not contain specific guidance with respect to bribery, gifts, hospitality, conflicts of interest and post-separation activities. The codes are relatively widely distributed but applied inconsistently, according to interviewee 7.

However, according to the November 2002 military penal code (Art. 78), elements of the army are punishable for a prison term between five to ten years and a monetary fine for the supervision or control of a private enterprise, the awarding of a contract to a private enterprise or private individual on behalf of the state, and working, giving advice to and investing into a private company or person for the period of five years after service in the army.

In October 2002, the government established an Observatory for the Code of Professional Ethics to promote ethical behaviour of its civil servants. No further public information was available regarding the Observatory for the Code of Professional Ethics, how strictly it enforces the code, or whether it is maintained and implemented today.

Researcher4306: A military code of conduct exists but is not made publicly available. A copy was obtained during research however.

According to Interviewees 6 and 7 general breaches of the code of conduct are being sanctioned. For example, in May 2014 soldiers were imprisoned for conduct. While military authorities have achieved progress in gradually improving its sanctions system to punish individual cases of misconduct, this system lacks consistent application and has too many gaps and exceptions to be called effective.

The lack of publicly available information suggests breaches of code of conduct from ministry officials are unlikely to be reported on.

Researcher4306: The defence sector offers few to no training sessions on any topic. Refresher courses are few in numbers.

“There are some ad hoc trainings, now and again, organized by donors. But there is no regular, systematic training initiated by [the Congolese government]” according to Interviewee 8. International partners are instrumental in organizing and conducting some trainings for the military. However, as of 2012, foreign military personnel have only provided or supervised specialized training to an estimated six percent of Congolese troops since 2007.

According to interviewees 17, 18 and 19, there are anti-corruption seminars in place, primarily for the military justice system, but it is not a systematic policy initiated and pursued by the Government, calling their sustainability into question. Interviewee 11 argued that these trainings are only &quoute;for external consumption”, adding that while there is a will to change within the government, progress in implementation is slow and very difficult.

On a positive note, in mid-2013, two draft decrees were prepared for the organization and functioning of a general directorate for police schools and training centres. The government also established an Observatory for the Code of Professional Ethics in October 2002 to promote ethical behaviour of its civil servants, but no more information regarding it or its findings is publicly available.

Researcher4306: According to all interviewees, elements of the army stand occasionally trial for embezzlement and related charges. But this is the exception rather the rule and involves neither high-ranking members of the defence sector nor large-scale corruption. While some of the cases are made public, there is no clear formal policy to do so.

As reported by Bertelsmann Foundation in 2012, “[d]espite the existence of anti-corruption laws, most officeholders who exploit their offices for private gain have gone unpunished. The prosecution of corrupt officeholders was usually motivated by the desire to weaken political competitors rather than promote the rule of law, per se. However, there are signs that total freedom to abuse power no longer exists […]. The population is growing more and more aware of high-level corruption through the “naming and shaming” of suspects. In general, however, the rule of law remains seriously undermined by political corruption. [...] “Effective prosecution of corruption is unheard of.”

Researcher4306: According to the 2013 Human Rights Report on the DRC by the US State Department, “PNC and FARDC units throughout the country regularly engaged in illegal taxation and extortion of civilians. They set up checkpoints to collect “taxes,” often stealing food and money and arresting individuals who could not pay bribes.” There are no specific measures in place to discourage facilitation payments. On the contrary, the system is largely built on it.

Note, however, that scholar Verweijen cautions not to “uncritically project the victim/victimiser dichotomy onto economic relations between the military and civilians, while paying little attention to how military revenue- generating activities are co-produced and instrumentalised by populations […] ” adding later that […] military revenue-generation is shaped by militarised structures that are in part (re)produced by the routine practices of civilians.&quoute;

Researcher4306: Asked whether the armed forces have military doctrine specifically addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations, Interviewee 11 said there might be one but was not able to recall specifics, while Interviewee 19 doubted the existence of doctrine addressing corruption, arguing, however, that there might a general directive. Interviewee 22 denied the existence of such a piece of writing altogether.

Generally, the 2002 Military Penal Code prohibits corruption, while the 2009 Code of Conduct does not specifically address corruption, including as a strategic issues while on operations.

Researcher4306: There is no evidence that any systematic training is provided; let alone specifically on matters of corruption and to commanders at all levels.

Interviewee 8 indicated that there are &quoute;some ad hoc trainings, now and again, organized by donors. But there is no regular, systematic training initiated by [the Congolese government]”. International partners are instrumental in organizing and conducting some trainings for the military. However, as of 2012, foreign military personnel have only provided or supervised specialized training to an estimated six percent of Congolese troops since 2007.

According to interviewees 17, 18 and 19, there are anti-corruption seminars in place, primarily for the military justice system, but it is not a systematic policy initiated and pursued by the Government, calling their sustainability into question. Interviewee 11 argued that these trainings are only &quoute;for external consumption”, adding that while there is a will to change within the government, progress in implementation is slow and very difficult.

Note that in December 2013, MONUSCO was finalizing the establishment of a training unit to support the training and mentoring of instructors in Congo’s armed forces, but no further information on the progress of this project was publicly accessible.

According to all interviewees, officers engage in or turn a blind eye to corrupt activities.

Researcher4306: It is unclear whether or not corruption monitors are deployed. No publicly available information was found at the time of writing. According to Interviewee 8, there are currently no systematically scheduled missions, adding that while the authorities do have this in mind as a future goal, they are at present &quoute;ad hoc and irregular.” Auditors lack sufficient training to support this, however.

Interviewee 17 expressed doubts too, arguing that while some seminars are held in Kinshasa, there is no similar coverage across the country, adding that it was not a current priority for the authorities. Interviewee 19 also implied this, stating that the authorities did not currently have time to follow up with professionals in this manner. Interviewee 18 had not heard of any deployments of corruption monitors.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Agreed. Score lowered from 1 to 0.

Researcher4306: Article 78 of the 2002 Military Penal Code spells out provisions for military personnel on how to engage commercial actors. Punishable by a prison sentence between five to yen years and a fine of 5,000- 10,000 Congolese Francs, military personnel are not allowed to control a private enterprise, sign contracts with private companies and/or person on behalf of the state, make offers to private companies and persons and work for a private enterprise or person for five years after leaving military service.

However, these provisions are frequently violated (see also questions 30-32), applied very selectively and irregularly. No regular training is heard of.

Nothing in the provision suggests that the provisions do not apply whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions. However, the guidelines themselves don't cover official operational contracts, only private business.

Researcher4306: A multitude of private security companies are employed in DRC, including ASCO, G4S, GESI, GSA Security, HADEC, Hdw-SD Security, KAMI HSS, KK Security, Latlong International, Magenya, Top S.I.G and Warrior Security. Research by Schoutten indicates that around 30,000 private security guards are stationed in DRC, predominantly in the capital Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and the eastern part of the country. Amongst others, they provide security and logistical support to international corporations (notably in the mining sector), international non-governmental organizations, and the United Nations.

Interviewee 4 indicated that private security contractors are employed rather than private military contractors. The former are explicitly &quoute;disallowed to carry arms and this is strongly enforced, although arms are sometimes sneaked in through the back door through structural cooperation with PNC/FARDC.&quoute;

Schouten indicates that private security companies obviously “benefit financially from prolongation of insecurity&quoute;. Private security companies often operate together with public security forces including elements of the army, police and navy, partially because private security companies are not allowed to carry arms (Arrêté ministériel N°98/008, Art. 6). There is a risk that corporations may become complicit in human rights abuses when employing public security forces notorious for their misconduct.

Mechanisms for oversight and accountability are formally in place and stipulated in a ministerial decree from 1998, albeit they are not consistently enforced and the decree does not define sanctions. There is also no evidence of cases involving PMCs in this situation. According to Interviewee 4, “there is some level of scrutiny through informal circuits,” amongst them by the Intelligence Services of ANR, who have a wide network of human intelligence officers deployed throughout the country. Moreover, there is evidence indicating that public security services also privatize and commercialize their own services. Schouten reports that the national police has a special unit called ‘Brigade de Garde’ mandated for private guarding, and that 9,000 police in Kinshasa alone are believed to be in its service. In North Kivu province, this system is believed to have generated over US$1m in 2012.

Researcher4306: “Parliament passed a new procurement law in April 2010 [&quoute;Loi relative aux marches publiques] and the GDRC [Government of the DR Congo] has also adopted key implementing steps, institutions, and a manual of procedures to implement the new procurement law,” according to the US Department of State in July 2014, which added that “bribery is still routine in public and private business transactions, especially in the areas of government procurement”, an assessment shared by scholar Theodore Trefon.

However, articles 44-46 of the 2010 &quoute;Loi relative aux marches publiques&quoute; provide for exemptions regarding the purchase of military equipment, making it subject to a decree of the Prime Minister.

According to Interviewee 11, procurement processes are fully ad-hoc and non-transparent, with Interviewee 24 adding that the defence sector is subject to “political management rather than legal management.” There is no publicly available evidence that an effective measure of scrutiny is being applied.

Researcher4306: Parliamentarians are unaware of when the procurement process is started, who initiated it, or when it has ended, according to information from Interviewee 25, while Interviewee 11 denied that the defence procurement cycle process is disclosed to the public. Asked to comment on defence procurements, Interviewee 2 called it a “vastly non-transparent process.” Public procurement systems are opaque and ineffective in the DRC, as noted by the Bertelsmann Foundation in 2012.

No media reporting seemed available at the time of writing.

Researcher4306: The parliament has at times requested information on procurement details and so the government submitted reports to the parliament, including ‘Rapport Lutundula’, and ‘Rapport des Biens Mals Acquis’. The National Assembly Special Commission on Peace and Security does not provide oversight on the specific aspect of defence procurement, according to Interviewee 25 who has experience in government. Interviewee 25 added, however, that the recommendations in the submitted reports were not followed through.

Interviewee 8 does not believe defence procurement oversight mechanisms exist, and neither do interviewees 17 and 25. Interviewee 11 believes that the absence of an oversight mechanism is a “very serious problem&quoute;, leading to a lot of decisions being taken by just one person.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
The legislation that you cite specifically exempts military procurement. There is no evidence of defence procurement oversight mechanisms. Score maintained.

Researcher4306: Some defence purchases are made public, although not through official sources, with suppliers notifying the UN Sanctions Committee of weapons deliveries to DRC. At the time of writing no media outlets had published public information on details of defence purchases however. No publicly available evidence suggests that there is a policy in place about the disclosure of defence purchases.

According to Amnesty International the main suppliers of arms to DR Congo between 2000 and 2012 have been China, France, Ukraine and the USA. Evidence from Amnesty International, SIPRI, and the UN Register for Conventional Arms indicates that other exporters included Albania, Belgium, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Serbia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.

The website of the Ministry of Budget publishes the annual budget and breakdown by ministry, which in turn offers an aggregate total figure for defence purchasing. However, Interviewee 17 said that here, two different budgets are provided, and many, including the interviewee, do not know which one the army budget is, leading to confusion rather than accountability. The interviewee cited as an example the purchase of hundreds of trucks, for which no budget was indicated. Interviewee 11 argued that the government itself “never publishes” defence purchases in practice.

Researcher4306: According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, foreign suppliers have been able to bid on government contracts since 2002. (The Government has yet to sign the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.) That said, foreign suppliers of arms interested in selling material to the DRC are not required to comply with existing procedures and standards.

Asked whether companies need to comply with standards to bid, Interviewee 11 immediately responded that there are no such official procedures known to parliament, and that the government of the DRC is hurting itself through this lack of legislation enforcing standards. Given the endemic corruption, it is very likely that if they were procedures or standards they would be applied inconsistently and with discretion.

No publicly available information nor interviewees could speak to possible discrimination made between bidding companies on matters of integrity or the possibility that bidding companies have to adhere to the pre-existing company law.

Researcher4306: According to Interviewee 24, the DRC government has been lagging for years on drafting legislation defining national defence and security strategy. Interviewee 9 sees “gaps and holes” in the army’s capabilities in eastern Congo, which they suggested implied the lack of a clear strategy, adding that they would be surprised if there were such a strategy in place. In terms of procurement, MONUSCO pays a lot of money each year, delivering fuel, rations, and other small items to the army.

Asked whether procurement requirements are derived from a well-audited strategy, Interviewee 11 strongly denied it, citing as evidence a recent incident where the government had allegedly bought rocket launchers without realising that they did not have the compatible rockets to use with them (NB: no further publicly available information about this incident was available at the time of writing).

The government has yet to formulate a national defence and security strategy from which to derive procurement requirements. Between December 2013 and March 2014, MONUSCO and international partners urged the Government to adopt a programmatic law for the defence sector, which would define a national defence strategy and priorities.

Interviewee 8 denied the existence of a multi-year procurement planning, remarking that he heard that the US reportedly proposed training in procurement planning, a claim that could not be verified by public information. “There is no cogent system.” According to Bertelsmann Foundation in 2012, “[p]ublic procurement systems are opaque and ineffective.“ […]. “Those individuals or companies awarded government tenders are often linked to the country’s elites,” which suggests that procurement is opportunistic. Procurement requirements are not disclosed to the public in any case.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, despite several resolutions from the UN Security Council urged for the adoption of a national defence and security strategy from which to derive procurement requirements the Government has not made any move toward a comprehensive, national, debated and shared defence and Security strategy. Nevertheless, Member States and donors went on cooperating with the Army and defence sector without any prior conditionalities related to such strategy. This scattered and piecemeal approach to the Sector has led to no progress up to now despite the fact that significant amounts of money were invested on SSR.

Researcher4306: Interviewees 25 and 11 denied that defence purchases are based on clearly identified requirements; Interviewee 11 further argued that the government did not seem committed to establishing a process of acquisition planning with clear oversight or a logical flow from identified requirements. As evidence, the interviewee cited examples of inefficiency where the government purchased three different models of tanks, and rocket launchers for which they did not possess compatible rockets. This inconsistency in the types of weapons procured is especially noteworthy in eastern Congo, where civilians and military alike have a wide range of arms at their disposal.

Interviewee 11 also asserted that the government seems to be purchasing in a hurry and responding to events when they occur rather than planning ahead, referencing the M23 crisis of 2012-2013, where the Congolese army struggled to mobilize the necessary equipment and manpower to defeat the powerful adversary of M23 in 2012, one of the many reasons it later lost the provincial capital of Goma to the rebels. In the following year, the army reportedly purchased a number of heavy weapons and eventually defeated M23 in November 2013.

Similarly, Interviewee 11 cited Congo’s 50th independence anniversary in 2010 as another example, with 15,000 soldiers parading the streets of the capital, as reported by Radio France International.

Arms purchases are often opportunistic in the sense that political and business elites personally profit from them, and they do not correspond to the armed forces' requirements at the given time.

Researcher4306: There is no open and objective system of competition for defence procurement. Many arms deals are not reported on, and research indicates that it is widely accepted that instead discretion and political calculations are the norm. For example, Interviewee 8 had never come across a tender process in the DRC's defence sector, saying that &quoute;people come unofficially from Israel, Ukraine, Russia, China and others, […] see politicians and make proposals.” Interviewee 11 also stated categorically that no competition occurred during army procurement tendering processes.

There is also a well-recognized lack of effective competition regulation for the country overall: a Bertelsmann Foundation assessment in 2012 indicated that there are “no safeguards&quoute; against monopolies and cartels for the wider market, and that “those individuals or companies awarded government tenders are often linked to the country’s elites.”

It is significant to note that according to the SIPRI international arms transfers database only two countries supplied arms to DRC in 2012: Serbia (60x mortars) and Ukraine (2x ground attack). Evidence suggests there are likely to be more, however. According to Amnesty International in 2012, the main suppliers of arms to DR Congo between 2000 and 2012 have been China (half of DRC’s tanks are reportedly sourced from China), France, Ukraine and USA. (On the Small Arms Survey’s Transparency Barometer for exporters, China scored 7, France 15, Ukraine 8 and the United States 15.75 on a scale of 25). Other exporters included Albania, Belgium, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Serbia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, according to Amnesty International, SIPRI, and the UN Register for Conventional Arms.

Researcher4306: According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Ministry of Budget supervises a tender board established with the sponsorship and technical assistance from the World Bank. However, Interviewee 11 strongly denied that tender boards for the defence and security sector are subject to regulations and code of conduct, as their operations are conducted in secret. Interviewee 25 could not think of any such regulations, and neither could interviewee 21.

The Ministry of Budget itself provides no publicly available information regarding tender boards, and there were no mentions of their existence in local media sources.

Researcher4306: Formally, collusion between bidders is subject to legislation in the DRC, namely 
&quoute;La loi relative aux marches publics, Le Décret du 30 janvier 1940 portant Code Pénal tel que modifié et complété à ce jour&quoute;, &quoute;L’Ordonnance-loi no82-020 du 31 mars 1982 portant Code d’organisation et la compétence judiciaries&quoute;, &quoute;Le Décret du 06 à1959 portant Code de procédure pénale tel que modifié et complété à ce jour&quoute;, and &quoute;La loi no 023-2002 portant Code de Justice militaire et la loi no024-2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant code judiciaire militaire&quoute;.

In practice, according to Interviewees 21 and 25 the provisions are frequently violated however and hardly, if at all, enforced across all industries, let alone the defence sector. There are no anti-collusion legislation or procedures in place specific to defence and security. As peer reviewer 2 also notes, the law related to public procurement encompasses a large exception for military procurement.

Researcher4306: Interviewee 8 doubted the existence of procurement staff specifically trained and empowered to ensure defence contract meet their obligations. Interviewee 11 shares this sentiment, arguing that procurement is dealt with privately and summarising the current process thus: &quoute;Individuals receive orders, cash and then go [buy arms].&quoute; Interviewee 25 could not think of any training.

There is no legal obligation for procurement staff to receive training, and, at the time of writing, there was no information pertaining to the issue publicly available.

Researcher4306: Research found no evidence of any existing formal complaint mechanisms. The defence procurement process in Congo overall is not transparent and generally secretive, with Interviewee 25 asserting that even parliament can be unaware of the identity of the country's arms suppliers. Interviewee 11 was not aware of any mechanisms allowing companies to complain about perceived malpractice, pointing out that most of the companies involved in procurement in the DRC are from Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, Russia China, and North Korea - companies which have a reputation for being &quoute;discreet&quoute;. If they were to complain, it is possible that they would be disadvantaged in future procurements.

Researcher4306: The Congolese parliament &quoute;passed a new procurement law in April 2010 and the GDRC [Government of the DR Congo] has also adopted key implementing steps, institutions, and a manual of procedures to implement the new procurement law,” according to the US Department of State in July 2014.

Articles 77-81 of this law (&quoute;Loi relative aux marches publiques&quoute;) spell out the sanctions available for punishing misconduct, including imprisonment and a fine for up to 50.000.000 Congolese Francs. However, according to Interviewee 25, there is &quoute;no such case [of sanctioning] in the history of the DRC army&quoute;, with Interviewee 11 adding that the only punishment faced is that a different firm will be hired for the next tender.

It is also worth noting that this legislation specifically exempts military procurement. There are therefore no formal sanctions for the defence sector.

Researcher4306: While no information is publicly available and any details pertaining to possible off-set contracts would be kept very secret, Interviewee 11, who has intimate insights into the military establishment, strongly rejected the existence of off-set contracts. It is indeed very unlikely that they exist because DRC purchases mostly second-hand military equipment in an informal manner.

Researcher4306: While no information is publicly available and any details pertaining to possible off-set contracts would be kept very secret, Interviewee 11, who has intimate insights into the military establishment, strongly rejected the existence of off-set contracts. It is indeed very unlikely that they exist because DRC purchases mostly second-hand military equipment in an informal manner. Nevertheless, the opacity surrounding the arms deals in general means that the existence of offset contracts cannot be ruled out, and a score of 0 has been awarded accordingly.

Researcher4306: While no information is publicly available and any details pertaining to possible off-set contracts would be kept very secret, Interviewee 11, who has intimate insights into the military establishment, strongly rejected the existence of off-set contracts. It is indeed very unlikely that they exist because DRC purchases mostly second-hand military equipment in an informal manner. Nevertheless, the opacity surrounding the arms deals in general means that the existence of offset contracts cannot be ruled out, and a score of 0 has been awarded accordingly.

Researcher4306: Formally, there are legislative and administrative procedures in place regarding brokering. According to the Small Arms Survey, the Government of Congo reported in 2010 that “Law No. 85- 035 of 3 September 1985 does not provide a brokering system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo because any import, export, transfer, transit and brokering depends on the prior authorization” of several ministries. “To carry out activities of brokering in SALW [small arms and light weapons] in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: authorization of the responsible authorities is required.” (Note that DRC expressed support for the inclusion of brokering in the scope of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).)

That said it is extremely likely that the authorization process is heavily corrupted or can be circumvented altogether. Interviewee 11 does not believe that agents and/or intermediaries are being used but that deals are made privately by elites in the defence and security sector. No information was publicly available at the time of writing.

Researcher4306: Art. 44-46 of the Loi Relative Aux Marches Publics state that purchases of national defence materials need to be discussed within the Council of Ministers and then adopted by decree. In practice however, the surrounding evidence suggests that the very existence of a contract is often not disclosed, let alone the identity of the seller or aspects of the financing package.

According to interviewee 11, financial packages are “totally obscure&quoute;, with no details being made public, adding that deals are paid in cash and that nobody involved dares to ask further questions. Leasing is sometimes believed to be a method of payment, although no further information was available to corroborate this.

The two leading research organizations Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the UN Register for Conventional Arms do not have information on the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals in the DR Congo.

Researcher4306: According to Art. 80 of the Congolese law pertaining to public business (Loi Relative Aux Marches Publics), corruption is illegal. However, the provision does not formally require subsidiaries and sub-contractors to adopt anti-corruption measures nor is it likely that the article is rigorously enforced in light of prevailing corruption across the DRC.

Interviewee 11 believes that this is an ideal far from the DRC at present, as the government uses only a few contractors. Interviewee 25 added that there was no single case they could recall wherein such a requirement was in place.

No publicly available information existed at the time of writing that could contradict this assertion.

Researcher4306: According to the interviewees, acquisitions are largely independent of political influence.

According to Interviewee 11 who has extensive experience in the military establishment, political influence by selling nations plays a minimal role, with the two biggest suppliers being China and the Ukraine. In Interviewee 11's analysis, China sells when approached by the DRC rather than exert pressure on the DRC to buy. Instead of political gain, &quoute;they are more interested in barters - using their own companies to build things in the DRC&quoute;. Interviewee 11 also deemed it unlikely that Ukraine had a sustained political interest in the DRC, especially given that the country does not have an embassy or official representatives there.

Interviewee 25 agreed with this analysis, positing that defence acquisitions are more likely to be determined by potential financial gains to be made by those within the procurement system rather than international political concerns. However, given the lack of a procurement framework and processes for strategic planning, the risk of political considerations preceding military need in purchases is present.