Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There appears to be no available evidence or information on assets disposal in Togo. No data could be found addressing the subject matter. Given the general climate of the country the process is likely to be corruption-ridden and non-transparent.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Constitution of Togo (1992) makes no explicit provisions for independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals. There is no evidence that independent and transparent scrutiny of the disposal of assets takes place for the defence services in Togo, nor are reports of any such scrutiny publicised.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no official indication or media briefing from the government regarding what percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services. Some sources (e.g. Index Mundi & Macro Economic Meter) have tried to provide some estimate of military expenditure in Togo. However, the method of data collection of these sources are not clear and their calculations are quite dated.

Contextual data:
The value for Military expenditure (current LCU) in Togo was 27,849,000,000 as of 2011. As the graph below shows, over the past 23 years this indicator reached a maximum value of 28,148,000,000 in 2010 and a minimum value of 12,834,000,000 in 1988. The Military expenditure as % of central government expenditure of Togo is 10.1 (% of central government expenditure) with a global rank of 41. Togo's Military expenditure as % of central government expenditure had a negative growth (decline) of 5.61 (%) in the last 7 years from (2004 to 2011). Togo had an average Military expenditure as % of central government expenditure of 9.33 (% of central government expenditure) in the last 7 years from (2004 to 2011).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no direct evidence that parliament examines secret budgets nor is there evidence of receiving full information for the budget year. In fact, researcher could find no specific information on secret budget or gain access to audit reports relating to the security sector and secret programs. This may suggest that the process of secret items spending is non-transparent and aggregated. According to the Inter-parliamentary union, the Togolese parliament does not approve government expenditures annually. Under the authority of the President, the Government decides and leads national policy and directs civil and military administration (Article 77 of the Constitution). The President may address messages to the nation, and once a year he/she addresses the state of the nation to the parliament (Article 74 of the Constitution).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that the audit reports are subject to parliamentary debate. Asides from this, the researcher could not find any evidence to support the fact that parliamentary audit of the state budget include annual accounts of the security sector and other secret programs. However, the Inter-parliamentary union (1996-2013) does state that the parliament exercises control over all public funds including defence budget.

It is very unlikely that legislators in Togo are provided with detailed information on secret items; there is little evidence of parliamentary debates on audit reports in Togo. The Court of Audit is responsible for drawing up an annual report addressed to the President and to the Government and to the National Assembly and in which it states, if appropriate, violations committed and liabilities incurred. The documents and information for carrying out a parliamentary audit of the state budget or the verification of the accounts of state companies are communicated by the competent authorities to the President of the National Assembly, for the attention of the President of the Finance Committee.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: In its report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that in Togo there is evidence of frequent expenditure overruns and large expenditures through off-budget operations and exceptional procedures, resulting in the accumulation of substantial domestic and external arrears. In fact, implementation of fiscal policy has been constrained by severe weaknesses in (military) expenditure management and budgetary transparency.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that off-budget military expenditures in Togo involves extra-legal economic activities. Most information on the Togo budget are scanty and comes from external sources (e.g. Trading Economics, Index Mundi, & Open Budget Portal of the World Bank), most of which are either dated or lack detail.

In Togo, there is some evidence of frequent expenditure overruns and large expenditures through off-budget operations, including off-budget military expenditures and exceptional procedures, resulting in the accumulation of substantial domestic and external arrears. Lack of transparency in government and defence financial spending often results in overspending and distortions in expenditure compositions. About 40 percent of all government financial operations in Togo are effected through “suspense account” (Abed 1998). According to George T. Abed of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘The prevalence of extra-budgetary funds, the separation between capital and current budgets, and the inability of the Ministry of Finance to control wages have led to spending overruns and inefficiencies.’

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence in the Togolese law of any provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security. There is evidence of government officials influencing decisions.
For example, Ayi Ayayi (2014) finds in empirical research that there are regulations on
which procurement professionals are supposed to base their decisions. However, they have to deal with inappropriate governmental interference, creating an ethical dilemma. This problem impacts the entire public procurement community because interference or pressure from government officials forces acquisition professionals to make unethical decisions. The Guardian (May 19, 2013), in its Special Report, sees the Togolese government's 'undue interference' as a 'major problem in the aviation sector.'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: While there is no available evidence that national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses in Togo, the Freedom House, Freedom in the World (2012) reports that corruption in Togo continues to be a serious problem, with nepotism and bribery commonplace. In 2011, the Togolese government worked towards improving transparency with a large-scale audit of all ministries and public services to trim government spending. Togo was ranked 143 out of 183 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index. And in 2013, Togo was ranked 123 out of 177 countries surveyed by Transparency International.
Corruption among defence officials in Togo are well documented (Freedom House 2012; US Department of State 2014). According to the Togo 2013 Human Rights Report of the US Department of State, members of the police force tend to carry out their operations with impunity.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence on military-owned business in Togo. If they exist, they are not publicly declared nor subject to transparent independent scrutiny. Reports by the US Department of State (2014) and Freedom House (2012) suggests that military are often perceived by the public as corrupt and abusive.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no substantial evidence to suggest that the military in Togo engages in unauthorised private enterprise, nor that the government outlaws private enterprise on the part of military officials.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is only a general commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures in Togo; the research could find no public commitment to corruption cleanup specific to defence institutions and its agents. The United States Department of State Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs asserted that despite corruption being widespread, Togo’s government is taking steps to reduce corruption (2012). According to the same report, in 2011, the Togo government successfully implemented procurement reforms to increase transparency, with the expectation of reducing corruption (United States Department of State, 2012).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Article 202 of the Criminal Code partly criminalizes the embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official, referring to “any official or agent of the State, of a local authority, public institution or company in which the State or another public authority has acquired an interest or, more
generally, any agent or official of a legal entity under public law who has embezzled, removed, misappropriated or dissipated public funds or equivalent effects, or items, securities, deeds or movable property that were in his or her possession by reason of, or in connection with, the performance of his or her duties” but not to the benefit derived from such illicit acts for another person or entity.

Giving a bribe, whether to private, government or police officials, is considered a crime but is often expected. Also, corruption and mismanagement of public funds remains a widespread problem in the government and security sector. The National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Economic Sabotage is the body responsible for combating corruption. However it remained weak as a result of lack of specific legal mandate to fight corruption. According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for 2012, corruption was endemic and that government corruption was most serious among prison officials, police officers, and members of the judiciary.

The Togolese authorities reported that several cases had been brought under Article 202 in the first years of work of the National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Economic Sabotage but that most of those cases had been settled when the offenders returned the misappropriated funds or property at the investigation stage. Those persons had nonetheless been subject to disciplinary proceedings.

Article 46 of Togo's Constitution (1992) states that 'The public assets are inviolable. Any person or any public agent must scrupulously respect the and protect them. Any act of sabotage, of vandalism, of embezzlement of public assets, of corruption, [or] of dilapidation is punished within the conditions provided by the law.' Notably, this is the only time when corruption is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. The researcher could find no evidence of any public action against personnel on evidence of bribery and corruption.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The researcher could find no institutionalised mechanisms of Whistle-blower protection applicable to military and official personnel that exists to facilitate corruption reporting. Transparency International (2013) report notes that in Togo procedures for whistle-blower protection appear to be restricted to those who report suspicious money-laundering transactions in good faith. Companies, for example, are not required to adopt whistleblower protections and they generally do not do it. When employees report any wrongdoing, they do it anonymously because no protection is offered and they could be fired for doing so (World Bank 2009). While the World Bank source seems dated, the researchers findings from other sources (Transparency International, Freedom House, US Department of State, etc.) suggests that no much has changed.

In 1989, the Whistleblower Protection Act was enacted to strengthen protections, for Federal employees who believe they have been subjected to unjustified personnel actions in reprisal for their whistleblowing activities. In 1994, whistleblower protections were extended to the Department of Veteran Affairs (see Memorandum from Togo West).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that there is (or is not) special attention paid to the selection and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, nor is there any evidence of recognition that certain positions may be more open to corrupt transactions than others. Moreover, the vast bulk of officers in Togo are made up of men coming from the president’s area. Also, the tendency is to favour the units closer to the leader, including paracommando of the Po in Burkina Faso, the ‘Pigeons’ battalion, the rapid intervention force in Togo, and the paramilitary and specific security forces

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The sources available on the number of military personnel in Togo are quite dated and lack detail. Drawing on a World Bank report, Trading Economics notes that the total armed forces personnel in Togo was last measured at 9300 in 2010. No further break-down is provided. In a more recent article, published in January 2014, Defence Web estimates the total force strength of Togo as follows: Army: 8 800, Air Force: 650, Navy: 220, Paramilitary: 2 500 Gendarmerie.

Response to Peer Reviewers: The number of civilian personnel could not be verified. Score has been adjusted to 1.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Research found no reliable information published on pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel for Togo.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: According to an interview with a university academic in Lome, there are widespread delays in salary payment for public servants in Togo. There is an unreliable system of state payment and this extends to the MoD also.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Defer to Peer Reviewer comments. Reports like Freedom House (2012) and US Human Rights Report (2012) have touched on the widespread level of corruption and nepotism in government institutions in Togo, including defence institutions.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of a formalised process or oversight to regulate the promotion process for defence officers. It is also likely that corruption or other inappropriate conduct occurs during the promotions process. Corruption and nepotism is widespread and systemic among public officials in general, according to reports from Freedom House (2012), Transparency International (2013), and World Bank (2010) . According to the US Department of State (2012), approximately 80 percent of the army’s officers and soldiers were from the Kabye ethnic group, which constituted 23 percent of the population and to which the current and previous presidents belonged.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: In Togo, the age for compulsory and voluntary military service is 18; there is a 2-year service obligation. There is no evidence of mechanisms in place to deal with issues of bribery and corruption aside from the broad measures mentioned in Question 35. There is likely to be widespread bribery and corruption.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of mechanisms in place to deal with conscription related issues of bribery and corruption aside from the broad measures mentioned in Question 35. There is likely to be widespread bribery and corruption in Togo according to reports (e.g. Transparency International 2013; Freedom House 2012). No further information could be obtained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The research could find no information or media reports on the phenomenon of ghost soldiers in Togo. There is also no evidence that this is problematised by the Togolese government or defence institutions. However, given the issues with the payment system and limited information regarding the strength of personnel, there is a strong risk of such phenomenon and the score has been selected accordingly.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Accepted, comments and score adjusted accordingly.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: This question could not be verified due to lack of available information.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no known Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel in Togo which covers corruption-related conduct. If there is, it is likely to be ineffective given reports of endemic corruption, inefficiency and abuse in defence institutions in Togo (US Department of State 2012).

Article 202 of the Criminal Code partly criminalizes the embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official, referring to “any official or agent of the State, of a local authority, public institution or company in which the State or another public authority has acquired an interest or, more generally, any agent or official of a legal entity under public law who has embezzled, removed, misappropriated or dissipated public funds or equivalent effects, or items, securities, deeds or movable property that were in his or her possession by reason of, or in connection with, the performance of his or her duties” but not to the benefit derived from such illicit acts for another person or entity. The Togolese authorities reported that several cases had been brought under this provision in the first years of work of the National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Economic Sabotage but that most of those cases had been settled when the offenders returned the misappropriated funds or property at the investigation stage. Those persons had nonetheless been subject to disciplinary proceedings.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of a code of conduct which is effectively enforced in Togo although conduct standards are specified in legislation in regard to bribery and corruption, as discussed in Question 35. Notably, the country was ranked 123 out of 177 countries and territories surveyed in Transparency International's 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index. The operational capacities of anti‐corruption agencies and of those promoting transparency and good governance (Anti‐Corruption Commission, State General Controller, Cells in charge of controlling the management of public funds within the Ministries) to deal with corruption cases and other financial offences are very weak (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014).

Response to Peer Reviewer: Accepted, comments reflected in main answer and score adjusted to 1.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is evidence of some anti-corruption training in Togo. The capacity of law enforcement agencies (Search and Investigation Service, Anti‐Gang Brigades (Gendarmerie), Anti‐Narcotics and Prostitution Brigades, Criminal Directorate of the National Police and the Anti‐Drugs Directorate of the Togolese Customs) to investigate transnational organised crime cases is increasingly improved through training and appropriate logistical support provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Also, an UNODC report notes that the capacities of Togo’s intelligence agencies to collect, analyse, process and exchange intelligence for the purpose of investigation are strengthened through the provision of equipment and technical training so as to foster prosecution; and Strategic advice on criminal justice matters is provided within the framework of the ongoing Justice Modernisation Programme.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The researcher could find no evidence of prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. There is an entrenched culture of impunity among defence officials according to public evidence (US Department of State). Although abuses by security forces were subject to internal disciplinary investigations and criminal prosecution by the Ministry of Justice, this rarely occurred. The government generally neither investigated nor punished effectively those who committed abuses (BTI 2014).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There are no specific law that directly addresses facilitation payments. Although Article 46 of Togo's 1992 Constitution does state that 'The public assets are inviolable. Any person or any public agent must scrupulously respect the and protect them. Any act of sabotage, of vandalism, of embezzlement of public assets, of corruption, [or] of dilapidation is punished within the conditions provided by the law.
The operational capacities of anti‐corruption agencies and of those promoting transparency and good governance (Anti‐Corruption Commission, State General Controller, Cells in charge of controlling the management of public funds within the Ministries) to deal with corruption cases and other financial offences are very weak. ‘Government procurement contracts and dispute settlements are more likely to go forward after palms are greased. Giving a bribe, whether to private or government officials, is considered a crime but is often expected’ (Wikileaks 2009). Not much has changed in this regard (see BTI 2012).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of a military doctrine in Togo that specifically addresses the issue of corruption during operations. At the same time, there is no available reports or news that that peace keeping officers from Togo engage in corruption during operations. Notably, despite its small geographic size and population, Togo has committed almost 200 police, troops and experts to the United Nations as of January 2014. The country has contributed some of the largest continents of peacekeeping forces operating in the African region.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is some evidence of military training for Togolese commanders. In 2012, for example, United States’s Institute of Peace, USIP travelled to Togo to provide negotiation training to the country’s military for upcoming peacekeeping missions. The visit marked the second Togo visit for Milofsky, who works for USIP’s Academy for International Conflict Management and Peace building, which trains African Security Personnel as part of the State Department’s African Contigency Operations Training and Assistance Program, that USIP has worked with for the last few years. The parliament exercises control over national defence policy when troops are dispatched overseas.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that the government of Togo deploys trained professionals to monitor corruption risk during peace keeping operations.It is highly unlikely given the lack of recognition of corruption as an issue in operations and the score has been selected on the basis of this assumption.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: It is not clear whether or not Togo has any guideline in place for addressing corruption risk in contracting. There is no evidence of any relevant guidelines or training in place for peacekeeping forces.

Response to Government Reviewer: Score adjusted to 1 as there is no public information to verify this.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is some evidence that private military contractors are hired in Togo and that their activities are not effectively regulated by the government. In a bid to develop its maritime forces to control piracy and protect the Gulf of Guinea shipping routes, for instance, there are unconfirmed reports that Togo hired the services of the US private maritime security firm AdvanFort. AdvanFort, which has recently rebranded itself as AdvanFort International amid the increased international demand for private maritime security, has successfully conducted counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman for several years. However, AdvanFort has courted some controversy, including the revelation that one of the company’s suppliers provided firearms to AdvanFort without the proper export licence in 2011, leading to a fire and a two-year probation period from the US government.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Togolese government procurement procedures are defined by the Code promulgated in 1993 (Ordinance No. 93-006 of 4 August 1993) and by Decree No. 94-039/PR of 10 June 1994. The Government Procurement
Code is administered by the National Procurement Commission, made up of an official appointed by the Prime Minister (Chairman of the Commission), four representatives of the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, two representatives of the Minister of Public Works, one representative of the Minister of Planning, one representative of the Minister of Commerce, one representative of the Minister of State-owned enterprises and three representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry of Togo. The Committee for the Study and Control of Procurement Projects is responsible for monitoring the contracts awarded by the National Commission. In reality, however, procurement decrees are weakly monitored and enforced.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Information related to the complete defence procurement cycle is not available nor accessible.

Response to Peer Reviewer: Information appreciated. However, this is one aspect of the process only and as such a score higher than 0 is not justified.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is evidence of some defence procurement oversight in Togo. The Government Procurement Code is administered by the National Procurement Commission, made up of an official appointed by the Prime Minister (Chairman of the Commission), four representatives of the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, two representatives of the Minister of Public Works, one representative of the Minister of Planning, one representative of the Minister of Commerce, one representative of the Minister of State-owned enterprises and three representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry of Togo. The Committee for the Study and Control of Procurement Projects is responsible for monitoring the contracts awarded by the National Commission. That said, oversight mechanisms in Togo appear to be ineffective and non-transparent according to a detailed empirical report (see Ayayi 2014).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no report on defence purchases available to the Togolese public. As concerns the public
finance management system, recent diagnostic studies have revealed gaps of which the most prominent are: (i) budget credibility, monitoring of execution and transparency of budget operations; (ii) no accountability in resource use; and (iii) weak internal and external control mechanisms for the financial operations of the State (Trade Policies Review). That said, the regulations required for an equitable and competitive procurement process are increasingly in place in Togo, and most interviewed Togolese public agree that there has been some progress in this area the past decade. In the 2012 Investment Climate Statement, the United States Department of State Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs asserted that despite corruption being widespread, Togo’s government is taking steps to reduce corruption (2012). According to the same report, in 2011, the Togo government successfully implemented procurement reforms to increase transparency, with the expectation of reducing corruption. Government procurements are now published in a weekly government periodical, and once contracts are awarded, all bids and the winner are published in the weekly government procurement publication (Ayayi 2014).

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Given information regarding defence purchases is provided by the delivering country or the manufacturer, rather than the government, a score higher than 0 is not justified.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: No specific information applicable to defence contracts was found. However, there are general requirements (compliance and ethical standards) which companies are expected to follow in Togo. The National Directorate of Procurement Monitoring works with the regulator of public procurement, the relevant ministries, professional organizations, writing and validation of implementing legislation relating to public procurement regulations and delegations public service, in particular, standard documents, procedure manuals, guides and others. A government contract is compulsory for all expenditure on works, supplies or services exceeding CFAF 15 million, whether the orders come from the State, from local authorities or from governmental corporations, including State-owned companies; parastatals are excluded from the application of the Government Procurement Code.

Score 0 has been selected as there appears to be no discrimination between bidding companies on grounds of integrity.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no data to support the fact that there is a national security strategy guiding the formulation of procurement requirements in Togo.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no sign that defence purchases are disclosed or based on identified and quantified requirements. Information on defence purchases are not accessible. There is also evidence that Togo government officials interfere unduly in the public procurement processes (Ayayi 2014).

Score 1 has been selected in recognition of comments put forth by Peer Reviewer 2 and the Government Reviewer (whose comments could not be verified by public information).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Although the Togo government as a whole is striving to improve the public procurement system along with an open competition system, media reports suggest that a number of public officials still believe most contracts are single-sourced and it is acceptable to influence procurement professionals in order to get contracts awarded to companies that they personally favour (The guardian 26 September 2013). The regulations required for an equitable and competitive procurement process are increasingly in place in Togo, and there is some agreement that there has been some progress in this area in the past decade (Ayayi 2014).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Tender boards appear to be subject to some degree of regulation by an oversight body. Created by Decree No. 2009-295 / PR, the National Monitoring Directorate of Public Procurement (DNCMP) is a structure under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Its main role to control for a priori procedure for the award of contracts valued above a threshold set by regulation and public service delegations. It may carry a posteriori control of procedures for the award of contracts below the threshold. The DNCMP mission control procedures for awarding public contracts and public service delegations and monitoring their implementation. The DNCMP is under the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Ministry of Economy and Finance is responsible for the overall direction of economic and financial policy of the government and the management of state assets.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no law specific to the defence sector that outlaws collusive behaviour between bidders for defence and security contracts.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is evidence of limited, general training provided to project and contract managers in Togo. The National Directorate of Procurement Monitoring works with the regulator of public procurement to the planning and organization of the education and training of actors in the system for the award of public contracts and public service delegations. According to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, one of the core activities of the National Monitoring Directorate of Public Procurement (DNCMP) is to provide seminars and training workshops for capacity building to ensure that contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery. However, widespread corruption in procurement and the shortage of manpower remains significant problems in Togo according to research (Ayayi 2014).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no formal mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived or real malpractice in procurement in Togo.

Response to Government Reviewer: It is not clear what regulation is being referred and given no evidence has been presented or found, score 0 is maintained.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no knowledge of the existence of effective sanctions for corrupt suppliers. Reports suggest that public officials in Togo practice corruption with impunity and the business climate is generally corrupt and non-conducive for business and investment (US Department of State 2012).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Togolese government does not appear to impose any anti-corruption due diligence or auditing requirements on offset contracts. World Bank Doing Business Indicator places Togo at 162 out of 183 countries for ease of doing business. The Doing Business Indicator is the most relevant of all indicators because it measures multiple issues, including corruption risk, start up cost and barriers to entry, which are high in Togo due to an unclear regulatory environment and a lengthy business-formation process.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Details of government's offset contracts are not made public.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no supporting evidence that offset contracts are subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract. This is partly due to the lack of information on offset contracts. However, competition for offset contracts in Togo is very limited, according to research (Ayayi 2014). Media report suggest that public officials still believe most contracts are single-sourced and it is acceptable to influence procurement professionals in order to get contracts awarded to companies that they personally favour (The guardian 26 September 2013).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no policy in Togo on the use of agents and intermediaries.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The parliament exercises control over all public funds, including defence budget and financing package surrounding major arms deal. There is no publicly available Information on financing package surrounding major arms deal in Togo. The National Assembly votes the final decision on the finance bill (Article 81 of the Constitution). However, the Senate compulsorily gives its recommendation before the National Assembly vote on the finance bill (Inter-parliamentary Union 2013).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that having anti-corruption programmes is a formal requirements for subsidiaries and sub-contractors in Togo. However, Togolese law (Article 46) makes provisions for criminal penalties for official corruption and related misconduct. However, the government did not implement the laws effectively and officials and contractors frequently engaged in corruption with impunity. Giving a bribe, whether to private, government or police officials, is considered a crime but is often expected. Also, corruption and nepotism remains a widespread problem in the procurement cycle (Ayayi 2014). The National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Economic Sabotage is the body responsible for combating corruption . However it remained weak as a result of lack of specific legal mandate to fight corruption (BTI 2012).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: According to SIPRI’s arms transfers database, France and Botswana have been its only arms suppliers in the past ten years, with France accounting for a majority of the arms purchases. Togo has significant historical ties with France and has strong existing historical relations and as such political influence cannot be ruled out, especially given that there is no public information to verify the need for purchases made. This likely materialises in the case of French desire to sell surplus or older equipment that is not necessarily mission-specific for Togo, but will be heavily discounted or incentivised. Exaggeration of threats and strategic responsibilities from a French defence marketing point of view may aid in this, and risk overwhelming any initial, legitimate military need by Togo.