Iraq

There is no information regarding such disposal of assets or the proceeds of their sale. Shrouding this issue is the use by Iraqi government departments of shell companies (defined as a company with a physical address, but absent of actual operations or assets), and the treating of ministries by political factions as fiefdoms.

According to ICG’s findings – based, in turn, on CoI and IG investigations – senior political office-holders, including in MoD and the Office of the Prime Minister, used shell companies overseas to enter into ‘cooperation agreements’ with ministries and state-owned firms, thus avoiding any procurement requirements. Contracts would often be paid in full, but many not implemented completely. (ICG, September 2011, pp.7-8 & p.10)

More recently, Toby Dodge has written that Iraq’s system of allocating ministries to political groups has enabled “the Iraqi political elite to strip state assets for personal gain and to fund the parties they represent” (Survival, 17 September 2014). Therefore, any controls that do exist cannot be regarded as effective.

Response to Government Reviewer: Agree with comments.

Aside from broad reports of behaviour and practices that are unaccountable and opaque (ICG, September 2011, pp.7-8 & p.10; Survival, 17 September 2014), there is no specific information on asset disposal in the defence sector. Reported scrutiny of asset disposals is not available. It is unclear whether or not asset disposals are scrutinised by an oversight body. Given the lack of transparency, the score awarded is 0.

Response to Government Reviewer: Agree with comments.

This information is not available. However, Iraq has reportedly engaged in extra-budgetary spending (spending on the military from other sections of the state budget – SIPRI) to cover the $50-million-per-day costs of fighting the insurgency during 2014 by using funds from the general budget, the Iraq Development Fund, and oil revenues (Musings on Iraq, 02 October 2014).

A December 2013 report into Iraqi parliamentary corruption indicates that MPs had some awareness of the breakdown of budgets, but stated that “extraordinary expenses whose exact nature could not be determined” were also included, suggesting that not all elements of the budget are detailed (IMS, December 2013).

During interview, an MP elaborated that the budget requests from ministries are broken down into individual items - including the Ministry of Defence - but that an undefined budget line for 'Other' expenses with unspecified purposes exists among the itemised expenditures listed (Interview, 01 September 2015).

The government reviewer maintains that there is no hidden expenditure. From the evidence above, that might be true to the extent that it is listed - however simply because there is a budget line annotated as 'Other' does not mean all otherwise unspecified expenditures are accounted for under this heading. Insufficient evidence to support a score change and the assertion that the legislature is provided with very limited or abbreviated information on secret items.

Neither the websites of the Commission of Integrity or the Board of Supreme Audit indicate that the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs are provided to the legislature, and/or are open to scrutiny and debate. These are both regularly updated (CoI; BSA).

Response to government reviewer:
There were no sources provided and none could be found to support this statement. Score maintained.

The World Bank states that Iraq engages in “extensive off-budget” activities where the Ministry of Finance “frequently resorts to reallocating appropriations, without parliamentary oversight, of the current budget to address shifting needs.” This suggests that such shifting of funds is not exceptional or out of the ordinary.

The Ministry of Finance, under the public financial management law, does have the legal authority to shift funds. According to the World Bank, whether these actions are recorded for the purposes of auditing by other bodies later is not clear, and actual spending may therefore not mirror budgeted spending (World Bank, 2014, p.xiii & pp.62-63). This may or may not indicate that the practice is well controlled.

Iraq has reportedly engaged in extra-budgetary spending (spending on the military from other sections of the state budget – SIPRI) to cover the $50-million-per-day costs of fighting the insurgency during 2014 by using funds from the general budget, the Iraq Development Fund, and oil revenues. It is not clear whether this is illegal in Iraq (Musings on Iraq, 02 October 2014). This has caused a major decline in Iraq Development Funds, perhaps suggesting that the process lacks controls.

Response to Government Reviewer: No sources provided to support comments. Score increased from 0 to 1 to reflect that off-budget military expenditures are permitted by law, and though they are recorded, this recording is incomplete or is otherwise unreliable.

In fighting ISIS during 2014, the GoI has reportedly used funds from the general budget, the Iraq Development Fund, and oil revenues (Musings on Iraq, 02 October 2014). The World Bank reported in 2014 that Iraq engages in &quoute;extensive off-budget activities&quoute;. These particular activities, if processed by the Ministry of Finance, which is legally authorised to transfer budget allocations, would not appear to be illegal (World Bank, 2014, p.62).

Response to Government Reviewer: No sources provided to support score. Score 1 chosen to reflect that there are substantial off-budget military expenditures but evidence suggests this involves licit, rather than illicit, economic activity.

There are some legal exemptions for disclosing information. For example, Article 18 of the Charter for the Iraqi National Intelligence Service states that the INIS will be exempt from any requirements to disclose information (Charter for the INIS, A.18).

However, there is no evidence of clear legal provisions for classifying information. The former Prime Minister invoked national security as his justification for not disclosing information or responding to requests from legislative or other oversight bodies (NCRI, 31 March 2013). Media outlets have been threatened with closure under new guidelines if their reporting is regarded as affecting “national security” (HRW, 03 July 2014).

The internet was blocked to varying degrees across Iraq on the auspices of preventing ISIS using it (The Independent, 17 June 2014), but this was reportedly ineffective (The Daily Beast, 20 June 2014), raising questions as to the real reasons for doing so.

Shortly after the fall of the Ba’ath regime in 2003, many state owned enterprises (SOEs) were disbanded or, if functioning and viable, privatised under free-market principles (PRISM, p.163). However, some SOEs still exist and employ an estimated 500,000 Iraqis, but the World Bank remains uncertain on further details (World Bank, 2014, pp.18-19).

The number of SOEs in 2012 was calculated to be 192, and emblematic of Iraq’s intransigence in moving away from a state economy to a market economy. They employ somewhere in the region of 500,000-650,000 Iraqis. Many are inefficient and lose money. Iraq’s defence sector is not explicitly listed as having commercial interests in SOEs (Musings on Iraq, 05 March 2013; RFI, 20 May 2012; MEI, 26 July 2012).

According to an anonymous member of Iraqi army, the Iraqi military no longer owns commercial businesses, and the housing cooperation referred to by the government reviewer was stated as no longer existing (Anonymous member of Iraqi army, interviewed 01 September 2015).

There have been reports of widespread Iraqi government officials’ (including from the Ministry of Defence) involvement in shell companies. These are not so much commercial businesses in which defence and security institutions are investors, but rather vehicles for fraudulent activity and profiteering. (ICG, September 2011, pp.7-8 & p.10; Survival, 17 September 2014) The transparency of such businesses is non-existent.

Evidence does not indicate that official military-owned legitimate business enterprises are in operation. (World Bank, 2014, pp.18-19; Musings on Iraq, 05 March 2013; RFI, 20 May 2012; MEI, 26 July 2012)

According to an anonymous member of the Iraqi army, the Iraqi military no longer owns commercial business. The housing cooperation referred to by the government reviewer is believed to no longer exist (Anonymous member of the Iraqi army, interviewed 01 September 2015).

Nevertheless, there have been reports of widespread Iraqi government officials’ (including from the Ministry of Defence) involvement in shell companies. These are not so much commercial businesses in which defence and security institutions are investors, but rather vehicles for fraudulent activity and profiteering. (ICG, September 2011, pp.7-8 & p.10; Survival, 17 September 2014) The transparency of such businesses is non-existent.

There is some defence sector involvement in commercial enterprises, some of this activity has been revealed through investigation by anti-corruption bodies (the CoI and BSA) in Iraq. Some MoD officials have reportedly been involved in shell companies. These are not so much commercial businesses in which defence and security institutions are investors, but rather vehicles for fraudulent activity and profiteering. (ICG, September 2011, pp.7-8 & p.10; Survival, 17 September 2014) The transparency of such businesses is non-existent.

There is no evidence that the Iraqi government discourages unauthorised/illegal private enterprises despite the fact that “the Iraqi Public Procurement Law aims at establishing transparency in the procurement system and introduces measures to reduce fraud and corruption.&quoute; (Business Anti-Corruption Portal) Reports of money laundering are apparently overlooked, enabling officials to spirit billions harvested from unmonitored fake projects and dubious investments out of the country. (Al Monitor, 21 August 2013). It has also been reported that, “through a web of alliances including Iraqi politicians, unions, oil syndicates and militias”, Iran has obtained Iraqi oil in an effort to limit the effects of sanctions against herself (UPI, 10 February 2012).

Although PM Abadi has retired or moved senior military figures in response to inefficiencies, corruption, etc. (ISW, November 2014), there is no evidence of such actions in the defence sector. An October 2014 interview with Army Chief of Staff Babikir made no mention of corruption, let alone a commitment to tackle it. (Rudaw, 26 October 2014)

However, the new Minister of Defence, Khalid al-Obeidi told viewers of a televised speech that the government’s mission was to confront corruption (and terrorism), although, according to the article, he did not elaborate either a strategy or a public commitment to existing anti-corruption and integrity measures. (Asharq Al-Awsat, 22 October 2014)

The new Interior Minister, Mohammed Salam al-Ghabban, also vowed in an interview to fight the corruption in the security services. Again, no commitment to existing measures was made. (Al Monitor, 23 October 2014) One Major General also noted the danger of corruption shortly after the rout of the Iraqi Army in Mosul in June 2014. (NBC News, 24 June 2014)

Response to peer reviewer and government reviewer:
Agreed. Score amended from 0 to 1.

Measures are in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption. However, there is evidence that these measures lack effectiveness or consistency.

Measures exist to punish those found to have taken part in corruption and bribery. Although improvements can be seen, the effectiveness of measures for personnel (across the Iraqi state apparatus) suspected of or investigated over corruption is, however, in doubt. Only 9% of public officials surveyed by UNODC refused a bribe because they feared the consequences. (UNODC, January 2013, p.36) This hardly suggests widespread faith in or fear of the system.

Although the numbers of criminal investigations 786 in 2004/5 to 6,779 in 2009 and 11,671 in 2011) and referrals to court under CoI have increased (jumping from 1,084 in 2009 to 5,682 in 2011), the percentage of convictions is low (257 in 2009 to 1,661 in 2011). Moreover, only half (867 in 2011) of those convicted in 2011 were convicted in person and actually served their sentence.

Investigation and prosecution remain challenging, and conviction rates are low: “In 2011, for every 100 people investigated in criminal corruption cases by the CoI, some 37 were referred to court, 11 were convicted, 8 were convicted in person and less than 6 were convicted in person and had their sentences actually carried out (not suspended). In other words, these data show that for each person convicted of corruption charges in Iraq, some 18 were investigated in the initial stages of the procedure.” (UNODC, January 2013, pp.7-8)

It appears to be widely accepted that many powerful or well-connected individuals implicated in scandal or opaque practices have still been able to rely on political patronage or obstructions being placed in the way of investigators in order to avoid punishment. (Iraqi News, 21 January 2013; Survival, 17 September 2014; Musings on Iraq, 09 December 2013)

The CoI offers whistleblowers the means to report corruption through its hotlines (CoI). However, many civil servants surveyed by UNODC voiced concerns about the repercussions of whistle-blowing. They feared the potential adverse consequences of reporting corruption, and indicated a lack of faith in the state to protect them: 66.3% would not feel adequately protected (38.9% of those are afraid of losing their job, while 22.8% fear physical harm) (UNODC, January 2013, p.7, p.11).

Public sector workers are theoretically protected from reprisals by law, but private sector workers are not (Business Anti-Corruption Portal). However, the US State Department states that “There was no evidence of laws pertaining to whistleblower protection”. It added that “Authorities frequently arrested or investigated officials for revealing human rights abuses or corruption by other government officials” (US DoS, 27 February 2014).

Pressure has been put on those reporting corruption in the past: journalist Hadi Al Mahdi was shot dead shortly after being threatened, and he had been detained and beaten (The Washington Post, 09 September 2011; The Independent, 29 September 2011); and other journalists have been paid or coerced into silence (Muftah, 24 April 2013); while each of the first three heads of the CoI appointed since 2004 resigned after having political pressure put on them, having their investigations obstructed, and their staff threatened with violence (Survival, September 2014; SMEP, June 2014, pp.15-16).

Although some ministries have more competitive recruitment processes than others (Bertelsmann, 2014, p.26), across much of the public sector the only special attention paid in hiring is to each largely unqualified individual’s family connections, and political ties (Musings on Iraq, 24 March 2014) or because of sectarian or ethnic quotas (Al Monitor, June 2015).

The UNODC/CoI report for the civil service elaborates on the non-transparent recruitment experience in Iraq. (UNODC, January 2013, pp.55-63) That applicants may or may not actually hold the degrees they claim is not necessarily a hindrance to employment (Al Jazeera, 01 October 2013). Iraq’s political elite set the most public example of nepotism – which automatically raises questions about the candidates’ true qualifications and the transparency of the hiring process. (Niqash, 21 July 2011)

In contrast to those perhaps employed unjustifiably, others have been barred from employment through discrimination. In addition to a point made by a reviewer for Transparency International's 2013 version of this index regarding vetting for employment according to de-Baathification, the International Centre for Transitional Justice wrote in 2013 that a repeated perception for Sunnis of de-Baathification was &quoute;de-Sunnification&quoute; (ICTJ, March 2013, p.17).

An assessor for Transparency International's 2013 version of this index noted that corruption tainted many more Iraqis than just those in sensitive positions. Other sources agree. In general terms, Patrick Cockburn noted in March 2013 a former minister's observation that &quoute;the Iraqi government is an institutionalised kleptocracy&quoute;, and a political scientist stated that all army or government jobs require a payment - as does leaving prison after being legally freed (The Independent, March 2013).

A June 2013 survey recorded that 35% of civil servants reported not having been subject to a formal hiring procedure (Wall Street Journal, 21 June 2013). Al Monitor reported in February 2015 about the increasing numbers of graduates and post-graduates struggling to find work, and individuals it spoke to included among the causes the fact that students were purchasing degrees or academic certificates, which then caused a glut of qualified - on paper, at least - job hunters (Al-Monitor, February 2015).

The government reviewer's claim that great attention is paid to applicants' CVs and professional capabilities is at odds with the above evidence.

Personnel figures are not provided by government officials.

In its 2014 report, the World Bank put the total number employed by the MoD at 306,614, and the MoI at 639,485. (World Bank, 2014, p.115) The Iraqi Army has 13 infantry divisions and one armoured division and two Special Forces brigades. (CSIS, June 2014, p.38) A division is 10,000-18,000 soldiers, while a brigade is 3000-6000. That puts the number of soldiers at 146,000-262,000.

The Navy is believed to have 3,600 personnel, while the Air Force’s size is not known. The MoI is reported to have a total (across the Iraqi Police Service, Federal Police, Border Enforcement, Facilities Protection Service, Oil Police) of 531,000. (CSIS, June 2014, pp.38-45) Working on the basis of these figures, the MoD has anywhere between 149,600-265,600 military personnel, and 157,014+ civilian personnel. (For the record, another source puts the figure of 350,000 soldiers alone – LRB, 17 July 2014) The MoI has 108,495 civilian personnel.

These approximate figures cannot be considered accurate, as CSIS’ 2011 table of MoD and MoI numbers notes that these are ‘payroll’ numbers, not ‘present-for-duty totals’. (CSIS, June 2014, p.7) Iraqi Army activities during 2014 have laid plain the fact that much of the military’s strength exists (and has historically existed – see sources in Survival) only on paper – ‘ghost’ soldiers and absenteeism are common. (Survival, 17 September 2014; Niqash, 02 October 2014; LRB, 17 July 2014; HRW, 26 December 2013) Desertions are estimated to have amounted to 70,000-90,000 over June 2014 alone. (The Washington Post, 11 July 2014)

Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score amended from 1 to 0.

Few sources actually quote figures for military or civilian personnel. No official GoI and MoD sources have been found noting salaries. Allowances are not included in any of the sources.

Although there is a formal, published system relating to the provision of wages - Law No.22 of 2008 was produced to establish guidance as to what wages civil servants would receive in accordance with their grade - Article 19 places military personnel and some others apart (Government and Public Sector Employees Salaries Law No.22 - 2008, Art.19).

Only media sources indicate salaries. Haaretz reports that the monthly salary for a soldier (rank not given) is $1000-1200. For an officer (again, rank not specified) it could be $6000. (Haaretz, 20 June 2014)

Another report, quoting an Iraqi military affairs expert, stated that an ordinary soldier would receive a monthly salary of $1300 or more, while those ranked Major General and above earn $6000. (Al Akhbar, 13 June 2014)

The average government employee’s salary is $400 (Al-Ahram, 01 August 2013) or $500 per month (Al Monitor, 04 March 2013).

Personnel do not always receive the correct pay on time. In June 2014, the government announced that it was cutting salaries in conflict-hit areas of the country, including Baghdad and Kirkuk. A journalist added that workers in ministries had not yet been paid (Al Arabiya, 30 June 2014). The government added that once military operations had ended in those areas, civil servants would be paid and given back-pay. (AFP, 24 June 2014)

Volunteers who signed up to fight during 2014 have complained of unpaid or only partially-paid salaries (RFERL, 02 October 2014; Reuters, 27 April 2014). Sahwa paramilitaries once on the government payroll began to be paid intermittently during their excommunication from the state defence forces (WINEP, 31 July 2013).

There is, however, a formal, published system of wages. Law No.22 of 2008 was produced to establish guidance as to what wages civil servants would receive in accordance with their grade. (Al Iraq Times, 03 October 2013) However, Article 19 places military personnel and some others apart (Government and Public Sector Employees Salaries Law No.22 - 2008, Art.19).

Iraq’s Constitution makes it plain that the Council of Ministers (i.e., the Cabinet, headed by the Prime Ministers) must make recommendations to the Council of Representatives (Parliament) for that latter body to “approve the appointment of undersecretaries, ambassadors, state senior officials, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and his deputies, division commanders or higher, the Director of the National Intelligence Service, and heads of security institutions”. Article 80 (5) could not be clearer that Parliament has the final say over these appointments. (Iraqi Constitution) Parliamentary approval is needed under the constitution for the appointment of senior military commanders.

However, the system that has operated over the last 5-6 years is not independent, transparent or objective. The Council of Representatives has “not approved a single military commander” (ISW, April 2013, p.16), ex-Prime Minister Maliki violated Iraq’s constitution by appointing military commanders directly himself. (Foreign Policy, 19 July 2014) According to Toby Dodge, the former Prime Minister “worked successfully to coup-proof the military, tying senior commanders and paramilitary units to him personally and thereby subverting the formal chain of command.” (Survival, 17 September 2014)

The forces in Iraq under the direct control of the Prime Minister through the Office of the Commander in Chief, particularly the Iraqi Counter-Terrorist Service and its Iraqi Special Operations Forces, lie outside the formal chain of command and the structure of the MoD. The Office of the Commander in Chief operates outside the law, it has no framework to control how it operates, and is not subject to any oversight. (ISW, April 2013, p.10)

In a similar vein to the lack of transparency and objectivity that surrounds the selection of high-ranking personnel, the promotion of military personnel is now a widely and systematically corrupt process, with promotion up the chain of common contingent on one criterion – the capacity to pay the going price.

“[O]ther positions at every level” are for sale in the Iraqi Army (CSIS, June 2014, p.38), costing from $3000 for a place at the Officer Training Academy to $30,000 for promotion to general. (Survival, 17 September 2014). A divisional commander’s job that cost $20,000 in 2009 was reported in July to now cost an estimated $2,000,000. (LRB, 17 July 2014)

Military officers and advisers have stated that a fixed pricing system exists for the army and police according to rank (HRW, 26 December 2013).

Conscription was suspended in 2003 through CPA Order Number 2, Section 3(2). Although conscription was suggested in 2012 as a means of reducing youth unemployment (Al Arabiya, 25 May 2012), this was not taken up. There is no compulsory conscription in Iraq. (CIA) Therefore the score awarded is N/A.

Iraq does not have compulsory or voluntary conscription (CIA). With regard to a policy of refusing bribes, the evidence points strongly towards there in fact being a culture of accepting bribes. (LRB, 17 July 2014; HRW, 26 December 2013; Niqash, 02 October 2014).

There have been cases of ghost soldiers reported in the past five years; however, the MOD or military is taking steps to reform payment systems to prevent ghost soldiers.

Reported evidence, particularly over the summer 2014, indicates strongly that the Iraqi Army has many ‘ghost’ (non-existent) and absentee soldiers (LRB, 17 July 2014; HRW, 26 December 2013; Niqash, 02 October 2014; Survival, 17 September 2014; Carnegie, 23 June 2014).

In late-2014 the GoI announced that it was aware of the 'ghost soldier' phenomenon and was taking measures to clamp down on it (Washington Post, November 2014; NBC News, December 2014; Al Jazeera, November 2014). The Iraqi prime minister has fired dozens of top officials after the government uncovered an estimated 50,000 ghost soldiers on the military payroll.

Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score amended from 0 to 1.

Such information is not published by the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Finance. Reported incidents of commanders pocketing soldiers’ salaries (wholesale or a percentage) would suggest that chains of command are not separate from chains of payment. (Haaretz, 20 June 2014; War on the Rocks, July 2014; SMH, 28 October 2014; Al Jazeera, November 2014) The widespread phenomenon of 'ghost soldiers' further indicates a lack of separation.

CoI states that it is among its aims to “promulgate [a/the] code of conduct for public sector employees” (CoI). It is not clear from the CoI whether a Code of Conduct does actually exist. And no other evidence has been found indicating the existence of one, let alone one specific to military personnel and anti-corruption (OECD, June 2010; OECD, 2010; UNODC, January 2013).

Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score revised from 1 to 0.

The CoI ‘Annual Reports’ section of its website has its most recent report dated August 2011, covering events of 2010. (CoI) Phenomena such as ‘ghost’ soldiers (those that exist only on paper), ‘astronaut’ soldiers (those that exist, but pay to stay away from the frontline) (LRB, 17 July 2014; HRW, 26 December 2013; Niqash, 02 October 2014; Survival, 17 September 2014; Carnegie, 23 June 2014), payment for rank (CSIS, June 2014, p.38; Survival, 17 September 2014; LRB, 17 July 2014; HRW, 26 December 2013), and subjective and non-transparent appointments have existed for a number of years.

The lead on these activities is widely indicated to have come from the very top in the shape of the former Prime Minister who blocked anti-corruption investigations, and set up a parallel security sector outside legislative oversight. (Iraqi News, 21 January 2013; ISW, April 2013; Foreign Policy, 19 July 2014; Survival, 17 September 2014) The length of time that these practices have been in operation indicates that significant breaches of the Code of Conduct are not and have not been effectively addressed.

However, the number of investigations, charges, prosecutions and convictions of individuals in the public sector alleged to have been involved in forms of corruption have all risen year on year. While the final conviction rate remains low, and while prosecutions largely involve lower-level officials, this nonetheless suggests some progress. (UNODC, January 2013, pp.49-53)

Anti-corruption training for military personnel cannot be regarded as a regular occurrence. Training on anti-corruption is believed to be non-existent for serving personnel. (Interviewee 1, 28 October 2014) Only 6.7% of all public servants across Iraq had received any anti-corruption and integrity training by January 2013 – in some ministries and institutions, only 3% had received such training. (UNODC/COI, p.9)

However, CoI reports that it is educating civilian state employees. (CoI, 30 June 2014) How regular or systematic this is (i.e., whether it forms part of a schedule, or is a series of one-offs) is not clear. There is no evidence on the CoI website to suggest that this training is applied to military or security personnel. And evidence in other answers of graft within the army particularly, would either confirm the absence of training to military and security personnel or suggest that whatever training had been given was not effective.

In a breakdown of its assistance mission to Iraq, NATO reported on the steps it had taken until the end of its mandate in 2011 to train Iraq’s security forces (military and police). In its training aimed at mid- to senior-level officers, anti-corruption training is not mentioned. (NATO, June 2013) The main areas of NATO cooperation with Iraq since then included “education and training, response to terrorism, counter-IED, explosive ordnance disposal, defence Institution building and communication strategy”. Again, the issue of corruption is not specifically mentioned. (NATO, December 2013)

The results of prosecutions of defence personnel specifically are not known. Any policy – and it is not clear that one exists – would more likely come from CoI, given its remit over investigations. CoI regularly informs the public through its website – in particular the ‘News’ section. Here training events, arrests, prosecutions, and updates are posted on a regular basis. (CoI. For example: 24 July 2014; 22 June 2014)

In addition, the 2013 joint report between UNODC and CoI (and others) provided statistics on the increase in prosecutions over recent years: from 257 in 2009 to 1016 in 2010 and 1661 in 2011. (UNODC/CoI, January 2013, p.51) In 2012 ministers ordered major investigations of graft to be dropped (US DoS, May 2013, p.36), and investigations of corruption were not free from political interference. (US DoS, January 2014, p.41)

However, and although the source does not specify from which departments the officials hailed, or their seniority, in the first ten months of 2013, 1,138 government officials were convicted, and the CoI referred 2,541 suspects in 1,778 corruption cases totalling $112 million to the judiciary (US DoS, January 2014, p.41) (although the outcome was not clear in these cases – i.e., whether the cases were successfully prosecuted, or, as noted above, were dropped or received political interference).

One success story is in the case of the faulty bomb detectors. Five months after bomb detectors, purchased at great cost ($85 million) by the GoI, were found to be faulty and the manufacturer imprisoned in the UK, they were still being used in Iraq. In May 2013, the Prime Minister was still insisting that the detectors worked. Major General Jihan al-Jabiri and two other officials were eventually jailed for corruption over the deal. (The Independent, October 2013) (Please note: Yet these bomb detectors are still being used, and moves have only recently been made to have them removed from circulation – Musings on Iraq, 29 October 2014.)

The Iraqi Penal Code 1969 outlines the penalties for any public official or agent who accepts a “gift, benefit, honor [sic] or promise thereof” in exchange for acting or omitting to act according to his/her duty. The sentence can reach 10 years in jail. Those who offer bribes are as culpable as those taking them. (Iraqi Penal Code, As.307-214)

This disincentive does not appear to be strong enough for many in Iraq’s public sector where the giving and receiving of bribes is commonplace. Bribes are necessary to be released from prison (even following the judge’s order to that effect), or obtain work in the government or army (The Independent, 04 March 2013); and are paid to speed up administration, and receive better treatment. (UNODC/CoI, January 2013, pp.5-6) IDPs have also reportedly paid bribes to receive government hand-outs (Relief Web, 22 October 2014).

The prevalence (the number of Iraqis who paid at least one bribe during 2011) of bribery among Iraq’s adult population during 2011 was 11.6%. (UNODC/CoI, January 2013, p.5) 502,000 Iraqis paid multiple bribes during the period – four on average, totalling 1.9 million bribes. (UNODC/CoI, January 2013, p.18)

The Iraqi Ministry of Defence took over the writing of military doctrine in late-2010, mentored by NATO forces. However, corruption was not among the themes mentioned in the report of the training course (NATO, 2011). One military affairs expert being interviewed about the collapse of Mosul stated that the Iraqi Army has no doctrine at all (Al Akhbar, 13 June 2014).

Contrary to this, a defence analyst suggests that the Iraqi army does have doctrine - although does not comment on whether anti-corruption is part of it (FP, June 2014). Interviewee 1 revealed that there was once a British-influenced doctrine (covering anti-corruption) in place pre-dating the beginning of the Baath era (i.e., 1979). This is no longer adhered to or explained to leaders. (Interview 1, 28 October 2014)

In Transparency International's 2013 version of this index it mentioned an ongoing process to re-write Iraq's military doctrine. No evidence has been found of this process.

In a breakdown of its assistance mission to Iraq, NATO reported on the steps it had taken until the end of its mandate in 2011 to train Iraq’s security forces (military and police). In its training aimed at mid- to senior-level officers, anti-corruption training is not mentioned. (NATO, June 2013) The main areas of NATO cooperation with Iraq since then included “education and training, response to terrorism, counter-IED, explosive ordnance disposal, defence institution building and communication strategy”. Again, the issue of corruption is not specifically mentioned. (NATO, December 2013)

Iraq’s Anti-Corruption Academy has been training public sector workers since 2012. (Iraqi News, 2013) However, according to the information given by the Commission of Integrity, it does not seem that military personnel fall under its schemes to promote integrity in state institutions. (Iraqi Anti-Corruption Academy) Given the apparent absence of anti-corruption training, it is not clear that commanders are clear on the anti-corruption issues they may face during deployment, or that they apply in the field any knowledge they do have. Interviewee 1 stated that there is a general lack of training for commanders and that many are incompetent in their posts. (Interviewee 1, 28 October 2014)

Moreover, there is evidence of commanders engaging in corrupt practices. One US Marine corps Executive Officer of a Military Transition Team supervising the Iraqi police stated that “Military leadership positions are opportunities for senior personnel to solidify power bases and dispense patronage in the form of military supplies, including ammunition, food, water, and vehicle repair parts.” (CSIS, June 2014, p.20) A system of 'buying positions' exists in and prices are set for ranks. This system has been in place for many years. (Cockburn, 2014; and HRW, 2013)

In addition, the ‘astronaut’ phenomenon – soldiers paying their officers to avoid front-line or any duty – is reported to exist. (Niqash,02 October 2014) A 2013 US State Department report stated that corruption exists at all levels of government and society, and across all government agencies. (US Department of State, 2014)

There is no evidence in the sources used for this report to support the idea that trained anti-corruption professionals accompany defence or security field operations. Interviewee 1 did not support this either. (Interviewee 1, 28 October 2014)

However, Commission of Integrity statements indicates what it terms &quoute;field visits&quoute;. Although this would indicate pro-action on CoI's part, sources referring to such field visits did not mention the defence or security sectors (CoI, August 2012; Iraqi News, February 2013; CoI, February 2014; CoI, July 2014). Another source noted the CoI's announcement of &quoute;the formation of field teams to investigate corruption among the Ministries of Electricity, Trade, and the Secretariat of Baghdad&quoute; (EPIC, August 2015) - again, there is no mention of the security sector.

Although it is clear that anti-corruption monitors are deployed in some fields, sources do not suggest that they are deployed in the defence and security fields. The score reflects the evidence.

There is no evidence of guidelines or staff training on corruption risks during missions provided in any of the sources used in this report. Interviewee 1 stated that these did not exist. (Interviewee 1, 28 October 2014) Reports of extortion and corruption (resulting in a lack of funds to buy rations and spare parts for vehicles) by military commanders in Mosul would suggest that if training and guidelines were in existence, neither were followed. (Rudaw, June 2014; Reuters, June 2014; Al-Monitor, July 2014) These sources do not divulge whether or not such practices went against any guidelines or training.

While the government reviewer has stated that there is &quoute;an education procedure and strict orders to prevent corruption&quoute; - and while the CoI states that its mandate includes educating Iraqi government officials in order &quoute;to develop the culture of integrity , straightness, transparency&quoute; (CoI) - no evidence has been found to support this, or that, if either exists in the defence and security sectors, they have any effect.

The use of PSCs has been contentious in Iraq, both during and since the US occupation. In 2012, the GoI stated that it would aim to reduce the work of PSCs in Iraq, while then-GoI Deputy Interior Minister Adnan al-Assadi labelled the issue of PSCs as “dangerous”. Mr Al-Assadi did not elaborate as to why, but the article’s focus is on the mistrust in Iraq of PSCs, their previous immunity, incidents of violence in which PSCs have been involved, and how rules would be put in place to limit the actions of PSCs (Al Arabiya, 2012).

There was concern over the lack of transparency in the conditions and guidelines under which these PSCs operated (Al-Akhbar, 2009). It is also unclear whether there is any Iraqi legislation to regulate and punish PMCs. However, even after the US withdrawal in December 2011, by 2013, 14,000 contractors remained in Iraq, 5,500 of whom were security guards (CNN, 2013). Due to rising violence during 2014, the Iraqi government has not only had to augment its procurement of weapons, but also pay salaries to the contracted personnel of private security companies who take part in training different sectors of the security forces (Baghdad News Agency, 2014).

The GoI has contracts with 5000 specialists working in various capacities. 2000 are believed to be Americans, while others are Iraqis and third-country nationals (RT, 2014). The US government in September 2014 began scouting for contractors to return to Iraq to assist the Iraq Defence Ministry and Counter Terrorism Service in a range of roles, including ‘operations’ (Stars and Stripes, 2014).

There is evidence pointing to corruption involving PMCs and Iraqi officials (Canadian Business, 2014).

General government procurement is controlled by a combination of legislation, regulations and guidelines (OECD, pp.17-19; Iraqi Local Governance Law Library). However, there are exemptions where contracts do not have to follow all of these regulations.

The exemptions do not appear to be in terms of type of item or sector. Instead, factors that might make a contract exempted from the Regulations for Implementing Government Contracts include cost (contracts under 50,000,000 IQD), speed, confidentiality, and situations of market monopolisation. (Al Tamimi; Musings on Iraq; defence Security Cooperation Agency)

As ‘public procurement’ is defined in Public Procurement Law N° (87) of 2007 as “procurement of goods, services and construction services by the State of Iraq acting through Ministries or federal agencies, governmental units including Regions, Governorates; and all other subdivisions of the State of Iraq that may commit public funds” this can be regarded as including ‘defence procurement’. (Iraqi Local Governance Law Library; OECD, pp.6-7.)

Government procurement is meant to be transparent, and with a complete procurement cycle. “Government entities are required to have a feasibility study for the project or purchase in mind, to include specifications, plans, drawings, bills of quantities, cleared source of funding and allocation amount identified; all needed approvals from relevant ministries and governmental entities; nature of contract required; advertisement in at least 3 local newspapers and DG Market, UN Website, or consulates/embassies”.

However, some tenders do not need to follow the same rules and this both deviates from one procurement cycle model, and obscures information on the process. The Government may submit a Request For Proposal to particular companies in certain instances where the work is specialised; where only one company offers the service; or where the cost is under 50,000,000 IQD. (New Frontiers Business Consulting)

There is evidence that this legislation is often by-passed and exempt procurement is not independently scrutinised. Scrutiny of the procurement cycle continues to be limited by previously identified issues such as lack of transparency; non-completion of the cycle, sub-contracting which blurs lines of accountability; under-qualified staff; varying practices between government agencies; the absence of a requirement to define and publicise the tender evaluation criteria; the lack of a rule for open competition; and the limited information available about the investigations of the IGs, BSA, and CoI (OECD, pp.6-8). ‘Cooperation agreements’ between government officials (including in the MoD) and shell companies have previously enabled transactions to be made which avoid the procurement rules (ICG, p.7).

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: This challenge could not be reviewed as unfortunately no further evidence was provided. In addition N/A can only be awarded if there is a clear reason why the question would not be applicable in Iraq's context. Score maintained.

There is no evidence that the defence procurement cycle is disclosed. Research indicated it is unlikely to have been formalised, although there is some positive evidence regarding how the initial stages of the cycle should be conducted.

According to the OECD, the legislation (three Regulations) and a Contracting Guide introduced in Iraq from 2007-2008 “span the entire procurement cycle from pre-tender preparations, the tender and evaluation process and post-award contract management. Defence procurement is not specifically mentioned here, however.

The law and regulations stress the importance of conducting a comprehensive feasibility study before launching a specific tender. Regulations also stipulate in great detail the creation of specific committees dedicated to the reception and evaluation of bids. The contract execution phase is also covered by the regulations. As is common practice in most countries, financial guarantees for procurement are required by the Iraqi regulations, inspired by international trade transaction guarantees.

No evidence was found (such as regulations, guides or legislation) that would point to other phases such as in-service support or asset retirement. It is also highly unlikely that there has been any relevant disclosure to the public. Although the procurement process exists on paper, for example, research found evidence that public awareness of it has been limited by a lack of transparency; non-completion of the cycle, sub-contracting which blurs lines of accountability; under-qualified staff; varying practices between government agencies; the absence of a requirement to define and publicise the tender evaluation criteria; the lack of a rule for open competition; and the limited information available about the investigations of the IGs, BSA, and CoI. (OECD, June 2010, pp.6-8).

There are three bodies in charge of oversight: Inspector Generals, the Integrity Commission, and the Board of Supreme Audit. Oversight mechanisms are in place, but they are regarded as ineffective, and the agencies are reportedly not incorruptible themselves. (Niqash, March 2011; Interviewee 1, 28 October 2014)

The Inspector Generals – placed in each ministry to conduct audits, and recommend and investigate cases under CPA Order 57 – have little effect because they have to go through their minister (who is in charge of the people they are investigating) to make progress, thus removing their independence. The Prime Minister has attempted to control the Inspector Generals, as well as both the Integrity Commission and the Board of Supreme Audit. Ministers often ordered investigations dropped, and all three bodies experienced political interference, and the investigators of the Commission on Public Integrity experienced real and threatened violence. (Business Anti-Corruption Portal; Musings on Iraq, 09 December 2013; Open Democracy, March 2012; Muftah, April 2013)

During investigations of corruption in an armaments deal between Iraq and Russia, when the Investigation Commission sent questions to Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister (and acting Defence Minister) ignored them, effectively obstructing their investigations. (Iraqi News, 21 January 2013) The first three heads of the Commission appointed since 2004 resigned after having political pressure put on them, having their investigations obstructed, and their staff threatened with violence. (Survival, September 2014; SMEP, June 2014, pp.15-16)

The Joint Anti-Corruption Council oversees the Inspector Generals, the Integrity Commission, and the Board of Supreme Audit. This body is regarded, due to the sheer level of official corruption, as having little effect. (US DoS, January 2014, p.42) The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reported being told that the ministerial level review committee that holds approval authority over major contracts needed to receive financial benefits before awarding contracts. (Musings on Iraq, January 2013)

However, one success story is in the case of the faulty bomb detectors. Five months after bomb detectors, purchased at great cost ($85 million) by the GoI, were found to be faulty and the manufacturer imprisoned in the UK, they were still being used in Iraq. In May 2013, the Prime Minister was still insisting that the detectors worked. Major General Jihan al-Jabiri and two other officials were eventually jailed for corruption over the deal. (The Independent, October 2013) (Please note: Yet these bomb detectors are still being used, and moves have only recently been made to have them removed from circulation – Musings on Iraq, 29 October 2014.)

There does not appear to be a full breakdown of actual or potential defence purchases from the GoI or the MoD. A general indication of these can be gathered from local and international sources. Some of these contain an announcement from a government or ministry official or military representative. Some defence purchases are in the public domain. (CSIS, June 2014, pp.26-27 & pp.39-43; SIGIR, October 2012, p.76; Musings on Iraq, 08 August 2013; Al Monitor, 28 February 2013; Al-Mada Press, 13 April 2014; HRW, 26 February 2014; The Telegraph, 29 June 2014; Rudaw, 08 January 2014; IISS, Military Balance Blog, 02 July 2014 and 02 July 2014)

Obtaining a clear picture is not easy. Illustrative of the lack of clarity in defence procurement was the deal between Iraq and Iran. This was reported in 2014, but doubts remain – due to players on both sides denying knowledge of the deal, three on the Iraqi side alone providing different versions of events – as to whether or not it actually took or would take place. (Reuters, February 2014; Juan Cole, March 2014; CSIS, June 2014, p.40; Republic of Iraq Embassy, US)

The Iraq Quick Start Contracting Guide 2007 lays out the requirements for bidding for Government of Iraq contracts, but it makes no mention of bidders’ procedures and standards. (GoI, 2007) Two regional firms – New Frontiers Business Consulting and Al Tamimi & Co – make no mention of such either in their guides to conducting business contracts with the GoI. (New Frontiers Business Consulting, November 2012; Al Tamimi, September 2013) Some companies are seemingly not even required to actually exist for the Iraqi Government to conclude deals with them, as was suggested in one article about a Swiss firm engaged in a oil refinery deal (Iraq-Business News, 17 December 2014), or in the cases of shell companies in an electricity deal and elsewhere, as highlighted by ICG in 2011 (ICG, September 2011, pp.6&7, ns.34&66), let alone have compliance programmes or business conduct programmes.

It is questionable that there exists a strategy at all, let alone one that is well audited and/or open. The method adopted since December 2011 for tackling Iraq’s internal problems, is the use of military force regardless of the fact that a major factor in ending the insurgency in 2008 was making political gestures towards many of those (i.e., Sunni Arab militiamen and tribesmen, mainly) fighting against the government, combined with precise counter-terrorist actions against Al-Qaeda networks and propaganda outfits. (WINEP, December 2013; CSIS, June 2011, pp.8-9)

International analysts believe that Iraq has lacked a proper, coherent strategy to deal with its internal threats. (Relief Web, 28 October 2013) One Iraqi Army general stated that the recent inability of the Iraqi military to halt the advance of Islamic State (et al) was because it lacked advanced weapons and airpower – his own division, the 17th, of 15,000 men received no air support and had no tanks. (NBC News, 24 June 2014) It has been argued that ex-Prime Minister Maliki believed that crushing armed opposition would help boost his image as the country’s strongman, despite the fact that those strong-arm tactics actually create enemies. (Channel 4, 08 January 2014)

To this military-first end Iraq is keen to obtain US weapons, including assault rifles, artillery, and helicopters. (Washington Post, 16 January 2014; IHS Jane’s 360, 12 May 2014) However, respected American defence analyst Anthony Cordesman argues that “orders often seemed more political and an effort to rush into increasing weapons strength than part of a well-structured effort at force development” (CSIS, June 2014, p.9) – again indicating a lack of strategy.

The longer term aim is to rebuild Iraq’s defensive military capabilities and achieve strategic independence, hence the acquisition of planes, tanks and artillery, from the US, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, South Korea, and Pakistan. (Defence Viewpoints, 09 January 2013; IHS Jane’s 360, 08 April 2014; MEO, 12 December 2012; defence [sic] News, 11 February 2014) However, many of these procurement plans are behind schedule, and disorderly – for example, the move to buy Russian radar systems, despite Iraq using US fighter jets. (Al Monitor, 31 July 2013)

In what would be a violation of UN sanctions, Iraq is reportedly also attempting to purchase weapons from Iran. (Reuters, 24 February 2014) There is reportedly some strategy behind sales to Iraq from the US: radar installations would prevent Iranian aircraft flying freely over Iraq to Syria. (CSIS, June 2014, p.42)

Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score amended from 1 to 0.

The GoI has made specific requests for and purchases of materiel. (CSIS, June 2014, pp.26-44) However, gaps remain in the Iraqi military’s defensive and mechanised capabilities. (US DoD, 06 March 2014) The defence sector (the MoI and MoD) is regarded as the most corrupt. (US DoS, 27 February 2014) The defence sector operates in a system where the ministerial level review committee in charge of approving major contracts (which presumably include defence contracts) has reportedly refused to award contracts before receiving payment (Musings on Iraq, 23 January 2013); in which shell or non-existent companies have been awarded contracts (Muftah, April 2013); and in which contracts have been awarded to companies run by or affiliated/connected with senior Iraqi politicians (Survival, 17 September 2014).

It cannot be held absolutely that all purchases are made on the basis of clearly identified and quantified requirements. The purchase of fake bomb detectors is an old, infamous example of where (15) Iraqi administrators prioritised the profit to be made on the kickback (estimated to be 75% of the $122 million deal) from awarding the contract over actual defence requirements. (The Independent, 23 April 2013; Reuters, 17 February 2011; BBC News, 23 April 2013; Musings on Iraq, 29 October 2014)

In explaining the decline of Iraq’s security situation since 2011, Zaid Al-Ali notes that, amongst corruption generally, “overpriced and faulty equipment was procured using the laxest standards”, suggesting that defence purchases were at least not carefully thought through. (Foreign Policy, 19 June 2014)

While the US still dominates the supply of Iraq’s defence procurement through its Foreign Military Sales program, GoI has sought to purchase from other countries in recent years in an effort to separate itself and diversify suppliers. Countries involved in recent procurement orders include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Iran, South Korea, Russia, and Ukraine. (Defence Viewpoints, 09 January 2013; Reuters, 24 February 2014) Access to Iraqi defence sector contracts is now more accessible than when dominated by the US FMS program.

It should be noted that open competition is not actually required in all circumstances. GoI’s own procurement guidelines allow for different circumstances in which procurement does not have to be competitive: when the price is below 5,000,000 IQD; when the work is highly specialised or confidential, or when there is an urgent matter of national security; or when there is only one provider available. (GoI, 2007, pp.20-21)

Single-source procurement and the absence of competition have been manifest phenomena since 2003. Data from 2003/04 indicates that roughly one-third of the total value of purchases in 2003 was through single-source procurement (Crowell, 2004; Washington Post, March 2004). No more recent data available.

The 2007 Iraq Quick Start Contracting Guide lays out the tendering process for open-competition contracts from beginning to end: preparation, tender, evaluation, and award. The procedures by which the tender board should operate are contained in the Quick Start Contracting Guide.

The Bid Evaluation Committee of any ministry must, under Article 11, Seventh, of the 2007 Implementing Regulation for Governmental Contracts, assess bids in secrecy. The criteria are available in a checklist. But ultimately the reasons as to why a particular bid might fail may not be revealed to the bidder by the Bid Evaluation Committee – only that they were not successful. (GoI, 2007, p.37)

The broader responsibility for auditing defence sector tendering would fall to the Inspector General in the ministry in question. But the capacity of this individual to ensure due process and fairness is highly questionable. The Inspector Generals – placed in each ministry to conduct audits, and recommend and investigate cases under CPA Order 57 – have little effect because they have to go through their minister (who is in charge of the people they are investigating) to make progress, thus removing their independence. Audits are therefore not routinely conducted.

The Prime Minister has attempted to control the Inspector Generals, as well as both the Integrity Commission and the Board of Supreme Audit. Ministers often ordered investigations dropped, and all three bodies experienced political interference, and the investigators of the Commission on Public Integrity experienced real and threatened violence. (Business Anti-Corruption Portal; Musings on Iraq, 03 December 2013; Open Democracy, March 2012; Muftah, April 2013)

Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score amended to 1 from 2.

Iraq adopted the Competition and Monopoly Prevention Law No.14 of 2010. However, there is limited regulation and few barriers to the creation of monopolies and cartels. (Bertelsmann, 2014, p.17) The Competition and Consumer Protection Commissions authorised by the Competition and Monopoly Prevention Law have yet to be formed, meaning that the enforcers of the law do not exist, and victims of price-fixing, bid-rigging, or abuse of a dominant position have no recourse. (US DoS, February 2013)

The Iraqi Penal Code does list the “Dishonourable offences such as theft, embezzlement, forgery, breach of trust, fraud, bribery and rape” under its non-political criminal offences. (Penal Code 111 of 1969, A.21 (1)(f)) Whether the threat of punishment under the Penal Code is a sufficient deterrent is unknown, but in the general context of Iraq and its punishment of opaque business practices, and considering the absence of Competition and Consumer Protection Commissions, it may be surmised that enforcement would not be strong.

This is not a new problem. As noted in a November 2009 OECD Observer article, government and public sector employees with procurement management responsibilities are prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in tendering processes, or supplying information. But the lack of coordination between the oversight bodies - IGs, BSA, CoI - and their overlapping remits mean that procurement is not comprehensively overseen (OECD Observer, November 2009, p.35).

There is no evidence to support that procurement staff are specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery (Bertelsmann, 2014; UNODC/CoI, January 2013; Eurasia Review, 21 March 2014) and it is considered unlikely in the circumstances.

There are reportedly “excessive delays” in the implementation of investment projects across the government (JAPU, January 2013, p.1), which would suggest that delivery in some areas is not strictly enforced. It appears that government employees are generally not qualified or trained for the positions they hold, that they are often given jobs through family connections and political patronage networks, and that they do very little for a few hours per day. (Musings on Iraq, 24 March 2014)

Government administration is not staffed on a meritocratic basis, but through patronage and politically inspired appointments. Some departments are better than others and have competitive recruitment practices. (Bertelsmann, 2014, p.26) Thousands of civil servants hold fake higher education certificates – the MoI places the number at 9000. (Al Jazeera, 01 October 2013) The state sector is enormously overstaffed, with some departments operating with four to ten times more employees than necessary.

Some state-enterprises have zero production, but the staff are paid regardless, while some government ministries contain ‘ghost’ workers. (Eurasia Review, 21 March 2014) Public officials, especially those in decision-making positions are open to bribery, and bribes are paid between employees of different state institutions. (UNODC, 2013, p.31) State employees involved in, among others, procurement decisions over public contracts and internal audit procedures, are statistically more vulnerable to bribery than others. (UNODC, 2013, p.6) Only 6.7% of civil servants have ever (at the time of publication of figures in 2013) received any integrity or anti-corruption training. (UNODC, 2013, p.11)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Unfortunately N/A cannot be awarded here as there are procurement staff operating in Iraq. It is difficult to consider any different score without further evidence. For example, the score was initially proposed as a 1 on the basis that a defence procurement department was likely to have existed. No evidence was found to confirm this however. In addition, it is possible that limited training occurs for procurement staff, however no specific evidence was found to verify this or that would suggest any training was likely to have anti-corruption as one of the priorities. Furthermore, elsewhere in the assessment there are examples of undue influence. Score maintained.

Under Article 10 of the Public Government Contracts Law No.1 of 2008, parties raising disputes (regarding offer acceptance, bidding, competition, etc), before or during the formation of a contract, take them to the Administrative Court of the Ministry of Planning. The complaint must be filed within seven days of the contract formation, and the Ministry of Planning will then follow up with the relevant ministry regarding the Court’s decisions, which will be issued within 120 days of the payment of the court fee. Article 11 allows for mediation and arbitration (including international, if the dispute involves a foreign company). (Iraqi Local Governance Library, May 2008)

Given everything stated above regarding the infrequency with which procedures are firmly followed, it is questionable whether following this route would achieve the result desired by the complainant. These dispute resolution mechanisms are regarded as neither reliable nor transparent. (US DoS, February 2013) Toby Dodge notes that where a complaint is made against companies with ties to or ownership by senior state figures, that complaint is ignored because of the protection afforded by political patronage. (Survival, 17 September 2014)

There are legal sanctions for corruption generally, but they are infrequently fully applied. However, there is no evidence of a procurement executive to issue sanctions to punish specifically the corrupt activities of suppliers.

Corruption is a criminal offence that is the remit of Iraq’s anti-corruption bodies. Once claims are investigated and passed to the judiciary, those individuals charged with corruption could face prosecution, and monetary fines or jail sentences, depending on the severity of the offence (Iraqi Penal Code, As.23-27) – although many convicted in person have received suspended sentences. (UNODC, 2013, p.51)

However, importantly, ‘bribery’ and ‘embezzlement’ only accounted for 3% and 7% of all convictions in court in 2011, while the largest share of convictions relates to ‘falsification crimes’ (36 per cent), ‘damaging state assets’ (18 per cent) and ‘other crimes’ (36 per cent). Yet the first two categories do not qualify as ‘corruption’ offences under UNCAC. (UNODC, 2013, p.52 and fn.29)

In deals with the US for equipment, non-state contractors are also being supplied as part of the contract. (RT, 04 February 2014; WSJ, 03 February 2014) But to what extent the firms supplying the contractors are subject to due diligence is not clear. Equally, no information can be found on performance or auditing of offset contracts. It would be highly surprising if GoI, only 6.7% of whose civil servants had received anti-corruption or integrity training by 2013 (UNODC, 2013, p.11), would levy integrity requirements on main or offset contractors.

The government reviewer states that &quoute;the government bodies follow offset contracts through the commission of integrity to apply the contracts&quoute;. This is not clear from the evidence. And more historic evidence indicates that diligence has not been conducted. The purchase of fake bomb detectors is an old, infamous example of where (15) Iraqi administrators prioritised the profit to be made on the kickback (estimated to be 75% of the $122 million deal) from awarding the contract over actual defence requirements.

In addition, a December 2009 interview by ICG with a former Iraqi military officer reported that &quoute;military or police officers routinely purchase substandard or even non-functioning products from a specific vendor in exchange for substantial kickbacks&quoute; (ICG, October 2010, p.33).

Iraq remains outside the World Trade Organisation, and therefore not subject to its Agreement on Government Procurement, and specifically, Article XVI ‘Offsets’. (WTO, June 2014) The MoD does not include details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance on its website. (MoD) But in deals with the US for equipment, non-state contractors are also being supplied as part of the contract (RT, 04 February 2014; WSJ, 03 February 2014), indicating the existence of offset programmes. No further information could be found the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance (UNODC/CoI, January 2013; OECD, June 2010). Nor is it obvious that the Iraqi government has taken steps to better comply with Article XVI of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.

Iraq is not a WTO member, and therefore is not bound by that organisation’s rules on ‘Offsets’. There is very limited information on off-set contracts. Given the limited regulation that exists of main contracts, it would be surprising if offset contracts were subject to greater regulation.

Officially, commercial agents must be Iraqi nationals, resident in Iraq, over 25 years of age, and members of the Chamber of Commerce (Law for the Regulation of Commercial Agency No.51 for 2000, A.4). To what extent this law is upheld is unknown.

Foreign governments aiming to secure defence contracts with Iraq have reportedly used intermediaries to advance deals. Foreign governments and companies are reportedly using well-connected Iraqis inside Iraq to help make progress in securing contracts. (Musings on Iraq, 08 August 2013; Al Ahram, 24 March 2014)

Front companies have also used by political parties or those close to senior political figures, bidding for contracts, receiving payments and not actually producing any goods or services. (Musings on Iraq, 23 January 2013; Survival, 17 September 2014)

No information was found on financing packages, or to suggest that they existed and/or were publicly available. (UNODC, January 2013; OECD, June 2010)

According to the government reviewer for this survey, the details above are accessible upon formal application. This proved impossible to verify.

There is no information supporting the idea that GoI either formally or informally requires subcontractors to adopt anti-corruption measures. Given GoI’s own unwillingness to properly adopt or actually enforce its own anti-corruption measures (Musings on Iraq, 09 December 2013), such requirements would be striking.

Moreover, Iraq’s 2008 contracting regulations permit the subcontracting of work (which the contracting party is obliged to accept, even if the subcontractor is inefficient or non-performing), and do not require subcontractors to be named on the original bid; and there is scope for subcontractors to subcontract the work to another party.

Effectively, the government does not formally require that, as the contracting authority, it is even aware of which company is meant to be doing the work. (OECD, June 2010, p.35 & pp.39-40) The possibility that the government formally requires the main contractor to ensure subsidiaries and subcontractors adopt anti-corruption programmes could therefore be considered even more remote.

Since the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in December 2011 (and even prior to that, to a limited extent), the US political influence over Iraq has declined. Whereas previously the Iraqi Government would effectively have had few options but to purchase US weapons and materiel through the Foreign Military Sales programme, in the last few years Iraq has been freer to pursue deals with other countries. (Rudaw, January 2014; Reuters, February 2014; Defence Viewpoints, January 2013; defence [sic] News, February 2014)

Nonetheless, the US remains a major supplier of materiel to Iraq (CSIS, June 2014), with whom it has a long history of supply, and with whom it has an ongoing relationship in terms of defence matters. The US Congress has questioned whether selling more weapons to Iraq would be worthwhile given how much US-supplied weaponry has already fallen into ISIS' hands - and over concerns that the Iraqi authorities might use them for internal repression (Foreign Policy, November 2014).

Yet evidence does also point to purchases or requests being made for military need (defence Industry Daily, November 2014). Since the advance of ISIS, Iraqi PM, Haidar al-Abadi, has made calls for weapons to be delivered to Iraq in order to repel that group (AFP, January 2015; Al Araby, April 2015).