Qatar

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no public knowledge about the procedures of asset disposal, nor of the controls that might be in place.

No information or reports have surfaced suggesting inappropriate asset disposal either, but the subject is unlikely to be discussed in a public forum.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no evidence of any independent oversight whatsoever on any aspect of the financial affairs of the Qatari military.

The armed forces are considered as an institution above public scrutiny, and one whose dealings do not need to be made public or held accountable.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Such information is unavailable.

Indeed, Qatar provided no budget information at all, and came joint last in the most recent global Open Budget Survey in 2012.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Qatar does not have a legislature in the true sense of the word; only an 'advisory council'. However, based on an understanding of Qatar's political system and its military structures, there is only a very small chance that the advisory body in Qatar receives any such information.

Military budgets are generally kept secret, and the restricted power of the legislature means that it is unlikely that very sensitive information such as this is shared with them.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no evidence indicating whether or not the legislature (or in this case, the advisory council) receives secret budget information. However, based on an understanding of Qatar's political system and the compartmentalised nature of budgets, there is very little chance that they do.

Given the lack of power vested in the legislature and the lack of general oversight over the secret intelligence services (Q19), it is reasonable to state that the parliament does not discuss such matters, and that even if there were audits of these activities, they would not be provided to the legislature.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no meaningful way of learning the mechanics of any secret military expenditures within the structure of procurement in Qatar given the closed nature of this sphere.

Given the lack of legislation suggesting otherwise, we can assume that they are permitted by law. It is certain, given the lack of evidence, that they are not reported upon.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no meaningful way to evaluate whether there are any off-budget military expenditures, but evidence suggests that it is possible they could occur with impunity. There is no way of judging the extent of this, however, hence the score of '2'.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: It is understood that Qatar's legislation regarding classification are vague and incomplete. Whatever loosely noted rules and regulations there are relating to classification of national security issues are likely to be almost entirely without scrutiny, such is the strength of the security decision makers who would not want to open themselves up to oversight.

However, for the purposes of this assessment, it must be noted that there is no available evidence to back up such conclusions. According to Freedom House, Qatar lacks any Freedom of Information legislation too, suggesting that there is little to no regulation of information and access.

In the 2013 index, this question was scored at a 1; however, given the lack of supporting evidence or transparency, as discussed above, a 0 is the most appropriate score here.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: The Qatar Armed Forces, as the central defence institution, does have extensive commercial interests, these are entirely opaque. In 2014, the investment arm of the Qatari armed forces bought a five-star Renaissance hotel in central Barcelona for €78.5m (£65m). Management of the hotel will remain with the previous owners, Marriott. The Qatari Armed Forces Investment Portfolio's representative, General Zani al Kuwari, who is also assistant chief of staff for financial affairs, stated at the time: &quoute;Our objective is to invest in the most important cities, and Barcelona is one of them. We are also looking for interests in London and Paris.&quoute; He added that they were interested in making further investments in Barcelona. In 2012 the same fund invested $170m (£100m) in a 60,000 sq m sports and leisure centre in Minsk, the capital of Belarus. The fund also has a 10% stake in Masraf Al Rayan, the Islamic Bank of Britain.
Domestically, their specific portfolio is unknown.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no evidence that any military owned businesses are subjected to any independent transparency. Given how such issues are treated in Qatar as a whole, there is only a very small chance that they are audited in any meaningful way, and certainly not by an independent company.

There is no evidence of other kinds of oversight.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Article 128 of the constitution states that: &quoute;When assuming their positions, the Ministers shall aim to serve the interests of the country and shall not, in any way, misuse their official positions for their own interests, or for the interests of their own acquaintances.&quoute;

In reality, this scripture is treated in a decidedly loose fashion. Private enterprise is a normal part of life in Qatar for Qatari civil servants and where most employees seem to have a side job of some description. Such enterprise is not officially frowned upon. At the top end of the military, the Defence Minister, Hamad Al Attiyah, is a key player in a consortium of companies: the Al Attiyah group. This group is a key contractor for a variety of businesses, including for services rendered by the Ministry of Defence itself. This is all considered acceptable to the ministry.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: While some may exist, there are no readily identifiable instances of such anti-corruption pronouncements from defence individuals or institutions. Fundamentally, corruption is not perceived as a particular problem in the Qatari defence and security sectors.

The gradual prioritization of corruption issues in the wider Qatari government has not, as yet, been in evidenced in the Armed Forces.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There are a variety of punishments for those convicted of corruption and related crimes according to the 2004 penal code. For example, those convicted of bribery can expect a fine equal to their bribe or at least QAR 5,000 (~$1300) and up to 10 years in prison. Also, the term is increased to a minimum of seven years in prison if the offender is a public official and the crime was committed within his/her official job purview.

While Qatar has seen a number of high-level corruption cases brought into the open (see media links above), it is difficult to avoid the impression that these examples are the exceptions to the norm. In other words, there are no clear, uniformly followed rules and regulations. Instead, where a curious mix of personal and institutional policy combines with a suitably egregious and public example of corruption, action is taken.

Indeed, there is something of a tension between the realities of the law and the somewhat haphazard application of it. The reasons for this presumably lie in the informal patronage networks (i.e. wasta) and politicking that can circumnavigate legal problems.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no evidence of any particular or specialized statutes pertaining to whistleblowing in the military and defence sectors.

Moreover, given the microcosmic nature of Qatari society, the social pressures to conform and not to 'blow the whistle' are significant. It is, thus, unsurprising that there are no significant examples of whistleblowing to date in the Qatar military and security sector.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Qatar is a young country and has only been operating complex bureaucracies for a decade or two. In terms of the military, this means that it lacks a range of basic practices and procedures such as the ones noted in this question.

Also, given the interwoven nexus of companies with stakes owned by Qataris, which are then a part of procurement cycles, part of the basic premise of the question does not apply to Qatar. While, therefore, there is no available evidence of any kind of special attention as the question suggests (for it likely does not exist) this is more likely due to the young nature of Qatar's bureaucracy not evolving to a stage where such measures are put in place.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is a general consensus as to the basic numbers in the Qatari military. The widely recognized Military Balance, for example, notes a figure of 11,800 overall. This is probably accurate to within 10-15%.

However, there is no breakdown of Qataris as a percentage of this overall force number; a key, missing component. The Qatari Armed Forces do not discuss their figures at all - this lack of transparency means that 0 is the most appropriate score here.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Aside from the generic announcement of a pay raise in 2011 for military officers and for civil servants, there is no information available publicly on pay rates or allowances. For example, there is no publicly available information noting the absolute figures for military pay.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: According to the interviewee, who works in the defence sector, payments are generally made on time, but these details are not published. The 2013 GI for Qatar also mentions that there are &quoute;sporadic delays with ad hoc payments&quoute; made to some employees, and that the system overall is completely non-transparent.

While there are some indications that an online wage system is being considered for private employees, its launch has been postponed (see Out-Law.com above), and there are no indications as to whether there is a similar system in place or being considered for the defence sector. There are no further publicly available details surrounding this subject

Given the lack of transparency on how the system of payments actually operates, and the lack of general public evidence concerning the question at hand, a full conclusion cannot be drawn here.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Anecdotal evidence suggests that time served is the key criteria for promotion in the Qatar Armed Forces. Other factors including necessary training courses are transparent as far as Qatari officers are concerned: everyone knows the hoops that need to be jumped through to ascend the ranks. There has also been a recent move to promote based on merit.

There is no evidence that these scriptures are published or openly available, however. Promotion above Brigadier level, however, is a more complex matter involving an array of more subtle factors including meritorious reports and familial and other personal connections with more senior members ('wasta', as mentioned before - see source above for a general analysis). The score here is 1, therefore, based on the lack of transparency.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: As mentioned in the previous question, time served appears to be the key criteria for promotion in the Qatar Armed Forces. Other factors including necessary training courses are transparent as far as Qatari officers are concerned: everyone knows the informal 'hoops' which need to be navigated in order to ascend the ranks. There is no evidence that these scriptures are published or openly available.

Promotion above Brigadier level, however, is a more complex matter involving an array of more subtle factors including meritorious reports and familial and other personal connections - 'wasta' in other words.

There is no evidence of independent oversight over these.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Qatar reintroduced a short period (three or four months) of national service in early 2014 for all Qataris from 18-35 years of age. There are stiff penalties for avoiding the service period, though as the whole venture is so new, the effectiveness of the penalties is unknown.

The penalties for avoiding the service include a blacklisting which would not allow Qataris to work in the public sector and make them ineligible to start a new business in the state. There will also be potential jail sentences from one month to one year and a fine of not more than QR20,000 (£3,600).

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Qatar reintroduced a short period (three or four months) of national service in early 2014 for all Qatari from 18-35 years of age. There are stiff penalties for avoiding the service period, though as the whole venture is so new, the effectiveness of the penalties and how the policies will work in practice is unknown.

The penalties for avoiding the service include a blacklisting which would not allow Qataris to work in the public sector and make them ineligible to start a new business in the state. There will also be potential jail sentences from one month to one year and a fine of not more than QR20,000 (£3,600).

It is reasonable to assume that there may be similar safeguards in place for bribery in order to gain preferential postings, but this is not explicitly made public, and not enough time has elapsed to evaluate whether this happens in practice. Furthermore, given the wasta system (See Q41 for more details), it is likely that people with connections get preferential treatment in this regard too. Given these factors, the best score here is 0.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no evidence of ghost soldiers on the payroll, or of such events happening in recent years.

However, given the nature of the Qatari Armed Forces, which sees a confusion of posts and roles, especially among the senior ranks, it is plausible that there are soldiers on the payroll who have a negligible presence day-to-day in the ranks and who are being paid for their services anyway. This is further evidenced by the fact that the number of ghost soldiers is not published formally (Q38), and there is also no publication of the payment system (Q40).

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no available evidence to determine whether payments are administrated by a body independent of the chain of commanders and the people working under them, but one might assume that they broadly are.

There is some information indicating that there could be a separate ministry in charge of personnel pensions for the government - presumably including the defence sector - so there is some organisation surrounding the separation of chains of command and chains of payment.

However, given the overall lack of transparency, a score of 2 would be most appropriate here. Response to Peer Reviewer: no sources given or found to support score increase.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is reportedly a rudimentary code of conduct, which refers to some degree to such matters as bribery and corruption, but no sources were found to support this. Its content, transparency, application and distribution are unknown.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no public source information as to whether the Code of Conduct is observed at all and the results of any prosecutions have never been made available.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no evidence of any thorough anti-corruption training taking place. There are some rumours which state that commanders receive a form of ethics training (see Q53), but there is little evidence to suggest that this covers good governance and anti-corruption.

Certainly, no external bodies (i.e. accountancy firms and auditors) are integrated into such processes.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Corruption in the Armed Forces is very much a taboo subject and consequently there is little publicly stated about any aspect of this policy, whether policies and procedures, problems or investigations. The only way that an outcome of such a trial would be made public is with the consent from the very top (the Emir) as part of a wider anti-corruption messaging programme.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Clearly, central to this question is the definition of 'facilitation payments'. An employee receiving a brown bag of cash as a facilitation payment to recommend x product is against the law in Qatar. However, it should be noted that on the smallest level - for example, obtaining driving licences or skipping the queue in the medical center when undertaking the necessary immigration procedures - such facilitation payments are common practice.

Nevertheless, there are typically formal rules in place that attempt to stop such issues. Consequences of a clear-cut case of bribery would likely involve the police and prosecution, though, as ever, if the Qatari were powerful enough, such an outcome would be in doubt.

According to interviewees, any company wanting to work in the Qatari defence and security sector needs to partner with a local company and must give up at least 51% of the company. This local Qatari partner must, therefore, inevitably be paid at some point to facilitate the contract: not only may he be paid to do so, it is in his direct financial advantage to do all that he can to make sure that his company wins the contract.

It is unclear how specific Qatari rules and regulations deal with this inherent conflict of interest.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no evidence of any such doctrine or any emphasis on the wider importance of addressing corruption as a strategic issue during operations.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is very little information available on such matters. There are ad hoc suggestions from unverified sources that commanders are provided with rudimentary training aimed in part at such matters, but it is likely to be incomplete. There is no evidence of the application of such knowledge in the field. Response to Peer Reviewer: Unfortunately no publicly available information found on this topic.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no evidence of any such deployments. Response to Peer Reviewer: Agree, it is unclear whether or not corruption monitors are deployed. However, given all the other evidence in other indicators, it is likely that Qatar deploys no personnel for corruption monitoring. Score maintained.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no publicly available evidence of any such guidelines or training taking place.

There is also no anecdotal evidence from interviewees which could point to such guidelines or training in place.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: The key issues with this question rests on issues of definitions.

The definition used here strongly insinuates PMCs at the 'higher' end of the market; i.e. private companies providing private solders for armed security roles. Qatar employs very few of such PMCs. Interviews reveal that the security environment in Qatar is tightly controlled by the leadership over those with weapons in the country. Only Qatari mandated security providers can carry arms, according to Qatar's laws.

There are regional examples that can be used to further elaborate on this issue. In 2011, it was revealed that there was a vast PMC presence in Abu Dhabi that, according to the New York Times, was there to act as an alleged 'back up' to the UAE armed forces in the event of a serious security and defence concern. There is no evidence at all of any analogous state of affairs being present in Qatar. Certainly, there are legions of companies providing contractors, but only as mall or hotel security and far from the 'high end' of the Blackwater example in the UAE.

It is not clear what scrutiny PMCs are subject to nor if sanctions are available to punish corrupt PMCs, there is no evidence of sanctions being applied but nor is there evidence of corruption.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Qatar's 2006 Procurement Law's first Article states that the wider provisions of the law &quoute;apply to all Ministries and other Government organs. [But]] confidential defence and security procurement are exempted:-

&quoute;The Armed Forces and the Police concerning the duties and works which are of
confidential attribute whose conditions of contracts and tenders are regulated by an Emiri
Decision.&quoute;

It is not clear how confidential is defined.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1 : Comments accepted, and scores changed accordingly.

The 2013 GI scored this as a 1; however, given the evidence which shows Defence procurement to be exempt from the general publicly available legislation, a score of 0 is the most appropriate for this indicator.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: No part of the defence procurement cycle is disclosed to the public. From strategic and tactical planning through to issuing tenders to selection and purchase, there is no evidence suggesting that any of this is officially disclosed to the public. The Qatari military appears to operate within a black box with acquisition being among the least discussed and debated aspects.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Qatar is undergoing changes to state-wide audit and according to an interviewee the defence sector will be part of this. One of the results of this may be the creation of a supreme committee to oversee and scrutinise all sizeable defence sector procurement. No publicly available information was found to verify this so it appears that this oversight mechanism is not yet active or established. There is no evidence that the State Audit Institution has audited defence procurement.

Response to Peer Reviewers: Agree score reduced to 0.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: The Qatar Armed Forces do not discuss procurement issues, and even the legislation surrounding general procurement exempts defence procurement it on the grounds of confidentiality.

There is some disclosure, but it is low-key. Even on occasions where the military do announce large contracts, as in March 2013 at the DIMDEX conference only basic details are given. There is evidence from external, aggregate data providers, that many defence purchases are not made public and there is no security justification as to why this information is withheld.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There are increasing, although vague, references made by those working in the Qatari security sector (on the selling side) suggesting that companies require such types of anti-corruption/governance initiatives in procurement. But the drive seems to be more from companies rather than the government.

It is unclear, however, whether such clauses are included in contracts and working practices across the board or rather whether such an emphasis is more of a temporary pressure. Legally, no requirements are placed on companies beyond what is generally in company law; no discrimination is made between companies on the grounds of integrity.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no national strategy guiding the formulation of procurement requirements. Evidence suggests that procurement is often opportunistic. There is some scattered information available suggesting that there are indications of strategy (such as safeguarding the sovereign wealth fund, or using procurement as a strategic tool against growing Iranian influence in the region). Response to Peer Reviewer: No further sources found to respond to this indicator.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Purchases do not appear to be based on a formal quantification of requirements. They are often opportunistic in nature. The rationale behind Qatari procurement is unclear. There may be a formal process to discern military requirements, but this process is not transparent. Any such workings are simply unknown. Indeed, there is no openly available national security strategy on which to base any long-term procurement requirements.

Moreover, even with a formal quantification of requirements. The impact would be limited, few in Qatar would agree that these reports have an impact on actual procurement. Based on what is known about the Qatari political structures, it seems unlikely that the Emir of Qatar, who would be the individual ultimately signing the more significant deals, would take into account such reports.

The recent purchase of over one hundred German Leopard II tanks has no discernible rationale behind it. Indeed, it might arguably be best to see the logic of Qatar's acquisition of German equipment as an approach to entrench more cooperation with the German state. Similarly, the decision on whether to buy French Raphael or British Typhoon fighter-jets is seen by those concerned as far more to do with wider state-to-state relations than it is to do with the capabilities of each plane.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: While you raise a valid point, there is still no real evidence that procurement can be traced back to a specific strategy. The score is maintained at 0.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is not enough information to quantify single source and competitively sourced procurement. The overall impression and the way systems have been developed is towards single-sourcing as a matter of course for much of defence procurement: the idea being that as a company develops a reputation for working effectively for the QAF, its relationship with the QAF is maintained. There are plenty of examples of single sourcing provided by the US state department in its trade with Qatar (see link above).

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no transparency of tender board procedure and practice, nor evidence of any particular codes of conduct applied to tender boards. Audits are not undertaken of tender boards, if they exist, and Qatar does not routinely conduct competitive tenders.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no legislation specific to the defence sector, nor wider national legislation, that outlaws collusion.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Procurement staff are expected to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations, but there is limited training and staff are likely to be rotated in and out from other functions. There are likely to be significant staff shortages. There is little control or oversight of defence contractors by procurement staff, and there is evidence of undue influence from higher grades within the organisation.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Comments accepted. Score changed from 0 to 1 and sources added.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: No formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. Opportunities for companies to complain about procurement is likely to be limited in practice due to fear of future bids that the companies may seek.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Given that there is no evidence of such complaint mechanisms being active, and there are no records of Qatar Airways or Qatar Petroleum bringing forward such a charge, a score of 0 seems the most appropriate.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no evidence of sanctions used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: No evidence found, score maintained.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: According to the US investment climate statement for 2015, there is no counter-trade offset programme (overall) in place. Offsets are used in other business sectors, but there is not enough information to state whether Qatar has active offsets for defence contracts, nor if the government imposes some due diligence or auditing requirements on offset contracts, if there are active offsets it is unlikely they are audited.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Offset contracts are generally not used by Qatar in defence according to an interviewee. There is not enough information available to state whether the government is involved in active offset contracts and programmes, if it is it does not make any details of them transparent.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: If offsets are used in defence, it is not know if there are currently active contracts, if there are they are not competed.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Intermediaries (whether people or companies) are common in Qatar in the defence and security sectors. The government imposes no restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: The existence of a financing package and the identity of the provider are occasionally made public. In most cases details of the financing package are not publicly available and there may be no information on whether a financing package exists at all.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: There is no evidence of the government formally requiring the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, nor is there evidence of the government encouraging this informally. There is evidence of such practices in certain, isolated instances and an increasing suggestion that Qatar is serious about focusing on such issues going forward, but how and when this will be properly institutionalised or written into legislation is unclear.

Response to Peer Reviewer: No sources identified.

Researcher + TI Reviewer3635: Qatar is generally in a strong position to withstand pressure from seller nations. Though the US is inevitably in more of a position to pressure Qatar, for it is the only country that can actually offer Qatar serious military guarantees of protection, thanks to its capabilities and specifically its forces already based in Qatar at Al Udeid Airbase. Therefore, it has more leverage than other countries. While this makes sense in theory and the received wisdom is certainly that the Qataris are looking at a split buy for their new fast jet requirement with the US half being the only certain purchase, the reality is somewhat more complex.

If there is one trait evident in Qatar's recent historical record it is of its leadership firmly doing what it wants to do and not what far larger powers expect it to do. Whether this is angering the US with cultivating relations with Iran or angering Saudi Arabia cultivating relations with Israel and Iran, Qatar typically does what it wants and is strong enough not to be meaningfully pressured.

Evidence suggests that Qatar's key purchases are strategic in the political and not the military sense, and that the political strings that states can attach are or paramount importance, often over technical capability. Selling nations compete to offer incentives to Qatar, for example, the UK granting Qatar an electronic visa waiver system and France admitting Qatar into the Francophonie. The imminent fast jet deal is one such example, with few Qataris really believing that the best and most effective jets according to testing and specifications will be chosen; instead, such a large-ticket item is a golden opportunity for Qatar to extract political concessions and guarantees: the ability of the planes is clearly secondary in the selection process.