Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The researcher found no legal evidence of controls over the disposal of assets nor any media or broader civil society speculation about corruption in asset disposals. The assessor found evidence of planned disposals being known in advance or a related published publicly. Financial results of disposals should they exist are not publicly available.

This is symptomatic of the opaque environment of Mauritanian defence and financing industry. Boris Samuel has for example documented how the Mauritanian state has been known to fake financial results for extended periods of over a decade in the past (22:2, p.1).

With regards to asset recording in general in Mauritania the World Bank stated that: “They are clearly not assessed in accordance with good accounting principles, in compliance with the accounting definition of an asset” (22:1, 3.76, p.80). Though this statement dates to 2011, this is likely to remain the case and as a result, it is very unlikely that the disposal of assets responds to transparent rules.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
The researcher found no indications that independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments takes place. There are certainly no publicly available reports of such scrutiny.

With regards to asset recording in general in Mauritania the World Bank stated that: “They are clearly not assessed in accordance with good accounting principles, in compliance with the accounting definition of an asset” (22:1, 3.76, p.80). Though this statement dates to 2011, this is likely to remain the case and as a result, it is very unlikely that the disposal of assets by defence establishments is conducted in a transparent way.

In its 2011-2015 Mauritania Plan, the IMF noted the need to introduce formal measures to facilitate the disposal of assets. It does not refer to the defence sector specifically but this further indicates that lack of such measures (and associated oversight) in the country as a whole, this is likely to remain true in 2015.

No evidence could be found to indicate that the Inspector General has any role in scrutinizing asset disposals by defence establishments.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
The percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year dedicated to spending on secret items is not available to the public.

According to one interviewee, figures for defence and intelligence capital expenditure are not publicly available, however the interviewee speculates that they were probably around 25% of the defence budget.

A details list of military expenditure is not, nor has it been in the past, available in Mauritania - that is, it is not published on the Ministry of Defence website, and statements are not made about it in press releases or official speeches for example. Between 2009 (when the current President came into power) and 2015 the overall defence budget figures were not available at all, with the one exception of 2013 when an article carried by Magharebia but not verified elsewhere and which is no longer accessible on their website reported that the '2013 budget draft was presented to Parliament in Nouakchott at the start of December. If approved by Parliament, the defence sector should receive 44.547 billion ouguiyas (around $150 million). Funds would cover the operating budget, equipment for the National Gendarmerie, salaries and equipment, and military healthcare.' (12:1)

Due to general opacity, the percentage of intelligence and secret spending in the budget year is not available. As most defence and intelligence spending is largely undeclared, delineating what is secret and what is not seems fairly arbitrary.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: No evidence was found to suggest that the legislature is provided with budgetary figures relating to defence and intelligence, let alone secret items within them. One interviewee confirmed that indeed military finances are in general not at all transparent.

Despite, a “Defence and Security Committee” tasked with oversight existing in both the National Assembly and the Senate (25:1, p.165), its ability to function is questionable, as the executive controls the defence and security sector and limits the Parliament’s room for manoeuvre (25:1, p.165).

As most defence and intelligence spending is likely to be unaudited and largely undeclared, delineating what is secret and what is not seems fairly arbitrary.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
Evidence specific to the debate of defence accounts including the military, police and intelligence services was unavailable. It is unlikely that audit accounts are provided to the legislature or that they are open to debate (if there are no audits their reports cannot be made available).

Formally the Mauritanian parliament does include a standing committee in charge of defence budgetary oversight. Under the rules of procedure of the national assembly they may set up commissions of inquiry into draft bills (including in theory draft budgets in the defence sector and interior security - i.e. the military, police and intelligence), enabling the oversight of government activity including defence and security policies (26:2).

In practice these are ineffectual (26:1, p.161). Similarly the judiciary is not independent, and it also has no specific powers in defence and security (26:1,p.162).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
The researcher could find no reference to confirm whether off-budget expenditures were legal or not (whether these be in exceptional or well controlled circumstances). However, according to Boris Samuel (2013) most 'presidential projects' a broad term that extends to defence infrastructural work (i.e. military bases and air strips) 'are largely carried out off-budget' (27:2, p.16). These projects are in theory monitored (control rests with the President) by the National Agency for Major Projects, however as of January 2015 this agency does not appear to be functioning (27:3).

During the Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya's regime (until 2005) there were reported instances of off-budget military expenditure: Boris Samuel notes 'massive military spending was carried out off-budget in 2003 and 2004, to which was added expenditure on the electoral campaign' (27:2, p.7). Research of this sort on the military's off budget expenditure under President Aziz (since 2008) is not possible to confirm but it is possible to have taken place given the country's transparency context.

Contextually, the executive is not, in practice, required to reveal information over military spending or other budgetary measures to parliament. In 2013, the Prime Minister was criticised for failing to provide a breakdown of the governments total external debt, much of the total figure estimated at over USD3billion, is likely to have been spent on defence (as figures are not released this cannot be confirmed) (27:1). The government was also criticised for allegedly receiving off budget receipts from Libya for the extradition of one of Gaddafi's family members (27:1).

It is likely that information, such as off budget expenditures, classified on the grounds of protecting national security is enabled by counter-terrorism initiatives which are not subject to effective scrutiny. Historically over the past decade (other than 2013) defence budget figures have not been published, it is likely that these are deemed classified. According to Amnesty International, counter terrorism initiatives are regularly used to justify often non-transparent security actions in Mauritania (27:4). This is likely to take place at the discretion of the President who has de-facto control over all government institutions (27:5)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
The International Monetary Fund has frequently complained of off-budget expenditures in Mauritania including those used to fund the defence services - the defence budget is included in the central budget (28:1, p.12). According to Boris Samuel (2013) most 'presidential projects' a broad term that extends to defence infrastructural work (i.e. military bases and air strips) 'are largely carried out off-budget' (28:2, p.16). Further details or breakdowns of this off-budget military spending are not available. However given the relative frequency of national threats such terrorism (a defence sector issue) that require emergency funding, off-budget expenditure does not necessarily point to illicit activity though they are not transparent. Samuel's report does however point to the use of off-budget expenditures to divert funds for personnel accumulation of politicians and their families (28:2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
No verifiable information was found regarding the classification of information either in the Constitution or in media searches on AllAfrica and national platform Cridem. However, it is likely that information classified on the grounds of protecting national security is enabled by counter-terrorism initiatives which are not subject to effective scrutiny. Historically over the past decade (other than 2013) defence budget figures have not been published, it is likely that these are deemed classified. According to Amnesty International, counter terrorism initiatives are regularly used to justify often non-transparent security actions in Mauritania (29:1). This is likely to take place at the discretion of the President who has de-facto control over all government institutions (29:3). Given that Mauritania faces an acute terrorism threat and partakes in several regional and international counter-terrorism strategies, confidentiality is likely to be justified in light of very apparent security issues.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The researcher could find no evidence that defence institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial enterprises in Mauritania - therefore it is not possible to say if they would be declared or not. Score 1 has been selected to reflect strong risk that such businesses may exist.

Contextual detail may give an indication of general business climate: Commerce in Mauritania remains largely dominated by state-owned companies. Families and kinship groups with strong (Bidhân) clan links or alliances to President Aziz as well as the higher echelons of the military dominate lucrative businesses and indeed most key sectors of the economy (30:1, p16). Boukhars writes 'Only a few individuals, families, and clans with ties to factions within the military dominate the most important sectors of the economy (for instance, imports and exports, banks, and agribusiness)' (30:4, p6). Transparent details around key businesses sectors are not available.

However, several scandals have broken out around for example, public officials (although not explicit to the defence sector) involved in scandals of illegal construction, contract allocation or land attribution (30:1, p.19 and 30:2). According to Alakhbar, It is even 'politically dangerous to impose taxes on agriculture' due the monopoly of the sector by those with strong connections to powerful state officials (30:2, p.14).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: No evidence of military having ownership over businesses was found, it is therefore not possible to speculate over whether or not they are audited. However given general levels of regulation in the country (31:1), should they exist it is unlikely that they face effective scrutiny.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 2012 Transformation Index on Mauritania, 'military officers ... are very active in business' and higher echelons of the military dominate lucrative businesses and indeed most key sectors of the economy (32:1, p16-18). Given that most lucrative (either financially or in terms of political and military esteem) contracts are held by individuals that the President favours, as he controls top appointments, defence institutions and Mauritanian businesses are likely to be networked with clansmen of the President Aziz (Boris provides a good explanation of how 'the market can be used as a means of control and regulate the political sphere' 32:2).

The government does not strictly outlaw private enterprise and there is no evidence of sanctions having been applied to those who engage in it. As most enterprise in Mauritania is state-led, for example state mining firm SNIM that leads on all exploration and exploitation activities, then it is likely that the government does indeed benefit from it. The Code of Ethics for Public Officials is applicable to all public officials and it 'establishes conflict of interest restrictions and disclosure requirements. However, there are no requirements [specific to military personnel or] for asset and income disclosure. The Code also includes disciplinary measures in cases of violation of the law in general, but not specific violations of conflict of interest provisions.(32:3)'.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: President Aziz who also 'determines the foreign, defence and security policy of the nation’ (34:1) stated in June 2014, following his re-election that he would 'combat corruption and inefficiencies ... all of which has nearly come to an end' (34:2). More forcefully, and when he first came to power, President Aziz said on the occasion of the 49th Anniversary of National Independence 'we underscore the positive results we achieved ... particularly, anti-corruption and the bad behaviors which have spread in our society .... Because resolving it is the precondition to make any reform process successful, the government continues to ... uproot these bad and immoral actions ... Because of being well aware of the necessity of reforming the administration, we declared a war against the corruption and mal-execution' (34:3).

Similar themes are re-emphasised annually and posted on the Mauritanian Army website indicating their support of these anti-corruption designs (34:4). Representatives from the defence sector, other than the President and outside the army website, rarely make public statements, no evidence was therefore found of their directly stated commitment to anti-corruption initiatives.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The Penal Code outlaws corruption and bribery, with possible sanctions including imprisonment from 2 to 10 years and fines. (35:7) It is unclear to what extent this also applies to defence personnel.

As Mauritanian journalist and researcher Boubacar N'Diaye states &quoute;Bribery in the national police force is endemic&quoute; (35:1,p.158). This extends to gendarmerie and army officials who are widely known for demanding bribes at checkpoints for example (35:5). Civilian and military public officials are regularly involved in bribery as a way to supplement their low salaries (35:6). According to a 2014 media article 'A bill strengthening penalties for persons guilty of the recognised misappropriation of public funds and corruption will soon be presented to parliament ... perpetrators of these crimes will be prosecuted and sentenced for criminal penalties when their guilt is established by the law. The new provisions will apply to the full extent necessary for good governance' (35:6) and reportedly include prosecution and dismissal. Furthermore, 'Mauritania has ratified anti-bribery agreements and adopted a national strategy in 2010 on the importance of raising awareness against the dangers of bribery' (35:6).

Within the army, the Inspection générale des forces armées et de sécurité is in charge of a general and permanent mission of inspection and inquiry (35:2, p.1000) This is set out in law, however the presidential decree (august 2009 see 35:2) that provides for this does not outline what formal measures this office can take against those found to partake in corruption. This position is today held by the Colonel Mohamed Vall Ould Maayif (35:3). Externally, the Ministry of Interior’s Economic Crimes Brigade, the Criminal Division for Economic and Financial Crimes of the Judiciary Council, and the Office of the Inspector General are responsible for investigating corruption across government institutions.

Nevertheless, authorities prosecuted few cases because judicial corruption is also a problem. (35:4, p.14). The independence of the aforementioned bodies is doubtful because they operate under or report to the Ministry of Interior or Justice. Despite some examples of prosecutions of high ranked officials (which indicates that prosecution is a formal measures for those found to be partaking in bribery), corruption and impunity are serious problems and the government rarely holds security officials accountable or prosecutes them for abuses (35:4 p.15).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
The Mauritanian government makes no comment on whistleblowing - it neither encourages nor discourages it. Freedoms are generally limited in the country and there appears to be no commitment to change this (36:3).

No Mauritanian contacts (other than one living abroad) were willing to supply on the record information for this survey. This can be explained by personal preferences but it also indicates what the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Mauritania 2014 Index states openly: 'elected civilian officials [or civilians themselves] make decisions that go against the preferences of military officers at their own peril. The military is the de facto dominant veto player in Mauritanian politics' (36:1, p.8).

There is no reference to whistleblowing in the constitution (36:2). Blueprint for Free Speech confirms that 'Mauritania affords no legislative protection to whistleblowers' (36:3) it further states that 'No recent whistleblower cases are known within the public sphere. This may be due to suppression, or because whistleblowers remain fearful of exposing themselves with the current lack of appropriate legislative protections'.

Independent moves by civil society to engage on corruption issues are less likely to be tolerated. Journalists reporting on corruption outside the state-sponsored media channels risk detention. (36:1; 36:4) In November 2014, police arrested an opposition member and at least eight other human rights defenders for staging a peaceful march in southern Mauritania to raise awareness around the issue of slavery and exploitation.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
No evidence was sourced specific to the positions in question (defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management), however by way of example, there is evidence of police inspectors and police commissioners being appointed without any training (i.e. without special attention) (37:1, p.158). Contextually, very few individuals from ethnic groups outside the President's Bidhân clan are nominated in strategic institutional positions, such as into the defence ministry, the justice ministry, the interior ministry or the army (37:2, p.7). Moreover, top level or 'sensitive' appointments are made by presidential decree which does not require vetting or rotations and is not subject to post-retirement restrictions (37:3). No rules or codes of conduct associated with such positions were found.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
Official figures are confidential, however, Mauritanian author N'Diaye estimates the following for 2009. The figures roughly correlate with those offered by a London based defence analyst of Africa:

The Army: 15,000 active members
The National Guard: 2,000
The National Police Force: 3,000.

There is no way of assessing their accuracy although the sources in question have no reason to be misleading.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Pay rates for civilian and military personnel are not available or openly published. Military salaries are executed by the allocation of credits without feedback or supporting documentation (39:1, 1.18, p.7). However, as noted in a World Bank study, pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel roughly respond to an institutionalized salary system but their low level encourages corruption (39:2, p. xv).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Delays in salary payments do occur (40:1, 40:3) however it could not be confirmed how regularly. Delays in salary payments is an issue that extends beyond the army, across the public sector, and often results in protest and strike action by workers demanding salary arrears (40:2). The system of payment works on a credits system; it is however not formalised in a published document.
The assessor could not find publicly available evidence could be found to comment on the use of discretionary adjustments.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There are regular public examinations to recruit new military personnel at low, middle and top management level (41:1, 41:2). Regular (several times a year) entrance and progression tests are scheduled within the military, which are advertised on the army website and the results of which are published in the army journal (41:4). The emphasis of these 'concours' is to demonstrate knowledge in security matters, administrative procedures and Mauritanian history (as well as general reading and writing). However, the fairness of the recruitment process is questionable and has been criticised for discriminating amongst people on ethnic bases (41:3). All appointments to top level positions are made by presidential decree, they are therefore not independent of the executive (see for example 41:5).
No evidence could be found to comment on the existence and aplpication of objective job descriptions or of the existence of oversight of the appointment process by independent personnel.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Article 32 of the constitution grants the President the authority to appoint (and by default, promote) civil service and military employees. This is done without boards or scrutiny (for example see October 2013 military personnel reshuffles: 42:3). The President, under article 34, is also head of the military council and superior committee of the defence forces. He thus controls the bodies that in other contexts/countries might provide oversight (42:1, p.164).

However, for lower level promotions, there are several procedures for the recruitment and training of personnel. Once completed, these lead to systematic and publicised (through ceremonies and decrees) promotions (42:2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Conscription is not compulsory in Mauritania (43:1).

The Mauritania Army recruits its soldiers according to Law no.62132 of June 29, 1962, Chapter II Article 7. Any Mauritanian or naturalised citizen can join the Mauritanian army under the section no.13, 14, 15, 17, 18 of Law no.61 112 of June 12, 1961 (the Code of Mauritanian nationality) (43:2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Conscription is not compulsory in Mauritania (44:1).

The Mauritania Army recruits its soldiers according to Law no.62132 of June 29, 1962, Chapter II Article 7. Any Mauritanian or naturalised citizen can join the Mauritanian army under the section no.13, 14, 15, 17, 18 of Law no.61 112 of June 12, 1961 (the Code of Mauritanian nationality) (44:2).

New recruits are however obliged to commit to a defined period of two, three, or five years. They can join at any time of year. Recruits that serve over three years are automatically put forward for a further five year commitment (44:2).

There is no specific mention of bribery relating to military posts in the Mauritanian Penal Code but civil servant corruption more broadly is theoretically punishable by law (44:3).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The assessor found no evidence of the existence of “ghost soldiers” in Mauritania in the last five years. The defence budget is by far the weightiest in the national budget, which is by far the highest in the area (45:1, p.156). Due to overstaffing, some agents only work intermittently, which, N'Diaye argues, fosters corruption (45:1, p171). The system of payment works on a credits system; it is however not formalised in a published document and delays in salary payments do occur (45:2, 45:3). Moreover, the number of civilian and military personnel are not known which presents an added risk of corruption through ghost-soldiers.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no evidence that chains of command are separated from chains of payment.

The Mauritanian national army takes the following chain of command:

The army headquarters are in Nouakchott (the capital), where senior personnel sit. These include the President and Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, the Minister of National Defence, Ahmed Ould Idey Ould Mohamed Radhi, the Chief of Staff of the National Army, General Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the National Army, Brigadier General Hanena Ould Sidi, and the Chief of Staff of Land Forces, Brigadier General Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mohamed Lemine (46:1).

The Armed Battalion, the Motorised Infantry Battalion, the Garrison Infantry Battalion, the Artillery Batallation, the Mortar Batallion and the Camel Corps all report directly to Nouakchott, as does the superior Paracommander Battalion, the Presidential Guard and the six regional outfits (46:1).

This centralisation is likely to characterise payment of salaries too (which come direct from government and not via a third party). Both chains of command and payment therefore follow a direct line. They are unlikely therefore to be separate. However, there is no published policy on this (46:1).

There is no public information available to support or contest the claims of the interviewee.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: According to Boubacar N'Diayev, no code of conduct specific to the armed forces exists, however, in 2012, a new code of ethics for public servants that is likely in theory to extend to the army, was introduced (47:1, p.171). Also that year the Investigations Unit of the Office of the Inspector General launched several criminal investigations into financial corruption and misappropriation of state funds(47:2, 47:3, p.16).

These examples demonstrate an awareness of corruption and attempts to tackle it but are not specific to the defence forces and are not comprehensive. The Code of Ethics includes disciplinary measures in cases of violation of the law in general, but not specific violations of conflict of interest provisions (or bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities etc.) (47:4).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: In 2012, a new code of ethics for public servants that is likely to in theory to extend to the army, was introduced. It does not appear to be publicly available (48:2). Under the previous 2007 code, violators were 'subject to disciplinary action, including any available penalties prescribed by law or regulation' it is likely that this article (31) has been maintained (48:4). There were no found primary examples of this code having been implemented.

However, the US state department reported in 2012 (and reiterated in 2013) that 'The government took some steps to punish officials who committed abuses and prosecuted a number of officials [results were not made public, see p.6]; however, authorities frequently acted with impunity. Civil society organizations objected to the small number indicted and alleged that some of the prosecutions, particularly those involving official corruption, had political motivations'. Further detail of the abuses of the civil society organisations referenced were not available and the researcher could not corroborate this quote with further evidence (48:5, p.1).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The national 'Stratégie de lutte contre la corruption' includes the mention of regular anti-corruption training for all civil servants (and magistrates) through their education and after their joining of the public administration, in cooperation with foreign institutions (49:1, points 16 and 36). There is evidence of specific training being organised in 2013 for civilian and military personnel (49:2, 49:3). Training can therefore be considered as structured, it is likely that it is regular if under reported. There is however no evidence of training being offered explicitly to personnel in sensitive positions and it is unlikely to be a consideration in their appointment given the procedure of appointment by presidential decree (49:4).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
The assessor could find few prosecutions of defence service representatives. However, there is a precedent in the highly publicised trials of former coup plotters and leaders that were conducted in the early 2000s. In 2003, 129 army officers went on trial for charges relating to the June 2003 attempted coup against former President Taya. Further trials took place in 2004 and in 2005 84 parachutists were found guilty and sentenced to between 18 months and life in prison (50:1, 50:2). This shows that the trials often appear to be politically motivated.

The US State Department report highlights, there does not seem to be a policy to make public the outcomes of prosecutions of defence services (50:3, 2012, p.7).

The Court of Audits has also undertaken some investigations. In March of 2013, for instance, it summoned the former Minister of Finance to reimburse 30 million ouguiyas he is accused of having embezzled.
However, its last annual report was published in 2006; since then, no report has been released and no evidence of prosecutions of defence services personnel could be found.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agree. However, the trials of the coup plotters shows that prosecutions are frequently politically motivated. Sources added.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
The assessor found no reference to facilitation payments specifically but the Penal Code does outlaw corruption. Corruption and small bribes are often reported as being very common within the police and armed forces (51:1, p.8, 9, 11, 15). Corruption in the army and the police is endemic (ibid., 51:2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
There does not seem to be a specific strategy or doctrine to combat corruption within the army. However, the fight against corruption in the army is included within the broader framework of the national 'Stratégie de lutte contre la corruption' (52:1) which demonstrates an awareness broadly (if not specifically to corruption on operations).

No media reports of corruption while on operations were found, which may be explained by the limited press freedom that characterises Mauritania.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no known training for commanders.

After a comprehensive search for media articles and official press releases, including from the websites of the National Army and the Agence Mauritanienne d'Information, only one mention of a regional anti-corruption training could be found and this was targeted at North African magistrates and police officers (including Mauritanians) organised by Algeria's Ministry of Justice in coordination with the US Embassy to Algeria in October 2013. In addition GIZ, with support from the German Federal Foreign Office, has implemented a program titled &quoute;Strengthening the capacities of police structures in Africa – Mauritania component&quoute; since 2013. The program aims to strengthen border security and enhance professionalism in the police force. The program description, however, does not mention a specific anti-corruption component nor anything specific to the defence sector.

Those two examples notwithstanding, based on the researcher's own sources, there is very little evidence that commanders have undergone specific trainings on corruption issues or that they have applied their newly acquired knowledge in the field. Indeed, points 16 and 36 of the Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption (53:1) only mentions magistrates and state agents, including the police, while leaving out the armed forces. While the National Strategy represents a positive step, it does not mean, in itself, that that the recommended trainings have taken place. In addition, the Steering Committee in charge of following up on the recommendations of the National Strategy was only appointed in September 2014, thus suggesting that the implementation of the aforementioned trainings has yet to begin in a systematic way.

Finally, the U.S. Department of State 2013 Mauritania Human Rights Reports, in addition to sources 53:2 and 53:3 provided by the researcher, offer several examples of high ranking officers engaged in corrupt activities, including the case of a military commander (see page 15).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: No evidence was found to suggest that trained professionals regularly deploy to monitor corruption risk in the field.

Mauritania does take part in peace-keeping missions, mainly in Africa but no mention of the deployment of trained professionals to monitor corruption risk in the field was found.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
The assessor found no evidence of guidelines on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.

Given that deployed operations are likely to be in emergency response, such as to the southern border in 2013 when Islamist militants took control of key towns in neighbouring Mali, training exercises will concentrate on combat missions and the use of sophisticated weapons in hostile terrains (55:1, 55:2). This can be ascertained from the training given by the US in their annual Operation Flintlock that was hosted by Mauritania in 2013 (and in which Mauritania has participated every year since 2006).
There is no evidence to suggest that deployed missions to Mali, for example, were trained in addressing corruption risks in contracting.

There is no evidence that institutionalised training - such as that under the 'Stratégie de lutte contre la corruption' or associated training days for military personnel is specific to corruption risks while on missions (55:3, points 16 and 36, 55:4, 55:5).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Foreign private military contractors are not employed to any significant extent in Mauritania. This is largely because the sector is dominated by the Mauritanienne de Sécurité Privée (MSP) founded by Cheikh Ould Baya and other former officers (56:1). MSP is a private company that functions like an entity of the state: its arms are provided by the state and it has near complete on and off shore monopoly. It was credited by the State Development Fund (UM$900m, US$3m of which 6% has reportedly been repaid) and is required to pay taxes (56:2) - while no specific legal stipulations (or sanctions) around PMC's were found this indicates that the government tolerates them and through its own financing is likely to exert a level of control over MSP. Moreover, MSP is partnered with Tennessee-based Sterling Global Operations in 2012 in an alleged attempt to ensure MSP complies with international security and surveillance standards (56:3).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
There are specific clauses regarding defence and security procurement in the Mauritanian Code des marchés publics in articles : 60, 72, 97.3, 129 (57:1). Defence procurement is under the same legislation as other kinds of public procurements (a new code was enacted in 2010 and came into effect in 2012), which include anti-corruption measures in articles 161 and 164 (57:1).

Mauritania is now governed by the 2010 Public Procurement Code (57:3). This law, along with the implementation decree 2011-180 (57:4) are what guide procurement.

Article 60 of the 2002 Procurement Law states that, in cases where national security is at stake, defence procurement is exempt from competitive procurement and is not required to be made public but can instead be tendered through an ad-hoc procurement commission. The law states that the Minister of National Defence should explain the reasons for this procedure and obtain the prior approval of the Minister responsible procurement. Reference to a similar provision in the 2010 law could not be found.

While the legal framework theoretically covers defence and security procurement, the 2010-44 Public Procurement Code and the 2011-180 implementation decree scantly mention what is meant by national security (in Art. 32 covering conditions for non-competitive bidding process known as &quoute;marché par entente direct&quoute; and Art. 77 covering conditions for the cancellation of the procurement process, respectively).

Procurement contracts below UM50million and that are not financed by public money are exempt from the Procurement Code (57:2). According to the code there is no procurement audit (although subsequent audit investigations can be launched by the Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement) while publication of decisions is not mandatory nor are reports on procurement necessary (thus further undermining the possibility of independent scrutiny) (57:2).

The assessor could find evidence indicating that the law is enforced or bypassed with regards to the defence sector or that exempt procurement is independently scrutinised..


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed. Sources added.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
Information regarding defence procurement is not disclosed to the public.

Moreover, the 2010 Public Procurement Code does not require that contracts be audited (although subsequent audit investigations can be launched by the Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement) while publication of decisions is not mandatory nor are reports on procurements necessary (thus further undermining the possibility of independent scrutiny) (58:1).

There are examples of procurement deals being published in international media. For example, in October 2012, Defence Web reported that Mauritania received a Super Tucano trainer and light attack aircraft from Brazilian manufacturing company Embraer (58:2) and in June 2013 Augusta Westland reported that Mauritania ordered an undisclosed number of AW109 Power helicopters from Italian-based, Finmeccanica company, AgustaWestland (58:3). These reports do not include details of the procurement cycle or speculation over corruption however (although details of the delivery date are usually included).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no recent evidence of procurement oversight mechanisms that are active.

There is no longer any indication that defence is under the purview of the National Commission for the Oversight of Public Procurement (&quoute;Commission Nationale de Contrôle de Passation des Marchés Publics&quoute;) or that any of the seven sector-specific public procurement commissions supposed to cover every aspect of socio-economic life (Sovereignty, Social Sectors, Administration/Culture/Communication, Rural and Food Security, Economy and Finance, Infrastructures, and Basic Services and Extractive Industries) are currently managing the procurement cycle process for the security sector.

The 2010 Procurement Code does not require an audit (although audit investigations can subsequently be launched by the Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement), the publication of decisions or reports on finalised decisions (thus further undermining the possibility of independent scrutiny) (59:2). In 2005-2006 the World Bank implemented the Strengthening of Mauritania’s Public Procurement Reform Project which involved training of personnel and auditing - however this did not extend to the weapons procurement area (59:1).

The Public Procurement Code does not specify defence procurement, and there is no further evidence of similar legislation governing these.

A 'Defence and Security Committee' exists in both the National Assembly and the Senate (59:3, p.165) but there are considerable concerns over its effectiveness. Although there have been anecdotal examples of the committee's activity (59:4 - 59:7), according to academic commentary (59:3) it is unclear what their formal rights of oversight are. Given their lack of formal independence (see quotes from the constitution below 2:2), it is unlikely they exercise effective oversight.

Oversight mechanisms are entirely non-transparent and there is no evidence that they are active.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed. score changed from 1 to 0 and sources added.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
There is no centralised policy for regular auditing, or for disclosing or withholding military purchases, but nevertheless, deals are often publicised in the media. It is unclear whether this information is made available through the government or through international sources. For example, in October 2012, Mauritania received a Super Tucano trainer and light attack aircraft from Brazilian manufacturing company Embraer (60:1) and in June 2013 Mauritania ordered an undisclosed number of AW109 Power helicopter from Italian-based, Finmeccanica company, AgustaWestland (60:2).

Not all acquisitions are purchased by Mauritania, either. In September 2014 for example, the US ordered a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX aircraft, in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) configuration funded through Section 1206 of the US National defence Authorisation Act, which gives the US Secretary of defence authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specific purposes —counterterrorism and stability operations (60:4).

Given that Mauritania faces an acute terrorism (60:5) threat and partakes in regional and international counter-terrorism strategies (60:6), confidentiality is likely to be justified in light of very apparent security issues.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
Mauritania's Commerical Law requires companies to avoid corruption and includes a punishment of three months for those found to be involved in corruption activities. Beyond this no relevant compliance procedures were found in this legislation or in the Investment Code.

There is no further publicly available information on this topic, which may indicate an absence of guidelines as mentioned around the bidding process.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: A summarized defence strategy is available on the Mauritanian National Army website (62:1); however there is no mention of purchases being audited. Defence acquisitions in recent years do support a broad national counter-terrorism policy (especially surveillance craft as in 62:2) as well as an offshore security enhancement policy as Mauritania seeks to increase fishing output (see purchase of vessels in May/June 2014 62:3). That Mauritania has prioritised the acquisition of aircraft to support its counter-terrorism initiatives is likely to be encouraged by the French and US monetary and diplomatic support for such efforts (62:4, 62:5). In September 2014 for example, the US ordered a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX aircraft, in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) configuration funded through Section 1206 of the US National defence Authorisation Act, which gives the US Secretary of defence authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specific purposes —counterterrorism and stability operations (62:6).

Interviewee 3 noted that several unreported military acquisitions in Mauritania 2010-15 were as a result of aid agreements with France, while the assessor considers this highly likely it could not be independently verified. France does however have strong defence bilateral ties with Mauritania (62:7)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no outlined systematic procedure for defence purchase requirements and these are allegedly flexible in order to react to an often rapidly changing security environment.

While this may not lead to opaque procedures, generally purchases seem to be based on identifiable requirements. For example, the acquisition of surveillance craft to build Mauritanian Air Force’s capabilities, is a direct result of the need to counter terrorist groups (63:1) that operate in the vast Sahara region of the country to the south and east (63:3,2 and 4). That Mauritania has prioritised the acquisition of aircraft to support its counter-terrorism initiatives is likely to be encouraged by the French and US monetary and diplomatic support for such efforts (63:5, 63:4). In September 2014 for example, the US ordered a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX aircraft, in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) configuration funded through Section 1206 of the US National defence Authorisation Act, which gives the US Secretary of defence authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specific purposes - counterterrorism and stability operations (63:6). Interviewee 3 noted that several unreported military acquisitions in Mauritania 2010-15 were as a result of aid agreements with France, while the assessor considers this highly likely it could not be independently verified. France does however have strong defence bilateral ties with Mauritania (63:7)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: defence purchases made over the past two years have been sourced from multiple contractors (64:1, 64:2). In October 2012, Mauritania received a Super Tucano trainer and light attack aircraft from Brazilian manufacturing company Embraer (64:1) and in June 2013 Mauritania ordered an undisclosed number of AW109 Power helicopter from Italian-based Finmeccanica company, AgustaWestland (64:2). However, the details of these procurement deals are not disclosed, while there may be several more that are not published at all. While the 2010 Public Procurement Code does not specify defence purchases, it does provide for 'competitive calls' in the general procurement cycle (64:3). While the 2002 procurement code called for defence exemptions (to competitive tendering) when national security was at stake, it's unclear to what extent that 2010 code does the same.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: In practice, there is evidence that some tenders are listed internationally through online portals such as Tender Info (65:1). Between 1-5 March 2015, for instance, seven tenders were listed which is an indication of the regularity of tender notice issuances. DG Market listings for Mauritania also give an indication of the competitive nature of tenders which, together with their open publication, indicates that they are likely to be subject to regulation although it is unlikely that this extends to audits (65:2).

It is likely that some military projects, such as for the construction of military infrastructure (such as the 2015 military airport project awarded to Najah 65:3) are subject to some similar regulation (i.e. pre-tender advertising and open competition). However, the Najah military airport project may not have been initiated by a &quoute;military tender board&quoute; since the contracting authority was the Ministry of Equipment and Transportation. That contract may have been subject to the oversight and regulatory powers of the National Commission for the Oversight of Public Procurement and the Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement. That some contract awards are published in the media (65:3) demonstrates some transparency of results; however this is unlikely to be routine or as a result of an implemented policy.

Public tender boards and contracting authorities managing the procurement process cycle of other sectors of the economy are subject to relatively well-defined regulations under the 2010 Public Procurement Code and the 2011 implementation decree. Indeed, the National Commission for the Oversight of Public Procurement is responsible for pre-approving all public contracts with a value greater than the threshold set by the Prime Minister, and for verifying procurement procedures a posteriori for all public contracts with a value smaller than the threshold. Furthermore, the Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement is empowered to verify contract performance through independent audits, initiate legal proceedings to ensure compliance by all stakeholders of the procurement cycle, and impose financial penalties against legal entities or individuals in breach of regulations. So while tender boards do exist in Mauritania (65:4) but it is not confirmed that they also apply to military procurement.

This reviewer was not able to find any evidence of codes of conduct specific to public tender boards. However, as the researcher noted earlier, all civil servants are bound by the Code of Ethics revised in 2013 (&quoute;Code de déontologie des agents publics&quoute;). According to the African Development Fund, &quoute;Mauritania has regulations and practices based on principles of competition and public procurement inherited from the French system. Tenders Boards are not really actors in budget execution, but their action contributes to ensuring transparency in the management of public funds by guaranteeing strict compliance with public procurement procedures. The regulatory framework distinguishes two types of boards: (i) the Central Tenders Board (CCM), attached to the General Secretariat of the Government, intervenes in the award of Government, local authorities and public administration contracts exceeding UM 75 million for works, UM 30 million for goods and services, UM 25 million for intellectual services, and UM 100 million for the contracts of public industrial and commercial establishments as well as public capital companies; and ii) Ministerial Boards created in each central administration and responsible for supervising the procedure. However, for contracts awarded through shopping and direct negotiation, the CCM can authorize the use of an exceptional procedure for contracts exceeding UM 15 million. Similarly, with respect to decentralization and/or deconcentration, the difficulties encountered in attempting to transfer the powers of the Central Tenders Board to Ministerial Boards undermine the effective empowerment of decentralized bodies&quoute;. It is not confirmed whether that tender boards also apply to military procurement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: No evidence was found to confirm whether or not legislation is in place to discourage and punish collusion. While the Penal Code does call for imprisonment for crimes of corruption, there is no evidence to suggest that prosecution, debarment from current and future competitions, or other sanctions are in place to punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts.

In theory, given that legal rights on access to information are extremely limited in Mauritania (66:1) collusion, being the defrauding of others of their legal rights to clear information regarding bids and tenders, is unlikely. I.e. because legal rights are limited, it is difficult to deprive interested parties of them.

There is no evidence to show that the government discourage collusion. The media, CSOs, academics have not reported on colluding companies in Mauritania.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105:
It is not clear whether Defence procurement staff are not organised into a professional staff department or not. A Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement does exist (ARMP). Members of the office, especially those in influential positions are likely to be rotated according to the Presidential system of favouritism, while it is also likely that procurement decisions are effected by presidential decree (allowed for in the constitution 67:5) as with other major administrative and security appointments (67:2, 67:4).

The 2010 Public Procurement Code provides for 'training programs, awareness and information campaigns related to the applicable legislation and institutional procurement for the participants and stakeholders in public procurement' (67:3) however there is no evidence that these have been introduced since the code's implementation in 2012, and whether this has extended to the defence sector. The ARMP reportedly trained hundreds 'of actors and stakeholders involved in public procurement' between 2010 and 2012 indicating that it is well staffed (67:3).

However there is no evidence to suggest that the code or the ARMP applies to defence procurement or any evidence of a separate defence staff department responsible for this. While civil service training does exist, ministries have been found wanting in terms of ability to uphold transparent contract awarding and tender procedures in the past (67:1, p.8).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The 2002 Public Procurement Act, demonstrated a 'total absence of the possibility of appeal to candidates or tenderers who consider themselves harmed by any act, procedure or decision' (68:1). However the amended version presented in 2010 allowed for a 'Commission for Settlement of Disputes' to be 'housed within the Regulatory Authority which reportedly resolves all disputes relating to procurement' (68:1).

While these changes were made with the aim of making the investment safer for investors - to take effect from 2012 - there is no evidence of sector-wide implementation (i.e. functionality) (68:2, p.17) nor is there any evidence (allafrica and cridem media search) of companies having used these mechanisms to complain (which also suggests they are not functioning). It is therefore not known if companies are protected from discrimination when using these mechanisms.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Punitive measures exist in the 2010 amended Public Contracts Code. Legal sanctions are as follows: cancellation of the contract and of the participation to the bidding, exclusion (temporary or not) from any future public tender, and penal prosecution (69:1). However, due to the questionable independence of the judiciary it is unlikely that the code is implemented systematically. No examples for defence contacts were found but for regular contracts there have been incidents: in December 2012 for example, authorities cancelled an order to bar three transport companies, only one day after issuing it (69:3).

In 2011, three agencies were created to address corruption around public contracts, the Public Contracts Regulation Agency (Autorité de regulation des marchés publics), the Procurement Commission (Commission de passation des marchés publics) and the National Commission for the Control of Public contracts (Commission nationale de contrôle des marchés publics). There is no evidence as yet of their level of effectiveness (69:2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Offset contracts are not mentioned in the 2010 Code des marchés publics, there is therefore unlikely to be any specific legislation for offset contracts and its associated matters of due diligence (70:1). The interviewee noted that they 'had not heard Mauritania enter into, or contemplate entering into such arrangements with regard to any of its resources' and that they 'would be surprised if there [are] now such contracts.'

Mauritania has strong trading relationships with international partners that are characterised by incoming donations and development projects. China is Mauritania's largest trading partner for both imports and exports for example. China has also funded over 40 different projects in the country, including the Friendship port, the Youth and Culture centre, the water supply project in Nouakchott, the International Conference Centre, the Olympic stadium and the Friendship hospital (70:3).

While there is no evidence to suggest that these projects were officially 'offset agreements' it is likely that they are offset in nature, i.e. China (the supplier) has agreed to buy something (natural resources) from Mauritania in return for providing services that relate directly, or indirectly to the purchased product. The EU (70:2), Russia and Japan are other major trading partners who are likely to be involved in similar agreements.

The researcher was unable to find any contextual examples relating to the defence sector. Taken in the context of procurement legislation (70:4) that does not require reporting, auditing or publishing nor does it have explicit causes for corruption avoidance, 'offset' agreements are unlikely to be subject to like stringent controls.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The assessor has been unable to confirm if offset agreements occur. The interviewee noted that they 'had not heard Mauritania enter into, or contemplate entering in such arrangements with regard to any of its resources' and that they 'would be surprised if there is now such contracts.'

Offset contracts are not specifically mentioned in the 2010 Code des marches publics they are likely to be guided by the same legislation as regular contracts. Depending on the type of contracts, the legislation aims to force the authorities to make details of the contracts available (71:1 article 41). Given that the amended code was implemented in 2012 it is too early to say whether corruption and other illegal practices in the allocation and implementation of public contracts will be effectively tackled (71:2, p.18).

Mauritania has strong trading relationships with international partners that are characterised by incoming donations and development projects. China is Mauritania's largest trading partner for both imports and exports for example. China has also funded over 40 different projects in the country, including the Friendship port, the Youth and Culture center, the water supply project in Nouakchott, the International Conference Center, the Olympic stadium and the Friendship hospital (71:3). While there is no evidence to suggest that these projects were officially 'offset agreements' it is likely that they are offset in nature, i.e. China (the supplier) has agreed to buy something (natural resources) from Mauritania in return for providing services that relate directly, or indirectly to the purchased product. The EU (71:4), Russia and Japan are other major trading partners that are likely to be involved in similar agreements.

The researcher was unable to find any contextual examples relating to the defence sector. Taken in the context of procurement legislation (71:5) that does not require reporting, auditing or publishing nor does it have explicit causes for corruption avoidance, 'offset' agreements are unlikely to be subject to like stringent controls.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: I have been unable to confirm if Mauritania is explicitly involved in offset agreements (and therefore what competition regulations they would have to adhere to should they exist). The interviewee noted that they 'had not heard Mauritania enter into, or contemplate entering in such arrangements with regard to any of its resources' and that they 'would be surprised if there is now such contracts.'

By proxy it is possible to assert that like-agreements take place as part of bilateral treaties. In this case, agreements are signed at a national level and therefore implicating national institutions and state-owned companies which limits the amount of possible contract competition.

For example: Mauritania has strong trading relationships with international partners that are characterised by incoming donations and development projects. China is Mauritania's largest trading partner for both imports and exports for example. China has also funded over 40 different projects in the country, including the Friendship port, the Youth and Culture centre, the water supply project in Nouakchott, the International Conference Centre, the Olympic stadium and the Friendship hospital (72:1). While there is no evidence to suggest that these projects were officially 'offset agreements' it is likely that they are offset in nature, i.e. China (the supplier) has agreed to buy something (natural resources) from Mauritania in return for providing services that relate directly, or indirectly to the purchased product.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Neither agents or intermediaries are mentioned in the 2010 Public Procurement Code (73). There is no policy on their usage. There is no public evidence available to suggest that agents and intermediaries are used in the procurement cycle. If they are used they are unlikely to be subject to strict controls given that the code is not stringent, for example it does not impose auditing, reporting or publications of procurements and that it doesn't apply to under UM50million or private contracts (73).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Major arms deals are not publicly disclosed in Mauritania.

Lower value purchases made by the Mauritanian government are published on an ad hoc basis - often by the seller company or market watcher rather than as a centralised initiative on the part of the Mauritanian government (74:1, 74:2). Finance package details even of these are not disclosed however, and third party assessments of expected time frames for delivery etc. are often offered (74:1, 74:2).

For example, in October 2012, Defence Web reported that Mauritania received a Super Tucano trainer and light attack aircraft from Brazilian manufacturing company Embraer (74:1) and in June 2013 Augusta Westland reported that Mauritania ordered an undisclosed number of AW109 Power helicopter from Italian-based, Finmeccanica company, AgustaWestland (74:2). Not all acquisitions are purchased by Mauritania either - in September 2014 for example, the US ordered a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX aircraft, in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) configuration funded through Section 1206 of the US National defence Authorisation Act, which gives the US Secretary of defence authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specific purposes —counterterrorism and stability operations (74:3).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no evidence of the government formally requiring the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, nor is there evidence of the government encouraging this informally.

A National Commission for the control of Public Contracts set up in 2011 exists in order to facilitate transparency in contract allocation however there is no stated policy applicable to subsidiaries and third party contractors. The effectiveness of the institution is also questionable owing to its leadership being stalwart government members (BTI, p.18) as well as the lack of independence of the judiciary (75:3) in Mauritania.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: That Mauritania has prioritised the acquisition of aircraft to support its counter-terrorism initiatives is likely to be encouraged by the French and US monetary and diplomatic support for such efforts (76:1, 76:2).
In September 2014 for example, the US ordered a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX aircraft, in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) configuration funded through Section 1206 of the US National defence Authorisation Act, which gives the US Secretary of defence authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specific purposes —counterterrorism and stability operations (76:3).

Interviewee 3 noted that several unreported military acquisitions in Mauritania 2010-15 were as a result of aid agreements with France, while the assessor considers this highly likely it could not be independently verified. France does however have strong defence bilateral ties with Mauritania (76:4). Broadly acquisitions are likely to be made with companies that represent friendly diplomatic ties, but more importantly a reasonable price and regulation demands.

Given the lack of information made publicly available by the government so there would be few instances of the government justifying its military procurement by referring to military need.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: A country can make acquisitions based on military need and political influence. I.e. a need to buy aircraft coupled with influence by a certain provider that makes one seller nation favoured over another.