This country is placed in Band F

Recommendations Unavailable

Policy recommendations not available for this country's assessment

Leadership 30
01.
score
0

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Researcher4272: Congo has two main legislative organs: the National Assembly and the Senate. Rules of Procedure provide for specialised committees in each house, including the 'Commission Défence et Sécurité' that is permitted to examine defence policy. While research found that meetings do occur, the legislature provides no meaningful oversight and would be highly unlikely to question policy set.

There is evidence that the legislature can be improperly influenced by the presidency. Defence policy is set by President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who is commander in chief. In October 2015, a controversial referendum was conducted whereby his bid to make constitutional changes to allow him to run for a third term was approved by a landslide majority of voters. The opposition alleged foul play in the vote.

Power is concentrated in the president's hands, and all available evidence indicates those in positions of influence in the National Assembly and the Senate are his allies. The independence of these bodies is therefore low. Independent analysis similarly shows the president is likely to attempt to change the constitution to allow himself to run for a third term. If he is successful in doing this, political analysts have suggested the changes would include increased National Assembly oversight powers, such as the ability to confirm ministerial appointments. However, this increased oversight would still be unlikely to result in improvements regarding defence policy.

Wider examination indicates that all branches of power in the political system are concentrated to the president of the Republic, who also extends his power through unofficial means such as traditional leadership. One can observe the weak performance of some departments to implicitly understand this influence, although the texts provide a fuller indication.

The researcher can also afford an analysis of an indicative series of events. The first was at a an informal meeting convened in Oyo, North Congo, during which the President of the Republic discussed domestic issues with the notables of his region. A video of this meeting is available online. Among the guests was the President of the Assembly, in his capacity of traditional leader (Prime Minister of the King of Loango) in another region. During this discussion President Sassou made it clear he saw no one able to succeed him as head of state, indicating he believed he could lead as long as necessary. Later, from his electoral stronghold of the Niari region, the President of the Assembly was the first politician to declare that the people required amendment of the Constitution, which would lead the Head of State to prolong his presidency.

Finally, evidence suggests lack of political will as the legislature engages in selective enforcement of laws. For example, the control action plan against corruption, bribery and fraud and to improve governance was approved by Decree No. 2009-235 of 13 August 2009. This document focuses its fields of action to key areas where weaknesses have been identified, including: political, administrative governance, financial governance and the justice sector. The editors have ranked the lack of political will among some senior officials of the state as the top element that may reduce the impact of the action plan however.

COMMENTS -+

Constitution de la Republique du Congo, January 20, 2002, Article 47

Assemblée Nationale, 'Commission Défence et Sécurité', http://www.assemblee-nationale.cg/commissions.php?commissions=4

National report on the occasion of the Universal Periodic Review, A/HRC/WG.6/17/COG/1., pt 25 p.5

Loi sur la corruption, la concussion et la fraude et les infractions assimilées en République du Congo, Loi 5-2009, September 22, 2009.

Joachim Mbanza, &quoute;Faire évoluer les institutions de la République&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, April 17, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015 http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/editorial/11551-faire-evoluer-les-institutions-de-la-republique

BBC, “Congo backs Sassou Nguesso third-term bid by landslide,” 27 October 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34646310

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
1

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Researcher4272: There is a Defence and Security Commission in each House of Parliament (National Assembly and Senate). Neither interviewees nor public sources could recall changes implemented by either commission however. Research showed that the appointees to this commission are political allies of the president, severely undermining its ability to challenge defence policy or the budget.

The composition of specialized commissions is problematic across the Assembly. It is notable that the appointment process does not necessarily take into account the MPs’ backgrounds. In Congo, national service has been minimally organized and few members have a military profile.

At a wider level, the legislature has minimal formal rights of oversight overall, and there are considerable concerns over its effectiveness. Despite what is stated in law, Parliament exercises very little control over the role of government in practice. Although the law refers to the existence of three branches of power, it is clearly difficult to observe the separation. Most members of the government are elected MPs, however the researcher found that many do not sit at the Assembly in practice, and that the stand-ins who serve instead do not demonstrate capacity to effectively control the government.

COMMENTS -+

Assemblee Nationale. &quoute;Commission defence et Securite.&quoute; Last accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.assemblee-nationale.cg/commissions.php?commissions=4

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010. pp 23, 36-39

Joachim Mbanza, &quoute;Faire évoluer les institutions de la République&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, April 17, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015 http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/editorial/11551-faire-evoluer-les-institutions-de-la-republique

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Despite the fact that they do have formal rights, these are never applied.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
0

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

Researcher4272: Research indicates that a defence policy exists, but it is not publicly available. In general, issues of defence and security are often not publicly discussed or kept confidential. The national development plan (PND) from 2012-16 does include a section on the Ministry of Defence, which sets out general objectives such a for the military to contribute to the economic development of the country. The PND is available online, but was not publicly debated.

A diaspora based journalist confirmed that given the primacy of the executive, the parliament is largely marginalized in practice. The security sector and its associated policies are considered to be the preserve of the Head of State as head of the armed forces, and his security counsellors and senior officers of the armed forces.

COMMENTS -+

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, march 2010. P.19

Constitution de la Republique du Congo, January 20, 2002, art.78

Alain-Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Conférence de planification annuelle de la gendarmerie nationale : Redynamiser le rôle opérationnel de la gendarmerie suivant ses missions judiciaires&quoute;, May 5, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/sports/11668-conference-de-planification-annuelle-de-la-gendarmerie-nationale-redynamiser-le-role-operationnel-de-la-gendarmerie-suivant-ses-missions-judiciaires

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011. Articles 58-59, 300-301
Plan National de Développement: Livre 2: Condense des PAP/CDMT Ministeriels, July 2011. p. 55-66

Interview with source 10. Civil society representative, December 2013

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no knowledge of a public debate on those terms.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
1

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

Researcher4272: Due to the highly militarised nature of Congo, civil society is weak and increasingly stifled. Any perceived opposition to the government, including from non-political CSO organisations, is increasingly cracked down on as the president attempts to maintain power. This has included numerous arrests of key civil society figures, and growing reports of censorship from journalists and CSO workers. With the president's control so reliant on the security forces, this area is particularly off bounds.

Several exceptions do exist, including ADHUC which tackles prisoners rights, and has worked on the codes of conduct for law enforcement officials. The Congolese chapter of EITI, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, has also organised seminars on anti-corruption, which included the participation of some senior members of the armed forces. These interactions are rare and involve minimal numbers of officers.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Comments accepted. Originally I felt score 0 would only be appropriate if there was no engagement at all, but as evidenced in the text, there are past examples of government contact with CSOs however, albeit minimal.

Looking at the methodology closer, I agree with the criteria that &quoute;Requests by CSOs to work with the government are likely to be rejected or considered inappropriate&quoute;.

Score changed from 1 to 0.

COMMENTS -+

Lopelle Mboussa Gassia, &quoute;Industries extractives : les officiers de l’armée congolaise formés sur l’importance de l’ITIE&quoute;. ADIAC-Congo, Mardi 12 Novembre 2013. http://www.adiac-congo.com/content/industries-extractives-les-officiers-de-larmee-congolaise-formes-sur-limportance-de-litie

Les militaires congolais formés sur l’importance de l’ITIE. ITIE, 13 November 2013. http://www.itie-congo.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120

Adrien de Calan, &quoute;Congo: Qui est responsable des explosions de Brazzaville?&quoute;. Slate Afrique, 26 March 2012. http://www.slateafrique.com/84517/congo-brazza-la-societe-civile-cherche-les-responsables-des-explosions

EITI. &quoute;LES OFFICIERS CONGOLAIS FORMES SUR L’IMPORTANCE DE L’ITIE.&quoute; Last modified 2012. http://www.itie-congo.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120:les-officiers-congolais-formes-sur-limportance-de-litie&catid=47:actualite&Itemid=71

OCDH. &quoute;Agressions du journaliste Elie Smith et des militants de l’opposition politique : L’OCDH exige l’ouverture d’enquêtes judiciaires sérieuses.&quoute; Last modified September 23, 2014. http://blog.ocdh.org/post/2014/09/23/Note-de-position-%3A-Agressions-du-journaliste-Elie-Smith-et-des-militants-de-l%E2%80%99opposition-politique-%3A-L%E2%80%99OCDH-exige-l%E2%80%99ouverture-d%E2%80%99enqu%C3%AAtes-judiciaires-s%C3%A9rieuses

Human Rights Watch. &quoute;Congo-Brazzaville: Authorities Try to Silence Anticorruption Activists.&quoute; Last modified November 15, 2006. http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/11/14/congo-brazzaville-authorities-try-silence-anticorruption-activists

Reporters Without Borders. &quoute;REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS SHOCKED BY THE VIOLENT ATTACK ON JOURNALIST ELIE SMITH AND HIS SISTER.&quoute; Last modified September 12, 2014. http://en.rsf.org/congo-reporters-without-borders-shocked-12-09-2014,46949.html

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: During my period in Brazzaville, I had any knowledge of contact to any CSOs. The only contacts (for example, for the Mpila explosion) was the contact with elders, but they were not associated to a further level (Source: UNMAS Republic of Congo internal reports, not to be shared)

Suggested score: 0

Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
2

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Researcher4272: The Republic of Congo has ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) on July 13, 2006; the African Union Convention on Preventing Corruption on January 31, 2006; and the Additional Protocol to the UN Convention Protocol against Transnational Organized Crime (“Palermo Protocol”) on June 11, 2012.

All of these need to be implemented.

COMMENTS -+

National Report submitted for the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), A/HRC/WG.6/17/COG/1
Pt 35, p.6

UNODC, &quoute;United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 April 2015&quoute; Last modified April 1, 2015. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html

Christian Brice Elion, &quoute;Cinq ONG nationales soutiendront les efforts du gouvernement en matière de gouvernance&quoute; Congo-Site, August 5, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.congo-site.com/Cinq-ONG-nationales-soutiendront-les-efforts-du-gouvernement-en-matiere-de-gouvernance_a17623.html

Diane Ondélé, &quoute;Célébration de la journée internationale de lutte contre la corruption&quoute; Congo-site, December 9, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.congo-site.com/Celebration-de-la-journee-internationale-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption_a18256.html

African Union. &quoute;LIST OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SIGNED, RATIFIED/ACCEDED TO THE
AFRICAN CONVENTION ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING CORRUPTION&quoute; Last modified on March 1, 2013. http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Corruption.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are a few more instruments implemented to combat corruption.

Institutions:
National Commission for the Fight Against Corruption,
Embezzlement and Fraud (CNLCCF) Formed in 2007

Anti-Corruption Watchdog Group

Laws/Regulations:
Law No. 5-2009 (22 September 2009)
Law No. 16-2007 (19 September 2007)
Law No. 13-2005 (14 September 2005)
Law No. 14-2005 (14 September 2005)
Decree No. 2007-155 (13 February 2007 reorganised the CNLSCCF
Decree No. 2009-235 (13 August 2009) authorised a plan of action to fight corruption

Republic of Congo is also a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

--

There has been note of a critical lack of infrastructure supporting anti-corruption measures, however. This in turn leaves the entire legislative framework woefully under implemented.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
1

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

Researcher4272: There is no formalised process that allows public debate of issues of defence. Debates that do take place mainly occur following serious or significant incidents, typically involving loss of life and serious damage to the population, as in the case of the explosion of a weapons depot on March 4, 2012. Evidence indicates it is generally civil society that takes a stand to generate more decisive action by Parliament.

The researcher found that on the occasions where Parliament has decided to convene, the Government - and in this case the Minister of Defence - has often requested planned questions in advance, before submitting prepared answers.

COMMENTS -+

Rigobert Ossebi, &quoute;Dos Santos imposera sa loi à Sassou Nguesso&quoute; Congo LIberty, October 17, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015 http://congo-liberty.com/?p=7557

Adrien de Calan, &quoute;Congo: Qui est responsable des explosions de Brazzaville?&quoute;, Slate, March 26, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015 http://www.slateafrique.com/84517/congo-brazza-la-societe-civile-cherche-les-responsables-des-explosions

Human Rights Watch, &quoute;Central African Republic: Peacekeepers Tied to Abuse ,
At Least 11 People Missing After Detained by Congolese Troops&quoute;, June 2, 2014, accessed on June 17, 2015 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/02/central-african-republic-peacekeepers-tied-abuse

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
2

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

Researcher4272: Congo has established a National Commission to fight against corruption, extortion and fraud. The mandate of the Commission extends to all sectors of society. There is also an Anti-Corruption Observatory. So far, the available evidence suggests the actions of these two institutions may not be effective in the area of defence and security. In 2015 the president of the Commission stated that they would be formulating a new anti-corruption national strategy over the coming year however. Part of the review process prior to this strategy, which has been funded by the World Bank, included surveys of the police and gendarmerie. The findings of these reviews have been submitted to the relevant institutions but were not publicly available at the time of research.

The Act 5-2009, on corruption, bribery, fraud and other related offenses provides for sanctions against any agent that would compromise in illegal activities in the exercise of his functions. This includes the defence sector. Article 180 of the Penal Code also forbids corruption within the military, and states that perpetrators would be held accountable to the Code of Military Justice of the Army (article 254), and Code of Military Justice of the Navy (article 268).

There does not appear to be evidence of effective implementation. The Circular of the Director of Office of the Head of State taken on November 14, 2012 has established a ministerial council of discipline, but an absence of results indicates this has in no way influenced on bad practice. The other official documents cited as sources, which cover pertinent departments of the military as well as the Directorate of Military Justice and the Procurement Directorate, do not indicate any consideration of anti-corruption measures.

COMMENTS -+

Ordonnance 1-2001 du 5 février 2001, portant Organisation générale de la défense nationale ;
Ordonnance 4-2001 du 5 février 2001, portant Statut général des militaires et des gendarmes ;
Décret n°2006-694 du 29 décembre 2006, portant Règlement de discipline générale
Décret 2002-2 du 3 janvier 2002, portant organisation et fonctionnement du Contrôle général des forces armées et de la gendarmerie.

Gaspard Lenckonov, &quoute;Les FAC évaluent les activités de 2014 et planifient celles de 2015&quoute; Congo Site, February 3, 2015, accesssed June 17, 2015, http://www.congo-site.com/Les-FAC-evaluent-les-activites-de-2014-et-planifient-celles-de-2015_a18472.html

Loi sur la corruption, la concussion et la fraude et les infractions assimilées en République du Congo, Loi 5-2009, September 22, 2009.

Code penal du Republique du Congo, March 29, 1836, updated through to August 2001, in Codes d’Audience, Recueil de codes et textes usuels, Editions Giraf, Aug. 2001. Article 180

Philippe Banz, &quoute;Commission nationale de lutte contre la corruption : La stratégie nationale de lutte contre la corruption sera élaborée cette année&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, January 30, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/11060-commission-nationale-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-la-strategie-nationale-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-sera-elaboree-cette-annee

UN Human Rights Council, “National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Congo”, 25 July 2013, http://www.refworld.org/docid/526903220.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the researcher in that references are generally made. They are not publicly available as far as I am aware and have seen through my own sources.

There is no openly-stated anti-corruption policy, or at least one that has not been widely published beyond military circles. The inability of Congolese anti-corruption infrastructure to support its legislation is, if anything, exacerbated in the military rather than improved.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I was unable to find a copy of the Code of Military Justice of the Army/Navy, so no chance to answer the required questions.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
2

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

Researcher4272: Some departments of the country’s defence and security services have been mandated to create an environment of integrity. These include the Central Directorate of Military Security, which monitors staff morale, and verifies that the agents approached for employment are of good character. The Central Directorate of Military Justice is also supposed to administer the military courts. Research (including interviews) indicates that these bodies are not really independent, although they seem to hold some influence. There are military judges, but in practice the courts have not been set up and neither of these appear to systematically tackle corruption issues.

In addition, there are two institutions whose mandates are very similar in appearance: the General Inspectorate and General Comptroller. In practice, this confusion of roles leaves room for prevarication.

The Control Action Plan against Corruption, Bribery and Fraud and to Improve Governance was approved by Decree No. 2009-235 of 13 August 2009. This document focused its fields of action to identified weakness areas, including political, administrative and financial governance, and the justice sector. It is notable that the editors of the Action Plan have ranked the lack of political will among some senior officials of the state as one of the first elements that may reduce the impact of the action plan.

COMMENTS -+

Les Dépêches de Brazza, n° 1805 du 20 août 2013, p. 7

Décret 2002-2 du 3 janvier 2002, portant organisation et fonctionnement du Contrôle général des forces armées et de la gendarmerie.

UN Human Rights Council, “National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Congo”, 25 July 2013, http://www.refworld.org/docid/526903220.html

Interview with source 8. Congolese Armed Forces major, 24 July 2014

Interview with source 9. Armed Forces Auditor, 18 July 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In my opinion, it is essential to mention the basic role played by the Ministry of Plans, who makes the global budget control and, in some terms, are responsible in the above mentioned role of integrity. Unproven rumours suggest a perception of budget diversion concerning the funds for the recovery of the Mpila area (Source. UNMAS internal documents, not to be shared)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
1

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

Researcher4272: Research found no polling in the media or online about the population's perception of the military. Wider research by international organisations, local civil society and local media indicates trust for the government and the security forces is minimal however. The Department of Military Justice is mandated to manage military courts, however it has not implemented a Code of Military Justice. The General Directorate of Administration and Finance (DGAF) is also weak.

Interviewees also noted lack of trust in the military by the private banking sector, with some banks implementing measures to refuse access to credit to noncommissioned officers as a result of their financial practices, for example. Interviewees elaborated that members of the military have become moneylenders, with usurers retaining electronic payment cards and personal codes for borrowers, and that banking services have struggled to cope with this practice. One auditor indicated that those involved were unlikely to be disciplined, noting that military officials stated to him that private business affairs were nothing to do with the Army however. This was later confirmed by the second interviewee.

Finally, Transparency International's 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Congo 152 out of 175 countries, with a score of just 23 out of 100. Congo also fared badly in TI's Control of Corruption (2010) score, where its percentile rank was 11%. Although this research applies to the government as a whole, it is likely to be broadly reflective of public trust in the military.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with source 11. Financial auditor, 1 August 2014

Interview with source 12. Retired senior banker, November 2012

Transparency International. &quoute;Congo&quoute;. Last modified 2014. http://www.transparency.org/country/#COG

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
1

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

Researcher4272: There is no evidence any measures have been put in place, although we may find indications of very limited attempts within the Decree 2006-694. In his annual speech to the heads of the armed forces, in January 2015, the Minister of Defence stated the need to create a road map for improving certain areas of the defence forces, including indiscipline and professionalism. While this acknowledged flaws within the current set up, this limited rhetoric did not outline any specific details for a review or new measures that would be introduced.

The president of the Commission to fight corruption (CNLCCF) stated in 2015 that they would be formulating a new anti-corruption national strategy over the coming year. Part of the review process prior to this strategy, which has been funded by the World Bank, included surveys of the police and gendarmerie. The findings of these reviews have been submitted to the relevant institutions, but they are not publicly available.

COMMENTS -+

Décret 2006-694 du 29 décembre 2006, portant Règlement de discipline générale;

Marcel Bikouta, &quoute;Sassou Nguesso élargit Germain Ickonga Akindou&quoute;, Journal Mwinda, April 4, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://mwinda.org/fr/actualites/actualites-a-la-une/actualites/22-sassou-nguesso-elargit-germain-ickonga-akindou

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Ministère chargé de la défense nationale : Une feuille de route avec des missions claires aux forces armées&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, January 16, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/10974-ministere-charge-de-la-defence-nationale-une-feuille-de-route-avec-des-missions-claires-aux-forces-armees

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

Philippe Banz, &quoute;Commission nationale de lutte contre la corruption : La stratégie nationale de lutte contre la corruption sera élaborée cette année&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, January 30, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/11060-commission-nationale-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-la-strategie-nationale-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-sera-elaboree-cette-annee

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The CNLCCF does not yet appear to have progressed far along enough to focus specifically on defence. At present there is still an ongoing development of their website, let alone projects.

There does not appear to be publicly accessible information on corruption risk priorities, but 3rd party analysis of military-related corruption and crimes committed by armed forces indicates that corruption is not so much of a priority by the Military police - who are responsible for investigating all military-related misconduct.

http://www.giswatch.org/sites/default/files/gisw_12_cr_republic_of_congo.pdf
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12242.pdf

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
1

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Researcher4272: There is limited information publicly available about defence acquisition planning. Much of this information is officially classified on the grounds of national security, although given the government's overall procurement capacity it is likely this is used to camouflage the fact that many purchases are made on an ad hoc basis. Some provisions are laid out in the National Development Plan (PND) and in the Ministry of Defence's public procurement plan. The PND, created by the Ministry of the Economy, lays out the objectives of the key ministries between 2012-2016. While this discusses increased training, modernisation and restructuring, it does not include a detailed process for acquisition planning.

The department's public procurement plan is drafted by a procurement division within the ministry, overseen by the minister. A procurement management cell exists under the authority of the individual responsible for procurement and is responsible for procurement planning, preparation of records and the procedure for the award and execution of contracts. The public procurement plan does not include any of the classified purchases and lacks detail, listing items in generic terms.

COMMENTS -+

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009.

Josiane Mambou-Loukoula, &quoute;Procès du 4-Mars : la hiérarchie militaire s’explique devant la Cour&quoute; ADIAC Congo, August 20, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://adiac-congo.com/content/proces-du-4-mars-la-hierarchie-militaire-sexplique-devant-la-cour

Interview with Interviewee 19: former foreign military advisor, London, June 2015

Ministere de la defence Nationale, Plan de Passation, Période du : 01er Janvier au 31 Décembre 2014. http://www.armp.cg/Portals/0/Pdf/PPM/d%C3%A9fense%20nationale.pdf

Plan National de Développement: Livre 2: Condense des PAP/CDMT Ministeriels, July 2011. p. 55-66

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011. Articles 58-59, 300-301

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
1

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

Researcher4272: The defence budget is not available online, and requests for access were unsuccessful. The national development plan (PND) does include limited information on past and future defence budgets. For example, for 2012, it shows a breakdown of how the budget was allocated to different arms of the ministry of defence (Table 3, p64-5); it shows the Director General of Equipment receiving the biggest portion, followed by the Gendarme. The document also shows the split between recurrent expenditure and investment for the budgets from 2008-2012 (actual) and through to 2016 (projected) (Table 4, p.66).

From the researcher's professional experience, the practice of overcharging is common in the financial system in Congo, and it is highly likely that this extends into the defence budget. Activists and opposition journalists have claimed that the defence budget includes inflated figures, and there is very limited transparency. The budget is controlled by allies of the president, and is therefore not challenged by the legislature. Many of the major weapons purchases also appear not to be included in the official budget, and the ministry reportedly refuses to share details on expenditure with the Minister of Finance and parliament.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence, &quoute;Programme de Travail Annuel des Actions Budgétisées (PTAB) 2013, pour la mise en œuvre du PAP-CDMT 2013-2015&quoute;:

Plan National de Développement: Livre 2: Condense des PAP/CDMT Ministeriels, July 2011. p. 55-66

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
1

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

Researcher4272: The available research and interviews indicate that the National Assembly Defence and Security Commission along with the Finance Commission debate the defence budget. In practice all evidence indicates that the executive has tight control over the military however, and it is highly unlikely that legislative bodies can challenge this. The defence budget additionally lacks transparency, and there are only vague guidelines in place over what information can be classified on the grounds of national security and therefore withheld from parliamentary oversight bodies.

COMMENTS -+

Assemblee Nationale. &quoute;Commission defence et Securite&quoute; Last accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.assemblee-nationale.cg/commissions.php?commissions=4

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone. Paris, March 2010. p201. http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/reformes_systemes_securite.pdf

Africa Confidential, &quoute;Dying by the sword&quoute;, Africa Confidential, March 30, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.africa-confidential.com/index.aspx?pageid=7&articleid=4409

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Most of the decisions come from the Ministry of Plans (Source: UNMAS Republic of Congo, internal reports)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
1

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

Researcher4272: The budget is printed and is theoretically made available to those who want to get it on request. The public and civil society can request information on the defence budget in the same way they have access to the overall state budget. Details in the structure of spending are not necessarily accessible however, and access can be difficult in practice. The budget can be requested online but the ministry is under no obligations to publish it and the researcher was unable to get a copy for this index.

While access to information is enshrined in the constitution, there is no corresponding legislation for implementation or other legislation mandating public disclosure of official information. Government officials reportedly often delay the release of information.

COMMENTS -+

Plan National de Développement: Livre 2: Condense des PAP/CDMT Ministeriels, July 2011. p. 55-66

ARMP. &quoute;PPM et Avis Generaux&quoute;. Last accessed June 17, 20115, http://www.armp.cg/fr-fr/publications/marché/ppmetavisgénéraux.aspx

Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2015, Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/congo-republic-brazzaville

Interview with source 10. Civil society representative, December 2013

Interview with source 13. Journalist and civil society representative, 4 August 2014

Interview with source 14. Journalist, 9 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: While there is reporting on the budget, there is no actual document itself. It appears as if even media sources trying to report on the budget are fed information from the government, rather than the specific document and its amendments.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
0

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Researcher4272: There is no evidence to show that the armed forces have other significant sources of income other than government allocations; the armed forces do not publish their income. According to the PTAB 2013, the military receives lower than its initial funded request in the budget. It is not clear how the difference is made up.

Research revealed a number of potential risk areas. For example, there are three military hospitals in the country that charge for their services; their balance sheets are not publicly available and this income is unaccounted for. The researcher secondly found evidence suggesting that that high ranking officers within the armed forces have numerous commercial interests that are often given preferential treatment. A third area of concern comes from indications the military has provided private security to certain private enterprises, such as banks, and received bonuses from the institutions they are guarding.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. « Programme de Travail Annuel des Actions Budgétisées (PTAB) » 2013

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011.

Plan National de Développement: Livre 2: Condense des PAP/CDMT Ministeriels, July 2011. p. 55-66

Bernard Elia, &quoute;La liste des biens acquis par le Président Sassou—Nguesso et sa famille depuis seulement octobre 1997&quoute;, La Conscience, February 26, 2005, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.laconscience.com/La-liste-des-biens-acquis-par-le-President-Sassou-Nguesso-et-sa-famille-depuis-seulement-octobre.html

CongoPage, &quoute;Quand le clan Nguesso pille les trésors du Congo&quoute;, CongoPage, February 11, 2006, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.congopage.com/Quand-le-clan-Nguesso-pille-les

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There will be additional income from other sources, but they are not disclosed by the Congolese government. IMET funding from the United States, for example, amounts to $100 000 per year. This is reported in some detail thought the US Government website, but not at all mentioned in Congolese sources, despite it having a very real impact on the military budget re training and equipment.

http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
0

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

Researcher4272: There may be cases where the General Comptroller may conduct audits in accordance with their mandate. The law does not stipulate that defence audits specifically have to be carried out however, and there is no note on their frequency.

There are some examples where external pressure has led the Comptroller to carry out specific audits however. In one case a budget line was identified for a training centre for wood processing, which received a very high funding allocation. Investigations revealed that the centre did not exist, and its director was a somewhat unknown officer. However, it is likely that investigations like this are only prompted by individuals who have not been benefiting from the illicit activity.

The extent of opacity in the management of military resources also means convincing results are not always possible. Defence chiefs have increased their rhetoric in recent years over the inclusion of improving the skills of civilian positions within the military however, including those with financial oversight. In September-October 2014, 61 NCOs of the FAC and gendarme were trained in accounting and financial management or human resource management, as part of a scheme supported by the French government.

COMMENTS -+

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009.

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010. pp 203-206

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Ministère à la présidence de la République, chargé de la défense nationale : 61 sous-officiers formés en administration et en gestion, prêts à servir dans leurs corps de troupe&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, November 7, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/10437-ministere-a-la-presidence-de-la-republique-charge-de-la-defence-nationale-61-sous-officiers-formes-en-administration-et-en-gestion-prets-a-servir-dans-leurs-corps-de-troupe

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Ministère à la présidence de la République, chargé de la défense nationale : Quarante sous-officiers vont passer le brevet technique n°2, option administration&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, August 5, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/9605-ministere-a-la-presidence-de-la-republique-charge-de-la-defence-nationale-quarante-sous-officiers-vont-passer-le-brevet-technique-n-2-option-administration

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute; Ministère à la présidence de la République, chargé de la défense nationale : Une quarantaine de sous-officiers prêts à servir dans l’administration militaire&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, December 5, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/societe/10680-ministere-a-la-presidence-de-la-republique-charge-de-la-defence-nationale-une-quarantaine-de-sous-officiers-prets-a-servir-dans-l-administration-militaire

CongoSite, &quoute;Séminaire sur les missions de l'Inspection générale des FAC et de la Gendarmerie nationale&quoute;, CongoSite, April 26, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.congo-site.com/notes/Seminaire-sur-les-missions-de-l-Inspection-generale-des-FAC-et-de-la-Gendarmerie-nationale_b5452913.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
1

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

Researcher4272: There are laws on the organisation and functioning of the State Inspectorate (IGE), however the lack of any suitable evidence indicates external verification is deficient in practice. The IGE is empowered to request any document of any kind, but it is subject to the acts to secrecy concerning national defence, foreign affairs, internal or external security of the State, and any special budgetary allocation. Thus, some documents are inaccessible to the IGE. World Bank and IMF reports from 2010 and 2012 state that the IGE was found to lack capabilities and political independence.

The audits are not published, but there is secondary evidence to suggest they are available to certain organisations/individuals on request - see the 2014 EU PEFA evaluation report completed by ADE for example. The ADE report indicates that the findings of reports are not sufficiently taken into account however, and do not get sent through the Audit Courts.

COMMENTS -+

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010. pp 206-208

Ali Achour/ADE, &quoute;Cadre de Mesure de la Performance de la Gestion des Finances Publiques en République du Congo Rapport Final&quoute;, June 2014. http://fichiers.acteurspublics.com/redac/pdf/Septembre/rapport_final%20congo.pdf

IMF. &quoute; République du Congo : Consultations de 2012 au titre de l'article IV — Rapport des services du FMI, note d'information au public sur les délibérations du Conseil d'administration, et déclaration de l'administrateur pour la République du Congo. Rapport du FMI no 12/283.&quoute; October 2012. http://www.imf.org/external/french/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12283f.pdf

Joachim Mbanza, &quoute;Faire évoluer les institutions de la République&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, April 17, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015 http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/editorial/11551-faire-evoluer-les-institutions-de-la-republique

World Bank. &quoute;Rapport sur le Respect des Normes et Codes («RRNC/ROSC1»): Compatabilite et Audit: Republique du Congo.&quoute; March 2010. http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_cgo_fre.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
0

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

Researcher4272: There is no evidence of statutory or constitutional blocks to the defence institutions involvement in these sectors. The defence institutions themselves do not have interests in natural resource businesses. The government's position - and specifically, the President's position here - is not publicly stated however and it is hard to assess exactly what this is.

The researcher contends from the wider evidence that it is likely the President would prefer to keep these resources under the control of key trusted individuals as opposed to the military as a whole. Evidence indicates that a significant proportion of high ranking officers do have related business interests however. A range of media reports demonstrate the oil sector has been tightly controlled by the president, who also serves as commander-in-chief. The Sassou-Nguesso family and the Secretary-General of the National Security Council have also all been implicated in French corruption investigations into the dealings of former national oil company Elf.

The family have numerous business in and connected to the oil sector. Other high ranking officers have been alleged to hold commercial interests in timber and minerals.

There is no evidence any of these interests have been appropriately publicly stated, nor that companies owned by these individuals have received any scrutiny beyond the French Elf investigation or coverage by opposition and diaspora media.

COMMENTS -+

Ordonnance 1-2001 du 5 février 2001 portant organisation générale de la défense nationale.

MoD document : Programme de Travail Annuel des Actions Budgétisées
(PTAB 2013)

CongoPage, &quoute;Quand le clan Nguesso pille les trésors du Congo&quoute;, CongoPage, February 11, 2006, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.congopage.com/Quand-le-clan-Nguesso-pille-les

Bernard Elia, &quoute;La liste des biens acquis par le Président Sassou—Nguesso et sa famille depuis seulement octobre 1997&quoute;, La Conscience, February 26, 2005, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.laconscience.com/La-liste-des-biens-acquis-par-le-President-Sassou-Nguesso-et-sa-famille-depuis-seulement-octobre.html

Xavier Monnier, &quoute;L’après-Sassou au Congo (2/4) : JDO, l’homme de l’ombre&quoute;, Le Monde, June 16, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/06/16/l-apres-sassou-au-congo-2-4-jdo-l-homme-de-l-ombre_4655230_3212.html

Research Group International, &quoute;Congolese president’s nephew in shady French political deals&quoute;, IndyMedia, December 22, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2014/12/519010.html

Rigobert Ossebi, &quoute;QUI VEUT LA PEAU DE JEAN-DOMINIQUE OKEMBA&quoute;, Congo Liberty, December 31, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://congo-liberty.com/?p=10840

Henry Samuel, &quoute;Congo President spent £1m on clothes he never wore more than once&quoute;, The Telegraph, December 16, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/congo/10521681/Congo-President-spent-1m-on-clothes-he-never-wore-more-than-once.html

Angelique Chrisafis, &quoute;France impounds African autocrats' 'ill-gotten gains'&quoute;, The Guardian, February 6, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/06/france-africa-autocrats-corruption-inquiry

Mwinda, &quoute;Comment Denis-Christel Sassou-Nguesso détournerait l'argent du pétrole congolais&quoute;, Mwinda, March 2, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://mwinda.org/en/actualites/actualites-a-la-une/actualites/116-les-millions-de-denis-christel-sassou-nguesso-a-geneve

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The position of government on military owning businesses is unclear. Like with the general atmosphere on corruption, there is little concrete evidence indicating businesses being either permitted or not.

As the assessor rightly notes, the government, not the military, holds a firm grip on the country's resources and associated businesses, thus making it unlikely for the relatively-small FAC to hold any significant stake, as an organisation, on these businesses.

There has been no recent indication, to my knowledge, of senior officers controlling or holding financial interests in businesses, but given the lack of reliable information, it is entirely plausible.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: This is not only applicable to the defence institutions, but to other governmental bodies

Sources: &quoute;Congo Brazzaville :La corruption atteint tous les secteurs&quoute; (Mediaf) : http://mediaf.org/?p=5639

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
3

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

Researcher4272: There is little organised crime reported in the country. It is nonetheless assessed highly unlikely that the government would have either the capabilities or intent to prevent soldiers at any rank from becoming involved in such activities. There has been an increase in recent reports of the country being used as a transit point for smugglers, particularly for ivory. For example, in January 2015, gendarme discovered 126kg of ivory in Brazzaville; a month later, three Chinese nationals were arrested in Mambili for attempting to transport pangolin scales. There have also been individual reports of officers being punished for their involvement – in November 2014, five officers were arrested for possession of elephant meat.

COMMENTS -+

UNICEF. “Congo Brazzaville and Benin Sign Accord to Fight Child Trafficking.” September 21, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015 http://www.unicef.org/media/media_59883.html

La Semaine Africaine, &quoute;Un étranger a été pris en flagrant délit de détention d’objets en ivoire&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, June 5, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/coup-doeil-en-biais/11864-un-etranger-a-ete-pris-en-flagrant-delit-de-detention-d-objets-en-ivoire

La Semaine Africaine, &quoute;Deux autres trafiquants chinois mis aux arrêts, à Yengo&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, February 20, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/coup-doeil-en-biais/11249-deux-autres-trafiquants-chinois-mis-aux-arrets-a-yengo

La Semaine Africaine, &quoute;Cent-vingt-six kilogrammes de pointe d’ivoire saisis à Ouenzé&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, January 27, 2015, accessed June 17,2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/coup-doeil-en-biais/11037-cent-vingt-six-kilogrammes-de-pointe-d-ivoire-saisis-a-ouenze

La Semaine Africaine, &quoute;Cinq agents de la force publique arrêtés pour détention illégale de la viande d’éléphant&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, November 27, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/coup-doeil-en-biais/10618-cinq-agents-de-la-force-publique-arretes-pour-detention-illegale-de-la-viande-d-elephant

US Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. &quoute;Republic of the Congo 2015 Crime and Safety Report.&quoute; Last modified January 20, 2015. https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=16936

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
1

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

Researcher4272: No policing function appears to be exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption. There are also no divisions specifically assigned to monitor organised crime within the armed services.

The national commander of the gendarme announced the creation of a new unit in January 2015 that was tasked with combatting 'new threats' such as maritime piracy and hostage-taking risks associated with regional terrorist groups however there has been little reporting on the new unit since its creation. If organised crime were to become a significant risk in the country, it is likely that this unit would also be used to tackle the threat. The researcher contends it is unlikely to be particularly independent, as sources indicate the national commander is close to the president.

COMMENTS -+

Draft report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review A/HRC/WG.6/17/L.14 p.5-6

Ralphanie Mwana Kongo, Expulsion des kinois au Congo Brazzaville, Terangaweb: L’Afrique des Idées. http://terangaweb.com/expulsion-kinois-au-congo-brazzaville/

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010 p. 104-106

&quoute;Le général Paul Victor Moigny commente les grandes lignes des orientations du chef de l’État&quoute;, Agence d'information d'Afrique centrale (ADIAC). 3 January 2014. http://adiac-congo.com/content/le-general-paul-victor-moigny-commente-les-grandes-lignes-des-orientations-du-chef-de-letat

Africa Intelligence, &quoute;Hommes d'influence. N°562 DU 09/04/2009: Paul-Victor Moigny&quoute;, 9 April 2009. http://www.africaintelligence.fr/LC-/who-s-who/2015/09/09/paul-victor-moigny,58905487-ART [paywalled]

Herv Keruet, &quoute;Congo - Brazza : après Sassou, le déluge ?&quoute;, Afrik.com, 31 January 2013. http://www.afrik.com/congo-brazza-apres-sassou-le-deluge

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Gendarmerie nationale : Création du G.i.g.n, pour lutter contre la grande insécurité&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, January 20, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/11010-gendarmerie-nationale-creation-du-g-i-g-n-pour-lutter-contre-la-grande-insecurite

US Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. &quoute;Republic of the Congo 2015 Crime and Safety Report.&quoute; Last modified January 20, 2015. https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=16936

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
0

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

Researcher4272: There is no evidence of external oversight for any aspect of the intelligence services, and no evidence of internal controls. The intelligence services appear highly politicised, and there is very little evidence of accountability. Media reports show that the national security council (CNS) is chaired by the president's nephew, indicated by a range of sources to be as a very close ally and potential successor for Sassou-Nguesso.

COMMENTS -+

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010, p. 206

Théophile Kouamouo, &quoute;Franc-maçons : les maîtres de l’Afrique&quoute;, Jeune Afrique, April 11, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/192113/politique/franc-ma-ons-les-ma-tres-de-l-afrique/

Xavier Monnier, &quoute;L’après-Sassou au Congo (2/4) : JDO, l’homme de l’ombre&quoute;, Le Monde, June 16, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/06/16/l-apres-sassou-au-congo-2-4-jdo-l-homme-de-l-ombre_4655230_3212.html

Jean-Jacques Omayundu Wondo, &quoute;Spécial Congo-Brazza : Denis Sassou resserre les rangs dans un parfum de fin de règne?&quoute;, DESC-Wondo, December 18, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://desc-wondo.org/special-congo-brazza-denis-sassou-reserre-les-rangs-dans-un-parfum-de-fin-de-regne-jj-wondo/

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
0

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Researcher4272: Research found the intelligence services appear to be highly politicised, with senior appointees apparently chosen based on loyalty to the president and with little or no independent scrutiny. The former deputy head of the intelligence services, Colonel Marcel Ntsourou, was recently tried for rebellion after a gunfight in December 2013. Media reports note that Ntsourou had publicly fallen out with the president prior to the violence and was consequently dismissed from his position.

COMMENTS -+

Alain Serge. &quoute;Congo Brazzaville: Marcel Ntsourou victime de sa hiérarchie militaire dans l’affaire de la fusillade&quoute;. Oeil d'Afrique, 31 juil 2014. http://oeildafrique.com/congo-brazzaville-marcel-ntsourou-victime-hierarchie-militaire-laffaire-fusillade/

RFI, &quoute;Congo: la plainte de Ntsourou n'effraie pas le pouvoir&quoute;, RFI, September 10, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140910-reaction-gouvernement-apres-plainte-ntsourou-contre-sassou-nguesso/

RFI, &quoute;Congo-Brazzaville: les profils variés des co-accusés de Marcel Ntsourou&quoute;, RFI, July 7, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140707-congo-brazzaville-profils-varies-co-accuses-marcel-ntsourou/

Jean-Jacques Omayundu Wondo, &quoute;Spécial Congo-Brazza : Denis Sassou resserre les rangs dans un parfum de fin de règne?&quoute;, DESC-Wondo, December 18, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://desc-wondo.org/special-congo-brazza-denis-sassou-reserre-les-rangs-dans-un-parfum-de-fin-de-regne-jj-wondo/

RFI, &quoute;Congo: Marcel Ntsourou condamné aux travaux forcés à perpétuité&quoute;, RFI, September 11, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140911-congo-marcel-ntsourou-condamne-travaux-forces-perpetuite/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is zero evidence suggesting any objective selection criteria. Appointments are politicised and highly susceptible to unobjective criteria. Thus, opportunity to intervene in these selections are just non-existent.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
N/A

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Researcher4272: Congo is a signatory of the Arms Trade Treaty (signed in September 2013), along with a number of other key international treaties on biological and chemical weaponry, anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions. International watchdog SIPRI shows no record of exports from the country.

Experts have indicated that Congo is not in a position to export weaponry, noting that much of its arms cache is Soviet-era and is in poor disrepair. Given the lack of scrutiny on defence budget and imported weapons, it is highly unlikely that any future disposals or exports would be subjected to serious questioning.

COMMENTS -+

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. &quoute;Congo&quoute;. Last accessed June 17, 2015. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/s/congo

SIPRI. &quoute;Arms Transfer Database.&quoute; Accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers

Interview with Interviewee 18: munitions expert, London, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 19: former foreign military advisor, London, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
0

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

Researcher4272: Research found no publicly available information to indicate that formal asset disposal procedures or controls exist. This is likely to be a combination of the fact that the process is rare (due to limited assets in the first place) and the high levels of corruption in the country.

Sources indicate that asset disposals in Congo are primarily aimed at removing Soviet-era weaponry from circulation, and are almost exclusively funded or supported by the international community. Much of Congo's weaponry is in very poor repair, and international experts have frequently reported the lack of in-country knowledge on arms depot storage, management and safe disposal. The extent of the issue is demonstrated by the series of explosions from arms depots in the Mpila area of Brazzaville in March 2012. Several reports were produced prior to the Mpila explosions, including high alert warnings from British military explosions experts on the need to dispose of many of the weapons in storage.

Numerous international bodies, notably Small Arms Survey and Mines Advisory Group (MAG), have carried out research on asset disposal in Congo. Between March 2012 and April 2013, over 200 tonnes of UXO (39 tonnes in net explosive content) was cleared by international explosive ordinance disposal teams, mostly of weaponry and bombs from the 1970s and 80s that was inadequately stored. Additionally, a programme run by MAG removed and destroyed 76,994 items of unexploded ordnance between July 2012 and March 2013. MAG has also carried out a programme of risk education, with over 1,800 sessions given between July 2012 and March 2013. Information on these programmes is available through the organisations' websites.

There is no evidence of how other intangible assets (such as capital/financial holdings) or tangible assets (such as buildings, land, major platforms, transport & plant equipment, or IT & comms systems) may be disposed of.

COMMENTS -+

MoD document : « Programme de Travail Annuel des Actions Budgétisées (PTAB 2013) »pp.13-18

Mines Advisory Group. &quoute;Republic of Congo&quoute;. Last accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.maginternational.org/where-mag-works/republic-of-congo/#.VX_uvPlVhBc

Pierre Gobinet, &quoute;Countdown to Catastrophe: The Mpila Ammunition Dept Explosions,&quoute; in Small Arms Survey 2014, (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2014). http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2014/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2014-Chapter-5-EN.pdf

Interview with Interviewee 18: munitions expert, London, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 19: former foreign military advisor, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
0

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

Researcher4272: No evidence was found that asset disposals are scrutinised by an oversight body of any form, either through desktop research or interview sources. If this occurs, it is highly likely to be provided through internal oversight bodies within the defence ministry due to the limited presence of any external oversight of the military.

Sources indicate that asset disposals in Congo are primarily aimed at removing Soviet-era weaponry from circulation, and are almost exclusively funded or supported by the international community. The weapons and UXO are removed and destroyed. EU-funded experts after the Mpila explosions reported a lack of buy-in from the government and slow progress on the reforms necessary to deal with the stockpiling issue. As a result, future disposals are likely to be lead by the international community, who publish transparent reports on their programmes.

The EU reported that the government earmarked XAF 2 billion ($4 million) to UXO disposal following the Mpila explosions, but there was no clarity over how this was spent. The funding was part of a supplementary budget. The Small Arms Survey reported that the 'post-explosion investigation incurred unknown administrative costs', and that additional spending (outside of the supplementary budget funds) were used to pay village leaders to rent disposal areas. The lack of reform since these investigations implies that such future secret spending would be allowed to continue.

COMMENTS -+

Pierre Gobinet, &quoute;Countdown to Catastrophe: The Mpila Ammunition Dept Explosions,&quoute; in Small Arms Survey 2014, (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2014). http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2014/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2014-Chapter-5-EN.pdf

RoC MoD (Republic of the Congo Ministry of Defence). Rapport d’étape de la phase 3. No. 00111/MDN/MID/GAS/CD/SUP. 30 November 2012

EU (European Union). 2013. Evaluation de l’action de déblaiement et de dépollution des quartiers affectés par l’explosion du dépôt de munitions de Mpila à Brazzaville, en République du Congo: Rapport final. March. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/congo/documents/press_corner/2013/20130410_brazzaville_evaluation_final_report_fr.pdf

Cyr Armel, &quoute;Assemblée nationale : Gilbert Ondongo a présenté le projet de budget rectificatif de l’Etat exercice 2012&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, April 13, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/archives/images/pdf/3386.pdf

Interview with source 9. Armed Forces Auditor, 18 July 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
0

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

Researcher4272: External analysts and local activists all indicated that secret spending by the security and intelligence services is widespread, but none were able to suggest an exact figure. Examples of such spending include the budget of the Republican Guard. The Republican Guard are known to have a heavily guarded headquarters near Oyo, Cuvette, but there is no information about the force numbers, budget, training or equipment stockpiles.

COMMENTS -+

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010, pp.37 ; 227

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

John F. Clark and Samuel Decalo 'Historical Dictionary of Republic of the Congo' (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2012),196-7

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
0

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

Researcher4272: According to well-placed sources, the legislature does not have information on secret military or defence spending. Such information appears to be limited to the president and allies at the top of the military structures.

COMMENTS -+

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010. pp 206

Interview with source 4. Member of Parliament, (Finance Specialist), 20 July 2014.

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
0

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

Researcher4272: There is no audit procedure for secret spending. Sources indicate it is classified on the grounds of national security and information is not shared beyond key members of the executive and the heads of the armed forces.

COMMENTS -+

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010. pp 204

Interview with source 4. Member of the Parliamentary Finance Commission, 20 July 2014.

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
1

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

Researcher4272: Off-budget acquisitions are permitted under clauses on classification of sensitive information (such as Article 76 of the Procurement Code). There is no auditing process for such expenditures, and the guidelines over classification are vague. The lack of evidence otherwise suggests that it is highly likely that the majority of weapon purchases fall into this category.

COMMENTS -+

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010. pg.205

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011. Articles 58-59, 300-301

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009.

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
0

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

Researcher4272: This was not able to be confirmed from publicly available material. It is highly likely that the majority of weapon purchases are not included in the official military budget. Due to the lack of scrutiny on these deals, there is a high risk of illicit economic activity.

COMMENTS -+

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010. pg.205

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is insufficient data to accurately track the defence budget. However, estimates place the budget at $720m for 2014.

Military expenditure is equally difficult to track, as the lack of any modern equipment in the military, combined with a general lack of new purchases, means that there is never really any arms deal that could be tracked and analysed. It is probable that ammunition and equipment purchases are done on an incredibly small scale, so much so that they could easily circumvent SIPRI database registers.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I did not have access to the budget, but from my experience there, the Ministry of Plan is also responsible for those purchases (Source: UNMAS internal reports)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
0

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

Researcher4272: Guidance in legislation over classification is very vague. For example, the procurement code states that secret clauses can be added/exempt from contracts if they are deemed to have an impact on national security (Article 76). Although the Council of Ministers was tasked to draw up separate guidelines on how to deal with such purchases (Article 75), public records and interviewees could not confirm that this has happened in practice. The Penal Code also makes reference to the classification of information in very vague terms (article 78) relating to 'national security'.

COMMENTS -+

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris, March 2010. pp 37

Interview with source 6. Congolese Armed Forces colonel, October 2014

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009.

Code penal du Republique du Congo, March 29, 1836, updated through to August 2001, in Codes d’Audience, Recueil de codes et textes usuels, Editions Giraf, Aug. 2001. Article 78.

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
0

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

Researcher4272: The defence and security institutions do not have a large portfolio of commercial businesses. Research indicates that the military hospitals do charge for usage, although there is no evidence of publication or scrutiny of these finances. Some of these structures also receive state subsidies in the budget for national defence.

Commercial enterprises owned by high ranking individuals within the defence and security institutions reportedly receive preferential treatment however, particularly those owned by members of the president's family or inner circle. A range of media reports demonstrate that the oil sector in particular has been tightly controlled by the president, who also serves as commander-in-chief. Other high ranking officers have been alleged to hold commercial interests in timber and minerals.

The Sassou-Nguesso family and the Secretary-General of the National Security Council have similarly all been implicated in French corruption investigations into the dealings of former national oil company Elf. Reports also indicate the president and his family hold interests in a number of oil companies and several service companies.

There is no evidence any of these interests have been appropriately publicly stated, nor that companies owned by these individuals have received any scrutiny beyond the Elf investigation or coverage by opposition and diaspora media.

COMMENTS -+

Steve Obirabassi, &quoute;Combien gagne un général des FAC ?&quoute;, La Voix du Peuple, July 9, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015, http://lavoixdupeuple.over-blog.org/article-congo-brazzaville-le-salaire-des-generaux-des-fac-fait-grincer-les-dents-dans-les-casernes-78942023.html

CongoPage, &quoute;Quand le clan Nguesso pille les trésors du Congo&quoute;, CongoPage, February 11, 2006, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.congopage.com/Quand-le-clan-Nguesso-pille-les

Interview with Interviewee 6. Congolese Armed Forces colonel

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
0

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

Researcher4272: Research indicates that defence and security institutions do not have a large portfolio of commercial businesses. There is no scrutiny of either military-owned business or commercial enterprises run by high ranking officers in the security forces however. Until 2011, there was on paper a training centre for wood processing, which benefited from a substantial allocation. Since its existence has not been proven, it has been removed from the state budget. Its manager has not been prosecuted.

COMMENTS -+

Personal knowledge and experience.

PTAB 2013

Interview with source 3. Defence official, February 2013.

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
0

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

Researcher4272: Private enterprise by military personnel or defence employees appears to be condoned. Codes of conduct are not publicly available (and appear to only be distributed to the higher ranks - see Q14) but none of the sources or research revealed any ban on military personnel engaging in private enterprise. The lack of evidence on the matter would suggest that it is poorly regulated - most of the discussion around the topic is media stories on corruption etc.

There is no indication that the government directly profits from this type of enterprise, but it is likely that key political figures do benefit privately. Research indicated that members of the security forces have been authorised to engage in private enterprise, and that this commonplace. There are examples of officers using defence equipment for personal profit and to engage in private enterprise whilst also acting in an official capacity. For example, reports indicate a senior officer charged individuals to use a helicopter and a freighter from the Air Force and used the profits to invest in the hospitality sector. Foot soldiers are also known to operate as 'loan sharks', with over 300 soldiers regularly recorded as lenders. The activity is registered with the salaries and pension department of the Ministry of Defence.

COMMENTS -+

Personal knowledge and experience.

Jecmaus, &quoute;Angola/Congo-Brazzaville : Sassou, Dos Santos et le mutisme, par Benjamin Bilombot-Bitadys&quoute; MediaPart, November 2, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/jecmaus/021113/angolacongo-brazzaville-sassou-dos-santos-et-le-mutisme-par-benjamin-bilombot-bitadys

Carole Mandello, &quoute;CONGO BRAZZA/ TSOUROU ET CIE, TOUS DES ENFANTS TROP GÂTES&quoute;, CenterBlog, June 16, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://mandelca.centerblog.net/35-congo-des-militaires-usiriers-craints-et-courtises

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I am unaware of any legal structures or statements made that discourages private enterprise within the defence force. It is far more likely that soldiers engaging in this practice likely benefit in a vertical structure, with lower-ranks paying off officers or NCOs who may threaten sanction.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
3

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

Researcher4272: The president and key defence chiefs regularly acknowledge the need to combat corruption in public speeches, however, this is widely perceived as rhetoric. President Sassou-Nguesso often includes a pitch to improve transparency and fight government corruption in his key speeches: during political campaigning, at inauguration, speeches to parliament or televised addresses (such as at the national day). The Defence Minister, and the heads of the army and gendarme, also make numerous commitments to improve anti-corruption initiatives. These speeches will often be at the launch of the new financial year, during annual conferences, or on the announcement of new recruits into either force. However, in all cases, references to improving transparency are vague, with little mention of concrete initiatives that are being launched. The exception to this was during the period of public sector reform, sponsored by international donors and IGOs, which led to the passage of new anti-corruption legislation and the reorganisation of anti-corruption monitoring bodies (CNLCCF and OAC, 2007).

COMMENTS -+

Cyr Armel Yabbat-Ngo, &quoute;Message du chef de l’Etat sur l’état de la nation : Denis Sassou Nguesso réaffirme la bonne marche de l’économie et de la démocratie congolaises&quoute; La Semaine Africaine, August 13, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/6375-message-du-chef-de-l-etat-sur-l-etat-de-la-nation-denis-sassou-nguesso-reaffirme-la-bonne-marche-de-l-economie-et-de-la-democratie-congolaises

Congo report for the UPR, Composition de la délégation. A/HRC/WG.6/17/L.14, p.25

Transparency International. &quoute;Congo&quoute;. Last modified 2014. http://www.transparency.org/country/#COG

FJN, &quoute;Congo Brazzaville : Mensonges et Erreurs dans les discours présidentiels de Sassou Nguesso&quoute;, BrazzaNews, August 25, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://brazza-news.com/?p=9797

Africa Confidential, &quoute;Old guard, new guard&quoute;, Africa Confidential, August 30, 2002, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.africa-confidential.com/index.aspx?pageid=7&articleid=698

Freedom House. &quoute;Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville); Freedom in the World 2013.&quoute; Last modified 2013. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/congo-republic-brazzaville#.VYFFBflViko

Journal de Brazza, &quoute;FAC: appel à un investissement personnel pour l’exécution du budget 2014&quoute;, Journal de Brazza, May 21, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://brazza-news.com/?p=8002

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Conférence de planification annuelle de la gendarmerie nationale : Redynamiser le rôle opérationnel de la gendarmerie suivant ses missions judiciaires…&quoute; La Semaine Africaine, May 5, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/sports/11668-conference-de-planification-annuelle-de-la-gendarmerie-nationale-redynamiser-le-role-operationnel-de-la-gendarmerie-suivant-ses-missions-judiciaires

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;F.a.c (Forces armées congolaises) : De nombreux officiers nouvellement nommés à de hautes fonctions&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, April 24, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/societe/11602-f-a-c-forces-armees-congolaises-de-nombreux-officiers-nouvellement-nommes-a-de-hautes-fonctions

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Ministère chargé de la défense nationale : Une feuille de route avec des missions claires aux forces armées&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, January 16, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/10974-ministere-charge-de-la-defence-nationale-une-feuille-de-route-avec-des-missions-claires-aux-forces-armees

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Researcher4272: The 2002 law on judicial powers in Congo (Law no. 022-92) includes a section on military tribunals (Articles 135-158). Members of the armed forces that violate the Penal Code, including articles 180 (corruption in military) and 430-433 (corruption in public office), will be tried at Military Tribunals. These tribunals can be held at either region or garrison level.

Despite the presence of these tribunals, they are widely considered to be subject to political influence and corruption. The US State Department's reports on human rights in 2010 noted this, while reporting that, as part of an investigation into corruption in the payroll, the military court continued to pay the salaries of over 500 current and former personnel.

COMMENTS -+

Decree No. 694-2006 of 29 December 2006;
Circular of the Minister of State, Chief of Staff of the President of the Republic of 14 November 2012;

Rigobert Ossebi, &quoute;Sassou NGuesso : « le Nord ne doit pas perdre le pouvoir ! »&quoute; Congo Liberty, March 16, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, www.congo-liberty.com/?p=8537

Code penal du Republique du Congo, March 29, 1836, updated through to August 2001, in Codes d’Audience, Recueil de codes et textes usuels, Editions Giraf, Aug. 2001. Articles, 180, 430-433.

Loi portant Organisation du Pouvoir Judiciaire en République du Congo, Loi no. 022-92, August 20, 1992. Articles 135-158. http://www.cesbc.org/congo/Lois/Loi%20022-92.pdf

Loi sur la corruption, la concussion et la fraude et les infractions assimilées en République du Congo, Loi 5-2009, September 22, 2009.

US State Department, &quoute;US department: Rapport 2010 sur les droits de l’homme au Congo-Brazzaville&quoute;, Congo Liberty, April 8, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015, http://congo-liberty.com/?p=348

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
0

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

Researcher4272: Mechanisms are envisaged for the protection of whistleblowers. But in practice, it is not the case and they are ostracised. In 2012, the Observatory of Congolese Human Rights reported that Major Atikilome had been released after eight years; the reported labelled him a political prisoner and indicated that his prosecution was motivated in part by his previous whistleblowing on political figures.

COMMENTS -+

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011. Articles 58-59, 300-301

Interview with source 1. Government legal attaché, 22 July 2014

Interview with source 2. Government official, 22 July 2014.

OCDH. &quoute;Libération de Monsieur NDABAMENYA après huit années de séquestration à la Direction centrale des renseignements militaires et à la Direction générale de la surveillance du territoire...&quoute; Last accessed at September 6, 2012. http://blog.ocdh.org/post/2012/09/06/Lib%C3%A9ration-de-Monsieur-NDABAMENYA-apr%C3%A8s-huit-ann%C3%A9es-de-s%C3%A9questration-%C3%A0-la-Direction-centrale-des-renseignements-militaires-et-%C3%A0-la-Direction-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9rale-de-la-surveillance-du-territoire...

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
0

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Researcher4272: The president must approve all appointments to sensitive positions, particularly within the defence sector or oversight bodies. Political loyalties are therefore considered more important than time in post. Political analysts indicated that Sassou-Nguesso tries to keep power in the hands of northerners, particularly from his home Cuvette region.

COMMENTS -+

Forces Publiques, &quoute;Ou va l'armée et la police congolaise?&quoute; DAC Presse, October 30, 2014, access June 17, 2015, http://www.dac-presse.com/actualites/a-la-une/politique/1892-2014-10-30-10-32-17.html

Patrick Eric Mampouya, &quoute;LES NOMINATIONS ETHNIQUES AU SEIN DES FAC (Forces Armées Congolaises)&quoute;, Mampouya, October 31, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.mampouya.com/article-les-nominations-au-sein-des-fac-forces-armees-congolaises-111923342.html

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
0

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

Researcher4272: The number of service men and women active is not publicly known. The government launched a review of the number of personnel in 2012 after a number of scandals involving &quoute;ghost&quoute; soldiers. The review was officially completed in 2013, but in early 2014, the Minister of Defence stated a further need to clarify the number of active personnel.

According to the World Bank, there are roughly 12,000 armed forces personnel. Foreign military analysts have estimated this is made up of 8,000 personnel in the Army, 800 in the Navy, 1,200 in the Airforce, and 2,000 gendarmes. Number of police personnel is estimated at 1,500. There is no information about the number of Republican Guards, the unit responsible for the president's security.

COMMENTS -+

Agence Ecofin, &quoute;Congo Brazzaville : 4909 faux fonctionnaires débusqués&quoute; Agence Ecofin, October 1, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.agenceecofin.com/gestion-publique/0110-6907-congo-brazzaville-4909-faux-fonctionnaires-debusques

World Bank. &quoute;Armed Forces Personnel, total&quoute;. Accessed June 17, 2015. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1

Gaspard Lenckonov, &quoute;Congo-Brazzaville: recensement des personnels militaires et civils du Ministere de la defence&quoute;, Africa defence Journal, February 2, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, https://africadefencejournal.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/congo-brazzaville-recensement-des-personnels-militaires-et-civils-du-ministere-de-la-defence/

People Daily, &quoute;Congo-armée : Le ministre de la Défense pour l'achèvement en 2013 de la revue générale des effectifs&quoute;, People Daily, January 16, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/96852/8094482.html

Xinhua, &quoute;Congo : Le ministre de la Défense fixe les quatre axes stratégiques pour 2014&quoute;, AfriquInfo, January 22, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2014/1/22/congo-ministre-defence-fixe-quatre-axes-strategiques-pour-2014-241703.asp

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

Spyros Demetriou and Robert Muggah and Ian Biddle, Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2002. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR02-Congo.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The figures, aside from being wrong, seems to be out-dated.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
0

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

Researcher4272: Average pay rates and allowances are not publicised in any formal system. However, there is some evidence that the government is working to unify the pay of public servants and the military. This would make salary information on members of the armed forces publicly available. This will not apply to the Republican Guard, responsible for the president's security; this group reportedly receives inflated salaries and additional bonuses to ensure their loyalty.

The opposition media or vocal diaspora media does occasionally print stories listing individual salaries. These cannot be verified and may not be accurate due to the agenda of the publications. A diaspora blog reported that generals make an estimated 3 million CFA per month plus benefits including two official cars. Colonels are estimated to receive 520,000 per month; this compares to a national minimum wage of 54,000 CFA per month. High levels of extortion among the police and lower ranking foot soldiers are attributed to the low salaries received at this level.

COMMENTS -+

PTAB 2013

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011. Articles 58-59, 300-30. Page 42.

Steve Obirabassi, &quoute;Combien gagne un général des FAC ?&quoute;, La Voix du Peuple, July 9, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015, http://lavoixdupeuple.over-blog.org/article-congo-brazzaville-le-salaire-des-generaux-des-fac-fait-grincer-les-dents-dans-les-casernes-78942023.html

US Embassy, &quoute;Republic of Congo 2013 Human Rights Report&quoute;, Last accessed June 17, 2015, http://brazzaville.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/2013-congo-brazzaville-english2.pdf

Gervais Mboumba, &quoute;Afrique centrale: Des écarts de salaire qui encourage la corruption&quoute;, Oeil d'Afrique, August 5, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://oeildafrique.com/afrique-centrale-des-ecarts-de-salaire-qui-encourage-la-corruption/

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Republican Guard units in African military formations can be generalised as &quoute;elite&quoute; units. As a consequence, justification for inflated and/or obscured or outright-hidden salary information is incredibly commonplace.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
1

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

Researcher4272: Numerous issues have been reported with the payment of salaries, however research found that officials within the Ministry of Defence have since committed to resolving this. There have been reports of ghost soldiers and incorrect pay dating back to 2005. In 2012, hundreds of FAC personnel protested in Brazzaville over non-payment of their salaries for several months. This is assessed as unlikely to happen over the coming years however, as a range of commentators have indicated the president is reliant on the military to maintain his grip on power.

COMMENTS -+

Journal de Brazza, &quoute;FAC: appel à un investissement personnel pour l’exécution du budget 2014&quoute;, Journal de Brazza, May 21, 2013, accessed August 26, 2015, http://www.journaldebrazza.com/article.php?aid=3086

Interview with source 9. Armed Forces Auditor, 18 July 2014

IRIN, &quoute;CONGO: Le gouvernement compte les effectifs de son armée&quoute;, IRIN, January 17, 2005, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/63909/congo-le-gouvernement-compte-les-effectifs-de-son-arm%C3%A9e

Xinhua, &quoute;Des soldats créent la panique au centre-ville de Brazzaville&quoute;, AfriquInfo, March 8, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.afriquinfos.com/articles/2012/3/8/afrique-centrale-198168.asp

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: This is normally a well established system, although with some punctual failures on day of payment.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
0

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

Researcher4272: Promotions within the armed forces are decided by the president, and based on individuals loyalty to him. In 2014, local media published an open letter by several members of the police complaining of discrimination in the promotions system. Political analysts indicated that Sassou-Nguesso tries to keep power at upper and middle levels in the hands of northerners, which recruiting junior officers from the local population. In 2011, opposition media published a list of generals by region. It showed that of 46 generals, 25 were from the Cuvette region (Sassou-Nguesso's home region). The upper and middle levels face regular reshuffling in order to maintain loyalties and prevent individuals from being able to challenge his position. In December 2013, the former deputy head of intelligence, Colonel Marcel Ntsourou was arrested for rebellion. Following his arrest, and later imprisonment, local media reported that officers considered close to Ntsourou were dismissed.

The media regularly publicises promotions and reshuffles at upper and middle management.

COMMENTS -+

Constitution de la Republique du Congo, January 20, 2002. article 77

Patrick Eric Mampouya, &quoute;LES NOMINATIONS ETHNIQUES AU SEIN DES FAC (Forces Armées Congolaises)&quoute;, Mampouya, October 31, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.mampouya.com/article-les-nominations-au-sein-des-fac-forces-armees-congolaises-111923342.html

RFI, &quoute;Congo-Brazzaville: les profils variés des co-accusés de Marcel Ntsourou&quoute;, RFI, July 7, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140707-congo-brazzaville-profils-varies-co-accuses-marcel-ntsourou/

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

Patrick Eric Mampouya, &quoute;LISTE PAR RÉGION DES 46 GÉNÉRAUX AU CONGO&quoute;, Mampouya, June 22, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.mampouya.com/article-liste-par-region-des-44-generaux-au-congo-77518741.html

Fouad Harit, &quoute;Congo-Brazzaville : affaire Marcel Ntsourou, l’armée sous pression ?&quoute;, Afrik, March 7, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.afrik.com/congo-brazzaville-affaire-marcel-ntsourou-l-armee-sous-pression

Reuters, &quoute;Congo Republic jails ex-intel official for life over gunbattle&quoute;, DefenceWeb, September 12, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36243:congo-republic-jails-ex-intel-official-for-life-over-gunbattle&catid=3:Civil%20Security&Itemid=113

Forces Publiques, &quoute;Ou va l'armée et la police congolaise?&quoute; DAC Presse, October 30, 2014, access June 17, 2015, http://www.dac-presse.com/actualites/a-la-une/politique/1892-2014-10-30-10-32-17.html

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Forces armées congolaises : Des officiers et sous-officiers promus au premier trimestre 2015&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, January 20, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/societe/11002-forces-armees-congolaises-des-officiers-et-sous-officiers-promus-au-premier-trimestre-2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
0

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Researcher4272: There is no objective promotion system within the armed forces, rather promotions are based on loyalty to the president. In 2014, several members of the police wrote an open letter to the Ministry of Defence criticising corruption within the career review boards. Despite numerous judicial challenges, which led to the creation of the career boards system, the letter argued that the individuals on the board used discriminatory practices when reviewing promotions. There are no indications that a formal appraisal system is used when considering promotions in either the police or the military.

COMMENTS -+

Ordonnance No. 4-2001 dated 5 February 2001 on the general status of militaries and gendarmes.

Forces Publiques, &quoute;Ou va l'armée et la police congolaise?&quoute; DAC Presse, October 30, 2014, access June 17, 2015, http://www.dac-presse.com/actualites/a-la-une/politique/1892-2014-10-30-10-32-17.html

Patrick Eric Mampouya, &quoute;LES NOMINATIONS ETHNIQUES AU SEIN DES FAC (Forces Armées Congolaises)&quoute;, Mampouya, October 31, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.mampouya.com/article-les-nominations-au-sein-des-fac-forces-armees-congolaises-111923342.html

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
N/A

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4272: Compulsory conscription was dropped in Congo in 1969. However, there were reports of forced conscription until the late 1990s, primarily from the southern regions. After the 1997 civil war, when President Sassou Nguesso established himself in power, this practice has reportedly ended.

COMMENTS -+

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011. Articles 58-59, 300-301, pt 411, Page 129,

Interview with source 1. Government legal attaché, 22 July 2014

Interview with source 13. Journalist and civil society representative, 4 August 2014

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

UNHCR, &quoute;The Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). Country Report.&quoute; October 2003. http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/402a36a34.pdf

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. &quoute;Congo-Brazzaville: Forced recruitment of young men by Pascal Lissouba's (former president) forces in the southern part of the country and how this recruitment was being conducted (1997)&quoute; UNHCR, August 25, 2000. http://www.refworld.org/country,,,QUERYRESPONSE,COG,456d621e2,3ae6ad5534,0.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
1

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4272: There is no compulsory conscription. Corruption is widespread in the military, and research found it is highly likely that this includes the recruiting agents although there are no published reports on this issue. However, in order to join the gendarme, applicants must complete three written exams and a fitness test. The commander of the gendarme has stated the tests are designed to prevent discrimination in recruitment and the media has reported a swift response when there are disturbances to these exams.

COMMENTS -+

Agence Ecofin, &quoute;Congo Brazzaville : 4909 faux fonctionnaires débusqués&quoute;, October 1, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.agenceecofin.com/gestion-publique/0110-6907-congo-brazzaville-4909-faux-fonctionnaires-debusques

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Gendarmerie nationale : 2.800 jeunes seront recrutés par voie de concours&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, December 5, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/10689-gendarmerie-nationale-2-800-jeunes-seront-recrutes-par-voie-de-concours

La Semaine Africaine, &quoute;Des perturbateurs mis en échec au concours de la gendarmerie&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, March 20, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/coup-doeil-en-biais/11419-des-perturbateurs-mis-en-echec-au-concours-de-la-gendarmerie

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
1

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

Researcher4272: The exact number of employed soldiers is unknown, and there have been multiple reports of 'ghost soldiers'. In 2005, after reports of widespread abuses within the military system, the president ordered a review of the number of military personnel, followed by the issuance of new military identity cards. Opposition figures and external analysts reported that part of the issue was the disorganised reintegration process following the end of the civil war, whereby former militia were being either disarmed or integrated into the army. In 2012, local media estimated that 'ghost workers' accounted for 6% of the public workforce, and resulted in yearly losses of 12 million euro. Since then, the FAC as conducted a review of personnel – both civilian and military – that was reportedly completed in 2013, although its details were not publicised. It is highly likely 'ghost soldiers' are still on the payroll.

COMMENTS -+

IRIN, &quoute;Congo: Government starts to count soldiers&quoute;, ReliefWeb, January 17, 2005, accessed June 17, 2015, http://reliefweb.int/report/congo/congo-government-starts-count-soldiers

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

Meyya Furaha, &quoute;Congo Brazzaville : la plaie des emplois fictifs&quoute;, Afrik53, October 23, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.afrik53.com/Congo-Brazzaville-la-plaie-des-emplois-fictifs_a11933.html

Gaspard Lenckonov, &quoute;Congo-Brazzaville: recensement des personnels militaires et civils du Ministere de la defence&quoute;, Africa defence Journal, February 2, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, https://africadefencejournal.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/congo-brazzaville-recensement-des-personnels-militaires-et-civils-du-ministere-de-la-defence/

Franck Cana, &quoute;Les fantômes de la fonction publique en Afrique&quoute;, Star du Congo, November 9, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.starducongo.com/Les-fantomes-de-la-fonction-publique-en-Afrique_a8612.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
2

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

Researcher4272: The system of military pay is the responsibility of the central administration, which separate from the operational command. However, there are still reports of some soldiers receiving their payment in the barracks, and are therefore subject to the management of their organic commandments. Part of the stated purpose of the recent reviews of the number of military personnel has also been to resolve issues in the payment systems. The new head of human resources at the ministry of defence has stated that this will be a priority going forward.

COMMENTS -+

Ordonnance 4-2001 sur le Statut général des militaires et gendarmes.

Interview with source 7. Congolese Armed Forces colonel, 18 July 2014.

Gaspard Lenckonov and Etibert Mobambo, &quoute;Le nouveau DGRH du ministère de la défense nationale prend ses commandements&quoute;, Congo Site, February 14, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.congo-site.com/Le-nouveau-DGRH-du-ministere-de-la-defence-nationale-prend-ses-commandements_a16654.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
2

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

Researcher4272: At the 2015 Annual Planning Conference of the National Gendarmerie, the theme was improving command and supervisory responsibilities. The leaders of the FAC and gendarme spoke of the need to introduce clearer performance standards, as well as clarifying the chains of command. The meeting was in April, so no further action has yet occurred, although the leadership of the gendarme stated they had produced a document 'Gendarmerie Vision 2020'. Although codes of conduct of the army, gendarme and police are not readily available, interviews with members of armed forces revealed that heads of deployments are issued with a &quoute;Code of Conduct for the law enforcement officials&quoute;.

Additionally, military and civilian personnel must adhere to the general anti-corruption act. The decree of General Discipline gives a list of misconduct. But in practice, all offenses are not always punished. Notions of corruption and bribes, kickbacks are not specifically mentioned. Also, the practice of giving presents, souvenirs, after some activity or back from training abroad is expected.

COMMENTS -+

Décret 2006-694

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Conférence de planification annuelle de la gendarmerie nationale : Redynamiser le rôle opérationnel de la gendarmerie suivant ses missions judiciaires…&quoute; La Semaine Africaine, May 5, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/sports/11668-conference-de-planification-annuelle-de-la-gendarmerie-nationale-redynamiser-le-role-operationnel-de-la-gendarmerie-suivant-ses-missions-judiciaires

Loi sur la corruption, la concussion et la fraude et les infractions assimilées en République du Congo, Loi 5-2009, September 22, 2009.

Interview with source 7. Congolese Armed Forces colonel, 18 July 2014.

Interview with source 8. Congolese Armed Forces major, 24 July 2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
1

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

Researcher4272: Reports of abuses by the police and military are common, and often go unpunished. Violence against immigrants from DRC and West African countries is particularly common, as well as abuse of prisoners and suspects at the hands of the police. Several high profile cases have gone to trial, notably following the explosions at the Mpila munitions depot and a case known as the 'Disappeared of the Beach'. In the former, 23 soldiers were tried in relation to arson and harming state security following the 2012 blast at an arms depot near Mpila that killed at least 240 people; six of these officers were imprisoned. In the latter case, which relates to the disappearance of hundreds of returning refugees in 1999, two officers were finally indicted in 2004. However, the case against former police chief Jean-Francois Ndengue was dismissed since he had immunity from prosecution.

US government officials have stated that since the creation of the Congolese Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH), funded by international human rights group FIDH, there has been a reduction in the impunity of security forces through the publication of abuses. Although the OCDH has increased discussion on the topic, the centralised nature of power in Congo means that loyalists to the president will not be held accountable for any abuses of power.

COMMENTS -+

Decree No. 2006-694 of 29 December 2006 on General Rules of Discipline

US State Department, &quoute;US department: Rapport 2010 sur les droits de l’homme au Congo-Brazzaville&quoute;, Congo Liberty, April 8, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015, http://congo-liberty.com/?p=348

OCDH. &quoute;OBSERVATOIRE CONGOLAIS DES DROITS DE L'HOMME&quoute;. Last accessed June 17, 2015. http://blog.ocdh.org/

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

BBC News, &quoute;Congo-Brazzaville soldiers tried for Mpila depot blast&quoute;, BBC, August 6, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23590999

BBC News, &quoute;Congo explosions: Soldiers jailed by Brazzaville court&quoute;, BBC, September 10, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24035538

FIDH. &quoute;The disappeared of the Beach case&quoute;. Last modified December 10, 2008. https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/Africa/congo/the-disappeared-of-the-beach-case/Release-of-Jean-Francois-Ndengue

HRW. 'The Long Arm of Justice: Annex III: Cases in France'. Last accessed on June 17, 2015. http://www.hrw.org/de/node/129035/section/13#_ftn413

RFI, &quoute;Mathias Dzon: «Le verdict de Mpila ne correspond pas à la vérité que les Congolais recherchaient»&quoute;, Star du Congo, September 13, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.starducongo.com/lesratsetlessouris/Mathias-Dzon-Le-verdict-de-Mpila-ne-correspond-pas-a-la-verite-que-les-Congolais-recherchaient_a311.html

IRIN, &quoute;CONGO: Torture commonplace in prisons – report&quoute;, IRIN, November 6, 2012, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.irinnews.org/report/96726/congo-torture-commonplace-in-prisons-report

John Ndinga-Ngoma, &quoute;Conférence de presse de la direction générale de police à Pointe-Noire : L’opération «Mbata ya bakolo» se réalise dans le respect de la dignité humaine&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, May 27, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/11772-conference-de-presse-de-la-direction-generale-de-police-a-pointe-noire-l-operation-mbata-ya-bakolo-se-realise-dans-le-respect-de-la-dignite-humaine

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
0

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

Researcher4272: Public research and interviews show no evidence of regular anti-corruption training systems for military and civilian personnel. The US does have a small assistance programme in the country, which includes non-combat courses for army and navy personnel. There are also a number of military training schools present in the country, but these do not offer specialised courses on anti-corruption.

COMMENTS -+

Decree 2007-159 implementing IHL/IHRL Dissemination Committee.

Severin Ibara, &quoute;Coopération militaire : des équipes de la marine nationale s'exercent aux côtés des Américains&quoute;, ADIAC, March 19, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://adiac-congo.com/content/cooperation-militaire-des-equipes-de-la-marine-nationale-sexercent-aux-cotes-des-americains

Interview with source 6. Congolese Armed Forces colonel, October 2011. (??correct date??)

Interview with source 7. Congolese Armed Forces colonel, 18 July 2014.

Interview with source 8. Congolese Armed Forces major, 24 July 2014.

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
1

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

Researcher4272: Public information on the results of military tribunals, which would be the main way to try defence service personnel for corruption, is not widely available. However, several high profile cases are reported on in the media, including negligence ahead of the explosion at the Mpila arms depot and the trial of former deputy intelligence chief Ntsourou.

The OCDH reports on incidents of corruption within the military, but primarily to call for prosecutions.

COMMENTS -+

Decree No. 2006-694;

Loi sur la corruption, la concussion et la fraude et les infractions assimilées en République du Congo, Loi 5-2009, September 22, 2009.

Loi determinant les infractions et les peines applicables en matiere de passation et d'execution des marches public, Loi 31-2012, October 11, 2012.

Interview with source 8. Congolese Armed Forces major, 24 July 2014.

OCDH, &quoute;Le colonel NGAKOSSO NGAMA Aristide, Directeur général des équipements de l’armée sous la complicité de la haute hiérarchie du Ministère de la défense nationale piétinent les décisions de justice, spolient les propriétaires terriens.&quoute; OCDH, August 25, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://blog.ocdh.org/post/2014/08/25/Le-colonel-NGAKOSSO-NGAMA-Aristide%2C-Directeur-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-des-%C3%A9quipements-de-l%E2%80%99arm%C3%A9e-sous-la-complicit%C3%A9-de-la-haute-hi%C3%A9rarchie-du-Minist%C3%A8re-de-la-d%C3%A9fense-nationale-pi%C3%A9tinent-les-d%C3%A9cisions-de-justice%2C-spolient-les-propri%C3%A9taires-terrains

RFI, &quoute;Mbemba case: the defence denounced the &quoute;arbitrary detention&quoute;, RFI, June 9, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20150609-affaire-j-mbemba-defence-denonce-detentions-arbitraires/

Reuters, &quoute;Congo Republic jails ex-intel official for life over gunbattle&quoute;, DefenceWeb, September 12, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36243:congo-republic-jails-ex-intel-official-for-life-over-gunbattle&catid=3:Civil%20Security&Itemid=113

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
1

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

Researcher4272: There are measures in the Rules of General Discipline, however all available evidence shows these are widely ignored. Facilitation payments and extortion attempts by police are widespread in Congo; these are most likely to be applied to foreign visitors. This is regularly attributed to the low pay of the foot soldiers and police, and indiscipline due to impunity.

COMMENTS -+

Decree No. 2006-694

Loi sur la corruption, la concussion et la fraude et les infractions assimilées en République du Congo, Loi 5-2009, September 22, 2009.

Transparency International. &quoute;Congo&quoute;. Last modified 2014. http://www.transparency.org/country/#COG

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Those are quite regular, especially in Brazaville. There is no oversight on that.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
0

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

Researcher4272: The Rules of General Discipline provides general guidance of good conduct to observe on operations, but this is primarily in respect to international humanitarian law (IHL). It is not specifically referred to the corruption and ethics in the doctrine. The anti-corruption code of 2009 does also apply to military personnel.

At the annual planning conference for the gendarme in 2015, the deputy chief of staff announced a need to improve the code of conduct, although no specific mention was made of anti-corruption training. Brigadiers within the gendarme have previously mentioned a need to debunk some of the 'mafia networks' that have developed within the force. These are patrimonial networks, in some cases that are linked to the integration process of militia units.

COMMENTS -+

Decree No. 2006-694

Interview with source 8. Congolese Armed Forces major, 24 July 2014.

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Gendarmerie nationale : Création du G.i.g.n, pour lutter contre la grande insécurité&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, January 20, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/11010-gendarmerie-nationale-creation-du-g-i-g-n-pour-lutter-contre-la-grande-insecurite

Loi sur la corruption, la concussion et la fraude et les infractions assimilées en République du Congo, Loi 5-2009, September 22, 2009.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
0

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

Researcher4272: Although military training schools are present in the country, the training policy does not mention an obligation to teach about the fight against corruption. The Rules of General Discipline emphasise respect for international humanitarian law and civil-military relations. It does not specifically referred to the corruption and ethics in the doctrine. The gendarme have announced a review of the training courses in place, but there are no indications this will include anti-corruption elements. Commissioned officers of the armed forces are occasionally involved in specialised training, such as in corruption related to natural resource extraction or procurement.

COMMENTS -+

Decree No. 2006-694

Interview with source 8. Congolese Armed Forces major, 24 July 2014.

ITIE. &quoute;LES OFFICIERS CONGOLAIS FORMES SUR L’IMPORTANCE DE L’ITIE.&quoute; Last modified 2012. http://www.itie-congo.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120:les-officiers-congolais-formes-sur-limportance-de-litie&catid=47:actualite&Itemid=71

Firmin Oye, &quoute;Passation des marchés : les animateurs des cellules formés à l’élaboration d’une commande publique&quoute;, ADIAC, May 23, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.adiac-congo.com/content/passation-des-marches-les-animateurs-des-cellules-formes-lelaboration-dune-commande-publique

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Gendarmerie nationale : Création du G.i.g.n, pour lutter contre la grande insécurité&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, January 20, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/11010-gendarmerie-nationale-creation-du-g-i-g-n-pour-lutter-contre-la-grande-insecurite

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
0

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

Researcher4272: There were no indications that trained professionals are deployed to monitor corruption risks. There may be ad hoc training.

COMMENTS -+

Personal knowledge and experience

Interview with source 7. Congolese Armed Forces colonel, 18 July 2014.

Interview with source 8. Congolese Armed Forces major, 24 July 2014.

Interview with Interviewee 16: academic at research university, California, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 17: diaspora-based journalist, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
0

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

Researcher4272: There is no known anti-corruption training for those deployed on missions internally or externally. Abuses by Congolese forces have been reported abroad, which would imply that there is little emphasis on ensuring good conduct while deployed. In March 2014, Amnesty International reported that a Congolese contingent of the MISCA forces in Central African Republic were involved in the enforced disappearance of 11 people. There have also been numerous reports of extrajudicial killings, torture and other human rights abuses by the Congolese peacekeeper. No investigations into these allegations has occurred.

COMMENTS -+

Decree 2006-694

Interview with source 7. Congolese Armed Forces colonel, 18 July 2014.

Interview with source 8. Congolese Armed Forces major, 24 July 2014.

Amnesty International. &quoute;Central African Republic: Amnesty International Report 2014/15&quoute;. Last accessed June 17, 2015. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/central-african-republic/report-central-african-republic/

Laura Mackenzie, &quoute; Peacekeepers implicated in torture, murder and disappearances in CAR&quoute;. June 3, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GTGvZL4e2V8

HRW. &quoute;Central African Republic: Peacekeepers Tied to Abuse.&quoute; Last modified on June 2, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/02/central-african-republic-peacekeepers-tied-abuse

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
2

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Researcher4272: In Congo, private security companies exist on a small scale, primarily for residential and commercial interests. While these include former military and militiamen, they do not constitute private military companies as they do not get involved in official military operations.

Research found no evidence indicating if the current government employs any PMCs/PSCs. There is extensive evidence that during the 1990s former President Lissouba engaged PMCs and arms brokers under a series of highly questionable contracts. There is no evidence to suggest that any appropriate legislation has since been established to prevent these kinds of deals from reoccurring in the future.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Agree with comments, in that there is longer-term evidence of PMCs/PSCs working for the private sector and that there is no sign of regulation. The USDOS African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program is civilian-contracted, although this is funded by the US government.

Score changed from N/A to 0 and sources added. Paragraph added discussing issues identified during previous presidential administration.

COMMENTS -+

Antony Barnett, &quoute;Barclays held cash for massacre&quoute;, The Observer, 28 November 1999. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/nov/28/antonybarnett.theobserver

Bruce Blain, The role of private and mercenary armies in international conflict, 2010, http://
www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3396.ht

Stefaans Brümmer and Craig McKune, &quoute;Offshore Documents Solve Mystery of Pre-Civil War Helicopter Deal in Congo&quoute;, 5 April 2013. http://www.icij.org/offshore/offshore-documents-solve-mystery-pre-civil-war-helicopter-deal-congo; https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/676122/1a08787578edc6f693325fb1e36d12d8-armscor.pdf

James Davis, &quoute;Fortune's Warriors: Private Armies and the New World Order&quoute;, Douglas & McIntyre, 2000, pp113-4. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ZX1Wi4_5-z0C&pg=PA113

Khareen Pech, &quoute;Chapter 5: Executive Outcomes – A corporate conquest&quoute;, in: Peace, Profit Or Plunder?: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies (eds. Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason), Institute for Security Studies, pp101-103
https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PEACECHAP5.PDF

Al Venter, &quoute;War Dog - Fighting Other People's Wars&quoute;, Casemate, 2006, p563. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=o4w2xNemc_EC&pg=PA563

Brian Wood, &quoute;Stopping the Global Terror Trade&quoute;, Speech at the European Social Forum, Florence, 9 November 2002. https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/stopping-the-global-terror-trade-by-brian-wood/

Brian Wood & Johan Peleman &quoute;The Arms Fixers. Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents&quoute;, NISAT/PRIO/BASIC Report, 2000, Ch 3. https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=658

US State Department, &quoute;African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program&quoute;, February 6, 2013. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/203841.htm

Personal knowledge and experience.

Interview with source 6. Congolese Armed Forces colonel, October 2011.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: PMC use in the Republic of Congo has been well-documented, involving activities relating to several coups in the country, but also more recently in ongoing, organic security for expatriate professionals working in remote mining or other industries in the country.

French Foreign legion veterans tend to be employed, likely because of their French language ability. Beyond this, G4S offers a private security service throughout Congolese cities.

There is no strict regulation or oversight on these activities. It is probably that this would continue to remain effectively unregulated so long as PMC activities do not threaten the government.

http://www.g4s.co.za/en-ZA/What%20we%20do/Services/Journey%20management/Vehicles/

https://www.issafrica.org/chapter-3-private-military-and-security-companies-and-the-nexus-between-natural-resources-and-civil-wars-in-africa-mpako-h-foaleng

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
0

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

Researcher4272: The Procurement Code was updated in 2009, in a reform process that was sponsored by the International Monetary Fund. The reform introduced competitive bidding and reduced the level of 'special procedures' (advance payments). Public procurement policy is managed by the General Public Procurement Directorate (DGCMP), and the Regulatory Authority (ARMP) oversees procurement.

The Procurement Code accounts for all government procurements, including in the defence sector. However, Article 75 of the Code state that articles relating to 'national defence, security and special interests' constitute 'special purchases' and are therefore exempt from the code. It stipulates that the Council of Ministers will set the procurement rules for such purchases, although there are no indications that this has happened. Article 76 also allows the inclusion of secret clauses in contracts if they pertain to national security.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: I am a little unclear about this comment, which seems to answer a slightly different question. The CoM do &quoute;review&quoute; these purchases - although refer to earlier comments on their ineffectiveness - but this is done on and ad hoc basis (and potentially after the fact - although I wasn't able to clarify this). As far as I can tell, it is not the result of a specific set of guidelines that they were meant to produce.

I have found no evidence to suggest the Council of Ministers have produced the new rules.

COMMENTS -+

AFDB, &quoute;Republic of Congo: Economic and Sector Study: Country Governance Profile&quoute;. December 2008. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Republic%20of%20Congo%20-%20Country%20Governance%20Profile%20EN.pdf

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009.

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I cannot find, nor am aware of any update or explanation of these procurement rules. It is unlikely to have been widely published if released at all.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Yes, is the Council of Ministers who have to review it, but is not publicaly available (Source: Interview with Congolese Defence member, 7 July 2015)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
0

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

Researcher4272: The ministry of defence publishes procurement plans, which are publically available on the website of the regulatory authority of public procurement (ARMP). This includes a list of recent and planned public procurements for the army, gendarme and the navy. However, this does not include needs assessments and is written in relatively generic terms – the need for 'specific vehicles' or 'equipment for logistics campaign' for example. It does not provide details of the bidding process or contract implementation. International researchers tracing the small arms trade in the region have reported difficulties in accessing information on the trade.

COMMENTS -+

Ministere de la defence Nationale, Plan de Passation, Période du : 01er Janvier au 31 Décembre 2014. http://www.armp.cg/Portals/0/Pdf/PPM/d%C3%A9fense%20nationale.pdf

Pierre Gobinet, &quoute;Countdown to Catastrophe: The Mpila Ammunition Dept Explosions,&quoute; in Small Arms Survey 2014, (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2014). http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2014/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2014-Chapter-5-EN.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
1

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Researcher4272: Although the Ministry of Defence has a publicly available procurement plan, this does not include major arms purchases, which are classified as matters of national security and remain undisclosed. These purchases are made at the behest of the president and his close allies that head the security forces. As a result, there is very little oversight for such procurements. Additionally, the government receives numerous donations of equipment, which are not subject to significant oversight.

COMMENTS -+

Ministere de la defence Nationale, Plan de Passation, Période du : 01er Janvier au 31 Décembre 2014. http://www.armp.cg/Portals/0/Pdf/PPM/d%C3%A9fense%20nationale.pdf

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Coopération militaire Congo/Etats-Unis d’Amérique : Don de matériel militaire au premier bataillon congolais de la Minusca&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, May 12, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/11715-cooperation-militaire-congo-etats-unis-d-amerique-don-de-materiel-militaire-au-premier-bataillon-congolais-de-la-minusca

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
0

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

Researcher4272: There is no formal policy of the government publicising defence purchases. The media reports major acquisitions, but it is highly unlikely that this captures all of the purchases made. For example, international media reported a the seizure of a shipment of tank parts and equipment for the army from North Korea; there was no information on the purchase prior to the seizure. External weapons analysts have reported the usage of new aircraft and naval vessels in recent years, but have not been able to find public information on the source of these purchases.

COMMENTS -+

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011. pt 406 & 408, Page 128.

Interview with Interviewee 18: munitions expert, London, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Associated Press, &quoute;North Korea's shadowy arms trade&quoute;, The Guardian, July 18, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/18/history-north-korea-arms-dealing

Neil MacFarquhar, &quoute;North Korean Military Parts Were Intercepted, U.N. Says&quoute;, New York Times, February 26, 2010, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/world/asia/26nations.html?_r=1

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The only legislation regulating defence procurement dates to 1962, and makes no mention of publicising purchases.

https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/News/2015/05/IllegalWildlifeTradeReport2015.pdf

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
0

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

Researcher4272: Article 53 of the procurement code lays out the basic conditions each bidder for government contracts must adhere to. These are general requirements, including a lack of business relationships with any individual that helped prepare the tender. Articles 54-56 stipulate that bidders must be able to demonstrate technical and financial capacity to complete the works. However, there is no mention of business conduct programmes.

These regulations apply to companies bidding for tenders with the Ministry of Defence and armed forces. However, it is unlikely that these requirements are applied to classified purchases.

As discussed in Question 57, the Procurement Code does not apply to purchases relating to ‘national defence, security and special interests.’ While the Code stipulates that the Council of Ministers would put in place rules governing such purchases but there is no evidence that this has taken place.

COMMENTS -+

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011, pt.418, pg.130

MoD document: PTAB 2013

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
0

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

Researcher4272: The national defence policy is opaque and centralised under the president and top military commanders, and little auditing occurs. In 2011, the government purchased two Mirage fighter jets, despite the fact that foreign military experts have stated that the airforce 'has ceased to exist as a military fighting unit.' The jets are therefore rarely used and it is reported that these are only seen at national parades.

COMMENTS -+

Guy Martin, &quoute;Paramount confirms Mirage F1AZs delivered to Congo-Brazzaville, eyes future customers&quoute;, DefenceWeb, April 21, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14988:paramount-confirms-mirage-f1azs-delivered-to-congo-brazzaville-eyes-future-customers&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107

Economist, &quoute;Arms and the African&quoute;, The Economist, November 22, 2014, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21633901-continents-armies-are-going-spending-spree-arms-and-african

DefenceWeb, &quoute;Congo-Brazzaville to receive ex-BDF CN235&quoute;, DefenceWeb, March 11, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29792:congo-brazzaville-to-receive-ex-bdf-cn235&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
1

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Researcher4272: Although the mechanisms of procurement and acquisition are in place, defence purchases are primarily opaque processes controlled by the president. In the PND 2012-2016, the government has recognised the need to purchase modern equipment that would suit the changing security threat. No further details have been given however.

The majority of the Congolese inventory is outdated Soviet-era weaponry that is in poor repair. It is likely to be cheaper to abandon this equipment than to recondition or repair it. International experts supporting the efforts to dispose of this weaponry has reported a lack of accurate information on the amount of weaponry in stockpiles. This lack of inventorying contributes to a lack of accurate needs assessments prior to defence purchases.

COMMENTS -+

Pierre Gobinet, &quoute;Countdown to Catastrophe: The Mpila Ammunition Dept Explosions,&quoute; in Small Arms Survey 2014, (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2014). http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2014/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2014-Chapter-5-EN.pdf

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011. Articles 58-59, 300-301

Interview with Interviewee 18: munitions expert, London, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 19: former foreign military advisor, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are no clear technical criteria for material purchase, nor is this based on any security or threat analysis (Source: interview with Defence Ministry member, 7 July 2015).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
1

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

Researcher4272: Since the procurement reform in 2009, the government has stated its commitment to competitive bidding. By 2011, they reported that 90% of contracts above $500,000 were subject to competitive bidding. This would include the items included in the Ministry of Defence's public procurement plan. However, the majority of arms purchases are not included in this plan as they are deemed matters of national security. These purchases will not have competitive bidding processes. Additionally, a significant amount of weaponry and equipment is donated to the government.

COMMENTS -+

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009. art.21, 22, 28

Ministry of Finance, &quoute;Letter of Intent, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding&quoute; IMF, July 14, 2011. https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2011/cog/071411.pdf

Ministere de la defence Nationale, Plan de Passation, Période du : 01er Janvier au 31 Décembre 2014. http://www.armp.cg/Portals/0/Pdf/PPM/d%C3%A9fense%20nationale.pdf

Interview with Interviewee 18: munitions expert, London, June 2015

Interview with Interviewee 15: political analyst and researcher, London, May 2014

Alain Patrick Massamba, &quoute;Coopération militaire Congo/Etats-Unis d’Amérique : Don de matériel militaire au premier bataillon congolais de la Minusca&quoute;, La Semaine Africaine, May 12, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.lasemaineafricaine.net/index.php/national/11715-cooperation-militaire-congo-etats-unis-d-amerique-don-de-materiel-militaire-au-premier-bataillon-congolais-de-la-minusca

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
0

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Researcher4272: Articles 11 and 12 of the Procurement Code lay out the regulation surrounding the award of public procurement contracts. They stipulate the creation of a tender board for each contract, which is to be headed by an individual from the commissioning department. As discussed in Question 57 however, the Procurement Code does not apply to purchases relating to ‘national defence, security and special interests.’ While the Code stipulates that the Council of Ministers would put in place rules governing such purchases but there is no evidence that this has taken place.

The Regulatory Authority (ARMP) has an audit and investigation committee, which is responsible for yearly audits of a selection of public procurement contracts. This includes reviewing the award process for the selected contracts. However, there are no indications the ARMP has ever overturned an awarded contract or questioned the bidding process. The organisation is not fully independent, with many of the high ranking officials being political appointees.

Article 6 of Act 31-2012 condemns any person holding public authority, a public service mission or holding an elective public office, who has used their real or supposed influence to obtain or attempt to obtain for himself or for the benefit of any person a public contract or any other favourable decision on procurement.

COMMENTS -+

Loi n°31-2012 du 11 octobre 2012 ;

ARMP. &quoute;Presentation and Organisation&quoute; Last accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.armp.cg/en-us/about/presentationandorganization.aspx

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009.

Loi determinant les infractions et les peines applicables en matiere de passation et d'execution des marches public, Loi 31-2012, October 11, 2012. Article 6

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
1

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Researcher4272: Law 31-2012 applies to all bidders for government contracts, although it is unlikely to be used for classified purchases. The Council of Ministers has not passed any separate regulation on special/classified purchases (see also Q57).

The law allows for the imposition of fines and prison sentences of up to five years. There is no mention of collusion between bidders, but it does allow for punishment of those privy to confidential information.

COMMENTS -+

Loi determinant les infractions et les peines applicables en matiere de passation et d'execution des marches public, Loi 31-2012, October 11, 2012.

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As I understand it, and as mentioned in The Order on War Materials, Weapons and Munitions 1962, Order No. 3507. A report by Cliff-Dekker Hofmeyer indicated the sentence as mentioned about (though it can also be as low as 15 days.)

This is updated as of April 2015, and I am unaware of any separate regulation that has been passed since. The law itself was unaccessible at this time of review, but appeared initially as a classification of weapon and firearm type, as well as their purchase and transport. It did not include collusion clauses as far as I had seen.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
1

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

Researcher4272: Ad hoc training of procurement staff does occur, but it is not regular or comprehensive. In 2015, the World Bank collaborated with the ARMP to train over 400 staff, including those responsible for purchases under Articles 75 and 76 of the Procurement Code (classified 'special purchases'). The government, under the DGCMP, organises occasional general training for procurement staff, but more comprehensive training is primarily in conjunction with donors or organisations such as the IPRC. It is not targeted to defence purchases, and specific training on reviewing defence contractors does not occur.

COMMENTS -+

Firmin Oye, &quoute;Passation des marchés : les animateurs des cellules formés à l’élaboration d’une commande publique&quoute;, ADIAC, May 23, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.adiac-congo.com/content/passation-des-marches-les-animateurs-des-cellules-formes-lelaboration-dune-commande-publique

IPRC. &quoute;Passation des marchés publics suivant le code des marchés publics congolais.&quoute; Last accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.iprc-training.org/congo/news/148/21/Passation-des-marches-publics-suivant-le-code-des-marches-publics-congolais/d,formats.html

ACI, &quoute;Marchés Publics au Congo: invitation au strict respect des Textes&quoute;, Journal de Brazza, November 21, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.journaldebrazza.com/article.php?aid=3778

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
2

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

Researcher4272: The ARMP has a Dispute Resolution Committee which receives appeals on procurement issues. If the complaint relates to violations of the procurement regulation on awarding tenders, they can be deferred to the Litigation Commission. Those that relate to the execution of contracts can also be referred to the Disciplinary Training Committee. There is no publicly available information on the Dispute Resolution Committee's past cases. It is likely to have limited capacity and either lack independence or enough weight to overturn any perceived wrongdoing in tendering processes.

COMMENTS -+

Loi determinant les infractions et les peines applicables en matiere de passation et d'execution des marches public, Loi 31-2012, October 11, 2012. art.6

US Department of State, &quoute;2014 Investment Climate Statement: Republic of Congo.&quoute; June 2014. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/227342.pdf

ARMP. &quoute;Presentation and Organisation&quoute; Last accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.armp.cg/en-us/about/presentationandorganization.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
2

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

Researcher4272: Law 31-2012 applies to all bidders for government contracts, although it is unlikely to be used for classified purchases. The law allows for the imposition of fines and prison sentences of up to five years. Along with fines, other sanctions that can be imposed include confiscation of deposits, exclusion from competition for a determined period, or withdrawal of their agreement or qualification certificate.

The law covers a number of potential corrupt practices, including access to confidential information prior to the award (Article 4), under- or over-valuing services (Article 5) and using undue influence to steer the awarding decision (Article 6). Article 11 also states that all parties involved in public procurement are subject to Law 5-2009 on anti-corruption and fraud.

Most sources indicate that Congo’s judiciary is weak, underfunded, corruption-prone and lacks technical capability, which would have implications on the application of sanctions on corrupt companies.

COMMENTS -+

Loi determinant les infractions et les peines applicables en matiere de passation et d'execution des marches public, Loi 31-2012, October 11, 2012.

Loi sur la corruption, la concussion et la fraude et les infractions assimilées en République du Congo, Loi 5-2009, September 22, 2009.

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
0

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

Researcher4272: No information was found to indicate that the government has signed offset contracts in the recent past. Given the lack of transparency associated with defence and security procurement, it cannot be ruled out that there are no offset contracts. The score has been selected accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

No public records found

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There have been no offset contracts publicly known. The small scale of any purchases combined with the off-record nature of any such arms deal generally removes any possibility of an offset contract potential.

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
0

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

Researcher4272: No information was found to indicate that the government has signed offset contracts in the recent past. Given the lack of transparency associated with defence and security procurement, it cannot be ruled out that there are no offset contracts. The score has been selected accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

http://www.lerusteph.com/marches-publics-larmp-envisage-de-mettre-en-place-un-reseau-de-journalistes/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There have been no offset contracts publicly known. The small scale of any purchases combined with the off-record nature of any such arms deal generally removes any possibility of an offset contract potential.

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
0

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

Researcher4272: No information was found to indicate that the government has signed offset contracts in the recent past. Given the lack of transparency associated with defence and security procurement, it cannot be ruled out that there are no offset contracts. The score has been selected accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

LIVRE 1 DSCERP 2012-2016 pt 79, Page 43

Interview with source 10. Civil society representative, December 2013.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There have been no offset contracts publicly known. The small scale of any purchases combined with the off-record nature of any such arms deal generally removes any possibility of an offset contract potential.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
0

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

Researcher4272: There are no indications in the public record of the government seeking to control the use of agents or intermediaries by contractors. However, Article 9 of the Procurement Code does state that bidders are required to report the payment made to intermediaries and agents. The limited capacity of the ARMP means that there is likely to be little investigation or auditing of these individuals or companies.

As discussed in Question 57, the Procurement Code also does not apply to purchases relating to ‘national defence, security and special interests.’ While the Code stipulates that the Council of Ministers would put in place rules governing such purchases but there is no evidence that this has taken place.

COMMENTS -+

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009. art.8, 9, 53. ;

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011. pt 418 ; Page 130

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

74.
score
0

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

Researcher4272: Information on major arms deals is classified as a matter of national security. The only information publicly available is that which is reported in the media post-contract. This will either be information from the seller or basic observations following the usage of the acquired arms. There have been instances of deals being reported prior to completion, such as a report in 2013 in the newspaper In &quoute;La Lettre du Continent&quoute; which wrote on negotiations between the government and an Israeli broker. However, this did not include details of the financial package, and there was no follow-up post-deal.

COMMENTS -+

PTAB 2013

Associated Press, &quoute;North Korea's shadowy arms trade&quoute;, The Guardian, July 18, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/18/history-north-korea-arms-dealing

Guy Martin, &quoute;Paramount confirms Mirage F1AZs delivered to Congo-Brazzaville, eyes future customers&quoute;, DefenceWeb, April 21, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14988:paramount-confirms-mirage-f1azs-delivered-to-congo-brazzaville-eyes-future-customers&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
0

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

Researcher4272: Articles 53-56 of the Procurement Code, pertaining to the qualifications of the contractor, also apply to subcontractors. However, these relate to general requirements, primarily around technical and financial capability to complete the work. No information can be found regarding a requirement for contractors to ensure subcontractors adopt anti-corruption programmes. The limited effectiveness of anti-corruption programmes and weak enforcement of anti-corruption legislation would strongly imply that no such requirement exists.

COMMENTS -+

Nancy-France Loutoumba, &quoute;Marchés publics : les appels d’offres accusent encore quelques insuffisances&quoute; ADIAC, December 23, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.adiac-congo.com/content/marches-publics-les-appels-doffres-accusent-encore-quelques-insuffisances

Code des Marches Publics et Textes d'Application, Décret 2009-156, May 2009. art.53

Plan National de Développement: Livre 1: Document de Strategie pour la Croissance, l'Emploi et la Reduction de la Pauvrete, DSCERP 2012-2016, July 2011. pt. 471 Page 148

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
1

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

Researcher4272: Not much information is publicly available on defence acquisitions. They are made at the behest of the president but there is likely to be an element of political influence by selling nations. Purchases previously tended to be from powers that have significant political influence in the country, such as former colonial power France and regional powerhouse Angola (who supported the president militarily when he took power). However, in recent years they appear to have been more opportunistic, with purchases from China, North Korea and South Africa.

The main example of a seller nation's political needs coming in to play is probably North Korea (see SIPRI link in sources) to whom the sale of weapons is a vital source of income. However, NK does not have political influence over Congo-B, so this would appear to have been a mutually beneficial, opportunistic purchase rather than the primary result of political pressure from the seller.

The assessor contends that purchases from China have the greatest potential to be conducted based on seller influence, however it must be noted that there have been no major purchases from China in recent years beyond light weaponry.

Finally, there is clear evidence the government has not justified individual purchases by military need. The government's 2011 purchase of two Mirage fighter jets through the South African private aerospace business Paramount was questioned by foreign military experts who stated that the airforce had 'ceased to exist as a military fighting unit.' The jets have been rarely used since and it is reported that these are now only seen at national parades (see also Q62).

COMMENTS -+

Associated Press, &quoute;North Korea's shadowy arms trade&quoute;, The Guardian, July 18, 2013, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/18/history-north-korea-arms-dealing

Guy Martin, &quoute;Paramount confirms Mirage F1AZs delivered to Congo-Brazzaville, eyes future customers&quoute;, DefenceWeb, April 21, 2011, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14988:paramount-confirms-mirage-f1azs-delivered-to-congo-brazzaville-eyes-future-customers&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107

Spyros Demetriou and Robert Muggah and Ian Biddle, Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2002. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR02-Congo.pdf

Hugh Griffiths and Lawrence Dermody, Shadow trade: how North Korea's barter trade violates United Nations sanctions, SIPRI, July 17, 2013, accessed August 27, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/media/expert-comments/shadow-trade-how-north-koreas-barter-trade-violates-united-nations-sanctions

Interview with Interviewee 18: munitions expert, London, June 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: With no clear sources on this, it seems that the influence of China is a major issue, especially on the works to renovate military premises and the Mpila area.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+