This country is placed in Band F

Recommendations Unavailable

Policy recommendations not available for this country's assessment

Leadership 30
01.
score
1

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are provisions for legislative oversight and popular participation in the drafting of Guinea Bissau's defence policy. Security sector policy-making is the prerogative of the Ministry of Defence (Ministério da Defesa Nacional). Despite these provisions, the effectiveness of legislative scrutiny is debatable due to the dominating role military institutions continue to play in the country (Embaló). There is a lack of evidence demonstrating commitment to critical and thorough examination, as well as updating of pertinent legislation.

Guinea Bissau's security and defence institutions are formally controlled by the President and Prime Minister, but their authority has been historically challenged by army chiefs in numerous military coups. The Prime Minister is in charge of intelligence services, while the President chairs the Higher Council on National Defence (HCND), which has advisory functions in the elaboration of national defence policy. The National Assembly (Assembleia Nacional Popular) is responsible for scrutinising all defence policies and can exercise its constitutional right to do so by relying on the work of the Committee for Administration, Local Power and National Defence (CAIPLDN, Comissão de Administração Interna, Poder Local e Defesa Nacional). There is extremely limited evidence pointing towards the effectiveness and productivity of the committee. De jure, parliament can exercise budgetary power and review major arms procurements, but does not do the latter regularly and there is no evidence of recent vetoing of defence policy.

COMMENTS -+

- Assembleia Nacional Popular. &quoute;Comissão de Administração Interna, Poder Local e Defesa Nacional.&quoute; n.d. http://www.anpguinebissau.org/assembleia/comissoes/comissao-de-administracao-interna-poder-local-e-defesa-nacional.
- Birgit Embaló, &quoute;Civil–military relations and political order in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 50, No. 2, June 2012, pp 253 - 281.
- CNN, &quoute;U.S. charges Guinea-Bissau military chief in plot with missiles, drugs,&quoute; April 19, 2013, accessed June 2, 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/18/justice/us-guinea-bissau-plot/.
- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, 1984 (as Amended to 1991), Articles 19, 74 and 75.
- Shola Jonathan Omoregie, &quoute;Challenges Facing the Implementation of Security Sector Reform Programme in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; Africa Peace Support, November 15, 2010, http://www.africapeacesupport.com/images/1/Guinea-Bissau.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
1

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Information on CAIPLDN's specific engagement in defence and security monitoring is scarce. The committee's portfolio is expansive - it covers administration, local governance and defence, but there is no indication whether it is adequately resourced to be active and all its stated domains of involvement. CAIPLDN's capabilities to scrutinise the performance of the MoD are restricted as it is comprised of only five members and there is no indication that the committee has the power to require expert witnesses to appear before it.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Accepted, score lowered to 1.

COMMENTS -+

- Fernanda Pinto Cardoso and Anki Sjöberg, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; DCAF, 2011, www.dcaf.ch/.../file/00_Complete_West%20Africa_gender_survey.pdf.
- Inter-Parliamentary Union. &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Assembleia Nacional Popular (People's National Assembly), Oversight.&quoute; Last updated 2013, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2133_F.htm/
- People's National Assembly Regulations, Lei N° 7/94, December 5, 2003, Article 40.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would suggest score 1. There is a defence committee, but with minimal rights of oversight (due to scarce financial and human resources).

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The ANP has a Special Committee for defence and Security with responsibility for parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sector; however, there is very little information about the specific functions, composition and effectiveness of this committee. (Inter-Parliamentary Union. &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Assembleia Nacional Popular (People's National Assembly), Oversight.” Last updated 2013, accessed June 29, 2015, http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2133_F.htm; IMF. “Guinea-Bissau: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Second Annual Progress Report.” IMF Country Report No. 10/382, December 2010, p. 18, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10382.pdf)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
1

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Leaders have been vocal in promoting Guinea-Bissau's progress in establishing peace after the 2010 military unrest. Since then, however, there has been no coherent national defence policy. The country initiated the restructuring of its security sector and developed a national strategy for security sector reform (SSR) in 2006, but reforms since then have been piecemeal and are largely considered to have stalled. There are no recent, publicly available white papers or strategy reformulations that indicate a commitment to consultation in the policy-making process. No recent evidence points towards a regular practice of public consultations on the defence policy. The public cannot easily access regularly updated information on all aspects of defence policy.

COMMENTS -+

- Agencia Angola Press, &quoute;Guiné-Bissau: Sector de defesa e segurança é o 'problema fundamental',&quoute; June 28, 2014, accessed July 2, 2014, http://www.portalangop.co.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/africa/2014/5/26/Guine-Bissau-Sector-defesa-seguranca-problema-fundamental,053af22c-4500-465c-ab86-0d61dee56af0.html.
- Daniel Fiott, &quoute;EU SSR Missions: The Case of Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; European Security Review 38 (2008): 4.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Koen Vlassenroot, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; Observatoire de l'Afrique, January 28, 2008, 4, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/4251.pdf.
- Peacebuilding Commission Country-Specific Configuration on Guinea-Bissau,&quoute;Background Paper on Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau, &quoute; UN, Jun 18, 2008, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gb/key_docs/bg_paper_ssr_18_06_08.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: While the public cannot easily access regularly updated information on all aspects of defence policy, it is important to note that the current government with the support of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), are beginning to engage the 'public' in the discussion about the role of the armed forces in democratic systems and in socioeconomic development.

Source:
United Nations Security Council, (2014). &quoute;Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau&quoute;. May, 16. Available:http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_333.pdf. pg. 3. Accessed: 09/06/2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Guinea-Bissau does not have a national defence policy as of yet. In the absence of a national defence policy, the Constitution of the Republic is the main guiding document with regards to national defence. As the country assessor notes, Guinea-Bissau developed a national SSR strategy in 2006, which was followed by a “SSR Reform Action Plan for Restructuring and Modernization of the Security and defence Sector.” However, these documents were largely donor-driven (i.e. by the EU and UN); many security sector stakeholders were not aware of or had little knowledge of these documents. (Fernanda Pinto Cardoso and Anki Sjoberg. “Guinea-Bissau.” In The Security Sector and Gender in West Africa: A Survey of Police, Defence, Justice and Penal Services in ECOWAS States, eds. Miranda Gaanderse and Kristin Valasek (Geneva: DCAF, 2011), p. 131; Christoph Kohl. “The Reform of Guinea-Bissau’s Security Sector: Between demand and practice.” PRIF Report No. 126, 2014, pp. 8-14)

Suggested score: 0

Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
1

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are no recent sources to indicate active government engagement with CSOs on defence matters even though SSR has been a key agenda in recent donor discussions. There is minimal engagement with CSOs on the part of the government - there is no recent evidence of CSO dialogue on issues of corruption in the defence and security institutions.

The firm grip that defence and security institutions have had on political power since independence has prevented them from opening up to civil society actors and seriously adopting an anti-corruption agenda. Guinea-Bissau is renowned for its vibrant CSO community which engages in a number of policy-making debates: from health to education. The 1998-1999 civil war and the 2010 military unrest, however, restricted the operation of a number of these organisations. Since the country's classification as a 'narco-state', its CSO network has received substantial external support to engage in anti-corruption dialogue with the government. The most prominent organisation is Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos (the Guinea-Bissau Human Rights League), which has expressed interest in engaging in security sector discussions and influencing the reform process. There is no evidence, however, that this has had tangible policy results.

COMMENTS -+

- Adelino Handem, “Guinea-Bissau,” in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, ed. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin (Geneva: DCAF, 2008), 161.
- Daniel Fiott, &quoute;EU SSR Missions: The Case of Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; European Security Review 38 (2008): 4.
- Division for Public Administration and Development Management (DPADM), &quoute;Republic of Guinea-Bissau Public Administration, Country Profile,&quoute; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), March 2004, 7, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023267.pdf.
- Emma Farge and Fernando Pereira, &quoute;Guinea Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coups,&quoute; Reuters, May 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/19/us-bissau-military-insight-idUSKBN0O41XS20150519.
- Euractiv, &quoute;EU gives boost to Guinea-Bissau after years of instability,&quoute; March 26, 2013, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/development-policy/eu-gives-boost-guinea-bissau-after-years-instability-313264.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Social Development Department, &quoute;Engaging Civil Society Organizations in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States: Three African Country Case Studies,&quoute; World Bank, Report No. 32538-GLB, June 28, 2005, 5, http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001375/P1685-World-bank_CSO_June2005.pdf/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
2

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Guinea-Bissau ratified (through accession, i.e. no signing) UNCAC on 10 September 2007, but it has not signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (it is not a member of OECD, but 7 non-members have signed the legal instrument).

The country is one of the 34 member states that have ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. The extent to which relevant international and regional legal anti-corruption tools have been incorporated in national legislation and enforcement mechanisms, however, is unclear. There is no indication that specific legislation has been passed by the government to comply with anti-corruption provisions present in the two conventions.

COMMENTS -+

- African Union Advisory Board on Corruption. &quoute;Status of ratification of the Convention on Corruption.&quoute; http://www.auanticorruption.org/auac/about/category/status-of-the-ratification.
- OECD. &quoute;OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 8 April 2014.&quoute; Last modified April 8, 2014. http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus_May2014.pdf.
- UNODC. &quoute;United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 2 April 2014.&quoute; Last modified April 2, 2014. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It has been argued that Guinea-Bissau's inability to fully implement existing anti-corruption policies, is partly as a result of scarce resources, weak border controls, under-resourced and understaffed police, justice system and, years of political instabilities.

See:IMF, (2013). &quoute;Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation; Debt Sustainability Analysis; Informational Annex; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for GuineaBissau&quoute;. June, 5. Available: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13197.pdf. 1-39.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In addition, Guinea-Bissau ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) in September 2007. Guinea-Bissau has undertaken some efforts to improve and modernize its public financial management system, including adopting an Organic Law for Budgeting in 2009 and a Public Accounting Decree in 2010. The government also passed complementary legislation regulating the role of the different government entities responsible for budget formulation, execution, and oversight. However, the extent to which is such laws are enforced is unclear, particularly since the 2012 coup. (UN Treaty Collection. “UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.” Last modified January 7, 2015; IMF. “Guinea-Bissau: Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries – Completion Point Document and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative.” IMF Country Report No. 10/380, December 2010, p. 19)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
1

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There exists a certain level of secrecy in the public discussions of defence issues. This is due to the turbulent historical relationship between political office holders and military leadership, which led to the civil war of 1998-1999. Matters of peacebuilding have come to dominate all public debates regarding security and defence policy-making. Minimal public consultation was carried out during the initial phase of the SSR reform, which was mostly guided by external actors. Presently, Guinea-Bissau is reported to struggle with a substantial expansion of global cocaine-smuggling activities, which has prompted some interaction between opinion-formers and the government. Still, the government does not host discussions with independent think tanks of civil society organisations - it assumes the position of information provider rather than interlocutor.

COMMENTS -+

- Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener, 2002), 114.
- Alexander Smoltczyk,&quoute;Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a 'Drug Trafficker’s Dream',&quoute; Spiegel, March 8, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/violence-plagues-african-hub-of-cocaine-trafficking-a-887306.html.
- BBC Africa, &quoute;Who should run Guinea-Bissau?,&quoute; August 16, 2010, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/legacy/africahaveyoursay/2010/08/who-should-run-guinea-bissau.shtml.
- Davin O’Regan and Peter Thompson, &quoute;Promover a Estabilidade e a Reconciliação na Guiné-Bissau: Lições do Primeiro Narco-Estado de África,&quoute;Centro de Estudos Estratégicos de África, Special Report Nº, 2 June 2013, 18, http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ASR2_POR.pdf.
- Euractiv, &quoute;EU gives boost to Guinea-Bissau after years of instability,&quoute; March 26, 2013, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/development-policy/eu-gives-boost-guinea-bissau-after-years-instability-313264.
- Emma Farge and Fernando Pereira, &quoute;Guinea Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coups,&quoute; Reuters, May 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/19/us-bissau-military-insight-idUSKBN0O41XS20150519.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
1

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Most anti-corruption activities in Guinea-Bissau date to 2012 when a coup took place. Despite extensive external assistance to advance SSR, no specific anti-corruption strategy has been formulated or implemented recently.

In the 2000s, Guinea-Bissau was declared Africa's first narco-state and as a result, its security and defence apparatus received international attention and assistance in order to promote anti-corruption measures. The ensuing series of military coups further demonstrated the need for coherent organised crime and anti-corruption policy-making and enforcement. UNODC has been active in assisting the country to update its anti-corruption armed forces training, and in 2012, the government developed a comprehensive programme against election rigging, impunity, crime and corruption. The most recent presidential and legislative elections (2014) were celebrated as successful and fairly held, which indicates a degree of progress in this direction. The problematic defence sector is still to demonstrate amelioration as a result of the government's anti-corruption programmes.

COMMENTS -+

- Government of Guinea Bissau, &quoute;Guiné- Bissau: Primeiro-ministro de transição apresenta Programa do
governo”, July 21, 2012. http://visao.sapo.pt/guine-bissau-primeiro-ministro-de-transicao-apresenta-programa-do-governo=f676608.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-coup Transition in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; Africa Report N°190, August 17, 2012, 4, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/190-beyond-turf-wars-managing-the-post-coup-transition-in-guinea-bissau.pdf.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Guinée-Bissau : les élections, et après ?,&quoute; Briefing Afrique N°98, April 8, 2014, 17, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b098-guinee-bissau-les-elections-et-apres.pdf.
- IRIN, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau’s tough post-coup recovery,&quoute; June 16, 2014, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/100222/guinea-bissau-s-tough-post-coup-recovery.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Guinea-Bissau has anti-corruption laws, nonetheless, anti-corruption efforts are alleged to be sporadic and uncoordinated. For instance, the &quoute;Procuradoria General Da Republica (Ministerio Publico)&quoute; - Attorney General 's Office (Public Ministry) is accused of being subject to political influence and corruption.

See: United States Congress, (2002). United States Congressional Serial Set, 108th Congress, Serial No. 14829, House Documents No. 67-95. United States of America: Government Printing Office, 96.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
0

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Guinea Bissau does not have a general anti-corruption commission and no similar, specialised and adequately resourced institutions exists within the security and defence sector. The Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas) is the supreme national audit institution of Guinea-Bissau. In legislative terms, it is vested with substantial power to combat corruption and promote accountability, but there is no evidence of its activity or ability to influence political decision-making.

Relevant monitoring is the prerogative of the Office of the Prosecutor General (Procuradoria General Da Republica), whose large portfolio, however, is likely to limit the attention paid to the country's defence institutions and policy-making.
Building integrity and counting corruption would be difficult to be exclusively carried out by the Office of the Prosecutor General due to scarce resources. The Office has been previously described as encountering 'difficulties in carrying out its ascribed duties' (TI and UN).

The peaceful and fair elections of April 2014 have prompted analysts' optimistic prognosis regarding the restructuring of the country's allegedly corrupt military leadership and the successful completion of SSR programmes. The government is not actively seeking to establish an anti-corruption commission.

COMMENTS -+

- Braima Darame, &quoute;Expetativas sobre o novo governo na Guiné-Bissau,&quoute; Deutsche Welle, June 5, 2014, acccessed July 3, 2014, http://www.dw.de/expetativas-sobre-o-novo-governo-na-guin%C3%A9-bissau/a-17687821.
- Samira Lindner, &quoute;Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Guinea-Bissau&quoute;, Transparency International, August 6, 2014, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Guinea_Bissau_2014.pdf.
- UNODC, &quoute;International Anti-Corruption Day 2007: Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; December 17, 2007, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/international-anti-corruption-day.html.
- UNODC. &quoute;National and International Authorities/Bodies against Corruption.&quoute; n.d. http://www.track.unodc.org/ACAuthorities/Pages/home.aspx.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
0

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is deep-seated popular mistrust in the defence and security sector resulting from the recurring episodes of military-led unrest in Guinea-Bissau in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s (Bissau DigitaL). Only now is the country beginning to recuperate from this prolonged instability (Farge and Pereira). Yet, the involvement of military figures in political assassinations and coups, as well as cocaine smuggling, has created a highly negative image of the defence sector among Guinea-Bissau's citizens (Pina). Local media and the public in general are highly critical in their assessment of the ability of defence institutions to tackle bribery and corruption (Pina)

COMMENTS -+

- Bissau Digital, &quoute;Guiné-Bissau piora resultado no Índice de Corrupção Percepcionada,&quoute; December 3, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.bissaudigital.com/noticias.php?noticia=2000332829.
- Emma Farge and Fernando Pereira, &quoute;Guinea Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coups,&quoute; Reuters, May 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/19/us-bissau-military-insight-idUSKBN0O41XS20150519.
- Filomeno Pina, &quoute;Opinião: Os Eucaliptos da Corrupção,&quoute; Guiné-Bissau, September 8, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.gbissau.com/?s=corrup%C3%A7%C3%A3o.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun,&quoute; Africa Briefing N°61, June 25, 2009, 9, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/B061%20Guinea-Bissau%20Beyond%20Rule%20of%20the%20Gun.pdf.
- Richard Valdmanis, &quoute;U.S. accuses Bissau military chief in Colombia drugs, weapons plot,&quoute; Reuters, April 18, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/18/us-usa-bissau-drugs-idUSBRE93H16K20130418.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
0

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no information indicating the performance of such assessments and as a result, mitigation is highly unlikely to occur. The stalled SSR reform has not yet been fully re-started, but even within its framework, there is no explicit mention of the integration of corruption risk assessment mechanisms in the country's defence sector. International NGOs such as the International Crisis Group have been highly vocal in recommending the initiation of an assessment programme, but progress in this direction is yet to be seen.

COMMENTS -+

- Amnesty International. &quoute;Guinea-Bissau Human Rights.&quoute; n.d. http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/africa/guinea-bissau.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation; Debt Sustainability Analysis; Informational Annex; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 13/197, July 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13197.pdf.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun,&quoute; Africa Briefing N°61, June 25, 2009, 13, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/B061%20Guinea-Bissau%20Beyond%20Rule%20of%20the%20Gun.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In 2007, the government drew up a national security strategy in which SSR featured prominently and focussed on restructuring the armed forces. This effort was well received by the international community seeing as Guinea-Bissau had become a major drug trafficking destination.

In June 2008, an EU-SSR Guinea-Bissau was launched. Its main objective being to provide local authorities with advice and assistance on SSR. The EU-SSR Guinea-Bissau was guided by the notion of local ownership, as it contributed to the drafting of implementation plans for reconstructing the security forces. However, the implementation of the principle of local ownership and the project itself were both short lived due to political instability which led to a coup in November 2008, the assassination of the president in March 2009, and mutiny in April 2010. These resulted in the abandonment of the EU-SSR Guinea Bissau in September 2010.

See: Koutratos, P. (2013). The EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 153-4.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
0

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Guinea-Bissau's MOD has been previously criticised for the lack of detail and clear strategy in its operations. Acquisitions are, therefore, not a product of careful, well-informed planning and are not independently monitored (Correia). Peace restoration and SSR have topped the national defence agenda for over five years. Fluctuating political instability, however, has led to little progress in the envisaged army, police and judiciary reforms. Guinea-Bissau's government itself has highlighted the fact that lack of defence acquisition planning provisions is a 'serious obstacle' before the regularisation of the country's military. There are general acquisition planning provisions in the Public Procurement Code, but those are not explicitly applied to the defence sector.

COMMENTS -+

- Birgit Embalo, “Civil-Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea Bissau,” Journal of Modern African Studies 50 (2012): 253-282.
- Inter-Ministerial Committee, Government of Guinea-Bissau, &quoute;Restructuring and Modernisation
of the Defence and Security Sector,&quoute; Strategy Document, 2006, http://uniogbis.unmissions.org/Portals/unogbis/Articles/SSR%20srtategy%20document%202006.pdf/.
- José Manuel Sérvulo Correia, &quoute;Direito dos Contratos Públicos - Faculdade de Direito de Bissau,&quoute; Sérvulo & Associados, November 22, 2011, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.servulo.com/en/not_publicacoes.php?filter_author=Jos%E9+Manuel+S%E9rvulo+Correia.
- Patrícia Godinho Gomes. &quoute;A Reforma das Forças Armadas na Guiné-Bissau: um compromisso possível?&quoute; Presented at Movimento Ação Cidadã, Cagliari, September 26, 2012, http://www.asequagui.org/sito/images/stories/pdf/A-reforma-do-sector-da-defesa-e-seguranca-na-guine-bissau.pdf.
- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, Article 10.
- Roundtable on the Restructuring and Modernisation of the Defence and Security sector in Guinea Bissau,&quoute;Final Communique,&quoute; April 20, 2009, http://uniogbis.unmissions.org/Portals/unogbis/Articles/Round%20table%20on%20Guinea-Bissau%20SSR.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
0

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The 2015 defence budget as an aggregated figure is publicly available. No details of any items of expenditure could be obtained. Currently the country is receiving emergency budget assistance, which is not reflected in the relevant budget document published by MOD. The IMF very recently advised the government to 'adopt and publish a prudent budget for 2014 and prepare the 2015 budget', underlining the lack of transparency and competency in the budget preparation process over the past two years.

Guinea-Bissau's chief of staff, alongside with his council, is responsible for preparing the national defence budget, which has to be approved by both MOD and parliament. Despite these mechanisms being in place, the budget's transparency is clearly compromised. (IMF) For instance, in 2010, the EU suspended its SSR mission to the country (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) when former mutiny mobiliser General Antonio Indjai became chief of staff. Indjai has been accused of involvement with to Colombian rebel group FARC.

COMMENTS -+

- African Development Bank, &quoute;Guinea Bissau: AfDB approves US $7-million Emergency Budget Support,&quoute; May 13, 2015, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/guinea-bissau-afdb-approves-us-7-million-emergency-budget-support-14233/.
- AFP, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau approves $200 million budget, twice what it can afford,&quoute; July 16, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130716/guinea-bissau-approves-200-million-budget-twice-what-it-can-afford.
- Birgit Embalo, “Civil-Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea Bissau,” Journal of Modern African Studies 50 (2012): 277.
- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 1996, section (7) of Article 56 and paragraph (e) of section (1) of Article 72.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- Journal Digital, &quoute;Guiné-Bissau: Deputados aprovam orçamento de Estado para 2012,&quoute; December 16, 2011, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.jornaldigital.com/noticias.php?noticia=28598.
- Ministério Da Economia E Finanças, &quoute;Lei Do Orçamento 2015,&quoute; accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.mef-gb.com/doc/OGE/OGE2015.pdf.
- People's National Assembly Regiment, Lei N° 7/94, December 5, 2004, Articles 123-128.
- SIPRI. &quoute;SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 1988-2012: Guinea-Bissau.&quoute; http://knoema.com/SIPRI2013/sipri-military-expenditure-database-1988-2012?country=1000300-guinea-bissau/.
- World Bank. &quoute;Military expenditure (% of GDP): Guinea-Bissau.&quoute; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS/countries/GW?display=graph

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
0

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Guinea-Bissau's defence budget is subject to parliamentary approval, but there is no specific subsequent oversight mechanism. CAIPLDN should be the body responsible for defence budget scrutiny, but has no track-record in exerting influence. There is no evidence that CAIPLDN is actively engaged with monitoring military expenditures or is provided with sufficient information to perform its expected supervisory functions.

COMMENTS -+

- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 1996, paragraph (3) of Article 20.
- Daniela Schröder, &quoute;Security sector reform and combating drugs,&quoute; EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, 2008, 95, http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/rep1/reportage%20vol1_chapter5_guinea%20bissau%20-%20security%20sector%20reform%20and%20combating%20drugs.pdf
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- People's National Assembly Regiment, Lei N° 7/94, December 5, 2004, Article 125.
- Samira Lindner, &quoute;Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Guinea-Bissau&quoute;, Transparency International, August 6, 2014, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Guinea_Bissau_2014.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
1

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The approved defence budget is easily available to the public as part of the national budget - all relevant budget documents since 2009 are online at [http://www.mef-gb.com/pt/arquivos-2/diversos-2/orcamento-geral-do-estado-2]. No details or itemisation are shared publicly.

COMMENTS -+

- African Development Bank. &quoute;Guinea-Bissau Economic Outlook.&quoute; n.d. http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/guinea-bissau/guinea-bissau-economic-outlook/.
- Ministério Da Economia E Finanças, &quoute;Lei Do Orçamento 2015,&quoute; accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.mef-gb.com/doc/OGE/OGE2015.pdf.
- Trading Economics. &quoute;Guiné-Bissau - Orçamento do Estado.&quoute; n.d. http://pt.tradingeconomics.com/guinea-bissau/government-budget.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
0

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Non-central government sources of funding are currently key in Guinea-Bissaus' security sector. While external donors publish information about their contributions, the government does not effectively collate and subsequently publish such data.

The strong grip that Guinea-Bissau's military has on political power has undermined parliamentary and public control of its activities and sources of revenue. There is evidence that off-budgetary spending during the height of the most recent conflict episode was common and external (and often illegal) sources of revenue were often used to finance the country's overstaffed armed forces. The navy is legally entitled to confiscate illegal goods (from fishing and drug smuggling) found in the country's territorial waters. Such confiscations are not formally reported and are likely to constitute one of several unofficial, unmonitored sources of income for the defence sector. Guinea-Bissau's defence forces are notorious for their implication in various transnational criminal activities (UN).

COMMENTS -+

- Birgit Embalo, “Civil-Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea Bissau,” Journal of Modern African Studies 50 (2012): 277.
- Daniela Schröder, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Security sector reform and combating drugs,&quoute; EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, 2008, http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/rep1/reportage%20vol1_chapter5_guinea%20bissau%20-%20security%20sector%20reform%20and%20combating%20drugs.pdf.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- IRIN, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: UN report implicates government in drug trafficking,&quoute; October 4, 2007, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/74649/guinea-bissau-un-report-implicates-government-in-drug-trafficking.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
0

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no internal auditing unit within the Ministry of Defence to monitor military expenditure. Limited parliamentary discussion of budget allocations was somewhat regular before the constitution was suspended and contributed to the transparency of the defence budget, which is also subject to legislative approval. No recent sources detail any information about the creation of internal defence expenditure oversight mechanisms.

COMMENTS -+

- ECOWAS, &quoute;Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians,&quoute; September 29, 2010, accessed June 4, 2015, www.dcaf.ch/content/download/35987/527191/file/ECOWAS%20Parliament-DCAF%20Guide%20eng.pdf .
- Inter-Parliamentary Union. &quoute;Guinea Bissau: Assembleia Nacional Popular (People's National Assembly): Parliamentary Oversight.&quoute; 2013, http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2133_F.htm.
- República da Guiné-Bissau, &quoute;Controlo Interno,&quoute; February 2009, http://www.ta.gov.mz/IMG/pdf/Controlo_Interno.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
1

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas) is the supreme national audit institution of Guinea-Bissau. In legislative terms, it is vested with substantial power to combat corruption and promote accountability. Reviews by international oversight bodies and the IMF progress have highlighted the court's unrealistic goals and the 'uneven and protracted' progress towards their achievement. There is no detailed information disclosing the court's specific preoccupation with defence budget auditing. The court submits its annual report to parliament, but there are no follow-up discussion opportunities during plenary sessions. Over the past two years, none of these reports are available or known to comment on defence ministry expenditure

COMMENTS -+

- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, Completion Point Document and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative,&quoute; Staff country report No. 10/380, December 2010, 22.
- Inter-Parliamentary Union. &quoute;Guinea Bissau: Assembleia Nacional Popular (People's National Assembly): Parliamentary Oversight.&quoute; http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2133_F.htm.
- Novas de Guiné-Bissau, &quoute;Tribunal de Contas paralisado por tempo indeterminado,&quoute; July 14, 2012, accessed July 3, 2014, http://novasdaguinebissau.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/tribunal-de-contas-paralisado-por-tempo.html.
- Organização das Instituições Supremas de Controlo da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, &quoute;V Assembleia-Geral da Organização das ISC Da CPLP,&quoute; May 9, 2008, 82, http://www.tcontas.pt/pt/publicacoes/outras/ag_cplp/5assembleia_isc_cplp.pdf.
- Tribunal de Contas, &quoute;Sustentabilidade Fin Anceira, Apresentação De Contas E Responsabilidade,&quoute; GERPCI, March 2007, 3, http://www.didinho.org/WS1GW-port.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
1

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Guinea-Bissau has few natural resources - it is slowly starting to attract foreign investors and attempting to expand its mining and mineral sectors. The constitution does not make any provisions that are explicitly addressing potential links between the extractives sector and defence institutions.

There is no evidence that the country's military institutions are involved in these sectors or have financial interests in them and neither are there individual's cases of business activity in the sector reported. Guinea-Bissau's navy has been reported to engage in rent-seeking behaviour by allowing illegal trawlers to operate in its waters however. Considering the evidence of historical implication of defence leadership in illicit economies, if bauxite mining expands substantially and becomes a lucrative source of revenue or rent, it is also likely to be exploited by military figures.

COMMENTS -+

- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, 1984 (as Amended to 1991).
- Daniela Schröder, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Security sector reform and combating drugs,&quoute; EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, 2008, http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/rep1/reportage%20vol1_chapter5_guinea%20bissau%20-%20security%20sector%20reform%20and%20combating%20drugs.pdf.
- Elisabete Azevedo-Harman, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau’s International Relevance: Small Country, Big Challenge, &quoute; Chatham House, November 24, 2013, https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/195697.
- G. P. Thomas, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Mining, Minerals and Fuel Resources,&quoute; AZ Mining, October 24, 2012, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.azomining.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=207.
- Sadibou Marone and Chris Spilane, &quoute;Russian Ship Held by Senegalese Navy in Fishing Dispute,&quoute; January 6, 2014, accessed July 10, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-06/russian-ship-held-by-senegalese-navy-in-fishing-dispute.html.
- The Economist, &quoute;Besieged in Bissau,&quoute; Arpil 17, 2012, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/04/guinea-bissaus-coup.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Guinea-Bissau has natural resources in bauxite, phosphate, fish, timber and un-utilized deposits of petroleum. According to press reports, there is evidence that members of Guinea-Bissau’s defence institutions have financial interests businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation—high-ranking military officials are complicit in the country’s illicit logging trade. Guinea-Bissau has seen a boom in illegal logging over the past five years. According to Jose Ramos-Horta, the UN special representative in Guinea-Bissau, the illegal logging boom is a largely a consequence of a decline in cocaine trafficking after a 2013 US sting operation targeting army chief Antonio Indjai. That parliament has approved resolutions on illegal logging in the past and that the government declared a five-year logging moratorium this April suggests that there is some degree of parliamentary scrutiny over the natural resource exploitation. (Reuters, “China demands fuels illegal timber logging in Guinea-Bissau,” 21 March 2014; Reuters, “Guinea-Bissau declares five-year logging moratorium,” 2 April 2015; UN, “Report of the Secretary-General on the restoration of the constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau,” S/2013/499, 21 August 2013, p. 9)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
0

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The country's military leadership has been well-identified for its criminal associations. In particular, media reports of military involvement in the cocaine transshipment industry through the country abound. In 2013, chief of staff General Antonio Injdai was indicted by a federal grand jury in New York on cocaine and arms-trafficking charges. The extent to which criminal entrepreneurs have liaised with defence and security staff is unclear and could be subject to exaggeration as a result of the US-led War on Drugs regime. Yet, persistent instability, coups and military-political infighting episodes in the country's recent past indicate the existence of substantial illicit rents over which leaders attempt to establish control. Also, in terms of fishing, Guinea-Bissau's navy has been reported to engage in rent-seeking behaviour by allowing illegal trawlers to operate in its waters. Recent international assistance commitments are likely to make the government more accountable and thus more active in tackling the issue, but still there is no evidence of such developments.

COMMENTS -+

- Adam Nossiter, &quoute;U.S. Indicts Guinea-Bissau’s Military Chief in Drug Case,&quoute; New York Times, April 18, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/world/africa/us-indicts-guinea-bissaus-military-leader-on-drug-charges.html?_r=0.
- BBC, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau drug trade 'rises since coup',&quoute; July 31, 2012, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19060861.
- Charles Parkinson, &quoute;LatAm Drug Traffickers Set Up in Guinea-Bissau, Expand in Africa,&quoute; Insight Crime, August 29, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/latam-drug-traffickers-set-up-in-guinea-bissau-expand-in-africa.
- Elisabete Azevedo-Harman, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau’s International Relevance: Small Country, Big Challenge, &quoute; Chatham House, November 24, 2013, https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/195697.
- Euractiv, &quoute;EU gives boost to Guinea-Bissau after years of instability,&quoute; March 26, 2013, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/development-policy/eu-gives-boost-guinea-bissau-after-years-instability-313264.
- Sadibou Marone and Chris Spilane, &quoute;Russian Ship Held by Senegalese Navy in Fishing Dispute,&quoute; January 6, 2014, accessed July 10, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-06/russian-ship-held-by-senegalese-navy-in-fishing-dispute.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggest that organised crime has penetrated the defence and security sector, so much so that it has been alleged that the April 2012 coup, and the two that had gone before it, are linked to power struggles that were in part motivated by the desire to secure control over the lucrative cocaine trade.
On the other hand, there is evidence (albeit minimal) to suggest that the new government, with the help of external agencies, is trying to tackle the problem. This is corroborated by the adoption of UN Resolution 2203, by the UNSC in February 2015. By adopting the Resolution the UNSC recognised and welcomed the progress made by Guinea-Bissau towards peace, security and stability in the country, by continuing to take steps towards SSR, tackling corruption through the reinforcement of the judicial system among other things.

Note: Resolution 2203 (2015), saw the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) for a period of 12 months.

See: The Global Initiative against Organized Crime, (undated). &quoute;Criminal accumulation into the governance vacuum in Guinea-Bissau&quoute;. Available:http://www.globalinitiative.net/criminal_accumulation_guinea-bissau/. Accessed: 12th June 2015.
UNSC, (2015). &quoute;Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2203 (2015), Security Council Extends Mandate of Guinea-Bissau Peacebuilding Office, Urges Parties to Consolidate Progress&quoute;. Available:http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11786.doc.htm&quoute;. 15th February. Accessed: 12th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
0

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no policing function that tackles specifically corruption and organised crime in the defence forces.

There has been no organised or effective investigation and policing of corruption and criminal activities carried out by members of staff from the defence and security sectors. Despite numerous international media investigations linking the defence sector with transnational organised crime, Guinea-Bissau's law enforcers have made no meaningful effort to increase their monitoring of military personnel's alleged criminal activities.

COMMENTS -+

- Daily Times NG, &quoute;Bissau Leader's New Cabinet Retains Military Influence ,&quoute; June 7, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.dailytimes.com.ng/article/bissau-leaders-new-cabinet-retains-military-influence.
- David Lewis and Richard Valdmanis, &quoute;Special Report: How U.S. drug sting targeted West African military chiefs,&quoute; Reuters, July 24, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/24/us-guinea-bissau-sting-special-report-idUSBRE96N0AR20130724.
- Francesca Monaco, &quoute;Instability and organized crime in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; Bright, May 24, 2012, accessed July 34, 2014, http://flarenetwork.org/report/syntheses/article/instability_and_organized_crime_in_guinea_bissau.htm.
- Jessica Hatcher, &quoute;Dialogue with a Coup Leader: Has Guinea-Bissau Become a Narco-State?&quoute; Time Magazine, October 2, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/10/02/dialogue-with-a-coup-leader-has-guinea-bissau-become-a-narco-state/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: It might be too early to access, but the new President of Guinea-Bissau has shown commitment to tackling organised crime within the military forces. In his commitment to ensuring SSR in the country, in September 2014, the head of armed forces Gen. Antonio Indjai was dismissed, and replaced by the president's confidant, Gen. Biague Na N'tam, who is committed to bringing discipline to the country's military.

Elsewhere, lack of sufficient funding makes it difficult for the police to fully commit to fighting against illicit drug trafficking. According to Reuters, (2015), the &quoute;police complain they cannot do basic detective work to track the boats and planes that bring drugs to the remote mangrove-fringed shores and islands. Their offices have only one operational computer and a typewriter. The airport has a radar that does not work&quoute;.

See: Guinea Bissau News, (2014). &quoute;New armed forces chief Biague In N'Tam receive testimony&quoute;. Available: http://www.gbissau.com/?p=11757. 19th September. Accessed: 12th June 2015.

Farge, E. & Pereira, F. (2015). &quoute;Guinea Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coups&quoute;. Reuters, 19th May. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/19/us-bissau-military-insight-idUSKBN0O41XS20150519. Accessed: 14th June, 2015.

Só, A. (2015). &quoute;New Year Greetings: GENERAL Biague N'TAM ASK THE UNION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES&quoute;. O'Democrata, 16th January. Available: http://www.odemocratagb.com/cumprimentos-do-novo-ano-general-biague-na-ntam-pede-uniao-no-seio-das-forcas-armadas/. Accessed: 15th June 2015.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is policing to investigate organized crime that covers the defence services, but there is little evidence to suggest that it is effective. The Judicial Police, under the Ministry of Justice, have primary responsibility for investigating narcotics trafficking and organized crime. A November 2013 report from the Secretary General on the activities of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau reported, “[T]wo military officers were arrested in the border area between Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Senegal …carrying two kilograms of cocaine.” (S/2013/681, p. 3) However, according to press reports, on the occasion that members of the military are arrested by the Judicial Police, they are turned over to the military, and there is no evidence that any such individuals have been punished. (McClatchy, “Tiny Guinea-Bissau has big role in drug smuggling, and seems likely to keep it,” 11 May 2012) More generally, the Judicial Police are few in number (around 100 officers in 2010) and “generally ineffective, poorly and irregularly paid, and corrupt.” As such, the Judicial Police are unlikely to be effective at investigating narcotics trafficking and organized crime within the military. (US State Department, “2010 Human Rights Report: Guinea Bissau,” April 2011).

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
0

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are no sources indicating that intelligence budgets are adequately monitored or subject to independent oversight. Consistent military intervention in the country's politics precludes the transparent transmission of such information to any auditing authorities. Further, national defence policies can be included in the legislative provisions for the protection of national secrets and are therefore contained solely within the MOD. There is no evidence of internal MOD controls that oversee the policy, administration and budgets of the intelligence services.

COMMENTS -+

- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Article 20.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Building a Real Stability Pact,&quoute; Africa Briefing No.57, January 29, 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/B057-guinea-bissau-building-a-real-stability-pact.aspx.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
1

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are no available sources that detail the recruitment procedure for intelligence services staff or the budgetary allocation for its staffing. Based on existing evidence of the country defence sector's corruptibility, however, it is likely that nepotistic channels are used for such appointments. There is no fully credible evidence suggesting senior positions in the intelligence services are gifts of the executive, made without prior integrity investigations.

COMMENTS -+

- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Jessica Hatcher, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau's Political Tempest,&quoute; Think Africa Press, March 27, 2012, accessed July 3, 2014, http://thinkafricapress.com/guinea-bissau/political-tempest-election-junior-gomes-drugs.
- Samira Lindner, &quoute;Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Guinea-Bissau&quoute;, Transparency International, August 6, 2014, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Guinea_Bissau_2014.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
1

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Guinea-Bissau has signed but not ratified the ATT. There are no legislative provisions to establish a functioning mechanism for arms export decision-making. Senior military staff's involvement in illicit arms trafficking also undermines monitoring transparency.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Accepted, score raised to 1.

COMMENTS -+

- Jessica Hatcher, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau's Political Tempest,&quoute; Think Africa Press, March 27, 2012, accessed July 3, 2014, http://thinkafricapress.com/guinea-bissau/political-tempest-election-junior-gomes-drugs.
- NTI. &quoute;Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).&quoute; 2015. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/arms-trade-treaty-att/.
- UNODC, &quoute;Firearms Trafficking in West Africa,&quoute; 2012, https://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWestAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_FIREARMS.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Guinea-Bissau has not declared its small arms exports in one or more annual National Reports on Arms Exports.

See: UNODA. 2014. ‘National Reports on Small Arms Exports.’ United Nations Register of Conventional Arms - The Global Reported Arms Trade. New York, NY: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 9 September. Available: http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/. Accessed: 14th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As the country assessor notes, Guinea-Bissau has signed but not ratified the ATT. As such, in my view, the comments of the assessor should be interpreted as “The country has signed the ATT but not ratified it, and there is evidence of non-compliance with ATT anti-corruption provisions.”

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
1

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are some regulations in place to ensure the transparent disposal of assets, but their effectiveness is highly questionable. There is no public information on relevant procedures and controls. There are no publicly available records of relevant information being transmitted from the government to the legislative authority and the public in Guinea-Bissau. Substantial fiscal reforms were undertaken in 2010 - the government was expected to provide parliament with quarterly updates on budget execution. Certain improvements were made in procurement policy too, including the establishment of a central procurement unit and an accompanying regulatory authority in July 2010. The concurrent political unrest caused by an attempted coup by the military, however, slowed down progress on the implementation of these reforms, and is likely to have severely restricted their effectiveness

COMMENTS -+

- Africa Details. &quoute;Guinea-Bissau.&quoute; 2015. http://www.africadetails.com/index.php/countries-maps/106-guinea-bissau.
- The World Bank. &quoute;Integrating World Bank Group Support in Facilitating Business Operations in Guinea Bissau.&quoute; 2015, https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/advisory-services/regulatory-simplification/business-regulation/guinea-bissau.cfm.
- The World Bank. &quoute;Guinea-Bissau Overview.&quoute; Last updated April 9, 2014. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guineabissau/overview#1.
- Wayne Wittig, &quoute;Public Procurement and the Development Agenda,&quoute; World Trade Organisation, 2012, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/wkshop_tanz_jan03/itcdemo1_e.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
0

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: In the aftermath of the most recent coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau, budget management, support and oversight have suffered tremendously. Weak economic activity is complemented by stalled public investment, while the fiscal deficit of the country is soaring. In this turbulent climate, effective and independent monitoring of the defence establishment is difficult to carry out, especially considering the continuously overbearing role of military figures in the country's politics (ICG). Guinea-Bissau, despite having some provisions for overall public spending and acquisition monitoring, is still a country in transition and its public administration is underdeveloped and ineffective. There are no reports of asset disposal scrutiny available to the public.

COMMENTS -+

- African Development Bank, &quoute;Emergency Fiscal Reform Support Programme (EFRSP): Guinea Bissau, Appraisal Report,&quoute; December 2009, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea%20Bissau_PAURB_EN.pdf.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Francisco Carneiro, Joao Faria and Boubacar Barry, &quoute;Government Revenues and Expenditures in Guinea-Bissau: Causality And Cointegration,&quoute; Journal of Economic Development 30 (2005): 108.
- UN, &quoute;Republic of Guinea-Bissau: Public Administration Country Profile,&quoute; Division for Public Administration
and Development Management (DPADM), March 2004, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023267.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
0

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The government does not publish information on its secret defence spending. There is evidence that suggests the acquisition of secret items is linked to misappropriation of budget funds (Raymond). Military and political figures are regularly involved in embezzlement scandals. The problem is further complicated by direct external budgetary assistance, which has been focussing heavily on defence and security strengthening. It is extremely difficult to estimate how much of the overall defence and security budget secret item take up, but 20 % sounds plausible given the sources examined.

COMMENTS -+

- Bate Felix and Alberto Dabo, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau votes in poll aimed at turning page on coup,&quoute; April 13, 2014, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.trust.org/item/20140413082922-f4cjt.
- EUROPEAID, &quoute;Guinea Bissau – European Community Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013,&quoute; 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/dgdev_europa/icenter/repository/scanned_gw_csp10_fr.pdf.
- Francisco Galamas, &quoute;Elections Give Guinea-Bissau a Chance to Emerge From Turmoil,&quoute; World Politics Review, May 7, 2014, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13763/elections-give-guinea-bissau-a-chance-to-emerge-from-turmoil.
- Nate Raymond, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau’s ex-Navy chief pleads guilty in U.S. drug case,&quoute; BizNews, June 4, 2014, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.biznews.com/africa/2014/06/guinea-bissaus-ex-navy-chief-pleads-guilty-u-s-drug-case/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
0

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The legislature is provided with an aggregated defence budget, but there is no evidence indicating that secret items spending is disclosed by the government. The legislature is therefore not given budget data on secret items spending.

COMMENTS -+

No relevant sources of information from government agencies, the parliamentary Committee for Administration, Local Power and National Defence or the Higher Council on National Defence could be obtained.
- Ministério Da Economia E Finanças, &quoute;Lei Do Orçamento 2015,&quoute; accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.mef-gb.com/doc/OGE/OGE2015.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
0

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Due to the dearth of information relevant to this question, it is difficult to determine precisely the extent to which military budget details are subject to parliamentary debate and transparent auditing.

Legislators do not receive annual security sector programme reports - it appears that such audits are not compiled at all.

COMMENTS -+

No relevant sources of information from government agencies, the parliamentary Committee for Administration, Local Power and National Defence or the Higher Council on National Defence could be obtained.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
1

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Off-budget military expenditure is permitted by law. As a result of mounting insecurity over the past decades, military and security expenditures in Guinea-Bissau have been rising with minimal control. External assistance with the SSR process has resulted in a few scattered initiatives to streamline off-budget military spending, but there is no evidence that these have been effective. There is no accurate record of off-budget expenditures. The legislature is formally responsible for reviewing state secret expenditure, but there is no record of its adherence to such a mandate. According to the World Bank, sectoral ministries are known to be collecting revenues and making payments through their own bank accounts, without communicating effectively with the Treasurer.

COMMENTS -+

- African Economic Outlook, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau, 2011,&quoute; 2011, 3, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/Country_Notes/2011/Full/Guinea-Bissau.pdf.
- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 1984 (as Amended to 1991), Article 85.
- ECOWAS, &quoute;Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians,&quoute; September 29, 2010, accessed June 4, 2015, www.dcaf.ch/content/download/35987/527191/file/ECOWAS%20Parliament-DCAF%20Guide%20eng.pdf .
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- The World Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: The Challenge of Restoring Budgetary Discipline, a Public Expenditure Review,&quoute; Report No. 27175-GW, February 5, 2004, 17, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/03/02/000012009_20040302125640/Rendered/PDF/271750GW.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
0

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Lack of transparency, accountability and adequate oversight in off-budget military expenditure have created a favourable context for senior members of staff to engage in illicit economic activity. There are numerous media and foreign government reports highlighting the involvement of defence and security personnel in criminal trade and their use of lax budget controls and position of power for private enterprise gains. This provides evidence that off-budget expenditure is likely to be linked with illicit economic activity, such as facilitation of the drug trade.

COMMENTS -+

- Bram Posthumus, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Out With the Old, in With the New?,&quoute; Think Africa Press, April 15, 2014, http://thinkafricapress.com/guinea/bissau/death-divider-kumba-yala.
- Caramo Cassama, &quoute;Guinea Bissau Arrests Ex-Minister Amid Probe of Funds,&quoute; Bloomberg, February 8, 2013, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-08/guinea-bissau-arrests-ex-minister-amid-probe-of-funds.html.
- Jessica Hatcher, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau's Political Tempest,&quoute; Think Africa Press, March 27, 2012, accessed July 4, 2014, http://thinkafricapress.com/guinea-bissau/political-tempest-election-junior-gomes-drugs.
- Nate Raymond, &quoute;Exclusive: Guinea-Bissau's ex-navy chief pleads guilty in U.S. drug case,&quoute; Reuters, June 3, 2014, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/03/us-bissau-drugs-guilty-idUSKBN0EE2FO20140603.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
0

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are no specific legislative provisions that regulate defence personnel's decisions regarding information classification. Covert political machinations have characterised the country's security and defence sector for over two decades (Stephen). During the 2012 coup, for instance, coup leaders from the country's military were found to have made a 'secret agreement' with Angola to guarantee the deployment of Angolan forces under Africa Union (AU) mandate. National security information is not classified through any regularised mechanism and individual military leaders appear to have the ultimate decision-making power in such circumstances.

COMMENTS -+

- Africa Daily, &quoute;G.Bissau army says coup bid over secret deal with Angola,&quoute; April 13, 2012, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.africadaily.net/reports/GBissau_army_says_coup_bid_over_secret_deal_with_Angola_999.html.
- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea Bissau.
- David Stephen, &quoute;Guinea Bissau Coup: military plays politics to defend own power,&quoute; African Arguments, April 23, 2012, accessed July 4, 2014, http://africanarguments.org/2012/04/23/guinea-bissau-coup-military-plays-politics-to-defend-own-power-by-david-stephen/.
- UN Security Council, &quoute; Special report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; S/2012/280, April 30, 2012, 2, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/GB%20S2012%20280.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
0

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Guinea-Bissau's military has played a central role in the country's volatile political and economic situation. As structural adjustment policies in the 1980s and 1990s favoured the country's business elite, figures from the defence and security institutions liaised informally with them. Apart from the military leaders' involvement in cocaine smuggling through the country, there have been allegations of other profit-yielding business endeavours such as money laundering, illegal fishing and logging. These businesses are largely informal and thus are not transparent. They remain unofficial, undeclared and subject to speculation, rather than open public disclosure or debate.

COMMENTS -+

- Bate Felix and Alberto Dabo, &quoute;China demand fuels illegal timber logging in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; Reuters, May 21, 2014, accessed July 4, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/21/uk-bissau-logging-insight-idUKKBN0E10C820140521.
- Birgit Embalo, “Civil-Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea Bissau,” Journal of Modern African Studies 50 (2012): 253-282.
- IRIN, &quoute;Analysis: Latest coup another setback for Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; April 23, 2012, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/95340/analysis-latest-coup-another-setback-for-guinea-bissau.
- IRIN, &quoute;Rosewood plunder in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; July 22, 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.irinnews.org/report/100387/rosewood-plunder-in-guinea-bissau.
- Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano, &quoute;Cocaine Politics in Guinea-Bissau: The link between drug trafficking and political fragility and its wider implications,&quoute; Columbia Journal of International Affairs, January 25, 2013, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/cocaine-politics-in-guinea-bissau/.
- Nate Raymond, &quoute;Exclusive: Guinea-Bissau's ex-navy chief pleads guilty in U.S. drug case,&quoute; Reuters, June 3, 2013, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/03/us-bissau-drugs-guilty-idUSKBN0EE2FO20140603.
- The Guardian, &quoute;China's red furniture craze fuelling illegal logging in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; July 23, 2014, accessed June 3, 4, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jul/23/china-furniture-rosewood-illegal-logging-guinea-bissau.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In an interview with Reuters, the former head of Guinea Bissau's army, General Antonio Indjai noted that the military is in dire need of reforms. However, he maintains that he has never engaged in any form of illegal activities that he has been accused of.
Unfortunately, it might be difficult to ascertain whether or not General Indjai is innocent as claimed, as the government is not willing to prosecute former military leaders, as doing so might undermine the ongoing SSR process.

See: Farge, E. & Pereira, F. (2015). &quoute;Guinea-Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coups&quoute; Reuters, 19th May. Available:http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/19/us-bissau-military-insight-idUSKBN0O41XS20150519. Accessed: 16th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
0

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Due to the mostly illicit nature of military-run and protected business, their objective and independent control in compliance with international standards is impossible.

COMMENTS -+

- Al Jazeera, &quoute;UN imposes sanctions on Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; May 19, 2012, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/05/2012518211637238186.html.
- Birgit Embalo, “Civil-Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea Bissau,” Journal of Modern African Studies 50 (2012): 253-282.
- Coronel Kiermes. &quoute;Os impactos da modernização e profissionalização do sector de defesa e
segurança: que critérios para a reforma e os futuros recrutamentos?&quoute; Presentation at Bissau Conference on National Political Dialogue, FES-Dakar, RADHO, Guinean Human Rights League, May 25-26, 2009.
- World Bank Group, &quoute;Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency, Guinea Bissau,&quoute; Economy Profile 2015, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/giawb/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/GNB.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
0

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no specific legislative provision outlawing for such private enterprise to take place. Since military leaders have a dominant position in the country's governance, their licit or illicit business activities are subject to no scrutiny or regulation. There is no recent public discourse by the government discouraging military and defence ministry employees from engaging in private enterprise.

There is consensus among analysts that senior military staff have been implicated in illicit private enterprise (Monaco; Shaw and Reitano; ICG), but there is little information regarding employees' legal business ownership. According to a 2015 analysis by ICG, 'some military networks got involved in cocaine trafficking' in the late 2000s and early 2010s.

COMMENTS -+

- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, 1984 (as Amended to 1991).
- Francesca Monaco, &quoute;Instability and organized crime in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; May 24, 2012, accessed July 4, 2014, http://flarenetwork.org/report/syntheses/article/instability_and_organized_crime_in_guinea_bissau.htm.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State,&quoute; Africa Report N°142, July 2, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/142-guinea-bissau-in-need-of-a-state.aspx.
International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano, &quoute;Cocaine Politics in Guinea-Bissau: The link between drug trafficking and political fragility and its wider implications,&quoute; Columbia Journal of International Affairs, January 25, 2013, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/cocaine-politics-in-guinea-bissau/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The involvement of senior military officials in illicit private enterprise is well documented. The new government has taken some measures to curb illicit enterprise. Notably, in April Guinea-Bissau announced a five-year moratorium on logging in an attempt to clamp down on the country’s illegal timber trade, which had been aided by senior military officials. (Alberto Dado, “Guinea-Bissau declares five-year logging moratorium,” Reuters, April 2, 2015) However, these measures do not include sanctions for military employees engaged in illicit private enterprise. A 2015 report of the Secretary General on developments in Guinea-Bissau notes: “In spite of the very positive change brought about by the elections, the rather small group exerting influence on key State functions still includes some who are involved in corruption and illicit activities, including human and drug trafficking.” (S/2015/37, para. 47)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
1

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The country's newly elected political leadership has made a number of public declarations of its intentions to address persisting corruption issues in the country, and especially within the military. International observers and donors have welcomed this initiative and expressed their optimism regarding the achievement of certain goals. A persistently problematic figure in these recent endeavours to improve the country's anti-corruption governance is Chief of Staff General Antonio Indjai, whose cooperation with senior FARC rebel leaders has been the subject of much criticism.

COMMENTS -+

- Alberto Dabo, &quoute;Vaz wins Guinea-Bissau presidential vote, loser rejects result,&quoute; Reuters, May 20, 2014, accessed July 4, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/uk-bissau-election-idUKKBN0E01PQ20140520.
- Jen Psaki, &quoute;Presidential Elections in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; US Department of State,&quoute; May 22, 2014, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226484.htm.
- Journal Digital, &quoute;Guiné-Bissau: Nuno Nabiam promete justiça contra a corrupção no aparelho do Estado,&quoute; May 12, 2014, accessed July 4, 2014, http://jornaldigital.com/noticias.php?noticia=41669.
- Security Council Report. &quoute;May 2014 Monthly Forecast: Guinea-Bissau.&quoute; http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-05/guinea-bissau_8.php?print=true.
- VOA, &quoute;Bissau Army Chief Vows to Never Resign nor Retire,&quoute; August 15, 2013, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-bissau-army-chief-vows-to-never-resign-nor-retire/1730672.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Guinea Bissau's newly elected political leadership has gone a step further in its efforts to address corruption issues by dismissing/retiring the former Chief of Staff, General Antonio Indjai. For his part, the new Chief of Staff, General, Biague Na N’Tam is committed to bringing discipline to the country's military.

Só, A. (2015). &quoute;New Year Greetings: GENERAL Biague N'TAM ASK THE UNION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES&quoute;. O'Democrata, 16th January. Available: http://www.odemocratagb.com/cumprimentos-do-novo-ano-general-biague-na-ntam-pede-uniao-no-seio-das-forcas-armadas/. Accessed: 15th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As the assessor notes, with the election of President Jose Mario Vaz last May, Guinea-Bissau has embarked on an overhaul of its military. The President has publicly stated his commitment to fighting corruption and the need for reforms, including in the defence sector. In September 2014, President Vaz dismissed General Antonio Indjai, who in many ways symbolized the corrupt old guard. His successor, General Biague Nantam, has yet to publicly commit to anti-corruption measures. (Emma Farge and Fernando Pereira, “Guinea-Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coup,” Reuters, 19 May 2015; “President sacks army chief,” Economist Intelligence Unit, 16 September 2014; “DSRSG attends Jose Mario Vaz’s inauguration,” UNIOGBIS website, 23 June 2014)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
0

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No effective measures that produce tangible results have been taken to address Guinea-Bissau's military elite's corrupt activities. There is a brief mention of their expected adherence to integrity principles in the country's constitution. But personnel who have been involved in corruption scandals have continued their careers with impunity (Shaw and Reitano), based on a political culture that favours patron-client relationships in business, military and political circles (ICG).

The degree of tolerance for defence sector employees' corruption is also reflected in the fact that external stakeholders have taken up the task of initiating legal proceedings against some of the country's most infamous military leaders. As to military personnel in general, there is no evidence of measures in place to deal with acts of bribery and corruption and specific attention to the effectiveness of certain sporadic anti-corruption initiatives. The very recent retirement of Indjai, however, is seen as signalling a shift in attitudes which is likely to also reflect mounting pressure by international donors, following recent financial commitments.

COMMENTS -+

- Alexander Smoltczyk, &quoute;Africa's Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a 'Drug Trafficker's Dream',&quoute; Spiegel, March 8, 2013, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/violence-plagues-african-hub-of-cocaine-trafficking-a-887306.html.
- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 1996, section (1) of Article 20.
- Daniela Schröder, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Security sector reform and combating drugs,&quoute; EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, 2008, http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/rep1/reportage%20vol1_chapter5_guinea%20bissau%20-%20security%20sector%20reform%20and%20combating%20drugs.pdf.
- Emma Farge and Fernando Pereira, &quoute;Guinea Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coups,&quoute; Reuters, May 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/19/us-bissau-military-insight-idUSKBN0O41XS20150519.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Between conflict and democracy,&quoute; African Security Review 13 (2010): 44-56.
- Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, &quoute;Guinea Bissau: Arrest of Guinea-Bissau's Drug Lords Just the First Step in the Battle Against Trafficking,&quoute; Institute for Security Studies, August 12, 2013, accessed July 4, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201308121833.html.
- VOA, &quoute;Bissau Army Chief Vows to Never Resign nor Retire,&quoute; August 15, 2013, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-bissau-army-chief-vows-to-never-resign-nor-retire/1730672.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although highly unlikely that corrupt military officials will be prosecuted in the near future, however, it is no longer business as usual, as the military is currently undergoing an overhaul. With an estimated 500 senior military personnel set to be retired by the end of 2015.

See: Farge, E. & Pereira, F. (2015). &quoute;Guinea-Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coups&quoute; Reuters, 19th May. Available:http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/19/us-bissau-military-insight-idUSKBN0O41XS20150519. Accessed: 16th June 2015.

Só, A. (2015). &quoute;New Year Greetings: GENERAL Biague N'TAM ASK THE UNION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES&quoute;. O'Democrata, 16th January. Available: http://www.odemocratagb.com/cumprimentos-do-novo-ano-general-biague-na-ntam-pede-uniao-no-seio-das-forcas-armadas/. Accessed: 15th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
0

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no explicit anti-corruption legislation that offers whistle-blowers any form of protection in Guinea-Bissau. Apart from the lack of such legal tools for the encouragement of whistle-blowing, the military's firm grip on political power constrains dissenters' and critics' ability to voice their concerns. Media and international observers have consistently highlighted the impunity with which corrupt members of national defence continue to operate and the lack of political space to criticise them.

COMMENTS -+

- Abdu Mané, &quoute;Corrupção e crime violento &quoute;impunes&quoute;, na Guiné Bissau,&quoute; RTP, February 15, 2013, accessed July 4, 2014, http://www.rtp.pt/rdpafrica/?t=Corrupcao-e-crime-violento-impunes-na-Guine-Bissau.rtp&article=1007&visual=6&tm=10&headline=16
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Guinée-Bissau : les élections, et après ?,&quoute; Briefing Afrique N°98, April 8, 2014, 17, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b098-guinee-bissau-les-elections-et-apres.pdf.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Novas de Guiné-Bissau, &quoute;Muita impunidade e corrupção no país, acusa Serifo Nhamadjo,&quoute; March 13, 2012, accessed July 4, 2014, http://novasdaguinebissau.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/muita-impunidade-e-corrupcao-no-pais.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As part of the ongoing military reforms, Guinea Bissau's newly appointed Chief of Staff General Biague N'tam has openly declared that all military officials are expected to abide by the rule of law, and will be prosecuted if found flaunting the law.

See: Só, A. (2015). &quoute;New Year Greetings: GENERAL Biague N'TAM ASK THE UNION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES&quoute;. O'Democrata, 16th January. Available: http://www.odemocratagb.com/cumprimentos-do-novo-ano-general-biague-na-ntam-pede-uniao-no-seio-das-forcas-armadas/. Accessed: 15th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
0

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No public records or media reports evince the existence of mechanisms to oversee personnel in sensitive positions in the country's military procurement domain. Considering the highly politicised role of certain military elite figures, as well as their orchestration of military coups, it is highly likely that prolonged usurpation of office remains unsanctioned. There is some recognition of corruption issues in the defence sector by the newly-elected government, but no specific dialogue has taken place vis-à-vis public procurement in particular.

COMMENTS -+

- Fernanda Pinto Cardoso and Anki Sjöberg, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: The Security Sector and Gender in West Africa&quoute;, DCAF, http://www.dcaf.ch/Chapter-Section/Guinea-Bissau.
- Koen Vlassenroot, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; Observatoire de l'Afrique, January 28, 2008, 4, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/4251.pdf.
- Samuel Rubenfeld, &quoute;Corruption Currents: From US Indicting Guinea-Bissau Military Leader to North Korea Sets Conditions,&quoute; Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2013, accessed July 4, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/04/19/corruption-currents-from-us-indicting-guinea-bissau-military-leader-to-north-korea-sets-conditions/.
- Shola Jonathan Omoregie, &quoute;Challenges Facing the Implementation of Security Sector Reform Programme in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; Africa Peace Support, Nvoember 15, 2010, http://www.africapeacesupport.com/images/1/Guinea-Bissau.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
2

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The most recent census of Guinea-Bissau's armed forces dates back to 2008 and was carried out by the United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS). The total number of military personnel at the time was 4,458, but no estimates were provided of the number of civilian defence and security staff. Guinea-Bissau's concentration of armed forces was larger than the West African average (2.73 soldiers per 1,000 people, compared to 1.23 soldiers per 1,000 people). No similar detailed census of the forces has been produced by the establishment in order to facilitate the management of security staff. Monitoring active members since the 2012 coup has been highly deficient and there appears to be a surplus of officers.

COMMENTS -+

- Adelino Handem, “Guinea-Bissau,” in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, ed. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin (Geneva: DCAF, 2008), 153.
- Fernanda Pinto Cardoso and Anki Sjöberg, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; DCAF, 2011, www.dcaf.ch/.../file/00_Complete_West%20Africa_gender_survey.pdf.
- United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau, &quoute;République De Guinée-Bissau: Recensement des Forces Armées,&quoute; April 4, 2008, http://uniogbis.unmissions.org/Portals/unogbis/Articles/Guinea-Bissau%20Armed%20Forces%20census.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: A 2015 Reuters article states that the army has 5,000 soldiers. (Emma Farge and Fernando Pereira, “Guinea-Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coup,” Reuters, May 19, 2015) According to the Guinea-Bissau government, it has undertaken steps to improve payroll management through SIGRHAP (Integrated System for Human Resource Management in Public Administration. As of September 2014, the government has already registered all civil servants, and has received a list of all military personnel to be gradually entered into the system; when the system is operational, the government should have an accurate count of civilian and military personnel, (“Guinea-Bissau: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding,” September 25, 2014, p. 10, https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2014/gnb/092514.pdf)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
0

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are no accessible public records of defence personnel's remuneration rates in Guinea-Bissau, prepared and distributed by the government. An IMF statistical report on the country included average monthly individual salary data for military personnel, but only for the period 2003 to 2005. The report further highlighted the flawed harmonisation of the military salary grid. No centralised or comprehensive state-run source of similar statistical information exists at present and score 0 has been selected to reflect this.

COMMENTS -+

- Adelino Handem, “Guinea-Bissau,” in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, ed. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin (Geneva: DCAF, 2008), 161.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix,&quoute; Country report 06/313, August 4006, 10.
- Instituto Nacional de Estatística e Censos, &quoute;Apoio ao Reforço da Capacidade Institucional,&quoute; September 4, 2004, http://www.stat-guinebissau.com/sistema_estatistico/sistema_estatistico.pdf.
- IRIN, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau’s tough post-coup recovery,&quoute; June 16, 2014, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/100222/guinea-bissau-s-tough-post-coup-recovery.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
0

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Preceding the 2012 coup, at the end of 2011, armed military personnel were attacking military targets, protesting against their inadequate remuneration and demanding pay increases. There have been regular episodes of unrest due to similar salary payment delays and no evidence demonstrates the government's commitment to improving the payment system, especially for low-ranking staff. Further, poor living conditions for many members of the armed forces have been criticised by international development agencies and human rights monitoring bodies.

COMMENTS -+

- Adelino Handem, “Guinea-Bissau,” in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, ed. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin (Geneva: DCAF, 2008), 154-156.
- Daniela Schröder, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Security sector reform and combating drugs,&quoute; EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, 2008, http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/rep1/reportage%20vol1_chapter5_guinea%20bissau%20-%20security%20sector%20reform%20and%20combating%20drugs.pdf.
- Freedom House. &quoute;Freedom in the World 2012: Guinea-Bissau, Overview.&quoute; http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/guinea-bissau#.U7vNTLHLI3U.
- IRIN, &quoute;Analysis: Politicians, military undermine Guinea-Bissau’s stability,&quoute; June 5, 2013, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/98167/analysis-politicians-military-undermine-guinea-bissau-s-stability.
- José Manuel Ramos-Horta, &quoute;Interview,&quoute; The World Today, Chatham House, February and March 2014, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/The%20World%20Today/2014/FebMarch/WT0114Interview.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As the assessor notes, delays in the payment of salaries has been a significant longstanding challenge for the government. (See also: IMF, “Guinea Bissau: Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility,” IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, p. 6, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf) However, the new government has demonstrated some commitment to improving the payment system, through its Integrated System for Human Resource Management in Public Administration (SIGRHAP). As of September 2014, the government has registered all civil servants, and has received a list of all military personnel to be gradually entered into the system; when the system is operational, salaries will be paid through bank transfers. (“Guinea-Bissau: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding,” September 25, 2014, p. 10).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
1

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Guinea-Bissau has a widely recognized history of flawed military appointment practices. Nepotism and ethnic favouritism have been the key mechanisms dictating the country's defence personnel selection, especially at the top management levels. Informal political and military leadership overlaps have led to a series of controversial appointments, including the appointment of General Antonio Indjai as army chief, despite his overt involvement in the 2010 military unrest. Further, the army's ethnic composition is primarily of the Balanta group, whose members occupy most of the top management positions.

COMMENTS -+

- Daniela Schröder, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Security sector reform and combating drugs,&quoute; EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, 2008, http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/publications/articles/rep1/reportage%20vol1_chapter5_guinea%20bissau%20-%20security%20sector%20reform%20and%20combating%20drugs.pdf.
- EU Business, &quoute;EU to review Guinea-Bissau aid over army chief appointment,&quoute; July 6, 2010, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.eubusiness.com/_zmi/plone/news-eu/gbissau-politics.5g.
- Pedro Lopez, &quoute;Appointment of mutiny leader as army chief deals serious blow to SSR efforts in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; SSR Resource Centre, July 7, 2010, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2010/07/07/appointment-of-mutiny-leader-as-army-chief-deals-serious-blow-to-ssr-efforts-in-guinea-bissau/.
- Ryan Cummings, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Uncertainty Despite Military Handover to Transitional Rule,&quoute; Think Africa Press, May 25, 2012, accessed July 8, 2014, http://thinkafricapress.com/guinea-bissau/uncertainty-despite-military-handover-transitional-rule.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It is noteworthy that the SSR process is still ongoing, and General Antonio Indjai has since been dismissed. While it might be too early to access the progress made, nevertheless, the new government is committed to implementing positive change.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
0

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Arbitrary and clientelistic practices continue to define military appointment processes in Guinea-Bissau. There is no coherent evidence of formal processes in place. Efforts to subject military leaders to civil authority remain largely unsuccessful and as a result, personnel promotions are a product of informal bargaining and favour-doing within the ranks of the country's armed forces. There are frequent allegations that officers who do not meet particular grade requirements are still being promoted. Since the civil war in 1998-1999, military codes have been disregarded by the recruitment and promotion authorities and as a result, many civil war combatants continue to serve in the army.

COMMENTS -+

- Birgit Embalo, “Civil-Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea Bissau,” Journal of Modern African Studies 50 (2012): 253-282.
- EU Business, &quoute;EU to review Guinea-Bissau aid over army chief appointment,&quoute; July 6, 2010, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.eubusiness.com/_zmi/plone/news-eu/gbissau-politics.5g.
- Interpeace, &quoute;Roots of Conflicts in Guinea-Bissau: The voice of the people,&quoute; 2010, 10, http://www.interpeace.org/publications/guinea-bissau/40-roots-of-conflicts-in-guinea-bissau-the-voice-of-the-people-english/file.
- Jessica Hatcher, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau's Political Tempest,&quoute; Think Africa Press, March 27, 2012, accessed July 8, 2014, http://thinkafricapress.com/guinea-bissau/political-tempest-election-junior-gomes-drugs.
- Pedro Lopez, &quoute;Appointment of mutiny leader as army chief deals serious blow to SSR efforts in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; SSR Resource Centre, July 7, 2010, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2010/07/07/appointment-of-mutiny-leader-as-army-chief-deals-serious-blow-to-ssr-efforts-in-guinea-bissau/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
0

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no clearly formulated policy of not accepting bribes to avoid conscription. Guinea-Bissau has a selective compulsory military service framework, within which Air Force service is voluntary. Male citizens above the age of 18 are liable for two-year-long military service, and those who are supporting families can apply for postponement. There is no formal recognition of the risk of corruption in the process of granting postponement and no mechanism is established to prevent such occurrences.

It is likely that unemployed youth are seeking to attain positions within the country's armed forces and using informal means to facilitate their access and/or hiring. There are no existent procedures in place to act as deterrent, but there is also lack of unequivocal evidence that bribery to avoid conscription occurs.

COMMENTS -+

- Amnesty International, &quoute;Conscientious objection to military service,&quoute; 1991, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL31/001/1991/en/306e1347-ee4f-11dd-9381-bdd29f83d3a8/pol310011991en.pdf.
- The World Factbook, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Military service age and obligation,&quoute; CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html.
- War Resisters' International. &quoute;Country report and updates: Guinea-Bissau.&quoute; http://www.wri-irg.org/programmes/world_survey/country_report/en/Guinea-Bissau.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
0

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no evidence that bribery is actively targeted within the defence sector to ensure the award of preferred posting options. Considering the entwined nature of political and military power (Ferreira), it is likely that unemployed youth are seeking to attain positions within the country's armed forces and using informal means to facilitate their access and/or hiring.

COMMENTS -+

- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, &quoute;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Guinea-Bissau, &quoute;United States Department of State, 2011, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186416.pdf.
- Division for Public Administration and Development Management (DPADM), &quoute;Republic of Guinea-Bissau Public Administration, Country Profile,&quoute; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), March 2004, 7, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023267.pdf.
- Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Between conflict and democracy,&quoute; African Security Review 13 (2010): 44-56.
- Ryan Cummings, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Uncertainty Despite Military Handover to Transitional Rule,&quoute; Think Africa Press, May 25, 2012, accessed July 8, 2014, http://thinkafricapress.com/guinea-bissau/uncertainty-despite-military-handover-transitional-rule.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
2

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are no available sources that indicate the presence (or absence) of ghost soldiers in Guinea-Bissau's defence forces. Considering the continuing turmoil in the country's military apparatus, it is likely that payroll irregularities occur, but it is unclear to what extent they involve the payment of ghost soldiers. The most relevant field-based study on this matter does not include any data relevant to ghost soldiers. There are reports of certain conscripts serving longer than the mandated two years due to bureaucratic sluggishness in processing their discharge applications.

COMMENTS -+

- Amnesty International, &quoute;Conscientious objection to military service,&quoute; 1991, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL31/001/1991/en/306e1347-ee4f-11dd-9381-bdd29f83d3a8/pol310011991en.pdf.
- Michael Ashkenazi, &quoute;Final Report, Guinea-Bissau: Conversion of Future Civilians,&quoute; BICC, November 2010, 15.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
0

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are low levels of transparency and accountability in the management of the country's chains of payment. Frequent irregularities in payment have opened up space for manipulation along existing formal hierarchical chains, as well as informal networks within the defence and security forces. Although these inadequacies have been partially recognised by the government, there has been no functional organisational framework for implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a better streamlined payment system.

COMMENTS -+

- Alberto Dabo, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau soldiers oust army chief, briefly hold PM,&quoute; April 3, 2010, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-04/03/content_9683693.htm.
- Alexander Smoltzcyk, &quoute; Africa's Cocaine Hub: Guinea-Bissau a 'Drug Trafficker's Dream',&quoute; Spiegel, May 8, 2013, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/violence-plagues-african-hub-of-cocaine-trafficking-a-887306.html.
- Inter-Ministerial Committee, Government of Guinea-Bissau, &quoute;Restructuring and Modernisation
of the Defence and Security Sector,&quoute; Strategy Document, 2006, http://uniogbis.unmissions.org/Portals/unogbis/Articles/SSR%20srtategy%20document%202006.pdf/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Chains of command are not separate from chains of payment. However, the government is currently reforming payroll management. According to an October 2014 IMF report, “The government aims to complete the administrative module of the payroll management system (SIGRHAP) and integrate it with the financial module in order to integrate the ministries of public administration and economy and finance. The authorities are planning to extend SIGRHAP and the payment of salaries through the banking system to military personnel and the Ministry of the Interior.” (IMF, “Guinea Bissau: Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility,” IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, p. 10)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
1

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are no publicly available materials that present a code of conduct, but its existence is mentioned in some government and NGO sources. There is no additional mention of an oversight mechanism. Although the code is likely to exist, it is disregarded for the most part, as adherence is discouraged by irregular and notoriously low pay rates for both military and civilian personnel. The military code has not been updated recently. The country's constitution makes brief and vague provisions for the operation of a military court, but there is no evidence that bribery and corruption are part of the offences addressed through it.

COMMENTS -+

- Adelino Handem, “Guinea-Bissau,” in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, ed. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin (Geneva: DCAF, 2008), 161.
- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 1984 (as Amended to 1991), paragraph (2) of Article 121.
- Euractiv, &quoute;EU gives boost to Guinea-Bissau after years of instability,&quoute; March 26, 2013, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/development-policy/eu-gives-boost-guinea-bissau-after-years-instability-313264.
- Fernanda Pinto Cardoso and Anki Sjöberg, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; DCAF, 2011, www.dcaf.ch/.../file/00_Complete_West%20Africa_gender_survey.pdf.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: A February 2011 report from the Secretary General noted that UNIOGBIS “recommended the adoption of a code of conduct to prevent impunity and renew public trust in the armed forces,” suggesting that Guinea-Bissau did not have a Code of Conduct for military personnel at the time of the report’s writing. (S/2011/73, para. 15) However, as a member of ECOWAS, Guinea-Bissau is a signatory to ECOWAS’s Code of Conduct for Armed Forces and Security Services. (David O’Regan and Peter Thompson, “Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa’s First Narco-State,” ACSS Special Report, June 2013, p. 44)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
0

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are no sources of information detailing the procedure that follows corruption-related breaches of the military Code of Conduct. When General Indjai became chief of staff, he made a number of legislative amendments, which concentrate power in his hands and disable the effective prosecution of any of the crimes he was widely believed to have previously perpetrated. These came after the initial, externally-assisted SSR strategy had stalled. It is likely that government breaches of the formal Code of Conduct are, in general, not adequately addressed. For instance, in 2009, members of a Ministry of Fisheries agency were arrested over embezzlement claims, but none of them were formally charged or effectively investigated.

COMMENTS -+

- Birgit Embalo, “Civil-Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea Bissau,” Journal of Modern African Studies 50 (2012): 253-282.
- Davin O’Regan and Peter Thompson, &quoute;Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa’s First Narco-State,&quoute; Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, June 2013, http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/SpecialReport-Guinea-Bissau-JUN2013-EN.pdf?utm_source=ACSS+Releases+Special+Report+Advancing+Stability+%26+Reconciliation+in+G.+Bissau&utm_campaign=Special_report_GB&utm_medium=email.
- Igbanugo Partners. &quoute;Profile Of Anti-bribery Laws/ Enforcement In SSA Countries.&quoute; 2015. http://www.igbanugolaw.com/Resources/antibriberylawsinSSA.pdf.
- Organic Law of the Armed Forces, Republic Act No. 26, February 28, 2011.
- UN Security Council, &quoute;Report of the Secretary-General on the Restoration of Constitutional Order in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; UN doc. S/2012/704, November 27, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/887.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Seeing as General Indjai was dismissed and replaced by General Biague Na N'tan in September 2014, it is believed that serious reforms are expected within the armed forces of Guinea Bissau. This is supported by the fact that in January 2015, addressing the country's armed forces, General Biague Na N'tam emphasised the need for the military officers to respect the rule of law, with the military police charged with the responsibility of maintaining order and discipline, especially to control those who intend to violate established rules.

See: Só, A. (2015). &quoute;New Year Greetings: General Biague N'tam ask for union within the Armed Forces&quoute;. Available:http://www.odemocratagb.com/cumprimentos-do-novo-ano-general-biague-na-ntam-pede-uniao-no-seio-das-forcas-armadas/. O'Democrata, 16th January. Accessed:16th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
1

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Following the prominent 'narco-state' reputation that Guinea-Bissau received in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the government made a formal commitment to 'conducting a major overhaul of training curricula' in the security and defence sector as part of a new, consolidated anti-corruption endeavour. No coherent training strategy has emerged as a result, however, and it is very unlikely that effective anti-corruption training continues to take place in the country.

There is evidence that military and civilian personnel have previously benefited from externally organised and sponsored anti-corruption training, mostly in the form of sporadic UN and EU-led workshops. The EU SSR Guinea-Bissau mission, which aimed to assist the country with the implementation of its SSR reform, was prematurely withdrawn on account of the lack of respect for constitutional order in the country. EU SSR Guinea-Bissau training initiatives were left uncompleted. The new assistance pledge by donors is likely to re-establish such training initiatives, whose scope so far has been rather limited.

COMMENTS -+

- Council of the European Union, &quoute;The EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Mission Completes Its Mandate ,&quoute; 12740/10, August 2, 2010, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/116072.pdf/
- EU, &quoute;EU mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau),&quoute; July 2009, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/300/300909/300909factsheet_eu_ssr_guinea-bissau_10_en.pdf.
- Euractiv, &quoute;EU gives boost to Guinea-Bissau after years of instability,&quoute; March 26, 2013, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/development-policy/eu-gives-boost-guinea-bissau-after-years-instability-313264.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Republic of Guinea-Bissau, &quoute;Political Declaration to counter Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; June 24, 2011, http://uniogbis.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket...tabid=9915.
- UNODC, &quoute;Fighting corruption together: The road to Marrakech and beyond,&quoute; April 2011, http://www.unodc.org/documents/NGO/11-83110_leaflet_Ebook.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
0

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no record of such policy being in place. Military and political elites are reportedly engaging in a host of corrupt activities, which are not prosecuted effectively due to a poorly-resourced and highly politicised judiciary. Ad-hoc external actors, such as UNIOGBIS, UNODC and EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, were involved in developing a system to enforce more accountability through prosecution of corruption suspects, but their mandates have either ended (in February 2012 in UNIOGBIS's case), or have been suspended (in the case of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau).

COMMENTS -+

- Freedom House. &quoute;Freedom in the World 2012: Guinea-Bissau, Overview.&quoute; http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/guinea-bissau#.U7wCmLHLI3U.
- Guiné-Bissau, &quoute;Ministério Público da Guiné-Bissau está mergulhado na corrupção – Bastonário da Ordem dos Advogados,&quoute; February 25, 2013, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.gbissau.com/?p=4674.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Guinée-Bissau : les élections, et après ?,&quoute; Briefing Afrique N°98, April 8, 2014, 17, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b098-guinee-bissau-les-elections-et-apres.pdf.
- IRIN, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Fighting crime without police or prisons,&quoute; October 16, 2009, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/86624/guinea-bissau-fighting-crime-without-police-or-prisons.
- RefWorld, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Attack on the independence of the judiciary,&quoute; 2001, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3c2afe610.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to Reuters (2015), Guinea Bissau officials say publicly that top officials suspected for crimes will be prosecuted. However, privately they admit that doing so will, and or could derail the SSR process as nervous military men might consider staging another coup.

See: Farge, E. (2015). &quoute;Insight - Guinea Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coups&quoute;. Reuters, 19th May. Available: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/19/uk-bissau-military-insight-idUKKBN0O41XO20150519. Accessed: 15th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
1

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are some legal provisions that are aimed at preventing facilitation payments, included in the country's first (and still acting) Criminal Code. In 2011, the government of Guinea-Bissau formalised its commitment to incorporating drug control, organized crime and anti-corruption provisions into newly codified national legislation, but there is no evidence that relevant laws have been passed and enforced. The country is often cited as one of the most corrupt ones in the region and facilitation payments, both at the grassroots and political elite level, are seen as among the root causes of prolonged instability.

COMMENTS -+

- Criminal Code, Republic Act no. 4/93, October 13, 1993, Articles 171, 202, 217, 219, 228, 235.
- Geneva Academy. &quoute;Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project, Guinea Bissau.&quoute; http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/national_legislation.php?id_state=81
- Igbanugo Partners. &quoute;Profile Of Anti-bribery Laws/ Enforcement In SSA Countries.&quoute; http://www.igbanugolaw.com/Resources/antibriberylawsinSSA.pdf.
- IRIN, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Security sector reform still lagging,&quoute; October 27, 2009, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/86760/guinea-bissau-security-sector-reform-still-lagging.
- Loro Horta, &quoute;Guinea Bissau: Africa’s first narcostate,&quoute; African Studies Centre, University of Pennsylvania, October 2007, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/guinbisauhorta.html.
- Samuel Rubenfeld, &quoute;Corruption Currents: From US Indicting Guinea-Bissau Military Leader to North Korea Sets Conditions,&quoute; Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2013, accessed July 8, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/04/19/corruption-currents-from-us-indicting-guinea-bissau-military-leader-to-north-korea-sets-conditions/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
1

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Considering the substantial international attention that corruption in Guinea-Bissau's armed forces has received over the past two decades, it is likely that military leadership is aware of the importance of tackling this persistent issue. The government has explicitly expressed its recognition of the issue and readiness to address it, but no resultant doctrine has been drafted. Failure to adequately deal with the corruption problem has prompted substantial criticism.

COMMENTS -+

- Inter-Ministerial Committee, Government of Guinea-Bissau, &quoute;Restructuring and Modernisation
of the Defence and Security Sector,&quoute; Strategy Document, 2006, http://uniogbis.unmissions.org/Portals/unogbis/Articles/SSR%20srtategy%20document%202006.pdf/.
- Lansana Gberie, &quoute;State Officials and their Involvement in Drug Trafficking in West Africa,&quoute; West Africa Commission on Drugs, Background Paper No. 51, 8, http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/State-Officials-and-Drug-Trafficking-2013-12-03.pdf.
- Republic of Guinea-Bissau, &quoute;Political Declaration to counter Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; June 24, 2011, http://uniogbis.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket...tabid=9915.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
0

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Senior staff in the defence sector do not receive regular anti-corruption training. Sporadic trainings were part of the foreign-led SSR reform, which since the 2012 coup has not made any substantial progress. It is supposed to be resumed this year, but this still does not indicate whether commanders at all levels will receive adequate training in corruption issues. There is no evidence that commanders are clear on corruption issues they might face during deployment (ICG).

The 2012 coup was borne out of the country's armed forces' desire to take control of the civilian regime, which was involved in transnational drug trafficking. Therefore, commanders have an understanding of the extent to which corruption is an issue during deployment. Yet, there is evidence that military leadership continue to engage in corrupt activities.

COMMENTS -+

- Ashley Neese Bybee, “Narco State or Failed State? Narcotics and Politics in Guinea-Bissau” (PhD diss. George Mason University, 2006).
- Dirk Kohnert, &quoute;Democratization via Elections in an African “Narco-state”? The Case of Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; GIGA Research programme, report No. 123, February 2010, http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Guinea-Bissau.pdf.
- ECOWAS, &quoute;Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians,&quoute; September 29, 2010, accessed June 4, 2015, www.dcaf.ch/content/download/35987/527191/file/ECOWAS%20Parliament-DCAF%20Guide%20eng.pdf .
- Emma Farge and Fernando Pereira, &quoute;Guinea Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coups,&quoute; Reuters, May 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/19/us-bissau-military-insight-idUSKBN0O41XS20150519.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Lansana Gberie, &quoute;State Officials and their Involvement in Drug Trafficking in West Africa,&quoute; West Africa Commission on Drugs, Background Paper No. 51, 8, http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/State-Officials-and-Drug-Trafficking-2013-12-03.pdf.
- Nate Raymond, &quoute;Exclusive: Guinea-Bissau's ex-navy chief pleads guilty in U.S. drug case,&quoute; Reuters, June 3, 2014, accessed July 8, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/03/us-bissau-drugs-guilty-idUSKBN0EE2FO20140603.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Guinea Bissau is in the process of SSR as stated earlier. Therefore, as part of its SSR process, the former head of the armed Gen. Antonio Indjai, notorious with the foreign media and government for leading the coup in 2012, was replaced by the newly elected president in September 2014.
Further, according to the Minister of Defence Cadi Seide, as part of Guinea Bissau's government commitment to rid the army of corrupt officials, there is a five years plan to retire more than half of the country's military.

See: Farge, E. (2015). &quoute;Insight - Guinea Bissau sidelines top brass in bid to end coups&quoute;. Reuters, 19th May. Available: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/19/uk-bissau-military-insight-idUKKBN0O41XO20150519. Accessed: 15th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
0

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No sources document the deployment of corruption monitors in the field. Guinea-Bissau has historically been a recipient, rather than contributor to peacekeeping operations. The score for this question was chosen based on evidence of irregularities and corruption monitoring during elections, but no specific information about military monitoring in the field is available.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Accepted, score adjusted to 0.

COMMENTS -+

No relevant sources could be accessed.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As the country assessor notes, Guinea-Bissau has primarily been a recipient rather than contributor to peacekeeping operations (for instance, in 2014, Guinea-Bissau contributed 1 peacekeeper). (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml) It is extremely unlikely that Guinea-Bissau deploys corruption monitors in the field. Thus, in my view, “The country deploys no personnel for corruption monitoring” in the field.

Suggested score: 0

Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
0

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No such guidelines could be obtained. Considering the slow progress of the SSR reform, which was supposed to restructure, reorganise and retrain the country's armed forces, it is highly likely that no corruption-specific guidelines have been compiled and put in force. There is no evidence of specific staff trainings addressing corruption risks in contracting while deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions.

COMMENTS -+

Survey of available NGO, intergovernmental and government literature revealed no specific information vis-à-vis anti-corruption guidelines for military staff.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
1

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: PMCs have not been actively employed in the post-coup recovery of Guinea-Bissau, but influential political figures are known to have used non-state (private) security in the past. Assassinated President, João Bernardo Vieira, employed private companies to ensure his own security as his relationship with then commander-in-chief deteriorated. There is also evidence that some private military presence has characterised the Casamance border conflict between Senegal, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Despite these instances of PMC involvement in the country's security, there is no evidence of any regulatory or monitoring framework to constrain their operations. It is unclear if they remain to be employed by the government, in particular, the armed forces and as such, score 1 rather than score 0 has been selected.

COMMENTS -+

- IRIN, &quoute;Analysis: Latest coup another setback for Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; April 23, 2012, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/report/95340/analysis-latest-coup-another-setback-for-guinea-bissau.
- Olajide O. Akanji, &quoute;Politicised Intervention: Private Security Companies and Armed Conflicts in Africa,&quoute; University of Ibadan, n.d., 6, http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/41-60/panel-47/Olajide-Akanji-Full-paper.pdf.
- UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. &quoute;National regulatory frameworks on PMSCs: Guinea Bissau.&quoute; n.d. http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/NationalRegulatoryFrameworks.aspx.
- Ute Gierczynski-Bocandé and Stefan Gehrold, &quoute;Guinea Bissau: President Assassinated, Constitution Remains In Force,&quoute; Auslandsinformationen, March 2009, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_16373-544-2-30.pdf?090504151903.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
1

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: After the end of the civil war of 1998-1999, Guinea-Bissau achieved significant progress in the improvement of its public procurement system. The military coup ousting President Yala in 2003, however, brought the existent mechanisms for public expenditure reporting and oversight to a halt. Since then, public procurement, including in the military sector, has been ineffective and sluggish, often omitting the production of regular audit reports. A procurement reform was subsequently implemented in 2009, but not explicitly in the MOD. New procurement legislation was passed in 2010, which envisaged the centralisation of the procurement process through a central unit of public procurement. It does not make specific provisions regarding exempt procurement linked to the defence sector. No specific oversight happens at the ministerial level, so it is difficult to confirm to what extent defence procurement is subject to regulation and control. The Office of the Auditor General publishes no relevant information. In the 2015-2019 African Development Bank strategy paper for the country, there is explicit mention of the need to vastly improve public procurement - both in terms of legislative provisions and regulatory framework.

COMMENTS -+

- African Development Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper,&quoute; January 2015, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea-Bissau__-_2015-2019_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: 2004 Article IV Consultation--Staff Report; Staff Statement,&quoute; Country Report, 05/69, March 2005, 46.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- Peter Karibe Mendy and Richard A. Lobban Jr., Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Plymouth: Scarecrow, 2013), 313.
- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, Paragraph (c) of section (3) of Article 3.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
0

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Public procurement in general has been means- and not results-oriented due to the prolonged episodes of political instability and violence in the country. Defence procurement is likely to be 'simplified' with no formalised cycle process and relevant documentation. According to the World Bank, sectoral ministries are known to be collecting revenues and making payments through their own bank accounts, without communicating effectively with the Treasurer. The existent control agencies, namely the Finance Inspectorate and the Office of the Auditor, are reported to be gravely malfunctioning and do not publish any reports.

COMMENTS -+

- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-coup Transition in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; Africa Report N°190, August 17, 2012, 4, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/190-beyond-turf-wars-managing-the-post-coup-transition-in-guinea-bissau.pdf.
- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, Paragraph (c) of section (1) of Article 5.
- World Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau - Second Economic Governance Reform Grant Program (English),&quoute; 2010, 19, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/06/12444807/guinea-bissau-second-economic-governance-reform-grant-program.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
0

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no evidence of active and transparent defence procurement oversight framework. Even though Guinea-Bissau is a member of the African Civil Services Observatory (OFPA), the authority, together with other external watchdogs, has recommended drastic improvements to the existing oversight mechanisms for defence public procurement. Although the defence sector in the country has suffered from significant corruption and lack of accountability, it is important to highlight that some positive overall trends have emerged since the end of the 2012 coup.

Administrative continuity resumed in 2009 and the government concentrated on restructuring and streamlining public procurement, including the elaboration of a new governance framework and pertinent legislation, as well as the incorporation of information technology to ensure transparency. The results of these reforms are yet to materialise even though several public procurement regulatory bodies have been created, including a regulatory authority for public procurement, Autoridade de Regulação dos Concursos Públicos (ARCP). There is also a central procurement unit - Unidade Central de Compras Públicas (UCCP), as well as a general procurement directorate at the Ministry of Finance (Diretoria Geral de Compras Públicas, DGCP), responsible for auditing the public procurement process. It is unclear whether all of these institutions engage with defence procurement at all. There is also no evidence that they are transparent and active. According to the African Development Bank, ARCP's activities and scope are 'highly limited in practice and the institution must be strengthened'.

COMMENTS -+

- African Development Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper,&quoute; XIV, January 2015, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea-Bissau__-_2015-2019_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf.
- African Development Bank, &quoute;République De Guinée Bissau, Document de Stratégie Pays 2012-2016,&quoute; November 2011, 6, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guin%C3%A9e%20Bissau%20-Draft%20Document%20de%20Strat%C3%A9gie%20Pays%20%282012-2016%29.pdf.
- Decreto relativo à instituição da Autoridade de Regulação dos Concursos Públicos (draft), http://www.marchespublics-uemoa.net/documents/18300581654f5f4ba53d9d5.pdf.
- Koen Vlassenroot, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; Observatoire de l'Afrique, January 28, 2008, 4, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/4251.pdf.
- Observatoire des Fonctions Publiques Africaines. &quoute;Guinea-Bissau.&quoute; 2015. http://www.ofpa.net/modules.php?name=News&file=categories&op=newindex&catid=3.
- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, Article 7.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
0

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Specific purchases are not publicly accessible and the government only provides an aggregate figure of its defence spending. There is no evidence or formal statements by MOD justifying the unavailability of concrete information as a result of security concerns. During the years of political turmoil and unrest, even those figures were not available.

COMMENTS -+

No relevant public records could be found. Media reports reflecting the publication of acquisitions by the government or the MOD are not available either.

- Ministério Da Economia E Finanças, &quoute;Lei Do Orçamento 2015,&quoute; accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.mef-gb.com/doc/OGE/OGE2015.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
0

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Companies that bid specifically for defence and security tenders are not required to comply with any integrity programmes or codes or sign 'no-corruption' clauses. The government does not make any explicit reference to the need for such clauses. However, there are general integrity provisions for bidders included in the Public Procurement Code, but these are rather broad. The sections of the constitution that address matters of defence remain very basic or vague and there is no parliamentary supervision of security sector management and procurement at all. It is, therefore, difficult to establish ethics compliance practices for defence sector bidders. In its 2015-2019 strategy report, the African Development Bank commented on the alarming absence of of real anti-corruption policy, as well as specific provisions such as barring companies who are prosecuted from the bidding process.

COMMENTS -+

- Adelino Handem, “Guinea-Bissau,” in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, ed. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin (Geneva: DCAF, 2008), 213.
- African Development Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper,&quoute; January 2015, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea-Bissau__-_2015-2019_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf.
- Constitution of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, 1984 (as Amended to 1991), December 2006, Article 63.
- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, sections (2), (3) and (4) of Article 18.
- World Bank, &quoute;Doing Business 2014, Economy Profile: Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; 2013, 4, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/01/000260600_20140501161755/Rendered/PDF/828540Guinea0B0Box0382098B00PUBLIC0.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
0

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: In November 2006, Guinea-Bissau prepared a National Security Strategy that detailed its implementation of the proposed SSR. Since then, no similar document has been produced and currently the national security strategy in general, and defence procurement specifically, are treated as confidential and are not subject to independent audit. The parliament has the mandate to mobilise independent specialised committees when necessary, but rarely uses this right. CAIPLDN also appears to be a largely passive body (IMF, de Mariz et al). Considering recent episodes of unrest in the country, it is evident that a coherent national defence and security strategy is yet to be elaborated. The termination of external assistance, mostly on the part of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, has slowed progress that was previously made in this direction. Its recent renewal could potentially limit opportunistic security procurement, which currently does not follow a clearly formulated strategy (AFDB).

COMMENTS -+

- African Development Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper,&quoute; January 2015, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea-Bissau__-_2015-2019_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf.
- Christine Léon de Mariz, Claude Ménard, and Bernard Abeillé, &quoute;Public Procurement Reforms in Africa: Challenges in Institutions and Governance,&quoute; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 107.
- EU Council, &quoute;Council Joint Action 2008/112/cfsp on the European Union Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in The Republic Of Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau),&quoute; Official Journal Of The European Union 40/11 (February 2008).
- Daniel Fiott, &quoute;EU SSR Missions: The Case of Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; European Security Review 38 (2008): 4.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- Inter-Ministerial Committee, Government of Guinea-Bissau, &quoute;Restructuring and Modernisation
of the Defence and Security Sector,&quoute; Strategy Document, 2006, 23, http://uniogbis.unmissions.org/Portals/unogbis/Articles/SSR%20srtategy%20document%202006.pdf/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
0

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Guinea-Bissau's military leadership is known for its opportunism, confirmed in a recent study by ICG. There is no evidence to suggest that clearly identified requirements are used in the MOD acquisition planning process. Unplanned purchases are likely to occur as a response to the volatile security situation. As some procurement is financed by external stakeholders, the mis-coordination of assistance from large numbers of donors and assistance bodies (such as United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS) has provided opportunities for opportunistic purchases. There is no evidence to suggest that work is undertaken to define and quantify the need for significant purchases.

COMMENTS -+

- African Development Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper,&quoute; January 2015, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea-Bissau__-_2015-2019_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf.
- Davin O’Regan and Peter Thompson, &quoute;Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa’s First Narco-State,&quoute; Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, June 2013, 41-42, http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/SpecialReport-Guinea-Bissau-JUN2013-EN.pdf?utm_source=ACSS+Releases+Special+Report+-+Advancing+Stability+%26+Reconciliation+in+G.+Bissau&utm_campaign=Special_report_GB&utm_medium=email.
- GFN-SSR. &quoute;SSR Case Study: SSR in Guinea-Bissau.&quoute; 2015. http://www.ssrnetwork.net/ssrbulletin/guineabis.php.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Simon Massey, &quoute;Multi-fFaceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War,&quoute; Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 32 (2004).

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
1

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The Procurement Code guarantees fair competition in general, but does not include any defence-specific provisions. There are no specific provisions for defence procurement, which means that defence procurement should be conducted as open competition. There is no information available that details the application of anti-collusion measures in defence procurement, or relevant bodies' oversight of the process. No explicit evidence suggests that single-sourcing does not occur. ARCP is in place as an appellate mechanism to address bidders' complaints, particularly ones relating to competition. There are no calls for tenders for defence contracts that are publicly advertised to encourage competitive sourcing.

Score 1 has been selected on the basis that while defence procurement should be conducted as open competition in principle, there is no evidence to verify this takes place and the risk of single sourcing is heightened given the lack of transparency and weak institutional systems related to defence procurement.

COMMENTS -+

- African Development Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper,&quoute; January 2015, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea-Bissau__-_2015-2019_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf.
- Christine Léon de Mariz, Claude Ménard, and Bernard Abeillé, &quoute;Public Procurement Reforms in Africa: Challenges in Institutions and Governance,&quoute; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 107.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries - Completion Point Document and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative,&quoute; Country Report No. 10/380, December 2010, 21.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, Article 13.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Elsewhere, the African Development (2015) recognises that some progress has been made with regard to procurement under the auspices of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), however, certain challenges remain to be addressed. For example, the use of the
WAEMU Regional Standard Bidding Documents (RSBD) raises a problem for Guinea Bissau's private sector because the documents are in French and not in the Portuguese language.

See: AFDB, (2015). &quoute;Guinea-Bissau 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper&quoute;. Available: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea-Bissau__-_2015-2019_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf. January, p.5. Accessed: 14th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
0

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no evidence to suggest that tender boards in general are subject to regulation, according to the African Development Bank. There is no specific information regarding tender boards of defence institutions.

COMMENTS -+

- African Development Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper,&quoute; January 2015, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea-Bissau__-_2015-2019_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf.
- Christine Léon de Mariz, Claude Ménard, and Bernard Abeillé, &quoute;Public Procurement Reforms in Africa: Challenges in Institutions and Governance,&quoute; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 107.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- Political Instability Task Force, &quoute;Polity IV Country Report 2010: Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; 2010, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/GuineaBissau2010.pdf.
- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, Paragraph (g) of section (1) of Article 5.
- World Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau - Second Economic Governance Reform Grant Program (English),&quoute; 2010, 19, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/06/12444807/guinea-bissau-second-economic-governance-reform-grant-program.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
1

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are explicit legislative provisions that prohibit collusion between bidders for public procurement contracts in general. No specific mention is made of defence and security sector procurement. The enforcement measures are invalidation of the proposal of specific bidders. There is no evidence of prosecution, investigation and punishment in relevant cases.

COMMENTS -+

- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, section (7) of Article 18 and Article 12.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
0

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no publicly accessible information on the level of training and competences of procurement staff. Budget deficits prevented the government from establishing procurement units for each ministry during the 2009-2010 public procurement overhaul. As a result, it is likely that the centralised procurement unit is understaffed and has no specialist knowledge of corruption risks in the defence procurement domain. There is no evidence of undue influence from higher grades within the organisation, but the African Development Bank insists that there is need for decentralisation as control of the procurement regulation system is highly concentrated.

COMMENTS -+

- African Development Bank, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper,&quoute; XIV, January 2015, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea-Bissau__-_2015-2019_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf.
- IMF, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: Request For Disbursement Under The Rapid Credit Facility—Staff Report; Press Release; And Statement By The Executive Director For Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 14/318, November 2014, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14318.pdf.
- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, section (8) of Article 18.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According the African Development Bank, with regard to procurement, some normative progress has been made under however, Guinea-Bissau does not have any provisions that would help to improve the public procurement regulatory framework such as an act imposing sanctions on contractors defaulting on their contracts. There is also no clear mechanism for combating corruption.

See: AFDB, (2015). &quoute;Guinea-Bissau 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper&quoute;. Available: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Guinea-Bissau__-_2015-2019_Country_Strategy_Paper.pdf. January, p.5. Accessed: 14th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
2

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are legislative provisions that are set out to guarantee the rights of bidders to complain about perceived malpractice. The relevant sections of the Public Procurement Code make explicit mention of corruption, but do not include a reference to defence procurement. Bearing in mind the state of administrative and security sector reform in the country, alongside the high levels of corruption, the effectiveness of complaint mechanisms and ensuing protection of bidders is questionable. There are also no reports in media or relevant publications of the regular use of such mechanisms. Companies are likely to see the filing of complaints as disadvantageous.

COMMENTS -+

- Christine Léon de Mariz, Claude Ménard, and Bernard Abeillé, &quoute;Public Procurement Reforms in Africa: Challenges in Institutions and Governance,&quoute; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 107.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed,&quoute; Africa Briefing No. 109, March 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/b109-security-sector-reform-in-guinea-bissau-an-opportunity-not-to-be-missed.aspx
- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, Article 20.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
1

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are provisions for debarment in the case of corrupt activities by suppliers, which are thoroughly enumerated. Yet no explicit mention of prosecution as a sanction for suppliers' breach of the integrity and ethics guidelines is made. Debarment decisions can also be reversed if the decision is deemed to be 'in the public interest'. There is no explicit mention of fines.

COMMENTS -+

- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, sections (7) and (18) of Article 18.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
N/A

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no evidence in media, NGO and other reports that Guinea Bissau engages in offset contracts. It is highly unlikely given the small size of its defence budget.

It is highly unlikely that the country engages in offset contracts given the small size of its defence budget.

COMMENTS -+

No information on offset contract provisions could be obtained from government, INGO or media sources.

SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
N/A

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no available public information on the Guinea Bissau engaging in defence offset contracts. It is highly unlikely that the country engages in them given the small size of its defence budget. It is highly likely that transparency requirements are not applied directly to offset programmes, if those exist.

It is highly unlikely that the country engages in offset contracts given the small size of its defence budget.

COMMENTS -+

SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
N/A

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no available public information on the Guinea Bissau engaging in defence offset contracts. It is highly unlikely that the country engages in them given the small size of its defence budget.

COMMENTS -+

SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
0

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The Public Procurement Code does not detail any types of controls and requirements that the government has put in place in order to regulate the use of agents in public procurement. Their operation is not explicitly addressed in other relevant legislation either. There is evidence that suggests that the use of agents is common practice and often complicates the execution of projects - for example in 2013, a road construction scandal transpired as a result of substantial delays in the operation of intermediaries (RDN). No similar use of intermediaries has been reported in defence procurement.

COMMENTS -+

- Christine Léon de Mariz, Claude Ménard, and Bernard Abeillé, &quoute;Public Procurement Reforms in Africa: Challenges in Institutions and Governance,&quoute; (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 107.
- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010.
- Rádio Difusão Nacional-RDN, &quoute;Concurso para reabilitação de 43 quilómetros das vias urbanas de Bissau fica suspenso,&quoute; June 26, 2013, accessed July 9, 2014, http://www.gbissau.com/?p=6469.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

74.
score
0

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Being a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Guinea-Bissau adopted the community's Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials. The convention includes provisions for the public oversight of arms deals. No available evidence indicates the country's adherence to most of the convention's provisions. Information on the identity of providers and details of financing packages is not accessible and there is no national legislation that requires their disclosure.

COMMENTS -+

- ANGOP, &quoute;Guiné-Bissau: Sector de defesa e segurança é o 'problema fundamental',&quoute; June 28, 2014, accessed July 9, 2014, http://www.portalangop.co.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/africa/2014/5/26/Guine-Bissau-Sector-defesa-seguranca-problema-fundamental,053af22c-4500-465c-ab86-0d61dee56af0.html.
- ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials, June 14, 2006, Section (1) of Article 20.
- GunPolicy. &quoute;Guinea-Bissau — Gun Facts, Figures and the Law.&quoute; 2015, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/guinea-bissau.
- UNODC, &quoute;Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,&quoute; February 2013, 33-34, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
0

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no specific mention of anti-corruption responsibilities that the main contractor has towards their sub-contractors. It is only the main contract that is legally required to comply with the existing code discouraging malpractice. There is no evidence that the government informally encourages a system of corruption avoidance put forward by main contractors in their work with subsidiaries, and it is highly unlikely this occurs.

COMMENTS -+

- Public Procurement Code, Lei Nº 19, June 30, 2010, sections (7) and (8) of Article 18.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It is important to note that after years of political instabilities, Guinea Bissau under the current government and with the help of the international community is in the process of reforming its internal institutions. For example, in a recent interview with Reuters, the Prime Minister, Domingos Simoes Pereira stated that his is currently reviewing its contracts, from mining to timber, to ensure diversity and transparency.

See: Farge, E & Pereira, F. (2015). &quoute;INTERVIEW-Guinea Bissau reviews contracts from mining to timber - PM&quoute;. Reuters, 5th May. Available: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/05/bissau-economy-idUKL5N0XW39D20150505. Accessed: 14th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
2

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Prior to the April/May 2014 elections, the country's leadership was not internationally recognised and therefore external political influence was limited. Guinea-Bissau is also currently subject to some financial sanctions, most notably by the UK. During its numerous periods of unrest, the country was often governed in isolation from global international relations configurations. Following the most recent coup, for instance, Portuguese airlines TAP suspended their flight link with Bissau.

Existing longitudinal records of arms transfer indicate that most legal arms exports to the country come from Portugal and Spain. Certain colonial trade patterns are at play here and Portugal's influence as former colonial power (until as late as 1973) is evident. This, however, should not be associated exclusively with Portugal's exertion of pressure, but also related to the cultural bonds existing between the two countries.

Evidence indicates most of the arms transfers in Guinea-Bissau are actually illicit and have been linked to military elites' involvement in regional and transcontinental rebel movements (Moreira). Morocco has also recently started exporting military equipment to Guinea-Bissau, which reflects the close relationship of the two countries during the latter's independence struggles. This also points to a degree of political influence by Morocco over Guinea-Bissau.

Predominantly informal political associations beyond the framework of the state can be seen as an important factor in Guinea-Bissau's mostly illicit arms acquisition. Formal military acquisition in the country, at the same time, is not so politicised. However, military expenditure is not justified by reference to military need although this would be a legitimate claim considering the volatile security situation in the country.

COMMENTS -+

- Afrol News, &quoute;Small arms access increases in Guinea-Bissau,&quoute; March 11, 2012, accessed July 9, 2014, http://afrol.com/articles/15871.
- Davin O’Regan and Peter Thompson, &quoute;Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa’s First Narco-State,&quoute; Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, June 2013, 19, http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/SpecialReport-Guinea-Bissau-JUN2013-EN.pdf?utm_source=ACSS+Releases+Special+Report+-+Advancing+Stability+%26+Reconciliation+in+G.+Bissau&utm_campaign=Special_report_GB&utm_medium=email.
- NISAT. Mapping Arms Data: Guinea Bissau. http://nisatapps.prio.org/armsglobe/index.php.
- Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman and Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, &quoute;Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa,&quoute; SIPRI Policy Paper No. 30, December 2011, 12, 155, http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP30.pdf.
- Sara Moreira, &quoute;Guinea-Bissau President Caught up in ‘Arms for Drugs’ Conspiracy,&quoute; Global Voices, April 15, 2013, accessed July 9, 2014, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/04/15/guinea-bissau-president-caught-up-in-drug-conspiracy-allegations/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The international community recognises the current leadership of Guinea Bissau, this is reflected in the level of cooperation between agencies such as the United Nations, and the World Bank.
For their part, in March 2015, the European Union lifted restrictions on cooperation with Guinea-Bissau imposed in July 2011 after the appointment of the main instigators of the military mutiny in April 2010 to leading posts in the military hierarchy.
Notably, sanctions on EU sanctions on select military personnel remain in place.

See: Council of the EU, (2015). &quoute;Guinea-Bissau: EU lifts restrictions on cooperation&quoute;. Press Release, 24th March. Available: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/24-guinea-bisau-eu-lifts-restrictions-on-cooperation/. Accessed: 14th June 2015.

Lester, M. (2015). &quoute;EU RENEWS GUINEA-BISSAU SANCTIONS REGIME&quoute;. Law and Practice, 12th June. Available:http://europeansanctions.com/category/guinea-bissau/. Accessed: 14th June 2015.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+