Syrian Arab Republic

Researcher4143: In theory, Article 32 of Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement specifically regulates asset disposals. However, such procedures are treated as a matter of national security and, as a result, are confidential. Civil society organizations are therefore likely to avoid any public speculation in the media.

Freedom and right to access information in Syria was and continues to be very limited. Although ‘Decree No. 108/Media Law/ 2011’ guarantees the right to access information about public affairs, Article 12(1) bars the media from publishing content that might affect national security.

Researcher4143: Article 70(8) of the Rules of Procedure of the People’s Council provides that the National Security Committee has the jurisdiction to consider the affairs of the Ministry of Defence and all the departments associated with it. However there is no evidence regarding its involvement in the scrutiny of asset disposals. There is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinized by an oversight body of any form.

Researcher4143: The government has not formally announced that secret budget expenditure is 0. According to the Syrian Ministry of Finance, the State budget for 2013 amounted to 1.3235 trillion SP (Syrian Pounds). Although 132 billion SP were allocated to ‘Defence Expenditure,’ the budget report does not provide any information in relation to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services.

It has been reported that the regime purchased devices and technology to monitor and control internet usage and access. However, there is no information on the expenditure and costs of implementing these measures.

Researcher4143: In theory, there is a legislative committee within the People’s Council. Article 67(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the People’s Council of Syria established the Budget Committee and Accounts. However, the article does not indicate whether the defence and security affairs fall within its jurisdiction.

Article 67(8) of the Rules of Procedure of the People’s Council provides that the National Security Committee has the jurisdiction to consider the affairs of the Ministry of defence and all the departments associated with it. However, there is no evidence to suggest that either of them or the Parliament in general has been provided with any information on spending on secret items.

Researcher4143: In theory, there is a legislative committee within the People’s Council. of Article 67(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the People’s Council of Syria established the Budget Committee and Accounts. However, the article does not indicate whether the defence and security affairs fall within its jurisdiction.

Article 67(8) of the Rules of Procedure of the People’s Council provides that the National Security Committee has the jurisdiction to consider the affairs of the Ministry of defence and all the departments associated with it. However, there is no evidence to suggest that either of them or the Parliament in general, is provided with audit reports on secret items.

Defence projects and policies are classified as highly secretive matters and are strictly discussed, decided and initiated by the Presidential Palace and the close circle of the president, which is composed of his family members, security advisors and senior members of Al Baath party. Therefore, the legislature is informed of given reports rather than invited to participate in debating them.

Researcher4143: There is no legal instrument or provision to permit or prohibit off-budget expenditures. However, when they occur, and they do, they are not reported on.

Article 80(4) of the 2012 Constitution provides that the People’s Council might not increase the estimates of total revenues or expenditures while examining the budget. However, the Military and Defence sector has traditionally operated flexibly and financed itself through the back-door. This has included using revenue from natural resources, which is not clearly allocated in the State budget. This revenue is used to pay loyalists in security forces and purchase military equipment.

Furthermore, the Syrian regime has received systematic financial support from both Iran and Iraq. These funds have been used to finance and support the military and security sectors.

Researcher4143: There are substantial off-budget military expenditures, which involve indications of illicit economic activities. For many decades the military has depended on unofficial revenue from natural resources, which is not clearly allocated in the State budget. This revenue is used to pay loyalists in security forces and purchase military equipment.

Furthermore, the Syrian regime has received systematic financial and monetary support from both Iran and Iraq to overcome its severe shortage of foreign currency. During the civil war, substantial amounts of public resources were shifted towards military expenditure. As a result, the increased expenditure combined with the drop in revenue created a surge in the public deficit, which has been reflected by a dramatic jump in public debt.

Researcher4143: Although a new media law, which guarantees the right to access information about public affairs, was issued in 2011, the same law bars the media from publishing content that might affect national security.

While the Syrian Penal Code No. 148 (1949) provides some insight into what might constitute a threat to national security, in the absence of any provisions that regulate mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, such classification is systematically considered on arbitrary basis at the discretion of the inspectors, officers and chiefs of the various security institutions across Syria.

Threats to national security are closely associated with the conduct of individuals or groups who attempt to challenge the regime's existing authorities or the country’s political status quo. Actions such as blogging and writing poems criticizing government performance have been prosecuted under ‘Weakening the National Sentiment’ charges and the work is subsequently removed from the public domain.

The security sector maintains a strong and traditional influence over the functioning of the Syrian judicial system. The latter has struggled for decades with corruption and nepotism and applied pressure from security institutions, rendering both its effectiveness and independence highly questionable if it attempted to regulate mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security.

Diverting from their original mission, Syrian courts have become the legal institution responsible for the repression of political and civil activists, using, as its tool, the lack of any clear defined legal basis as to what constitutes a threat to the national security and how information is classified.

Researcher4143: Defence institutions publicly state their ownership of commercial businesses. However, details of their operations, audits and finances are not transparent.

Like the rest of the Syrian public sector, defence institutions and establishments have not managed to survive the corrupt culture in Syria. Army and security officers have not been recruited based on their competence, but based on their loyalty to the regime. As a consequence, some have held their positions for decades.

These patterns enhanced the engagement of army and security officers in corrupt activities and kept the defence and security institutions excluded from scrutiny. Furthermore, Military and Defence establishments lead and manage a widespread network of factories, foundations and hospitals, which produce goods and provide training and services to both military personnel and civilians.

Establishments such as the Military Housing Foundation, the Defence Factories and the Military Construction Foundation, some of which are managed by the President's associates, are associated with corruption and nepotism, even by the official media and newspapers. These establishments continue to be under the ownership of the defence institutions.

In addition, many officers have benefited from their positions by establishing their own business and enterprises. Many of these projects were either established inside Syria to recycle accumulated funds, or established abroad, providing a money laundering channel for the regime to circumvent European and American sanctions.

Researcher4143: Like the rest of the defence institutions, military-owned businesses are not subject to transparent and independent scrutiny. Freedom of and access to information in Syria was and remains very limited. Although ‘Decree No. 108/Media Law/ 2011’ guarantees the right to access information about public affairs, Article 12(1) bars the media from publishing content that might affect national security.

In addition, the Rules of Procedure of the People’s Council of Syria indicates in Article 67(8) that the National Security Committee, which is a parliamentary committee, has the jurisdiction to consider the affairs of the Ministry of defence and all the departments associated with it. However there is no evidence as to its role in relation to military-owned businesses.

Also, the Budget Committee and Accounts, established by virtue of Article 67(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the People’s Council of Syria, has no oversight or scrutiny power over the defence and security sector, their affairs or their budget. Furthermore, the President’s branches run some of these businesses. For instance, Mr. Riyad Shalish, the President’s cousin, manages the Military Construction Foundation.

Researcher4143: Defence personnel are permitted to own properties and business as long as the latter are not related to the domain they are working in. However, traditionally, army and security officers have not been recruited based on their competence, but based on their loyalty to the regime and some have held their positions for decades. Many officers have benefitted from their positions by establishing their own unauthorised businesses and enterprises. Many of these projects were either established inside Syria to recycle their accumulated funds, or established abroad, providing a money laundry blanket for the regime to circumvent international sanctions.

In some examples, high-ranking officers established strong connections with the Sunni business elite and the latter operated as the commercial cover for the former. Many reports indicate the involvement of Syrian army and intelligence officers in smuggling Iraqi oil, particularly under the regime of Saddam Hussein, to and via Syria.

Individuals within defence and intelligence institutions have maintained these well-established financial interests in the country's natural resources. For instance, Maher Al Assad, the brother of the Syrian president and the commander of the Republican Guards, owns (in association with a businessman) Al Rai Group, which has interests in the Syrian metallurgic industry. Moreover, Hafez Makhlouf and Iyad Makhlouf, both cousins of the Syrian president and officers in the General Intelligence Department (GID), own various petroleum companies in association with their brother and businessman Rami Makhlouf.

As these figures and officers are considered indispensible to the stability of the regime, a blind eye has been turned to the corrupt practices in the defence sector.

Researcher4143: There is no evidence of any such commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs, and there is no evidence that any such commitments are made by senior ministry of defence or armed forces staff. Security officials and officers do not appear on media platforms, and those in the Defence sector do not address corruption matters nor anti-corruption and integrity measures in their speeches, or in their rare appearances on media.

Researcher4143: According to Articles 50 and 53 of the Decree No.61 of 1950, The Military Penal Code, the Military Court has jurisdiction over both army officers and civil employees of the Ministry of Defence for all felonies and misdemeanors (Article 3).

However, neither the Decree, nor any other provision, refers to anti-corruption and/or bribery or effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption. Indeed, security officers and personnel are immune from most prosecution by virtue of Article 16 of Legislative Decree No. 14 1969, Article 74 of Legislative Decree No. 549 Date of 1969 and Legislative Decree No. 64 of 2008.

Prosecution is only possible following a decision by the General Command of the Army and Armed forces. In addition, the Military Court, like the rest of the Syrian judicial system, is subject to corruption and nepotism, which renders both its effectiveness and independence highly questionable.

Moreover, in order to overcome economic challenges spurred by low wages, the Government has traditionally turned a blind eye to bribery in an attempt to bridge the large gap between average incomes and expenditures. Defence and security institutions and establishments are not immune to the corruption culture in Syria. Army officers have not traditionally been recruited based on their competence, but rather on their loyalty to the regime - some have held their positions for decades. These patterns enhanced the engagement of army officers in corrupt activities and kept defence establishments and policy excluded from scrutiny.

As these figures and officers are considered to be indispensible to the stability of the regime, a blind eye has been turned to corrupt practices in the defence sector. Any attempt to counter corruption in this sector is associated with eliminating officers whose loyalty is suspected or whose activities and practices took international dimensions that threatened national security. For example, former Intelligence Chief Gen. Bashir al-Najjar was ousted in 1998 due to loyalty issues and later sentenced to prison on corruption charges. Yet, loyalists such as Gen. Mustafa Tlass, the former Minister of defence, were immune from any form of prosecution despite evidence of corruption.

Researcher4143: There is no evidence to suggest the existence of legislation or mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel to facilitate corruption reporting, nor institutionalized mechanisms of whistle-blower protection. Considering the secretive nature of the Syrian defence sector, the latter remains outside the observation and scrutiny of any anti-corruption policy and/or measures. Approaching and/or addressing corruption in the security and defence sectors is dangerous task and is often associated with breaching national security.

Researcher4143: Sensitive positions in defence procurement, contracting, financial management and commercial management are often treated a as gift for those with proven loyalty to the regime. There is no evidence to suggest that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions.

Researcher4143: The number of civilian and military personnel was accurately known and publicly available before the war. However, the numbers have become a matter of speculation since the war eruption. This is due to many factors, but the most apparent drivers are defection from the army, which occurs on daily basis, and the merge between the regular army units and the paramilitary groups, such as the National Defence Forces (NDF).

Response to peer reviewers:
This question assesses government attitudes towards providing such information, rather than whether the numbers are available and/or estimated by external sources and domains. While peer reviewer 1 states that “media and academic reports from late 2014 do provide some estimations”, those numbers do not derive from official statements. In addition, estimated numbers vary considerably. Therefore, for the reasons above, a score of 0 has been maintained.

Researcher4143: Pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel are openly published on the websites of both the Syrian Bar Association and the People’s Council of Syria. Legislative Decree No. 18 of the Military Service Law regulates salaries, bonuses and promotion mechanisms. The Decree provides a detailed breakdown of each rank and its awarded salary and allowances.

Researcher4143: Before the war, personnel generally received the correct pay on time. Article 86 of the Legislative Decree No. 18, concerning Military Service Law, provides that salaries are to be paid at the beginning of every month. The system of payment was well-established, routine, and published. However, since the advent of the war, late payments have often been reported, which is attributed to the sharp decline in revenue from oil, tourism, industry and agriculture as they were directly affected by the drastic consequences of international sanctions and civil war.

Moreover, the defence budget has been exhausted due to the increase in spending by the intelligence and defence ministries to pay loyalist militias who assisted in crushing the demonstrations at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, and who later joined the war as key players in support of the central government in Damascus.

Researcher4143: In theory, Legislative Decree No. 18, concerning the Military Service Law, provides a system for the appointment of military personnel. However, there is no evidence to suggest the use of objective job descriptions, of assessment processes, or of provision for oversight of the appointment process by independent personnel.

In practice, appointments are awarded based on entirely different factors. Army personnel, at middle and top management level, are often appointed and promoted based on their sectarian affiliation (being Alawite) and their proven loyalty to the regime. Of these criteria, loyalty appears to be the predominant factor, allowing some Sunni officers to assume high positions within the intelligence services structure, such as General Ali Mamlouk the Head of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate.

Researcher4143: In theory, Legislative Decree No. 18, concerning the Military Service Law, provides a system for the appointment of military personnel. However, in practice, appointments are awarded based on entirely different factors. While promotion at lower ranks functions fairly systematically, army personnel at middle and top management level are often promoted based on their sectarian affiliation (being Alawite) and their proven loyalty to the regime. Of these criteria, loyalty appears to be the predominant factor, allowing some Sunni officers to assume high positions within the intelligence services structure, such as General Ali Mamlouk the Head of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate.

Although the promotion system is publicly known and published, there is no evidence to suggest the existence of promotion boards outside the chain of command, nor an oversight mechanism of the process.

Researcher4143: Syrian male citizens are subject to compulsory military conscription from the age of 18 years for 18 months. While articles 341-9 of the Penal Code 1949/148 prohibit any form of bribery, abuse of position or nepotism, these articles do not act as an effective deterrent - there is a bulk of evidence to suggest that bribing officers and nepotism are the key means to either postponing enlistment or avoiding conscription altogether.

Army and security officers and personnel are immune from prosecution by virtue of Article 16 of Legislative Decree No. 14 1969, Article 74 of Legislative Decree No. 549 Date of 1969 and Legislative Decree No. 64 of 2008. Prosecution is only possible following a decision by the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces.

Like the rest of the public sector in Syria, defence and security institutions and establishments are not immune from the corruption culture in Syria. To overcome economic challenges spurred by low incomes, the government has turned a blind eye to bribery in an attempt to bridge the large gap between average incomes and expenditures.

Response to peer reviewer:
It is important to distinguish between the regime's urgent need to enlist young men and its ability to control the corruption within its defence institutions. In my opinion, the latter is still out of control and paying a bribe to avoid conscription is still the case. I have added four recent sources in support of this view. Therefore, a score of 1 has been maintained.

Researcher4143: Voluntary conscription occurs in Syria and Syrian male citizens are subject to compulsory military conscription from the age of 18 years for 18 months. While articles 341-9 of the Penal Code 1949/148 prohibit any form of bribery, abuse of position or nepotism, there is a bulk of evidence to suggest that bribing officers and nepotism are the key means to accessing preferred postings and locations over the course of both voluntarily and compulsory conscription.

Army and security officers and personnel are immune from prosecution by virtue of Article 16 of Legislative Decree No. 14 1969, Article 74 of Legislative Decree No. 549 of 1969 and Legislative Decree No. 64 of 2008. Prosecution is only possible following a decision by the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces. However, there is no evidence to suggest that any officer or member of staff has ever been prosecuted for offering or receiving bribes for soliciting preferred postings.

Like the rest of the public sector in Syria, defence and security institutions and establishments are not immune from the corrupt culture in Syria. To overcome economic challenges fueled by low incomes, the Government has turned a blind eye to bribery in an attempt to bridge the huge gap between average incomes and expenditures.

Researcher4143: The presence of non-existent employees on the payroll is a widespread phenomenon in Syria. Many reports, particularly following the outbreak of the war in 2013, have indicated the existence of a similar practice in the defence sector.

This situation has been enhanced by two factors. Firstly, the numbers of civilian and military personnel have become a matter of speculation since the advent of the war. This is due to defection from the army, which occurs on a daily basis, and the merge between the regular army units and the paramilitary groups, such as the National Defence Forces (NDF).

Secondly, since the advent of the war, late payments have often been reported, which is attributed to the sharp decline in revenue such as the oil, tourism, industry and agriculture as they were directly affected by the drastic consequences of the international sanctions and the civil war. These factors call into question the strength of payment and personnel systems in Syria, leaving them susceptible to the kind of corruption risks associated with ghost soldiers.

Researcher4143: While salaries and allowances for civilian and military personnel are openly published, there is no evidence that chains of command are separated from chains of payment.

It is unclear how likely it is that funds for soldiers are stolen or diverted en route. Before the war, personnel generally received the correct pay on time. Article 86 of the Legislative Decree No. 18, concerning Military Service Law, provides that salaries are to be paid at the beginning of every month. The system of payment was well-established, routine, and published. However, since the advent of the war, late payments have often been reported, which is attributed to the sharp decline in revenue from oil, tourism, industry and agriculture as they were directly affected by the drastic consequences of international sanctions and civil war.

However, the regime is in dire need of human resources for its army and defence forces and has shifted and mobilized significant public resource in order to meet military expenses which includes the wages of its army personnel. While bribery and nepotism are widespread in the Syrian army, wages are an entirely different story. Where payment interruption occurs, it is hard to pinpoint whether this is due to diversion by senior officers or a more general lack of resources.

Researcher4143: There is no evidence of any Code of Conduct for Defence Ministry personnel covering conduct with respect to corruption.

The oath that Syrian military personnel swear on on entering service doesn't mention corruption or integrity, and while bribery, abuse of position and nepotism are outlawed in legislation by articles 341-9 of the Penal Code 1949/148, there is no proof that this is adhered to in practice.

Furthermore, the defence sector remains outside the scope and scrutiny of both the ‘Anti-Corruption Commission’ and the ‘Central Commission for Control and Inspection.’

Researcher4143: There is no evidence of any Code of Conduct for Defence Ministry personnel covering conduct with respect to corruption. Furthermore, the defence sector remains outside the scope and scrutiny of both the ‘Anti-Corruption Commission’ and the ‘Central Commission for Control and Inspection.’

The oath that Syrian military personnel swear on on entering service doesn't mention corruption or integrity, and while bribery, abuse of position and nepotism are outlawed in legislation by articles 341-9 of the Penal Code 1949/148, there is a bulk of evidence to suggest that bribing officers and nepotism are the key means to access preferred postings and locations during the course of both voluntarily and compulsory conscription.

Army and security officers and personnel are immune from prosecution by virtue of, Article 16 of Legislative Decree No. 14 1969, Article 74 of Legislative Decree No. 549 of 1969 and Legislative Decree No. 64 of 2008. Prosecution is only possible after a decision by the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces. However, there is no evidence to suggest that any officers or military personnel have been prosecuted for offering or receiving bribes for soliciting preferred postings.

Researcher4143: There is no evidence of regular anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel. While the government states its intentions to tackle and counter corruption, its anti-corruption efforts remain periodic and selective rather than steady, systematic and based on transparent policy.

Any attempt to counter corruption in the sector is associated with eliminating officers whose loyalty is suspected or whose activities and practices have an international dimension considered threatening to national security. This attitude has increased the engagement of army officers in corrupt activities and kept defence establishments and policy excluded from scrutiny. It has also hindered any opportunity to establish an institution within the defence and security sectors to counter corruption. For instance, the defence sector remains outside the scope and scrutiny of both the ‘Anti-Corruption Commission’ and the ‘Central Commission for Control and Inspection.’

Researcher4143: There is no evidence of an existing policy to make public the outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. Freedom of and access to information in Syria was and remains very limited. Although ‘Decree No. 108/Media Law/ 2011’ guarantees the right to access information about public affairs, Article 12(1) bars the media from publishing content that might affect the national security.

In addition, According to Articles 50 and 53 of the Decree No.61 of 1950, The Military Penal Code, the Military Court has jurisdiction over both the army officers and the civil employees of the Ministry of Defence, for all felonies and misdemeanors (Article 3). However, neither the Decree, nor any other provision, refers to anti-corruption and/or bribery or effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption.

Indeed, Security officers and personnel are immune from prosecution by virtue of, Article 16 of Legislative Decree No. 14 1969, Article 74 of Legislative Decree No. 549 Date of 1969 and Legislative Decree No. 64 of 2008. Prosecution is only possible following a decision by the General Command of the Army and Armed forces. In addition, the Military Court, like the rest of the Syrian judicial system, is subject to corruption and nepotism, which renders both its effectiveness and independence highly questionable.

Moreover, to overcome economic challenges fuelled by low wages, the government has often turned a blind eye to bribery in an attempt to bridge the huge gap between average incomes and expenditures. The defence and security institutions and establishments are not immune from the corruption culture in Syria. Army officers have traditionally not been recruited based on competence, but rather their loyalty to the regime - some had held their positions for decades. These patterns have enhanced the engagement of army officers in corrupt activities and kept the defence establishments and policy excluded from scrutiny.

As these figures and officers are considered indispensable to the stability of the regime, a blind eye has been turned to the corruption practices in the defence sector. Any attempt to counter corruption in this sector is associated with eliminating officers whose loyalty is suspected or whose activities and practices took international dimension considered as threatening to national security. For instance, former Intelligence Chief Gen. Bashir al-Najjar was ousted in 1998 due to loyalty issues and was later sentenced to prison on corruption charges. Yet, loyalists such as Gen. Mustafa Tlass, the former Minister of defence, were immune from any form of accountability despite evidence of corruption. This has resulted in public distrust over any attempted prosecution and/or conviction of army personnel.

Researcher4143: In the absence of any effective measures to discourage facilitation payments in the Syrian army, such payments have become a convention in the military institutions. Facilitation payments remain, along with nepotism, one of the main keys to obtain sick leave, receive preferential treatment during service or gain preferred postings in the recruitment process. These practices are widespread within the defence institutions and the regime has never shown the will to counter them. As army officers are considered to be indispensable to the stability of the regime previously and its survival recently, the government has turned a blind eye to corrupt practices in the defence sector.

Researcher4143: There is no evidence of awareness of, or a military doctrine addressing, corruption as a strategic issue on operations. During the two events in which the Syrian army has been deployed, in Lebanon (1975-2005) and Syria since the eruption of the civil war in 2012, corruption has been evident and overseen by high ranking officers who themselves were involved in. In Lebanon, army personnel were involved in robbery at Syrian checkpoints across Lebanon and some properties were burgled and looted. The same conduct was reported and has been systematically widespread across Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in 2012.

Researcher4143: There is no training in corruption issues for commanders. During the two events in which the Syrian army was recently deployed, Lebanon (1975-2005) and Syria since the eruption of the civil war in 2012, corruption has been evident and overseen by high ranking officers who themselves have been complicit.

In Lebanon, army personnel were involved in robberies at Syrian checkpoints across Lebanon and some properties were burgled and looted. The same conduct has been reported and has been systematically widespread across Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in 2012.

Researcher4143: Syria deploys no personnel for corruption monitoring. The defence sector remains outside the scope, jurisdiction and scrutiny of both the ‘Anti-Corruption Commission’ and the ‘Central Commission for Control and Inspection.’ Furthermore, Syria does not contribute to peacekeeping missions.

Nevertheless, the Syrian army has been deployed abroad twice, once in 1991 when it joined the international campaign to liberate Kuwait, and the other in Lebanon from 1995 to 2005. In Lebanon, corruption was evident and overseen by high-ranking officers who themselves were complicit. Army personnel were involved in robberies at Syrian checkpoints across Lebanon and some properties were burgled and looted. These patterns remained unchallenged and commanders engaged in and turned blind eye to such activities.

Researcher4143: There is no evidence or relevant guidelines or training. This lack of training applies to the full range of contracting procedures that accompany international deployments: construction and maintenance, base contracting, translating and logistics, and security companies.

Syria does not contribute to the peacekeeping missions. However, the Syrian army was deployed abroad twice, once in 1991 when it joined the international campaign to liberate Kuwait, and the other time was in Lebanon from 1995 to 2005. In Lebanon, corruption was evident and exceeded the limits of bribery to burglary. These patterns remained unchallenged and commanders engaged in and turned blind eye to such activities.

Researcher4143: No sources could be used or found in regards to the presence or operation of Private Military Companies. There are no regulations to forbid their use, but a high ranking officer in the Syrian army (still serving there) in June 2014 stated that no PMCs were in operation in Syria.

However, it must be noted that there are “mercenaries” who are paid and funded by the Syrian regime, assisting it with the fight against the rebels. Although they do not operate within the framework of particular companies, they could be considered as private contractors. They are in Syria on both ideological and individual grounds, and it is unclear what scrutiny they are subjected to. There are, however, reports of these contractors being prosecuted in their own countries for their actions in Syria.

Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 1.

Researcher4143: Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement covers various provisions such as the rules of the tender procedure, direct and indirect procurement, internal and external procurement contracts and the implementation of contracts provisions and clauses. However, these provisions are by-passed systematically and remain unfulfilled.

Procurement activities are often performed on occasional basis that are associated with major events (wars) and/or the defensive orientation of the Syrian combat doctrine. Realizing and admitting the superiority of the Israeli air forces and tanks, the Syrian combat doctrine is of a defensive nature in which it relies on defensive systems (such air defence missile systems), weapons of mass destruction and the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare.

In addition, procurement activities are affected by the extensive trade restrictions imposed on Syria since the beginning of the civil war, which include an arms embargo banning the export of arms and related material for military use. Furthermore, the secretive nature of the Syrian defence sector ensured that the latter remains outside the observation and scrutiny of any anti corruption policy and/or law.

Researcher4143: Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement regulates the contracts of sales and procurement of the Ministry of Defence, including asset disposal. However, this procedure is treated as a matter of national security and as a result is confidential. Procurement details are not disclosed to the public and the only route to learn about these deals is often in foreign media.

Nevertheless, Article 7 of Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement outlines a ‘Book of General Conditions’ which provides the rights and obligations of the contracting parties, the stages that precede the contract, its implementation, and the maintenance resulting from it along with the technical conditions. This could be considered as limited disclosure of some defence procurement cycle information.

Acquiring further information on the defence procurement cycle process is not possible. Any attempt to acquire or obtain such information would likely be deemed as a threat to the national security. Although ‘Decree No. 108/Media Law/ 2011’ guarantees the right to access information about public affairs, Article 12(1) bars the media from publishing content that might affect national security.

Researcher4143: There is no evidence of procurement oversight mechanisms, neither officially nor independently. Officially, although the ‘Central Commission for Control and Inspection’ is the main administrative body responsible for coordinating and monitoring public sector corruption, the defence establishment falls outside its jurisdiction.

Furthermore, Article 70(8) of the Rules of Procedure of the People’s Council provides that the National Security Committee has the jurisdiction to consider the affairs of the Ministry of Defence and all the departments associated with it. However there is no evidence of its role in relation to defence procurement oversight.

In addition, the ‘Anti-Corruption Commission,’ established and approved by the government in 2013, excludes from its jurisdiction in Article 6 the Ministry of Defence and the security forces in the Ministry of Interior.

Due to the secretive nature of the Syrian defence sector, any attempt to demand the implementation of such oversight mechanism would likely be deemed as a threat to national security.

Researcher4143: Defence purchases and the aggregate total spend are not disclosed to the public. Instead, information about defence purchases reaches Syrians through foreign media outlets. An example of this is the 1997 South African arms sale to Syria, which was only covered in foreign media rather than the official or domestic news agencies and channels.

The absence of any clarity and/or transparency has also been evident during and after the negotiation and sale of Russian arms to Syria. Most notable is the S-300 air defence case, of which the Syrian public learned about from foreign media. There is still confusion surrounding the case, as the Syrian foreign minister appeared in a Lebanese newspaper to confirm that Syria will get the S-300, while Russian officials stated in August 2014 that the deal has been cancelled.

In addition, although ‘Decree No. 108/Media Law/ 2011’ guarantees the right to access information about public affairs, Article 12(1), however, bars the media from publishing content that might affect national security.

Researcher4143: Article 14 of Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement regulates the rules of the tender procedure. Article 14(4) of Law No. 8 of 2005 stipulates that the bidder should not have been convicted of felony or misdemeanor. Although the Article does not provide a definition as to what constitutes felonies and misdemeanors, generally speaking, the Syrian legislature acknowledged bribe to be a felony in the Syrian Penal code, article 353(2). It also makes a reference to fraud and misrepresentation as valid reasons to terminate a contract.

It is also worth noting that procurement activities are affected by the extensive trade restrictions imposed on Syria since the beginning of the civil war, including an arms embargo banning the export of arms and related material for military use.

Researcher4143: Procurement requirements are not derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy. An audited national defence strategy does not exist at all and available evidence indicates that procurement requirements are increasingly derived on occasional basis in association with major events (war) and/or the defensive orientation of the Syrian combat doctrine.

Prior to the civil war, procurement requirements appeared to be derived from a number of key national defence and security objectives, including the attainment of ballistic missile capabilities and strategic parity with Israel. These fueled the import of ballistic missiles and of anti-tank and anti-air weapons systems, including the failed acquisition of the S300 air defence system. Realizing and admitting the superiority of the Israeli air forces and tanks, the Syrian combat doctrine was of a defensive nature in which it relied on defensive systems (such air defence missile systems), weapons of mass destruction and the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare.

The secretive nature of the Syrian defence sector and the ongoing conflict have meant that this area remains outside the observation and scrutiny of any known anti corruption policy and/or law. Military defence expenditure and the financial affairs of the Ministry of Defence also remain a matter of speculation, as they are kept confidential on grounds of national security. According to Law no. 27/2014, the State budget for 2015 amounted to 1.554 trillion SP (Syrian Pounds). However, the budget report does not provide a break down of expenditure into functions nor key items of expenditure.

Response to peer reviewer: Comments and sources have been incorporated. The criteria to award score 1 would require clear evidence that formally links procurement requirements to a national defence and security strategy. As this is not visible (nor are ongoing procurements or the national strategy made available by the government) it is not possible to verify this. Score maintained.

Researcher4143: The affairs of the Ministry of Defence remain a matter of speculation, as they are confidential due to their importance to national security. Purchases are not based on quantification of requirements. They are often opportunistic in nature and are performed on occasional basis that are associated with major events (wars) and/or the defensive orientation of the Syrian combat doctrine.

The opportunistic nature of acquisitions was enhanced by the extensive trade restrictions imposed on Syria since the beginning of the civil war, which include an arms embargo banning the export of arms and related material for military use.

In addition, realizing and admitting the superiority of the Israeli air forces and tanks, the Syrian combat doctrine is of a defensive nature in which it relies on defensive systems (such air defence missile systems), weapons of mass destruction and the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare.

The secretive nature of the Syrian defence sector ensures that it remains outside the observation and scrutiny of any anti corruption policy and/or law.

Researcher4143: While Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement states that defence procurement should be conducted as open competition, the majority of defence contracts, however, are conducted as single-source.

Traditionally, Syrian military equipment was acquired from the Soviet Union and what used to be known as the ‘Eastern Bloc.’ Following the collapse of both, Russia became the main resource for military equipment along with North Korea and Iran. The collaboration extended to the rehabilitation of the Syrian military arsenal and training.

Procurement is often performed on occasional basis that are associated with major events (wars) and/or the defensive orientation of the Syrian combat doctrine. Realizing and admitting the superiority of the Israeli air forces and tanks, the Syrian combat doctrine is of a defensive nature in which it relies on defensive systems (such air defence missile systems), weapons of mass destruction and the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare.

Furthermore, personal relationships and connections between the Syrian defence officials and those from the selling nations have played significant role in sealing various defence deals and agreements. The international sanctions imposed on the Syrian defence sector are another factor that must also be taken in consideration. This leaves the Syrian regime with fewer options but to purchase from nations with whom it enjoys close ideological and political ties, pushing it towards a single-sourcing model.

While the 2013 version of this assessment referenced a contract law here, defence contracts are not subject to Contract Law No. 51 of 2004. They are subject to Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement.

Researcher4143: Article 14(2) of Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement provides for the specifications of the tender board and in theory it subjects the latter to regulations and codes of conduct (although it does not refer to those regulations as a code of conduct). For instance, Article 14(2)(G) states that the board chairman or member must declare whether he or she is a relative or personally known to a potential tendering authority. These provisions are publicly available in tender books.

However, enhanced by the ongoing civil war, there is no evidence of independent audits of tender boards. Although the ‘Central Commission for Control and Inspection’ is the main administrative body responsible for coordinating and monitoring public sector corruption, defence establishments fall outside its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the ‘Anti-Corruption Commission,’ established and approved by the government in 2013, excludes from its jurisdiction in Article 6 the Ministry of Defence and the security forces in the Ministry of Interior.

It is worth mentioning that personal relationships and connections between the Syrian defence officials and those from the selling nations have played significant role in sealing various defence deals and agreements.

Researcher4143: There is no clause or article in ‘Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence contracts of sale and procurement’ to suggest discouragement and/or punishment for collusion. However, the latter practice is prohibited in general by virtue of article 342 of the Penal Code 1949/148.

While the 2013 version of this assessment mentioned a contract law here, defence contracts are not subject to Contract Law No. 51 of 2004. They are subject to Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement.

Researcher4143: There is no evidence to suggest that the defence procurement staff are organized into a professional staff department, nor trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations.

Procurement is often performed on an occasional and opportunistic basis following major events (wars) and/or the defensive orientation of the Syrian combat doctrine. Personal relationships and connections between Syrian defence officials and those from the selling nations have played a significant role in sealing various defence deals and agreements. This is likely to result in little control or oversight of defence contractors by procurement staff, and undue influence from higher grades.

Researcher4143: Without spelling out or mentioning ‘perceived malpractice’, Article 22 of Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement provides the right for companies to complain about any problem that might arise upon the execution of the contract. If no agreement is reached, then the company has the right to seek arbitration before the Syrian Administrative Judiciary by virtue of article 24 of Law No. 8.

However, there is no available evidence to suggest that such process has taken place. It is highly unlikely that such mechanisms would be used or take place under the current circumstances of the ongoing civil war. Also, and even if the arbitration procedure set out in Article 24 were followed, complaining companies would have to deal with a severe and pyramidal system of corruption within the Syrian judiciary system. The latter has struggled for decades with corruption and nepotism and applied pressure from the security departments, rendering both its effectiveness and independence highly questionable.

Researcher4143: Article 25(2) of Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement provides the right for the Minister of Defence to terminate the contract if the contractor commits an act of fraud and/or misrepresentation. Further, article 28 debars him (the contractor or supplier) from contracting with the Ministry of Defence.

Evidence suggests that sanctions are actually mandatory in Syria, i.e. government entities are required to withdraw an order from an awarded contractor in the event of bribery, fraud and “manipulation”.

This information comes from a MENA-OECD report, which references Syria’s Organising Decree No. 195/T dated 25 July 1974 regulating contracts and tenders of public establishments, companies and enterprises (article 47(a) (3)). This covers defence contracts.

Notwithstanding, there is no available evidence to suggest that such practice has ever taken place.

Researcher4143: Generally speaking, Syria engages in offsets contracts and official newspapers often publish the news of offset programmes. The news reveals some details of offset contracts which includes: the contract details, the parties to the contract, the deal value and whether the contract is in favor of the Syrian party or not. However, no evidence could be found for the same practice in relation to the defence sector. There is no evidence in either Law No. 8 of 2005 or Law No. 51 of 2004 to suggest that the government addresses corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors when negotiating offset contracts.

Researcher4143: Generally speaking, official newspapers often publish news about offset programmes. The news reveals some details of offset contracts which includes: the contract details, the parties to the contract, the deal value and whether the contract is in favor of the Syrian party or not. However, no evidence could be found of the same practice in relation to the defence sector.

Researcher4143: There is no evidence in ‘Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement’ to suggest that offset contracts are subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract.

Researcher4143: While there is no evidence of existing provisions that regulate their use and control, agents and intermediaries remain key figures in the procurement cycle in the Syrian defence sector. Their role provided significant help for the regime to circumvent international sanctions.

In other sectors, there does appear to be a general prohibition of the exercise of intermediaries in government procurement, but there is no evidence that this applies to defence.

Researcher4143: Article 7 of Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning the Ministry of Defence Contracts of Sale and Procurement includes a ‘Book of General Conditions’ which is split into three parts.

1-tThe book of general conditions.
2-tThe book of technical conditions.
3-tThe book of special conditions.

These books provide technical and general guidance in the stage that precedes the contract. They are made available to the interested parties prior to the signing of contracts and they provide technical and general guidance as to the rights and obligations of the contracting parties (technical, financial and procedural). The first book is of a general application; the second and the third are modified and amended on contract-by-contract basis. The details of the financial package surrounding the deal are presumably included in these books, but the information is only visible to the parties of the contract.

Considering the implication of the widespread corruption surrounding the defence sector and its contracts and agreements, it is highly unlikely that further details would be available in the public domain.

Researcher4143: There is no evidence in either Law No. 8 of 2005 or Law No. 51 of 2004 to suggest that the government formally requires the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes.

Response to peer reviewer:
I am not sure that a group made up of Russia, China, North Korea, few Eastern Bloc, Arab states, and Iran constitutes a ‘drastically limited choice of suppliers’. They appear to be not only to have a variety of resources, but also their industries respond directly to the defensive strategy of the Syrian army according to its battle doctrine.

Researcher4143: It is difficult to assess this in light of the ongoing conflict. Traditionally, Syrian military equipment was acquired from the Soviet Union and what has been known as the ‘Eastern Bloc.’ Following the collapse of both, Russia became the main resource for military equipment along with North Korea and Iran. The collaboration extended to the rehabilitation of the Syrian military arsenal and training.

While these nations have some political influence in Syria, they do not necessarily influence defence acquisition decisions. Procurement is often performed on an occasional basis driven by major events (wars) and/or the defensive orientation of the Syrian combat doctrine. Realizing and admitting the superiority of the Israeli air forces and tanks, the Syrian combat doctrine is of a defensive nature in which it relies on defensive systems (such air defence missile systems), weapons of mass destruction and the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare. While personal relationships and connections between Syrian defence officials and those from selling nations have played significant role in sealing various defence deals and agreements, this does not automatically equate to political-level influence.

Sanctions imposed on the Syrian government have left the Syrian regime with no option but to purchase from nations with whom it also enjoys close ideological and political ties.

Response to peer reviewers:

The country assessor held that buying from Russia appears to be a technical necessity rather than a result of political influence. The assessor preferred Score 3 and maintains that “some evidence points towards occasional incidences or small-scale purchasing that has a political element.” In the assessor's opinion this is satisfactory indication to the very occasional incidents in which political element was involved.

The assessor noted that during the Soviet era, although the USSR was the main arms supplier for the Syrian army, Syrian communists were severely persecuted, detained and tortured. Documents have revealed that the USSR failed to influence the Syrian regime on loosening the restrictions imposed on the activities of the Syrian communists. Reports have also indicated Russian dissatisfaction with the level of cooperation demonstrated by the Syrian regime towards the opposition. Russia has nonetheless continued to supply the Syrian regime on a very regular basis with the necessary weaponry, spares and ammunition, which maintain the regime's survival.

Transparency agrees that it was challenging to award a score here and with the assessor's point that other factors than political influence have contributed to create the current procurement relationship between Syria and Russia.

Most analysis indicates that Russia has substantial strategic political and financial need to continue this relationship, and it is widely accepted that the Syrian state has been reliant on this relationship for its survival. The evidence at the time of publication indicates Russia currently remains the only significant supplier to Syria (past estimates have indicated up to 80% of arms purchases). There is also credible evidence that layers of opacity around these deals have been consistently created by both sides. It must therefore be assessed that although there is likely to be an underlying military justification for most procurements, there is high risk that Russia has been able to influence this process to allow manufacturers to maintain sales of specific platforms or equipment.

Score 1 has therefore been awarded.