Researcher4123: There is no information available on the disposal of assets, indeed it is unlikely that a formal process exists. In practice, when assets (such as land) are available for disposal there is opportunity for corruption - a study by Marqaati shows that much public land in the capital has been illegally sold, for example.

The diversion of arms, sale of bullets or weapons by ordinary soldiers is a widespread issue that is speculated on in the media. A UNIDIR report notes that the management of weapons and ammunition in Somalia is a key risk area: &quoute;The FGS is currently unable to account for the location or custody of numerous recently imported weapons.&quoute; The costs of diverted weaponry (both in monetary and operational terms) are reportedly high for the defence and security forces. In addition, the report notes that &quoute;the structure of the FGS defence and security forces remains opaque. This is a fundamental obstacle to the effective management of weapons and ammunition. Unless the FGS can identify units of the defence and security forces precisely, it stands very little chance of implementing a registry and accounting system that could account for the weapons held by those units.&quoute; (p. 1)

In a UN report from 2014, monitors said a number of assault rifles provided by Ethiopia had ended up in street markets in the Somali capital. It added that the weapons were &quoute;undeniably sourced from SNA (Somali army) stockpiles,&quoute; while arms dealers &quoute;also stated that al Shabaab agents were procuring weapons in at least one of the markets.&quoute; (Reuters)

It was concluded that weapons were both being sold illegally by SNA officers taking advantage of poor accountability at the unit level, and that weapons are being leaked at a higher level. The UN reports that it has consistently received testimony from individuals about &quoute;systematic abuses&quoute; by Somalia's government that have resulted in direct transfers of the arms to markets and to al Shabaab. (Reuters, BBC)

These issues suggest that there are no clearly defined procedures surrounding asset disposal, and that few controls are likely to be in place.

Response to government reviewer:
Agreed that there is a steering committee for Arms and Ammunition Management. This was set up in 2014, and has been welcomed by the UNSC as a sign of Somalia's commitment to better managing munitions. However, there is no information about the process for asset disposal available, nor of the specific controls that are in place. Accordingly, I have raised the score from 0 to 1 to reflect the work of the committee, but cannot award a higher score. I have also added this information to the sources list.

Researcher4123: There is no information available on the disposal of assets, indeed it is unlikely that a formal process exists, let alone that asset disposals are scrutinised by an oversight body of any form. In practice, when assets (such as land) are available for disposal there is opportunity for corruption - a study by Marqaati shows that much public land in the capital has been illegally sold, for example.

The diversion of arms, sale of bullets or weapons by ordinary soldiers is a widespread issue that is speculated on in the media. A UNIDIR report notes that the management of weapons and ammunition in Somalia is a key risk area: &quoute;The FGS is currently unable to account for the location or custody of numerous recently imported weapons.&quoute; The costs of diverted weaponry (both in monetary and operational terms) are reportedly high for the defence and security forces. In addition, the report notes that &quoute;the structure of the FGS defence and security forces remains opaque. This is a fundamental obstacle to the effective management of weapons and ammunition. Unless the FGS can identify units of the defence and security forces precisely, it stands very little chance of implementing a registry and accounting system that could account for the weapons held by those units.&quoute; (p. 1)

In a UN report from 2014, monitors said a number of assault rifles provided by Ethiopia had ended up in street markets in the Somali capital. It added that the weapons were &quoute;undeniably sourced from SNA (Somali army) stockpiles,&quoute; while arms dealers &quoute;also stated that al Shabaab agents were procuring weapons in at least one of the markets.&quoute; (Reuters)

It was concluded that weapons were both being sold illegally by SNA officers taking advantage of poor accountability at the unit level, and that weapons are being leaked at a higher level. The UN reports that it has consistently received testimony from individuals about &quoute;systematic abuses&quoute; by Somalia's government that have resulted in direct transfers of the arms to markets and to al Shabaab. (Reuters, BBC)

These issues suggest that there are no clearly defined procedures surrounding asset disposal, and that few controls are likely to be in place. For example, a World Bank report on the financial management capacity of Somalia suggests that no government expenditure is currently audited at all. This does not suggest that an independent and transparent system of scrutiny of asset disposals in the defence sector is likely to be in place.

Response to government reviewer:
Agreed that UNMAS operates in Somalia, but its website does not list a mandate to support the capacity of Somali institutions in the area of asset disposal. Instead, it has delivered weapons marking training for the Somali National Army, and has launched a project to develop the infrastructure and procedures to ensure safe storage, registration and distribution of military equipment by the Security Forces. This is not the same as asset disposal.

In addition, I was unable to verify whether progress is reported on to the PSG2 working group, or whether they provide any formal oversight of the process. However, the as the UNMAS project does not concern asset disposals, this cannot result in a score increase. In addition, the Somali Explosive Management Authority only works in the field of de-mining, which is not relevant to asset disposals.

Researcher4123: The national budget for 2015 breaks down the defence appropriation into broad sections for the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Defence, the Military Court, the Police Force, the Armed Forces, and the National Security Force. Each of these categories contains aggregate information on 'other expenses', for which no further detail is given.

These 'other expenses' can be significant; for example, for the armed forces (which are allocated 58,821,768), 'other expenses' are budgeted at 20,841,768, some 35% of the total money budgeted in the original 2015 budget.

Under the National Security Force budget line (as distinct from lines for the Armed Forces and Police) over 29% is allocated to 'other expenses'. The total level of spending on secret items is unclear.

Researcher4123: The national budget for 2015 breaks down the defence appropriation into broad sections for the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Defence, the Military Court, the Police Force, the Armed Forces, and the National Security Force. Each of these categories contains aggregate information on 'other expenses', for which no further detail is given.

These 'other expenses' can be significant; for example, for the armed forces (which are allocated 58,821,768), 'other expenses' are budgeted at 20,841,768, some 35% of the total money budgeted in the original 2015 budget.

Under the National Security Force budget line (as distinct from lines for the Armed Forces and Police) over 29% is allocated to 'other expenses'.

It is unclear whether the parliament receives any additional information on these 'other expenses' that is not available to the general public. It is also unclear whether a copy of the budget is available to them in Somali or Arabic, the two official languages of Somalia.

Response to government reviewer:
While the budget appropriation act is published (and is listed as the source for this response), this does not include a detailed breakdown of all defence and intelligence spending. Secret spending is not directly referenced, although it may be encapsulated under 'other expenses'. Given it is unclear whether information on secret items is provided to the legislature, a score of 0 has been selected.

Researcher4123: A World Bank report on the financial management capacity of Somalia suggests that the existing percentage of government expenditures that are audited is 0. The Budgetary Execution Process tab on the Ministry of Finance website leads to a blank page, making it hard to determine whether there is any existing policy on providing legislators with audit reports on secret items.

In any case, the lack of detail available on secret spending would make auditing difficult. The national budget for 2015 breaks down the defence appropriation into broad sections for the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Defence, the Military Court, the Police Force, the Armed Forces, and the National Security Force.

There is a section entitled 'other expenses' for each section, for which no further detail is given. These 'other expenses' can be significant; for example, for the armed forces (which are allocated 58,821,768), 'other expenses' are budgeted at 20,841,768, some 35% of the total money budgeted in the original 2015 budget.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, although an audit office exists by law, its powers to investigate and sanction fraud and corruption are limited due to lack of capacity and resources of governance institutions in the country. In addition, the audit office does not have the mandate to cover the defence sector.

Response to government reviewer:
While the budget appropriation act is published (and is listed as the source for this response), this does not include a detailed breakdown of all defence and intelligence spending. Secret spending is not directly referenced, but is presumably encapsulated under 'other expenses'. The fact that only headline figures are given precludes a higher score, as it means that legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items. Indeed, the evidence suggests that secret programs are not audited at all.

Researcher4123: There is no provision in Somali law for off-budget payments but they do occur. This is mainly in the form of bilateral agreements from international donors. Some donors give aid directly in the form of training and equipment delivery although some donors such as the UAE and Turkey have been injecting funds directly to the FGS. The US have similarly been donating finances in the past but allegations of corruption have led to a change in policy.

The Office of the Accountant General produces financial reports that provide some level of detail on sources of financing from outside of the central government allocation, although these are not specific to the defence sector. For example, in the report for the year ending December 2012 it was stated that:

&quoute;The only sources of state receipts were from customs duties levied on goods imported from overseas through Mogadishu Sea and airports and some contributions from a few services rendering companies; telecommunication, and money transfer companies, and big hotels. A total of US$35.1 million was collected as domestic revenue compared to the budget of US$29.9 million... US$20.3 million was received as external assistance against the budget of US$68.6 million.... About 70% of the recurrent expenditure of US$55.4 million was spent on Administration and General services whilst the remaining 30% was used to cover security and contingency expenses.&quoute; (pp. 8-9)

The document also contains a statement of receipts and cash payments for the financial year, including receipts and payments controlled by external third parties. Where this is attributed to the defence and security sector, a headline figure is given for &quoute;Security and Contingency&quoute;. No more details are given on how the money is spent, and it is not clear whether there are detailed records of off-budget expenditure that are not released to the public.

In addition, while the 2014 and 2015 documents are listed on the website, they produce an access error when clicked that suggests the files aren't actually stored on the server. A 2015 World Bank report suggests that there is still a substantial amount of external income and expenditure that is not officially recorded, citing this as one of the core things that needs improving under their ongoing project to strengthen financial management in Somalia:

&quoute;Putting ‘aid-on-budget’ is the tipping point towards use of country systems. In Somalia, most Official Development Assistance (ODA) is ‘off-budget’ this inevitably leads to waste and corruption. The use of parallel systems to circumvent limited Government absorptive capacity has impeded aid effectiveness and the building of a more effective State. There are efforts to capture such assistance in the Development Assistance Database (DAD). This component will support the development of a framework to include aid-on-budget.&quoute; (17)

Evidence suggests that both donated equipment and funds have been misappropriated, despite donor oversight. In 2014 a local civil society organisation conducted a corruption risk assessment of the federal government’s Ministry of Interior and National Security (MINS). The assessment specifically asks whether MINS &quoute;receive[s] income from the public, or designated clients (taxation, customs levies, payments for services or rents etc.) What is the process for recording, banking and auditing these payments? In what form are such payments received?&quoute; (Q12) The response reports that the ministry &quoute;receives payments from the public via the Directorate of Immigration and Naturalisation which issues passports. Payments are deposited into the Directorate’s bank account in Dahabshiil. This money is understand to be sizeable, and none of it has been found to be deposited into the central bank.&quoute;

There is therefore some evidence that external payments are being documented in Somalia, with receipts being collected by the Office of the Accountant General. However, with expenditures listed purely as relating to &quoute;Security and Contingency&quoute;, these records are devoid of any information that would allow expenditure to be identified, audited or analysed. There is also evidence that the existing records are unlikely to contain all of the money that funds defence and security activities that fall outside of the official budget. These deficiencies preclude a higher score.

Response to government reviewer:
Agreed that work is underway to consolidate this budget under the national budget, but as this is not yet in place the score cannot be increased.

Researcher4123: Off-budget payments occur in the form of bilateral agreements from international donors. Some donors give aid directly in the form of training and equipment delivery although some donors such as the UAE and Turkey and previously the US have been injecting funds directly to the FGS.

The Office of the Accountant General produces financial reports that provide some level of detail on sources of financing from outside of the central government allocation, although these are not specific to the defence sector. For example, in the report for the year ending December 2012 it was stated that:

&quoute;The only sources of state receipts were from customs duties levied on goods imported from overseas through Mogadishu Sea and airports and some contributions from a few services rendering companies; telecommunication, and money transfer companies, and big hotels. A total of US$35.1 million was collected as domestic revenue compared to the budget of US$29.9 million... US$20.3 million was received as external assistance against the budget of US$68.6 million.... About 70% of the recurrent expenditure of US$55.4 million was spent on Administration and General services whilst the remaining 30% was used to cover security and contingency expenses.&quoute; (pp. 8-9)

The document also contains a statement of receipts and cash payments for the financial year, including receipts and payments controlled by external third parties. Where this is attributed to the defence and security sector, a headline figure is given for &quoute;Security and Contingency&quoute;. No more details are given on how the money is spent, and it is not clear whether there are detailed records of off-budget expenditure that are not released to the public.

In addition, while the 2014 and 2015 documents are listed on the website, they produce an access error when clicked that suggests the files aren't actually stored on the server. A 2015 World Bank report suggests that there is still a substantial amount of external income and expenditure that is not officially recorded, citing this as one of the core things that needs improving under their ongoing project to strengthen financial management in Somalia:

&quoute;Putting ‘aid-on-budget’ is the tipping point towards use of country systems. In Somalia, most Official Development Assistance (ODA) is ‘off-budget’ this inevitably leads to waste and corruption. The use of parallel systems to circumvent limited Government absorptive capacity has impeded aid effectiveness and the building of a more effective State. There are efforts to capture such assistance in the Development Assistance Database (DAD). This component will support the development of a framework to include aid-on-budget.&quoute; (p. 17)

Evidence suggests that both donated equipment and funds have been misappropriated, despite donor oversight. For example, in a UN report from 2014, monitors said a number of assault rifles provided by Ethiopia had ended up in street markets in the Somali capital. It added that the weapons were &quoute;undeniably sourced from SNA (Somali army) stockpiles,&quoute; while arms dealers &quoute;also stated that al Shabaab agents were procuring weapons in at least one of the markets.&quoute; (Reuters)

It was concluded that weapons were both being sold illegally by SNA officers taking advantage of poor accountability at the unit level, and that weapons are being leaked at a higher level. The UN reports that it has consistently received testimony from individuals about &quoute;systematic abuses&quoute; by Somalia's government that have resulted in direct transfers of the arms to markets and to al Shabaab. (Reuters, BBC)

In 2014 a local civil society organisation conducted a corruption risk assessment of the federal government’s Ministry of Interior and National Security (MINS). The assessment specifically asks whether MINS &quoute;receive[s] income from the public, or designated clients (taxation, customs levies, payments for services or rents etc.) What is the process for recording, banking and auditing these payments? In what form are such payments received?&quoute; (Q12) The response reports that the ministry &quoute;receives payments from the public via the Directorate of Immigration and Naturalisation which issues passports. Payments are deposited into the Directorate’s bank account in Dahabshiil. This money is understand to be sizeable, and none of it has been found to be deposited into the central bank.&quoute;

While there is some provision for officially recording off-budget expenditure, there is also evidence that this expenditure is being illegally diverted, either to profit government ministries or to provide weaponry to armed groups.

Response to government reviewer:
While the majority of off-budget expenditure may concern donor funds, there is also evidence that this money is funding illicit activity such as arms acquisitions by al Shabaab. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: Somalia does not have a clearly defined and followed system for classifying information. Governmental processes are so fledgling that a government-approved system is unlikely to be implemented for some time.

The government appears generally reluctant to share information publicly, and it is difficult to judge the extent to which information is hidden for legitimate reasons such as national security.

As noted by peer reviewer 1, there is no information regarding the classification of information in the Somali Constitution of 2012.

Response to government reviewer:
No record of the military penal code or the national intelligence service code could be found, so it could not be verified whether they would contain provisions for the classification of information. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: It does not appear that defence institutions have any formal 'beneficial ownership of commercial businesses'. However, as peer reviewer 2 notes, there is neither applicable law that requires the head of state and government, ministers, members of parliament, defence officers, or civil servants to file asset disclosures nor are there regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to these various actors.

There are no restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers and defence officers opening or working in private companies or entering the private sector after leaving the government, and it is common practice for members of government and defence go to work in the private sector when they resign or leave office (U4).

Somalia's natural resources are a source of considerable tension between the federal government and the federal member states, with both sides issuing licenses in 2014. Ownership of natural resources is therefore complex and disputed, meaning that it is extremely difficult to determine whether any defence and security institutions have controlling interests in the industry.

Somalia is not a member of EITI, or the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Currently, an increasing level of oil development is taking place in Somalia since the new government has come to power. In combination with the lack of transparency in the sector, this increase also raises the opportunities for corrupt officials to make substantial profits from the industry.

Given this opacity, it is impossible to definitively rule out the possibility that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation, or other commercial businesses. This precludes a higher score.

Response to government reviewer:
Without legislation in place to monitor the ownership of commercial business, and given the lack of transparency surrounding business ownership, it is impossible to definitively rule out the possibility that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation, or other commercial businesses. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: There is no legislation or mechanism to provide for the accountability of institutionally owned business. In addition, the current turmoil over commercial rights and ownership of businesses in Somalia in general do not lend themselves to independent scrutiny or oversight.

For example, Somalia's natural resources are a source of considerable tension between the federal government and the federal member states, with both sides issuing licenses in 2014. Ownership of natural resources is therefore complex and disputed, meaning that it is extremely difficult to determine whether the defence sector has any interests in commercial businesses, let alone whether any form of scrutiny is taking place.

A World Bank report on the financial management capacity of Somalia suggests that the systems that manage public resources are very weak, with high potential for money laundering and terrorism financing. The existing percentage of government expenditures that are audited is reportedly 0.

Given this opacity, it is impossible to definitively rule out the possibility that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation, or other commercial businesses. There is no evidence that any military-owned businesses are subject to any scrutiny or auditing processes, nor that other businesses are being effectively overseen in this way. This lack of evidence precludes a higher score.

Response to government reviewer:
Without legislation in place to monitor the ownership of commercial business, and given the lack of transparency surrounding business ownership, it is impossible to definitively rule out the possibility that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation, or other commercial businesses. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: According to Article 98 of the provisional constitution, peer reviewer 1 notes that Members of Parliament and all government officials are barred from entering or maintaining private enterprises while holding office, including military and defence ministry officials. However, Article 98 does not delineate sanctions for failure to comply with its principles. There is no public evidence to suggest that this has been enforced, for example through dismissal resulting from contravention.

Articles 126-127 cover the mandate and principles of the armed forces, but neither of them contain any reference to private enterprise. It is therefore unclear whether there is any formal legislation to cover military personnel when it comes to allowing or outlawing private enterprise.

In addition, as peer reviewer 2 notes, there is neither applicable law that requires the head of state and government, ministers, members of parliament, defence officers, or civil servants to file asset disclosures nor are there regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to these various actors. There are also no restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers and defence officers opening or working in private companies or entering the private sector after leaving the government, and it is common practice for members of government and defence go to work in the private sector when they resign or leave office (U4).

There is evidence of unauthorised private enterprise involving defence and security personnel in Somalia. A UNIDIR report notes that the management of weapons and ammunition in Somalia is a key risk area, and a UN report from 2014 records how a number of assault rifles provided by Ethiopia had ended up in street markets in the Somali capital. It added that the weapons were &quoute;undeniably sourced from SNA (Somali army) stockpiles,&quoute; while arms dealers &quoute;also stated that al Shabaab agents were procuring weapons in at least one of the markets.&quoute; (Reuters)

It was concluded that weapons were both being sold illegally by SNA officers taking advantage of poor accountability at the unit level, and that weapons are being leaked at a higher level. The UN reports that it has consistently received testimony from individuals about &quoute;systematic abuses&quoute; by Somalia's government that have resulted in direct transfers of the arms to markets and to al Shabaab. (Reuters, BBC)

In addition, it has been noted that the lack of regular payment of armed forces is pushing soldiers to erect checkpoints to extract bribes, suggesting that ground troops are engaging in private enterprise to supplement their own wages.

There are no publicly available reports of this business being sanctioned. The lack of specific provisions against, or public discouragement of private enterprise by military personnel precludes a higher score.

Response to government reviewer:
There is evidence of such activity, for example through selling weaponry on the black market. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: The President has recently declared the Security Sector payments will be conducted electronically and efforts will be made to increase transparency and accountability. However, public statements from the military high command suggest more of a focus on protecting reputations than combating corruption and abuse.

For example, the former head of the military General Dahir Aden Elmi said &quoute;If any person who is dressed like a soldier causes problems, it cannot be blamed on the military.&quoute; A well-known example of this stance in action is the case of a woman, who alleged she had been raped by government soldiers, being arrested and sentenced to prison along with the journalist who published her story.

Researcher4123: Overall there seems to be a very low desire to combat corruption by senior officials. A Freedom House report notes that the judicial system is general weak, and while the draft constitution includes the creation of a Constitutional Court, Federal Government courts, and Federal Member State courts, these institutions have yet to be established (Freedom House).

During an interview in August 2014, the new Somali Attorney General cited numerous challenges, including &quoute;inheriting an office in ruins that lacked skilled employees and adequate office equipment.&quoute; He stated that the Public Prosecutor's Office, which is responsible for investigating all crimes in the country &quoute;has only six prosecutors working there&quoute;, while it is estimated that it would require at least 30 to cover the workload. He also stated that making his office free of corruption was going to be a significant challenge (All Africa). As peer reviewer 1 notes, there has been some recent progress, with the appointment of prosecutors in July 2015 who are focused on dealing with fighting corruption at all levels in Somalia.

When asked specifically about how the new Somali Attorney General was planning on tackling lawlessness among the security forces in the country, he responded that &quoute;There are many complaints against the security agencies, the judiciary and even the Public Prosecutor's Office. Our role is to ensure all those agencies do their work in accordance with the law. We will bring them to justice if they do not work according to the law.&quoute; (All Africa)

As peer reviewer 2 notes, an Anti-Corruption Commission with the power to carry out formal investigations was established at the beginning of 2012 to more closely monitor all activities by public officials, including defence officials. This committee composed of 10 members constitutes an attempt to revive the former Bureau of Investigation and Anti-Corruption, based on the 1968 anti-corruption law.

Nevertheless, a media search did not uncover any cases of military personnel, or anyone from the defence and security establishment, being prosecuted for corruption in recent years, despite evidence that personnel are implicated in crimes. For example, a UN report from 2014 reported that a number of assault rifles provided by Ethiopia had ended up in street markets in the Somali capital. It added that the weapons were &quoute;undeniably sourced from SNA (Somali army) stockpiles,&quoute; while arms dealers &quoute;also stated that al Shabaab agents were procuring weapons in at least one of the markets.&quoute; (Reuters)

It was concluded that weapons were both being sold illegally by SNA officers taking advantage of poor accountability at the unit level, and that weapons are being leaked at a higher level. The UN reports that it has consistently received testimony from individuals about &quoute;systematic abuses&quoute; by Somalia's government that have resulted in direct transfers of the arms to markets and to al Shabaab. (Reuters, BBC)

In addition, it has been noted that the lack of regular payment of armed forces is pushing soldiers to erect checkpoints to extract bribes, suggesting that ground troops are engaging in private enterprise to supplement their own wages.

Somalia’s Criminal Code, which applies also to defence officials, criminalises active and passive bribery, attempted corruption, extortion, bribing a foreign official, and money laundering. In terms of preventing/prohibiting nepotism, the Transitional Charter, art. 71 states that &quoute;The Transitional Federal Government shall take all necessary measures to combat tribalism, nepotism, looting of public properties, corruption and all fraudulent activities, which may undermine the functioning of state organs and decent traditions of the society.&quoute;

However, follow-up legislation has not been developed, and a military code of conduct has not been established.

Response to peer reviewers:
Many thanks for your insightful comments, I've integrated elements into the response above. However, in the absence of evidence of formal measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, a higher score cannot be awarded. At the moment there do not seem to be effective or consistent mechanisms to hold personnel to account.

Researcher4123: Marqaati is an anti-corruption local non-governmental organisation based in Mogadishu that advocates for government transparency in Somalia’s federal and local governments. In 2013, on their own initiative, they carried out a corruption risk assessment of the federal government’s Ministry of Interior and National Security (MINS).

Question 56 specifically asks whether there is &quoute;a formal procedure by which staff members may notify a designated official or unit of the ministry of suspected breaches of integrity or contravention of the code of conduct within the ministry?&quoute;, while Q57 covers whether there is &quoute;an alternative channel by which staff may file complaints&quoute; if their complaint concerns their superior. Both questions are answered in the negative.

In addition, Q59 covers whether there are &quoute;any mechanisms in place to protect those who file such notifications from retaliation&quoute;. The response to this question is also negative.

There does not appear to be any legislative protection for whistle-blowers outside of the defence sector either, and there is evidence that officials do not believe that they would be protected if they reported corruption. An example of this is the fact that the former Governor of the Central Bank resigned while abroad when she wished to expose corruption, stating that she feared for her life in Somalia.

None of the interviewees had heard of measures in place to encourage and support whistleblowers in the military, and they agreed that it could have severe consequences for the individuals involved.

Researcher4123: As peer reviewer 1 notes, there is no evidence to suggest that the government recognises corruption as a risk during government appointments, or that this risk is heightened in certain positions.

Article 117 of the provisional constitution covers the appointment of high-ranking officials, stating that &quoute;high ranking public employees and officials of the government as defined by the law, shall be appointed by the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, after considering the proposal by the Council of Ministers&quoute;.

The Council of Ministers is the highest executive authority of the Federal Government and consists
of the Prime Minister, the deputy prime minister(s), ministers, state ministers and deputy-ministers. These are all appointed by the Prime Minister.

There is no mention of any procedure that the Council of Ministers or the President is required to follow in making their selection. Any specific rules of conduct associated with such positions are not made public, and there is no clarity over the mechanisms for selection and oversight.

Researcher4123: Exact numbers of soldiers and civilians are difficult to identify, and there is no official release of statistics. Those that are paid through donor support, and those that have passed through the EU training mission are theoretically quantifiable, but this does not take account of soldiers incorporated into the national forces from various militias. Numbers are difficult to quantify as militias are brought into the DDR process.

Interviewees 1 and 3 confirmed that there is ongoing EU and UN work to biometrically register all members of the security services. Additionally the President has mandated that all members will eventually be paid electronically. In reality this is meeting with technical and logistic difficulties but also resistance from commanders who are profiting from the disparity of allocated funds and the number they need to actually pay. During interview, the government reviewer stated that, while the Salary and Stipend Task Force had originally aimed to reform payroll so that all pay would be distributed directly into soldiers' accounts, this is now being phased. Reforms of the payroll database will take precedence for now, meaning that soldiers will continue to be paid on the ground.

An unpublished report by a UN monitoring group seen by Reuters suggests corruption was one reason for non-payment of wages. In the report, the group accuses senior Somali military commanders of inflating troop numbers and embezzling funds bound for salaries (The Star).

In addition, it should be noted that there is not yet one 'national' army in Somalia. There are ongoing 'talks about talks' to merge forces currently operating in some of Somalia's regional administrations (Somalia Newsroom). This further complicates the task of compiling and verifying troop numbers in the country.

Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence that the number of personnel is known and is reported publicly by the defence establishment. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: Information on salaries is available but only indirectly, and only for junior ranks. For example, media reports quote the monthly salary of Somali soldiers at $100 (France 24). There is no official release of salary information, and the Ministry of Defence is omitted from the &quoute;Planned Salaries for Civil Service&quoute; section of the 2015 budget (pp. 36-37).

In terms of allowances, there is a highly aggregated figure for the total spend for the Ministry of Defence ($432,000), the Armed Forces ($14,302,560), the Ministry of National Security ($226,000), the Police Force ($800,000), and the National Security Force ($5,488,000). This information is contained in the &quoute;Planned Allowances for Civil Service&quoute; section of the 2015 budget (pp. 38-39).

The table that they are presented in would seem to suggest that this is broken down into the numbers paid to staff at each pay grade, however the figures for the security sector do not seem to be comprehensive. For example, notwithstanding a projected spend of $14,302,560 on allowances for the Armed Forces, the personnel records list 0 staff members for each pay grade.

Response to government reviewer:
While there are some figures published in the budget, these are not comprehensive and are highly abbreviated. The MOD is not covered in the salaries section, while allowances are given as headline figures. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: The Somali military has been plagued with problems of unpaid salaries for many years. For example, in 2010 it was suggested that hundreds of Somali soldiers were deserting because they weren't being paid their $100 monthly stipend, with some joining militia movements, despite huge sums of money invested into training by the US (totalled at around $6.8 million supporting training programs run out of Djibouti and Uganda in 2009-2010) (Hiiraan).

This year, the non-payment of salaries (which is reported to exceed six months for some troops) continues to strain relations between the government and foreign donors. An unpublished report by a UN monitoring group suggests corruption was one reason for non-payment of wages. In the report, the group accuses senior Somali military commanders of inflating troop numbers and embezzling funds bound for salaries. This is reportedly weakening morale, causing large numbers of desertions, and threatening to undermine years of military gains made against al Shabaab (The Star).

There is the possibility for improvement, however. In September 2015 the President announced that all security sector payments would become electronic and regular (the current payment system is unclear). A new 'Salary and Stipend Task Force' has the remit to tackle corruption in defence. Made up of Somali and international delegates the TF is primarily to ensure pay reaches soldiers and police and oversee international stipend payments but will be able to build some integrity structures. This may bring improvements.

However, the TF is extremely new, and its success is therefore hard to measure. It convened its first meeting on August 17 2015 with representatives from Ministries of Finance, Internal Security, Planning and International Cooperation, Central Bank of Somalia, the security forces (SNA, SPF, Custodial Corps), key donors (EU, Turkey, UAE, UK, US) and implementing partners (UNOPS, AMISOM, World Bank) (see ACU monthly bulletin).

During interview, the government reviewer stated that, while the TF had originally aimed to reform payroll so that all pay would be distributed directly into soldiers' accounts, this is now being phased. Reforms of the payroll database will take precedence for now, meaning that soldiers will continue to be paid on the ground.

Response to government reviewer:
There continue to be widespread delays in distributing pay, so the score cannot increase at the moment.

Researcher4123: In theory, Somalia has a system of military ranks, however in practice, promotion is based not on merit but on clan connections or, for some, on their previous ranks before the collapse of the central state. The minister of defence has publicly committed to reforming the system but that is likely to take some time.

Interviewee 3 noted that the overwhelming majority of the senior and middle management of the SNA and National Police are Hawiye Clan. This situation is not helped by the international community who conduct the majority of their training in Mogadishu, an area that is predominantly Hawiye therefore exacerbating the issue and effectively contributing to the exclusion of others. This is reflected across many governmental strands.

As peer reviewer 1 has commented, there are no job descriptions available publicly, nor are assessments of candidates available. The only clear guidelines for officials in power is within the remit of the constitution, as if refers to elected representatives, the justices, and the president. Other offices are left opaque.

As provided by peer reviewer 2, 'In terms of preventing/prohibiting nepotism, the Transitional Charter, art. 71 states that &quoute;The Transitional Federal Government shall take all necessary measures to combat tribalism, nepotism, looting of public properties, corruption and all fraudulent activities, which may undermine the functioning of state organs and decent traditions of the society.&quoute; However, follow-up legislation has not been developed.'

Researcher4123: There is no system of meritocratic promotion.

As interviewee 2 notes, this not helped by the complete lack of structure or professional training regime beyond basic combat. The SNA HQ and MoD are staffed by generals who, with no pension scheme in place will doggedly retain their positions.

As peer reviewer 1 has commented, there are no job descriptions available publicly, nor are assessments of candidates available. The only clear guidelines for officials in power is within the remit of the constitution, as if refers to elected representatives, the justices, and the president. Other offices are left opaque.

As provided by peer reviewer 2, 'In terms of preventing/prohibiting nepotism, the Transitional Charter, art. 71 states that &quoute;The Transitional Federal Government shall take all necessary measures to combat tribalism, nepotism, looting of public properties, corruption and all fraudulent activities, which may undermine the functioning of state organs and decent traditions of the society.&quoute; However, follow-up legislation has not been developed.'

Response to government reviewer:
I could not find any references to HR policy, oversight boards, or a promotions commission in public documents or on the MOD website. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: It is somewhat unclear whether compulsory conscription is currently in place for Government forces in Somalia. As peer reviewer 1 notes, eighteen was the legal minimum age for voluntary and compulsory military service as of 2012. However, the government reviewer has stated that this question in not applicable, suggesting that there is no compulsory conscription in place.

Nevertheless, recruitment process do not meet international standards; in particular there are ongoing allegations of recruitment of children into the armed forces.

Researcher4123: There is no conscription in Somalia. However, there are no policies in place to deal with bribery for securing recruitment advantage more broadly. As confirmed during interview, it is generally accepted that clan bias and nepotism are rife.

Many military units are still comprised of clan militias although with the DDR process there is now some form of screening of applicants before they are admitted into the armed forces. This is UN-sponsored, and has a strong emphasis on screening to exclude children from the armed forces.

Researcher4123: There is a very large issue with ‘Ghost Soldiers’. The President has made statements outlining an aspiration to electronically pay and biometrically register members of the security sector, but according to interviewee 1 senior members of the International Community are already sensing that this will be delayed.

It has been suggested that there are up to 10,000 Ghost Soldiers in the SNA alone. Interviewee 3 reported that it is also believed that many of the ‘lost’ wages have been used to influence the elections in 2016 by bribing clan elders. Additionally there is little clarity over who is and is not entitled to pay. As interviewee 3 stated, with the lack of any welfare system or pension; widows, veterans and orphans all receive (or are supposed to receive) payments. This is very poorly managed with very little visibility nationally. To compound the issue further as militias become 'incorporated' into the SNA the situation becomes more complex.

However, a new 'Salary and Stipend Task Force' has the remit to tackle reform payroll and pay procedures. Made up of Somali and international delegates the TF is primarily to ensure pay reaches soldiers and police and oversee international stipend payments . This may bring improvements. However, the TF is extremely new, and its success is therefore hard to measure. It convened its first meeting on August 17 2015 with representatives from Ministries of Finance, Internal Security, Planning and International Cooperation, Central Bank of Somalia, the security forces (SNA, SPF, Custodial Corps), key donors (EU, Turkey, UAE, UK, US) and implementing partners (UNOPS, AMISOM, World Bank) (see ACU monthly bulletin).

Interviewee 1 stated that the international community in Somalia is worried that the original vision for the TF is being watered down. During interview, the government reviewer stated that the scope of the TF is very specific to payroll and payment, and while it might encapsulate some improvement of payroll registration and the oversight of the finance ministry, no additional integrity elements are included. In addition, while the TF had originally aimed to reform payroll so that all pay would be distributed directly into soldiers' accounts, this is now being phased. Reforms of the payroll database will take precedence for now, meaning that soldiers will continue to be paid on the ground.

Response to government reviewer:
Agreed that reforms are underway to address this. Score raised from 0 to 1.

Researcher4123: There is no separation of command and pay structures for monthly pay. As confirmed by interviewee 3, allowances and rations are paid in cash and are routed via senior officers. The MoF or the MoD have little authority to be able to oversee any of these payments.

The recent announcement by the President that all Security Sector payments will become electronic is encouraging, but senior international observers are already noticing moves to water this commitment down, according to interviewee 1. The new 'Salary and Stipend Task Force' (with both IC and Somali representatives) has been established improve this.

During interview, the government reviewer stated that, while the TF had originally aimed to reform payroll so that all pay would be distributed directly into soldiers' accounts, this is now being phased. Reforms of the payroll database will take precedence for now, meaning that soldiers will continue to be paid on the ground.

As noted by interviewee 3, operational stipends are paid separately by donors and have been getting to the SNA, although have experienced problems.

Response to government reviewer:
Many thanks for clarifying the fact that, although payment is distributed through commanders, the Finance Office oversees payments. Score raised from 0 to 1 accordingly.

Researcher4123: The Chief of Defence Forces has, according to interviewee 3, signed a 'statement' drafted by the EU mission on corruption and values. However no effort has been made to promulgate, advertise or train the wider defence community in reaction to this.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, Somalia’s Criminal Code, which applies also to defence officials, criminalises active and passive bribery, attempted corruption, extortion, bribing a foreign official, and money laundering. In terms of preventing/prohibiting nepotism, the Transitional Charter, art. 71 states that &quoute;The Transitional Federal Government shall take all necessary measures to combat tribalism, nepotism, looting of public properties, corruption and all fraudulent activities, which may undermine the functioning of state organs and decent traditions of the society.&quoute;

However, follow-up legislation has not been developed, and a military code of conduct has not been established.

Researcher4123: There is no evidence of a Somali-owned code of conduct being in place, nor that behaviour standards are being enforced.

As interviewee 3 has confirmed, there is no evidence of accusations, investigations, or prosecutions being followed through on.

Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence of a code of conduct that the military courts could use to address breaches. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: As confirmed by interviewee 3, the fact that the Somali defence establishment has started from an extremely low knowledge and skills base means that most resources for training police and military forces are directed towards operational concerns.

Both AMSIOM and the EUTM have been very concerned about human rights abuses by Somali forces but it does not appear that broader corruption issues are yet a specific focus of training.

Researcher4123: In broad terms military justice is not actively publicized, though occasionally the government will announce an execution or punishment if there has been an instance of abuse that has stirred public feelings. For example, the cases that could be identified relate to offenses such as human rights abuses, rape, mistreatment of the public, but they do not specifically mention corruption.

As noted by peer reviewer 2, there is no freedom of information law to guarantee access to public information, and defamation is a criminal offense.

Response to government reviewer:
There does not seem to be any public information to support the statement that outcomes of corruption-related prosecutions are public and reported to the media, or that sentencing is broadcast from radio and TV. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: In practice, facilitation payments are prevalent and are not discouraged. There are reports of security personnel setting up illegal roadblocks, for example, in order to tax civilians. As peer reviewer 3 notes, in an environment when security personnel are regularly unpaid, this is perhaps inevitable.

As peer reviewer 1 notes, bribery, facilitation payments, and illicit activities are not barred in the Constitution. Little evidence suggests corruption issues relating to bribes are being dealt with. Some citizens have claimed to have paid up to $2,000 US dollars on bribes to police, judges, and other public officials (Sabahi Online, 10 July 2014). In July 2015, Somalia did appoint seven new state prosecutors focused on anti-corruption measures, it is too early to judge the effectiveness of this new cohort of prosecutors (Billow).

As peer reviewer 2 has found, Somalia’s Criminal Code criminalises bribery, attempted corruption, extortion, bribing a foreign official, and money laundering. In terms of preventing/prohibiting nepotism, the Transitional Charter, art. 71 states that &quoute;The Transitional Federal Government shall take all necessary measures to combat tribalism, nepotism, looting of public properties, corruption and all fraudulent activities, which may undermine the functioning of state organs and decent traditions of the society. However, follow-up legislation has not been developed.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Facilitation payments are not the same as bribery and are not currently referenced in any legislation. Score maintained.

Response to government reviewer:
I could find no evidence that there are laws against this. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: There does not appear to be a military doctrine or policy framework for preventing and addressing issues of corruption.

Some efforts are being made at higher levels, for example that withdrawals for the central bank should be authorized by Parliament. The lack of policy in this area and the potential for corruption as a result is extremely severe in Somalia.

Efforts are focusing on mass corruption at present and it can be expected to take some time before changes are seen within ministries and for ministry staff.

Researcher4123: As confirmed by interviewee 3, the fact that the Somali defence establishment has started from an extremely low knowledge and skills base means that most resources for training police and military forces are directed towards operational concerns. Some training does occur in issues of Human Rights and protections of civilians, but this is not systematic or specifically targeted at senior officers.

Overall there seems to be a very low desire to combat corruption by senior officials. A Freedom House report notes that the judicial system is general weak, and while the draft constitution includes the creation of a Constitutional Court, Federal Government courts, and Federal Member State courts, these institutions have yet to be established (Freedom House).

There are frequent accusations of corruption that implicate senior commanders and government officials. For example, in a UN report from 2014, monitors said a number of assault rifles provided by Ethiopia had ended up in street markets in the Somali capital. It added that the weapons were &quoute;undeniably sourced from SNA (Somali army) stockpiles,&quoute; while arms dealers &quoute;also stated that al Shabaab agents were procuring weapons in at least one of the markets.&quoute; (Reuters)

It was concluded that weapons were both being sold illegally by SNA officers taking advantage of poor accountability at the unit level, and that weapons are being leaked at a higher level. The UN reports that it has consistently received testimony from individuals about &quoute;systematic abuses&quoute; by Somalia's government that have resulted in direct transfers of the arms to markets and to al Shabaab. (Reuters, BBC)

Response to government reviewer:
I could not find any evidence that anti-corruption training is covered under military discipline. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: It does not appear that personnel receive any anti-corruption training at the staff or tactical level that might equip them to serve as corruption monitors. This was confirmed by interviewee 3.

Researcher4123: There is as yet no specific training on anti-corruption practices, as confirmed by interviewee 3. There is therefore an absence of guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployment.

Researcher4123: As peer reviewer 1 has noted, Private Military Companies operate widely in Somalia and play an integral role in filling Somalia's security capacity gaps, providing policing and other protections for aid groups, private firms, and to even provide help to peacekeeping missions. Interviewee 3 suggests that the international community have drafted guidelines for the MOD on PMCs, but that dealings continue to be opaque.

PMCs may receive scrutiny from the UN Monitoring Group, UNMAS and donors when directly employed. Scrutiny applies mainly to companies operating in Mogadishu, other organizations operating across the country are subject to much less scrutiny and it is assumed there are several unlicensed groups. As peer reviewer 1 has stated, no sanctions exist against PMCs in Somalia, and UNHCHR states that PMCs in Somalia should be regulated more heavily.

This is supported by peer reviewer 2, who notes that the UN Chairperson of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries has called for scrutiny in this area. “As Somalia rebuilds its security institutions, the Government should ensure that private security forces are properly regulated and do not become a substitute for competent and accountable police. All Somalis have the right to security, not just those who can afford to pay for it,” said Faiza Patel, at the end of a seven-day mission to Somalia.

The UN Monitoring Group has found evidence of links between criminal / pirate groups and private security activities.

Researcher4123: Somalia is covered by a UN arms embargo, this has been partially lifted but is still a strong deterrent for arms trade with Somalia. Additionally most defence procurement is in the form of donations from the International Community. As such, there are no current procurement rules.

However, the FGS and MoF are now making steps towards procurement oversight. UN and donor presence is also assisting.

As peer reviewer 2 has noted, Somalia performs poorly an all procurement-related criteria. There are no regulations to prevent conflict-of-interest for public procurement officials, and no regular mandatory professional training is conducted to build their capacity. Competitive bidding is not required by law for major procurement and there are no strict formal requirements limiting the extent of sole sourcing. Unsuccessful bidders can not instigate an official review of procurement decisions or challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

In a press release from The Ministry of Finance in Somalia dated 24th March 2015, it is stated that:

&quoute;The Minister of Finance as the chair of the Financial Governance Committee (FGC) wishes to highlight recent progress on procurement and on the handling of government contracts and concessions. It is envisaged that these new measures will streamline public procurement processes by enhancing transparency and accountability, which is no doubt needed in order to stimulate economic growth, poverty reduction and state building of Somalia.&quoute;

Nevertheless, while a Procurement Bill is reportedly in front of parliament, it has not yet been passed. This precludes a higher score.

Response to government reviewer:
Many thanks for the confirmation that procurement legislation has been passed by cabinet and is currently with parliament for approval. However, until this comes into force, it cannot influence the score.

Researcher4123: There is no public discussion of procurement needs beyond the general need for more equipment. The thinking behind specific procurement decisions or deliveries is not publicly disclosed. There is no public discussion of procurement of more routine items such as fuel or food.

In a press release from The Ministry of Finance in Somalia dated 24th March 2015, it is stated that:

&quoute;The Minister of Finance as the chair of the Financial Governance Committee (FGC) wishes to highlight recent progress on procurement and on the handling of government contracts and concessions. It is envisaged that these new measures will streamline public procurement processes by enhancing transparency and accountability, which is no doubt needed in order to stimulate economic growth, poverty reduction and state building of Somalia.&quoute;

Nevertheless, while a Procurement Bill is reportedly in front of parliament, it has not yet been passed. This precludes a higher score.

Researcher4123: There does not appear to be any oversight of procurement by the Somali authorities.

Somalia is covered by a UN arms embargo, this has been partially lifted but is still a strong deterrent for arms trade with Somalia. Additionally most defence procurement is in the form of donations from the International Community. As such, there are no current procurement rules.

As peer reviewer 2 has noted, Somalia performs poorly an all procurement-related criteria. There are no regulations to prevent conflict-of-interest for public procurement officials, and no regular mandatory professional training is conducted to build their capacity. Competitive bidding is not required by law for major procurement and there are no strict formal requirements limiting the extent of sole sourcing. Unsuccessful bidders can not instigate an official review of procurement decisions or challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

As peer reviewer 1 states, there is no present evidence of active oversight mechanisms, while they may be present in the Constitution via the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Ombudsman. If they are active, their activities are not available publicly.

Response to government reviewer:
I could not find any public mention of the procurement board that you mention. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: As Somalia is under partial embargo, in theory everything procured must be declared to the sanctions committee and therefore have the oversight of the UN. However these do not appear to be made public.

While some arms shipments are reported in the media or by the UN monitoring group, this is by no means standard practice. The UN monitoring group has argued against the easing of the arms embargo because of poor processes around storing and tracking weapons.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
As no information on defence procurement is released by the Somali government or MOD, the score has been maintained.

Response to government reviewer:
While defence purchases may be reported to the UN security council, these do not appear to be public, which is the main focus of this question. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: Somalia is covered by a UN arms embargo, this has been partially lifted but is still a strong deterrent for arms trade with Somalia. Additionally most defence procurement is in the form of donations from the International Community. As such, there are no current procurement rules.

Somalia performs poorly an all procurement-related criteria. There are no regulations to prevent conflict-of-interest for public procurement officials, and no regular mandatory professional training is conducted to build their capacity. Competitive bidding is not required by law for major procurement and there are no strict formal requirements limiting the extent of sole sourcing. Unsuccessful bidders can not instigate an official review of procurement decisions or challenge procurement decisions in a court of law (U4).

As peer reviewer 2 has noted, in a press release from The Ministry of Finance in Somalia dated 24th March 2015, it is stated that:

&quoute;The Minister of Finance as the chair of the Financial Governance Committee (FGC) wishes to highlight recent progress on procurement and on the handling of government contracts and concessions. It is envisaged that these new measures will streamline public procurement processes by enhancing transparency and accountability, which is no doubt needed in order to stimulate economic growth, poverty reduction and state building of Somalia.&quoute;

Response to peer reviewer 2:
As the Procurement Bill has not yet been passed, a higher score cannot be awarded.

Researcher4123: At present there is no procurement strategy. Procurement is mainly reliant on donor support and availability in local markets, as such it is strongly opportunistic. It is also limited by the UN sanctions regime's restrictions.

According to interviewee 3, the procurement department is critically understaffed and is incapable of developing a strategy. However the UK and others are reportedly sponsoring a medium-term structural plan within PSG2 and the FGS, making steps towards longer term planning.

Response to government reviewer:
Noted that Somalia is under partial embargo and is not able to purchase unless it reports to the UN security council. However, it would still be able to draft a procurement strategy to inform this process. Score maintained.

Researcher4123: At least in public, military planners do not appear to have a clear idea of equipment requirements. They speak of the need for more and more powerful weapons without clearly defining the numbers, types and situations they will be used for. As peer reviewer 1 notes, international sanctions make it very difficult for the Somali military to acquire equipment so an opportunistic approach makes some sense in this regard.

MoD and FGS staff simply do not have the experience and training to deliver efficient procurement processes. This is not helped by donor influence or the fact they are donated most of their equipment. As interviewee 3 notes, this means that they are under no real pressure to reform their processes.

Researcher4123: While arms and equipment are generally donated by the international community logistical supplies are bought through contracts. However, as peer reviewer 2 notes, competitive bidding is not required by law for major procurement and there are no strict formal requirements limiting the extent of sole sourcing. Unsuccessful bidders can not instigate an official review of procurement decisions or challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

Researcher4123: There do not appear to be any tender boards in Somalia. Somalia does not conduct competitive bidding processes.

This may change in the future. For example, as peer reviewer 2 notes, 'The Ministry of Finance is spearheading the enactment of the Public Procurement Concessions and Disposal Bill 2014 (PPCD Bill 2014). The Law shall lay down the principles and practices of public procurement, concessions and disposal of assets, and establish institutional structures for managing public procurement in all ministries, departments and agencies. The PPCD Bill 2014 had its first reading in Parliament in December 2014 and was referred to the Parliamentary Finance Committee for further scrutiny and consideration before it is tabled by the committee to the plenary for final passing into law, as is the parliamentary practice.'

Researcher4123: There is no legislation to deal with collusion. Indeed it is public knowledge that the brother of the longstanding Chief of Logistics, runs a company in the Middle East that is the premier logistical supplier for the Army. This was confirmed by interviewee 1.

Where supplies are purchased rather than donated there is considerable space and opportunity for corrupt practices. There are multiple reports of diversion of military equipment to clan militias and opposition groups.

The Public Procurement Concessions and Disposal Bill 2014 is still undergoing review, but should provide legal framework to prevent corrupt practice.

Response to government reviewer:
Until the legislation is passed a higher score cannot be awarded.

Researcher4123: The FGS and MoD simply do not have the trained and experienced staff to deal with contract and project management. Government ministries are understaffed and of the staff they do have many are hold-overs from the Barre dictatorship or clan appointees. Only in ministers' personal offices are there consistently well trained. Procurement is ad-hoc, and likely to be managed by senior officers and is not an organized function. This was confirmed by the interviewees.

With most procurement being donor funded, the FGS and security sector are unlikely to get much real experience in project and contract management anytime soon. This was mentioned as a specific barrier to improvement by interviewee 3.

Researcher4123: There are no mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about malpractice. Business disputes in Somalia are sometimes settled violently, although there we do not have evidence of this with relation to security contracts.

As peer reviewer 2 has noted, Somalia performs poorly an all procurement-related criteria. There are no regulations to prevent conflict-of-interest for public procurement officials, and no regular mandatory professional training is conducted to build their capacity. Competitive bidding is not required by law for major procurement and there are no strict formal requirements limiting the extent of sole sourcing. Unsuccessful bidders can not instigate an official review of procurement decisions or challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

Researcher4123: There do not appear to be any mechanisms for such sanctions. As most weapons are supplied by donors or purchased from the illegal arms market it may be hard to enforce such sanctions even if legislation were passed.

As peer reviewer 2 has noted, Somalia performs poorly an all procurement-related criteria. There are no regulations to prevent conflict-of-interest for public procurement officials, and no regular mandatory professional training is conducted to build their capacity. Competitive bidding is not required by law for major procurement and there are no strict formal requirements limiting the extent of sole sourcing. Unsuccessful bidders can not instigate an official review of procurement decisions or challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.

Researcher4123: Somalia is not likely to have active offset contracts, and would probably find it very difficult to get a supplier to agree to the same given the poor state of Somalia's economy.

However many Somali's believe that deals receive favorable attention from the government because of political or other support.

There is no legislation to regulate offsets contracts in Somalia. The score has been selected on the basis that give the lack of transparency regarding defence procurement in Somalia, there is a risk that offset contracts may exist but are not reported on.

Researcher4123: Somalia is not likely to have active offset contracts, and would probably find it very difficult to get a supplier to agree to the same given the poor state of Somalia's economy.

However many Somali's believe that deals receive favorable attention from the government because of political or other support.

There is no legislation to regulate offsets contracts in Somalia, nor is the transparency of the procurement process high enough to make it likely that details of offset contracts would be released to the public. The score has been selected on the basis that give the lack of transparency regarding defence procurement in Somalia, there is a risk that offset contracts may exist but are not reported on.

Researcher4123: Somalia is not likely to have active offset contracts, and would probably find it very difficult to get a supplier to agree to the same given the poor state of Somalia's economy.

However many Somali's believe that deals receive favorable attention from the government because of political or other support. As noted by peer reviewer 1, Soma Oil and Gas reportedly gave half a billion dollars to Somali government officials.

There is no legislation to regulate offsets contracts in Somalia. However, competitive bidding is not required by law for other major procurement deals and there are no strict formal requirements limiting the extent of sole sourcing. Unsuccessful bidders can not instigate an official review of procurement decisions or challenge procurement decisions in a court of law. It seems unlikely that offset contracts would be subject to better controls. The score has been selected on the basis that give the lack of transparency regarding defence procurement in Somalia, there is a risk that offset contracts may exist but are not reported on.

Researcher4123: No legislation exists that relates to the control of agents or intermediaries within procurement cycles.

Somalia is mainly reliant on donations from neighboring states and other international supports to equip its armed forces so has less control than it might have in the future. Contractor and procurement processes are under development.

Researcher4123: Somalia receives much of its equipment as donations directly (or via AMISOM), or through purchases on the illegal arms market. As such there is unlikely to be any need for financing deals. However there is little transparency around any requirements related to donations or purchases that the government might make.

Researcher4123: The government does not yet formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes. However, it should be recognised that contractor and procurement processes are under development.

As Somalia secure much of its military equipment through international donations the use of sub-contractors is out of the control of the Somali government. Purchases from the illegal arms market are by their nature not transparent and the use and conduct of sub-contractors, although unlikely in such a scenario, is certainly unregulated.

As peer reviewer 1 has noted, Somalia's arms embargo restricts legal arms sales and currently incorporates the UN checking all vessels entering Somalia for illegal arms.

Researcher4123: In Somalia the situation is not so much a question of acquisition as of donation. The Somali government has received arms from neighboring states, and the US among others. These donations, as they are not for the commercial profit of the donors, are de facto more open to being used for political influence.

Somali government officials have campaigned vigorously against restrictions imposed by the UN sanctions regime and have achieved a small relaxation of the regime.