Algeria

Researcher4311: Research found no evidence of public knowledge about the procedures of asset disposal, nor of the controls that might be in place. Research also found very little data or information related to this topic, including from online sources such as reports or press articles, or from the academic field.

The information that can be found on this matter was mainly from the media, and only bilateral deals were discussed. Media reports have not provided any information regarding the controls which may be in place in this regard, although there is evidence of speculation about corruption in this area.

Researcher4311: It is difficult to find sources dealing with this matter but from the lack of evidence it seems that asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form. This appears to be part of a wider area of opacity and absence of oversight in Algeria. One example of this, although not directly related to the defence sector, is how the Sonatrach assets were sold off without any commission or oversight on the matter.

Researcher4311: The percentage of defence and security spending on secret items is not available to the public. This kind of information is classified as &quoute;secret défense&quoute;, or a defence secret. Secrecy of national defence is defined in the penal code (Art 66. ordinance n°75-47 of June 17, 1975) and Law No. 12-05 of January 12, 2012 on information (Section 84) is clear on this subject: &quoute;The right of access to sources of information is recognized for professional journalist unless: the information relates to the secrecy of national defence&quoute;. One journalist has stated that this is &quoute;a tradition inherited from the military dictatorship period in which the citizen is excluded from this area of arms contracts and defence budget.&quoute; (Source 1)

Research found evidence that parliamentarians have sought to justify this lack of transparency. For example, at the sitting of parliament on October 30, 2013, the budget allocated to the Ministry of Defence was set at USD20 billion. Media coverage from the event states that the leaders of the parliamentary groups for the RND (National Rally for Democracy) and the FLN (National Liberation Front) parties openly stated that &quoute;Nobody has the right to issue any criticism on military spending. Because whatever the volume of spending, they will not be in vain. [...] The military has the right to take the money they want (...) because the army is doing an invaluable work to the nation&quoute; (Source 3).

Research showed there is very limited information available in general concerning military spending, and no data to indicate defence spending on secret items. The total amount of the defence budget is available but there is no transparency within the defence figures. For instance, the total figures have been published in the national press (see source 2) but there is no detail on items of expenditure. Other sources such as SIPRI and the CIA World Factbook have similarly only provided broad figures.

Researcher4311: There is no evidence that the legislature has been, or would be likely to be, provided with such information. State security and intelligence bodies such the former DRS receive almost no media coverage and it is very difficult to tell what oversight may apply to or through them, if any.

Constitutional articles on the legislative and executive branches of Government in Algeria clarify the supremacy of the executive branch, specifically the Presidency of the Republic. The Parliament, which is a bicameral one, can debate but the ultimate decision-maker is the President. Article 81 of the Constitution stipulates that if the Parliament does not approve a program, the Prime Minister shall present the government’s resignation to the President, who nominates a new Prime Minister. The latter will follow the same procedures but in his case, if the Parliament do not approve the (new) Program, the National Assembly will be considered as dissolved (Art. 82).

Researcher4311: Research indicates the legislature is not provided with audit reports on secret items and secret programs, nor are these likely to be audited at all. All relevant information appears to be classified as &quoute;secret défense&quoute;.

Articles 63-66-67 of the Penal Code explain how security in Algeria may be classified &quoute;secret défense&quoute;, and also explains the punishments for those who reveal this information.

Researcher4311: Research found no information on this matter. There is no evidence that off budget military expenditures are either allowed or forbidden by law. There is a vague reference to transparency in the management of public finances in the law on prevention and fight against corruption (article 10) : &quoute; According to the law, appropriate measures to promote transparency, accountability and rationality in public financial management are made, including, rules relating to the preparation and the execution of the state budget&quoute;.

It is likely that unreported off-budget expenditure does occur. Evidence indicates defence spending may be directly tied to oil and gas income, rather than coming from a central government allocation, which is of significant concern. In addition, as explained by Laurence Aïda Ammour: &quoute; [...] a defence offset policy runs the risk of political corruption in a country where the level of corruption is high, and where defence industry has been marred by a lack of transparency in awarding defence contracts. While the corruption prevention law of 2006 calls for addressing off-budget expenditure, there is no proof of such expenditures being controlled&quoute;.

This is supported by another academic source that indicates: &quoute;There are many reasons to suppose that natural resource revenue may have a particular role in fueling military expenditure [...] they can be a factor in provoking or prolonging conflict and can also create a demand for military power to protect extraction infrastructure. They can lead to nontransparent and corrupt practices, which may favor off-budget military expenditure and large arms deals with lucrative bribe potential&quoute;.

Researcher4311: Given the particularly high volume of spending, links between oil and gas income and defence spending, and the opacity that exists around defence allocation and expenditure (sources 1, 4), it is likely that off-budget spending occurs and may be used to fund illicit economic activities.

Research found that the defence budget does not appear to be subject to any control or internal or external audit, due to its classification as a state secret. Research by civil society (source 5) also points to evidence of sixty special funds, mostly fuelled by money from the Treasury, that have not been subject to any control by the Parliament.

It is also likely that senior defence figures would be able to carry out off-budget expenditure for illicit purposes. The opacity of the intelligence services and extent of military engagement in commercial enterprise (see related questions) create clear and significant risk areas. Other cases also show that senior figures are likely to be able to act with impunity. In December 2014 the Algerian media published allegations that the Chief of Staff of the People's National Army and the Deputy Minister of Defence were involved in a corruption case in which they accepted the delivery of poor quality military equipment delivered to Algeria by Russian suppliers, against the payment of commissions and bribes. The Ministry of Defence reacted through an official communique and declared the opening of an investigation focused on the technical aspects of the case, namely the failure of the helicopters. There has been no further evidence that any investigation or trial has been opened against the Chief of Staff or any other individuals alleged to be involved however.

Researcher4311: Articles 63-66-67 of the Penal Code explain how security in Algeria may be classified &quoute;secret défense&quoute;, and also explains the punishments for those who reveal this information. In practice, however, this law is extremely vague and it is not possible to tell how decisions to classify information have been made. It appears clear that it has been persistently possible for individuals or agencies within the state to influence decisions to improperly classify information.

For example, evidence shows that access to a range of subject areas, such as national identity, sovereignty, economy and national security are restricted. The Law on Information, adopted in January 2012, is also very restrictive on associations' ability to publish and disseminate information in Algeria. All publications need to have a prior approval from a media regulatory authority before publishing. Source 2 notes that &quoute;According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 32 provisions of the information law can be used to repress free expression; many are broadly written and could serve as a pretext for unwarranted censorship. Violations under this law can result in fines of up to 500,000 dinars (about $6,700 US).&quoute;

Researcher4311: The defence institutions in Algeria are widely believed to have ownership of commercial businesses but these businesses are not publicly declared and are wholly non-transparent. It is impossible to find evidence of that. Commentators have stated that generals hold a monopoly over the importation of food, medicines and building materials as well as security companies (source 2). It was not possible for the researcher to find any details of the operations and finances on these companies.

According to source 3, this type of illicit activity is common because of a lack of implementation of the anti-corruption law.

Researcher4311: There is no evidence that military-owned businesses are subject to any scrutiny or auditing processes, and there is a significant lack of transparency and oversight in this area. Research found that many businesses ranging across imports and exports, food, pharmaceutical products, construction material and other sectors are believed to be owned either by the military or military figures.

Researcher4311: The researcher could not find any proof of the existence of a legislation or policy in relation to military personnel. The only related evidence of this for parliamentarians who are not allowed to have more than one professional activity, otherwise sanctions would be taken against them (source 1).

There is no proof that the government publicly discourage the military personnel from having private enterprises. According to Interviewee 1, the structural adjustment measures imposed to Algeria by the IMF in 1994 that promoted the liberalization of the economy have also given the occasion for some of the elites, including many senior officers, to monopolize certain sectors of the Algerian economy. This created a number of monopolies (pharmaceuticals, construction materials...etc) that had the effect of blocking the development of a truly diverse and inclusive private sector in Algeria.

There is extensive evidence of unauthorized private enterprise by military, as shown in several credible pieces of research and press articles. The implication of several generals in a 1998-1999 case of corruption and money laundering against businessman Rafik Khalifa highlights this. These generals were accused of being behind the success of the individual, and of sponsoring him to help him gain credibility to build a client base and business empire (Khalifa Bank, Khalifa Airways, Khalifa TV). In return, Khalifa was alleged to have helped them launder money. There were no sanctions for the involvement of these generals (source 5.6.7).

Mohamed Hachemaoui has also claimed in an academic paper (source 8) that the military holds the monopoly on pharmaceutical companies and the market of imported food products, among others. He specifically implicates the Chief of Staff of the Presidency and the brother of the president, and notes that &quoute;Generals and top-ranked military also enjoy trading monopolies. According to the same study cited above, The market for imports since the 1990s is under the control of businessmen linked to the military and civilian elite. Generals have a monopoly on the importation of food, medicines, building materials, etc.&quoute;

Hachemaoui's research provides numerous examples to support his assertion. For example, that Apotex belongs to the family of the General Secretary of the Ministry of defence. Pharmalliance is the company of the daughter of the former director of the Department of Counter-Espionage and Internal Security (who died in 2009). The former Minister-Counsellor of the Head of State appears to control much of the import of pasta through credit lines allocated by a public bank (CPA) to its firm called GERIC. There is no evidence of punitive measures in place to prevent or limit this kind of private enterprise by military personnel, nor is it outlawed.

Agree with Peer Reviewer: Score selected to reflect criteria that &quoute;The government does not explicitly outlaw private enterprise under the umbrella of the state’s defence and security operations, though it might publicly discourage it, and there are no, or trivial, repercussions for those who engage in it.&quoute;

Researcher4311: There is no evidence of any publicly stated commitment by the Defence Ministry, Chief of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs, and there is no evidence that any such commitments are made by senior ministry of defence or armed forces staff either.

There are a large number of statements from officials in Algeria from other areas of the government however, such as the Minister of Justice Mohamed Charfi (sources 1, 2, 3) or the Minister of Finance Karim Djoudi (sources 4,5). In these cases, statements are numerous but evidence of any action is absent.

It should be noted that media that report these statements frequently report them in a derisive manner, indicating a general public belief that there is no real political will to integrity and fighting corruption.

Researcher4311: Legal measures exist which apply to personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption. The Anti-Corruption Law 06-01 outlines these in several Articles (Articles 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39). No recent evidence was found of sanctions being applied to defence sector personnel.

There is some evidence that measures are taken, although in they are not always consistently applied and in some cases they lack effectiveness. In the recent past, efforts have been made in investigating corruption amongst officials. The government investigated several high-profile corruption scandals in 2009 and 2010. One major case involved several senior officials from the National Bank of Algeria (BNA) being arrested, such as the regional director and the head of the Cherchell agency, who were sentenced to fourteen years in prison for giving large loans to industrialists, businessmen and importers, without considering the prudential rules. According to Algerian news, 215 disciplinary cases were also reported during the first quarter of 2008, 118 of which resulted in official reprimands and 9 cases resulting in suspensions.

Researcher4311: There is evidence of limited legal provisions to protect whistleblowers in Algeria. Article 45 of the 2006 anti-corruption law, concerning the protection of witnesses, experts, victims and whistleblowers states that someone who attempts to exact revenge or intimidation on whistleblowers “shall be punished by imprisonment of six (6) months to five (5) years and to a fine of USD526 to USD5,260&quoute;. The law is not specific to public officials, but refers to all whistle-blowers.

Members of ANLC are also afforded legal protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption. As mentioned in Law No. 06-01 of 20 February 2006, Article 19, Paragraph 4 “safety and protection of members and officials of the National Prevention And Fighting Corruption Body are protected against any form of pressure or intimidation, threats, insults or attacks of any nature whatsoever which may be the object of or in connection with the performance of their duties”.

In practice the situation appears to be very different however. There is no evidence that the government actively encourage whistle-blowers, and there is little reason to believe defence officials and personnel would trust that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity. Several cases of whistle-blowers working in the public sector or elsewhere have been reported in the media as being subject to harassment or persecution, have been fired from their jobs, or prosecuted for false allegations and defamation. One such case is that of Khaled (see source 10) who was sentenced in 2014 to 9 months of prison for whistle blowing and for exposing corruption and misappropriation in his firm.

In another case, Pierre Demers, a Canadian engineer, was arrested in 2009 after denouncing corruption and facilitation payments in the military. Two members of the Algerian military who were involved in the case were not convicted despite evidence of them offering confessions (sources 11 and 12).

Interviewee 2 also stated that the law does not protect whistleblowers, and confirmed that &quoute;that there are hundreds of whistle-blowers dismissals every years in all sectors. Abusive dismissals, forced retreats, abusive end of functions for fixed term contracts...&quoute; as well stating that many other unreported cases exist of whistle-blowers being persecuted for their actions.

Researcher4311: There is no evidence that personnel in sensitive positions are subject to attention such as specific vetting requirements, rotation of posts after a limited number of years, or post-retirement restrictions in Algeria. There is also no evidence of any codes of conduct associated with these types of position, and no evidence of recognition by the government that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others. Djilali Hadjadj, president of the AACC, explains that there is a &quoute;lack of systematic analysis of risk factors (for instance: conflict of interest and obtaining unfair advantage) and of vulnerable areas of corruption (such as public procurement, healthcare, permits and licenses issuance) in Algeria&quoute;.

Sensitive positions (officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management) do not seem to be openly declared. Furthermore, there is no evidence of the existence of any mechanism for selection and oversight for these positions.

There is no special attention shown to vetting, rotation on posts or post-retirement restriction of officials in sensitive positions, as shown by the very advanced age of top ranking generals in the PNA. For instance, at the time of writing the Chief of the Defence Staff was 79 years old; the Minister for National Defence was 78; and the head of the intelligence services (DRS), Médiène Mohammed, was 75 years old. It is very hard, if not impossible, to find any official biographies or even life stories about military personnel holding sensitive posts in Algeria and there is a total opacity around them and a lack of transparency regarding their professional ascension.

Researcher4311: The Ministry of Defence website did not publish this information at the time of research. Unofficial figures were available to the researcher from other secondary sources. It is clear from these that Algeria is the largest military power in the region in terms of strength, equipment and capabilities. For example, the French Research Intelligence Centre (1), gives the following numbers:

- Army (PNA): with 147,000 men, including 80,000 conscripts performing military service of 18 months (6 months of basic training and 12 months in projects civilians), but without military expertise. The PNA also has 150,000 reservists under 50.
- Air Force: 14 000 men and 15 air bases.
- Marines: 6000 men
- Paramilitary Forces: 1200 Republican Guards, 20,000 police, 16,000 members of the national security forces. The number of auxiliary forces (Brigades of self-defence and communal guards), created during the civil war, is estimated at about 150 000 civilians.
- Polisario Front: between 6,000 and 15,000 men.

These figures were also found in other sources (2), indicating that they are likely to be broadly accurate.

According to source 3, Algeria has an Active Front Line Personnel of 512,000 men and an Active Reserve Personnel of 400,000. The same source indicates the number of those reaching military age annually is 672,993.

Researcher4311: Very little primary information was found regarding the salaries or allowances for civilian and military personnel. The law on the adjustment of military pensions (source 1) was found during research but nothing else relevant on salaries or allowances, such as salary tables or standard allowance tables and criteria.

The researcher was able to find some information in the local media about the increase of salaries however. For instance, in July 2012, the press reported the salary increase of the communal guard that included an increase in the monthly food premium, that went from DZD 3,000 to 4,200 (EUR 30 to 42) and an increase between 20-30 percent of bonuses. In January 2012, an increase of 40 percent in wages was reported by the media for all military. The decision was applied retroactively for three years. More recently, in March 2013, there has been a revaluation of pensions for certain categories of civilian and military personnel.

Researcher4311: There is no evidence that personnel do not receive the correct pay on time. There are no reports in the media of military personnel protesting for receiving their pay late. Source 2 indicates that the government authorised a 40% salary increase for military personnel in 2012, retroactive over three years, and a revaluation of military pensions. This was indicated to be in response to discontent over a similar previous increase granted to police and customs officers.

The system of payment is neither transparent nor published however. Basic pay appears to be non-discretionary. According to Interviewee 5, &quoute;wages vary according to the grades and positions. Wages are paid in monthly transfer as in all institutions and businesses through bank transfer to the accounts of the person. It is the Finance Department of the MoD that is responsible for the salaries&quoute;.

Researcher4311: It is likely, although not stated, that a system for appointments exists given Algeria's current levels of military professionalism. There is no indication of any formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process however. It is the assessor's professional assertion that Algerians tend to believe that nepotism, networking, regionalism and cronyism are the &quoute;real criteria&quoute; in the recruitment process, especially in senior positions. Some generals have been in senior positions for decades, which can be taken as a key indicator of the related lack of transparency. As stated by the researcher Tayeb Chenntouf, &quoute; [...] nepotism or servitude often is the dominant criterion in the selection or revocation of senior positions in the structures of the security state”.

According to the sources above, the PNA recruited in 2008: 100,000 new graduates, among them 40,000 for the Gendarmerie. In 2013, the PNA was planning to recruit young people from all over the country and from different background and social levels. The PNA's plans to recruit from &quoute;different background and social levels&quoute; is an official strategy. No evidence was available to indicate if this will apply to appointments at the middle and senior ranks.

Researcher4311: There is no indication of any formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process.

From the assessor's professional experience, many Algerians believe that there is a high level of corruption, cronyism, regionalism and nepotism in the PNA. As stated by the researcher Tayeb Chenntouf, &quoute; [...] nepotism or servitude often is the dominant criterion in the selection or revocation of senior positions in the structures of the security state&quoute;. One has to point out that it is very hard to find evidence of corruption or inappropriate conduct in the promotions process however, even in media reports.

Anthony Cordesman says: &quoute;The [Algerian] army is heavily politicized, it is corrupt and nepotistic and this affects promotion at the higher level of command. [...] there is considerable corruption and favouritism in promotion and command assignments, and the army has serious organizational, training, logistic, and combat and service support problems. [...] high level positions are highly political and so is promotion; there is massive internal corruption among the top leadership&quoute;.

In a more recent research (2014), the researcher Emile Ouédraogo explains about African countries - among them Algeria - that &quoute;African militaries do produce highly competent and professional officers trained in the world’s best military schools. Unfortunately, these officers are unable to flourish in an environment where competence and professionalism are not rewarded with promotion or rank advancement.&quoute;

Researcher4311: Conscription is compulsory in Algeria. All male Algerians who are of 19 years or older must serve. In May 2014, conscription length was reduced from 18 months 12 months. This new law considers the 12 months in the army as &quoute;professional activity&quoute;, meaning that these 12 months will count towards the future retirement of the young conscript.

Law 01-06 on the prevention and the fight against corruption includes a number of provisions prohibiting accepting bribes (not only for conscription) particularly in Articles 32, 33 and 38. However, from the assessor's professional experience, it is commonly known that individuals have avoided national service and obtained a &quoute;yellow card&quoute; thanks to &quoute;marifa&quoute; - an expression used in Algeria to say that a top ranked official has intervened for them, or that they have given a &quoute;tchippa&quoute; or &quoute;backchiche&quoute; (bribe).

One recent controversy emerged when a famous Algerian singer, Cheb Khaled, explained to a French newspaper that he used to sing in weddings of generals' children in order to avoid the compulsory conscription. Khaled indicated that his acquaintances enabled him to avoided being conscripted until his departure to France when he was 26 years old.

There is no evidence (reports or articles) of individuals being prosecuted for having paid bribes in order to avoid conscription, or that people who have done so have been punished according to the law mentioned above.

Researcher4311: Conscription is compulsory in Algeria. All male Algerians who are of 19 years or older must serve. In May 2014, conscription length was reduced from 18 months 12 months. This new law considers the 12 months in the army as &quoute;professional activity&quoute;, meaning that these 12 months will count towards the future retirement of the young conscript. Law 01-06 on the Prevention and the Fight Against Corruption prohibits accepting bribes, particularly in Articles 32, 33 and 38. Public servants are similarly not allowed to accept money or gifts.

There is no evidence (reports or articles) of individuals being prosecuted for having paid bribes in order to gain preferred postings during conscription, or that people who have done so have been punished according to the law mentioned above. As there is no transparency in defence institutions regarding recruitment, it is both possible and likely that bribery is practised in order to gain preferred postings however. From the assessor's professional experience, it is commonly known that individuals have avoided national service and obtained a &quoute;yellow card&quoute; thanks to &quoute;marifa&quoute; - an expression used in Algeria to say that a top ranked official has intervened for them, or that they have given a &quoute;tchippa&quoute; or &quoute;backchiche&quoute; (bribe).

Researcher4311: Research found no evidence of ghost soldiers, including any media reports of ghost soldiers in the past five years. Interviewee 3 also indicated there are no ghost soldiers in the PNA. There has been historic evidence: the interviewee mentioned that during the civil war (1990-2000) there was the &quoute;patriots&quoute; and the &quoute;GLD : Groupes de légitime défense&quoute; that were receiving payments from the ministry without really having any control on their work or activities.

There is no evidence that personnel do not receive the correct pay on time, or reports in the media of military personnel protesting for receiving their pay late. Basic pay appears to be non-discretionary. The system of payment is, however, neither transparent nor published.

Researcher4311: There is no evidence to confirm whether or not chains of command are separated from chains of payment. According to a security consultant to the Ministry of defence, &quoute;wages vary according to the grades and positions. Wages are paid in monthly transfer as in all institutions and businesses through bank transfer to the accounts of the person. It is the Finance Department of the MoD that is responsible for the salaries&quoute;.

Researcher4311: There is no evidence of the existence of a code of conduct specifically for military and civilian personnel. The 2006 Anti-corruption Law includes articles that discuss bribery and misappropriation (Art 30), influence peddling (Art 32), conflict of interest (Art 34), illicit enrichment (Art 37) and gifts (Art 38). The law covers all public officials and civil servants in general without any specification for military or defence personnel.

By contrast, in 2008 the General Director of the National Security (Sureté Nationale) announced the creation of a code of conduct that police officers will be required to comply with and respect. This came into effect from 1 January 2008 and includes specific provisions on corruption: &quoute;Under penalty of law, it is prohibited for any police officer to solicit, demand or receive, directly or through an intermediary, in consideration of the provision made ​​in the course of his duties, any gift, donation, gratuity or benefit of any kind &quoute;.

Researcher4311: No evidence could be found of a code of conduct specific to either military or civilian defence personnel. There is no evidence that any existing legislation such as the 2006 Anti-corruption Law is effectively addressed.

A police code of conduct was mandated by authorities in 2008. The researcher could not find an electronic copy of this code but several sources have mentioned it including the official newspaper JORA. According to an article in Algerie-Focus, the DGSN put in place a code of conduct in which the focus is made on a better civil-police relationships. This includes answering to the requests of citizens, and performing a better service and welcome in police structures. The code also does not seem to be publicly available.

Researcher4311: There is reference to anti-corruption training in Law 06-01 on the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption, (Title II, Section 3, paragraph 4) that states there should be &quoute;the development of educational programs and adequate training to enable government officers to fulfill their duties in a fair, honorable and proper manner and have them receive specialized training to sensitize advantage of the risks of corruption&quoute;.

Evidence indicates this does not happen in reality. The President of the AACC has condemned the lack of risk assessment areas and the lack of adequate systematic training that may allow personnel to better understand corruption. He has also recommended that all public officials should receive adequate ethics training, not only upon recruitment but also in the context of continuing education, particularly for posts most at risk of corruption.

Training is not systematic however the researcher found information on several wider initiatives such as a workshop organized in June 2010 on corruption and the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. This workshop was organized under the patronage of the Bank of Algeria and the US Embassy in Algiers. There was also training in Ghardaïa, in June 2010, of 25 judges from 36 departments. This training workshop was organized by the Ministry of Justice as part of the cooperation program with the European Union. There was also a workshop organized in collaboration with the United States in Algeria in October 2013. This workshop was aimed at magistrates and officers of the criminal police, and discussed legal standards and tools for the fight against corruption and international organized crime; or this seminar on the modernization of law and judicial practices and investigations in the fight against corruption organized in Algiers by the Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (OCRC) in partnership with the Embassy of France in Algiers.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Score changed from 1 to 0.

Researcher4311: There is no evidence of a policy to make public outcomes of prosecutions of defence service personnel for corrupt activities, nor is there evidence of any effective prosecutions in recent years. If there is any effective prosecutions of defence personnel they do not seem to be available to public.

Some public sector cases have been raised following major scandals, such as the Khalifa case, Algérie télécom case, Sonatrach 1,2,3,4, and the East-West Highway. Even in these cases, prosecutions have not been very effective however - as shown by the time (10 years) it took to Rafik Khalifa to be extradited from the UK, despite the 2006 extradition agreement between the two countries.

Further evidence of this wider lack of effectiveness surrounds the former minister of Energy, where issues with an international arrest warrant issued against him have prevented its implementation. The mandate was meant to be made by the President of the Supreme Court and not by the prosecution, because of the special status of the litigant under section 573 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This has effectively rendered the mandate useless in practice. The government has continued to refuse to comment on this issue.

Researcher4311: Research found clear evidence that Law 06-01 is proving insufficient to fight corruption in practice. Facilitation payments appear to be common in all government levels, such as shown in an August 2014 case where police agents in the Houari Boumediene airport were identified to be asking travelers for facilitation payments (around DZD 3000 - 5000) [EUR 30-50] in order to board flights that were known to be overbooked. There is limited evidence of prosecution: a 2013 investigation by the DGSN (Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale / National Police) under the command of the Major General Abdelghani Hamel implicated officials and police officers who had unusually acquired cars, homes and land, in making and receiving facilitation payments (Sources 4 and 5).

Researcher4311: There is no evidence of the military having a doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. This is likely to be at least in part symptomatic of Algeria's strictly defensive constitutional principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs (Article 26). This has been widely interpreted as preventing its forces from undertaking operations abroad but there is academic critique that this is not proving suitable in practice. Whilst several senior Algerian government officials, including the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Chief of Staff, have also clearly stated that the Algerian army will not undertake any operation outside Algerian territory, expert analysis shows that this has nonetheless occurred in Libya, for example.

Researcher4311: Algeria has no known training in corruption issues for commanders.

There is evidence from several cases that indicates officers have actively engaged in corrupt activities with little or no retribution. For example, Pierre Demers, a Canadian engineer, was arrested in 2009 after denouncing corruption and facilitation payments in the military. Two members of the Algerian military who were involved in the case were not convicted despite evidence of them offering confessions (sources 2 and 3).

Researcher4311: There is no evidence on the Ministry of Defence website or elsewhere indicating that any trained professionals have been deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field. Recently, the National Body for prevention and fight against corruption (ONPLC) announced a plan for the implementation of a training for 10,000 agents of the civil service corps. Nothing has been mentioned on the military however.

Researcher4311: No evidence was found on the Ministry of Defence website or anywhere else showing the existence of guidelines or staff training on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations.

Researcher4311: The Algerian government does not appear to employ private military companies. Nonetheless, a number of private military contractors and corporations do operate in Algeria; the most well known include Secur Group Vigilance and SAG Es Salem. Research indicates these PMCs have been present in Algeria since the early 1990s and predominantly provide security to oil companies. In May 2008 the former Minister of the Interior stated there were 52 MPCs operating; it was not possible to confirm if these figures still apply however. The Minister also explained that &quoute;[t]here are 52 security companies that have a para-police mission in Algeria and are under constant surveillance by the services of the national police, the Gendarmerie and the DRS&quoute;.

According to the sources above, before a contract is signed with a company, it must be audited by a foreign firm that provides auditing and consulting in security. They assess the potential risk and determine safety regulations in the area of health and safety (HSE). There is a high level of scrutiny, particularly for armoury management, traceability, possession and the importation and movement of firearms. This is strictly codified. For example, weapons accompanying safety equipment are sent separately with an interval of twenty four hours [Decree of August 8, 1999: Article 27-bis].

The limited evidence available indicates a corruption risk in this area. For example, there has been outsourcing of contracts to foreign security companies, as indicated by the Minister of the Interior in 2009. Research found that due to the high level of corruption and depending on networking and relationships in the administration, this process can be accelerated and the habilitation inquiry overlooked. Media coverage also shows that after the attack on the oil site of Tinguentourine on January 16 2013, many questions about the protection system was raised and the PMCs were targeted and criticized because of their lack of reactivity and their security management.

Researcher4311: Executive Decree No. 95-396 of November 30, 1995 references procedures for arms import and the safety of the state (Source 1). The legislation is likely to be bypassed however - research indicates there are no effective control mechanisms for defence procurement. Article 119 of the Law of Public Procurement [Presidential Decree 12-23) also states that confidential procurement are exempt from requirements such as mentioning in the BOMOP the company names, the groups of beneficiaries, the time-line of the project, etc. There is no evidence that these items are subject to any other form of independent scrutiny.

Since the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, no law on fiscal regulations has been passed by parliament, in violation of the Constitution. Interviewee 1 indicated that the documents submitted by the Executive to parliament do not allow members of parliament to decide on the reality of budget execution or implementation rates. Some figures also show evidence of the existence of sixty special funds, mostly fuelled by money from the Treasury, which appear to never have been controlled by the Parliament (source 1).

Researcher4311: The defence procurement cycle does not appear to be disclosed and it is unclear if it has been formalised. The relevant public procurement laws only allow for its disclosure in a very abbreviated/general way.

Article 49 of the Law of Public Procurement [Presidential Decree No. 10-236 of October 7, 2010 modified] states that any public calls for tender is written in Arabic and in at least one other language. It should be published in the BOMOP (Bulletin Officiel des Marchés de l'Opérateur Public. Official Bulletin for Public Market Operations) and in at least two national newspapers. The procurement notice is also published in the press that ensures its publication and specifies the price, the timetable and all the elements that are required for the selection of the contractor. There is nothing to prove that this applies to defence contracts however. The researcher could not find any example outside these legal texts in which this legislation has actually been applied.

There are other limited references to procurement in the law. Article 69- (Decree No. 11-222, Decree No. 12-23) makes reference to a public notice. Article 114 states that the contractor service have to publish a notice in case of a cancellation. Finally, Article 119 (Decree 12-23) states that information – such as the list of all former contracts, the names’ company or the groups of beneficiaries, the time-line of the project etc.. – shall be published in the BOMOP and/or in the Contractor's website. Confidential procurement are exempt from these requirements however.

Researcher4311: There is no evidence of procurement oversight mechanisms in Algeria. Research found a total lack of transparency and evidence indicating high levels of corruption in this area, and that many breaches are likely to have occurred with the collusion of government ministers. As explained by Djilali Hadjadj, President of the AACC: &quoute; [...] the legal arsenal, established for fourteen years now is inconsistent, unenforced and did not meet international standards. Organizations fighting against corruption are just posturing, the lack of political will is obvious. Consider that the actions and decisions that promote concussion in awarding public contracts, such as over-the-counter agreements are discussed during the council of Ministers&quoute;.

There are no control mechanisms in place for defence procurement. Since the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, no law on fiscal regulations has been passed by parliament, in violation of the Constitution. Indeed, evidence from civil society indicates that the documents submitted by the Executive to parliament do not allow members of parliament to decide on the reality of budget execution or implementation rates (source 3).

Researcher4311: Publishing defence purchases is not common in Algeria and research found the Ministry of Defence has not published or circulated this type of information. As mentioned in previous questions, this information typically falls under the &quoute;secret défense&quoute; umbrella, which has created significant lack of transparency.

Many defence purchases have not been made public, although one can find information in an aggregated form from different national and international sources. The national press have reported actual and potential purchases from time to time. Information from journalists and in the media mostly make no disclosure of their sources, making it difficult to cross-check.

Researcher4311: The law makes some reference to the need for companies to avoid corruption, notably in Section 6, Articles 60, 61, 61bis and 61ter. These articles mention the requirement to have a code of ethics, the duty to withdraw from a public servant if he happens to have a conflict of interest, the duty to abide by the code of ethics from the preparation, negotiation to the conclusion and execution phase of the project/contract.

Commentators have separately noted that public officials must follow a code of ethics and conduct in monitoring the procurement and execution of a public contract. Presidential Decree No. 11-98 of March 1, 2011 (amending and supplementing the Presidential Decree No. 10-36 regulating public procurement) was designed to relax the steps for foreign bidders in the competitive process for international bids. This decree maintains that public officials must follow a code of ethics and conduct in monitoring the procurement and execution of a public contract. The decree was introduced to relax the historically very strict procurement code, which prevented non-nationals from investing in Algeria, including by requiring them to find an Algerian resident partner in Algeria in order to invest.

Researcher4311: There is no information about the national defence and security strategy and information related to this has not been openly published. An examination of known military procurement and expenditure does provide some indication on the likely national security strategy (explained below), however there is no proof that this procurement has been formally derived from this strategy.

The available evidence indicates that Algeria has been increasing its military expenditure in order to protect its borders that it is building up against jihadists of Al Qaeda and IS (Islamic State organization) and that it has been sending more troops to monitor its frontiers with Libya, Mali and Niger. The country has also now closed all the borders (except the one with Tunisia) that are now military zones accessible only with a special security clearance. A 2014 SIPRI report shows that &quoute;Algeria became the first country in Africa with military spending over $10 billion, an increase of 8.8 per cent since 2012, and of 176 per cent since 2004. [...] High oil revenues appear to be a factor driving ... military spending increases&quoute;.

Analysis shows military expenditure is likely to increase for several reasons: 1) the Arab spring and the rise of militancy that is unsettling for the Algerian authorities, especially after the &quoute;black decade&quoute; and its 150,000 victims of radical Islamism; 2) the increase of conflicts in neighbouring states that are becoming terrorist hubs and also a haven for arms and drug smuggling (including Tunisia, Sinai, and especially the south border with Libya); 3) the increasing role of Algeria in regional security and its demonstrated desire to place itself as &quoute;North Africa's gendarme&quoute;.

One has to mention that despite continuing jihadist expansion regionally, Algeria has demonstrated a policy of protectionism rather than interventionism. Algeria has publicly opposed foreign intervention in Libya and is pushing the “conflicting parties” to reach a security agreement. The country also refused to participate in military intervention in Mali. Developments on the ground may lead to a change in the foreign policy of Algeria however, especially if there is another threat made against Algeria’s oil industry like the events in Aïn Amenas.

Researcher4311: Presidential Decree n°10-236 of October 7, 2010 modified (Title 2, Article 1) related to the regulations of Public Procurement establishes a formal procedure for defining purchase requirements. This decree states for instance that &quoute;Needs must be accurately prepared, in type and quantity by reference to detailed technical specifications and established on the basis of a standard or a performance to be achieved&quoute; (Title 2, Section 1, article 11). There is no clear reference made to defence purchases however.

In practice, there is no evidence that defence purchases have been based on a clear identified and quantified requirements. The limited available evidence indicates that there is likely to be a high risk that these have often been opportunistic.

Researcher4311: Defence procurement is in principle conducted as open competition (Title 3, Section 1, Articles 26 and 28).
In practice a majority of defence contracts appear to be conducted via single-sourcing however. According to Habib Yousfi, President of the General Confederation of Algerian entrepreneurs (CGEA), the specifications in tenders for public procurement is still &quoute;prepared according to the relational system [...]&quoute; According to him, the command service is not available democratically to all traders because it is the personal relationships that decide on suppliers, which gives them some influence.

Competition may also be influenced at a geopolitical level. Evidence shows that, having being Algeria's primary military supplier for many years, France has lost its influence in the country. Its criticism of the crisis management of the Algerian authorities during the 1990s has led to its lost of influence (Source 4). Russia is now the leading defence partner of Algeria, who represent 8% of its total arm sales (SIPRI. Source 5). According to a 2013 report (source 6) &quoute;Russia supplied 93 per cent of Algerian arms imports, including 44 Su-30MKA combat aircraft,2 Project-636 submarines, an estimated 3 S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B) long-range szrface-to-airmissile (SAM) systems and 185 T-90S tanks, and training aircraft Yak-130 missile batteries aswell as Russian-made S-300 PMU2 air defence missile system&quoute;.

It is nonetheless important to note that Algeria has been diversifying its sources by opening its market to suppliers other than Russia such as the US, Germany and Italy through direct government -to-government deals or through joint ventures and partnerships (sources 6-7).

The Algerian procurement code appears to contribute to this situation. Foreign firms which apply for a public contract must do so in a joint venture with an Algerian company [Art 24, Décret n°11-98]. On 11 July 2010, the Algerian government announced an increase in the preference margin it gives to domestic firms in public procurement contracts. Where Algerian firms were enjoying a preference margin of 15 percent, they will now enjoy a preference of 25 percent.

At the time of research, the law for public procurement had been changed three times in less than 15 months. The procurement code has historically been very strict and prevented non-nationals from investing in Algeria. Indeed, foreigners had to find an Algerian resident partner in Algeria in order to invest. This had perverse effects on the economy that was suffering from a real gloom. It is for this reason that the government retracted by implementing the Presidential Decree No. 11-98 of March 1, 2011 amending and supplementing the Presidential Decree No. 10-36 regulating public procurement, which relaxes the steps at foreign bidders in the competitive process for international bids. In this Decree, Section 6, Article 60, it says that public officials must follow a code of ethics and conduct in monitoring the procurement and execution of a public contract.

Researcher4311: There is no transparency of tender board procedure and practice.

It is not clear whether provisions for audits are in case but it is unlikely that they are undertaken on tender boards. Several corruption cases in the last few years in Algeria tend to show that things are different in practice and relationships, networking and nepotism are prevalent (source 1). The most significant corruption cases in the media that relate to the security sector were ABM Algeria Business Multimedia. The head of the General Directorate of National Security was convicted of &quoute;a doubtful deal&quoute; and &quoute;public procurement procedures in violation with the Algerian legislation&quoute; in the purchase of computer equipment from the ABM private firm. He was accused of having used his influence on the technical committee of evaluation in which he was a board member and chose ABM in which his son-in-law is a shareholder and the Deputy Director General (Source 4, 5,6). Other high-profile cases such the Sonatrach case, where the sons of the CEO were accused of &quoute;Complicity in contracting in violation of the regulations&quoute;, demonstrate that this issue extents more widely beyond defence tendering (source 7).

The Presidential Decree No. 11-98 of March 1, 2011 amending and supplementing the Presidential Decree No. 10-36 regulating public procurement, Section 6, Article 60, states that public officials must follow a code of ethics and conduct in monitoring the procurement and execution of a public contract.
In the &quoute;Public procurement rules&quoute;. Section 6, Fight against corruption, Art.60 it is stated that: &quoute;A code of ethics and professional conduct in procurement matters--which prescribes the fees and obligations of public officials during the inspection, the award, and execution of a public contract or amendment--will be approved by decree&quoute;. It is not clear whether this applies to or is imposed on defence procurement. However, it seems that this code of conduct was expected to be ready by 2010, but as mentioned by an article dated from 2013, the code is still pending (source 2).

Researcher4311: In Law 06-01, there are clauses that specifically address collusion: Art. 49 states, “an accomplice or an author of an infraction provided by the Law 06-01 may benefit of an 'absolutory excuse' under the conditions provided by the Criminal Code, if before any judicial pursuit he/she reveals to the administrative authorities an infraction and helps identify the concerned individuals.” And, “except the above-mentioned case, the maximum penalty for any author or accomplice of an infraction provided by this Law, and who has, after the initiation of judicial pursuits, facilitated the arrests of one or more persons involved, will be reduced by half.“

Art. 52 of Law 06-01 state, “The provisions related to collusion provided for in the Penal Code are applicable to offences provided by this Law. […]”. In the Criminal Code, there is several articles related to collusion: Art. 42, 43, 44, 51bis., 91, 92, 122, 182, 236, 261, 384, 389.

Law 06-01, Title 2, Article 9 states that the procedures for public procurement must be based on transparency, fair and loyal competition, and objective criteria. In addition, there is the article 33 that states that any public servant who intentionally abuse his power in order to obtain personal advantages, will be punished of 2 to 10 years of prison and a fine up to 1,000,000. It should be said that these articles do not mention anything about the defence sector.

Enforcement of measures to punish colluding companies is likely to be only weakly enforced as proved by the case of the steel complex Arcelor Mittal-Algérie. In December 2014 allegations were raised that the Deputy Minister of defence (also Army Chief of Staff) was implicated in a corruption case involving defective aircraft delivered by Russia. There is no evidence to indicate this has been appropriately investigated however.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments updated.

Researcher4311: According to the 2011 (most recent for Algeria) Global Integrity Report, there is no regular required training of public procurement officials and when this is available is voluntary. Presidential Decree No. 11-98 of March 1, 2011 amending and supplementing the Presidential Decree No. 10-36 regulating public procurement, Section 6, Article 60, states that public officials must follow a code of ethics and conduct in monitoring the procurement and execution of a public contract. In practice there appears to be little control or oversight of defence contractors by procurement staff, and there is likely to be evidence of undue influence from higher grades within the organisation (source 1).

Researcher4311: No formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. Saida Neghza, vice president of the General Confederation of Algerian companies explains that &quoute;in Algeria there is no mechanism to allow a company to denounce corruption. There is a fundamental legal vacuum in that case. In cases where there is a complaint, the problem is the evidence. Indeed, what justice may rule in your favour if you do not have any evidence? [...] To be clear, we can do nothing. When we see senior officials involved in corruption, it is not surprising that small managers do the same&quoute;.

It is likely that companies would be disadvantaged because there is no formal mechanisms to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. No examples were found of companies being debarred from future procurement, although there is one example of a company debarred by the World Bank (the Chinese company CSCEC) that is still in business in Algeria (Source 2).

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agree with comments. Score changed from 1 to 0.

Researcher4311: Law 06-01, Article 26, Paragraph 2 states that suppliers who try to raise prices, or change to their advantage the quality of the goods or services or delivery or supplies will be punished by imprisonment of two to ten years, as well as a fine of between DZD200,000 and DZD1,000,000 (EUR 20,000 - EUR 100,000).
As for Army suppliers, it is mentioned in the Penal Code, (promulgated by Ordinance No. 66-156 of June 8, 1966), Art. 161. (Modified) that suppliers who change to their advantage the quality of the good are punishable by imprisonment of five (5) to ten (10) years and a fine not exceeding one quarter of civil damages, nor less than two thousand (2,000) DA. In addition to that, officials or agents, servants and employees of the State, who have caused or helped the supplier, shall be punished by imprisonment of ten (10) to twenty (20) years.

Several cases have shown that the law is not applied in practice. The most recent one is the Agusta-Westland case, a corruption case over helicopter contract in which &quoute;slush funds&quoute; and fake invoices were shown to have been made to help the Italian firm win a contract by bribing Algerian officials.

Researcher4311: According to senior analyst Laurence Aïda Ammour (Source 1, 2), Algeria is discussing a policy of offset agreements on defence capable of attracting international companies in order to increase its domestic manufacturing capacity for weapons materials. The country has also begun discussions with the Directorate of the Gulf Cooperation Council, with which it desires to establish formalized compensation programs. As the analyst explains however, there is clearly a high risk of political corruption for offset policies that is associated with countries where corruption is already commonplace and where the defence industry is characterized by a lack of transparency.

Although the Prevention of Corruption Law of 2006 calls for an estimation of expenditures in offset agreements, there is no evidence of effective control over it. The analyst notes that given the particularly high financial transfers involved in these kinds of agreements, and the confidentiality and opacity surrounding the allocation and expenditure of defence budgets, there is significantly aggravated risk of corruption. According to the same report (source 1), the unquestionable influence of senior members of the defence and security sector prevents any review or control over transactions. Similarly, military control over many private commercial enterprises prevents appropriate verification and transparency from occurring.

It similarly appears neither the ANLC and IGF are currently able to take on this responsibility. According to the report: &quoute;The National Body for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption and the Inspectorate General for Finance are both weak. No anti-corruption institutions specifically targeting the defence sector exist and there is a lack of enforcement of counter corruption laws. Furthermore, the nation’s Supreme Audit institution is limited in its ability to audit defence institutions. Finally, offsets represent transfers of substantial resources to authoritarian government under no conditionality&quoute;. (source 2).

As mentioned in the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism report (2010. p. 7) in Algeria, &quoute;The procedures followed do not meet the requirements of R.5 related to obtaining information on the purpose and nature of the business relationship; as such obligation should be imposed by virtue of an explicit provision.There is no legal or regulatory provision that requires financial institutions to take ongoing due diligence measures. As well, the financial institutions are not required to verify that the documents, data or information obtained by virtue of the due diligence procedures are updated and consistent, particularly for the categories of high risk customers and business relationships&quoute;.

Researcher4311: The government does not provide any details on offset contracts or programs. ConsecutiveOpen Budget Index findings show that the Algerian government provides the public with scant information on the central government’s budget and financial activities during the course of the budget year.

Research found that proposals are not made available to the public, making it very difficult for citizens to have a comprehensive picture of the government’s plans or spending. Citizens have very limited access to the government data on this topic. The Law on Information (2012) does not mention the rights of citizens to access government data. It is rather concerned with the responsibilities and rules of jobs related to information, such as journalism (Source 2).

According to the French Research Center for Intelligence (Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement), Algeria is discussing a policy of offset agreements on defence capable of attracting international companies in order to increase domestic manufacturing capacity for weapons materials. The country has begun discussions with the Directorate of the Gulf Cooperation Council, with which it desires to establish formalized compensation programs. The report points out that offset policies, especially in defence, are deemed to be at a high risk of political corruption in countries where it is already commonplace and where the defence industry is characterized by a lack of transparency.

Researcher4311: There is no specified offset policy in the country. Tender opportunities appear to either be classified as national, international restricted or closed (i.e. only sent to specific companies and not published). The lack of available evidence indicates that most defence contracts are likely to have occurred through a closed route.

Researcher4311: The intervention of an intermediary and the use of them by any means is strictly prohibited by Algerian law (including under the provisions of Law No. 88-29 of 19 July 1988 on the state monopoly on foreign trade) and are punishable under sections 128, 242, 243, 423 of the Penal Code.

Despite this, the use of agents and intermediaries is common in the procurement cycle. According to the source cited above (1) there is a real &quoute;diktat&quoute; of intermediaries in Algeria. It appears likely that they receive uncompetitive advantages, such as being made aware of tenders before publication.

It also appears that there is at least some degree of control over their usage, as indicated by several cases. For example, prosecutions against ENI and SNC Lavalin, Sonatrach (see source 4) and Saipem (Source 5) emphasized the illegality of these practices where intermediaries took millions of dollars in commission. This control does not appear to be consistently enforced however, as shown by the absence of a trial for East-West (source 6).

Researcher4311: The principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals are required to be published in a national newspaper and/or in the BOMOP under Presidential Decree No.10-236 of October 7, 2010, Section 1, Article 69 and Section 2, Article 49. No evidence was found of this being applied in practice.

Researcher4311: The research could not find any evidence that the government requires main contractors to ensure that their subsidiaries/sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programs. No policy was found that would evidence that the Algerian government - at least - encourages the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes.

It is worth noting that the procurement code was strict and prevented non-nationals from investing in Algeria; foreigners were required to find an Algerian resident partner in Algeria in order to invest. This had perverse effects on an economy that was poorly performing. For this reason the government reacted by implementing Presidential Decree No. 11-98 of March 1, 2011 to amend and supplement Presidential Decree No. 10-36 regulating public procurement, which relaxes the steps at foreign bidders in the competitive process for international bids.

Section 6, Article 60 of this Decree states that public officials must follow a code of ethics and conduct in monitoring the procurement and execution of a public contract. There is also a reference to transparency in the Decree 10-236 of March 7, 2010 (Title I, Article 3). These policies again do not make a specific formal requirement for contractors to ensure their subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programs however. Additionally, no evidence was found that the articles of the law cited above are enforced.

Researcher4311: Government statements show the state has used the &quoute;lutte contre le terrorisme&quoute; (fight against terrorism) and the need to secure its borders to justify its defence and security expenditures. Platform requirements appear to be broadly justified by reference to military need; the procurement of IFVs corresponds to Algeria's need to defend its large desert borders, for example, whilst its naval expansion indicates recognition of problems such as smuggling, illegal migration and indigenous terrorism that affect Algeria's harbours and maritime routes as well as over 1,000km of coastline.

Political influence from seller nations is likely to have resulted in specific platforms being selected however, as arms deals have often been connected with oil and gas exports (Interviewee 4). Notably, Russia currently dominates the Algerian arms market after a deal negotiated in 2006 to cancel debts incurred by Algeria for Soviet-era arms transfers* in exchange for new arms orders and access for Russian energy companies. Analysis indicates significant geopolitical motivations existed for the Russian government to press for deals that would strengthen its domestic arms industry and gain energy market leverage against Europe. Given Algeria's obligations to Russia formed around 29% of its national debt, it is reasonable to assess that Russia was able to exert significant pressure here. It is not clear how suitable some of these platforms may have been for Algeria however. It should be noted, for example, that Algeria subsequently cancelled a $1.3 billion contract and returned 15 MiG-29 aircraft to Russia after parts were found to be old or defective.

Commentators have noted that Algeria has nonetheless made efforts to diversify suppliers, including procuring military goods and services from Germany, China and Italy.

*Between 1970 and 1991, the Soviet Union, accounted for 90 percent of Algeria's imports of major conventional weapons. Algeria was the eighth largest recipient of Soviet arms exports, accounting for four percent.