Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The assessor found no evidence of legal or practical controls over military asset disposal, debate over planned asset disposals or financial results of such disposals. Evidence suggests there are major lapses in the legal framework with regard to arms import/export; there is little or no control in the management of military stockpiles; and weapons often disappear and circulate easily (22:1, p38-40).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Information over asset disposal is not available for audit or indeed official or public scrutiny (23:1, p7). Generally, public financial management is weak and opaque. There are major lapses in the legal framework with regards to arms import/export; there is little or no control in the management of military stockpiles; and weapons often disappear and circulate easily (23:2, p38-40).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no specific defence budget, but the ministry of defence has a section in the general budget. This does not appear to contain secret spending items or emergency spending funds (24:5). Chadian law does not provide for public access to government information (24:1, p18).

In 2006, the Chadian parliament voted to 'double the percentage of money that can be spent with no oversight' on the military (24:2). This culture continues to present day; around a fifth of government spending was executed via emergency procedures between 2011 and 2012 (24:1). Moreover, the management of public resources is weak and a large share of public expenses are appropriated through emergency procedures (24:3, p8). To avoid debate in parliament and any kind of external control, the government has classified military spending as a &quoute;state secret&quoute; (24:4, p8).

Off-budget expenditures like emergency expenditures are likely to be on items relating to intelligence and national security. Due to severe insecurity in and around Chad (threat of Boko Haram, Central African civil war to the south, ongoing Darfur conflict to the east), substantial domestic spending goes on national security and intelligence collection, most often in an emergency capacity.

A 2013 IMF report suggests that in 2008 the military spending approved by extraordinary budgetary procedures was 50%of the total. This was the height of the rebel threat in Chad. This figure fell to 15% by 2013. Between 2007 and 2010, about a third of domestically-financed spending (excluding wages and debt) was executed through emergency spending procedures. Between 2011 and 2012, this fell to about a fifth (24:1, p7).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no specific defence budget, but the ministry of defence has a section in the general budget. This does not appear to contain secret spending items or emergency spending funds (25:8). No explicit reference to legislative oversight of spending of secret items relating to national security and military intelligence was found on Chad's legal portal legitchad.cefod-tchad.org.

It is unclear whether the parliament has access to more budgetary detail than is available to the public, but the fact that the opposition voted against budgetary amendments on the basis of opacity suggests that they do not. The leader of the opposition cited &quoute;extremely opaque expenditure&quoute; as one of the reasons for voting against budgetary amendments in 2014 (which were meant, among other things, to control for the fall in oil prices), stating that &quoute;the Ministery of Defence has never revealed how much Mali cost, how much CAR cost, how much the planes that they have just bought from Ukraine cost.&quoute; The opposition complained that &quoute;overall, there is opacity everywhere. It's a budget made predominantly for our donors&quoute; (25:9).

In 2006, the Chadian parliament voted to 'double the percentage of money that can be spent with no oversight' on the military (25:4). This culture continued; around a fifth of government spending was executed via emergency procedures between 2011 and 2012 (25:1). Moreover, the management of public resources is weak and a large share of public expenses are appropriated through emergency procedures (25:1, p8). To avoid debate in parliament and any kind of external control, the government has classified military spending as &quoute;state secret&quoute; (25:5, p8). A large share of government spending is executed via emergency procedures which are likely to be on items relating to intelligence and national security.

Furthermore, off-budget military expenditures are legally permitted through budget contingency provisions (25:2). They are called 'depenses avant ordonancement' (DAO), which means that if a payment is deemed urgent or exceptional, the Treasury can agrees to a quick disbursement that does not require regulation through a formal parliamentary approval process. There is no evidence that this well controlled and there is media speculation that the process is abused (25:3). A 2013 IMF report suggests that in 2008 the military spending approved by extraordinary budgetary procedures was 50% of the total. This was the height of the rebel threat in Chad. This figure fell to 15% by 2013.

Despite a Court of Accounts of 31 members on a 5-year renewable mandate, being established in 2014 (following a Economic Community of Central African States ratification in 2011) to oversee receipts and expenditure of the state funds (25:6), the assessor found no reports confirming that it is active or that its functions will include oversight of security and military intelligence. Like other legal bodies and their practitioners, it is likely to be heavily influenced by defence and security forces (25:7, p30).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: It is likely that there is a legal requirement for accounts to be presented to parliament for scrutiny - certainly reports about the new anti-corruption Court of Accounts suggests it would be performing this function. There is, however, no evidence that a Court of Accounts (established in 2014 according to CEMAC guidelines) is functioning yet (26:2).

There is a general public auditing body, Inspection Générale des Finances (IGF) that covers all public accounts. According to a 2014 report by TI it 'publishes an annual report of budget implementation as well as its audit reports on its website. Its recommendations in terms of sanctions are rarely implemented ... However, few Chadians have internet access and the IGF website was not functional at the time of writing this report' (26:2). The website, as of March 2015, is still not functioning.

Oversight institutions in Chad appear to be generally inefficient either because of political interference or institutional weakness. For example, even though a civil society monitoring group was set up to follow oil spending, evidence indicates it is chronically overloaded with work and under funded. The chair of the programme stated that he had to spend USD 900 on statements from a European bank because no-one in the Chadian treasury had a breakdown of what Chad had earned in oil taxes (26:1). Chad's opposition in parliament is ineffective and has been harassed over the years; today they only have a small number of seats in the National Assembly so they are not in a good position to question government or military and secret spending (26:1).

In 2006, the Chadian parliament voted to 'double the percentage of money that can be spent with no oversight' on the military (26:5). This culture continued; around a fifth of government spending was executed via emergency procedures between 2011 and 2012 (26:4). Moreover, the management of public resources is weak and a large share of public expenses are appropriated through emergency procedures (26:4, p8). To avoid debate in parliament and any kind of external control, the government has classified military spending as &quoute;state secret&quoute; (26:6, p8). A large share of government spending is executed via emergency procedures which are likely to be on items relating to intelligence and national security.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Off-budget military expenditures are legally permitted through budget contingency provisions (27:3). They are called 'dépenses avant ordonancement' (DAO), which means that if a payment is deemed urgent or exceptional, the Treasury can agree to a quick disbursement that does not require regulation through a formal parliamentary approval process.

There is no evidence that this well controlled, or officially recorded, and there is media speculation that the process is abused (27:4). A 2013 IMF report suggests that in 2008 the military spending approved by extraordinary budgetary procedures was 50% of the total, at the height of the rebel threat in Chad. This figure subsequently fell to 15% by 2013.

It is likely that DAOs are justified by noting the substantial regional and domestic threats to the Chadian regime. As budgets and spending or their planning and reasoning are not published it is not possible to confirm whether, for example, terrorism threats or threats from regional civil wars have been used to justify secret and off budget spending. These do not need to be classified as they are not publicly available nor is there legislation in place for access to government information.

Ad hoc government announcements refer to specific expenditure, such as the minister of finance and budget's disclosure that military intervention in Mali in 2013 had cost an estimated USD 217 million (27:5, p4). It is unclear from these statements whether expenditure is meant to have been budgeted for, or whether it is off-budget or crisis expenditure.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There are many examples of off-budget military spending, usually associated with rebel attacks and regional military interventions such as those in Mali and the Central African Republic in 2013 (28:3). The cost of the Mali intervention, remains unconfirmed, estimates range from USD 50m to USD 500m (28:2). While this is not 'illegal' spending, related bills are reported to be pushed through at the will of the president and his small circle of advisors (28:1). The interviewee stated that on the basis of his/her communication with a high-ranking government official, there is acknowledgement of the very high level of extraordinary budgetary procedures within government and there have been orders to curb them (28:1).

Due to severe insecurity in and around Chad (threat of Boko Haram, Central African civil war to the south, ongoing Darfur conflict to the east), substantial domestic spending goes on national security and intelligence collection, most often in an emergency capacity. A 2013 IMF report suggests that in 2008 the military spending approved by extraordinary budgetary procedures was 50%of the total. This was the height of the rebel threat in Chad. This figure fell to 15% by 2013. Between 2007 and 2010, about a third of domestically-financed spending (excluding wages and debt) was executed through emergency spending procedures. Between 2011 and 2012, this fell to about a fifth (28:4, p7). Off-budget expenditures like emergency expenditures are likely to be on items relating to intelligence and national security.

There is no specific defence budget, but the ministry of defence has a section in the general budget (28:8). This does not appear to contain secret spending items or emergency spending funds and the Chadian law does not provide for public access to government information (28:4, p18). The international community provides funding for specific military training and operations in Chad, although the full extent of this is unknown. There is limited information in the budget on donor-funded projects such as French-funded security and police projects (28:8, p.86), and an EU-funded project to support the reform of internal security forces in Chad (Programme d'appui à la réforme des forces de sécurité intérieure du Tchad -PAFSI). There are no accompanying details apart from the headline figures for the amount given by the donor.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The assessor found no legislation relating to classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security on Chad's legal portal, legitchad.cefod-tchad.org. However an 2012 NGO report noted that, to avoid debate in parliament and any kind of external control, the government classifies military spending as a &quoute;state secret&quoute; (29:3, p8), which indicates that there are classification provisions in place.

Such provisions are likely to be at the discretion of the president and not subject to effective scrutiny (29:1). As an example of the President's central position and the parliament's lack of independence: in 2013 the President threatened to dissolve the parliament after it refused to vote in favour of an administrative issue he was backing (29:4). Moreover, members of the parliamentary opposition are subject to unlawful arrest and intimidation by Chadian security forces. 29:5, p18-22).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: National defence and security institutions appear unlikely to have beneficial ownership of lucrative commercial businesses, which are managed by nationalised state firms. State owned enterprises are publicly declared while tenders, licence renewals/cancellations and new projects are frequently reported in the media (30:4). Nevertheless, a search on Chad's legal portal, legitchad.cefod-tchad.org found no legislation with regards to removing defence institutions from business ownership.

There is likely to be a related risk of nepotism however. Beneficial ownership and management of holding companies across industry in Chad are reported to be most frequently awarded to family members of President Deby, as are high profile defence and security positions. Deby's neice, Haoua Daoussa Deby directs the national oil refinery (30:5). The national infrastructure company, Société nationale d'études et de réalisations, is directed by Deby's half brother, Daoussa Deby (30:1, p198); the national cement company, Société national de ciment, is managed by Deby's son, Mahamat Timan Deby (30:2); another son, Hissein Idriss Deby directs the Chadian Investment Corporation (30:3).

Given the secrecy in the defence sector, it is impossible to rule military owned businesses out as a risk, even though there is no clear evidence of institutional level ownership. A score of 2 has therefore been selected.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: National defence and security institutions are unlikely to have beneficial ownership of lucrative commercial businesses, which are managed by nationalised state firms. State owned enterprises are publicly declared while tenders, licence renewals/cancellations and new projects are frequently reported in the media (31:4). Nevertheless, a search on Chad's legal portal, legitchad.cefod-tchad.org found no legislation with regards to removing defence institutions from business ownership. There is no evidence of effective or explicit scrutiny of the activities of the military or military business.

There is broader related risk here however. Beneficial ownership and management of holding companies across industry in Chad are reported to be most frequently awarded to family members of President Deby, as are high profile defence and security positions. Deby's neice, Haoua Daoussa Deby directs the national oil refinery (30:5). The national infrastructure company, Société nationale d'études et de réalisations, is directed by Deby's half brother, Daoussa Deby (30:1, p198); the national cement company, Société national de ciment, is managed by Deby's son, Mahamat Timan Deby (30:2); another son, Hissein Idriss Deby directs the Chadian Investment Corporation (30:3). Given that industry is dominated by clan members it is unlikely to face executive scrutiny (from the President and main patriarch) or legislative scrutiny, as parliament is beholden to the executive (31:5, 31:6).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The Military Code of Conduct does not refer to enterprise or business ownership (32:2). The interviewee was not aware of private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees but did mention that
some civil service employees more generally are engaged in private enterprise. This was to supplement incomes and also because they can trade on connections in the heart of power (32:1).

The assessor found no evidence to suggest that Defence officials are, by statutory or constitutional means, removed from having controlling or financial interests in businesses. Public officials are subject to financial disclosure laws and required to declare their assets, but the laws do not specify any sanction for noncompliance and remain largely unenforced (US Department of State).

While there is no evidence that this is outlawed, there is evidence that the government occasionally cracks down on public servants engaged in corrupt private enterprise - for example arresting the mayor of N'djamena (32:3) and the former finance minister (32:4) - but often these anti-corruption drives are not fully followed through with the culprits often being reappointed (32:3). Interviewee 1 noted that should military officers be engaged in illegal activity, they would be unlikely to face a government led crack down as President Deby is reliant on the army to reduce coup risks and therefore would want to ensure their favour (32:1).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs do not traditionally make public statements. Neither President Deby, who is also the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, nor the former Chadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moussa Faki Mahamat, made reference to corruption or integrity measure during their United Nations General Assembly public addresses in 2012 and 2013 (34:1).

However at the 2013, Economic Commission for Africa conference on the Eradication of Corruption in Post-Conflict States held in N’Djamena in December 2013, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Public Transparency and Promotion of Good Governance said that the World Bank's classification of Chad as last on its Doing Business index was ‘unfair’ given the country's ‘famous history’ of ‘change’ and ‘development. (34:2).

In February 2010, former Prime Minister Abdelkerim Fidèle Moungar, affirmed that ‘corruption in Chad is a structural problem’ and added that ‘there is no transparency’ (34:3).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There are specific bodies in place in Chad to investigate abuses, including bribery and corruption, committed by the national army, the gendarmerie as well the national nomadic guard. These are the Special Intervention Squad of the Gendarmerie that investigate security force abuse committed by the National Armed Forces, gendarmerie, and the national nomadic guard, as well as Judicial Police (35:1, p2). A 2011 law allowed for the establishment of military courts to try military members, however these are yet to become operational. Military personnel are therefore tried in civilian courts (35:1, p.8). The sanctions designed for corrupt activities and the mandates of these bodies are not available to the public, however.

A 2013 United States Country Report found that Chadian 'Members of the Judiciary Police, often did not enforce domestic court orders against the military or members of their own ethnic groups. There were isolated reports of former soldiers posing as active duty military and committing crimes with government-issued weapons.’ (35:1, p5) Moreover, the report explains, the ‘Police were ineffective, corrupt, and involved in extortion' (35:1, p5). This is likely to extend to special forces, the national army as well as the nomadic guard given evidence that 'impunity for officials, particularly the military, is widespread' in Chad (35:2)

There is evidence to suggest that military and civilian personnel are involved in extensive bribe taking; for example, prison guards have been reported to release prisoners in return for cash (35:1,p4), However, there is no evidence that corrupt officials are prosecuted. Interviewee 1 has indicated President Deby is reliant on the army to defend him. As loyalty is questionable he cannot afford to crack down on the military too much in case they launch a coup (35:4).

In 2015, a dozen security officers were arrested after a video of them torturing detainees was released on line (35:3). The event, i.e. the public announcement of security abuses (abuse of authority is against the military code of conduct) being dealt with was unprecedented. There is no evidence that they have or will be prosecuted.

There is no openly stated state policy to fight corruption in the defence sector, although the Ministry of Public Transparency and Promotion of Good Governance (PTPGG) is responsible for combating corruption across government institutions. The National Agency for Financial Investigations also exists to help combat corruption across government institutions. The assessor found no evidence of these institutions targeting investigations into the defence sector.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There are no legal provisions for the protection of public (including defence) or private whistleblowers in Chad (36:3). Article 29 of the Military code of Conduct forbids military officers from making written or verbal disclosures about military affairs without certified Ministry of Defence authority (36:4). Furthermore ‘there are no laws providing for the protection of public and private employees who make internal disclosures or lawful public disclosures of evidence of illegality’ (36:1. p17).

The assessor found no evidence of institutionalised mechanisms in place to facilitate reporting of corruption by personnel but a 2010 media law that abolishes prison sentences for defamation or insult (36:1, p7), but also prohibits ‘inciting racial, ethnic, or religious hatred, punishable by up to two years in prison (36:1, p8).

No examples of whistleblowing in Chad were found by the assessor, but by way of proxy, examples of civil society reporting on corruption and facing severe consequences indicates that it is unlikely to be tolerated.
In March 2013, civil rights activist and commentator on state corruption, Jean Laokolé, was arrested in N’Djamena and charged with defamation. He was detained until August 2013 and received a three year suspended prison sentence (36:2). Examples like this suggest that there would be little trust amongst officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The assessor found no evidence of recognition by the government that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.

According to the constitution, the President has the power to appoint 'the prime minister and the Council of state and exercises considerable influence over appointments of judges, generals, provincial officials and heads of Chad's parastatal firms' (37:3, p.8). While not stated, this is likely to apply to personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management too. The assessor found no rules of conduct associated with such positions (other than those provided by the military code of conduct to all personnel) or appointment procedures relating to selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel.

According to the interviewee, loyalty and family or clan connections are allegedly more important in getting a job than probity or qualifications. Interviewee 1 also held the view that the very real dangers that present instability in Chad and across its borders (Libya, Darfur, CAR, Nigeria) have meant that President Deby has never been fully confident of his position, and has therefore needed to have confidence that individuals making key decisions such as in defence procurement will not let him down (37:1).

Opposition websites, as mentioned elsewhere, for example suggest that about seven members of Deby's close family have high positions in either the army or the police, including Siddick Deby who is in charge of procuring military equipment for the National Army (37:2). President Deby himself is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces for example, while his brother Oumar Deby Itno is the Director General of the Chadian special forces (Services de Sécurité et Institutions de l’Etat: DGSSIE). General Mahamat Idriss Deby, the President’s son, is the Commander of first contingent of the DGSSIE. Mahamat Haiga Déby, the President’s nephew, is the Commander for the Mixed Chadian-Sudanese Force. It is likely that this type of personal preferential system extends throughout the intelligence services (37:2). In a sense, this is a form of appointment criteria and demonstrates that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions.

There has been some progress in procurement and open bidding in recent years with the government starting to move away from sealing deals in private through direct approaches and more towards open tenders (37:1). Interviewee 1 indicated this may partly indicate that President Deby is determined to show that Chad has not completely corrupted away all its oil money and has been able to put some of it toward development, and partly support an indicative motivation to achieve compliant status with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Response to peer reviewers:
Agreed that there is no evidence that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions and that familial ties dominate most high-level selections in Chad. Score lowered from 2 to 0.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: While no public figures are made available, there are likely to be between 50,000 and 80,000 military personnel in Chad (38:1). This includes human resource positions, law enforcement officers as well as combat troops. No breakdown of the latter is available, however, at least 20,000 are likely to be included in the national armed forces, 5,000 in the gendarmerie and 2,000 in the Chadian special forces (38:1). These estimates, though not publicly available are likely to have been calculated using disclosures in the media (of deployments overseas or recruitment domestically) over several years and then confirmed with security experts.

In 2011, a census within the army proved the previous existence of ghost soldiers (38:2). Prior to the census, the number of soldiers was estimated around 18,000, the assessment revealed that there were only 8,000. The same goes for the Gendarmerie and the Garde Nationale (38:2). These are figures from the government website. The assessor found no evidence of a more recent assessment, although the government did switch to automatic payments of civil servants in 2014 which suggests that a more recent census may have been done to facilitate the transition (38:3).

As peer reviewere 2 notes, recent media reports suggest the size of the active military could increase by 1,000 (but confirmation of what the total size would then be was not confirmed) in response to Chadian involvement in several foreign missions (38:4).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Since 2005, both soldiers and civil servants are paid according to an official salary scale which is not publicly available but can be requested in-country (39:1, p190; 39:2). There is evidence that they were irregularly paid (39:1, p182, 39:2). However, since January 2014, Chad began paying public salaries automatically between the 25th and 30th of each month - while according to the Finance Minister there may still be some delays these are likely to be occur less frequently (39:3).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Since 2005, both soldiers and civil servants are paid according to an official salary scale which is not publicly available but can be requested in-country (40:1, p190; 40:2).

It is often reported that members of the Chadian army are not paid on time or that they are paid irregularly (40:1, p180). These delays can be of longer than 3 months. In September 2013, around 160 Chadian soldiers deployed to Mali deserted after their wages were not paid (40:2).

Since January 2014, Chad began paying public salaries automatically between the 25th and 30th of each month - while according to the Finance Minister there may still be some delays these are likely to be occur less frequently (40:3). The assessor found no evidence that basic pay is subject to discretionary adjustments.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The assessor found no explicit evidence of a published appointment system that uses objective job descriptions, an assessment processes or independent oversight for military personnel.

According to the constitution, the President has the power to appoint 'the prime minister and the Council of state and exercises considerable influence over appointments of judges, generals, provincial officials and heads of Chad's parastatal firms' (41:2, p.8). It is likely that the power to appoint middle and top management level positions in the MOD and army also rests with the President, although this could not be verified.

Appointment and promotions are reportedly based on personal relations to the president (they are also made on his direct orders), Idriss Deby Itno, and his Zaghawa clan (41:1). President Deby himself is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, while his brother Oumar Deby Itno is the Director General of the Chadian special forces (Services de Sécurité et Institutions de l’Etat: DGSSIE). General Mahamat Idriss Deby, the President’s son, is the Commander of first contingent of the DGSSIE. Mahamat Haiga Deby, the President’s nephew, is the Commander for the Mixed Chadian-Sudanese Force. (41:1)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The assessor found no explicit evidence of a published promotions system that uses promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

The Military Code of Conduct (42:3) does however provide for 'nominations of soldiers to first class', 'advancement' and 'certificates of good behaviour'. These articles (36, 37 and 38 respectively) include the following stipulations:
- To be able to stand for first class nomination a soldier must: 1) have served for 4 months at least, 2) have recognised good behaviour and military skills 3) have the support of their commander or corporal.
- To be eligible to pass from corporal or corporal-chef a nominee must: 1) have all the required commanding aptitudes (no further detail disclosed)
- To gain certification of good behaviour a soldier must: 1) not have been broken more serious aspects of the code (which do not include corruption), 2) have served for at least a year

According to the constitution, the President has the power to appoint (and promote) 'the prime minister and the Council of state and exercises considerable influence over appointments of judges, generals, provincial officials and heads of Chad's parastatal firms' (42:2, p.8). This indicates an appointments and promotions system, although it is not one purely based on merit.

Appointment and promotions are reportedly based on personal relations to the president (they are also made on his direct orders), Idriss Deby Itno, and his Zaghawa clan (42:1). President Deby himself is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, while his brother Oumar Deby Itno is the Director General of the Chadian special forces (Services de Sécurité et Institutions de l’Etat: DGSSIE). General Mahamat Idriss Deby, the President’s son, is the Commander of first contingent of the DGSSIE. Mahamat Haiga Deby, the President’s nephew, is the Commander for the Mixed Chadian-Sudanese Force. (42:1)

Access to higher ranks in the army is governed by clan membership. For the last 20 years the President's Zaghawa clan has dominated the army and there are persistent problems with other groups, the Gorane for example, who complain of being excluded (42:4). Such groups may well resort to bribes to ensure prominent positions (this is also likely to take place amongst Zaghawa) (42:4).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Conscription is only legal in Chad when the country faces external threat (43:1). Even without external threat, however, there have been several reports of forced conscription of civilians (43:1; 43:2). Because defence forces are widely understood to take bribes and to do so with impunity, it is highly probable that both legal and illegal conscription can be avoided by those who have the means to do so (43:3, 43:4, 43:5).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The assessor found no evidence that voluntary conscription legally occurs in Chad. Conscription (of any kind) is only legal when the country faces external threat (44:1). Even without direct external threat, however, there have been reports of forced conscription of civilians (44:1; 44:2). Because defence forces are widely understood to take bribes and to do so with impunity (44:3, 44:4, 44:5) It is highly probable that both legal and illegal conscription can be avoided by those who have the means to do so.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: In 2011, a census within the army proved the previous existence of ghost soldiers (45:1). Prior to the census, the number of soldiers was estimated around 18,000, the assessment revealed that there were only 8,000. The same goes for the Gendarmerie and the Garde Nationale (45:1). The government switched to automatic payments of civil servants in January 2014 which suggests that steps are being taken to reform payment systems to prevent ghost employees, including soldiers (45:2). The assessor found no media reports on ghost soldiers since the introduction of the electronic system.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Chains of command are theoretically separated from chains of payment. Since 2005, both soldiers and civil servants are paid according to an official salary scale which is not publicly available but can be requested in-country . (46:1, p.181-190).

The government switched to automatic payments of civil servants in January 2014 which suggests that steps are being taken enforce the separation and formalisation of payment systems (46:2). However, chains of payment are not transparent. Evidence exists to suggest that high-ranking officers have benefited from the existence of ghost soldiers (46:1, p181-182).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: A 2005 Code of Conduct known as the 'Décret portant règlement militaire sur la discipline générale' is available on legitchad (47:6). It is clear, comprehensive and broken down into three parts: General Principals, Military Ceremony and Awards and Penalties. A 2011 law allowed for the establishment of military courts to try military members, however these are yet to become operational. Military personnel are therefore tried in civilian courts (47:1, p8). The assessor found no evidence of a code of conduct for civilian personnel.

The Code does not refer to bribery or corruption, although conduct relating to corruption are defined in legislation, as discussed in Q.35. There is evidence to suggest that military and civilian personnel are involved in extensive bribe-taking; for example, prison guards have been reported to release prisoners in return for cash (47:1, p4), However, there is no evidence that corrupt officials are prosecuted.

In 2015, a dozen security officers were arrested after a video of them torturing detainees was released on line. This event, and specifically the public announcement of security abuses being dealt with, was unprecedented. Abuse of authority is mentioned in article 39, chapter 3 of the Code of Conduct. There is no evidence that they have or will be prosecuted however. Other research by a range of independent groups indicates that 'impunity for officials, particularly the military, is widespread' (47:5).

By contrast, military personnel believed to be treasonous (which breaches chapter 26 in part 2 of the code of conduct) have been dealt with swiftly. In 2013, three high profile military figures, Yambaye Asira Abel the former head of the armed forces, Ngomine Beadmadji, the former director of military justice and Weiddig Assi Assoue a general and former regional governor, were arrested and detained in undisclosed locations following alleged coup plots (47:2 & 47:3).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: A 2005 Code of Conduct known as the 'Décret portant règlement militaire sur la discipline générale' is available on legitchad (48:6). It is broken down into three parts: General Principals, Military Ceremony and Awards and Penalties. A 2011 law allowed for the establishment of military courts to try military members, however these are yet to become operational. Military personnel are therefore tried in civilian courts (48:1, p.8).

The Code does not refer to bribery or corruption. There is evidence to suggest that military and civilian personnel are involved in extensive bribe taking; for example, prison guards have been reported to release prisoners in return for cash (48:1,p4), However, there is no evidence that corrupt officials are prosecuted.

Military personnel believed to be treasonous (which breaches chapter 26 in part 2 of the code of conduct) are dealt with swiftly; in 2013, three high profile military figures, Yambaye Asira Abel the former head of the armed forces, Ngomine Beadmadji, the former director of military justice and Weiddig Assi Assoue a general and former regional governor, were arrested and detained in undisclosed locations following alleged coup plots (48:2, 48:3).

In 2015, a dozen security officers were arrested after a video of them torturing detainees was released on line. The event, i.e. the public announcement of security abuses being dealt with was unprecedented. Abuse of authority is mentioned in article 39, chapter 3 of the code of conduct. There is no evidence that they have or will be prosecuted. Generally, 'Impunity for officials, particularly the military, is
widespread.' (48:5)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Anti-corruption training has previously taken place in Chad. In 2011, the US Embassy and the Chadian Ministry of Defence organised a training session for civil servants, soldiers and representatives from civil society. (49:1) However, there is no evidence of systematic training.

While the so-called anti-corruption “operation cobra” run by the Ministry of Morality and Good Governance (Ministre Moralité et de la Bonne Gouvernance) has been criticised for its lack of efficiency (49:2).

The assessor found no other evidence of anti-corruption training (Operation Cobra did not extend to this - 49:3). There is no evidence that explicit anti-corruption training for select personnel in sensitive positions takes place.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no evidence to suggest that an explicit policy to make public the outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities exists. The Code of Conduct (50:6) does not refer to bribery or corruption. There is evidence to suggest that military and civilian personnel are involved in extensive bribe-taking; for example, prison guards have been reported to release prisoners in return for cash (50:5, p4). However, there is no evidence that corrupt officials are prosecuted. Interviewee 1 suggested that President Deby is reliant on the army to defend him, and that as loyalty is questionable he cannot afford to crack down on the military too much in case they launch a coup (50:1).

There are often serious problems with effective implementation of the law despite existing anti-corruption legislation. In particular, Chad's judiciary is weak and unable to remain independent from political interference. A range of independent research indicates that impunity for military officials is common, with examples of the judiciary police often not enforcing court orders against the military or members of their own ethnic groups (50:2). The former Minister of Morality and Good Governance, Ahmadaye Al Hassan, for example was himself accused of corruption (50:3).

There has been some reform of the police (who investigate military abuses) and over 1400 were sacked in 2013 (50:4). In 2015, a dozen security officers were arrested after a video of them torturing detainees was released on line. The event, and specifically the public announcement of security abuses being dealt with, was unprecedented. Abuse of authority is mentioned in article 39, chapter 3 of the Code of Conduct. There is no evidence that they have or will be prosecuted however.

There are some examples of sanctions being imposed on military personnel for other types of breaches of the law, however these too show no evidence of publicised prosecutions. Military personnel believed to be treasonous (which breaches chapter 26 in part 2 of the Code of Conduct) have been dealt with swiftly. In 2013, three high profile military figures, Yambaye Asira Abel the former head of the armed forces, Ngomine Beadmadji, the former director of military justice and Weiddig Assi Assoue a general and former regional governor, were arrested and detained in undisclosed locations following alleged coup plots (50:7, 50:8).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Chadian commercial anti-corruption laws (under the PTPGG) strictly prohibit facilitation payments. Penalties for non-compliance include prison sentences of up to 10 years and refused re-entry into the country for foreigners (51:5). In 2012 the PTPGG led an anti-corruption drive known as Operation Cobra (51:2, 51:6). The Operation published the results of 23 investigations in the Chadian press in November 2012. 107 suspects were identified but their names or occupations and offences were not revealed, therefore it is not possible to tell if this general governmental anti-corruption policy was applied to the defence sector or if it countered facilitation payments specifically; it was also criticised for its inefficiency (51:2, 51:6).

The military Code of Conduct however contains no provisions regarding facilitation payments (51:3) which according to Debos and the Ethical Corporation are widespread in Chad (51:1, p188, 51:4).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no available evidence to suggest that the Army has doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. The military code of conduct (52:1) includes guidance as to how soldiers should act while on operations. For example, how they should address their colleagues, superiors and civilians; how they should dress and appear; how they should follow orders. However, the code does not reference bribery, corruption or facilitation fees for example.

There are clear examples of the Chadian army having alleged committed abuses (domestically 52:2, 52:3 and internationally 52:4) which contravene the Code of Conduct. By proxy therefore one can judged that if there were a doctrine on corruption on operations it is unlikely to be strictly enforced. Investigations into these abuses have been conducted (internally into domestic issues and by the UN into international issues see articles listed) however there is no evidence of a resultant awareness of corruption or even further abuses as an issue in operations

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There are no known domestic training programmes on anti-corruption for commanders and it is likely that officers engage in corrupt activities. There is evidence to suggest that military and civilian personnel are involved in extensive bribe-taking, for example prison guards reportedly releasing prisoners in return for cash; however, there is no evidence that such corruption is explicitly discouraged (53:1).

Anti-corruption training has previously taken place in Chad. In 2011, the US Embassy and the Chadian Ministry of Defence organised a training session for civil servants, soldiers and representatives from civil society (53:2). This was a generalised training session that could be applied to conduct on operations but was not specific to it. However, there is no evidence that such training sessions take place regularly and widespread corruption makes it difficult for them to be efficient.

While no domestic defence-specific assessment of corruption risk has taken place, the Chadian defence forces have come under international scrutiny following their intervention in the Central African Republic. The United Nations launched an investigation in March 2014 into the role of Chadian peacekeepers in the violence in the conflict (53:3, 53:6). The investigation will focus on soldier abuses against civilians, which if it occurred, will include corruption. President Deby's brother Oumar Deby, who commanded the Chadian contingent in the Central African Republic, is likely to remain immune. Chadian domestic forces are also unlikely to be affected by the investigation. There is no evidence of a resultant awareness of corruption or even further abuses as an issue in the field, with no evident willingness to provide training to as a mitigating measure.

There is evidence that the Chadian government is willing to cooperate with third party investigations into corruption and criminality within the defence forces that are considered to be in violation of human rights. In 2013, the International Committee of the Red Cross was granted access to civilian and military prisons in order to report on conditions and procedures. However, local human rights organisations were not granted access (53:4, p5).

Some internationally recognised guidelines and staff training that includes reference to anti-corruption is provided in Chad by external organisations. The United States provides training to the Chadian armed forces under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme. IMET assistance emphasises the importance of democratic values and human rights in governance and military operations (53:5). Chad also participates in the annual United States-led Flintlock training programme and has contributed to United Nations (UN) peace-keeping operations in Mali and the Central Africa Republic (CAR) in 2013 (as well as ongoing commitments in the Ivory Coast). While both the UN as well Amnesty International advise on the how contingents are to operate, their command and control remains at the national level, in the Chadian case it is therefore centred on President Deby and his brother Oumar Deby Itno.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no available evidence that trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field. The military code of conduct (54:1) provides for 'Inspections' of troops in the filed by their commander in order to assess the 'moral and physical condition' of the men (article 13). Such inspections are scheduled in advance. The code does not however reference bribery, corruption or facilitation fees for example.

There are clear examples of the Chadian army having alleged committed abuses (domestically 54:2, 54:3 and internationally 52:4) which contravenes the Code of Conduct. By proxy therefore one can judged that if there are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk that they are ineffective. Investigations into these abuses have been subsequently conducted (internally into domestic issues and by the UN into international issues see articles listed) however there is no evidence of a resultant awareness of corruption risks or the need for inspections to extend to corruption monitoring.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Internationally recognised guidelines and staff training that includes reference to anti-corruption is provided in Chad by external organisations. The United States provides training to the Chadian armed forces under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme. IMET assistance emphasises the importance of democratic values and human rights in governance and military operations (55:1). There is no specific evidence to suggest that this covers operational contracting risks.

While both the UN as well Amnesty International advise on the how contingents are to operate, their command and control remains at the national level, and is therefore centred with President Deby's brother Oumar Deby Itno. Chad withdrew from CAR in April 2014 following allegations of human rights abuses, allegations however did not extend to corruption in contracting (55:2).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no evidence that private military contractors, private security contractors or any related bodies are employed in Chad. However, there are no regulations forbidding their use and the Chadian government often allies with foreign militias. Until 2010, there was an alliance between the government and the Justice and Equality Movement militia in Darfur, Sudan. Evidence also suggests that similar alliances, often informal in nature and reliant on familial or clan ties, have been frequent in Chad (56:1, p173-174).

The score has been selected on the basis that there is no evidence of the employment of PMCs by the armed forces, despite the fact that this is not forbidden.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The assessor found no legal framework covering security and defence procurement (57:3). An AfDB report confirms that there is a general framework for procurement - which includes 50 stages and 13 approvals from the invitations for bids to the signing of a contract, resulting in extensive delays in procurement (5 to 7 months on average (57:6, p5). The original law can be found at legitchad, measures on corruption are listed below. The AfDB notes that the current framework for public procurement is 'weak' and noted ' the major generic problems' with it as 'lack of familiarity with disbursement and goods and service procurement rules, failure to conduct project audits' (ibid., p.19-20). The report did not mention if or to what extent the law is bypassed in practice.

According to a CCFD report the Ministry of Interior acts on behalf of the President, by a special delegation, with regards to procurement ambitions. The report does not mention any involvement on the part of the Chadian Ministry of defence (57:1, p38). One opposition blog noted that clan member Siddick Deby was in charge of procuring military equipment for the National Army, which suggests that procurement is done on a strategic level within Deby's inner circle (57:3). The interviewee confirmed this but also added that 'there has been some progress in procurement and open bidding in recent years with the government starting to move away from sealing deals in private through direct approaches and more towards open tenders'. This is supported by the listing of dozens of Chadian procurement tenders on globaltenders.com (57:5). The assessor found no tenders relating to defence and security listed here.

Section 5.8 of the Invitation to Tender for Public Procurement Supplies and Services is titled 'Corrupt and fraudulent practices' and notes that 'agents, Bidders, Suppliers and Contractors are to observe, during the procurement and execution of such contracts, the highest of ethics' defined as follows:

'a) &quoute;corrupt practice&quoute; means the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting of any thing of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement process or in contract execution and
b) is guilty of influence peddling persons engaged in fraudulent &quoute;means a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement or performance of a contract to the detriment to the Contracting Authority, or agrees or trying to get along with other bidders to set prices at a competitive level or not artificial thereby depriving the Contracting Authority to benefit from competitive bidding;
b) The Contracting Authority must reject any bid or offer of any candidate or tenderer who is convinced of engaging or attempting to engage in such practices or maneuvers;
c) In addition, the candidate or tenderer convinced of engaging in practices or maneuvers under section 118 of the Public Procurement Code will automatically be excluded from public procurement by decision of the Trusteeship Minister of the Contracting Authority;
d) The decision of exclusion, which must be substantiated can not be made after receiving the observations of the bidder and the opinion of the Appeal Panel and Amiable Regulation confirming the non-offending due process by the applicant;
e) The penalty of exclusion of Procurement encompasses the prohibition to participate directly or indirectly in any contract entered into by the State and its public institutions, local authorities, their associations and their public institutions and companies granted by the State or by local governments or groups.
f) Also when pronounced a decision of suspension or temporary exclusion against a company, this decision is for the company and the person of its owner who can not bid for other tenders in person or by proxy or by creating a new business;
e) Exclusion can be imposed for a maximum period of five (5) years.'

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The assessor found no legal framework covering security and defence procurement (58:3), and no mention of the procurement cycle. An AfDB report confirms that there is a general framework for procurement - which includes 50 stages and 13 approvals from the invitations for bids to the signing of a contract, resulting in extensive delays in procurement (5 to 7 months on average (58:6, p5). The original law can be found at legitchad, measures on corruption are listed below. The AfDB notes that the current framework for public procurement is 'weak' and noted ' the major generic problems' with it as 'lack of familiarity with disbursement and goods and service procurement rules, failure to conduct project audits' (ibid., p.19-20). Given these weaknesses it is unlikely that the procurement cycle (whether general or defence specific) is formalised.

The interviewee added that 'there has been some progress in procurement and open bidding in recent years with the government starting to move away from sealing deals in private through direct approaches and more towards open tenders'. This is supported by the listing of dozens of Chadian procurement tenders on globaltenders.com (58:5). The assessor found no tenders relating to defence and security listed here.

With regards to procurement ambitions, according to a CCFD report, the Ministry of Interior acts on behalf of the President, by a special delegation, the report does not mention any involvement on the part of the Chadian Ministry of defence (58:1, p38). One opposition blog noted that clan member Siddick Deby was in charge of procuring military equipment for the National Army which suggests that procurement is done on a strategic level within Deby's inner circle (58:3) and there not be any formalised process around it.

Section 5.8 of the Invitation to Tender for Public Procurement Supplies and Services is titled 'Corrupt and fraudulent practices' and notes that 'agents, Bidders, Suppliers and Contractors are to observe, during the procurement and execution of such contracts, the highest of ethics' defined as follows:
a) &quoute;corrupt practice&quoute; means the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting of any thing of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement process or in contract execution and
b) is guilty of influence peddling persons engaged in fraudulent &quoute;means a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement or performance of a contract to the detriment to the Contracting Authority, or agrees or trying to get along with other bidders to set prices at a competitive level or not artificial thereby depriving the Contracting Authority to benefit from competitive bidding;
b) The Contracting Authority must reject any bid or offer of any candidate or tenderer who is convinced of engaging or attempting to engage in such practices or maneuvers;
c) In addition, the candidate or tenderer convinced of engaging in practices or maneuvers under section 118 of the Public Procurement Code will automatically be excluded from public procurement by decision of the Trusteeship Minister of the Contracting Authority;
d) The decision of exclusion, which must be substantiated can not be made after receiving the observations of the bidder and the opinion of the Appeal Panel and Amiable Regulation confirming the non-offending due process by the applicant;
e) The penalty of exclusion of Procurement encompasses the prohibition to participate directly or indirectly in any contract entered into by the State and its public institutions, local authorities, their associations and their public institutions and companies granted by the State or by local governments or groups.
f) Also when pronounced a decision of suspension or temporary exclusion against a company, this decision is for the company and the person of its owner who can not bid for other tenders in person or by proxy or by creating a new business;
e) Exclusion can be imposed for a maximum period of five (5) years.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The defence procurement cycle in not transparent and seems to be arbitrarily managed by the President and his inner circle. Defence and security procurement do not respond to a precise and pre-established policy. (59:1, p38). The Parliament has no room for manoeuvre when it comes to defence procurement. It does not receive precise information and the government classifies data regarding armament as “secret-defence” (59:1, p39).

The AfDB noted that the current framework for general public procurement is 'weak' that its 'major generic problems' were 'lack of familiarity with disbursement and goods and service procurement rules [and] failure to conduct project audits' (59:2, p.19-20). The lack of audits suggests that either there are no oversight mechanisms in place, or should they exist they are weak.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The defence procurement cycle process is not formally disclosed to the public nor did the assessor find evidence of a policy to do so. However, details on procurement are infrequently released in national and international media (information is likely to be obtained from the Chadian as well as seller governments).

In June 2014, Defence Web reported that Chad received the first of three MiG-29 fighter jets from Ukraine after a procurement negotiations that opened in 2009 (60:1). In March 2014, Radio France International reported that Chad acquired four Sukhoï 25 jet combat aircraft. No details of the cost, order process or origin of the purchases were disclosed (60:2).

The same month, Journal Chad reported that the National Police received 40 all terrain vehicles and 50 motorbikes as part of efforts, heralded by Prime Minister Kalzeube Payimi Deubet to improve domestic security (60:3). Similarly, a year earlier, Journal Chad, revealed that the National and Nomadic Guard, the National Gendarmerie and the National Police received a total of fifty new Toyota vehicles destined for military operations.

The vehicles we described as a ‘gift from the President’ and as a means to prepare against potential jihadist threats (60:4). These adhoc disclosures demonstrate that defence purchases are being made, however they are not systematically publicised in any detail, and are certainly not publicised by the government or the ministry of defence.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The Chadian Ministry of Defence and armed forces are unlikely to hold open bids for work. Outsourced work is unlikely to follow any standardised compliance or business conduct programmes but rather patrimonial networks and favourable relations with the Zaghawa clan of President Deby (61:2).

The Ministry of Defence and armed forces have also benefited from the presence of French armed forces in Chad. France have had a constant base in the capital city since the launch of its Epervier Operation in 1986. France also has operations based out of Abeche in the east of the county and in late 2013 it was announced that new base at Faya-Largeau (61:1) near the Libyan border would be established. Infrastructural development, of especially a working airstrip, will be managed directly by French military construction contractors agreed to by the Chadian government.

Chad does have general legislation covering 'Invitation to Tender for Public Procurement Supplies and Services' (61:3). However, this does not appear to apply to defence procurement. It is divided into five sections: 1) General provisions, 2) composition of bid for tender, 3) regulations of bid for tender, 3) models and forms, 4) market model, 5) special administrative clauses. According to section 2 part 2, the government will assess the eligibility of candidates presenting offers - these seem to be largely a question of registering correctly and having the correct work permits. Section 5.8 is titled 'Corrupt and fraudulent practices' and notes that 'agents, Bidders, Suppliers and Contractors are to observe, during the procurement and execution of such contracts, the highest of ethics' defined as follows:

a) &quoute;corrupt practice&quoute; means the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting of any thing of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement process or in contract execution and
b) is guilty of influence peddling persons engaged in fraudulent &quoute;means a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement or performance of a contract to the detriment to the Contracting Authority, or agrees or trying to get along with other bidders to set prices at a competitive level or not artificial thereby depriving the Contracting Authority to benefit from competitive bidding;
b) The Contracting Authority must reject any bid or offer of any candidate or tenderer who is convinced of engaging or attempting to engage in such practices or maneuvers;
c) In addition, the candidate or tenderer convinced of engaging in practices or maneuvers under section 118 of the Public Procurement Code will automatically be excluded from public procurement by decision of the Trusteeship Minister of the Contracting Authority;
d) The decision of exclusion, which must be substantiated can not be made after receiving the observations of the bidder and the opinion of the Appeal Panel and Amiable Regulation confirming the non-offending due process by the applicant;
e) The penalty of exclusion of Procurement encompasses the prohibition to participate directly or indirectly in any contract entered into by the State and its public institutions, local authorities, their associations and their public institutions and companies granted by the State or by local governments or groups.
f) Also when pronounced a decision of suspension or temporary exclusion against a company, this decision is for the company and the person of its owner who can not bid for other tenders in person or by proxy or by creating a new business;
e) Exclusion can be imposed for a maximum period of five (5) years.

An AfDB report confirms that this a general framework for procurement - which includes 50 stages and 13 approvals from the invitations for bids to the signing of a contract, resulting in extensive delays in procurement (5 to 7 months on average (61:4, p5). The original law can be found at legitchad. The AfDB notes that the current framework for public procurement is 'weak' and noted ' the major generic problems' with it as 'lack of familiarity with disbursement and goods and service procurement rules, failure to conduct project audits' (ibid., p.19-20)

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Chad's national defence and security focusses on maintaining domestic security, particularly in N'Djamena, which is near Kousseri in Cameroon - Boko Haram's furthest eastern outpost - as well as around the Doba and Bongor oil fields in the south (62:1). Otherwise, President Deby prioritises the strength of his presidential guard as coup risks in the country are high (62:2).

Externally, defence looks to intervention in Mali and neighbouring Central African Republic as well as shared security initiatives with Sudan, Cameroon and Nigeria (62:3). Both the US and France have a presence leading counter-terrorism campaigns in the country (62:4).

A public, audited defence strategy is not available but the above can be deduced from analysing military movements in Chad for the last eighteen months (for examples, see sources listed). Procurement is done on an ad hoc basis in response to emergency threats, as a result of strong relations with international players and as a result of strong budget performance (or oil revenues).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Chad's national defence and security focusses on maintaining domestic security, particularly in N'Djamena, which is near Kousseri in Cameroon - Boko Haram's furthest eastern outpost - as well as around the Doba and Bongor oil fields in the south (62:1). Otherwise, President Deby prioritises the strength of his presidential guard as coup risks in the country are high (62:2).

Externally, defence looks to intervention in Mali and neighbouring Central African Republic as well as shared security initiatives with Sudan, Cameroon and Nigeria (62:3). A public, audited defence strategy is not available but the above can be deduced from analysing military movements in Chad for the last eighteen months (for examples, see sources listed).

Procurement is done on an ad hoc basis in response to emergency threats, which in a way are demonstrate identified requirements, as a result of strong relations with international players - both the US and France have a presence leading counter-terrorism campaigns in the country (62:4).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: While there is no available policy on defence procurement, evidence of published acquisitions during President Deby's rule demonstrate variation in sourcing. However, potential bidders are likely to be deterred by the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Export which points to the risk of arms being diverted to regional conflicts and used in relation to human right abuses.

Ukraine is a significant supplier of arms to Chad: in 2006-7 it supplied 12,000 rifles and two Mi-24 combat helicopters(64:1, p4), in 2008, three Sui-24 jet combat aircraft and 16 armoured personnel carriers, (64:2), in 2014 Chad received the first of three MiG-29 fighter jets from Ukraine form procurement negotiations that opened in 2009 (64:3). China, Singapore, the United States France are all also reported to have supplied armoured vehicles and some aircraft to Chad in the past ten years (64:4, 64:5).

With regards to procurement ambitions, according to a CCFD report, the Ministry of Interior acts on behalf of the President, by a special delegation, the report does not mention any involvement on the part of the Chadian Ministry of defence (64:6, p38). One opposition blog noted that clan member Siddick Deby was in charge of procuring military equipment for the National Army which suggests that procurement is done on a strategic level within Deby's inner circle (64:7).

The interviewee confirmed this but also added that 'there has been some progress in procurement and open bidding in recent years with the government starting to move away from sealing deals in private through direct approaches and more towards open tenders'. This is supported by the listing of dozens of Chadian procurement tenders on globaltenders.com (64:8). The assessor found no tenders relating to defence and security listed here.

Regarding general procurement legislation, section 5.8 of the Invitation to Tender for Public Procurement Supplies and Services, titled 'Corrupt and fraudulent practices' and notes that 'agents, Bidders, Suppliers and Contractors are to observe, during the procurement and execution of such contracts, the highest of ethics' which includes not colluding or undermining competition (section b).

However, regarding general public procurement the AfDB noted that the current framework for general public procurement is 'weak' that its 'major generic problems' were 'lack of familiarity with disbursement and goods and service procurement rules [and] failure to conduct project audits' (64:11, p.19-20). The lack of audits suggests that either there are no oversight mechanisms in place, or should they exist they are weak. Moreover an IMF report stated that in 2012 for example, a large share of contracts (54 percent, accounting for 82 percent of the total value of contracts) were awarded without competitive tender. Treasury management has been so weak, that the government has suffered periodic cash shortages and payment arrears. (64:12, p7).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The available evidence indicates that audits are not normally undertaken of tender boards and that the country does not openly conduct competitive tenders.

Evidence indicates that public procurement is poorly conducted overall in Chad. The AfDB noted that the current framework for general public procurement is 'weak' and that its 'major generic problems' were 'lack of familiarity with disbursement and goods and service procurement rules [and] failure to conduct project audits' (65:2, p.19-20). The lack of audits suggests that either there are no oversight mechanisms in place, or should they exist they are weak. Moreover an IMF report stated that in 2012 for example, a large share of contracts (54 percent, accounting for 82 percent of the total value of contracts) were awarded without competitive tender. Treasury management has been so weak, that the government has suffered periodic cash shortages and payment arrears. (65:1, p7).

A general code of conduct does on the other hand exist - although the assessor could not however confirm if it is applied to defence contacts. Section 5.8 of the Invitation to Tender for Public Procurement Supplies and Services is titled 'Corrupt and fraudulent practices' and notes that 'agents, Bidders, Suppliers and Contractors are to observe, during the procurement and execution of such contracts, the highest of ethics'. It also notes that:

&quoute;b) The Contracting Authority must reject any bid or offer of any candidate or tenderer who is convinced of engaging or attempting to engage in such practices or maneuvers;
c) In addition, the candidate or tenderer convinced of engaging in practices or maneuvers under section 118 of the Public Procurement Code will automatically be excluded from public procurement by decision of the Trusteeship Minister of the Contracting Authority;
d) The decision of exclusion, which must be substantiated, can not be made after receiving the observations of the bidder and the opinion of the Appeal Panel and Amiable Regulation confirming the non-offending due process by the applicant&quoute;

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: There is no available legal framework detailing punitive measures for tender collusion in defence contracts. Regarding general procurement legislation, section 5.8 of the Invitation to Tender for Public Procurement Supplies and Services, titled 'Corrupt and fraudulent practices' and notes that 'agents, Bidders, Suppliers and Contractors are to observe, during the procurement and execution of such contracts, the highest of ethics' which includes not colluding or undermining competition (section b).

Acting in contravention to this framework can result in exclusion for a maximum period of 5 years - no examples of implementation of this punitive measure were found. According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2012, a large share of public contracts (54 per cent, accounting for 82 per cent of the total value of contracts) were awarded without competitive tender. The AfDB noted that the current framework for general public procurement is 'weak' that its 'major generic problems' were 'lack of familiarity with disbursement and goods and service procurement rules [and] failure to conduct project audits' (64:3, p.19-20).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Due to the nature of the Chadian defence forces, which Marielle Debos has described as largely 'informal', formalised procurement departments are unlikely to exist (67:1, p.174). With regard to general public procurement, the AfDB noted that the current framework for general public procurement is 'weak' that its 'major generic problems' were 'lack of familiarity with disbursement and goods and service procurement rules [and] failure to conduct project audits' (67:2, p.19-20).

The lack of audits suggests that either there are no oversight mechanisms in place, or should they exist they are weak. Given that in 2012 for example, a large share of contracts (54 percent, accounting for 82 percent of the total value of contracts) were awarded without competitive tender, it seems unlikely that procurement staff are effective in making contractors meet their obligations (which provide for competition).

According to an IMF report, treasury management has been so weak, that the government has suffered periodic cash shortages and payment arrears (67:3, p7) which are likely to affect the capability of procurement staff.

The defence procurement cycle in not transparent and seems to be arbitrarily managed by the President and his inner circle. Defence and security procurement do not respond to a precise and pre-established policy. (67:4, p38). The Parliament has no room for manoeuvre when it comes to defence procurement. It does not receive precise information and the government classifies data regarding armament as “secret-defence” (ibid., p39).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The 2003 Code des marches publics (Code of Public Contracting) provides some protection regulation. For example, theoretically, if suppliers are not paid for two months, they can terminate their contract with the government and take them to court to demand payment (68:1). The 2004 Procurement Supplies and Services act also notes that 'the supplier will guarantee the Contracting Authority [the government] against any third party claims relating to infringement or unauthorised use of a patent, trademark or industrial property rights resulting from the use of supplies or components in the country of the Contracting Authority' (article 5.8.9.).

There do not seem to be mechanisms in place to protect companies from discrimination if they were to complain, moreover the assessor found no evidence of companies having complained about malpractice. Companies have complained over irregular taxes and fines on the part of the Chadian government, the government has also led legal proceedings against investors for failing to meet obligations but nothing explicit to using legal mechanisms to complain was found (68:4, 68:5).

However, procurement cycles are rarely transparent (68:2, p.27-29). Extortion is not a severe risk in Chad; however, there are examples of the government acting favourably (in 2014 towards Glencore for example, 68:6) or unfavourably (in 2013 towards Chinese National Petroleum Corporation for example, 68:5) towards investors. Given these evident biases it is likely that companies that have attempted to complain would be disadvantaged from future procurements unless their offers were suitably generous.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The 2003 Code de marches public (Code for Public Contracting) does provide for (theoretical) administrative and penal sanctions including exclusion from the bidding and temporary or permanent exclusion from any future tender (69:2). Section 5.8 of the 2004 Invitation to Tender for Public Procurement Supplies and Services (act) provides for immediate exclusion for up to five years for a supplier found to be corrupt (see full details below). Neither statute refers to heavy fines or imprisonment.

The government has in the past imposed fines on a company for failing to meet regulations. In 2013, Chad suspended the the activities of Chinese National Petroleum Corporation before imposing a fine of USD 1.2 billion on the company for &quoute;failure to comply with environmental regulations&quoute; (69:3). As yet there is no evidence that they would be excluded from further tenders. However, the favourable position of Glencore (69:4) in the country is likely to preclude this anyway. This may not be an example of a corruption case but it demonstrates that sanctions have been used.

Procurement cycles are rarely transparent. Furthermore, procurement is often organised through illegal means (69:1, p.27-29, 69:5).

Section 5.8 of the Invitation to Tender for Public Procurement Supplies and Services is titled 'Corrupt and fraudulent practices' and notes that 'agents, Bidders, Suppliers and Contractors are to observe, during the procurement and execution of such contracts, the highest of ethics' defined as follows:
a) &quoute;corrupt practice&quoute; means the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting of any thing of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement process or in contract execution and
b) is guilty of influence peddling persons engaged in fraudulent &quoute;means a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement or performance of a contract to the detriment to the Contracting Authority, or agrees or trying to get along with other bidders to set prices at a competitive level or not artificial thereby depriving the Contracting Authority to benefit from competitive bidding;
b) The Contracting Authority must reject any bid or offer of any candidate or tenderer who is convinced of engaging or attempting to engage in such practices or maneuvers;
c) In addition, the candidate or tenderer convinced of engaging in practices or maneuvers under section 118 of the Public Procurement Code will automatically be excluded from public procurement by decision of the Trusteeship Minister of the Contracting Authority;
d) The decision of exclusion, which must be substantiated can not be made after receiving the observations of the bidder and the opinion of the Appeal Panel and Amiable Regulation confirming the non-offending due process by the applicant;
e) The penalty of exclusion of Procurement encompasses the prohibition to participate directly or indirectly in any contract entered into by the State and its public institutions, local authorities, their associations and their public institutions and companies granted by the State or by local governments or groups.
f) Also when pronounced a decision of suspension or temporary exclusion against a company, this decision is for the company and the person of its owner who can not bid for other tenders in person or by proxy or by creating a new business;
e) Exclusion can be imposed for a maximum period of five (5) years.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: No mention of offset contracts was found in the 2003 Code des marchés publics or in procurement supplies legislation. A thorough media search including allafrica, Tchadoscopie, AlWihda, Makaila blog, Tchad infos, RFI, Jeune Afrique, Tchad Online, Journal du Tchad and Tchad Pages did not find reports on the subject. Moreover the interviewee did not profess to having heard of this taking place in Chad. There are no visible controls on offset contracts, and the opacity surrounding defence procurement and deals in general preclude a higher score.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: No mention of offset contracts was found in the 2003 Code des marchés publics or in prcourement supplies legislation. A thorough media search including allafrica, Tchadoscopie, AlWihda, Makaila blog, Tchad infos, RFI, Jeune Afrique, Tchad Online, Journal du Tchad and Tchad Pages did not find reports on the subject. Interviewee 1 had not heard of this taking place in Chad.

According to a 2012 report by the 'Comité catholique contre la faim et pour le développement' procurement cycles are rarely transparent, and tenders are rarely open to private competition (71:1, p27-28-29). When it comes to defence and security contracts, the government hides behind “secret-defence” so as to hide as much information as possible (71:5, p.8). Therefore if offsets did take place, which according to the interviewee seems highly unlikely, they would probably not be disclosed.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: No mention of offset contracts was found in the 2003 Code des marchés publics or in prcourement supplies legislation. A thorough media search including allafrica, Tchadoscopie, AlWihda, Makaila blog, Tchad infos, RFI, Jeune Afrique, Tchad Online, Journal du Tchad and Tchad Pages did not find reports on the subject. Moreover the interviewee did not profess to having heard of this taking place in Chad. If offsets do take place, which according to the interviewee seems highly unlikely, no information was found to suggest that the blanket level of competition would not be enforced. However, there are no visible controls on offset contracts, and the opacity surrounding defence procurement and deals in general preclude a higher score.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: Contracts in the field of defence are very opaque. Militias operate alongside the army and the functioning of the procurement cycle is mostly informal (73:1, p.173-174). The assessor found no evidence that the government controls or does not control company use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle in legislation or policy.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) are not made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts in Chad.

Some acquisitions are reported in the media but the commentary is not detailed. For example defence web reported in June 2014 that Chad acquired three MIG-29 fighter jets from the Ukraine, reportedly likely ex-Ukraine Air Force jets, for which negotiations had started in 2009.

In 2006, President Deby announced that he intended to purchase weapons (using blocked oil funds) to defend itself from 'rebel attacks' (74:2). The actual details of the desired purchases were not mentioned. A more recent example of the government announcing its justification for purchases was found however similar justifications are likely to remain prevalent. Despite the threats along Chad's border (Boko Haram in Nigeria, Jihadists in Libya, Darfuri rebels in Sudan, civil war in the CAR) the opposition has accused President Deby of excessive arms purchases - they did not detail the purchases in their criticism (74:7).

Given the presence of French forces in Chad, there may be limited need for formal arms deals. For example France reportedly deployed a fourth Rafale aircraft in N'Djamena in March 2015 (74:3). In December 2014 France sent two light Gazelle helicopters to Chad (74:4). France has historically been a supplier of arms to Chad but recent deals have not been disclosed, SIPRI published costs of the deals up to 2009 (74:6).

Chad is also a manufacturer of arms which limits the amount of imports needed and therefore the number of arms deals (74:5). This arguably has led to available arms in the country and an illegal trade. Many smaller scale arms deals take place illegally off the books for exmaple. In November 2014, Cameroonian custom officials seized two lorries transporting arms and military equipment from Chad; the drivers aimed to bribe officials (74:6). In January 2014, Chadian arms smugglers were intercepted again in Cameroon with ammunition from N'Djamena (74:7). In July 2013, Chadian security forces uncovered an arms stockpile in Faya which led to the arrest of several intelligence agents and ANS soldiers (74:8).

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: No relevant detail found suggesting that this type of regulation is enforced.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4105: The principal supplier of Chadian defence equipment is Ukraine (76:1). There is no evidence to support the notion that Ukraine may exert influence over Chad's political sphere. Both France and the US have supplied Chad with armoured vehicles which is likely to be an extension of their own security agendas. The US operatives a regional (extending to Chad) counter-terrorism initiative under its Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative while France's regional aerial surveillance is based out of N'Djamena (76:2, 76:3).

In 2006, President Deby announced that he intended to purchase weapons (using blocked oil funds) to defend itself from 'rebel attacks' (76:4). The actual details of the desired purchases were not mentioned. A more recent example of the government announcing its justification for purchases was found however similar justifications are likely to remain prevalent. Despite the threats along Chad's border (Boko Haram in Nigeria (76:9), Jihadists in Libya (76:10), Darfuri rebels in Sudan (76:11), civil war in the CAR (76:12)) the opposition has accused President Deby of excessive arms purchases - they did not detail the purchases in their criticism (76:5). Given the prevalence of the threats mentioned (and referenced above), it is unlikely the government feels the need to refer explicitly to military need - the threats are objectively large enough to warrant high security costs - how high they should be is debated by the opposition and media (76:5, 76:13).

Given the presence of French forces in Chad, there may be limited need for acquisitions. For example France reportedly deployed a fourth Rafale aircraft in N'Djamena in March 2015 (76:6). In December 2014 France sent two light Gazelle helicopters to Chad (76:7). France has historically been a supplier of arms to Chad but recent deals have not been disclosed, SIPRI published costs of the deals up to 2009 (76:1). Details on the awards and procurement processes were not available - they are likely to be bilateral agreements. In December 2013, the French defence Minister visited Chad to discuss the security environment and joint security campaigns (76:8).