- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
Oman’s overall GI ranking in Band F places it in the highest risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. Oman’s highest risk area is Procurement, followed by Political, Financial, Operations and Personnel risk. To reduce corruption risk and build integrity, security sector reforms are urgently needed across the following issue-areas:
Increased transparency and scrutiny in procurement and budgeting
- Oman has no defined process for acquisition planning – the process through which the state identifies what arms it will buy – and all Omani military procurement is exempted from public tender, with most contracts single-sourced. While there have been some attempts to use the Ministry’s Tender Board page it is not used regularly. To increase accountability and competition for defence procurement, we recommend that the MOD list tenders on this website, and the government amend legislation to establish a principle of open competition, with clauses to specifically address corruption risks and narrowly define cases of single source procurement. Exempted or single sourced items should include provisions for other forms of independent scrutiny.
- Information on military procurement is not shared with the Majlis al-Shura, who is not permitted to scrutinise defence purchases. While there is a State Audit Body, it does not publicly release its findings. To increase the independence and activity of procurement oversight mechanisms, State Audit reports should be published and the Majlis given the power to scrutinise defence purchases.
- It is unclear if there is an active audit function in the MoD. An independent internal audit function with sufficient resources, training and independence could help ensure that the budget is spent on arms and equipment that actually meet Oman’s strategic needs. We recommend that both internal and external audit findings be acted upon by a relevant enforcement body to maintain public trust in the defence sector.
- An estimated 27% of Oman’s budget is dedicated to defence spending. While an aggregate figure is released, no further details on defence spending are available. To allow for effective civilian and parliamentary scrutiny, the government should publish a defence budget that includes detailed information on expenditure across functions including research & design, training, salaries, acquisitions, disposal of assets, maintenance and personnel expenditures.
- Despite the enactment of the 2005 Law on Commercial Agencies, Oman imposes no restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries and no anti-corruption requirements are stipulated in contracts with suppliers. To mitigate corruption risks connected to suppliers, agents, and intermediaries, we recommend that enacted procurement legislation should mandate what anti-corruption procedures and standards potential suppliers are required to demonstrate - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work. In addition, we suggest that agents and intermediaries be forbidden by law, with strict controls to ensure the law is not circumvented. These controls should be public and well known to potential suppliers.
Engagement with the Public
- The Omani government, unlike Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia and Iraq, did not complete a government review of the 2015 GI research. We urge the government to take part in this dialogue during the next review. The Omani government should allow a space in which civil society can operate and assist in formulating policies to enhance transparency and build integrity in the defence sector. This would send a signal that the defence sector is there to defend the state and serve the needs of the general population.
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
Institutional sources:
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla) http://www.statecouncil.om/kentico/default.aspx?lang=en-us (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) http://shura.s-oman.net/ (Arabic)
- Consultative Assembly FAQ http://shura.s-oman.net/?page_id=1123 (Arabic)
- Oman basic Law: &quoute;The Defence Council considers the matters related to preserving the Sultanate's safety and its defence&quoute; (Oman: Basic Law, accessed 8 Dec 2014, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=225224)&quoute;
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Sultan Qaboos gives larger role to Shura&quoute;, Gulf News, October 21, 2011 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman-s-sultan-qaboos-gives-larger-role-to-shura-1.910984 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Oman's Majlis Al-Shura election fails to excite voters&quoute;, RFI, 15 October 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/middle-east/20111015-omans-majlis-al-shura-election-fails-excite-voters (article from 2011; accessed 15 April 2014)
- Curtis Oman Law Blog http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2012/01/basic-law.html, accessed Dec 8 2014
Research:
- BTI 2014 | Oman Country Report http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/omn/index.nc (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) has oversight powers relating to defence and domestic security decisions. The Shura is able to suggest defence laws to the Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla).
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Sources:
Consultative Assembly working website should be here http://shura.s-oman.net/ (arabic language but should have auto translation option).
Defence policies:
The 'Defence Council', established 28th December 1996 by Royal Decree 105/96 has evolved to include nominal participation of the Shura Council by including the Shura Council's President, alongside a number of appointed political elites close to the Sultanate.
From Omani Law:
&quoute;The Defence Council considers the matters related to preserving the Sultanate's safety and its defence&quoute; (Oman: Basic Law, accessed 8 Dec 2014, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=225224)
'The Defence Council is headed by the Sultan, and composed of the Minister of Royal Office, the General Inspector of Police and Customs, the Head of Internal Security Services, the Commander of the Royal Navy, the Commander of the Royal Air Force, the Commander of the Royal Guards, the Commander of the Royal Army and the Commander of the Sultan’s Armed Forces. This process was amended by Royal Decree 99/2011 to include the presidents of the State Council, the Shura Council, the Supreme Court and two of its oldest deputies, together with the Defence Council in taking over the process and appointing the person nominated by His Majesty the Sultan in his letter.' (From Curtis Oman Law Blog http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2012/01/basic-law.html, accessed Dec 8 2014).
Suggested score:
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
There is no dedicated defence/security committee tasked with oversight. There are no reports related to defence and security policy on the State Council (Majlis al-Dawla) website or in the media. The Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) does not have the necessary authority to scrutinise defence matters, as reported by RFI (link above): &quoute;It does not have legislative power, nor any role in defence, internal security or foreign policy.&quoute;
More recent sources for this question are not publicly available.
Institutional sources:
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla) http://www.statecouncil.om/kentico/default.aspx?lang=en-us (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) www.shura.om (impossible to access this website at the time of research)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Sultan Qaboos gives larger role to Shura&quoute;, Gulf News, October 21, 2011 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman-s-sultan-qaboos-gives-larger-role-to-shura-1.910984 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Oman's Majlis Al-Shura election fails to excite voters&quoute;, RFI, 15 October 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/middle-east/20111015-omans-majlis-al-shura-election-fails-excite-voters (article from 2011; accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
There is no publicly available national defence policy or strategy document. No media reports on this were identified either.
Peer Reviewer 2 correctly points out that &quoute;while defence policies are opaque, there is nominal 'press coverage' of developments in this area.&quoute; However the press coverage identified to support such a stance is from 2012 (i.e., outside of the current Index's examination period; see sources box for links).
Even the most recent piece on Oman-Iran relations (from 2013) remains extremely vague and does not constitute a discussion of doctrine or defence policy. Hence, the most appropriate score seems to be '0'.
Institutional sources:
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla) http://www.statecouncil.om/kentico/default.aspx?lang=en-us (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Ministry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Sultanate of Oman -- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 15 April 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Oman, Iran strengthen military ties,&quoute; Oman Observer, 17 December 2013 Available at
http://main.omanobserver.om/oman-iran-strengthen-military-ties
- &quoute;Daring defence&quoute; discussing a UK destroyer, Muscat Daily, 26 May 2012 available at http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Features/Daring-defence/
- Coverage of a GCC summit on cyber defence, Muscat Daily, 1 April 2012 http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Cyber-Defence-Summit-concludes/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: While defence policies are opaque, there is nominal 'press coverage' of developments in this area.
For example, this 17 December 2013 report in the Oman Observer, &quoute;Oman, Iran strengthen military ties,&quoute; Available at
http://main.omanobserver.om/oman-iran-strengthen-military-ties, or this 26 May 2012 report in the Muscat Daily, &quoute;Daring defence&quoute; discussing a UK destroyer available at http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Features/Daring-defence/%28language%29/eng-GB or this coverage of a GCC summit on cyber defence http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Cyber-Defence-Summit-concludes/%28language%29/eng-GB.
Suggested score:
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
While searching for contacts from civil society to address this question to, I have consistently run into those who did not wish to go on record: civil society members said they were afraid to even discuss the topic over email or in private, let alone attempt to investigate or be more involved with defence and security matters. There is little reason, given such circumstances, to state that the Omani government searches for collaboration from CSOs.
According to BTI 2014 Oman Country Report, &quoute;The Omani government does not permit the formation of independent civil society associations, including independent workers’ unions, or pro-democracy or human rights organizations. The government employs the registration and licensing process to obstruct the legitimization of these groups. Political associations are banned.&quoute;
Peer Reviewer 1 states a disagreement with this assessment due to 'Royal Decree No.14/ 2000', which 'actively promotes CSOs and NGOs including the Omani Lawyers Association'. Although Peer Reviewer 1 is correct about the Lawyers Association, it has to be noted that this is a professional trade association, just like the Doctors’ Association, the Engineers’ Association, and the Economists’ Association, and not the same as a CSO.
Additionally, although this Decree exists, civil society struggles to develop. As highlighted by Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi (see link above), &quoute;in most Gulf countries civil society organisations are set up by the government, for instance Oman established in August 2008, Tawasul to be the &quoute;first national independent and professional not-for-profit think tank in Oman, serving locally with international standards&quoute;.&quoute; Although the piece is from 2010, the situation does not seem to have changed fundamentally.
This is what the US Dept of State 'Human Rights Report' for Oman states: &quoute;The law provides for limited freedom of assembly, and the government restricted this right. Government approval was necessary for all public gatherings with more than nine persons present, although there was no clear process for obtaining approval for public demonstrations. Authorities enforced this requirement sporadically. [...] The law provides for freedom of association “for legitimate objectives and in a proper manner,” but the law does not clearly define “legitimate objective.” Examples of associations include labor unions and social groups for expatriate nationalities, such as the Indian Social Group. The council of ministers limited freedom of association in practice by prohibiting associations whose activities were deemed “inimical to the social order” or otherwise not appropriate.&quoute; Both the BTI 2014 report and the US State Dept brief highlight frequent obstructions from authorities.
Thus, no evidence was identified that CSO actually operate freely let alone that CSO engagement has taken place on any significant subject. No policy or strategy was identified to highlight that talking to CSOs is considered part of the defence institutions’ work.
Institutional sources:
- US State Dept Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Oman http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220371
Media sources:
- &quoute;The Civil Society Movement in the Arab Gulf States&quoute;, HuffPo, 24 Sept 2010 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sultan-sooud-alqassemi/units-of-the-civil-societ_b_720583.html
Research:
- BTI 2014 | Oman Country Report http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/omn/index.nc (accessed 15 April 2014)
Others:
- Tawasul (think tank) http://www.tawasul.co.om/index.html
Unless otherwise stated, all links accessed 20 Mar 2015
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I do not agree that the Omani Government 'extensively engages in administrative harassment to obstruct CSOs from operating' because Royal Decree No.14/ 2000 actively promotes CSOs and NGOs, including the Omani Lawyers Association.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
This indicator is difficult to grade as Oman has signed UNCAC and its ratification happened during the examination period (in 2013). Yet, this is the only international instrument the country is aligned with so far. It is not possible to say how compliant is Oman to this instrument at this stage - there has not been any evidence on Oman having requested any technical assistance for its particular needs in order to implement the UNCAC either. Lastly, it is unknown what stage of the UNCAC Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM) Oman is in.
Oman has not signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, nor is it a full participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions. Oman does not seem to have signed up to any other international anti-corruption instruments.
Institutional website:
- United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 2 April 2014 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/fr/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (accessed 15 April 2014)
- United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (Accessed April 15, 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;After popular protests, Oman starts to pursue graft&quoute;, Reuters/Gulf News, March 25, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/after-popular-protests-oman-starts-to-pursue-graft-1.1308765 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Oman issues statement at UN General Assembly regular session&quoute;, Times of Oman, October 01, 2014 www.timesofoman.com/News/40766/Article-Oman-issues-statement-at-UN-General-Assembly-regular-session
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;Oman's Ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, March 5, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/03/omans-ratification-of-un-convention.html (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Oman has continued to make statements about 'redoubling' efforts to comply with UNCAC, while it is unclear how sincere anti-corruption initiatives have been since the ratification of the Convention, mentions of 'anti corruption' initiatives have been more frequent since ratification.
Yousef bin Alawi bin Abdullah, Foreign Affairs Minister, Oct 1 2014, &quoute;The sultanate...has redoubled efforts to fight corruption and organised crime. In this respect, and as part of its efforts...the Sultanate has acceded to the UN Convention Against Corruption...&quoute;
(http://www.timesofoman.com/News/40766/Article-Oman-issues-statement-at-UN-General-Assembly-regular-session)
&quoute;In his first response to the February 2011 protests...authorities have turned their focus to corruption... Nearly 30 people have been sentenced to prison terms ranging from one to 23 years. It has also ordered public sector employees to meet financial disclosure requirements and signed the U.N. Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)...
The Sultan has taken a number of steps to respond to some of the grievances articulated by protesters, and the current corruption crackdown would seem to be part of this,&quoute; said Jane Kinninmont, a Middle East expert at Chatham House.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/23/oman-corruption-idUSL6N0ME36220140323
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
There is no public debate on defence or on corruption in the defence sector. The criminal offence of lèse-majesté exists in Oman, which means that any debate can be shuttered if deemed to constitute &quoute;publication of false news, statements or rumours liable that undermine the prestige of the state&quoute;.
As mentioned by the BTI 2014 report, a journalist from the Al-Zaman newspaper was sentenced to one year in jail in 2013 over lèse-majesté charges. The defence and security sectors being parts of the state make-up, it is reasonable to believe that debate is being quelled via self-censorship, for the least.
No media reports were identified specifically discussing defence matters.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
- a search for 'Oman corruption' for the examination period on Gulf News website http://gulfnews.com/advanced-search/search-results?action=search&submitted=true&freeText=Oman+corruption&fromDate=01%2F01%2F2013&toDate=18%2F05%2F2014&channel=&source=&site=gulfnews&author=&search= (accessed 15 April 2014)
Research:
- BTI 2014 | Oman Country Report http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/omn/index.nc (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The government operates all media outlets (although a private radio station launched in 2007 according to the BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14654265) Some media reports discuss defence matters, but don't indicate deeper public debate.
For example, this 17 December 2013 report in the Oman Observer, &quoute;Oman, Iran strengthen military ties,&quoute; Available at
http://main.omanobserver.om/oman-iran-strengthen-military-ties,
or this 26 May 2012 report in the Muscat Daily, &quoute;Daring defence&quoute; discussing a UK destroyer available at http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Features/Daring-defence/%28language%29/eng-GB
or this coverage of a GCC summit on cyber defence http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Cyber-Defence-Summit-concludes/%28language%29/eng-GB.
Suggested score:
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
According to the Oman Law Blog: &quoute;The Sultanate has the following legislation in place to deal with corruption in public and private sectors:
* The Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) (promulgated by Royal Decree 112/2011); and
* The Omani Penal Code (promulgated by Royal Decree 7/1974).&quoute;
The same resource highlights that the Sultanate has &quoute;enacted the following legislations concerning anti-money laundering:
* The Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorist Financing Law (the “AML-CTFL”) (promulgated by Royal Decree 79/2010); and
* The Executive Regulations of the Anti-Money Laundering Law (the “Executive Regulations”) (promulgated by Royal Decree 72/2004).&quoute;
The 2014 BIT, meanwhile, states that &quoute;Oman has no dedicated anti-corruption agencies or organizations. Instead, corruption falls under the aegis of a number of security services such as the Royal Omani Police, the Internal Security Services and the Ministry of Palace Office. In 2010, the Wultan issued a new law to combat money-laundering and terrorism which established a “Financial Intelligence Unit” under the supervision of the Assistant Inspector General of Police and Customs.&quoute;
The Sultan's Decree number 110 of 201 sets up a military judiciary which is allegedly responsible for the investigation and prosecution of members of the Armed Forces as well as related ministries. There does not seem to exist a provision dedicated to the Ministry of Defence though. This entity can investigate various offences including bribery.
Yet, despite these good governance initiatives, none of these frameworks or entities constitute a full anti-corruption policy per se and not for the defence sector. Neither were media reports identified where the probable investigation or application of the above provisions is featured. The effectiveness of these regulations thus seems somewhat limited.
Institutional sources:
- Sultan's Decree number 110 of 2011; see http://www.omaninfo.com/news/military-judiciary-law-issued.asp (&quoute;Military Judiciary Law issued&quoute;, Oman Info, Oct 25, 2011; accessed 25 April 2014)
- legislation:
* The Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) (promulgated by Royal Decree 112/2011); and
* The Omani Penal Code (promulgated by Royal Decree 7/1974).
The Sultanate has enacted the following legislations concerning anti-money laundering:
* The Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorist Financing Law (the “AML-CTFL”) (promulgated by Royal Decree 79/2010); and
* The Executive Regulations of the Anti-Money Laundering Law (the “Executive Regulations”) (promulgated by Royal Decree 72/2004).
Media sources:
N/A
Research/Specialised:
- &quoute;Oman's Ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, March 5, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/03/omans-ratification-of-un-convention.html (accessed 25 April 2014)
- &quoute;UN Convention Against Corruption and Anti-Money Laundering&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, April 8, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/04/un-convention-against-corruption-and.html (accessed 25 April 2014)
- BTI 2014 | Oman Country Report http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/omn/index.nc (accessed 25 April 2014)
- &quoute;Mutual Evaluation Report of the Sultanate of Oman&quoute;, MENA Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) established in 2004 as a FATF Style Regional Body, 2011 http://www.menafatf.org/images/uploadfiles/mutual_evaluation_report_of_the_sultanate_of_oman.pdf (accessed 25 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
No media or online articles reported such institutions to exist.
BTI 2014 highlights that &quoute;Oman has no dedicated anti-corruption agencies or organizations. Instead, corruption falls under the aegis of a number of security services such as the Royal Oman Police, the Internal Security Services and the Ministry of Palace Office. In 2010, the sultan issued a new law to combat money-laundering and terrorism which established a “Financial Intelligence Unit” under the supervision of the Assistant Inspector General of Police and Customs.&quoute; No mention of corruption was identified on ROP website, it is thus unclear whether this institution participates at all in anti-corruption activities.
The Sultan's Decree number 110 of 2011 set up a military judiciary which is allegedly responsible for the investigation and prosecution of members of the Armed Forces as well as related ministries. The military judiciary can investigate various offences including bribery. Nobody in the Armed Forces has been convicted because of bribing or similar charges, or -- if it has happened, -- no publicly accessible information on the case is available.
Yet none of these entities are &quoute;independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions&quoute;. With respect to the aforementioned entities, no media reports were identified where probable investigation or application of the above provisions is featured neither which makes it impossible to assess whether the aforementioned entities engage into &quoute;building integrity and countering corruption&quoute;.
Response to Peer Reviewer's score challenge:
This statement on its own does not seem sufficient to justify an upgrade of the score, given the absence of evidence provided of found concerning these institutions' resourcing, funding and effectiveness.
Institutional sources:
- Sultan's Decree number 110 of 2011; see http://www.omaninfo.com/news/military-judiciary-law-issued.asp (&quoute;Military Judiciary Law issued&quoute;, Oman Info, Oct 25, 2011; accessed 25 April 2014)
- Royal Oman Police website, Laws section http://www.rop.gov.om/english/roplaws.asp, Last update, February 2015
Media sources:
N/A
Research/Specialised:
- &quoute;Oman's Ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, March 5, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/03/omans-ratification-of-un-convention.html (accessed 25 April 2014)
- &quoute;UN Convention Against Corruption and Anti-Money Laundering&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, April 8, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/04/un-convention-against-corruption-and.html (accessed 25 April 2014)
- BTI 2014 | Oman Country Report http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/omn/index.nc (accessed 25 April 2014)
- &quoute;Mutual Evaluation Report of the Sultanate of Oman&quoute;, MENA Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) established in 2004 as a FATF Style Regional Body, 2011 http://www.menafatf.org/images/uploadfiles/mutual_evaluation_report_of_the_sultanate_of_oman.pdf (accessed 25 April 2014)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Royal Oman Police, Internal Security Services and Ministry of Palace Office are well resourced and effective in their roles to prevent corruption; although the institutions are scattered.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
This is a difficult indicator to grade. There are no published surveys of public opinion on corruption in general or in the defence sector in particular.
There seems to have been a set of measures taken to fight corruption, after popular uprisings happened protesting high level of corruption, as showcased by the media reports. The World Economic Forum ranks Oman in the top 30 most reliable countries in its Global Competitiveness Index 2013-2014 report: 'Public trust in politicians' thus is graded 5.14 (where 1 is no trust and 7 is absolute trust); 'reliability in police services' was graded 5.78; lastly, 'Favouritism in decisions by government officials' was graded 4.63.
A Gulf News piece by Staff writer(s) noted: &quoute;The government should be commended for the way in which it has dealt with the corruption case. Not only because it tackled head-on an issue that played an important role in fermenting grievances among the public, but also because it was done transparently and through the rule of law.&quoute; The media is however, generally sympathetic to the ruling majority; thus this is not a real reflection of public perception (except one outlet, all the media are government-owned).
Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Agree with score challenge, score lowered from 2 to 1, and sources added.
Media reports:
- &quoute;After popular protests, Oman starts to pursue graft&quoute;, Gulf News, March 25, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/after-popular-protests-oman-starts-to-pursue-graft-1.1308765 (accessed 25 April 2014)
- &quoute;Oman’s commendable crackdown on graft&quoute;, Gulf News, January 13, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/opinions/editorials/oman-s-commendable-crackdown-on-graft-1.1277026 (accessed 25 April 2014)
- &quoute;After popular protests, Oman starts to pursue graft&quoute;, Reuters, 23 March 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/23/oman-corruption-idUSL6N0ME36220140323 (accessed 4 August 2015)
Others:
- The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 data platform, World Economic Forum http://www.weforum.org/issues/competitiveness-0/gci2012-data-platform/ (accessed 25 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The indicator is difficult to measure, but recent post 2011 unrest could signify public belief that anti-corruption measures 'are just rhetoric, and not seriously intended.'
There is no reliable public opinion polling for the Sultanate, let alone good measures for views on corruption, but some suggest recent political unrest Oman is perceived as a reaction to deep concerns concerning corruption, among other complaints (for less tight government grasp on the civic space and increased transparency etc). The fact that the Sultanate is trying so hard to appear, however cosmetically, committed to combating corruption by signing the UNCAC etc is so reactionary that it may suggest even deeper public distrust currently.
&quoute;In his first response to the February 2011 protests...authorities have turned their focus to corruption... Nearly 30 people have been sentenced to prison terms ranging from one to 23 years.It has also ordered public sector employees to meet financial disclosure requirements and signed the U.N. Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)...
The Sultan has taken a number of steps to respond to some of the grievances articulated by protesters, and the current corruption crackdown would seem to be part of this,&quoute; said Jane Kinninmont, a Middle East expert at Chatham House.
- &quoute;After popular protests, Oman starts to pursue graft&quoute;, Reuters, 23 March 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/23/oman-corruption-idUSL6N0ME36220140323 (accessed 4 August 2015)
Suggested score: 1
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
No evidence was found, either on institutional websites, or through the media, that any such effort has taken place. Whether the practice of producing assessments of areas of corruption risk for any other sectors exists is unclear.
According to the Evaluation Report linked above (ML = money laundering; TF = terrorist financing): &quoute;Despite the wide range of powers granted to the National Committee on Combating ML/TF according to Article 24 of the Anti-Money Laundering/ Combating of Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) Law that were partially exercised to address ML/TF risks in various fields of concern, the Omani authorities have not yet adopted a comprehensive national AML/CFT strategy/risk assessment of ML and TF.&quoute; (p. 76)
Although this report is dated 2011, it is the only resource specifically discussing money laundering and terrorist financing.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Comments do not address the exact question. No evidence has been identified that such assessments are carried out by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel. Thus, the score remains unchanged at 0.
Institutional resources:
N/A
Media reports:
N/A
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;Mutual Evaluation Report of the Sultanate of Oman&quoute;, MENA Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) established in 2004 as a FATF Style Regional Body, 2011 http://www.menafatf.org/images/uploadfiles/mutual_evaluation_report_of_the_sultanate_of_oman.pdf (accessed 25 April 2014)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The government of Oman does not finance terrorism. Article 24 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorist Financing Law enshrines in law regular assessments of corruption within defence infrastructure. There is evidence of awareness regarding some risk areas.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
Neither the planning process for defence acquisitions nor the contracting procedures are transparent.
The Ministry of Defence seems to have its own tender board (i.e., separate from the one used by the rest of the government; general tendering linked to above on the Omanuna portal) but information on the conditions according to which it functions, or plans acquisitions, is not publicly available. A search at the Tender Board with &quoute;Ministry of Defence&quoute; gives no results, indicating that defence-related tenders are not advertised through this board. Tenders ordered by the Ministry of Interior were identified: the great majority of them concern construction (mainly of offices); the entry for an awarded tender gives very succinct information about the bidders, the submitted bids and the decision to award.
This observation is consistent with the tendering exceptions outlined by Lex Arabiae, &quoute;Certain types of contracts such as security and defence units do not go through the Tender Board. These are carried out directly by the concerned ministries. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Oman Police have their own tender boards pursuant to their own regulations. The same applies to the tendering process at Petroleum Development Oman LLC and Oman LNG LLC while the projects are not subjected to the Tender Law.&quoute; This suggests there is much lack of transparency not just around acquisition planning specifically, but also general financial details in the defence sector.
The specific institutions responsible for acquisitions could not clearly be identified: there has been an attempt to publish tenders on the Ministry of Defence website yet the page is empty and no further information is provided. This (failed so far) attempt along with the mention of a Secretariat of the Tender Board and a Directorate of Purchasing within the Ministry of Defence show that there is some process for acquisition planning hence a score of '1' is chosen. No oversight mechanism was identified.
Institutional sources:
- &quoute;Tendering Process at Tender Board&quoute;, on Omanuna (Official eGovernment Services Portal) http://www.oman.om/wps/portal/!ut/p/a1/hY5BDoIwFERvxP-2UGUJIRBAJIIIdmMgQgWRmkrk-qJxq85ukjeZBxwK4EP5aEU5tnIo-1fn7JgGoZ36OsF4Qwz0MzdjiZssPJ3NwGEG8Ess_LfPgb8Rih5ibPpRuIssJHTvBuaaUcfRP8CPiwC46GU16Y28FNHlv72JWYNFV0J4KpualUr7SzvIxTTNGlCStHXWqPgdi2wMy75E_J2D5w!/dl5/d5/L0lDU0lKSWdrbUEhIS9JRFJBQUlpQ2dBek15cXchLzRKQ2hEb01kdEJnY2huQVZHRUEhL1o3X1NKS0JTSTQyME9OMjUwSVVGVTZSRlIxRzIyLzA!/?PC_Z7_SJKBSI420ON250IUFU6RFR1G22000000_WCM_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/en/site/home/gov/gov1/gm/tenderboard/tenderingprocess (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Tender Board website http://www.tenderboard.gov.om/arb/default.aspx
- Tender Board rules in Arabic http://www.tenderboard.gov.om/Arb/TbRegar.pdf
- Ministry of Defence, 'Tendering' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/TenderLanding.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014; displays &quoute;Tender Module will be Coming Soon&quoute; at the time of research)
- Ministry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;Tendering in Oman: Practical Issues&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, November 30, 2009 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2009/11/tendering-in-oman-practical-issues.html (from 2009, but has not been modified; accessed 8 May 2014)
- Legal Notes on Tendering in the Sultanate of Oman, Lex Arabiae (an in-house magazine of Meyer-Reumann & Partners, Legal Consultants in the Middle East) http://lexarabiae.meyer-reumann.com/legal-notes-on-tendering-in-the-sultanate-of-oman/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
Defence is estimated to make up 27% of Oman's budget. The defence and security budget is not published on the Ministry of Defence website. The numbers referred to by specialised publications give an aggregated view of the budget. Thus, the 'Analysis of Oman’s 2014 Budget', published on 2 January 2014 by KPMG in Oman refers to 3,700 million RO which is estimated to be 27% of the total country budget. However, the source for this information is unclear.
The Times of Oman piece discusses the overall budget, however - no mention of the specific breakdown of defence expenditure exists. Although overall defence expenditures are listed in the general national budget, there does not seem to be a separate published defence budget, at least one that is available on the internet.
Overall, what seems to be available is high-level numbers and occasional bulk sums scheduled for purchases (when a big contract is signed, for ex.) are mentioned in specialised publications. Overall defence expenditures do not seem to be listed in the general national budget, and no break down into functions or areas was identified.
Jane's analysis focus more on the dynamics of the bulk sum over the past eight years. According to Jane's summary: &quoute;Most extra funding appears allocated to facilitate major arms deals, including the acquisition of Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft, Airbus C-295M transport aircraft, and BAE Systems Hawk advanced jet trainers, all of which were concluded in 2012. Raytheon confirmed on 23 January that Oman had awarded it a direct commercial contract worth USD1.28 billion for the delivery of its National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS).&quoute;
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman’s 2014 budget leaves an anticipated deficit of OMR1.8b&quoute;, Times of Oman, 4 Jan 2014 http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article-27679.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;Oman's defence budget rises again&quoute;, IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 February 2014 http://www.janes.com/article/33489/oman-s-defence-budget-rises-again (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Analysis of Oman’s 2014 Budget&quoute;, KPMG in Oman, 2 January 2014 http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/mesa-tax-update/Documents/oman-jan-2014.pdf (accessed 8 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Another source tracking Oman's defence expenditure mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/...5c6f.../SIPRIFS1010.pdf
Suggested score:
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
A legislative committee exists, however, as highlighted by the RFI piece, the Majlis Al-Shura has no impact in defence issues. The Economic Committee of the State Council is tasked with discussing &quoute;the draft of the Annual budget of the state&quoute;. Reports in November 2014 (IHS) stated that the Shura Council's Economic and Finance Committee had recommended a 5% cut to defence and security expenditure in the face of declining oil revenues, despite this the government announced a 2.7% increase in its defence and security budget for 2015, accounting for 27.0% of state spending.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Score increased to 1, however no evidence was identified to support an actual capacity of these committees to influence decision making on defence and security matters, the source provided supports that view.
Institutional sources:
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla), 'Committees' http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) http://shura.s-oman.net/ (accessed 20 March 2015)
- Economic Committee of the State Council [Arabic] http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee/Economic/Specializations_Economics.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 8 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Majlis Al-Shura election fails to excite voters&quoute;, RFI, 15 October 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/middle-east/20111015-omans-majlis-al-shura-election-fails-excite-voters (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman increases defence budget despite low oil prices&quoute;, Jan 2015, www.janes.com/article/47729/oman-increases-defence-budget-despite-low-oil-prices
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Majlis al-Shura does have a say in defence related issues, and thus is able to scrutinise or approve the defence/security budget. The Economic Committee of the State Council discusses the 'Annual budget of the state', which does include the defence budget.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
There is no detailed defence budget posted on the Ministry of Defence website.
In Jan 2015, Oman announced a 2.7% increase in its defence and security budget for 2015. Under the new budget, related expenditure will increase to OMR3.8 billion (USD9.9 billion) despite earlier suggestions of potential cuts to related spending. According to the budget, released by the Ministry of Finance on 1 January, defence and security spending will account for around 27.0% of state spending. Reports in November stated that the Shura Council's Economic and Finance Committee had recommended a 5% cut to defence and security expenditure in the face of declining oil revenues. Oman recently finalised a number of major defence acquisitions, including deals for 12 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D, 12 Eurofighter Typhoon and eight BAE Systems Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) aircraft. More recently, a USD1.3 billion contract was finalised for Raytheon's National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) in late 2013.
The 2013 Government Defence Index assessment states, &quoute;There is no defence budget posted online, either through the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Defence. Indeed, online information regarding the MoD and armed forces is available only on the Ministry of Information’s website&quoute;. The current assessment, however, failed to identify any further information on the defence budget on the Ministry of Information's website.
The Times of Oman piece only discusses the overall budget, no mention of the defence expenditure exists while Muscat Daily thoroughly discusses both revenues and expenditures but mentions a brief overview of defence and security overall budget. There is no legal provision in the Omani law that allows citizens, organisations or journalists to request information on the approved defence budget.
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Information 'Articles & Publications' section (reads 'Coming soon') http://www.omaninfo.om/english/module.php?module=topics&CatID=29 (accessed 20 March 2015)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman’s 2014 budget leaves an anticipated deficit of OMR1.8b&quoute;, Times of Oman, Jan 4, 2014 http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article-27679.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman Budget 2013&quoute;, Muscat Daily, January 14, 2013 http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Business/Oman-Budget-2013-1z03 (accessed 8 May 2014)
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;Oman's defence budget rises again&quoute;, IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 February 2014 original link not accessible anymore: http://www.janes.com/article/33489/oman-s-defence-budget-rises-again although accessed 8 May 2014; the piece is still available through the Web Archive though http://web.archive.org/web/20140326135613/http://www.janes.com/article/33489/oman-s-defence-budget-rises-again (accessed 20 March 2015)
- &quoute;Analysis of Oman’s 2014 Budget&quoute;, KPMG in Oman, 2 January 2014 https://www.kpmg.com/OM/en/Documents/Analysis_of_Oman_2014_Budget.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
There is no detailed defence budget. No specific information is available about income from equipment sales or property disposal. The information available on revenues is solely for those from the natural resources economies. Additionally, media institutions, CSOs, academics were not identified as reporting/speculating on the existence of sources of defence income other than from central government allocation. As explained in indicator 12B, the defence budget is not available to the public, and in practice it is extremely difficult or impossible to obtain any detail on the budget. Public scrutiny is thus obstructed.
The 2013 GI assessment mentions a chart of government income from 2011 (and before), where there is information about income from the Ministry of Defence. In 2011, it earned some 180,000 riyals. The report posited that it was possible that some of this money was generated from sales of surplus weapons and equipment.
This report is the most recent available on the Ministry of Finances website, section 'Financial Reports'. It is thus impossible to use a similar updated chart to comment on this question for the 2015 assessment. The lack of such updates can also be considered as an additional argument for the lack of publicly available (even gross) information on defence income and budget in general.
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Finances, Financial Reports https://www.mof.gov.om/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9 (accessed 20 March 2015)
Government Income 2011, www.mof.gov.om/files/publications/GeneralBudget2011.pdf, accessed June 2012.
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman’s 2014 budget leaves an anticipated deficit of OMR1.8b&quoute;, Times of Oman, Jan 4, 2014 http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article-27679.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman Budget 2013&quoute;, Muscat Daily, January 14, 2013 http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Business/Oman-Budget-2013-1z03 (accessed 8 May 2014)
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;Oman's defence budget rises again&quoute;, IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 February 2014 original link not accessible anymore: http://www.janes.com/article/33489/oman-s-defence-budget-rises-again although accessed 8 May 2014; the piece is still available through the Web Archive though http://web.archive.org/web/20140326135613/http://www.janes.com/article/33489/oman-s-defence-budget-rises-again (accessed 20 March 2015)
- &quoute;Analysis of Oman’s 2014 Budget&quoute;, KPMG in Oman, 2 January 2014 https://www.kpmg.com/OM/en/Documents/Analysis_of_Oman_2014_Budget.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
It is unclear whether internal auditing of defence expenditure occurs. The Ministry of Defence has a Directorate General of Finance and Accounting but no description of its role and functions is available. A very brief indication exists that indicates that there is a Head of Internal Audit of the MoD.
Google searches reveal that a few people describe themselves as &quoute;internal auditors at the MoD&quoute;. No evidence of activity or effectiveness by the internal audit unit is publicly available.
Institutional sources:
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla), 'Committees' http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) http://shura.s-oman.net/ (accessed 20 March 2015)
- Economic Committee of the State Council [Arabic] http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee/Economic/Specializations_Economics.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Bank of Muscat's Board of Directors http://www.bankmuscat.com/en-us/AboutUs/Pages/Board-of-Directors.aspx (accessed 20 March 2015)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Majlis Al-Shura election fails to excite voters&quoute;, RFI, 15 October 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/middle-east/20111015-omans-majlis-al-shura-election-fails-excite-voters (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Bank Muscat SAOG (BMAOq.L), Reuters, undated http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyOfficers?symbol=BMAOq.L (accessed 28 Oct 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
The State Audit Institution seems to have broad auditing capacities yet no report or update has been published on its website to indicate that defence audits are part of its remit. The website also speaks about training public administration members but the part is vaguely worded and no reports or dates are publish to signify activity.
In addition, the State Audit Institution does not seem independent (it is under the auspices of the Ministry of Finances and its highest ranking officials are named by Sultan's Decree). A presentation by Abdulrahman A. Al Harthy (identified as CEO at GeoConsultancy Center) suggests that the audits conducted by the SAI are not made publicly available, but released only to the authorities and auditees concerned. This applies to companies, but -- assuming the SAI audits the defence sector, -- may explain why no publicly available documents of such an audit were identified.
While the 2013 GI for Oman indicates that there were recent legislative changes, there has been no movement on this situation since the last assessment. No evidence exists that the Institution is active or efficient on defence-related matters, hence this low score seems the most appropriate.
Institutional sources:
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla), 'Committees' http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) http://shura.s-oman.net/
- Economic Committee of the State Council [Arabic] http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee/Economic/Specializations_Economics.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;The State Audit Institution of Oman: A Profile&quoute;, ASOSAI (Asian Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions) http://www.asosai.org/asosai/journal2002/the_state_audit_oman.htm (accessed 8 May 2014)
- State Audit Institution http://www.sai.gov.om/Default.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;SAI Role in Auditing State Owned Enterprises in Oman&quoute;, presentation by Abdulrahman A. Al Harthy, 2010 http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/44770752.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Majlis Al-Shura election fails to excite voters&quoute;, RFI, 15 October 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/middle-east/20111015-omans-majlis-al-shura-election-fails-excite-voters (accessed 8 May 2014)
Others:
- Abdulrahman A. Al Harthy LinkedIn profile https://www.linkedin.com/pub/abdulrahman-al-harthy/48/488/b43?trk=pub-pbmap
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Majlis al-Shura does have a say in defence issues.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
Oman has pursued several high profile prosecutions against high level officials as part of an official probe into oil sector corruption. In a piece entitled &quoute;After popular protests, Oman starts to pursue graft&quoute;, Gulf News notes: &quoute;Omanis blame a system that allows senior government officials to simultaneously hold positions in private sector companies, leading to a potential conflict of interest in contracts involving public projects.&quoute;
The other Gulf News pieces all relate cases of investigation, prosecution and punishment of corrupt high-level government officials for bribery and corruption. None of the latter, however, seem to be directly linked to the defence sector.
No institutional source was identified that specifically prohibits defence/security related personnel to engage in business ventures. Yet, it is impossible to rule out such participation. Indeed, there is no separation of powers between the military and executive in Oman. BTI 2014 highlights that, despite claimed intolerance to corruption in the public sector, &quoute;conflicts of interest among the ruling elite are common. Since 2011 protestors have repeatedly demanded measures against corruption among top political incumbents. The majority of cabinet members and senior office holders and some prominent members of the ruling family are directly involved in businesses that benefit from public contracts.&quoute;
No legislative provision relating to conflicts of interest for government officials was identified to inform that (defence sector) officials are specifically prohibited from taking parts in both the government and natural resources related industries and businesses. Relationships between the ruling elite and business are extremely close, and makes it possible for individuals from the defence sector have controlling interests in defence-related businesses. Such interests, if they exist, have not been mentioned publicly; no oversight report was identified where such interests were mentioned.
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman oil executive on trial for corruption&quoute;, Gulf News, November 15, 2013 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman-oil-executive-on-trial-for-corruption-1.1255319 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Ex-government officials in Oman jailed for abuse of office&quoute;, Gulf News, February 16, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/ex-government-officials-in-oman-jailed-for-abuse-of-office-1.1291839 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Oman hands down more sentences in oil corruption case&quoute;, Gulf News, March 3, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman-hands-down-more-sentences-in-oil-corruption-case-1.1298303 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;After popular protests, Oman starts to pursue graft&quoute;, Gulf News, March 25, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/after-popular-protests-oman-starts-to-pursue-graft-1.1308765 (accessed 15 April 2014)
Research:
- BTI 2014 | Oman Country Report http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/omn/index.nc (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 ranks Oman 3rd for the 'Organised Crime indicator', with a score of 6.81 (where 1 is 'imposes burden on business to a great extent' and 7 is 'no organised crime at all').
Research suggests overall crime rates are low especially in comparison to other industrialised countries. This background information is however quite outdated (1997), and yet no recent account was identified to acknowledge situation has significantly changed.
Oman has signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (the above link is the status as of 2 April 2014). In 2012, Oman has also signed the Arab Cross-border Anti-Organized Crime Agreement and the Arab Convention to Combat Information Technology Crimes. It is unclear how these are implemented though, thus it is difficult to gauge how prepared the government has become for this risk, as a result of these.
Institutional resources:
- &quoute;Endeavours exerted by the Sultanate of Oman in implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and, in particular, General Assembly resolution 64/50, paragraphs 10,11,12 and 13&quoute;, 2010 http://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.poa-iss.org%2FCASACountryProfile%2FPoANationalReports%2F2010%40149%40PoA-Oman-2010-E.doc&ei=cYARVYPsNtTvar7wgHg&usg=AFQjCNFbetj8D_aiy2xrYdNmeHY5AQ3gJQ&sig2=59mvfY2oa9ktt7uzjdzbYg&bvm=bv.89184060,d.d2s (accessed 20 March 2015)
Others/Specialised:
- The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 data platform, World Economic Forum http://www.weforum.org/issues/competitiveness-0/gci2012-data-platform/ (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;A Comparative Criminology Tour of the World&quoute;, Dr. Robert Winslow, San Diego State University, undated http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/asia_pacific/oman.html (accessed 15 April 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Oman signs agreements to combat organised crime&quoute;, Al-Shorfa, Feb 16, 2012 http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/newsbriefs/2012/02/16/newsbrief-08 (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Omani reports to the UN Programme of Action for preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects talks about educational action to avoid corruption (these guarantees may, of course, be purely cosmetic).
&quoute;1. The agencies concerned with combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and drugs distribute informational materials via the press, television and the Internet in order to raise public awareness of the dangers of involvement with drugs, or the unlicensed possession of and trade in drugs and small arms and light weapons.
2. The security agencies also help to raise public awareness by analysing the security dimensions of social problems and employing the results of studies when conducting awareness-raising campaigns using various media, and by holding meetings in universities, colleges, schools, factories, places of worship and sporting and social clubs.
3. Persons engaged in combating the illicit trade in weapons are informed of regulations and laws that are relevant to their field of work through the inclusion of pertinent information in educational curriculums and through training courses.
4. The Royal Oman Police has established special telephone numbers for reporting emergencies and crimes. Those numbers are 9999 and 1444, each of which is connected to multiple lines.&quoute;
Sources
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=22&ved=0CCQQFjABOBQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.poa-iss.org%2FCASACountryProfile%2FPoANationalReports%2F2010%40149%40PoA-Oman-2010-E.doc&ei=YaiRVM2eCcXdsATl84KIBg&usg=AFQjCNFbetj8D_aiy2xrYdNmeHY5AQ3gJQ&sig2=X8ZvMbS7eUVqlSWn_CUTgg&bvm=bv.82001339,d.cWc
Suggested score:
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
The Sultan's (Royal) Decree number 110 of 2011 has set up a military judiciary tasked to investigate and judge members of the Armed Forces. But there is no provision for the Ministry of Defence as a whole to be subject to this. The military judiciary can investigate various criminal offences including bribery; yet there is no evidence this judiciary has been effective on matters relating to organised crime until now. Either no such prosecution has arisen or no publicly accessible information exists on such a prosecution. No information whatsoever regarding organised crime in the MoD/army is available.
I have been unable to independently verify the whether the Military Judiciary is independent, too. Judicial and military officers are considered &quoute;persons exposed to risk owing to their positions&quoute; by the MENAFATF but no prosecution seems to have occurred during the examination period. There have been high-profile cases as the former commerce minister (see Reuters piece), but they seem to concern only non-military/non-security people.
Institutional sources:
- Sultan's Decree number 110 of 2011
http://www.omannews.gov.om/ona/english/newsDetails.jsp?newsID=60858 (accessed 8 May 2014) or here in Arabic https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/implementingLaws.xsp?documentId=CC69EFCFD786A869C1257D4300543BE1&action=openDocument&xp_countrySelected=OM&xp_topicSelected=GVAL-992BU6&from=state&SessionID=DMQB8EWAP7 amended 23 April 2014
- &quoute;Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: Sultanate of Oman&quoute;, MENAFATF, 4 May 2011
http://www.menafatf.org/images/uploadfiles/mutual_evaluation_report_of_the_sultanate_of_oman.pdf (accessed 20 Match 2015)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Royal Decree Issued&quoute;, Muscat Daily, April 23, 2014 http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Royal-Decree-issued-33p4 (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Former Omani minister jailed for three years for corruption&quoute;, Reuters, 8 May 2014 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/18/uk-oman-corruption-sentences-idUKKBN0DY0FC20140518 (accessed 20 Match 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
The Internal Security Service (ISS) is the national security intelligence agency of Oman, which focuses on domestic security (foreign intelligence operations is handled by the Royal Office). The Royal Office also controls external security and coordinates all intelligence and security policies. According to the US State Department's information: &quoute;The Ministry of the Royal Office, part of the cabinet, controls internal and external security and coordinates all intelligence and security policies. Under the Ministry of the Royal Office, the Internal Security Service investigates all matters related to domestic security. The Sultan’s Special Forces have limited border security and anti-smuggling responsibilities.&quoute; (The Royal Office is the Cabinet of Oman, the chief executive body of the Sultanate.)
There is no evidence of effective oversight over these services. Neither the Shura nor the State Council seem to discuss issues related to intelligence. None of them has a committee on defence or national security. (The Shura does not discuss defence and security matters in general, as highlighted by the RFI piece above.)
No evidence of legal provisions relating to the oversight of the intelligence services was identified, and neither was there any evidence of internal controls on intelligence services.
Institutional sources:
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla), 'Committees' http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) www.shura.om (it was not possible to access this website at the time of research)
- &quoute;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Oman&quoute;, US State Dept, 2013 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220371 (accessed 28 Oct 2014)
Others:
- &quoute;Oman -- Internal Security&quoute;, Mongabay.com, &quoute;Data as of January 1993&quoute;, http://www.mongabay.com/history/oman/oman-internal_security.html (accessed 8 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Majlis Al-Shura election fails to excite voters&quoute;, RFI, 15 October 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/middle-east/20111015-omans-majlis-al-shura-election-fails-excite-voters (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;His Majesty the Sultan appoints new head of Internal Security Service&quoute;, Muscat Daily, May 21, 2013 http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/His-Majesty-the-Sultan-appoints-new-head-of-Internal-Security-Service-29z8 (accessed 28 Oct 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
There is no information about the selection criteria for leaders of the intelligence services.
The only news article on this subject is the announcement (identical whatever the media outlet, as illustrated by two media sources above) of the nomination, in 2013, of the new Chief of Internal State Security. Family loyalties may play a role in senior intelligence appointments: in the most recent appointment, the new chief Al Hilali, is described as a &quoute;brother of the country’s attorney-general, Hussain Bin Ali Bin Zahir Al Hilali&quoute;. Nominations are made by the Sultan, through a dedicated decree.
No evidence was identified to support a system where appointees are subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct.
Institutional sources:
- Royal Decree No. 34/2013 on military promotions and appointments promoting Major General Said Bin Ali Bin Zahir Al Hilali to the rank of lieutenant general and appoints Al Hilali as head of the Internal Security Service with the rank of a minister, retranscribed in Times of Oman, 22 May 2013 http://www.timesofoman.com/news/article-16035.aspx (accessed 20 March 2015)
Media sources:
- &quoute;New chief for internal security in Oman&quoute;, Gulf News, May 21, 2013 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/new-chief-for-internal-security-in-oman-1.1186473 (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;His Majesty the Sultan appoints new Head of Internal Security Service&quoute;, Muscat Daily, May 21, 2013 http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/His-Majesty-the-Sultan-appoints-new-head-of-Internal-Security-Service-29z8 (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Barriers to developing ‘Leadership' in the Sultanate of Oman&quoute;, Richard K Common, International Journal of Leadership Studies, 2011 http://www.regent.edu/acad/global/publications/ijls/new/vol6iss2/3_Common_pp215-229_jm.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is little information on intelligence sector appointment/promotion criteria, however, it seems clear this follows other trends in leadership in Oman, where social/kinship ties often defeat meritocratic criteria in practice.
According to Richard Common, U of Manchester...
&quoute;In effect, two systems work in parallel: there are formal systems based on the merit principle, while it is clear that ascriptive or social criteria is still used when making judgements about selection, recruitment,and promotion.&quoute;
http://www.regent.edu/acad/global/publications/ijls/new/vol6iss2/3_Common_pp215-229_jm.pdf
Suggested score:
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
The Sultanate does not formally export arms but is reported to have exported small arms for amounts less than 5,000USD).
Oman has neither signed nor ratified the ATT; nor is it a signatory to the Wassenaar Arrangement. It does not seem to report to the UN's Register of Conventional Arms (but actually no member state has submitted a report for 2013). Furthermore, no talks seem to have happened about Oman joining any of these instruments.
The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database does not have any information on deliveries for the suppliers, recipients and time period specified. Same result for PRIO. Both queries concerned the examination period (PRIO's data stops at 2012)
Oman imports considerable amounts of arms. There is no evidence of a clear oversight process or controls for arms import or export decisions. Neither the Shura nor the National Council seem to play a role in these decisions. The primary legislation is Decree 36/1990, which, inter alia, puts the import and trade of weapons under the control of the Police, in particular the Inspector-General of Police and Customs. It is unclear who exactly negotiates such deals on the Omani side.
Institutional sources:
- UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/ (accessed 8 May 2014)
- The UN Register of conventional arms http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/CountryDetail1.aspx?Register_Id=2246 (accessed 8 May 2014)
- The Wassenaar Agreement: Participants http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html (accessed 8 May 2014)
- UN Programme of Action Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS) http://www.poa-iss.org/CountryProfiles/CountryProfiles.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Statements on the Arms Trade Treaty, UN Conference 18-28 March 2013 http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/ (accessed 8 May 2014)
- UNODA Arms Trade Treaty, Status of the Treaty http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att (accessed 10 May 2014)
- &quoute;THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK, Volume 38: 2013&quoute; http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/yearbook/2013/ (accessed 10 May 2014)
- &quoute;Adoption of Arms Trade Treaty to Constrain Conventional Weapons Flows 'Big Win', Say Speakers in First Committee; Critics Say Text 'Easy to Manipulate' &quoute;, Sixty-eighth General Assembly, 11 Oct 2013 http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gadis3478.doc.htm
Specialised:
- SIPRI Arms Transfers database: http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php (accessed 20 March 2015)
- NISAT PRIO, Mapping Arms Data (data until 2012) http://nisatapps.prio.org/armsglobe/index.php
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Oman has not signed the ATT, but its arms imports primarily come from Britain and the US who have done so - oversight therefore, should be provided by the governments making the sales.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: An Omani representative has in the past made some statements about cooperation with UN arms control initiatives. See summary reports of Najeem al-Abri (Oman) statements at 68th GA meeting (http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gadis3478.doc.htm)
Suggested score:
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
There is very little to no information about this.
The Ministry of Defence seems to have its own tender board (i.e., separate from the one used by the rest of the government; general tendering, as linked to above on the Omanuna portal). The specific institutions responsible for acquisitions could not clearly be identified: there has been an attempt to publish tenders on the Ministry of Defence website yet the page is empty and no further information is provided. No other information was identified in the media neither. There is no speculation on blogs or among (oft-government controlled) CSOs about this. This lack of transparency surrounding the matter means that a score of '0' is most appropriate here.
Institutional sources:
- &quoute;Tendering Process at Tender Board&quoute;, Omanuna (Oman's official e-gov portal) http://www.oman.om/wps/portal/!ut/p/a0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOKDvbydgj1NjAz8_YxMDTxD3ULNgtyCDN1NzPQLsh0VAY3g_RY!/?PC_Z7_SJKBSI420ON250IUFU6RFR1G22000000_WCM_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/en/site/home/gov/gov1/gm/tenderboard/tenderingprocess (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Minsitry of Defence, 'Tenders' http://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/TenderLanding.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Minsitry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;Tendering in Oman: Practical Issues&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, Nov 30, 2009 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2009/11/tendering-in-oman-practical-issues.html (from 2009, but has not been modified; accessed 8 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
There is no information on this topic.
No legislative committee was identified which is tasked to scrutinise or approve the defence/security expenses and no mention of scrutiny of assets is made. The State Audit Institution seems to have broad auditing capacities yet no report or update has been published on its website to indicate an actual audit of defence matters has occurred. There is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinised by an oversight body of any form. All these factors imply that a low score of '0 is the most appropriate here.
Institutional sources:
- Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) www.shura.om (impossible to access this website at the time of research)
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla), 'Committees' http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Economic Committee of the State Council http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee/Economic/Specializations_Economics.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Minsitry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Sultanate of Oman -- Ministry of Information, http://www.omaninfo.om/english/ (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;The State Audit Institution of Oman: A Profile&quoute;, ASOSAI (Asian Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions) http://www.asosai.org/asosai/journal2002/the_state_audit_oman.htm (accessed 8 May 2014)
- State Audit Institution (SAI) http://www.sai.gov.om/Default.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Majlis Al-Shura election fails to excite voters&quoute;, RFI, 15 October 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/middle-east/20111015-omans-majlis-al-shura-election-fails-excite-voters (article from 2011; accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
Although the headline budget is available (in Arabic on the Ministry of Finances website), no details are disclosed on defence spending and certainly not on secret items. The Ministry of Defence has no information even closely related to expenditure.
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Finances, 'Budget' http://www.mof.gov.om/p_balance.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Ministry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman State General Budget 2014&quoute;, Bank of Muscat, 9 Jan 2014 http://content.argaam.com.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/03357a92-a68a-4ea1-9b25-c6da37e0620d.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Another source on budgetary breakdown: Bank of Muscat
http://content.argaam.com.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/03357a92-a68a-4ea1-9b25-c6da37e0620d.pdf
Suggested score:
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
Neither the Shura nor the State Council have a say on defence-related matters, be it spending, acquisitions or secret items.
The 2013 GI for states that &quoute;According to the law, members are given draft copies of the budget. There is no evidence that the legislature is given detailed accounts of any part of the budget.&quoute; As previously mentioned, I have not been able to identify any evidence that the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) is given information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: No source or evidence found that could support this conclusion. Score maintained at 0.
Institutional sources:
- Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) www.shura.om (impossible to access this website at the time of research)
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla), 'Committees' http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Majlis Al-Shura election fails to excite voters&quoute;, RFI, 15 October 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/middle-east/20111015-omans-majlis-al-shura-election-fails-excite-voters (article from 2011; accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Shura does have a say on defence related matters, and thus must decide on secret defence spending.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
No legislative committee was identified which is tasked with scrutinising or approving the defence/security budget. As highlighted by the RFI piece, the Majlis Al-Shura has no say in defence issues. The Economic Committee of the State Council is tasked with discussing &quoute;the draft of the Annual budget of the state&quoute;, but no evidence was found that it discusses or has ever discussed the defence budget, secret items or any other security-related matters.
The State Audit Institution seems to have broad auditing capacities yet no report or update has been published on its website to indicate an actual audit of defence matters has occurred. In addition, the State Audit Institution does not seem independent (it is under the auspices of the Ministry of Finances). It is unclear which defence-related institutions have been audited, whether they have been audited at all and what the outcomes are.
All in all, there is no evidence that the legislature sees any report (assuming it is active). There is no evidence that any debate occurs.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: There is no evidence presented to support the Peer Reviewer's statement, and I have not been able to find any either. Additionally, the 2013 GI for Oman also acknowledges that the legislature has no say on defence-related matters. Score maintained at 0.
Institutional sources:
- Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) www.shura.om (impossible to access this website at the time of research)
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla), 'Committees' http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Economic Committee of the State Council http://www.statecouncil.om/Kentico/Inner_Pages/CommitteeDepartments/Committee/Economic/Specializations_Economics.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Minsitry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Sultanate of Oman -- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;The State Audit Institution of Oman: A Profile&quoute;, ASOSAI (Asian Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions) http://www.asosai.org/journal2002/the_state_audit_oman.htm (accessed 8 May 2014)
- State Audit Institution (SAI) http://www.sai.gov.om/Default.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Majlis Al-Shura election fails to excite voters&quoute;, RFI, 15 October 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/middle-east/20111015-omans-majlis-al-shura-election-fails-excite-voters (article from 2011; accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Shura does have a say on defence related matters.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
No reports, either institutional and media, are available regarding off-budget expenditure. Thus, it is impossible to say whether off-budget expenditure exists and how/whether it is regulated.
The 2013 GI for Oman outlined activities that suggested that off-budget military expenditures exist(ed) in Oman. Attempts to verify the evolution of then-praised collaboration between the UNDP-POGAR and the IMF have been unsuccessful, as the UNDP-POGAR website provides scant information and the resources cited in the 2013 GI are no longer available. As for the IMF, there have been some white papers and news releases during the examination period but none seems to address this topic. Attempts to interview a UNDP-POGAR spokesperson also proved unsuccessful, as they insisted that their mandate did not include defence-related matters. The score this year, therefore, is lower than that of the 2013 GI.
An inability to verify the information on issues related to off-budget military expenditure, and the fact that they are not explicitly banned, means that the most appropriate score is '0'.
Institutional sources:
- The IMF and Oman http://www.imf.org/external/country/omn/index.htm
Media sources:
N/A
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: No information at all is available on this particular issue.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: No public information was found regarding off-budget spending.
Suggested score:
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
No reports, either institutional or media, are available regarding off-budget expenditure. Thus, it is impossible to say for definite whether or not off-budget expenditure exist and whether they are regulated. A lower score has thus been selected to reflect the lack of transparency.
The 2013 GI for Oman outlined activities which suggested that off-budget military expenditures exist(ed) in Oman. The IMF has released a few white papers and news releases during the examination period but none seems to address this topic specifically; UNDP-POGAR, when contacted, clarified that their work did not overlap with the defence sector.
Thus, this indicator assumes there are off-budget military expenditures for which it is impossible to get information.
Institutional sources:
- The IMF and Oman http://www.imf.org/external/country/omn/index.htm (accessed 20 March 2015)
Media sources:
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: No information on off- budget expenditures was forthcoming.
Suggested score:
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
Various provisions impose secrecy in official work although there does not seem to exist a specific classification framework.
The Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force &quoute;Mutual Evaluation: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in the Sultanate of Oman&quoute; published in 2011 states:
- &quoute;According to the Law on Occupation Secrets and Protected Locations (issued by Royal Decree No.36/1975) it is a crime for any employee of the Government of Oman to transfer official documents or information to unauthorized persons&quoute; (p. 59);
- &quoute;Confidentiality of information and investigations are protected under the Office Secrets Law places protected function and promulgated by Royal Decree No. 36/1975. [...] Regarding the confidentiality of information, Article 164 of the PC states that if an official discloses, with no lawful reason, a secret which he knows due to his function, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for up to three years and a fine from OMR 20 to OMR 200. Also the Police Law enables the authorities to punish an employee in case he discloses an official secret. Before taking up duty, police officers are screened.&quoute; (p. 69)
These provisions seem to indicate that by default, administrative resources are confidential. No provisions or guidelines are featured regarding control mechanisms for classifying information, or scrutiny over them, and, given the informal and porous structures of other systems such as appointments or the legislature, it seems likely that information is classified at the discretion of individuals.
Specialised/Research:
- Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), &quoute;Mutual Evaluation: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in the Sultanate of Oman&quoute;, 2011 http://www.menafatf.org/images/uploadfiles/mutual_evaluation_report_of_the_sultanate_of_oman.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
No evidence was identified regarding military participation or beneficial ownership of state-owned companies.
The examples of Oman Air and Oman Oil Company highlighted above showcase a nearly-exclusive to exclusive government ownership but there is no mention of the military in any of these cases. The government is also said to be engaging in divestment from several state-owned companies. The 'Omanisation' policy however does not seem to include the military, for unknown reasons (or perhaps the military has never been foreign-owned only).
There is no law that prohibits defence sector officials/employees from having interests in business. Given the close ties between the governing elite and different business ventures, it is highly likely that such involvement occurs. No public evidence have however been identified to support this however.
It is important to note that a strict western-model distinction between individuals and institutions, the military and the executive doe snot exist in Gulf state. Every company that is state-owned is transitively military-owned given who the Minister of Defence is and how power is given to members of the ruling family. Score 0 selected to reflect the lack of transparency.
Institutional sources:
- Omanuna - List of govt-owned institutions and entreprises http://www.oman.om/wps/portal/!ut/p/a0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOKDvbydgj1NjAz83YINDTwdPT2cnR1DjAxDzfQLsh0VAbI64k0!/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/EN/site/home/gov/gov1/gm/
- Omanuna - Businesses http://www.oman.om/wps/portal/!ut/p/a1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOKNDdwNDPwtPX1NnAJdDIy8jLxNgx2NjQyCTYAKIoEKDHAARwNC-sP1o1CVeIf4OhoYGYe5eVn6mBm7uJhAFeCxoiA3wiDTUVERALgjT0A!/dl5/d5/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SmlFL1o2XzMwRzAwTzlJTTRTVjEwMkpGRDU4UzcyRzgz/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=EN%2Fsite%2Fhome%2Fbz%2F
- Ministry of Manpower, Omanisation Per Sector http://www.manpower.gov.om/portal/en/OmanisationPerSector.aspx
- Oman Oil Company, About http://www.oman-oil.com/About.html
- Oman Air, Fact sheet http://www.omanair.com/about-us/corporate-information/fact-sheet
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman plans to divest stake in 11 state-owned companies&quoute;, Times of Oman, 9 Mar 2014 http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article-30863.aspx
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
As explained in the previous indicator evaluation, no military-owned businesses seem to exist. As highlighted by the 2013 assessment, it can be said that &quoute;the Sultan 'owns' the army and the institute of the state, the notion of private enterprises owned by defence or security institutions does not make much sense&quoute;. Thus, no specific law forbids or permits national defence and security institutions of having beneficial ownership of commercial businesses, such a distinction does not seem to make sense in the case of Oman.
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
The Sultan's (Royal) Decree number 112 of 2011 relates to the protection of state funds. It prohibits administrative employees from using state financials or their professional influence. Such employees are also prohibited from acting as a mediator or support of business activity similar or related to their administrative position. However no evidence was identified about the actual application of the Decree to defence/security personnel.
Response to Peer reviewer 2: I agree that, due to a lack of enforcement, a lower score would be more appropriate to reflect that the sanctions for breaking these laws are weak or often not enforced. No evidence found to support a score of 3.
Institutional sources:
- Sultan's Decree number 112 of 2011, State Audit Institution website (accessible here, in Arabic: http://www.sai.gov.om/LawDocs/112-2011.pdf; accessed 8 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: This indicator is hard to judge, but the current scoring seems high with relation to enforcement. It is hard to find proof either way. Score '3', that there are sanctions in place that are 'usually applied' may be more fitting.
From Global Security (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/oman-corruption.htm), ministers and Under Secretaries (deputy ministers) are not allowed to hold offices in public shareholding companies. However, many influential figures in government still maintain private businesses and some are also involved in private-public projects. These activities either create or have the potential to create conflicts of interest.
Suggested score: 3
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
Despite the well publicised increase in scrutinising and prosecuting corrupt officials over the past year, there is no evidence that the Minister of Defence and other defence/security officials have made any publicly stated commitments regarding anti-corruption and integrity measures. The Sultan's &quoute;cautious measures&quoute; (Reuters) were not considered as evidence in the response to this indicator as they only seem to concern public sector and business, not the defence and security sector specifically.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
- &quoute;FEATURE-After popular protests, Oman starts to pursue graft&quoute;, Reuters, Mar 23, 2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/23/oman-corruption-idUSL6N0ME36220140323
Others:
- &quoute;Petrodollars: Oman gripped by action against oil corruption&quoute;, McGraw Hills Financial, April 28, 2014 http://blogs.platts.com/2014/04/28/oman-oil-corruption/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In August 2013, the State Financial and Administrative Audit Institution SFAAI launched a smart phone application to go along with its social networking site to allow Omanis to report instances of abuse or corruption by government officials.
There is no evidence this is a strong or capable protection, and this does not relate directly to defence programs or individuals.
(https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/oman-0#.VJGhLCAA)
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
There are general anti-bribery laws as well as anti-money laundering legislation. The Omani Law Blog cited above notes:
&quoute;Government officials are subject to stringent anti-bribery/corruption regulations. Royal Decree No. 112 of 2011 “the Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest” (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) prohibits giving, accepting and mediating bribes, and prohibits this most forcefully and specifically in the context of public sector employees.&quoute; Omani general legislation criminalizing bribery and corruption thus applies to the military.
In addition, the Sultan's (Royal) Decree number 112 of 2011 stipulates that administrative employees cannot be, directly or indirectly, involved in business activities similar or relative to their professional occupation; the decree frames jail time punishments if an employee is found guilty of such violations. No mention of corruption, bribe or graft has been identified.
This decree also notes that a military judiciary should exist to investigate and judge members of the Armed Forces in relation to various criminal offences including bribery, with the subsequent trials made public (unless held in secret at the discretion of the judge). Yet there is no proof that such a judiciary has been established or is active.
No media or institutional reports were identified where officials from these sectors were charged, prosecuted or investigated for corruption or bribery although the Decree provides prison sentences for many of the crimes. There are, however, many media reports on high-profile officials being sentenced to jail time for oil-related corruption cases recently (see Gulf News articles).
Institutional sources:
- Sultan's Decree number 112 of 2011, State Audit Institution website (available at http://www.sai.gov.om/LawDocs/112-2011.pdf in Arabic, accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman oil executive on trial for corruption&quoute;, Gulf News, November 15, 2013 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman-oil-executive-on-trial-for-corruption-1.1255319 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Ex-government officials in Oman jailed for abuse of office&quoute;, Gulf News, February 16, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/ex-government-officials-in-oman-jailed-for-abuse-of-office-1.1291839 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Oman hands down more sentences in oil corruption case&quoute;, Gulf News, March 3, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman-hands-down-more-sentences-in-oil-corruption-case-1.1298303 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;After popular protests, Oman starts to pursue graft&quoute;, Gulf News, March 25, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/after-popular-protests-oman-starts-to-pursue-graft-1.1308765 (accessed 15 April 2014)
Others:
- &quoute;Oman's Ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, March 5, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/03/omans-ratification-of-un-convention.html (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;UN Convention Against Corruption and Anti-Money Laundering&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, April 8, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/04/un-convention-against-corruption-and.html (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;H.M. The Sultan of Oman Issues Royal Decrees&quoute;, LinkedIn post, 24 Oct 2011 https://www.linkedin.com/groups/HM-Sultan-Oman-Issues-Royal-3815509.S.77102046
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Agree: little sign that new anti corruption initiative is specifically designed to aid defence sector, but lots of action, however cosmetic, to address corruption since 2011.
Oman jails former commerce minister for corruption, BBC, 19 May 2014
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27469354
More sentences in Oman anti-corruption drive
Over 35 civil servants and businessmen have gone on trial in Oman since 2013
Nov 14, 2014
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/more-sentences-in-oman-anti-corruption-drive-1.1412503
Oman: Getting Rid of Graft, The Economist, Feb 20 2014
http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/02/oman
&quoute;Some worry that the anti-corruption campaign will target figureheads only. “It’s too little too late,” says Shawqi al-Sultan, a prominent businessmen. Still, most people agree that of all the reforms undertaken since 2011, this may be the most successful.&quoute;
Suggested score:
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
There are institutions within the Omani state who have established whistleblower protection. The Bank of Muscat, for example, adopted a whistleblower policy in 2009. Two whistleblower channels are thus available to report a wrongdoing or inappropriate behaviour (a hotline and email). The policy provides protection for the whistleblower and sets out internal and external reporting channels.
In February 2014, the Omani State General Reserve Fund (a sovereign wealth fund) adopted its own wide-ranging whistle-blowing programme aimed at encouraging the reporting of illegal practices, becoming one of the first government institutions to apply whistle-blowing policy in the Sultanate. According to Oman Observer, &quoute;the senior management and officials of SGRF emphasised the protection of whistle blowers from any harm or retaliation which they may be exposed to.&quoute;
These cases, however, represent individual initiatives by these departments/organisations and are internally applied. The country overall does not have a domestic whistleblowers' legislation. There is no such provision for military and civilian personnel either. It is unclear whether there is or not trust among defence and security officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.
There was a news report published on the Omani e-gov portal reporting that, in 2013, the State Audit Institution has been given a prize by the UN for its initiative &quoute;Complaints Window&quoute;. There is no mention about defence or security here though.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1:
Peer Reviewer 1 may be right about perceptions and evolution of society. Yet, the indicator is scored on the fact that no legislation or mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel currently exist to facilitate corruption reporting, and there are no institutionalised mechanisms of whistle-blower protection. Score maintained at '0'.
Institutional reports:
- &quoute;Whistleblower Policy&quoute;, Bank of Muscat http://www.bankmuscat.com/en-us/Pages/Whistle-Blower-Policy.aspx (accessed 25 April 2014)
- &quoute;Sultanate captures two first place 2013 United Nations Public Service Awards&quoute;, e-Oman (website of the Information Technology Authority), May 16, 2013
http://www.ita.gov.om/ITAPortal/MediaCenter/NewsDetail.aspx?NID=511 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Measures to ensure transparency&quoute;, Oman Daily Observer, February 24, 2014 http://main.omanobserver.om/?p=59637 (accessed 25 April 2014)
Others:
- &quoute;Whistleblowing Policy in Oman&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, April 17, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/04/whistleblowing-policy-in-oman.html (accessed 25 April 2014)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Whistle blowing is becoming more apparent within Omani society, but it is difficult to find any such legislation which protects military and official personnel.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
This indicator is difficult to grade as none of the rules and regulations on the promotion in the defence and security sectors are made publicly available. The only related announcement was of the nomination of the State Security (intelligence) chief who is the brother of Oman's attorney-general. In Oman, as in other countries in the region, tribal and family affiliations can be much more important than merit in securing jobs and promotions. It is frequently found that people with close personal connections are nominated to positions for which they may or may not be qualified.
For clarity, 'personnel in sensitive positions' refers to what the FATF defines as &quoute;politically exposed persons&quoute;: &quoute;persons who hold or have held senior public function in a foreign country such as the heads
of states or governments; prominent politicians; judicial or military officers; senior executives of state owned corporations; high-ranking government officials; or prominent members in a political party including their intimates, family members until the third degree&quoute; (see the MENAFATF document).
There is no indication that such personnel are subject to vetting requirements, or rotation of post and post-retirement restrictions either. This lack of sensitivity to corruption risk means that a score of '0' is the most suitable.
Institutional sources:
- &quoute;Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: the Sultanate of Oman&quoute;, MENAFATF, 4 May 2011
http://www.menafatf.org/images/uploadfiles/mutual_evaluation_report_of_the_sultanate_of_oman.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015)
Media sources:
- &quoute;New chief for internal security in Oman&quoute;, Gulf News, May 21, 2013 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/new-chief-for-internal-security-in-oman-1.1186473 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Others:
- &quoute;Merchant Family Series: Oman's Zawawi family&quoute;, Research & Markets, January 2013 http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/2393893/merchant_family_series_omans_zawawi_family (accessed 20 March 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is much evidence of mixing of commercial/political/military interests among elites in sensitive positions. Historically, for example, the Zawawi family held a monopoly over major defence contracts. Alan and Rigsbee suggest that this has led to a 'perception that contracts are awarded on the basis of personal standing rather than the needs of either the military or sound commercial practice'.
&quoute;Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution&quoute;, 1970-1996, Calvin H. Allen, W. Lynn Rigsbee II (figure 11, p. 94)
Suggested score:
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
Institutional websites such as that of the Ministry of Defence do not provide such information. According to the interviewee, official statistics about civil servants and public sector employees do not include such numbers either. Information, however, can be found in foreign media and/or research reports. For example, regarding the military force (see the paper from the Center for Strategic and International Studies): &quoute;Oman’s military manpower totalled 44,100 in 2006: Oman had a 25,000 man Army. The Navy had 4,200 sailors, and the Air Force had 4,100 personnel. The Royal Household maintained 5,000 Guards, 1,000 in Special Forces, 150 sailors in the Royal Yacht fleet, and 250 pilots and ground personnel in the Royal Flight squadrons.&quoute;
The interviewee concluded that the figures published are impossible to verify.
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Typhoon jets deal with Oman helps boost UK arms exports&quoute;, The Guardian, 20 June 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/20/typhoon-jets-oman-uk-arms-exports
Others/Research:
- &quoute;The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of AsymmetricWar: Oman&quoute;, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 28, 2006 http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_oman.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (senior journalist; May 2014)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Government of Oman seemingly does not publish official career statistics, especially not relating to sensitive military positions.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Such information is not made publicly available by the government.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
The Sultan's Royal Decree number 101 of 1996 Promulgating the Basic Statute of the State regulates the matters of salaries. According to the interviewee, no problems with the payment system have been flagged. The interviewee also highlighted that the lack of compulsory conscription and the fact that there are many volunteers who take conscription as a solution to unemployment, makes it unlikely for payments to be dysfunctional.
It is unclear whether the basic pay is non-discretionary as the rules and regulations covering appointments in defence are not readily available. It is reasonable to assume that these to be non-discretionary for the civilian personnel - this is enshrined in law as per the recent Sultan's Decree number 78 of 2013 on the issuance of the standardised grades and salaries schedule for Omani civil employees of the state, and there are no reports of this law being broken.
Institutional sources:
- Sultan's Decree number 101 of 1996 (accessible in inofficial English translation at ILO website http://www.ilo.org/aids/legislation/WCMS_125868/lang--en/index.htm; accessed 14 May 2014)
- Sultan's Decree number 78 of 2013 (accessible in English on Times of Oman) http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article-27374.aspx/39294/Article-His-Majesty-sends-greetings-to-Brazilian-President-Dilma-Rousseff (accessed on 20 Mar 2015)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (senior journalist; May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
There are no publicly available rules on appointments in the defence sector. In Oman, as in other countries in the region, tribal and family affiliations are much more important than merit (for an in-depth overview, see Prof. Common's work cited above). According to the media report linked to above, the top position in the intelligence is nominated by the Sultan. The interviewee added that the top position in the police is also appointed by the Sultan.
While there are some rules regulations for nominations within the military left since colonial times, it is unknown how much they are respected in practice.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
- &quoute;New chief for internal security in Oman&quoute;, Gulf News, May 21, 2013 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/new-chief-for-internal-security-in-oman-1.1186473 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Others/Research:
- &quoute;BARRIERS TO DEVELOPING ‘LEADERSHIP’ IN THE SULTANATE OF OMAN&quoute;, Richard K. Common, Journal of International Studies, 2011 http://www.regent.edu/acad/global/publications/ijls/new/vol6iss2/3_Common_pp215-229_jm.pdf (accessed 20 Mar 2015)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (senior journalist; May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
There are no publicly available rules on appointments in the defence sector.
According to the media report linked to above, the top position in the intelligence is nominated by the Sultan. The interviewee added that the top position in the police is also appointed by the Sultan; there are also apparently some regulations for nominations within the military leftover from colonial rule, but it is unknown to what extent these rules are obeyed today. In these conditions, it is difficult to assess how much merit is taken into account. There was no evidence found of independent oversight.
The Sultan's Decree number 78 of 2013 is &quoute;applicable to all Omani civil employees of the state, while to non-Omani employees the terms of their contracts shall be applicable&quoute;. It is however unclear how much this impacts upon the pre-existing laws, especially the Police Force Law whose provisions have been outlined in the 2013 assessment: &quoute;Articles 12-24 provide information on Appointments, Evaluation Reports and Promotions in Rank. Article 15 states that seniority plays the key role in appointments and promotions, except as limited by other factors. Article 24 allows the Inspector General to promote individuals who have performed outstanding services or tasks (Sultani Order 35/1990).&quoute; But again this is not intended for defence personnel, there is no publicly available evidence indicating formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process.
Institutional sources:
- Royal Decree number 78 of 2013 on the issuance of the standardized grades and salaries schedule for Omani civil employees of the state (see Times of Oman piece below for the fulltext)
Media sources:
- &quoute;New chief for internal security in Oman&quoute;, Gulf News, May 21, 2013 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/new-chief-for-internal-security-in-oman-1.1186473 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;His Majesty issues Royal Decree to standardize grades, salaries schedule for state employees&quoute;, Times of Oman, December 23, 2013 http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article-27374.aspx/39294/Article-His-Majesty-sends-greetings-to-Brazilian-President-Dilma-Rousseff (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (senior journalist; May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
There is no compulsory conscription system in Oman. The only 'conscription drive' in recent years was a campaign to attract volunteers as a means to avoid unemployment (see Emirates247 piece linked to above and Q44 for more details).
Other sources:
- &quoute;Conscription: Countries Compared&quoute;, NationMaster.com (dated 1997, but still accurate for Oman) http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Military/Conscription (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman air force in conscription drive&quoute;, Emirates247, April 16, 2011 http://www.emirates247.com/news/region/oman-air-force-in-conscription-drive-2011-04-16-1.381519 (accessed 8 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
There is no compulsory conscription in Oman, but the country has a voluntary conscription system used by the government to regulate issues with unemployment.
People join the army as it is a source of income. As outlined by the Capstone paper: &quoute;If the public sector can only absorb one third of the Omanis graduating from higher education institutions, these students will have to find jobs in the private sector, join the military, look for work outside of Oman, or remain unemployed.&quoute; There is no dedicated policy, rules or mechanisms against bribery for soliciting preferred postings the armed forces but nor is there evidence of bribery for soliciting preferred postings.
The Omani Law Blog cited above notes:
&quoute;Government officials are subject to stringent anti-bribery/corruption regulations. Royal Decree No. 112 of 2011 “the Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest” (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) prohibits giving, accepting and mediating bribes, and prohibits this most forcefully and specifically in the context of public sector employees.&quoute;
This decree also states that a military judiciary should exist to investigate and judge members of the Armed Forces in relation to various criminal offences including bribery, with the subsequent trials made public (unless held in secret at the discretion of the judge). Yet there is no proof that such a judiciary has been established or is active.
Omani general legislation criminalizing bribery and corruption thus applies to the military, but there are no further indications that there are laws specifically warning against bribery to gain preferred postings when enlisting.
Institutional sources:
- Royal Decree number 112 of 2011
Other/Specialised sources:
- &quoute;Anti-Bribery Laws: Restrictions on Providing or Receiving Gifts, Oman Law Blog, October 14, 2013 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2013/10/anti-bribery-laws-restrictions-on.html (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Rentierism and Reform: Youth Unemployment and Economic Policy in Oman&quoute;, Capstone paper, May 2014 http://www.gwu.edu/~imes/assets/docs/Capstone%20Papers%20-%202014/Romano%20Seeger%20Capstone%20Final.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
No reports have been identified featuring issues with salary payments; nor are there articles or reports featuring evidence of ghost soldiers in the press. Indeed, no publicly accessible speculation (emanating from media, CSOs, academia or others) was identified addressing this precise issue. The chains of payment and command are separated (see Q46 for more details) and people do receive pay on time (Q39). However as per Q38, there is no evidence that the number of civilian and military personnel is accurately known. There is also no published payment system. Given these factors, a score of '3' seems the most appropriate here.
Institutional reports:
N/A
Media reports:
N/A
Others:
- &quoute;Rentierism and Reform: Youth Unemployment and Economic Policy in Oman&quoute;, Capstone paper, May 2014 http://www.gwu.edu/~imes/assets/docs/Capstone%20Papers%20-%202014/Romano%20Seeger%20Capstone%20Final.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
Payment is processed independently from the chain of command. The organisation of the military seems well-delimited, and there are no reports indicating late payments. The chain of payments thus seems functional and independent for both civilian and military sectors. In a document entitled &quoute;Central Recruiting System (Ministry of Civil Service - Oman)&quoute; by Fatma Al-Bulushi, it is stated: &quoute;Ministry of Civil Service (MoCS) is responsible for recruiting Omani job seekers for the 34 units (Ministries and Government Units) under the Civil Service Law. MoCS receives different requirements for recruitment from these units through the Human Resources Management System (HRMS).&quoute; Thus, this system (which appears to be a somewhat generic name for a HR-dedicated software) appears to be used for civilian servants.
The document by Al-Bulushi does not mention defence or security sector, but seems consistent with the 2013 assessment which stated that such a system is used to manage &quoute;security officers&quoute; especially when adding up various LinkedIn profiles where Omanis indicate having worked in the defence sector's HR management.
Institutional sources:
- &quoute;Central Recruiting System (Ministry of Civil Service - Oman)&quoute;, ITU, undated http://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CDEQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.itu.int%2Fnet4%2Fwsis%2Fstocktaking%2Fprojects%2FFileManager%2FDownloadProjectFile%3FfileId%3D2e5c8da6-287e-4951-bf31-9342a93e6fbc&ei=yf8bVciWLI2zae2MgYgJ&usg=AFQjCNG5xu8T60kf9uXcT0TF6H3GM54emw&sig2=eCRxdPcANTFBnWU9e3Lg_A&bvm=bv.89744112,d.d2s (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Media reports:
N/A
Others:
- &quoute;Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996&quoute;, Calvin H. Allen, W. Lynn Rigsbee II, 2000 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1949-3606.2000.tb01097.x/abstract
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
According to the Oman Law Blog: &quoute;The Sultanate has the following legislation in place to deal with corruption in public and private sectors:
* The Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) (promulgated by Royal Decree 112/2011); and
* The Omani Penal Code (promulgated by Royal Decree 7/1974)&quoute;
Oman's anti-corruption rules apply in the military and to civilian personnel related to it.
In addition, the Sultan's (Royal) Decree number 112 of 2011 prohibits any administrative employee from using their professional position to be involved in business be it directly or indirectly. If breached, these provisions are punishable by jail sentences.
There is no Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel which comprehensively covers conduct with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities.
Institutional sources:
- Sultan's Decree number 112 of 2011 (can be accessed at SAI website http://www.sai.gov.om/LawDocs/112-2011.pdf, in Arabic; accessed 14 May 2014)
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;Oman's Ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, March 5, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/03/omans-ratification-of-un-convention.html (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
There is no evidence of a Code of Conduct, so no reports about related prosecution were identified. No relevant reports from other sources (academia, media, NGOs) could be identified either.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
According to the Oman Law Blog, the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorist Financing Law (the “AML-CTFL”) (promulgated by Royal Decree 79/2010) includes &quoute;establishing appropriate internal policies for surveillance, training and appointment of compliance officers in such institutions in accordance with the provisions of the competent Regulatory Authorities (formed pursuant to AML-CTFL).&quoute;
The Financial Investigation Unit has been established &quoute;pursuant to the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Law issued pursuant to Royal Decree No. 79/201o on 28/06/2010&quoute; (see FUI About). According to its website, the FUI is tasked, among others, with &quoute;Developing special training programs in the field of anti-money laundering and combating of financing of terrorism.&quoute;
In the FUI's Training plan, however, no courses/workshops/seminars have been organised since 2012. Response to Peer Reviewers: there is no evidence anti-corruption training taking place for military and civilian personnel.
Institutional sources:
- Financial Investigation Unit, 'About Us' http://www.fiu.gov.om/aboutus.html (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Financial Investigation Unit, 'Training' http://www.fiu.gov.om/training.html (accessed 14 May 2014)
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;UN Convention Against Corruption and Anti-Money Laundering&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, April 8, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/04/un-convention-against-corruption-and.html (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Anti-corruption training has not taken place since 2012, but the fact is that it has taken place, and thus does take place for military personnel.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Note: New 'anti corruption initiative' for businesses (no mention of training of government/military personnel)
&quoute;The Oman offices of international law firm Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle and KPMG, the global audit, tax and advisory firm, will jointly offer comprehensive anti-bribery and corruption procedures, processes, training and support to Omani companies, and international organisations with business interests in the Sultanate.
&quoute;The collaboration between the market leading professional firms in Oman is a response to the Government of Oman’s increased focus on eliminating bribery and corruption.&quoute;
http://www.curtis.com/sitecontent.cfm?pageid=15&itemid=1059
Suggested score:
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
According to the Sultan's (Royal) Decree number 112 of 2011, a military judiciary should exist to investigate and judge members of the Armed Forces in relation to various criminal offences including bribery, with the subsequent trials made public (unless held in secret at the discretion of the judge). Yet there is no proof that such a judiciary has been established or is active. In addition, no media reports were identified relative to prosecution for corruption in the military or in the police, although, as pointed out by Peer Reviewer 2, there are recent high profile cases from elsewhere in government.
Overall, there does not seem to exist a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. However, no public speculation over whether other attempted prosecutions have been suppressed or inappropriately sanctioned was identified.
Institutional sources:
- Sultan's Decree number 112 of 2011 (can be accessed at the SAI website http://www.sai.gov.om/LawDocs/112-2011.pdf, in Arabic; accessed 14 May 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Oman’s National Gas confirms CEO detained in corruption case&quoute;, Al-Arabiya, 5 Feb 2014 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/energy/2014/02/05/Oman-s-National-Gas-confirms-CEO-detained-in-corruption-case.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Yes, there is little public evidence of of defence prosecutions, in particular over corruption cases. Of course, the recent anti corruption campaign has had some high profile cases, but there is no mention of this targeting any public officials from the security sector.
(More than 20 government officials and private executives have gone on trial on charges of offering or accepting bribes in exchange for contracts, mostly in infrastructure projects.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/energy/2014/02/05/Oman-s-National-Gas-confirms-CEO-detained-in-corruption-case.html)
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
The Oman Law Blog notes that &quoute;Government officials are subject to stringent anti-bribery/corruption regulations. Royal Decree No. 112 of 2011 “the Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest” (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) prohibits giving, accepting and mediating bribes, and prohibits this most forcefully and specifically in the context of public sector employees.&quoute;
This decree also states a military judiciary should exist to investigate and judge members of the Armed Forces in relation to various criminal offences including bribery, with the subsequent trials made public (unless held in secret at the discretion of the judge). Yet there is no proof that such a judiciary has been established or is active.
Media reports cited above note the pervasive corruption in the oil and gas sector. These reports focus much more on bribery rather than facilitation payments. Regarding policy: under the UNCAC, which Oman signed up to, facilitation payments are prohibited.
According to the Al-Tamimi brief: &quoute;Best practice, in addition to the threat of prosecution for acting as an accomplice in the bribery of a public official, requires businesses operating in Oman to have proportionate systems and processes in place to prevent and detect corruption. Certain industry sectors are clearly more prone to bribery and corruption and may be exposed to any or all of the following:
[...]
- payments made to “grease the wheels” (often referred to as facilitation payments);
[...]
While any of the above may be commonplace or necessary in certain sectors or parts of the world, UNCAC imposes an obligation on Oman to eradicate these practices. Businesses in these sectors are likely to encounter a dilemma of being uncompetitive if they want to prioritise compliance with the law.&quoute;
Media reports:
- &quoute;Bribery trial adjourned to Jan 16&quoute;, Oman Daily Observer, December 27, 2013 http://main.omanobserver.om/?p=42896 (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Corruption in energy sector hard nut to crack: Oman Minister of Oil and Gas&quoute;, Times of Oman, March 4, 2014 http://www.timesofoman.com/News/30634/Article-Corruption-in-energy-sector-hard-nut-to-crack-Oman-Minister-of-Oil-and-Gas (accessed 8 May 2014)
Other reports:
- &quoute;Anti-Bribery Laws: Restrictions on Providing or Receiving Gifts&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, Oct 14, 2013 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2013/10/anti-bribery-laws-restrictions-on.html (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Stamping out bribery & corruption: An Oman perspective&quoute;, Al-Tamimi & Co. (Independent law consultancy), Dec 2014-Jan 2015 http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-11/december-january-2/stamping-out-bribery-corruption-an-oman-perspective.html (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is no evidence at all of facilitation payments, which are illegal in Oman, being widespread.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
&quoute;Oman's Maritime Doctrine&quoute; (2012) notes: &quoute;Oman’s primary interest is to ensure national maritime security by maintaining an effective navy and other agencies to guard its sea areas, and protect its maritime trade. However, it still lacks a formal maritime doctrine to underpin its policies.&quoute;
Oman has no known military doctrine which specifically addresses corruption as a strategic issue; the country has no published military doctrine at all. If there is awareness of corruption as a strategic issue for operations, as an aspect of governance, the armed forces do not publicly discuss this.
Institutional sources:
- Sultanate of Oman -- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Minsitry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Others/Research:
- &quoute;Oman's Maritime Doctrine&quoute;, University of Exeter, Doctoral Thesis of Khamis Salim Sulaiman Aljabri, 2012 https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/3653 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
The Omanet Defence summary states: &quoute;In order to continue to preserve the freedoms it has enjoyed for centuries, it is essential Oman's Armed Forces remain well equipped, well trained and at a high standard of combat capability.&quoute; Training appears thus to relate only to security rather than corruption. No evidence was identified that any training on corruption occurs. The only explicit mention on anti-corruption training is from the Ministry of Information and is clearly geared towards its own employees, not towards defence and security sector commanders. No media attention is devoted to corrupt activities in the defence and security sector. It is therefore impossible to state if corruption is tackled internally in a systematic fashion.
Institutional sources:
- Sultanate of Oman -- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Sultanate of Oman -- Ministry of Information, &quoute;Training on Combating Corruption&quoute;, 3 Feb 2015 http://www.omaninfo.om/english/module.php?module=topics-showtopic&CatID=1&ID=107 (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
- Minsitry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Others/Research:
- &quoute;Oman's Maritime Doctrine&quoute;, University of Exeter, Doctoral Thesis of Khamis Salim Sulaiman Aljabri, 2012 https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/3653 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
According to Omanet Defence overview, Oman &quoute;assiduously follow[s] a policy of non-interference in the internal political affairs of other countries.&quoute;
There have been no reports on troops deployment either inside the country and its maritime borders, nor internationally. (See for example, the ongoing Saudi-led intervention in Yemen where all GCC except Oman participate.) No evidence identified of trained professionals deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: N/a not applicable. Score maintained at '0'.
Institutional sources:
- Sultanate of Oman -- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Minsitry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Saudi and Arab allies bomb Houthi positions in Yemen&quoute;, AJAmerica, 26 March 2015 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/03/saudi-ambassador-announces-military-operation-yemen-150325234138956.html (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Cannot find any evidence about this at all.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
No evidence of guidelines, or staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.
Institutional sources:
- Sultanate of Oman -- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Minsitry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman sends new aid convoy to Gaza&quoute;, Times of Oman, 27 Aug 2014 http://www.timesofoman.com/news/38718/Article-Oman-sends-new-aid-convoy-to-Gaza (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
- &quoute;Egypt allows Omani delegation into enter Gaza for half an hour&quoute;, MEMO, 3 Oct 2014 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/14512-egypt-allows-omani-delegation-into-enter-gaza-for-half-an-hour (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: No evidence available for this.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Currently, no troops deployed.
Reports of short 'humanitarian' mission in Gaza however:
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/14512-egypt-allows-omani-delegation-into-enter-gaza-for-half-an-hour
http://www.timesofoman.com/News/38718/Article-Oman-sends-new-aid-convoy-to-Gaza
Suggested score:
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
A law focused on private security companies does not seem to exist. The OHCHR's website does not contain dedicated legislation text for Oman.
Some specific regulations exist though. The Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task Force &quoute;Mutual Evaluation on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in the Sultanate of Oman&quoute; from 2011 notes:
&quoute;769. The Capital Market Regulation provides for the qualifications of securities companies and branches of foreign security companies operating in Oman. In applying for the license, the following information is required: (i) the founders’ good reputation and (ii) they were not (a) declared bankrupt during the last five years or (b) convicted in a felony or dishonorable crime or for breach of trust or any of Mutual Evaluation of the Sultanate of Oman the crimes stipulated in the Commercial Company Law, Commercial Law and the Capital Market Law or (c) they have been rehabilitated (Article 115). The securities companies are also required to submit along with the application form, founders’ educational qualification and experience to satisfy the standards that the CMA deems necessary (Article 119).&quoute;
Guidelines and recommendations exist for control of activities. Yet no media reports were identified for the examination period that mention that such auditing/control has been effective. It is unknown how many PMCs operate in Oman nor how widespread is their presence. No information was identified to indicate how compliant PMCs are with the regulations. Thus, no evidence was identified that scrutiny takes place.
Given the topic, neither myself nor the reviewers were able to provide more recent updates and facts on this. Each of the sources I attempted to talk to about this categorically refused to discuss it, considering such a discussion dangerous for their own security.
Institutional sources:
- &quoute;National regulatory frameworks on PMSCs&quoute;, OHCHR http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/NationalRegulatoryFrameworks.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Research:
- &quoute;Mutual Evaluation on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in the Sultanate of Oman&quoute;, Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task Force, 2011 http://www.menafatf.org/images/uploadfiles/mutual_evaluation_report_of_the_sultanate_of_oman.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
The Ministry of Defence reportedly has a Secretariat of the Tender Board and a Directorate of Purchasing but no other information is publicly available on legislation. Oman is &quoute;an observer to the WTO Committee on Government Procurement&quoute; (see link above), though defence procurement is considered an exception.
According to the interviewee who highlighted the Executive Order number 36 of 2008, the rules surrounding general government tenders exclude defence and security procurement.
Institutional sources:
- Minsitry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Executive Order number 36 of 2008, Tender Board http://www.tenderboard.gov.om/Arb/Tblawar.pdf (in Arabic; accessed 14 May 2014)
-WTO, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/march/tradoc_149240.pdf
Media sources:
N/A
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (senior journalist; May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
The Ministry of Defence has a Secretariat of the Tender Board and a Directorate of Purchasing but no other information is publicly available regarding this legislation, nor if it is active. The Ministry's Tender Board page is currently empty and no reports are published on the website regarding procurement process. According to the interviewee who highlighted the Executive Order number 36 of 2008, government tender legislation excludes defence and security procurement.
Response to Peer Reviewer: This does not address the question or criteria, for the reasons above, score maintained.
Institutional sources:
- Minisitry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Executive Order number 36 of 2008, Tender Board http://www.tenderboard.gov.om/Arb/Tblawar.pdf (in Arabic; accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
N/A
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (journalist; May 2014)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: A public tender board is available through the Directorate of Purchasing; just because the board is currently empty does not mean there have never been any public tenders available.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
The Ministry of Defence, according to legislation, has a Secretariat of the Tender Board and a Directorate of Purchasing but no other information is publicly available regarding procurement legislation. According to the interviewee who highlighted the Executive Order number 36 of 2008, the government tender laws exclude defence and security procurement.
There are no reports related to defence and security policy on the State Council (Majlis al-Dawla) website. The Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) does not have the necessary authority to reflect on defence matters, as reported by RFI (link above): &quoute;It does not have legislative power, nor any role in defence, internal security or foreign policy.&quoute;
There is no evidence of procurement oversight mechanisms.
Institutional sources:
- Minsitry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla) http://www.statecouncil.om/kentico/default.aspx?lang=en-us (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) www.shura.om (impossible to access this website at the time of research)
- State Audit Institution http://www.sai.gov.om/Default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Sultan Qaboos gives larger role to Shura&quoute;, Gulf News, October 21, 2011 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman-s-sultan-qaboos-gives-larger-role-to-shura-1.910984 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman's Majlis Al-Shura election fails to excite voters&quoute;, RFI, 15 October 2011 http://www.english.rfi.fr/middle-east/20111015-omans-majlis-al-shura-election-fails-excite-voters (article from 2011; accessed 14 May 2014)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (senior journalist; May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
No official reports (through announcements on institutional websites) detailing defence purchases were identified, although some basic details of large purchases are made public through the state-run media, mostly foreign and/or specialised outlets. No dedicated report seems to have been made in popular Omani or Arabic speaking newspapers.
There are examples provided above of articles discussing defence deals which originate from foreign and/or specialised media outlets, and provide only the basic details regarding the biggest defence deals. This disclosure is not matched by any statements from the Ministry of Defence, nor any information made public on their websites. As mentioned in previous indicators, Oman does not have a publicly accessible military doctrine or purchasing plans.
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman Upgrading its Air defences&quoute;, defence Industry Daily, Jan 23, 2014 http://www.defenceindustrydaily.com/oman-upgrading-its-air-defences-07161/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman to Purchase Air Defence System From Raytheon&quoute;, MilitaryEdge.org (originally from Times of Oman), January 20, 2014 http://militaryedge.org/articles/oman-purchase-air-defence-system-raytheon/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman to buy $2.1B Raytheon missile system&quoute;, UPI.com, May 21, 2013 http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/05/21/Oman-to-buy-21B-Raytheon-missile-system/UPI-72381369166633/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Kerry pushes $2.1 b defence deal in Oman&quoute;, Khaleeji Times, May 22, 2013 http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?section=middleeast&xfile=data/middleeast/2013/may/middleeast_may244.xml (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: State-run media discloses actual and defence procurements in many cases.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
No institutional or media reports were identified featuring such requirements for companies, and the interviewee was also unaware of such rules.
According to an intelligence brief by IHS Jane's, military procurement does not follow the country's public procurement legislation. Defence procurement being very opaque, we have no evidence suggesting that the government makes some reference to the need for bidding companies to have procedures and standards - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces.
The Law of Commercial Agencies was amended in 2005, according to an article by the Oman Law Blog: &quoute;The wording of the amendment states that contracts for the purchase of weapons or ammunition or all types of military equipment can be entered into directly between the MOD and the overseas defence manufacturer. However, the amendment to the law did not prohibit an overseas defence manufacturer from having an Omani agent. (...) Nonetheless, regardless of the law, the practical truth is that, unless the MOD agrees with the supplier in advance, it prefers not to have agents involved in such transactions.&quoute; This article was published in 2009, no further sources available.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
N/A
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;IHS Jane’s Navigating the Emerging Markets: Sultanate of Oman&quoute;, 9 Feb 2012 (available through Google webcache only) http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:PMc-4TpEkroJ:202.118.72.90/kuke/janes/29.pdf+&cd=6&hl=fr&ct=clnk&gl=fr (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (senior journalist; May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
There is no national strategy guiding the formulation of procurement requirements is publicly available. The formulation of defence procurement guidelines follows unknown paths as no entity is tasked to handle acquisitions or tendering. Oman's procurement requirements do not seem to be published either.
Institutional sources:
- Sultanate of Oman -- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Ministry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Oman Upgrading its Air defences&quoute;, defence Industry Daily, Jan 23, 2014 http://www.defenceindustrydaily.com/oman-upgrading-its-air-defences-07161/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman to Purchase Air Defence System From Raytheon&quoute;, MilitaryEdge.org (originally from Times of Oman), January 20, 2014 http://militaryedge.org/articles/oman-purchase-air-defence-system-raytheon/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman to buy $2.1B Raytheon missile system&quoute;, UPI.com, May 21, 2013 http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/05/21/Oman-to-buy-21B-Raytheon-missile-system/UPI-72381369166633/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- 'Paying the rent for our protectors', Al-Jazeera America, August 17, 2013 http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/8/17/-paying-the-rentforourprotectors.html (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Others/Research:
- &quoute;Oman's Maritime Doctrine&quoute;, University of Exeter, Doctoral Thesis of Khamis Salim Sulaiman Aljabri, 2012 https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/3653 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- SIPRI Arms Transfers database http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php (select &quoute;Imports to Oman&quoute;, for 2010-2014 and then display: direct link to result is not available; accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
There is no evidence of a formal procedure in place for defining purchase requirements.
In his research, Kenneth Katzman writes: &quoute;Oman was the first Gulf state to formalize defence relations with the United States after the Persian Gulf region was shaken by Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, which it was at first feared would spread throughout the Middle East and lead to the downfall of monarchy states there. Oman signed an agreement to allow U.S. forces access to Omani military facilities on April 21, 1980 (was renewed in 1985, 1990, 2000, and 2010).
[...] Oman uses U.S.-provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF), other U.S. accounts, and national funds to modernize its forces. These sales are among the large recent arms sales to the GCC states intended in part to contain Iran.&quoute; Such an agreement suggests that some form of planning might exist when purchasing &quoute;defence articles and services transfers&quoute; from the US. No additional information was identified relating to the criteria included in the alleged planning though.
Institutional sources:
- Sultanate of Oman -- Ministry of Information http://www.omaninfo.om/english/index.php (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Minsitry of Defence https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
- 'Paying the rent for our protectors', Al-Jazeera America, August 17, 2013 http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/8/17/-paying-the-rentforourprotectors.html (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Research sources:
- &quoute;Oman's Maritime Doctrine&quoute;, University of Exeter, Doctoral Thesis of Khamis Salim Sulaiman Aljabri, 2012 https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/3653 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy&quoute;, Kenneth Katzman for FAS, 2013 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21534.pdf (accessed 10 May 2014)
- SIPRI Arms Transfers database http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php (select &quoute;Imports to Oman&quoute;, for 2010-2014 and then display: direct link to result is not available; accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
No information is available on the proportion of contracts signed after competition (through tendering) and how many are single-sourced. With no defence-specific legislation regarding defence procurement it cannot be said that defence procurement is in principle conducted as open competition. No media reports were identified on defence purchases either, whether related to single-sourcing or not.
Oman uses U.S.-provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF), other U.S. accounts, and national funds to modernize its forces. These sales are among the large recent arms sales to the GCC.
The BTI 2014 notes: &quoute;The country usually rejects proposals for foreign assistance from neighbouring countries (especially Saudi Arabia), considering them potential sources of unwanted political interference. In contrast, however, Oman has close strategic partnerships with the UK and the U.S. Regular renewals of military cooperation and facility access agreements with these two countries have confirmed that “Britain’s oldest friend on the Arabian Peninsula” (in the words of a “Times” correspondent in 1974) remains dependent on both Britain and the United States.&quoute;
The U.S. business community reports, &quoute;that the procurement process is often opaque. Of particular concern is the role that consultants play in the government procurement process. At times, consultants appear to steer a procurement decision toward a particular supplier on grounds other than technical qualifications or price&quoute;.
IHS reports, &quoute;The Omani market was historically dominated by the UK as a result of deep historic relations between London and Muscat. However, Oman’s procurement profile has changed over the past decade. The USA overtook the UK to emerge as the Sultanate’s dominant supplier (with a 55 per cent market share) as Oman sought security and enhanced value through broader trade and diplomatic alliances. There are indications that procurement relations will widen further. China has made tentative inroads into the market, while emerging suppliers such as South Korea, and India in the longer term, have circled the Sultanate&quoute;.
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 10 May 2014)
Research sources:
- &quoute;Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy&quoute;, Kenneth Katzman for FAS, 2013 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21534.pdf (accessed 10 May 2014)
- BTI 2014 | Oman Country Report http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/omn/index.nc (accessed 10 May 2014)
-USTR Trade Summary www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Oman_0.pdf
-IHS 2014, www.ihs.com/events/exhibitions/eurosatory-2012/news/jun-14/english/Major-defence-markets.aspx
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
There is no transparency of tender board procedure and practice, it is not clear if they are even active. Audits are not normally undertaken of tender boards, and Oman does not conduct competitive tenders.
Institutional sources:
- Minsitry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 10 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
There is no legislation specific to the defence sector, nor wider national legislation, that outlaws collusion. No case or investigation of collusion between bidders for the purpose of destroying competition in Oman was identified, neither in the media, nor through official websites communication channels.
Institutional sources:
- Minsitry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 10 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
Insufficient evidence available to state whether procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, are specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery or even if defence procurement staff are organised into a professional staff department. No evidence of control or oversight of defence contractors by procurement staff available.
It is likely that undue influence from higher grades within the organisation might exist given Omani power structures (see previous indicators of this assessment).
The 2013 assessment mentions that &quoute;The Omani MoD procurement staff have been trained by a British company, LogicaCMG, in all aspects of procurement and project management.&quoute; It is unclear whether such training has happened again during the examination period as no publicly available information was identified concerning such activities. Thus, this information is not taken into account for the assessment above.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Low score chosen to reflect lack of transparency.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
N/A
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: No information relating to or remotely linking to this question is available anywhere publically available.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
No information is available on mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, whether through official sources, research, or the media. Thus, it is unknown whether any protection from discrimination exists for companies in case they used these mechanisms.
It is unknown whether companies have already attempted to complain for being unfairly disadvantaged or if any have been debarred from future procurements.
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 10 May 2014)
Media sources:
N/A
Other sources:
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
Although the Ministry of Defence allegedly has a tender board, no information is available on the regulations governing the process (assuming it exists). Sanctions are not available, whether procurement executive-imposed debarment to legal sanctions, such as heavy fines or imprisonment for the corrupt activities of a supplier. No relevant provisions were identified in the Penal Code (Art. 155-158 relative to bribery) that could apply in this case.
In theory national anti-corruption rules might apply. According to law firm Al-Tamimi and Co.: &quoute;Oman must ensure that private enterprises have sufficient internal auditing controls to assist in “preventing and detecting” acts of corruption and that the accounts and financial statements of such private enterprises are subject to appropriate auditing and certification procedures. [...] it is not clear how this obligation has been communicated to, followed by or enforced in the private sector community in Oman.&quoute; The opinion piece notes that, &quoute;Given the length of time since the bribery provisions in the Penal Code were enacted and the relatively recent requirements under UNCAC’s uncompromising stance on corruption, legislative changes in Oman on bribery and corruption are likely, particularly to criminalise corporate bribery.&quoute;
Currently no legislative or policy changes have been identified.
Institutional sources:
- Minisitry of Defence, 'About Us' https://www.modus.gov.om/en/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed 10 May 2014)
- Omani Penal Code https://www.unodc.org/tldb/showDocument.do?documentUid=6409&
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;Oman's Ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, March 5, 2014 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2014/03/omans-ratification-of-un-convention.html (accessed 10 May 2014)
- &quoute;Stamping out bribery & corruption: An Oman perspective&quoute;, Al-Tamimi & Co. (independent law consultancy), Dec 2014-Jan 2015 http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-11/december-january-2/stamping-out-bribery-corruption-an-oman-perspective.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
Offset programs exist but no information is available regarding whether the government specifically addresses corruption risks by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors, nor if the government follows up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity.
An IHS Jane's intelligence brief from 2012 briefly explored the then-poorly regulated existing offset programs in Oman; procurement opacity and misbehaviour are noted as challenges for parties.
Oman appears to have had an 'offset' regime since at least August 2001 when the Ministry of Defence issued Guidelines for the Partnerships Development Program (the Guidelines). Essentially the regime imposes obligations on foreign companies who contract with the Oman government whereby they should invest part of the value of the contract back in to Oman by way of investing in projects that will benefit the on-going development of Oman. The Guidelines set out these obligations and the process for having projects approved as an offset project. In recent times some significant defence procurement contracts have excluded any offset obligations.
Responsibility for administering the program moved to the Ministry of Commerce & Industry in 2008. For a number of years there has been discussion of further change and on 3 February 2014 Sultani Decree No. 9/2014 was issued and came into effect immediately and this established the Omani Authority for Partnerships for Development (the Authority).
According to the law firm Dentons, &quoute;on 3 February 2014 Sultani Decree No. 9/2014 was issued which came into effect immediately and established the Omani Authority for Partnerships for Development (the Authority). The Authority is a public authority affiliated to the Ministry of Commerce & Industry. Stakeholders include the Royal Office, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance and the Royal Omani Police. The new law sets out the basic parameters of the offset regime and contains the organisation rules, objectives and authority and responsibilities of the Authority.&quoute;
However the website of the Omani Ministry of Commerce and Industry makes no mention of these topics, and the Authority does not seem to have an online presence or to be referred to in the media. While offsets are compulsory for some contracts, the Decree creating the Authority that handles them does not mention any due diligence obligations or follow up on offset contract performance.
The 2013 GI assessment stated: &quoute;According to the new SAI law, the SAI has the power to audit government owned organizations and companies in which it has a 30% ownership interest, which may include such contracts [Article 20].&quoute; This holds, but the State Audit Institution does not seem to publish auditing conclusions on offset programs nor to have been active in scrutinising these contracts.
Institutional sources:
- State Audit Institution http://www.sai.gov.om/Default.aspx (accessed 10 May 2014)
- Sultan Decree number 9 of 2014; see several details at OmanObserver &quoute;New authority for development&quoute; http://omanobserver.om/new-authority-for-development/ (4 February 2014)
Media sources:
N/A
Others/Specialised:
- Sultanate of Oman: Partnerships for Development, Dentons (independent law firm) http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2014/march/31/sultanate-of-oman-partnerships-for-development
- &quoute;GCC defence Offset Programs: The Trillion-Dollar Opportunity&quoute;, ATKearney (independent management consultancy firm), 2013 http://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/3278959/GCC+defence+Offset+Programs+-+The+Trillion-Dollar+Opportunity+v2.pdf/4a92196a-fb52-4bb8-835c-cc4f04cf30ce (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
- &quoute;IHS Jane’s Navigating the Emerging Markets: Sultanate of Oman&quoute;, 9 Feb 2012 (available through Google webcache only) http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:PMc-4TpEkroJ:202.118.72.90/kuke/janes/29.pdf+&cd=6&hl=fr&ct=clnk&gl=fr (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: It is not possible to see whether the Government of Oman has defence offset programmes.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
No information about offset contracts, programs or performances seem to be available from the Omani government, despite a dedicated Authority being established in 2014. See Q70 for the legal technical information surrounding offsets.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: N/a not appropriate in this instance. Score maintained at 0.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
N/A
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Not possible to find out about defence offset programmes.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Cannot find information on offset programmes
Suggested score:
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
There is no evidence that offset contracts are subject to any level of competition regulation, it is likely they are simply not competed. It is difficult to assess as the offset program and the procurement process lack any transparency. The score has been selected accordingly.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
N/A
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Not possible to find evidence of offset programmes at all.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Another reference
http://www.dnbcountryrisk.com/pages/FreeSamples/samplefiles/Sample.pdf
Suggested score:
How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
The government imposes no restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle.
The interviewee suggested that one might assume that these agents would not be public sector employees (in agreement with Sultan's Decree 112 of 2011 which prohibits administrative employees from taking part to related or similar business activities). Yet as no information or reports are available regarding whether and how this regulation is enforced.
The Law of Commercial Agencies was amended in 2005, according to an article by the Oman Law Blog: &quoute;The wording of the amendment states that contracts for the purchase of weapons or ammunition or all types of military equipment can be entered into directly between the MOD and the overseas defence manufacturer. However, the amendment to the law did not prohibit an overseas defence manufacturer from having an Omani agent. (...) Nonetheless, regardless of the law, the practical truth is that, unless the MOD agrees with the supplier in advance, it prefers not to have agents involved in such transactions.&quoute; This article was published in 2009, no further sources available.
Institutional reports:
N/A
Media reports:
N/A
Others/Specialised:
- &quoute;Agents and defence Contracts&quoute;, Oman Law Blog, October 27, 2009 http://omanlawblog.curtis.com/2009/10/agents-and-defence-contracts.html (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (senior journalist; May 2014)
Legislation:
Law of Commercial Agencies, 2005
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
No information on the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) is made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts on governmental/institutional websites.
According to the interviewee, scarce information can be obtained through reports and research assessments established by foreign governments and/or embassies. An example, using US data, is the Foreign Military Financing statistics (see Kenneth Katzman's &quoute;Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy&quoute; linked to above; see section &quoute;U.S. defence Articles and Services Transfers to Oman&quoute;, pages 10-12: &quoute;Oman uses U.S.-provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF), other U.S. accounts, and national funds to modernize its forces.&quoute;) along with the high-level amounts of military aid the US provides Oman with.
Research:
- &quoute;Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy&quoute;, Kenneth Katzman for FAS, 2013 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21534.pdf (senior journalist; May 2014)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (senior journalist; May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
There is no evidence of the government formally requiring the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, nor is there evidence of the government encouraging this informally.
The interviewee suggested that one might assume that local subcontractors would not be public sector employees (in agreement with Sultan's Decree 112 of 2011 which prohibits administrative employees from taking part to related or similar business activities). No information is available however as to whether this regulation is effectively enforced.
Institutional reports:
N/A
Media reports:
N/A
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1 (senior journalist; May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
The military procurement process remains opaque. The government does not justify its defence and security expenditure at all.
In a research report entitled &quoute;Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy&quoute; from 2013, Kenneth Katzman writes: &quoute;Oman was the first Gulf state to formalize defence relations with the United States after the Persian Gulf region was shaken by Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, which it was at first feared would spread throughout the Middle East and lead to the downfall of monarchy states there. Oman signed an agreement to allow U.S. forces access to Omani military facilities on April 21, 1980 (was renewed in 1985, 1990, 2000, and 2010). [...] Oman uses U.S.-provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF), other U.S. accounts, and national funds to modernize its forces. These sales are among the large recent arms sales to the GCC states intended in part to contain Iran.&quoute;
In addition, the BTI 2014 notes: &quoute;The country usually rejects proposals for foreign assistance [note from researcher: 'assistance' is meant in the broad sense of international cooperation] from neighboring countries (especially Saudi Arabia), considering them potential sources of unwanted political interference. In contrast, however, Oman has close strategic partnerships with the UK and the U.S. Regular renewals of military cooperation and facility access agreements with these two countries have confirmed that “Britain’s oldest friend on the Arabian Peninsula” (in the words of a “Times” correspondent in 1974) remains dependent on both Britain and the United States.
In a piece published at defence Industry Daily, the author writes: &quoute;Oman has traditionally had strong defence and foreign policy relationships with Britain, and its military equipment reflects this.&quoute; Indeed, a quick search through SIPRI Arms Transfers database shows that, for 2013 and 2014, Oman has by far bought the most of its arms to the UK; the only remarkable change is the huge spike in purchases to the US for 2014, which is coherent with the big deals with Raytheon linked to in the Sources box. In addition, a piece published at Al-Jazeera America: &quoute;Thus the arms sales by the United States to Oman have as much to do with the politics of U.S. hegemony in the Gulf as they do with security.&quoute;
However, confronted by the short-term challenge of the Arab Spring and the perceived threat (shared by all Gulf monarchies) of destabilization of the authoritarian order, the Omani government has overcome its usual reluctance to accept foreign assistance from its powerful neighbours, receiving a $10 billion aid package from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries over 10 years to support its economy.&quoute;
Media sources:
- &quoute;US tries to allay GCC fears&quoute;, Gulf News, Dec 18, 2013 http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/us-tries-to-allay-gcc-fears-1.1268456 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Security spending rises as GCC nations upgrade systems&quoute;, Gulf News, Nov 17, 2013 http://gulfnews.com/gn-focus/dubai-air-show/security-spending-rises-as-gcc-nations-upgrade-systems-1.1254613 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Hagel to meet GCC defence ministers on Wednesday&quoute;, Gulf News, May 13, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/hagel-to-meet-gcc-defence-ministers-on-wednesday-1.1332004 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Security market in the MENA skyrocketing&quoute;, Gulf News, February 12, 2013 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/government/security-market-in-the-mena-skyrocketing-1.1145597 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Oman opposes Saudi plan for Gulf union&quoute;, Gulf News, December 7, 2013 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/oman-opposes-saudi-plan-for-gulf-union-1.1264455 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- 'Paying the rent for our protectors', Al-Jazeera America, August 17, 2013 http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/8/17/-paying-the-rentforourprotectors.html (accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Research sources:
- &quoute;Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy&quoute;, Kenneth Katzman for FAS, 2013 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21534.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014)
- BTI 2014 | Oman Country Report http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/omn/index.nc (accessed 14 May 2014)
- SIPRI Arms Transfers database http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php (select &quoute;Imports to Oman&quoute;, for 2010-2014 and then display: direct link to result is not available; accessed 26 Mar 2015)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Although unclear, Oman is modernising its defence infrastructure with US funding. This political influence may have an impact on defence acquisition decisions.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
The Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla) is the upper house of the Council of Oman. It has 83 members all of whom are appointed by the Sultan for a 4-year term. There are no reports related to defence and security policy on the Council's website, nor media reports on their activity. The Council does not seem to have formal rights over defence policy. If related provision exists, it is not made public.
The other house is the Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura). It is composed of 84 elected members. The legislative process was amended by a Royal Decree in October 2011: the Council of Ministers can now refer a draft law to the Consultative Assembly which has to approve or amend it within 3 months of referral. The draft law is then referred to the Council of State which has to approve or amend it. If the two bodies disagree, they take a vote to resolve the difference. If an absolute majority approves the draft law the Chairman of the Council of State refers it to the Sultan. No mention is made here of the defence/security related matters though. As reported by Radio France Internationale (RFI) in 2011: &quoute;It does not have legislative power, nor any role in defence, internal security or foreign policy.&quoute;
Peer Reviewer 2 highlighted that the Shura is able to suggest defence laws to the Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla). However, I have not been able to identify any such documents on the respective websites. Lastly, the Shura Council's FAQ does not mention any such function either. More specifically, the response to Question 14 indicates that access to the minutes of sessions is &quoute;protected by the law&quoute;; although a specific request for purposes of scientific research can be responded to positively, minutes from some meetings remain secret and will not be made publicly accessible.
Given these limitations on the Shura's powers, a score of '0' seems the most appropriate here.