Oman

There is very little to no information about this.

The Ministry of Defence seems to have its own tender board (i.e., separate from the one used by the rest of the government; general tendering, as linked to above on the Omanuna portal). The specific institutions responsible for acquisitions could not clearly be identified: there has been an attempt to publish tenders on the Ministry of Defence website yet the page is empty and no further information is provided. No other information was identified in the media neither. There is no speculation on blogs or among (oft-government controlled) CSOs about this. This lack of transparency surrounding the matter means that a score of '0' is most appropriate here.

There is no information on this topic.

No legislative committee was identified which is tasked to scrutinise or approve the defence/security expenses and no mention of scrutiny of assets is made. The State Audit Institution seems to have broad auditing capacities yet no report or update has been published on its website to indicate an actual audit of defence matters has occurred. There is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinised by an oversight body of any form. All these factors imply that a low score of '0 is the most appropriate here.

Although the headline budget is available (in Arabic on the Ministry of Finances website), no details are disclosed on defence spending and certainly not on secret items. The Ministry of Defence has no information even closely related to expenditure.

Neither the Shura nor the State Council have a say on defence-related matters, be it spending, acquisitions or secret items.

The 2013 GI for states that &quoute;According to the law, members are given draft copies of the budget. There is no evidence that the legislature is given detailed accounts of any part of the budget.&quoute; As previously mentioned, I have not been able to identify any evidence that the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) is given information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: No source or evidence found that could support this conclusion. Score maintained at 0.

No legislative committee was identified which is tasked with scrutinising or approving the defence/security budget. As highlighted by the RFI piece, the Majlis Al-Shura has no say in defence issues. The Economic Committee of the State Council is tasked with discussing &quoute;the draft of the Annual budget of the state&quoute;, but no evidence was found that it discusses or has ever discussed the defence budget, secret items or any other security-related matters.

The State Audit Institution seems to have broad auditing capacities yet no report or update has been published on its website to indicate an actual audit of defence matters has occurred. In addition, the State Audit Institution does not seem independent (it is under the auspices of the Ministry of Finances). It is unclear which defence-related institutions have been audited, whether they have been audited at all and what the outcomes are.

All in all, there is no evidence that the legislature sees any report (assuming it is active). There is no evidence that any debate occurs.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: There is no evidence presented to support the Peer Reviewer's statement, and I have not been able to find any either. Additionally, the 2013 GI for Oman also acknowledges that the legislature has no say on defence-related matters. Score maintained at 0.

No reports, either institutional and media, are available regarding off-budget expenditure. Thus, it is impossible to say whether off-budget expenditure exists and how/whether it is regulated.

The 2013 GI for Oman outlined activities that suggested that off-budget military expenditures exist(ed) in Oman. Attempts to verify the evolution of then-praised collaboration between the UNDP-POGAR and the IMF have been unsuccessful, as the UNDP-POGAR website provides scant information and the resources cited in the 2013 GI are no longer available. As for the IMF, there have been some white papers and news releases during the examination period but none seems to address this topic. Attempts to interview a UNDP-POGAR spokesperson also proved unsuccessful, as they insisted that their mandate did not include defence-related matters. The score this year, therefore, is lower than that of the 2013 GI.

An inability to verify the information on issues related to off-budget military expenditure, and the fact that they are not explicitly banned, means that the most appropriate score is '0'.

No reports, either institutional or media, are available regarding off-budget expenditure. Thus, it is impossible to say for definite whether or not off-budget expenditure exist and whether they are regulated. A lower score has thus been selected to reflect the lack of transparency.

The 2013 GI for Oman outlined activities which suggested that off-budget military expenditures exist(ed) in Oman. The IMF has released a few white papers and news releases during the examination period but none seems to address this topic specifically; UNDP-POGAR, when contacted, clarified that their work did not overlap with the defence sector.

Thus, this indicator assumes there are off-budget military expenditures for which it is impossible to get information.

Various provisions impose secrecy in official work although there does not seem to exist a specific classification framework.

The Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force &quoute;Mutual Evaluation: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in the Sultanate of Oman&quoute; published in 2011 states:
- &quoute;According to the Law on Occupation Secrets and Protected Locations (issued by Royal Decree No.36/1975) it is a crime for any employee of the Government of Oman to transfer official documents or information to unauthorized persons&quoute; (p. 59);
- &quoute;Confidentiality of information and investigations are protected under the Office Secrets Law places protected function and promulgated by Royal Decree No. 36/1975. [...] Regarding the confidentiality of information, Article 164 of the PC states that if an official discloses, with no lawful reason, a secret which he knows due to his function, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for up to three years and a fine from OMR 20 to OMR 200. Also the Police Law enables the authorities to punish an employee in case he discloses an official secret. Before taking up duty, police officers are screened.&quoute; (p. 69)

These provisions seem to indicate that by default, administrative resources are confidential. No provisions or guidelines are featured regarding control mechanisms for classifying information, or scrutiny over them, and, given the informal and porous structures of other systems such as appointments or the legislature, it seems likely that information is classified at the discretion of individuals.

No evidence was identified regarding military participation or beneficial ownership of state-owned companies.

The examples of Oman Air and Oman Oil Company highlighted above showcase a nearly-exclusive to exclusive government ownership but there is no mention of the military in any of these cases. The government is also said to be engaging in divestment from several state-owned companies. The 'Omanisation' policy however does not seem to include the military, for unknown reasons (or perhaps the military has never been foreign-owned only).

There is no law that prohibits defence sector officials/employees from having interests in business. Given the close ties between the governing elite and different business ventures, it is highly likely that such involvement occurs. No public evidence have however been identified to support this however.

It is important to note that a strict western-model distinction between individuals and institutions, the military and the executive doe snot exist in Gulf state. Every company that is state-owned is transitively military-owned given who the Minister of Defence is and how power is given to members of the ruling family. Score 0 selected to reflect the lack of transparency.

As explained in the previous indicator evaluation, no military-owned businesses seem to exist. As highlighted by the 2013 assessment, it can be said that &quoute;the Sultan 'owns' the army and the institute of the state, the notion of private enterprises owned by defence or security institutions does not make much sense&quoute;. Thus, no specific law forbids or permits national defence and security institutions of having beneficial ownership of commercial businesses, such a distinction does not seem to make sense in the case of Oman.

The Sultan's (Royal) Decree number 112 of 2011 relates to the protection of state funds. It prohibits administrative employees from using state financials or their professional influence. Such employees are also prohibited from acting as a mediator or support of business activity similar or related to their administrative position. However no evidence was identified about the actual application of the Decree to defence/security personnel.

Response to Peer reviewer 2: I agree that, due to a lack of enforcement, a lower score would be more appropriate to reflect that the sanctions for breaking these laws are weak or often not enforced. No evidence found to support a score of 3.

Despite the well publicised increase in scrutinising and prosecuting corrupt officials over the past year, there is no evidence that the Minister of Defence and other defence/security officials have made any publicly stated commitments regarding anti-corruption and integrity measures. The Sultan's &quoute;cautious measures&quoute; (Reuters) were not considered as evidence in the response to this indicator as they only seem to concern public sector and business, not the defence and security sector specifically.

There are general anti-bribery laws as well as anti-money laundering legislation. The Omani Law Blog cited above notes:

&quoute;Government officials are subject to stringent anti-bribery/corruption regulations. Royal Decree No. 112 of 2011 “the Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest” (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) prohibits giving, accepting and mediating bribes, and prohibits this most forcefully and specifically in the context of public sector employees.&quoute; Omani general legislation criminalizing bribery and corruption thus applies to the military.

In addition, the Sultan's (Royal) Decree number 112 of 2011 stipulates that administrative employees cannot be, directly or indirectly, involved in business activities similar or relative to their professional occupation; the decree frames jail time punishments if an employee is found guilty of such violations. No mention of corruption, bribe or graft has been identified.

This decree also notes that a military judiciary should exist to investigate and judge members of the Armed Forces in relation to various criminal offences including bribery, with the subsequent trials made public (unless held in secret at the discretion of the judge). Yet there is no proof that such a judiciary has been established or is active.

No media or institutional reports were identified where officials from these sectors were charged, prosecuted or investigated for corruption or bribery although the Decree provides prison sentences for many of the crimes. There are, however, many media reports on high-profile officials being sentenced to jail time for oil-related corruption cases recently (see Gulf News articles).

There are institutions within the Omani state who have established whistleblower protection. The Bank of Muscat, for example, adopted a whistleblower policy in 2009. Two whistleblower channels are thus available to report a wrongdoing or inappropriate behaviour (a hotline and email). The policy provides protection for the whistleblower and sets out internal and external reporting channels.

In February 2014, the Omani State General Reserve Fund (a sovereign wealth fund) adopted its own wide-ranging whistle-blowing programme aimed at encouraging the reporting of illegal practices, becoming one of the first government institutions to apply whistle-blowing policy in the Sultanate. According to Oman Observer, &quoute;the senior management and officials of SGRF emphasised the protection of whistle blowers from any harm or retaliation which they may be exposed to.&quoute;

These cases, however, represent individual initiatives by these departments/organisations and are internally applied. The country overall does not have a domestic whistleblowers' legislation. There is no such provision for military and civilian personnel either. It is unclear whether there is or not trust among defence and security officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.

There was a news report published on the Omani e-gov portal reporting that, in 2013, the State Audit Institution has been given a prize by the UN for its initiative &quoute;Complaints Window&quoute;. There is no mention about defence or security here though.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1:
Peer Reviewer 1 may be right about perceptions and evolution of society. Yet, the indicator is scored on the fact that no legislation or mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel currently exist to facilitate corruption reporting, and there are no institutionalised mechanisms of whistle-blower protection. Score maintained at '0'.

This indicator is difficult to grade as none of the rules and regulations on the promotion in the defence and security sectors are made publicly available. The only related announcement was of the nomination of the State Security (intelligence) chief who is the brother of Oman's attorney-general. In Oman, as in other countries in the region, tribal and family affiliations can be much more important than merit in securing jobs and promotions. It is frequently found that people with close personal connections are nominated to positions for which they may or may not be qualified.

For clarity, 'personnel in sensitive positions' refers to what the FATF defines as &quoute;politically exposed persons&quoute;: &quoute;persons who hold or have held senior public function in a foreign country such as the heads
of states or governments; prominent politicians; judicial or military officers; senior executives of state owned corporations; high-ranking government officials; or prominent members in a political party including their intimates, family members until the third degree&quoute; (see the MENAFATF document).

There is no indication that such personnel are subject to vetting requirements, or rotation of post and post-retirement restrictions either. This lack of sensitivity to corruption risk means that a score of '0' is the most suitable.

Institutional websites such as that of the Ministry of Defence do not provide such information. According to the interviewee, official statistics about civil servants and public sector employees do not include such numbers either. Information, however, can be found in foreign media and/or research reports. For example, regarding the military force (see the paper from the Center for Strategic and International Studies): &quoute;Oman’s military manpower totalled 44,100 in 2006: Oman had a 25,000 man Army. The Navy had 4,200 sailors, and the Air Force had 4,100 personnel. The Royal Household maintained 5,000 Guards, 1,000 in Special Forces, 150 sailors in the Royal Yacht fleet, and 250 pilots and ground personnel in the Royal Flight squadrons.&quoute;

The interviewee concluded that the figures published are impossible to verify.

Such information is not made publicly available by the government.

The Sultan's Royal Decree number 101 of 1996 Promulgating the Basic Statute of the State regulates the matters of salaries. According to the interviewee, no problems with the payment system have been flagged. The interviewee also highlighted that the lack of compulsory conscription and the fact that there are many volunteers who take conscription as a solution to unemployment, makes it unlikely for payments to be dysfunctional.

It is unclear whether the basic pay is non-discretionary as the rules and regulations covering appointments in defence are not readily available. It is reasonable to assume that these to be non-discretionary for the civilian personnel - this is enshrined in law as per the recent Sultan's Decree number 78 of 2013 on the issuance of the standardised grades and salaries schedule for Omani civil employees of the state, and there are no reports of this law being broken.

There are no publicly available rules on appointments in the defence sector. In Oman, as in other countries in the region, tribal and family affiliations are much more important than merit (for an in-depth overview, see Prof. Common's work cited above). According to the media report linked to above, the top position in the intelligence is nominated by the Sultan. The interviewee added that the top position in the police is also appointed by the Sultan.

While there are some rules regulations for nominations within the military left since colonial times, it is unknown how much they are respected in practice.

There are no publicly available rules on appointments in the defence sector.

According to the media report linked to above, the top position in the intelligence is nominated by the Sultan. The interviewee added that the top position in the police is also appointed by the Sultan; there are also apparently some regulations for nominations within the military leftover from colonial rule, but it is unknown to what extent these rules are obeyed today. In these conditions, it is difficult to assess how much merit is taken into account. There was no evidence found of independent oversight.

The Sultan's Decree number 78 of 2013 is &quoute;applicable to all Omani civil employees of the state, while to non-Omani employees the terms of their contracts shall be applicable&quoute;. It is however unclear how much this impacts upon the pre-existing laws, especially the Police Force Law whose provisions have been outlined in the 2013 assessment: &quoute;Articles 12-24 provide information on Appointments, Evaluation Reports and Promotions in Rank. Article 15 states that seniority plays the key role in appointments and promotions, except as limited by other factors. Article 24 allows the Inspector General to promote individuals who have performed outstanding services or tasks (Sultani Order 35/1990).&quoute; But again this is not intended for defence personnel, there is no publicly available evidence indicating formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process.

There is no compulsory conscription system in Oman. The only 'conscription drive' in recent years was a campaign to attract volunteers as a means to avoid unemployment (see Emirates247 piece linked to above and Q44 for more details).

There is no compulsory conscription in Oman, but the country has a voluntary conscription system used by the government to regulate issues with unemployment.

People join the army as it is a source of income. As outlined by the Capstone paper: &quoute;If the public sector can only absorb one third of the Omanis graduating from higher education institutions, these students will have to find jobs in the private sector, join the military, look for work outside of Oman, or remain unemployed.&quoute; There is no dedicated policy, rules or mechanisms against bribery for soliciting preferred postings the armed forces but nor is there evidence of bribery for soliciting preferred postings.

The Omani Law Blog cited above notes:
&quoute;Government officials are subject to stringent anti-bribery/corruption regulations. Royal Decree No. 112 of 2011 “the Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest” (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) prohibits giving, accepting and mediating bribes, and prohibits this most forcefully and specifically in the context of public sector employees.&quoute;

This decree also states that a military judiciary should exist to investigate and judge members of the Armed Forces in relation to various criminal offences including bribery, with the subsequent trials made public (unless held in secret at the discretion of the judge). Yet there is no proof that such a judiciary has been established or is active.

Omani general legislation criminalizing bribery and corruption thus applies to the military, but there are no further indications that there are laws specifically warning against bribery to gain preferred postings when enlisting.

No reports have been identified featuring issues with salary payments; nor are there articles or reports featuring evidence of ghost soldiers in the press. Indeed, no publicly accessible speculation (emanating from media, CSOs, academia or others) was identified addressing this precise issue. The chains of payment and command are separated (see Q46 for more details) and people do receive pay on time (Q39). However as per Q38, there is no evidence that the number of civilian and military personnel is accurately known. There is also no published payment system. Given these factors, a score of '3' seems the most appropriate here.

Payment is processed independently from the chain of command. The organisation of the military seems well-delimited, and there are no reports indicating late payments. The chain of payments thus seems functional and independent for both civilian and military sectors. In a document entitled &quoute;Central Recruiting System (Ministry of Civil Service - Oman)&quoute; by Fatma Al-Bulushi, it is stated: &quoute;Ministry of Civil Service (MoCS) is responsible for recruiting Omani job seekers for the 34 units (Ministries and Government Units) under the Civil Service Law. MoCS receives different requirements for recruitment from these units through the Human Resources Management System (HRMS).&quoute; Thus, this system (which appears to be a somewhat generic name for a HR-dedicated software) appears to be used for civilian servants.

The document by Al-Bulushi does not mention defence or security sector, but seems consistent with the 2013 assessment which stated that such a system is used to manage &quoute;security officers&quoute; especially when adding up various LinkedIn profiles where Omanis indicate having worked in the defence sector's HR management.

According to the Oman Law Blog: &quoute;The Sultanate has the following legislation in place to deal with corruption in public and private sectors:

* The Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) (promulgated by Royal Decree 112/2011); and
* The Omani Penal Code (promulgated by Royal Decree 7/1974)&quoute;
Oman's anti-corruption rules apply in the military and to civilian personnel related to it.

In addition, the Sultan's (Royal) Decree number 112 of 2011 prohibits any administrative employee from using their professional position to be involved in business be it directly or indirectly. If breached, these provisions are punishable by jail sentences.

There is no Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel which comprehensively covers conduct with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities.

There is no evidence of a Code of Conduct, so no reports about related prosecution were identified. No relevant reports from other sources (academia, media, NGOs) could be identified either.

According to the Oman Law Blog, the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorist Financing Law (the “AML-CTFL”) (promulgated by Royal Decree 79/2010) includes &quoute;establishing appropriate internal policies for surveillance, training and appointment of compliance officers in such institutions in accordance with the provisions of the competent Regulatory Authorities (formed pursuant to AML-CTFL).&quoute;

The Financial Investigation Unit has been established &quoute;pursuant to the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Law issued pursuant to Royal Decree No. 79/201o on 28/06/2010&quoute; (see FUI About). According to its website, the FUI is tasked, among others, with &quoute;Developing special training programs in the field of anti-money laundering and combating of financing of terrorism.&quoute;

In the FUI's Training plan, however, no courses/workshops/seminars have been organised since 2012. Response to Peer Reviewers: there is no evidence anti-corruption training taking place for military and civilian personnel.

According to the Sultan's (Royal) Decree number 112 of 2011, a military judiciary should exist to investigate and judge members of the Armed Forces in relation to various criminal offences including bribery, with the subsequent trials made public (unless held in secret at the discretion of the judge). Yet there is no proof that such a judiciary has been established or is active. In addition, no media reports were identified relative to prosecution for corruption in the military or in the police, although, as pointed out by Peer Reviewer 2, there are recent high profile cases from elsewhere in government.

Overall, there does not seem to exist a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. However, no public speculation over whether other attempted prosecutions have been suppressed or inappropriately sanctioned was identified.

The Oman Law Blog notes that &quoute;Government officials are subject to stringent anti-bribery/corruption regulations. Royal Decree No. 112 of 2011 “the Law for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest” (the “Anti-Corruption Law”) prohibits giving, accepting and mediating bribes, and prohibits this most forcefully and specifically in the context of public sector employees.&quoute;

This decree also states a military judiciary should exist to investigate and judge members of the Armed Forces in relation to various criminal offences including bribery, with the subsequent trials made public (unless held in secret at the discretion of the judge). Yet there is no proof that such a judiciary has been established or is active.

Media reports cited above note the pervasive corruption in the oil and gas sector. These reports focus much more on bribery rather than facilitation payments. Regarding policy: under the UNCAC, which Oman signed up to, facilitation payments are prohibited.

According to the Al-Tamimi brief: &quoute;Best practice, in addition to the threat of prosecution for acting as an accomplice in the bribery of a public official, requires businesses operating in Oman to have proportionate systems and processes in place to prevent and detect corruption. Certain industry sectors are clearly more prone to bribery and corruption and may be exposed to any or all of the following:
[...]
- payments made to “grease the wheels” (often referred to as facilitation payments);
[...]
While any of the above may be commonplace or necessary in certain sectors or parts of the world, UNCAC imposes an obligation on Oman to eradicate these practices. Businesses in these sectors are likely to encounter a dilemma of being uncompetitive if they want to prioritise compliance with the law.&quoute;

&quoute;Oman's Maritime Doctrine&quoute; (2012) notes: &quoute;Oman’s primary interest is to ensure national maritime security by maintaining an effective navy and other agencies to guard its sea areas, and protect its maritime trade. However, it still lacks a formal maritime doctrine to underpin its policies.&quoute;

Oman has no known military doctrine which specifically addresses corruption as a strategic issue; the country has no published military doctrine at all. If there is awareness of corruption as a strategic issue for operations, as an aspect of governance, the armed forces do not publicly discuss this.

The Omanet Defence summary states: &quoute;In order to continue to preserve the freedoms it has enjoyed for centuries, it is essential Oman's Armed Forces remain well equipped, well trained and at a high standard of combat capability.&quoute; Training appears thus to relate only to security rather than corruption. No evidence was identified that any training on corruption occurs. The only explicit mention on anti-corruption training is from the Ministry of Information and is clearly geared towards its own employees, not towards defence and security sector commanders. No media attention is devoted to corrupt activities in the defence and security sector. It is therefore impossible to state if corruption is tackled internally in a systematic fashion.

According to Omanet Defence overview, Oman &quoute;assiduously follow[s] a policy of non-interference in the internal political affairs of other countries.&quoute;

There have been no reports on troops deployment either inside the country and its maritime borders, nor internationally. (See for example, the ongoing Saudi-led intervention in Yemen where all GCC except Oman participate.) No evidence identified of trained professionals deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: N/a not applicable. Score maintained at '0'.

No evidence of guidelines, or staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.

A law focused on private security companies does not seem to exist. The OHCHR's website does not contain dedicated legislation text for Oman.

Some specific regulations exist though. The Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task Force &quoute;Mutual Evaluation on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism in the Sultanate of Oman&quoute; from 2011 notes:
&quoute;769. The Capital Market Regulation provides for the qualifications of securities companies and branches of foreign security companies operating in Oman. In applying for the license, the following information is required: (i) the founders’ good reputation and (ii) they were not (a) declared bankrupt during the last five years or (b) convicted in a felony or dishonorable crime or for breach of trust or any of Mutual Evaluation of the Sultanate of Oman the crimes stipulated in the Commercial Company Law, Commercial Law and the Capital Market Law or (c) they have been rehabilitated (Article 115). The securities companies are also required to submit along with the application form, founders’ educational qualification and experience to satisfy the standards that the CMA deems necessary (Article 119).&quoute;

Guidelines and recommendations exist for control of activities. Yet no media reports were identified for the examination period that mention that such auditing/control has been effective. It is unknown how many PMCs operate in Oman nor how widespread is their presence. No information was identified to indicate how compliant PMCs are with the regulations. Thus, no evidence was identified that scrutiny takes place.

Given the topic, neither myself nor the reviewers were able to provide more recent updates and facts on this. Each of the sources I attempted to talk to about this categorically refused to discuss it, considering such a discussion dangerous for their own security.

The Ministry of Defence reportedly has a Secretariat of the Tender Board and a Directorate of Purchasing but no other information is publicly available on legislation. Oman is &quoute;an observer to the WTO Committee on Government Procurement&quoute; (see link above), though defence procurement is considered an exception.

According to the interviewee who highlighted the Executive Order number 36 of 2008, the rules surrounding general government tenders exclude defence and security procurement.

The Ministry of Defence has a Secretariat of the Tender Board and a Directorate of Purchasing but no other information is publicly available regarding this legislation, nor if it is active. The Ministry's Tender Board page is currently empty and no reports are published on the website regarding procurement process. According to the interviewee who highlighted the Executive Order number 36 of 2008, government tender legislation excludes defence and security procurement.

Response to Peer Reviewer: This does not address the question or criteria, for the reasons above, score maintained.

The Ministry of Defence, according to legislation, has a Secretariat of the Tender Board and a Directorate of Purchasing but no other information is publicly available regarding procurement legislation. According to the interviewee who highlighted the Executive Order number 36 of 2008, the government tender laws exclude defence and security procurement.

There are no reports related to defence and security policy on the State Council (Majlis al-Dawla) website. The Consultative Assembly (Majlis al-Shura) does not have the necessary authority to reflect on defence matters, as reported by RFI (link above): &quoute;It does not have legislative power, nor any role in defence, internal security or foreign policy.&quoute;

There is no evidence of procurement oversight mechanisms.

No official reports (through announcements on institutional websites) detailing defence purchases were identified, although some basic details of large purchases are made public through the state-run media, mostly foreign and/or specialised outlets. No dedicated report seems to have been made in popular Omani or Arabic speaking newspapers.

There are examples provided above of articles discussing defence deals which originate from foreign and/or specialised media outlets, and provide only the basic details regarding the biggest defence deals. This disclosure is not matched by any statements from the Ministry of Defence, nor any information made public on their websites. As mentioned in previous indicators, Oman does not have a publicly accessible military doctrine or purchasing plans.

No institutional or media reports were identified featuring such requirements for companies, and the interviewee was also unaware of such rules.

According to an intelligence brief by IHS Jane's, military procurement does not follow the country's public procurement legislation. Defence procurement being very opaque, we have no evidence suggesting that the government makes some reference to the need for bidding companies to have procedures and standards - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces.

The Law of Commercial Agencies was amended in 2005, according to an article by the Oman Law Blog: &quoute;The wording of the amendment states that contracts for the purchase of weapons or ammunition or all types of military equipment can be entered into directly between the MOD and the overseas defence manufacturer. However, the amendment to the law did not prohibit an overseas defence manufacturer from having an Omani agent. (...) Nonetheless, regardless of the law, the practical truth is that, unless the MOD agrees with the supplier in advance, it prefers not to have agents involved in such transactions.&quoute; This article was published in 2009, no further sources available.

There is no national strategy guiding the formulation of procurement requirements is publicly available. The formulation of defence procurement guidelines follows unknown paths as no entity is tasked to handle acquisitions or tendering. Oman's procurement requirements do not seem to be published either.

There is no evidence of a formal procedure in place for defining purchase requirements.

In his research, Kenneth Katzman writes: &quoute;Oman was the first Gulf state to formalize defence relations with the United States after the Persian Gulf region was shaken by Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, which it was at first feared would spread throughout the Middle East and lead to the downfall of monarchy states there. Oman signed an agreement to allow U.S. forces access to Omani military facilities on April 21, 1980 (was renewed in 1985, 1990, 2000, and 2010).
[...] Oman uses U.S.-provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF), other U.S. accounts, and national funds to modernize its forces. These sales are among the large recent arms sales to the GCC states intended in part to contain Iran.&quoute; Such an agreement suggests that some form of planning might exist when purchasing &quoute;defence articles and services transfers&quoute; from the US. No additional information was identified relating to the criteria included in the alleged planning though.

No information is available on the proportion of contracts signed after competition (through tendering) and how many are single-sourced. With no defence-specific legislation regarding defence procurement it cannot be said that defence procurement is in principle conducted as open competition. No media reports were identified on defence purchases either, whether related to single-sourcing or not.

Oman uses U.S.-provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF), other U.S. accounts, and national funds to modernize its forces. These sales are among the large recent arms sales to the GCC.

The BTI 2014 notes: &quoute;The country usually rejects proposals for foreign assistance from neighbouring countries (especially Saudi Arabia), considering them potential sources of unwanted political interference. In contrast, however, Oman has close strategic partnerships with the UK and the U.S. Regular renewals of military cooperation and facility access agreements with these two countries have confirmed that “Britain’s oldest friend on the Arabian Peninsula” (in the words of a “Times” correspondent in 1974) remains dependent on both Britain and the United States.&quoute;

The U.S. business community reports, &quoute;that the procurement process is often opaque. Of particular concern is the role that consultants play in the government procurement process. At times, consultants appear to steer a procurement decision toward a particular supplier on grounds other than technical qualifications or price&quoute;.

IHS reports, &quoute;The Omani market was historically dominated by the UK as a result of deep historic relations between London and Muscat. However, Oman’s procurement profile has changed over the past decade. The USA overtook the UK to emerge as the Sultanate’s dominant supplier (with a 55 per cent market share) as Oman sought security and enhanced value through broader trade and diplomatic alliances. There are indications that procurement relations will widen further. China has made tentative inroads into the market, while emerging suppliers such as South Korea, and India in the longer term, have circled the Sultanate&quoute;.

There is no transparency of tender board procedure and practice, it is not clear if they are even active. Audits are not normally undertaken of tender boards, and Oman does not conduct competitive tenders.

There is no legislation specific to the defence sector, nor wider national legislation, that outlaws collusion. No case or investigation of collusion between bidders for the purpose of destroying competition in Oman was identified, neither in the media, nor through official websites communication channels.

Insufficient evidence available to state whether procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, are specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery or even if defence procurement staff are organised into a professional staff department. No evidence of control or oversight of defence contractors by procurement staff available.

It is likely that undue influence from higher grades within the organisation might exist given Omani power structures (see previous indicators of this assessment).

The 2013 assessment mentions that &quoute;The Omani MoD procurement staff have been trained by a British company, LogicaCMG, in all aspects of procurement and project management.&quoute; It is unclear whether such training has happened again during the examination period as no publicly available information was identified concerning such activities. Thus, this information is not taken into account for the assessment above.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Low score chosen to reflect lack of transparency.

No information is available on mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, whether through official sources, research, or the media. Thus, it is unknown whether any protection from discrimination exists for companies in case they used these mechanisms.

It is unknown whether companies have already attempted to complain for being unfairly disadvantaged or if any have been debarred from future procurements.

Although the Ministry of Defence allegedly has a tender board, no information is available on the regulations governing the process (assuming it exists). Sanctions are not available, whether procurement executive-imposed debarment to legal sanctions, such as heavy fines or imprisonment for the corrupt activities of a supplier. No relevant provisions were identified in the Penal Code (Art. 155-158 relative to bribery) that could apply in this case.

In theory national anti-corruption rules might apply. According to law firm Al-Tamimi and Co.: &quoute;Oman must ensure that private enterprises have sufficient internal auditing controls to assist in “preventing and detecting” acts of corruption and that the accounts and financial statements of such private enterprises are subject to appropriate auditing and certification procedures. [...] it is not clear how this obligation has been communicated to, followed by or enforced in the private sector community in Oman.&quoute; The opinion piece notes that, &quoute;Given the length of time since the bribery provisions in the Penal Code were enacted and the relatively recent requirements under UNCAC’s uncompromising stance on corruption, legislative changes in Oman on bribery and corruption are likely, particularly to criminalise corporate bribery.&quoute;
Currently no legislative or policy changes have been identified.

Offset programs exist but no information is available regarding whether the government specifically addresses corruption risks by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors, nor if the government follows up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity.

An IHS Jane's intelligence brief from 2012 briefly explored the then-poorly regulated existing offset programs in Oman; procurement opacity and misbehaviour are noted as challenges for parties.

Oman appears to have had an 'offset' regime since at least August 2001 when the Ministry of Defence issued Guidelines for the Partnerships Development Program (the Guidelines). Essentially the regime imposes obligations on foreign companies who contract with the Oman government whereby they should invest part of the value of the contract back in to Oman by way of investing in projects that will benefit the on-going development of Oman. The Guidelines set out these obligations and the process for having projects approved as an offset project. In recent times some significant defence procurement contracts have excluded any offset obligations.

Responsibility for administering the program moved to the Ministry of Commerce & Industry in 2008. For a number of years there has been discussion of further change and on 3 February 2014 Sultani Decree No. 9/2014 was issued and came into effect immediately and this established the Omani Authority for Partnerships for Development (the Authority).

According to the law firm Dentons, &quoute;on 3 February 2014 Sultani Decree No. 9/2014 was issued which came into effect immediately and established the Omani Authority for Partnerships for Development (the Authority). The Authority is a public authority affiliated to the Ministry of Commerce & Industry. Stakeholders include the Royal Office, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance and the Royal Omani Police. The new law sets out the basic parameters of the offset regime and contains the organisation rules, objectives and authority and responsibilities of the Authority.&quoute;

However the website of the Omani Ministry of Commerce and Industry makes no mention of these topics, and the Authority does not seem to have an online presence or to be referred to in the media. While offsets are compulsory for some contracts, the Decree creating the Authority that handles them does not mention any due diligence obligations or follow up on offset contract performance.

The 2013 GI assessment stated: &quoute;According to the new SAI law, the SAI has the power to audit government owned organizations and companies in which it has a 30% ownership interest, which may include such contracts [Article 20].&quoute; This holds, but the State Audit Institution does not seem to publish auditing conclusions on offset programs nor to have been active in scrutinising these contracts.

No information about offset contracts, programs or performances seem to be available from the Omani government, despite a dedicated Authority being established in 2014. See Q70 for the legal technical information surrounding offsets.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: N/a not appropriate in this instance. Score maintained at 0.

There is no evidence that offset contracts are subject to any level of competition regulation, it is likely they are simply not competed. It is difficult to assess as the offset program and the procurement process lack any transparency. The score has been selected accordingly.

The government imposes no restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle.

The interviewee suggested that one might assume that these agents would not be public sector employees (in agreement with Sultan's Decree 112 of 2011 which prohibits administrative employees from taking part to related or similar business activities). Yet as no information or reports are available regarding whether and how this regulation is enforced.

The Law of Commercial Agencies was amended in 2005, according to an article by the Oman Law Blog: &quoute;The wording of the amendment states that contracts for the purchase of weapons or ammunition or all types of military equipment can be entered into directly between the MOD and the overseas defence manufacturer. However, the amendment to the law did not prohibit an overseas defence manufacturer from having an Omani agent. (...) Nonetheless, regardless of the law, the practical truth is that, unless the MOD agrees with the supplier in advance, it prefers not to have agents involved in such transactions.&quoute; This article was published in 2009, no further sources available.

No information on the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) is made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts on governmental/institutional websites.

According to the interviewee, scarce information can be obtained through reports and research assessments established by foreign governments and/or embassies. An example, using US data, is the Foreign Military Financing statistics (see Kenneth Katzman's &quoute;Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy&quoute; linked to above; see section &quoute;U.S. defence Articles and Services Transfers to Oman&quoute;, pages 10-12: &quoute;Oman uses U.S.-provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF), other U.S. accounts, and national funds to modernize its forces.&quoute;) along with the high-level amounts of military aid the US provides Oman with.

There is no evidence of the government formally requiring the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, nor is there evidence of the government encouraging this informally.

The interviewee suggested that one might assume that local subcontractors would not be public sector employees (in agreement with Sultan's Decree 112 of 2011 which prohibits administrative employees from taking part to related or similar business activities). No information is available however as to whether this regulation is effectively enforced.

The military procurement process remains opaque. The government does not justify its defence and security expenditure at all.

In a research report entitled &quoute;Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy&quoute; from 2013, Kenneth Katzman writes: &quoute;Oman was the first Gulf state to formalize defence relations with the United States after the Persian Gulf region was shaken by Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, which it was at first feared would spread throughout the Middle East and lead to the downfall of monarchy states there. Oman signed an agreement to allow U.S. forces access to Omani military facilities on April 21, 1980 (was renewed in 1985, 1990, 2000, and 2010). [...] Oman uses U.S.-provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF), other U.S. accounts, and national funds to modernize its forces. These sales are among the large recent arms sales to the GCC states intended in part to contain Iran.&quoute;

In addition, the BTI 2014 notes: &quoute;The country usually rejects proposals for foreign assistance [note from researcher: 'assistance' is meant in the broad sense of international cooperation] from neighboring countries (especially Saudi Arabia), considering them potential sources of unwanted political interference. In contrast, however, Oman has close strategic partnerships with the UK and the U.S. Regular renewals of military cooperation and facility access agreements with these two countries have confirmed that “Britain’s oldest friend on the Arabian Peninsula” (in the words of a “Times” correspondent in 1974) remains dependent on both Britain and the United States.

In a piece published at defence Industry Daily, the author writes: &quoute;Oman has traditionally had strong defence and foreign policy relationships with Britain, and its military equipment reflects this.&quoute; Indeed, a quick search through SIPRI Arms Transfers database shows that, for 2013 and 2014, Oman has by far bought the most of its arms to the UK; the only remarkable change is the huge spike in purchases to the US for 2014, which is coherent with the big deals with Raytheon linked to in the Sources box. In addition, a piece published at Al-Jazeera America: &quoute;Thus the arms sales by the United States to Oman have as much to do with the politics of U.S. hegemony in the Gulf as they do with security.&quoute;

However, confronted by the short-term challenge of the Arab Spring and the perceived threat (shared by all Gulf monarchies) of destabilization of the authoritarian order, the Omani government has overcome its usual reluctance to accept foreign assistance from its powerful neighbours, receiving a $10 billion aid package from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries over 10 years to support its economy.&quoute;