Researcher4112: It is not possible to confirm the effectiveness of government controls over the disposal of its excess war material because there is no information on disposals.

There is no known policy accessible to the public of reutilisation, transfer, donation or dumping of military inventory considered surplus or deemed unnecessary, or excess to the agency’s currently designated mission.

According to the Monitoring Group (2011), Eritrea is repeatedly accused of supporting non-state actors in the Horn of Africa. It also allegedly trains armed groups inside the country such as the people's army militia (Danish report). Therefore, one could speculate that its excess military hardware is distributed among such groups. The government also has a comprehensive programme of distribution of machine guns and ammunition to the population, primarily among members of the National Service. Military surplus inventory could be circulated within and re-utilised by its militias, members of the national service and passed to foreign rebel groups.

Researcher4112: There is no transparency of the regulatory system in Eritrea. There is no evidence that asset disposals are monitored, controlled, and transparently dealt with in Eritrea.

The Foreign Policy and Government Guide states: 'Eritrea has not convened a parliament for over a decade, and all laws are issued by proclamation from the executive branch. The government also does not operate a clearly organised regulatory system; what procedures are in place, appear to be of haphazard and irregularly enforced. The government often does not announce new regulations prior to implementation, and they are often unequal in application and subject to sudden change. For example, the president announced the drafting of a new constitution during a speech at Asmara Stadium where tens of thousands of supporters gathered to celebrate the country’s 23rd Independence Day anniversary. In addition, the government neither publishes accounts of its decision making process nor offers a public comment period for proposed laws or regulations.' (USA PRD p. 179)

Eritrea, a country with little or no legislative scrutiny, dysfunctional parliament, with unknown sources of defence income, no publicly accessible internal and external audits, cannot be expected to disclose information on asset disposal controls/scrutiny. Never has the government disclosed reports of independent and transparent scrutiny on asset disposal to the public via government controlled media.

While there is an external auditing body, the Office of the Auditor General, it is not clear that it is functioning (or how it functions) or that it extends to defence spending.

Researcher4112: Interviewee 7 stated that due to lack of publicly accessible information, it is not possible to provide account figures regarding military expenditures. He added that such information is unavailable from either government or any other sources. The percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year that is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services is not known.

According to a US State Department report, &quoute;The [Government of the State of Ethiopia] does not publish a national budget or national accounts.&quoute;

A country with a dysfunctional parliament (see source 2) cannot hold parliamentary debate on national issues, including programmes concerning annual accounts of the military, the police, intelligence and other security segments and more. A country that does not provide access to audit reports of its annual accounts of the security sector cannot have a government structure in place for a crucial oversight role.

Therefore, it is difficult for the public, in the case of Eritrea, to discern the percentages of defence and security expenditure.

Researcher4112: In Eritrea the legislative body is not given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence. The reason behind this is the fact the national assembly does not function as it should (see USA PDA).

The main legislative body of the Eritrean government, supposedly, is the National Assembly. The G15, an opposition group, in an open letter to all members of the PFDJ, stated that the National Assembly has no committees, internal rules and guidelines, it does not convene every six months as stipulated in Proclamation 37/1993 (see background information below). Their complaints are still relevant today.

The government does not publish a national budget or national accounts for any department, including security and intelligence.

Background: In May 2001, 15 members of the 75-member PFDJ central council, former ministers and including one former vice-president, issued an open letter criticising several of Isayas’s actions as “illegal and unconstitutional.” The “Group of 15” (G-15) letter demanded that the president convenes the PFDJ’s governing bodies. On September 18 and 19, 2001 the government arrested 11 of the G-15. The rest remain in exile (HRW, 2009)

According to African Economic Outlook, 'Parliament has not been convened for over a decade, and all laws are issued by proclamation from the Executive Branch. The government sees itself as a revolutionary movement and does not publish accounts of its decision-making process nor offer a period of public comment or scrutiny for new law proposals or regulations. Often, the central and regional governments do not co-ordinate policies and procedures, thus adding to a seeming lack of transparency in conducting business. The state’s growing role in commercial activities, in attempts to control the economy, and the lack of a transparent regulatory environment could undermine investor confidence.'

Assessor response to reviewer comments:

I agree with the reviewer's statement that: &quoute;Eritrea does not have functioning parliament since February 2002 (for the about 13 years). Any discussion of the role of parliaments in Eritrea is inevitably meaningless, because there is no such institution in the first place.&quoute;

Researcher4112: There are no audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector that are made available to the public in Eritrea. There is no information on any secret programmes provided to the legislature and are subsequently became subject to parliamentary debate. Besides, the Eritrean National Assembly has not functioned effectively on its founding principles, especially since 1998. It has not called a formal assembly meeting since 2002 (Tesfagiorgis).

Excessive government secrecies have prohibited the Eritrean public, in general, and its research community in particular, to understand the measure of the scale of resources absorbed by military and intelligence activities.

Researcher4112: In Eritrea, there is no evidence to suggest that off-budget military expenditure is permitted according to the laws of the country. However, reports indicate that in practice, 'the PFDJ and the state control absolutely the private sector, co-owning the main financial and commercial institutions and running most industrial and agricultural enterprises and supporting services' (ICG). This would make it easy for the government to operate through the 'back-door' channels. The party has an enormous portfolio of commercial and industrial interests and is the sole owner of, or senior partner in, a wide range of trade, financial services, transport, construction and other industrial enterprises (ibid).

The government uses military-run business activities to generate off-budget revenue. Most of the economic enterprises of any significance are controlled by the PFDJ or the military and are not subject to financial oversight, including the mining sector.

Given the strong executive decision-making culture within the Eritrean government, it is highly possible that military spending is either partly or mostly financed from dedicated accounts for natural resource revenues. No one knows how revenues earned from extractive industry are being ustilised.

Statistical data by which Eritrea’s macroeconomic stability might be assessed are either non-existent or unreliable, as the country has not published a budget since independence (BTI).

Assessor response to reviewer comments:
The Constitution of Eritrea, Chapter 2, Article 12. National Defence and Security, (http://www.eritrean-embassy.se/government-agencies/eritrea-constitution/), states that 'The defence and security forces shall be competent and be subject to and accountable under the law'. While this is true in law, I agree that the score should not change because of how little accountability there is in practice. This is also in line with peer reviewer 2 comments.

Researcher4112: In the absence of an elected functioning parliament, there is no public review of Eritrea's governmental expenditures nor is information publicly available on Eritrea's military expenditures. Information on military expenditures is not disseminated even within the Eritrean government (interviewee 7).

According to Foreign Policy and Government Guide (source 3), there are strong indications that Eritrea has significant off-budget sources of income that were used in 1999 for military purposes. These sources included the sale of interest-free war bonds.

The government requires its diaspora population to pay 2% of their income but it does not disclose information how that amount is spent. For instance, during the Badme war of 1998, the Economist reported that the government collected around USD 400 million for the war effort. Parts of these funds are thought to have been used to purchase MIG 29s from the Ukrainians. The Eritrean diaspora continues to pay the 2% diaspora tax to this day.

Researcher4112: A search in government media and printed press did not produce any evidence on how information concerning national security is managed in the country.

According to interviewee 7, in Eritrea the structures and powers of government is not clearly defined. He added that one is aware of the fact that various security agencies do exist in the country - the military, police, security, and intelligence authorities, and their respective affiliated agencies. However, the public is not aware of the laws and regulations applicable to those authorities and their oversight bodies and internal accountability mechanisms.

It is common knowledge that there are no democratic means in place to obtain information that is crucial to evaluate and control the expenditure of public funds. There is no information on gross overall budgets and basic expenditure information for such authorities. Basically, national security in general is out of the public view.

Considering the fact that information classification is of vital importance to the national security of the country, one can assume that Eritrea adheres to some principles that guide the country regarding its intelligence and on protection for unauthorised disclosures of national security. However, one cannot find any information on whether Eritrea has an information commissioner or someone comparable or other oversight bodies and mechanisms.

Eritrea is under the control of a network of generals ruled by the president. The country has been divided into five military zones, headed by generals who have become the most important figures – after Isaias – in Eritrea (source 4; ICG - p 15). The ICG report states that &quoute;All are under the direct control of the president but have steadily built their own networks of loyalty and interests and appear to have gained significant independence. &quoute;This network regime structure is, according to a UN Security Council Report, designated to conduct covert regional intelligence operations, maintain an illicit international revenue collection and procurement apparatus and service a private armed force loyal to the President’s inner circle.

Under such circumstances, it is fair to say that utter secrecy is exercised and there is little to no level of transparency.

Assessor response to reviewers:

I agree with the statement by the reviewer that &quoute;everything that has to do with national security classified, and it is done in an opaque and non-transparent way.&quoute;

In addition, information from the 2013 GI assessment provides useful historical context: &quoute;As early as 1995, the various Ministries e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under Petros Solomon, had initiated procedures to establish regulations for &quoute;Classfied&quoute; and &quoute;Unclassified&quoute; information. Following the 1998 war and the dissenting ministers, one would assume that there was a reversion to tradition of democratic-centralism where bureaucratic decisions were overseen either by PFDJ officials or the Office of the President.&quoute;

Researcher4112: Eritrean defence and security institutions likely have beneficial ownership of many key businesses in Eritrea – in agriculture, forestry, fishing, animal husbandry, mining and minerals, industry and manufacturing, energy, services, tourism, banking and finance. There is no transparency regarding the details of their operations and finances. Furthermore, the BTI 2014 report states that unlimited-term national service requirements force working-age persons to perform labour for very little remuneration for government and military enterprises.

According to Connell and Killion, the banking system in Eritrea is dominated by three major institutions that are owned by the government - the Bank of Eritrea, the Commercial Bank of Eritrea, and the Housing and Commerce Bank of Eritrea (owned by PFDJ, the ruling party). PFDJ also controls Himbol Financial Services (foreign exchange). There are no private banks in Eritrea. Though no evidence was found to indicate that the military owns these banking institutions, this information is still relevant given the highly-militarised nature of the regime.

Kibreab (source 2) states that Office of Economic Affairs holds and manages share-capital investment, including movable and immovable assets held by PFDJ (the government party). He added that PFDJ plays a dominant role in the national economy through ownership of a large number of firms engaged in nearly every important aspect of economic activity. For instance, all the Fenkil garages located in Asmara, Massawa, Keren, Dekemhare, Tessenei were taken over by the Ministry of Defence during the border war with Ethiopia (Kibreab).

Parastatals are a central part of the military patronage system, and conscripted troops are often used as a source of labour for them. According to an ICG report (source 4): &quoute;To secure their loyalty and protect himself from internal dissent, the president bestowed increasing favours from the state, both financial and material, on high ranking officers, thereby creating enormous corruption within the EDF. National service is used as a source of free, forced labour for “parastatal” farms or companies directly in the hands of individual generals.&quoute;

Assessor response to reviewers:

As to whether mining companies are owned by the military, I could find information that the State partially owns companies, but not direct evidence that the military does. For example, the Bisha mine is operated by the Bisha Mining Shareholders Corporation (BMSC), of which is (according to Martin Plaut, source below) 40 per cent is owned by the State-owned Eritrean National Mining Corporation (ENAMCO); the remaining 60 per cent is owned by the Canadian company, Nevsun.

It is unclear whether the military has ownership of the company through the BMSC. However, according to the UN Commission findings, the military is involved in its operations, with conscripts forced to work in the mines.

In December 2014 the Guardian reported that, &quoute;Three Eritrean refugees have filed a lawsuit against a Canadian mining firm over claims that it conspired with the Eritrean government to force them and other conscripted workers to work at a copper mine for long hours while receiving little pay and living in squalid conditions.&quoute;

The same UN Commission report (source below) finds that &quoute;military and party representatives in particular have abused their authority to seize land, houses and businesses for their own profit.&quoute;

I response Nevsun Resources released a report that found no evidence of forced labour or human rights violations the miner was been accused of by the United Nations in June 2014. One of the authors of the study, produced by LKL International Consulting, told Canadian Press the UN allegations of forced labour dealt with the construction phase of the mine, while his assessments started after the mine was already operational in 2013. &quoute;I've been able to validate what's been happening 2013 onwards, and I have seen absolutely no evidence of national service workers being used by the different Eritrean contractors,&quoute; human rights lawyers and co-author of the Nevsun report was quoted as saying. The use of conscripted labour in Eritrea’s mining sector was first reported by Human Rights Watch in 2013.

Sources:

Martin Plaut, &quoute;Eritrea: UN Commission details forced labour at Nevsun’s Bisha mine&quoute; June 2015 https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2015/06/08/eritrea-un-commission-details-forced-labour-at-nevsuns-bisha-mine/

A/HRC/29/42 “Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea”, Human Rights Council Twenty-ninth session, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/114/50/PDF/G1511450.pdf?OpenElement

Researcher4112: The assessor found no evidence in government media to demonstrate that there are transparent and independent bodies that scrutinise military-owned businesses.

The UN commission report states that &quoute;military and party representatives in particular have abused their authority to seize land, houses and businesses for their own profit.&quoute; (source 3) Little information is available publicly about state- and military-owned businesses. According to the CIA World Factbook report, &quoute;Since the conclusion of the Ethiopian-Eritrea war in 2000, the government has expanded use of military and party-owned businesses to complete President ISAIAS's development agenda.&quoute;

Context: According to the US State Department, the Eritrean government continues to experience problems with consistent government commitment to structural reform. The report states “the country performs poorly with regard to public finance management. Its legal and regulatory frameworks are underdeveloped, and its judicial system is not sufficiently experienced or independent to protect the sanctity of contracts.”
.
According to the same report, Eritrea does not have a functioning parliament, and laws are issued by proclamation from the executive branch. The government does not operate a clearly-organised regulatory system. New regulations are simply announced prior to implementations. The government neither publishes accounts of its decision-making process nor offers a public comment period for proposed laws or regulations. In short, the government and by extension the military does not make use of any oversight system of a recognised international standard.

Researcher4112: It is not clear if private enterprise is prohibited for military personnel. The BTI 2014 report states that 'due to the distortions caused in the command economy, illegal activities by military officers including contraband trade increased sharply and were tolerated by the government'. The report also refers to unlimited-term national service requirements that force working-age persons to perform labour for very little remuneration for government and military enterprises. Therefore, the government does profit from such activities.

According to a UN Commission report (source 7) &quoute;military and party representatives in particular have abused their authority to seize land, houses and businesses for their own profit.&quoute;

The UN Monitoring Group reported on the role of Eritrean officials in the human trafficking rings operating in the eastern part of the Sudan, Egypt and Israel and has also identified a Swiss bank account that had been used to collect ransom payments extorted from the families of those being trafficked (S/2013/440).

Parastatal companies are a central part of the military patronage system, and important roles can be given to officers as a form of reward. Conscripted troops are often used as a source of labour for them. According to an ICG report (source 8): &quoute;To secure their loyalty and protect himself from internal dissent, the president bestowed increasing favours from the state, both financial and material, on high ranking officers, thereby creating enormous corruption within the EDF. National service is used as a source of free, forced labour for “parastatal” farms or companies directly in the hands of individual generals.&quoute;


For context:

There is also evidence of possibly unorthodox contributions to the defence ministry through the 'diaspora tax' scheme. The 'diaspora tax' was enforced by Proclamation No. 67/1995 'to Provide for the Collection of Tax from Eritreans who live abroad and earn an income'. The Eritrean government has systematically forced its diaspora citizens to contribute to the government funds through its 2 % ‘Diaspora tax’ and a national defence levy to the government in Asmara. If one fails to pay the diaspora tax he/she will not be allowed to access any services from the Eritrean authorities. This tax is in addition to any taxes paid in host nations.

This practice has been deemed illegal by countries including the US and UK.The UN resolution 2023 states that Eritrea should: “cease using extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means to collect taxes outside of Eritrea from its nationals or other individuals of Eritrean descent.” According to the assessor Eritrea claimed that the UN investigators were biased and politically motivated by way of response. The UN resolution called for an end to Eritrea's tax on expats. However, the Eritrean government continues to raise finances for the Eritrean armed forces by taxing the diaspora (S/2013/440). Eritrea was warned by the FCO it must comply with the resolution to desist from illicit means of collecting revenue from members of the Eritrean diaspora in the UK (The Guardian).

Researcher4112: The assessor found no evidence of speeches and statements made by high defence officials concerning anti-corruption and integrity measures in government media. In general, one does not hear stories related to anti-corruption authorities, anti-corruption laws, anti-corruption investigation (very rare), anti-corruption prevention, anti-corruption education, anti-corruption cases. But there is no evidence that they are acted upon.

Occasionally, the Eritrea president gives interviews on government media concerning corruption, human trafficking and other concerns in other countries. In March 2014 he gave an extensive interview regarding corruption in South Sudan. Corruption in Eritrea was not mentioned (source 2). The president’s interview shows that he has some understanding of the effects of corruption on the day-to-day life of average citizen and the resulting loss of public confidence in the integrity of government and public institution.

There is no further evidence of any commitment by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs.

Local and international NGOs who could platform this type of statement by focusing on improving accountability in the provision of government services are banned in Eritrea.

Researcher4112: Through the provisions made by the Special Court (source 5), the law provides criminal penalties, including prosecution, for corruption by officials. However, as trials (and their outcomes) in the special court are not open to the public, the assessor could not confirm if these measures are effective. According to the US State Department, corruption among officials occurs with impunity. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea alleged that Eritrea is experiencing a deeply entrenched culture of corruption and its military leaders are involved in human trafficking.The Special Court issues directives to other courts regarding corruption matters.

There is also a Military Court which has jurisdiction over penal cases relating to military officials. It does not afford the right to appeal. Recent reporting (6) indicates that the court is under the control of military officers and have become increasingly inactive. The same report states that military officers and high-ranking officials of parties have enriched themselves and operate with impunity which indicates the lack of independence and activity of the court(s).

The justice system is in general tightly controlled by the regime and is itself complicit in rights violations. The UN commission of inquiry on human rights report is worth quoting at length: &quoute; Judges are appointed, reassigned and dismissed at the will of the President and are directed in their actions and influenced in their decisions by members of the PFDJ and of the army. The judicial system has also been affected by the creation of a parallel structure, the Special Court, which, in practice, presides over and rules on all kinds of crimes, operating with clear disregard for the most basic safeguards related to due process. Its judges are senior military officers without legal training, apparently directly appointed by the President and directly accountable to him.&quoute;

The report paints a grim picture of the rights of conscripts into national service, and the lack of accountability for senior officers accused not only of corruption, but of human rights violations: &quoute;The duration of national service is indefinite, its conditions violate international standards and conscripts are severely underpaid . As such, it is an institution where slavery-like practices take place. Conscripts are at the mercy of their superiors, who exercise control and command over their subordinates without restriction in a way that violates human rights and without ever being held accountable. Conscripts are regularly subjected to punishment amounting to torture and ill-treatment, during both military training and life in the army. Women and girls are at a high risk of rape and other forms of sexual violence in all areas of national service, and particularly in military training camps, where they are often forced into concubinage by superiors in the camp.&quoute;

Context: There is confusion as who does what within the Eritrean government. Obscurity of the National Assembly, prominence of the PFDJ, and the top echelon of Eritrean Defence Forces having direct access to the president, has created a system that revolves around the President’s office (interviewee 2). Certain individuals and groups hold set of responsibilities parallel to those of appointed government officials creating puzzling and informal channels linked to the President rather formal institutions (ibid). If one superimposes corruption issues on such a system then they turn into ploys. Corruption charges are used to either silence critics or imprison opponents. So it is difficult to judge if there are effective and transparent measures in place against corruption in the country.

Given the special context of the

Researcher4112: Eritrea has the Special Court which is set up to combat corruption-related crimes. However, there are no mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel to facilitate corruption reporting (interviewee 2). There are no empowered civil society organisations or institutions with expertise that address whistleblowing, corruption, fraud, or illegality in Eritrea. Whistle-blowing is an unknown phenomenon in Eritrea (ibid) and there is no evidence that Eritrea is among the countries that have passed comprehensive and dedicated legislation to protect public sector whistle-blowers.

The Special Court is, according to IIJD, one of the most corrupt and inhumane court systems in the world. In a Special Court “the plaintiff is the government (the judge), the interrogator or prosecutor is the government (the judge), and the verdict is given by the government (the judge)” (ibid).

According to the assessor's knowledge of the country, it is hard to imagine how corruption could be challenged in Eritrea where fear would be a significant factor for whistle-blowers to overcome. For whistle-blowers to exposes illegal activities that take place in government establishments they would have to be comfortable with taking severe risks, particularly when there is no legal protection against reprisals. Eritrea is a country where freedom of information is virtually non-existent. Normally, organisations are mostly owned and run by the government. Moreover, there are pro-government informants tasked with reporting on dissenters everywhere.

Researcher4112: The selection process of government officials, including top defence and security officials, is the responsibility of the president (interviewee 2). As a result, there is no evidence of any special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions. There is no evidence to suggest the system employs high ranking personnel on the basis of meritocracy.

There is special attention paid to the background of candidates. It is, for example a pre-requisite for those in high ranking posts to have been a former EPLF fighter. Government newspapers are filled with names of former EPLF fighters in high government positions (source 1). The criteria for those in sensitive posts is based on loyalty to the ruling elite, the party and of course, the president himself (interviewee 2).

Appointments are rarely announced on government media and appointees do not go through confirmation hearings. The same process applies to side-lining officials, referred to as ‘mdiskal’ (freezing), which is common in Eritrea as a form of humiliation or punishment to those who fail to demonstrate utter loyalty (interviewee 3).

According to Freedom House, &quoute;High-ranking officers and government officials who question the president's judgment over minor issues often find themselves subjected to the practice of midiskal (freezing), in which they are removed from their posts and kept on salary but not permitted to work.&quoute; (source 5). This is supported by the International Crisis Group: &quoute;To be “frozen” (midiskal), is the Eritrean term for the unlawful dismissal, sidelining, or neutralisation of potentially critical regime members.&quoute;

Researcher4112: The number of military personnel and their civilian counterparts is not known. Although the information supplied by NationMaster may shed some light on military statistics, the data is obtained second-hand. There is no verifiable information on manpower fit to serve and manpower currently available.

Considering the size of Eritrean population, the country’s military forces are large; Eritrea's army is allegedly one of the largest in Africa; every able bodied man and woman is required to serve ostensibly for 1½ years but in practice the government prolongs service indefinitely (HRW).

According to the Bloomberg article, conscripts to the army, public services and industry have been “permanently mobilized” since 1998.

External sources (see source 5) have estimated the size of the armed forces to be 600,000.

Despite commitments to demobilise in 2000, there is evidence that this has not taken place (source 6).

Researcher4112: The pay rates of military and civilian personnel are not openly published. Those who are privy to such information - pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel - are not at liberty to disclose it.

Context that sheds light on how the majority of EPLF fighters transitioned to a civilian life and regular army:
The pay rates of military and civilian personnel were never openly published (interviewee 2). However, most former combatants, who constituted the country’s initial post-independence defence forces, were paid in accordance to a point system (interviewee 2).

Not all fighters joined the military. Some assumed civilian jobs to administer the day-to-day running of the government and various government institutions and others were let go (interviewee 3, for example, chose to leave). All former combatants, whether they joined the military or not, were paid in accordance to the point system established by a task force. The criteria included education, seniority in the struggle, seniority in responsibility etc. It was relatively a fair system albeit meagre wages. Similar system was pursued during the distribution of military ranks in 1994.

The UN describes the level of pay as &quoute;ludicrous&quoute; (source 3) but do not provide details on amounts or systems.

Human Rights Watch reports, in its World Report 2013, the following: &quoute;National service keeps most young Eritreans in perpetual bondage. Although a decree mandating compulsory national service limits service to 18 months, in practice the government prolongs service indefinitely. National service conscripts are poorly fed and receive inadequate medical care. Eritrean refugees describe them as emaciated. Their pay (less than US$30 per month) is insufficient to provide sustenance for a family.&quoute; The figure ($30 / month) is obtained from individuals who fled the country; it is not a figure that is publicly announced by the government.

Researcher4112: Pay for defence personnel is meagre and inflation is high. There are likely to be shortcomings in the clarity or transparency of the payment system. Workers rights are completely deficient, as described in the US State Department report noted above.The UN Commission Report report paints a grim picture of the rights of conscripts into national service, and the lack of accountability for senior officers accused not only of corruption, but of human rights violations: &quoute;The duration of national service is indefinite, its conditions violate international standards and conscripts are severely underpaid . As such, it is an institution where slavery-like practices take place.&quoute;

According to interviewee 2, there is no evidence that members of the military have gone without pay for any significant period of time. The payment system may be well established but no report is published regarding payroll matters.

There is no evidence to suggest that basic pay is done in a systemic, non discretionary manner, and the payment system is not published.

Researcher4112: No human resource records of the Eritrean military are accessible to the public. The assessor could not therefore confirm if there is an objective and established appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level.

Interviewee 2 noted that high ranking military figures as well as their subordinates are all former EPLF fighters; all the Major Generals, Brigadier Generals, Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, Captains are all former EPLF fighters. The infantry brigades, commando divisions and mechanized brigades are also all led by the same group (interviewee 2). Selection criteria is therefore based on EPLF experience.

Interviewee 2 also mentioned that in 1994, the government used a point-system in order to transition from a freedom fighter-based set-up to regular army - a point system that was based on years of service (as freedom fighters), recommendations from the veteran fighter community (former superiors and colleagues), level of education etc. However that was over two decades ago, and there is no EDF (Eritrean Defence Froces) Personnel Management literature that highlights the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level currently.

The foundation of Eritrean Defence Forces rests upon a citizen army raised through a programme of compulsory national service. As such one would expect to see many young officers from the non-EPLF group of recruits. However, according to the assessor, in practice, this is not the case.

The Head of the Office of the National Security of the State of Eritrea, the deputy and others at high levels are all appointed by the President (interviewee 2). One example is Brigadier General Abraha Kassa, former EPLF fighter, is the Director of National Security for Eritrea; and very little is known about him, let alone the criteria of his and his colleagues' appointments. The UN report (source 2) indicates that General Abraha Kassa has been in charge of the National Security Office since 1993, when it was created--he is known to be a regime loyalist.

Assessor response to peer reviewers:

Agree with peer reviewer, score reduced.

Researcher4112: The assessor could not find evidence of formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process in Eritrea. Following the harsh political crackdown in 2001, the PFDJ, with the military in tow, positioned itself to become the country's uncontested authority (see source 2). The notion of meritocracy therefore does not apply neatly to the Eritrean context in which when administrative life revolves tightly around the PFDJ, itself derived from former EPLF fighters. The military is in the hands of the ‘trusted’ generals who were former fighters. Moreover, the military leaders are strong PFDJ members.

The interviewee, who served the government for many years in various high level capacities, stated that there was no such policy that they knew of within the civil service. Moreover, they do not know how or why they were hired to do the work they were employed for they stated they were simply assigned to the role, but without any documentation or paperwork.

Researcher4112: There are no publicly known rules and regulations specific to bribery to avoid compulsory conscription in Eritrea. And there is no evidence to suggest that there are effective procedures in place to act as a deterrent against bribery.

Eritrea has a Special Court which according to the Home Office was established, among other things, to deter the spread of corruption by bringing perpetrators to justice. Article 37 of the 1995 Proclamation states a list of penalties to those who avoid conscription, but it makes no mention of penalty against bribes.

Citizens are burdened with the endless national service (there is no set end date for it and often extends indefinitely) National Service is the most widespread system that touches on many aspects of life in Eritrea today – every Eritrean citizen from 18 to 50 years of age has the obligation of taking part in it. The UN report (source 9) has likened the national service to slavery.

Therefore, the National Service has become the breeding ground for corruption today. In order to escape from this bondage Eritreans in national service and military camps have learned to buy their way out of the system by bribing the military leaders. The military leaders have also gotten used to this lucrative enterprise. That is why the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea and others cited allegations that Eritrea is experiencing a deeply entrenched culture of corruption, and its military leaders are involved in human trafficking.

Thousands of Eritreans avoid national service by fleeing the country (source 6 and 7). Interviewee 2 noted that bribes are exchanged between recruits and military officials to avoid conscription and to facilitate the movement of people out of the country (HRW also supports this suggestion). Government press does not report what actions or punishments are applied when bribery occurs to facilitate this movement.

The interviewee added that in the past the president has admitted the existence (in small scale) of corrupt military officials who worked within illicit cells that assisted conscripts to leave the country. He mentioned some of them acquired passports and visas through illegal means to escape national service. He also mentioned measures the government took against such illegal activities. The contents of this speech or when it was announced could not be verified.

Assessor response to reviewers:

Peer reviewer 2 could be right to state that bribery within military circles is common (to avoid conscription). However, I would find it difficult to prove that it is done with the acquiescence of high-ranking officials.

Researcher4112: With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, one cannot find evidence in a form of policy that one should not gain preferred postings in the recruitment process by bribing officials.

Interviewee 2 stated that bribery is used widely to extend and obtain favours between recruits and officials. According to the assessor's network in Eritrea, the practice among those with power or influence of favouring relatives, friends, or those who provide bribes is common in Eritrea. Many, including members of the military, have trouble earning an adequate salary in the inflation-ridden economy. Under such circumstances those with power or influence boost their income through bribery.

The Special Court is designed to look into corruption matters of any kind; it provides for criminal penalties for corruption by officials (source 3). However, there is no evidence that, in practice, there are appropriate procedures in place to deal with bribery. No evidence was found in government media of officials being dismissed from the public service, fined, demoted, being given written warnings being prosecuted for example due to attempts to influence the recruiting process of conscripts.

Context: Eritrea is a highly militarised society shaped by its armed struggle and run and controlled by its former fighters. The presence of military mind-set, shaped by a sense of duty and obligation, which was inherited from the old fighters and imposed on the new generation, is still a way of life in the country. As a result of that citizens are burdened with the endless national service. National Service is the most widespread system that touches on many aspects of life in Eritrea today - every Eritrean citizen from 18 to 50 years of age has the obligation of taking part in the national service. Therefore, National Service, due to its sheer size and harsh realities and due to the fact that it keeps most young Eritreans in unending cycle of servitude, has become the breeding ground for corruption today. In order to escape it Eritreans in national service and military camps, have learned to buy their way out of the system by bribing the military leaders. The military leaders are accustomed to this lucrative enterprise.

Researcher4112: Interviewee 2 noted that there is evidence to suggests that ghost soldiers exist within Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF). His/her assertion was in reference to members of the National Service who are made exempt from taking active part in the programme. The members of the National Service pay their officers their salaries and in return are allowed not to show up for duty, enriching their commanders and hollowing out the EDF (interviewee 2). The interviewee continued, explaining that 'military superiors extend 'favours' to young soldiers because of 'other duties' young people are engaged in or or 'credible reasons' they put together. Some of the excuses used are: 'Medical exemptions', 'sick parents', 'unavoidable work', 'sole provider' ...etc. In exchange for such favours, the official pockets the salary of these members.'

The interlocutor suggested that evidence can be obtained from young Eritrean refugees who are escaping from the country in thousands. Thousands of Eritreans flee to neighbouring countries on a monthly basis to avoid military service (source 2).

There is no information as to how up-to-date the military rosters are to reflect 'ghost soldiers', evaders, or deserters.

Given there appears to be no clear distinction between chains of command and payment, that adds to the risk of such phenomenon occurring and continuing.

Researcher4112: There is no evidence to demonstrate that chains of command are separated from chains of payment. As far as chains of payment is concerned there is no published information/policy on how it is conducted.

The Eritrean government, and its institutions, are characterised by a top-down, regimented management style. In general, within the military, personnel give orders to those directly below them in the chain of command and receive orders only from those directly above them. Former government officials have mentioned various forms of interference in their departments by the president’s office. For instance, the authority of the Defence Minister can be tempered by the role of regional commander who happens to have closer ties to the president (interviewee 2). The President's office can disrupt the chain of command within the finance ministry at any time (interviewee 7).

No public information was available to further comment on the interviewees' statements.

Researcher4112: The assessor could not ascertain whether a Code of Conduct exists for all military and civilian personnel that includes guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and so forth. The only hint of such legislation is in the Eritrean Constitution which notes the need to have a code of conduct with regards to the administration of justice (chapter VI). However, it should be noted that the Constitution, while it has been ratified, has not been implemented.

Context: The assumption Armed Forces may or should follow a Code of Conduct consisting of rules that all Armed Forces will actively follow and uphold is a value of transparency, performance and accountability that is at odds with the secretive mode of operating that characterises the Eritrean state and military. (source 2)

Assessor response to reviewers:

I do not agree with peer reviewer 2. Considering the existence of Military Court, Special Court it is likely there is a code of conduct of some sort that keeps an eye on some rogue players. Tronvoll and Mekonnen discuss the structure and functions of the Military Court and the Special Court. From their discussion one can infer the existence of some kind of centralised order, albeit not transparent. Dan Connell and Tom Killion describe the Special Courts (source 4).

The score of 1 therefore remains.

Researcher4112: There is no evidence found of a Code of Conduct for military and civilian defence personnel which covers conduct with respect to corruption and no evidence that breaches of such a code, if it exists, are dealt with.

Context: Source 1 stated that ‘one of the official justifications for the establishment of Special Court is to deter the spread of corruption by bringing perpetrators to justice’. They state that the Court has jurisdiction over theft, embezzlement and corruption; it does not even have ‘to follow the basic legal principles that ensure fair and just trial for the accused’. Outcomes of prosecutions made at the Eritrean Special Court are not made public. The Special Court is, according to IIJD, &quoute;one of the most corrupt and inhumane court systems in the world&quoute;. In a Special Court “the plaintiff is the government (the judge), the interrogator or prosecutor is the government (the judge), and the verdict is given by the government (the judge)” (ibid).

According to Source 3, the judges of Special Court are senior military officers with no legal training. In addition, the President’s Office has power to allocate budget for the Court making it a judiciary organ under an executive branch. Their recruitment to the court is likely to be based on personal affiliations and loyalty to the president, and their proven toughness in disciplining their troops.

According to source 2, the government has always struggled to exercise legal restraints. He notes, 'Teame Beyene, who became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court came to grief because he protested against executive interference with the judicial branch. He was summarily dismissed by the president'.

Researcher4112: There is no evidence to suggest that Eritrea conducts regular anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel. An exhaustive search in government newspapers and online did not produce evidence of such training programmes.

The assessment in 2013 found that some anti-corruption seminars had taken place, and based this on an interview source. The assessor found that: &quoute;Under the auspices of the PFDJ , &quoute;Anti-Corruption&quoute; seminars are conducted that are required attendance for members. Most citizens are card carrying members of the PFDJ - the former EPLF. In most cases, anti-corruption is interpreted to mean anti-bribery types of behaviours, but it also serves to create a political atmosphere of intimidation.&quoute; As this was based on an interview, this year's assessor could not confirm it, so the score remains a 0.

Researcher4112: There are no proper judicial processes to look into corruption apart from the Special Court of Eritrea which is not bound by a code of criminal procedure or a penal code, nor by precedents set by earlier court decisions (source 1, p.50). Judges in the special courts are senior military officers, most of whom with little or no legal experience (source 2). According to a former Chief Justice who was unceremoniously dismissed by the president (source 5), the Special Court can overturn previously decided cases, provides unbinding powers to the judges and denies the convicted the right of appeal. He concludes that the establishment of special court was an indirect attack and affront to the courts.The assessor found no evidence of prosecutions of defence services personnel by the Special Court in recent years.

Theoretically, judicial policies do exist in Eritrea by they are not independent. For instance, the Special Court was created to have an exclusive jurisdiction on offences related to corruption, theft and embezzlement. The President’s analysis in defence of the Special Court was well presented (48 Questions within 6 Hours). However, according to Tronvoll, ‘despite the existence in general of a theoretically adequate judicial framework in Eritrea, the value of the Constitution, supporting laws and international conventions are null and void as long as the authorities do not implement them or enforce them in practice’ (p.11). Through the provisions made by the Special Court (source 5), the law provides criminal penalties, including prosecution, for corruption by officials. However, trials (and their outcomes) in the special court are not open to the public.

While the results of Special Court prosecutions are not public, a few cases have come to public knowledge. One involved a senior EPLF cadre, a former representative to the UK, and at the time of his arrest in 1997, Eritrea's ambassador to China. in 2000 court accused and convicted him of embezzling government funds and abuse of power. He was not allowed to defend himself against his accusers. A 2002 report stated that he was imprisoned for political reasons (source 1, p 51).

There is also a Military Court which has jurisdiction over penal cases relating to military officials. It does not afford the right to appeal. Recent reporting (7) indicates that the court is under the control of military officers and has become increasingly inactive. The same report states that military officers and high-ranking officials of parties have enriched themselves and operated with impunity which indicates the lack of independence and activity of the court(s).

IIJD (source 3) stated that Eritrea, as far as corruption is concerned, needs impartial and independent anti-corruption agency vested with the power and having the resources to freely investigate allegations of corruption.

Researcher4112: There are no publicly known measures in place to discourage facilitation payments in Eritrea. Although the government tried to abolish facilitation payments by disbanding the networks of ‘delalo’ during the mid-90s, the practice still exists (source 1). Employing the services of ‘delalo’, the Tigrinya word for either brokers or facilitators, is quite common in Eritrea. It is commonly used to secure or speed up routine actions, or to expedite administrative processes, usually undertaken by public officials, such as issuing permits, providing services or releasing goods held in customs (source 1). Residents of Asmara tell stories of the difficulty of navigating through tough government institutions which 'require the services of brokers or facilitators' who are viewed as the experts on bypassing government bureaucracy (interviewee 1) .

Researcher4112: The assessor found no evidence of the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations or of its recognition of corruption as an issue in operations.

Researcher4112: The assessor found no evidence to suggest that there is training on corruption issues for commanders at all levels.

The assessment in 2013 found that some anti-corruption seminars had taken place, and based this on an interview source. The assessor found that: &quoute;Under the auspices of the PFDJ , &quoute;Anti-Corruption&quoute; seminars are conducted that are required attendance for members. Most citizens are card carrying members of the PFDJ - the former EPLF. In most cases, anti-corruption is interpreted to mean anti-bribery types of behaviours, but it also serves to create a political atmosphere of intimidation.&quoute; As this was based on an interview, this year's assessor could not confirm it, so the score remains a 0.

No information could be found on corrupt behaviour of Eritrean troops on operations. There have been reports of desertion (see source 3), though it was not clear from the report whether this was on operations.

Researcher4112: Interviewee 4 is of the opinion that there are many trained professionals who are capable of spotting and monitoring corruption risks within the administration (so, by extension, also while on deployment); however, they do not dare to confront the PFDJ with irregularities. It is highly unlikely that a group of trained professionals are explicitly deployed in military operations. Most officials have strong political connections with corrupt practices.

Context: More broadly, Gaim Kibreab explained the government’s corrupt mechanisms in chapter 6 of his book – PFDJ’s Dominance of the Economy and the Consequences.

Researcher4112: The assessor did not find any evidence guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions. A search for guidelines, staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting in government newspapers produced no results.

Context: According the US State Department, Eritrea maintains a command economy with PFDJ activities predominating over private enterprise. PFDJ enterprises are controlled by the government (source 2). Many key firms are owned by the PFDJ party and the military. Contracts are affected by such a setup. Eritrea is not a party to international anti-corruption agreements.

Eritrea performs poorly with regard to public finance management generally (source 1). The US State Department report also notes that ‘its legal and regulatory frameworks are underdeveloped, and its judicial system is not sufficiently experienced or independent to protect the sanctity of contracts’.

A country like Eritrea is unlikely to put heavy emphasis on producing guidelines, training its staff at international standards or address corruption risks in its contractual obligations because the government, the military and its widespread business dealings are one and the same.

Researcher4112: Very little is known of any PMCS activities in Eritrea. The assessor could not confirm if they are employed. Moreover, the assessor found no evidence to suggest that PMCs are either permitted or forbidden by law in Eritrea.

There are indications that mercenaries (which might be considered a form of PMSC) have operated in Eritrea. According to source 2, International Alert, &quoute;Although difficult to track because of the covert nature of their activities, mercenaries have been active in fighting in ... Eritrea,&quoute; among other states. The Interior Minister of Djibouti has also decried the use of Eritrean mercenaries in Djibouti (source 3)

Assessor response to peer reviewers:

The reviewer needs to present evidence that Ethiopian armed opposition group is used as a supplement to the president's own “republican guards.” There is no information to suggest there are PMCs or similar forces or industry operating in the country but score 1 has been selected to reflect this risk.

Researcher4112: In Eritrea there is no publicly disclosed legislation that covers defence and security procurement. A search in the list of proclamations and legal notices and government newspapers produced no such legislation.

Until the president made his recent announcement to abolish the ratified constitution (source 4 and 5), the 1997 Constitution was viewed as the supreme law of Eritrea. Article 12 of the defunct constitution makes a mention of 'National defence and Security'. It states that 'defence and security is rooted on the people and on their active participation, and the forces shall be subject and accountable to the law'.

To understand the national side of Eritrean legal system one can read the cited document, Law Library of Congress, which was last updated in March 2014. It starts with ‘Eritrea has a transitional government composed of legislative, executive, and judicial branches’ and mentions that the country is ruled by civil, special, and military courts and more - all theoretical. In reality the existing state of affair is totally different (see HRW mentioned below). Moreover, the report mentions that &quoute;the Eritrean Constitution (official source) ratified in 1997 and awaiting implementation, sits at the top of the hierarchy of the Eritrean laws.&quoute;

On the contrary, the HRW report states that &quoute;Eritrea has no constitution, functioning legislature, independent judiciary, elections, independent press, or nongovernmental organisations; it does not hold elections. All power is concentrated in the hands of President Isaias Afwerki, in office since 1991.&quoute; On the 23rd independence day, the president made an announcement to abolish the 1997 constitution by saying: &quoute;I would thus like to announce on this occasion that a constitution drafting process will be launched in order to chart out the political road map for the future governmental structure.&quoute; On new year's day he definitively announced the constitution is 'dead'. He said: &quoute;As everybody knows, there is no constitution ... the constitution is practically a dead document before its declaration.&quoute; (Eritrea Profile - Vol 21. No. 91)

In this context, it is therefore impossible to confirm if Eritrea has certain legislation ‘covering defence and security procurement with clauses specific to corrupt risks’.

Eritrea is under UN embargo on procurement since 2009 and that measures have recently been reinforced given the lack of compliance by the relevant authorities.

Researcher4112: It is not possible to comment on defence procurement cycle in Eritrea because information is not made available to the public.

The PFDJ continues to maximise its profits by deciding the price of the goods, controlling the supply of goods, setting high-barriers to enter the market for others (source 1). The military is the biggest customer of PFDJ. Buyers and suppliers are one and the same. All phases of the market that are present under the procurement cycle process are not transparently conducted.

Context: Eritrea’s economy is monopolised by the ruling PFDJ party. There is no economic competition to produce goods and services in the country (source 1, which remains relevant even 6 years after publication).

According to US State Department report, &quoute;most medium and large businesses in Eritrea are controlled by either the government or PFDJ. For example, in 2005 the government suspended all private construction activity, leaving only state-run firms in operation for this purpose.&quoute; The report also states that &quoute;the military and PFDJ sometimes used persons performing national service as a low-cost labour force, disrupting free competition in the labour market.&quoute;

Researcher4112: The assessor found no evidence of defence procurement oversight mechanisms.

Context: In Eritrea procurement is a major source of corruption in defence and security due to the role PFDJ businesses play in the market (source 3). The government, the military and the ruling PFDJ work together to prevail over the economic life of the country. Apart from nominal roles, small, privately owned businesses are inconsequential.

In the case of Eritrea there is no functioning parliament and no enforced legislatures to reduce corruption (source 4). All administrative functions, including procurement processes, are controlled by the PFDJ. Therefore, there is no information available regarding purchases.

According to the 1994 PFDJ Charter, building an economy that meets the needs of the people is at the forefront of its objectives. It states: &quoute;Accepting a significant role by the government is not the same as having an economy that is dominated by the government. The economy of Eritrea must be a mixed economy in which both public and private sectors co-exist&quoute; (p.15). It also notes that the PFDJ plays a role in establishing appropriate army, security and police institutions which serve public and national interests, are accountable and function openly, and are bound by a national constitution (p.26). However, as the HRW report and others make clear, Eritrea does not have a functioning constitutional charter.

Researcher4112: The assessor found no evidence that actual and potential defence purchases are made public in government sponsored newspapers or websites.

Context: One can find stories on government and pro-government websites, newspapers regarding various development related projects – construction of schools, dams, roads, bridges, wells etc. Sometimes the project cost is included.

Assessor response to reviewer comments:
Agree with both. Score of NA is not appropriate here because the question regards transparency, so score remains.

Researcher4112: Bids for work for the government and by extension the military are advertised in the advertisements section of government newspapers, Hadas Eritra and Eritrea Profile. Many of the advertisements are posted in conjunction with foreign grants received for development projects. However, the assessor noted no follow-up news in these papers concerning bid-winners or progress report for example. A search for bids concerning explicitly military related projects produced no results.

It is not known how PFDJ-owned businesses such as Hidri Trust, Red Sea Company, Himbol conduct their bidding invitations.

Little is known regarding the procedures and standards that companies are required to adhere to in Eritrea. The advertisements in government newspapers indicate that bidding is to be conducted in line with the International Competitive Bidding (ICB) procedures specified in the Global fund Guidelines (source 2 clarifies what these are).However, no further information is provided to elaborate on further processes and procedures.

There is no evidence to suggest that there are measures so that companies with prosecutions for corrupt activities are partially or totally barred from bidding.

Researcher4112: The assessor found no evidence to suggest that procurement requirements are (or are not) derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy. Procurement requirements from the government’s side are not clearly presented; the public is not privy to procurement related information. As far as the strategy for security is concerned, the government may have a security strategy in place, but this is not available and there is no evidence to suggest that it has managed to plan and implement the strategy adequately. Interviewee 2 stated that contracts are awarded in an opportunistic and underhand way.

Interviewee 7 commented that 'Certain budgetary proposals go to the president's office and then are swallowed up,' indicating that the process around them in opaque. The interviewee added that 'fraudulent phenomena are regularly observed at the highest levels of procurement leadership'.

According to an 2002 UNDP report, the contents of which remains relevant today, 'there is still a great dearth of relevant, timely and reliable economic and social information [in Eritrea]. There is no reasonably accurate data on national income, fiscal and monetary developments, balance of payments, price indices, demography and social trends’. The report also states that ‘government has not yet enacted a budgetary law and does not publish the country’s annual budget, which is an important element for more transparent and effective decision making’.

There is a dearth of information on this issue, so recent sources could not be found.There is no evidence to suggest, however, that the situation has changed.

Researcher4112: The assessor found no information to confirm whether or not defence purchases are based on clearly identified and quantified requirements.

Context: The Eritrean government is secretive and does not for example, even publish its budget. As a result, it is difficult to assess its purchases of any kind. It is also not possible to evaluate how defence purchases are formulated. Eritrea’s economy is dominated by the state and provides a difficult environment for foreign investors. The financial system remains very underdeveloped. All banks are majority-owned by the state, and private-sector involvement in the system remains limited (source 1 and 2).

Researcher4112: According to interviewee 2, defence procurement is not generally conducted in open competition. This assertion is supported by a thorough search of domestic and international media, international reports and academic articles that produced no results on this issue. A second search for any proclamations or legal notice regarding defence procurement also failed to produce any results.

Based on the fact that Eritrea faces a UN embargo on arms and related material, one cannot expect its defence procurement to be conducted openly. According to SIPRI (source 3), &quoute;the sanctions were imposed in reaction to the findings by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia that Eritrea had provided political, financial and logistical support to armed groups in Somalia and to the Eritrean refusal to withdraw its forces from disputed territory on the border with Djibouti and engage in diplomatic dialogue about this issue.&quoute;

Researcher4112: There is some evidence that Eritrea conducts competitive tenders for contracts generally, however no evidence was found that this occurs for defence procurement.

The anecdotal evidence provided below indicates that some non-defence tender boards are subject to regulations but that there is a problem implementation and decisions are not subject to strict independent audit. A thorough search in government newspapers and websites did not produce evidence that the government has put laws in place regarding both procurement and tendering procedures.

Context: For example, in the advertisement pages of Eritrea Profile, 'Invitations for Bids' are published. However, these advertisements also highlight how the tendering process lacks transparency.

One advertisement was titled, 'IFAD GRANT No. DSF-8060-ER' and tracing the advertisement to International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) revealed several problems with the composition and functions of the Tender Committee:
1. The establishment and composition of the Tender Committee: &quoute;Although the FDP has established a Tender Committee, the committee needs to be reviewed and a new one re-constituted for the purposes of the segregation of duties.&quoute;
2. &quoute; ...there was no independence of individual functions; the members of the Tender Committee were the same persons who carried out the evaluation exercises. This practice contravenes IFAD Procurement Guidelines;&quoute;
3. &quoute;The tender committee receives, opens, evaluates and deliberates on the bids for contract awards. This is contrary to 'Procurement Good Practice' and contravenes the IFAD Procurement Guidelines. In playing their roles, the players should observe independence&quoute;

The follow-up report recommended &quoute;to formally appoint the Tender Committee and reorganise it to ensure appropriate segregation of duties&quoute;; and to &quoute;establish the Tender Committee with oversight role on the whole procurement process&quoute;

Assessor response to reviewer comments:

Given the reviewer comments, and the fact that the only example that was found related to a non-defence procurement, the score has been changed to 0.

Researcher4112: A search in the list of Eritrean proclamations and legal notices found no evidence that the country has legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts. Nor did it find that the country has or wider national legislation that outlaws collusion. According to Gaim (whose conclusions remain valid in 2015), ‘with the exception of a few public works contracts awarded to Chinese multinational corporations, nearly all public works contracts are awarded to PFDJ businesses automatically, without being opened for bidding. It is impossible for the private sector to compete on equal footing with PDFJ companies and the companies owned by their protégés (pp 284-283)'.

To provide context, the government has done several things that have weakened the private sector, which has implications for their ability to operate and contract with the government. For example:
•tLicenses of many firms were withdrawn;
•tThe private firms were made to go through hoops to obtain foreign currency;
•tThe foreign currency black market fell in the hands of government exchange agents;
•tSupply of goods was monopolised by Red Se Trading Corporation.

Researcher4112: Following consultation with interviewee 7, it appears that the government developed a strategy for its procurement programme based on availability of the exclusive workforce it has at its disposal. Veteran fighters make up most of its workforce. Given their background, procurement professionals cannot be expected to perform in a range of advanced roles including engaging with suppliers to shape requirements, developing procurement strategies, running an efficient procurement process, managing contracts etc.

According to the interviewee, every procurement activity is initiated from the president's office. The interviewee added that the president, through his close aides, has direct access to PFDJ companies, and the paperwork and reports remain out of public reach.

It does not therefore seem as though procurement staff are specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery. There is no further information related to the organisation of the procurement department and whether it suffers from shortages or whether staff rotation takes place.

A review of newspaper archives made no mention of procurement staff, project and contract managers, specifically trained defence contractors, how government offices meet their obligations on reporting and delivery, or similar issues.

Researcher4112: If there are any such mechanisms in place they are all maintained within the president's office, PFDJ and the military. Checking mechanisms or monitoring malpractice in procurement are all a government affair.
There are no complaints, critiques, objective evaluations concerning any procurement activities in Hadas Ertra or Eritrea Profile. On the contrary, the newspapers publish plenty of stories that depict that the public is satisfied with government endeavours (see source 3).

In his 2001 interview the president stated that the PFDJ is inseparable from the people, and hinted there are mechanisms in place to keep an eye on corruption. He mentioned that there are baseless complaints against the PFDJ. He also spoke in support of the Special Court. He dismissed the fact that the PFDJ operates without any formal and informal constraints.

For companies or individuals to accuse the PFDJ of malpractice in procurement would be considered a risky assertion likely leading to arrest or jail time (as with the members of the 2001 open letter, see source 4).

Researcher4112: In its 2015 report, the Heritage Foundation states that corruption is endemic in Eritrea. Furthermore, it stated &quoute;over the past five years, scores have declined in the areas of corruption, taxation, and labor policy, further burdening an already weak institutional framework. An oppressive central government controls investment and the financial sector and distorts prices. The judiciary is highly politicised and fails to check government expropriations of private property.&quoute; In this context, it was not possible to find details of the relations and agreements between government institutions and contractors.

Given that Eritrea is under sanctions and an arms embargo by the UN, little information about its suppliers is available. The UN Monitoring Group found in 2012 that Eritrea is guilty of trafficking arms.

Researcher4112: A thorough search of the list of all proclamations and legal notices in Eritrea provide no indication that regulations around offset contract exist. It is not possible to ascertain whether offset contracts are permitted or forbidden by law in Eritrea. The assessor was unable to confirm if offset contracts exist in Eritrea. Given the arms embargo placed on the country, it seems highly unlikely that it would enter into offset contracts; an N/A has therefore been awarded.

The mining industry in Eritrea is flourishing. The country is doing business with numerous international companies to extract Copper, Gold, Silver, and Zinc. A search for Eritrea’s National Mining Corp (ENAMCO) activities produced no evidence of any signs of offset contracts. Moreover, similar searches in the websites of the Nevsun Resources, Sunridge Gold Corp, China SFECO, NGEx/Sanu Resources Inc etc. produced no relevant results.

Researcher4112: A thorough search of the list of all proclamations and legal notices in Eritrea provide no indication that regulations around offset contract exist. It is not possible to ascertain whether offset contracts are permitted or forbidden by law in Eritrea. The assessor was unable to confirm if offset contracts exist in Eritrea. Interviewee 2 was unable to confirm any information regarding offset contracts in general, and standards of transparency of such contracts in particular. Given the arms embargo placed on the country, it seems highly unlikely that it would enter into offset contracts; an N/A has therefore been awarded.

The mining industry in Eritrea is flourishing. The country is doing business with numerous international companies to extract Copper, Gold, Silver, and Zinc. A search for Eritrea’s National Mining Corp (ENAMCO) activities produced no evidence of any signs of offset contracts. Moreover, similar searches in the websites of the Nevsun Resources, Sunridge Gold Corp, China SFECO, NGEx/Sanu Resources Inc etc. produced no relevant results. Canada's Fraser Institute ranked Eritrea 77th in the World and 14th in Africa in its annual global mining survey 2014. That indicates Eritrea's business dealings in the extractive industry are making headway.

A country like Eritrea that is very much in need of huge supply of arms (three wars in the last fifteen years – against Yemen, Ethiopia and Djibouti) must have had gone through several contracts to obtain weapons. Given the level of secrecy that shrouds government activities and PFDJ business dealings, defence-related projects and offset contracts remain ambiguous, to say the least.

Researcher4112: A thorough search of the list of all proclamations and legal notices in Eritrea provides no indication that regulations around offset contract exist. It is not possible to ascertain whether offset contracts are permitted or forbidden by law in Eritrea. The assessor was unable to confirm if offset contracts exist in Eritrea. Interviewee 2 was unable to confirm any information regarding offset contracts in general, and standards of transparency of such contracts in particular. Given the arms embargo placed on the country, it seems highly unlikely that it would enter into offset contracts; an N/A has therefore been awarded.

A country like Eritrea that is very much in need of huge supply of arms (three wars in the last fifteen years – against Yemen, Ethiopia and Djibouti) must have had gone through several contracts to obtain weapons.
But the arms trade remains non-transparent in Eritrea. Weapons-sellers may invest in side deals in Eritrea but only PFDJ’s top officials can provide an adequate answer to this matter.

Researcher4112: The government maintains a command economy, with government activities predominating over private enterprise. According to a US State Department report, many key firms are party or military-owned. Therefore, the companies it uses, the business agents and their intermediaries in the procurement cycle are considered an extension of the government (interviewee 2).There is no legislation/policy on the use of agents in the procurement cycle.

There is evidence that agents are used. In 2015, an Italian regional official, Piergianni Flournoy, was sentenced to four years in prison by an Italian court for transferring sniper scopes to Eritrea. A report by Global Witness found that &quoute;Ukrainian arms traders are suspected of using a UK company to provide fighter jet servicing and parts to Eritrea’s dictator, a breach of the UN arms embargo against Eritrea.&quoute; Given the secrecy surrounding Eritrea and its role as an intermediary in illicit arms transfers, and breaches of the embargo on the country (source 7), it is highly likely that agents are used regularly and without anti-corruption controls.

Researcher4112: There is no publicly available information on matters of government finances, particularly regarding defence matters. This fact was confirmed by interviewee 7. No information on financing package of any procurement contracts is publicly available prior to (or post) the signing of contracts.

One could speculate that there is some form of correspondence which takes place between departments while finalising agreements but it is not publicly available while no former government officials who have defected and who dealt with the government’s financial dealings has commented on this.

The above referenced articles also provide context on the multimillion-dollar arms trafficking industry that is funding the Eritrean military regime. An investigation by the Somalia and Eritrea monitoring group has uncovered a trafficking highway running from the Eritrean highlands through Sudan's refugee camps into the Sinai desert, delivering arms to militant groups.

Researcher4112: There is no evidence available that suggests the government requires the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption measures.

There exists a complete, 2016-page book comprising 156 proclamations and 114 legal notices in Eritrea which came into existence since independence (1991). However, there is no copy accessible to the general public. The list of proclamations and legal notices is a Tigrinya document published in 2011 (as an outcome of a ministry of Justice sponsored symposium held in Keren in May 2011). This book makes no reference to procurement procedures and relationship between main contractor and subcontractors.

Researcher4112: There is no publicly accessible information to show how defence acquisition decisions are made in Eritrea. Such information can only be obtained either from the president's office or some of the top commanders. Moreover, there is no information on political influence imposed on Eritrea by nations that sell weapons to Eritrea.

Eritrea has been under UN sanctions since 2009. Therefore, it is safe to assume that Eritrea’s defence procurement is neither openly conducted nor open for debate under such circumstances.
The government does not justify its defence and security expenditure and the assessor found no evidence to suggest that Eritrea adheres to any such method concerning its political preference when purchasing weapons.

Given the UN sanctions, it is highly likely that arms procurement is based on political relations with supplying countries. SIPRI's Trade Registers Database indicates that Belarus, Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine have been the only suppliers of weapons to Eritrea since 2001. News articles from 2014 indicate trade and military cooperation between Russia and Eritrea. A report from 2005 refers to Russia's supplying weapons to both Eritrea and Ethiopia when they were at the brink of war.

The UK has also approved export licenses for military equipment Eritrea, despite the arms embargo. This included: cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, body armour, and military helmets (source 7). It is unclear if these exports were politically motivated.