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Country Policy Recommendations
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Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
1. Interview with civil society member and defence reform expert, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Sékou Sanoh, 'Parlement : la commission de défense et de sécurité en action', Guineenews, 25 March 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://guineenews.org/parlement-la-commission-de-defence-et-de-securite-en-action/
4. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
5. Union Interparlementaire, &quoute;Guinnee Assemble Nationale&quoute;, last accessed 22 August 2015, http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/CtrlParlementaire/1131_F.htm#defnat
6. Alpha Camara, &quoute;Loi des finances 2015 : Les ministres de la Justice et Délégué à la Défense devant le Parlement&quoute;, LeConakryKa.com, 1 December 2014, accessed 22 August 2015, http://leconakryka.com/2014/12/01/loi-des-finances-2015-les-ministres-de-la-justice-et-delegue-a-la-defence-devant-le-parlement/
7. Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, &quoute;Guinea Country Report 2014&quoute;,
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Parliamentary oversight of the security sector is still minimal, although the process of reforming the security sector has been introduced. See also United Nations General Assembly (2015) Rapport du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme sur la situation des droits de l’homme en Guinée A/HRC/28/50
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: A defence committee was formed in 2014 as part of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme, but it is not yet fully resourced or effective. Training of legislators is underway in 2014 in order to allow them to be more effective in this role. Full operational capacity may be expected in 2015, but the Guinean legislature is constitutionally weak compared to the Presidency.
It has not been possible to locate the relevant founding legislation online. The rights and formal remit of the committee, including whether it might scrutinise the defence ministry’s performance, is therefore not clear. Legislative independence is at an early stage of development, as described by the BTI report [6]. The committee’s independence from the executive is therefore not guaranteed.
Response to peer reviewer:
I agree with your comments. The lack of evidence to confirm the committee is operational raises considerable concerns over its effectiveness. I have therefore amended the score from 2 to 1.
1. Interview with civil society member and defence reform expert, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Sékou Sanoh, 'Parlement : la commission de défense et de sécurité en action', Guineenews, 25 March 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://guineenews.org/parlement-la-commission-de-defence-et-de-securite-en-action/
4. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
5. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
6. Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Guinea Country Report 2014, p.8, accessed 22 August 2015, http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Guinea.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The National SSR Steering Committee (Comité national de pilotage de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité en Guinée (CNP-RSS) was set up on 21 June 2011 by presidential decree and is constituted by two Commissions (the Strategic Orientation Commission and the Technical Monitoring Commission) and five sectorial technical committees (defence, Justice, Police and Civilian Protection, Customs, Water and Forestry).
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The sources consulted, including my own searches, do not suggest there exist formal statutes, laws, or regulations with formal rights regarding oversight or control.
The newspaper article refers to the good intentions of the Ministry of defence and reiterate the importance of a democratic process of consultation prior to enacting laws, but there is no recognition of a right to review or oversight.
Suggested score: 1
Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There have been consultations on the new 2013 National Defence and Security Policy at a fairly elite level - military, presidency, ministry, international partners/IGOs, and some civil society representatives. This is a new process as part of Guinea's democratic transition, and is not yet fully institutionalised. It is unclear if the same process will be repeated after the transition. It is also unclear whether parliament has had input into the 2013 national security and defence policy.
This was a process open to the public, with regional workshops held throughout Guinea [6]. However, from public information alone, it ultimately can not be determined whether this was an extensive process and included discussion of contentious elements.
With the public information available, it is not possible to conclusively state whether the workshops ultimately influenced the direction of the policy. It is though of relevance that the policy includes commitments to civil society engagement (p.9), commitment to security sector reform, and improved civil-military relations (both p.16). The policy is available to the public and a direct link is now included to the policy.
The policy was only adopted in 2013 and it is not clear whether there is a process for formal review; a timeframe for review is not stated in the policy itself, for example.
Response to peer reviewer:
I have added source 6, which indicates that there were public consultations. Score maintained.
1. Interview with civil society member and defence reform expert, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
3. Plan-cadre des nations unies pour l’aide au developpement, République de Guinée, 2013-2017, February 2012, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.gn.undp.org/content/dam/guinea/docs/pnuad-guinee-2013-2017.pdf
4. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
5. Présidence de la République de Guinée website, 'Grands Dossiers: Restructuration des Forces de defence et de Securite', last updated 28 March 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.presidence.gov.gn/index.php/defence-et-securite
6. Jean-Pierre Ouendeno, GuineeNews, &quoute;Des consultations nationales pour la définition de la politique nationale de défense et de sécurité (PNDS)&quoute;, 10 October 2013, accessed 22 August 2015, http://guineenews.org/des-consultations-nationales-pour-la-definition-de-la-politique-nationale-de-defence-et-de-securite-pnds/
7. &quoute;Politique Nationale de Defence et de Securite 2013&quoute;, November 2013, accessed 22 August 2015,
http://pbfguinee.org/sites/default/files/report-documents/politique_nationale_de_defence_et_de_securite_2013.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See also Presentation du Gouvernement de la Republique de Guinee sur la Reforme du secteur de la securite
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: None of the sources cited speak to public debate or consultations on defence policy with IGOs. The UNDP references are in regard to their work on governance, poverty and jobs, and vulnerability risk factors - - not on Security Sector or defence.
The President;'s web site lists important structural reforms (that will impact on internal corruption) within the military but there is no mention of how those decisions were taken.
Suggested score: 1
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is quite recent CSO engagement on SSR programmes such as community policing, the media's role in accountability, and programmes to combat sexual and gender-based violence. Security agencies have also sought CSO facilitation of inter-service dialogue on reconciliation and accountability. OSIWA and other CSOs are very active in anti-corruption and financial transparency (e.g. in the mining sector) but not yet in terms of military corruption issues.
There is evidence that defence and security institutions are seeking (or are beginning to seek) CSO engagement, although it is not ultimately clear whether there has been engagement on corruption issues specifically. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund has been heavily involved in the security sector reform process, initiated in 2011. It has stated that the national steering committee for security sector reform includes 10 members of civil society (out of a committee of 70 in total) as well as representatives from five government ministries (defence, security and civil protection; justice; economics; finance; and the environment). A strategy orientation commission also includes civil society participants [4].
1. Interview with civil society member and defence reform expert, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
3. Guineenews, ‘Réforme du secteur de la sécurité : Fin des premiers ateliers régionaux’, Guineenews, 12 October 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://guineenews.org/reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-fin-des-premiers-ateliers-regionaux/
4. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The issue in Guinea is not about the existence of anti-corruption bodies but about their capacity to prosecute. See The Guardian (2013) Guinea's anti-corruption activists raise doubts over mining crackdown
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: Guinea signed UNCAC in 2005, and ratified it in 2013. It has joined the EITI and was recorded as compliant in July 2014. Guinea ratified The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2012. Guinea has also signed the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption, but it proved impossible to find the date from online research and there is no indication of the country having ratified the protocol. This may be due to delays in adopting a national anti-corruption law.
While Guinea has signed or ratified several anti-corruption protocols, implementation and monitoring are weak. There are several deficiencies in Guinea's anti-corruption regime that relate specifically to UNCAC: Guinea has not formally adopted an anti-corruption law (this remains the case); parliamentary scrutiny is limited; and there is considerable overlap and a lack of clarity on the roles of institutions to combat corruption [3].
In addition, Guinea's National Anti-Corruption Agency (ANLC) has been described as &quoute;relying on a thin legal basis&quoute; and the Guinean penal code &quoute;has yet to be reviewed to ensure conformity with UNCAC&quoute;. The ANLC has also been described as &quoute;one of the least funded anti-corruption bodies in West Africa&quoute; [6]. Guinea initiated an UNCAC self-assessment during a workshop that took place on 27-29 May 2015, where calls were made for in-depth reforms of legislation and institutional set-up [6]. It is unclear whether the results of the self-assessment will be made public, but an external UNCAC implementation review does not yet appear to have been carried out [7].
On the other hand, areas where there has been general progress under the Conde government (2010 - present) include: a greater respect for the independence of the judiciary and engagement with civil society groups [4]. In addition, public management of extractive sector income has improved, which is a priority area for the country given the economic importance of its mining sector.
Guinea cannot sign or ratify the OECD convention as it is not an OECD member country or a full participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions.
Response to peer reviewers:
Many thanks for these additional comments, I have integrated some of the information into the response above.
1. United Nations Convention against Corruption, Signature and Ratification Status as of 5 September 2014, accessed on 27 October 2014, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
2. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Guinea country page, https://eiti.org/Guinea
‘Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight against Corruption’, 21 December 2001, not yet ratified.
3. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
4. Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Guinea Country Report 2014, accessed 22 August 2015, http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Guinea.pdf
5. African Union, &quoute;List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption&quoute;, 1 March 2013, last accessed 22 August 2014, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Corruption.pdf
6. UNODC, &quoute;Guinea assesses its national anti-corruption legislation with UNODC support&quoute;, (n.d.), https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/guinea-corruption-self-assessesment.html
7. UNODC, &quoute;Country Profile: Guinea&quoute;, (n.d.), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CAC/country-profile/profiles/GIN.html
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Guinea ratified The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2012.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The extractive industry is at the heart of Guinea's economy and future. Efforts by the country to comply with EITI requirements have been uneven.
But the history of Guniea;'s EITI involvement is informative.
Implementing the EITI process during the socio-political crisis was difficult and Guinea was granted a temporary suspension of its status in 2009. In 2011 Guinea's ‘EITI Candidate’ status was granted for 18 months. The EITI Board requested a second EITI Validation by April 2014. The Board recommended that Guinea improves its work plans for implementation, and ensures that its Reports cover all companies making material payments to the state for exploring and exploiting mines. The country is once more behind in its reporting deadlines so EITI Guinea began updating its work plan for 2012-2014.
Guinea was accepted as 'EITI Compliant' by the international EITI Board at its meeting in Mexico City in July 2014. This is an important and strong indicator of the capacity for Guinea to move forward into the international anti-corruption arena if the will is there, and there is a monitoring instrument.
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: As part of the post-2010 SSR process, there is public-society discourse on defence and security policy - especially relating to policing. It is too early to say that this is regular. The government, through representatives of the relevant ministries and security forces, has been a regular participant in regional and sectoral dialogues on security.
There was public consultation on the defence strategy [6] and the UN Peacebuilding Fund ensured public engagement in security sector reform [7] through broad committees encompassing civil society organisations and government ministries.
With the public information available, it is not possible to conclusively state whether the workshops ultimately influenced the direction of the policy. It is though of relevance that the policy includes commitments to civil society engagement (p.9), commitment to security sector reform, and improved civil-military relations (both p.16). The policy is available to the public and a direct link is now included to the policy [8].
Based on these sources, the main venue for discussion appears to be public forums, which are likely to be government-sponsored. From public record information, it is difficult to confirm whether the forums represent a true, two-way dialogue. There is little indication of media debate.
There is little indication of parliamentary involvement in defence issues; however, the sources added do point to at least occasional public debate and increasing commitment to promoting dialogue under the new democratic government (2010 - present).
1. Interview with civil society member and defence reform expert, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
3. Plan-cadre des nations unies pour l’aide au developpement, République de Guinée, 2013-2017, February 2012, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.gn.undp.org/content/dam/guinea/docs/pnuad-guinee-2013-2017.pdf
4. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to UNDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
5. Guineenews, ‘Réforme du secteur de la sécurité : Fin des premiers ateliers régionaux’, Guineenews, 12 October 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://guineenews.org/reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-fin-des-premiers-ateliers-regionaux/
6. Jean-Pierre Ouendeno, GuineeNews, &quoute;Des consultations nationales pour la définition de la politique nationale de défense et de sécurité (PNDS)&quoute;, 10 October 2013, accessed 22 August 2015, http://guineenews.org/des-consultations-nationales-pour-la-definition-de-la-politique-nationale-de-defence-et-de-securite-pnds/
7. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
8. &quoute;Politique Nationale de Defence et de Securite 2013&quoute;, November 2013, accessed 22 August 2015,
http://pbfguinee.org/sites/default/files/report-documents/politique_nationale_de_defence_et_de_securite_2013.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The participation of the parliament in defence policy is limited because the President, as guarantor of national independence and territorial integrity, is responsible for national defence. See Inter-Parliamentary Union (2013) Guinea Assemblee Nationale
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: No policy is yet in place for the defence and security sector but one may be developed as part of the second stage of the SSR programme in 2014-17.
There is a National Anti-Corruption Agency (L'Agence Nationale de Lutte contre la Corruption - ANLC), but in the absence of an anti-corruption law and strategy, it draws its authority from disparate sources, including [1]:
1) Arrêté no. 7137/MPCEF of 13 July 2004 establishing the creation, powers and organisation of the ANLC
2) The web page of the agency on the official government website
3) The decree on the organisation of the President’s Office.
The ANLC has been described as &quoute;relying on a thin legal basis&quoute; and as &quoute;one of the least funded anti-corruption bodies in West Africa&quoute; [7]. Guinea initiated an UNCAC self-assessment during a workshop that took place on 27-29 May 2015, where calls were made for in-depth reforms of legislation and institutional set-up [7].
It is unclear whether there was a specific call for an anti-corruption policy, or whether the defence and security sectors were mentioned. Nevertheless, follow-up activities are reportedly going to be implemented before the end of 2015, which might result in an anti-corruption policy [7].
1. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
2. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
3. Interview with Guinean journalist, 28 August 2014, by telephone.
4. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
5. Plan-cadre des nations unies pour l’aide au developpement, République de Guinée, 2013-2017, February 2012, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.gn.undp.org/content/dam/guinea/docs/pnuad-guinee-2013-2017.pdf
6.UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
7. UNODC, &quoute;Guinea assesses its national anti-corruption legislation with UNODC support&quoute;, (n.d.), https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/guinea-corruption-self-assessesment.html
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In 2002 a National Committee against Corruption was established but soon after was devoid of powers. See also Camara, M.S. et al (2014) Historical Dictionary of Guinea Lanham: Scarecrow Press
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no evidence that there is an internal, well-resourced institute within defence and security tasked with countering corruption, although during the junta period (2009 - 2010), the Court of Auditors investigated corruption cases in defence [6].
The current lack of institutions specific to the defence sector may, however, be changing, as the UN Peacebuilding Fund refers to military magistrates having been trained as part of the security sector reform process, but it is difficult to determine from public information if they have involvement in corruption issues [4].
Outside the defence sector there is a National Anti-Corruption Agency (L'Agence Nationale de Lutte contre la Corruption - ANLC), which has four main objectives:
1) To prevent corruption;
2) To identify acts of corruption and provide support for their suppression;
3) To ensure communication of efforts to fight corruption; and
4) To mobilise citizens to support anti-corruption efforts.
However, the ANLC has been described as &quoute;relying on a thin legal basis&quoute; and as &quoute;one of the least funded anti-corruption bodies in West Africa&quoute; [7]. It is generally regarded as being ineffective [5].
1. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
2. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
3. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
4. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
5. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 23 August 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
6. Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Guinée : l’armée, la corruption et les mobiles possibles de l’attentat contre Alpha Condé&quoute;, 1 August 2011, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/190730/politique/guin-e-l-arm-e-la-corruption-et-les-mobiles-possibles-de-l-attentat-contre-alpha-cond/
7. UNODC, &quoute;Guinea assesses its national anti-corruption legislation with UNODC support&quoute;, (n.d.), https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/guinea-corruption-self-assessesment.html
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The National Anticorruption Agency (Agence Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption, ANLC) was set up in 2004 but it has limited resources and impact due to the absence of anti-corruption laws.
See International Associations of Anti-Corruption Authorities (2012) 'National Agency for fight against corruption (ANLC)'
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is, unfortunately, a dearth of public information on this topic: the Global Corruption Barometer has not previously covered Guinea, there don't appear to be any online reports by national NGOs on perceptions of defence institutions, and there are no recent media reports which offer any real insight on public perception of defence and its stance on corruption. In addition, there does not appear to be any recent, credible, Guinean media commentary on acts of corruption by defence institutions.
During previous research, Guinean interviewees voiced the opinion that the security forces are focused on opportunities to extract money from the population, although this could not be verified as a representation of public opinion more generally.
In the absence of specific information on defence, some conclusions can be drawn from the Corruption Perceptions Index. Guinea is ranked at 145 in the 2014 survey, suggesting lack of public trust across public institutions in tackling corruption. It only achieved a score of 25 out of 100, where 0 represents a public perception that the government is highly corrupt and 100 that the government is highly clean.
1. Discussions and interviews with Guinean society and political actors since 2009.
2. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See Politico (2015) Guinea: small steps forward in a lengthy battle
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The public is well aware of the problem of corruption and the role of the military.
Alpha Conde took office as Guinea’s first democratically elected President in 2010 and declared that the fight against corruption was a top priority. He promised he would tackle endemic corruption. In 2012 he appointed Aissatou Boiro at the head of the treasury to impose integrity on money flows. A few months into her mandate Aissatou Boiro was shot dead by unidentified attackers in military uniforms as she returned home in her car. “Aissatou Boiro worked tirelessly against corruption in our young democracy,” said Conde.
Suggested score:
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no evidence in the public domain that there has been a recent assessment of corruption risk. There is similarly no indication, as far as can be determined from the public record, of even partial assessments in specific areas of defence. Furthermore, there is no public information on what mitigating measures may have been put in place.
However, in 2003 the National Anti-Corruption Agency (ANLC) conducted an assessment of corruption and governance in Guinea more generally. This covered the Ministry of Defence and assessed several different categories of risk (perceived corruption, corruption in personnel, budget corruption, state capture, corruption in contracts, and administrative corruption) [6].
The ANLC assessment was conducted by a government agency, as it sits under the Presidential Office and a selection of other government ministries (although there is some lack of clarity over which ministries) [7]. There is no evidence that this has become a regular activity, and it has not been factored into the scoring here given that it was conducted over a decade ago.
Response to peer reviewer:
Many thanks for this additional information, I have integrated it into the answer above.
1. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
2. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
3. Plan-cadre des nations unies pour l’aide au developpement, République de Guinée, 2013-2017, February 2012, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.gn.undp.org/content/dam/guinea/docs/pnuad-guinee-2013-2017.pdf
4. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to UNDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
5. Présidence de la République de Guinée website, 'Grands Dossiers: Restructuration des Forces de defence et de Securite', last updated 28 March 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.presidence.gov.gn/index.php/defence-et-securite
6. Agence Nationale de Lutte contre la Corruption et de Moralisation des Activites Economique et Financieres (ANLC) (2003) Enquete Nationale sur la Corruption et la Gouvernance en Guinee (ENACOG/2003), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206663/Executive_summary_english.pdf
7. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There was a survey done about corruption in Guinea in 2003. See Agence Nationale de Lutte contre la Corruption et de Moralisation des Activites Economique et Financieres (ANLC) (2003) Enquete Nationale sur la Corruption et la Gouvernance en Guinee (ENACOG/2003)
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There does not seem to be any public information on a formal process for acquisition planning. Equally, there is little information on oversight in this regard. There is no clear division of roles and identification of a body which might have responsibility in this area.
It is unlikely that there is a large amount of arms acquisition going on at the moment, given the emphasis on security sector reform in the national defence policy [3]. This may not be an official policy, which makes it difficult to evidence.
1. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Guinea (2013)
2. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
3. &quoute;Politique Nationale de Defence et de Securite 2013&quoute;, November 2013, accessed 22 August 2015,
http://pbfguinee.org/sites/default/files/report-documents/politique_nationale_de_defence_et_de_securite_2013.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See Human Rights Watch (2011) We have lived in darkness. A Human Rights Agenda for Guinea’s New Government
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The budgetary process for defence and security is somewhat unclear. It appears that the defence budget is not separate from the rest of the national budget, and there is only one commission in charge of the whole process. The budget process is launched nine months before the end of the financial year, with a month given over to negotiations with ministry representatives [5]. This is presumably when the defence-specific aspects of the budget would be drafted. It appears that &quoute;sectors&quoute; can make recommendations to the budgetary commission, but that the latter is not obliged to follow them [5].
Parliament is presented the budget three months before the end of the financial year, and it has two months within which to adopt it. Parliament has the right to make modifications to the budget, but it cannot alter the total deficit/excess [5].
A media article from August 2015 suggests that the Minister of Defence presented a headline figure for the defence sector budget to Parliament, and that this might then have been broken down into aggregate figures for: naval spending, traffic policing, military engineering, personnel costs, purchasing costs for goods and services, subsidies, and investments [4]. It is not clear whether the Minister of Defence is mandated to release this information to Parliament as part of defence budget policy. Official sources do not exist to show how different sectors are represented in the overall budget.
There is a limited amount of information made available in the public domain on national budgets in general, and none of this emanates from official sources. A headline total budget for 2013 is available in the media [3].
1. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database, 2012 - 2014
2. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Guinea (2013)
3. Xinhua, &quoute;Guinée : 52% de réduction du budget de l'armée depuis 2010&quoute; accessed 23 August 2015, http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/96852/8249305.html
4. Alpha Camara, &quoute;Loi des finances 2015 : Les ministres de la Justice et Délégué à la Défense devant le Parlement&quoute;, 1 December 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, http://leconakryka.com/2014/12/01/loi-des-finances-2015-les-ministres-de-la-justice-et-delegue-a-la-defence-devant-le-parlement/
5. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See also Jane’s World Armies (2000) Issue Seven and The Military Balance 2000-2001, IISS
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: In 2014 a legislative committee was set up under phase II (2014-17) of the SSR programme. Legislators are being trained. It is not yet clear what level of information they will receive from the ministries or what powers they will have in practice in relation to the budget.
It can not be conclusively determined, but it is likely that the new committee would be the relevant body to undertake budgetary scrutiny. There is no evidence of it having done so to date, and in the absence of its formal statues, it is not clear whether this falls within the committee’s remit.
Equally, it is not possible to determine from public sources whether it has been supplied with detailed budget information. A media article from August 2015 suggests that the Minister of Defence presented a headline figure for the defence sector budget to Parliament, and that this might then have been broken down into aggregate figures for: naval spending, traffic policing, military engineering, personnel costs, purchasing costs for goods and services, subsidies, and investments [7].
It is not clear whether the Minister of Defence is mandated to release this information to Parliament as part of defence budget policy, or whether the legislative committee would receive a briefing that is separate or more detailed than this. Indeed, there is no real evidence of the committee’s activity, which raises questions about its overall effectiveness. Guinea’s highly presidential system likely diminishes the oversight functions of the legislature.
In general, the external audit of national budgets in Guinea has been described as being &quoute;confronted with significant constraints and severe delays&quoute; [6, p.21].
In the absence of any evidence that the committee receives budget information, a score of 0 has been awarded.
1. Sékou Sanoh, 'Parlement : la commission de défense et de sécurité en action', Guineenews, 25 March 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://guineenews.org/parlement-la-commission-de-defence-et-de-securite-en-action/
2. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
3. Plan-cadre des nations unies pour l’aide au developpement, République de Guinée, 2013-2017, February 2012, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.gn.undp.org/content/dam/guinea/docs/pnuad-guinee-2013-2017.pdf
4. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
5. Union Interparlementaire, &quoute;Guinnee Assemble Nationale&quoute;, last accessed 22 August 2015, http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/CtrlParlementaire/1131_F.htm#defnat
6. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
7. Alpha Camara, &quoute;Loi des finances 2015 : Les ministres de la Justice et Délégué à la Défense devant le Parlement&quoute;, 1 December 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, http://leconakryka.com/2014/12/01/loi-des-finances-2015-les-ministres-de-la-justice-et-delegue-a-la-defence-devant-le-parlement/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: On the governance of the security sector see also Bangoura, D. (2011) Guinea
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is a limited amount of information made available in the public domain on the defence budget, none of which emanates from official sources. An article shows the total budget for 2013 [9], and the total defence budget for 2015 that was presented to parliament is also publicly reported on [3].
The SIPRI database has data on the total budget only for military expenditure for the period 2012 - 2014. The figures are: $169m (2012), $193m (2013), $255m (2014).
In 2010 Guinea enacted freedom of information legislation [4], which enshrines the principle of free access and outlines clear procedures government bodies must follow in this regard. However, an exception to the law applies to any information concerning state security institutions or that which is held by them.
How this is interpreted in practice is a harder question to answer from online research alone. One article [5] complains about slow process across wider government in implementing the legislation, but there is a lack of specific information about how defence requests are treated.
1. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
2. IMF country information on Guinea, http://www.imf.org/external/country/GIN/index.htm
3. Alpha Camara, &quoute;Loi des finances 2015 : Les ministres de la Justice et Délégué à la Défense devant le Parlement&quoute;, 1 December 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, http://leconakryka.com/2014/12/01/loi-des-finances-2015-les-ministres-de-la-justice-et-delegue-a-la-defence-devant-le-parlement/
4. Republic Of Guinea Organic Law L 2010/004/Cnt/ Of 24 November 2010 On The Right Of Access To Public Information, note Article 16, “The Information Officer of an administration to whom request is made is not required to disclose information concerning state security institutions or that which is held by them”
5. Hyppolite Dossou-Yovo, &quoute;Guinée – Accès à l’information: Une loi, juste une loi et tout reste à faire, 16 May 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.flammedafrique.org/parite-senegal/2013/05/16/guinee-acces-a-linformation-une-loi-juste-une-loi-et-tout-reste-a-faire/
6. US Department of State, Fiscal Transparency Report 2014, accessed 22 August 2015, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/oma/235938.htm
7. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database, 2012 - 2014
8. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Guinea (2013)
9. Xinhua, &quoute;Guinée : 52% de réduction du budget de l'armée depuis 2010&quoute; accessed 23 August 2015, http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/96852/8249305.html
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See also US State Dept. (2014) Fiscal Transparency Report
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no clear indication that other sources of defence income are publicised and scrutinised, whether this be equipment sales, property dispersal or other relevant income streams. The court of auditors has previously scrutinised spending under the military junta 2009 – 2010 [4], highlighting irregularities. However, there is no indication of regular auditory scrutiny of defence income streams.
In general, the external audit of national budgets in Guinea has been described as being &quoute;confronted with significant constraints and severe delays&quoute; [5, p.21]. Audit reports are only &quoute;rarely&quoute; released to the public (and it is not clear whether any of these are from the defence sector), while only somewhere between 0-20% of ministries have audit offices at all [5, p.54]. There does not appear to be any official publication of sources of defence income.
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Agence France Presse, ‘Dispute over diamond-rich region key in Guinea, Sierra Leone talks’, AFP via Relief Web, 3 August 2004, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/dispute-over-diamond-rich-region-key-guinea-sierra-leone-talks
3. Discussions with Guinean citizens, CSOs and journalists, 2010-14.
4. Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Guinée : l’armée, la corruption et les mobiles possibles de l’attentat contre Alpha Condé&quoute;, 1 August 2011, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/190730/politique/guin-e-l-arm-e-la-corruption-et-les-mobiles-possibles-de-l-attentat-contre-alpha-cond/
5. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See Aireff, A. (2009) Still Standing: neighborhood wars and political stability in Guinea, Journal of Modern African Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is an inspectorate within the armed forces to monitor and investigate expenditure and tendering [6], but there is no information about its remit and activities in the public domain. It is therefore difficult to comment on issues such as quality of personnel, its effectiveness and level of independence.
A study of the budgetary process in Guinea more generally suggested that audit reports are only &quoute;rarely&quoute; released to the public (and it is not clear whether any of these are from the defence sector), while only somewhere between 0-20% of ministries have audit offices at all [8, p.54].
Given the apparent lack of public information on the auditing process, it can only be concluded that there is no transparency on the process, nor is there evidence of parliamentary scrutiny.
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
3. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
4. Plan-cadre des nations unies pour l’aide au developpement, République de Guinée, 2013-2017, February 2012, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.gn.undp.org/content/dam/guinea/docs/pnuad-guinee-2013-2017.pdf
5. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
6. Amara Moro Camara, &quoute;Décrets : nomination des hauts cadres civils et militaires au ministère de la Défense&quoute;, 19 February 2015, accessed 23 August 2015, &quoute;http://guineenews.org/decrets-nomination-des-hauts-cadres-civils-et-militaires-au-ministere-de-la-defence/
7. &quoute;Rapport d’évaluation du Secteur de Sécurité en Guinée: Avant-projet de rapport,” Joint Project of the ECOWAS, African Union, and United Nations, May 2010
8. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: About the poor oversight of military expenditure see Rapport d’évaluation du Secteur de Sécurité en Guinée: Avant-projet de rapport,” Joint Project of the ECOWAS, African Union, and United Nations, May 2010
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The Guinean Court of Auditors has previously scrutinised defence expenditure. In 2011 it examined and critiqued military expenditure for the junta period 2009 - 2010 [3], highlighting numerous irregularities, particularly around excessive procurement expenditure. However, there is no indication in the public domain that the Court of Auditors has carried out such work on a regular and systematic basis since then.
There has been substantial international technical assistance throughout the security sector reform programme [4]. However, it was impossible to establish whether this support specifically encompasses auditing.
In general, the external audit of national budgets in Guinea has been described as being &quoute;confronted with significant constraints and severe delays&quoute; [5, p.21]. Audit reports are only &quoute;rarely&quoute; released to the public, and it is not clear whether any of these are from the defence sector [5, p.54].
1. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
2. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
3. Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Guinée : l’armée, la corruption et les mobiles possibles de l’attentat contre Alpha Condé&quoute;, 1 August 2011, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/190730/politique/guin-e-l-arm-e-la-corruption-et-les-mobiles-possibles-de-l-attentat-contre-alpha-cond/
4. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
5. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See IMF (2012) Guinea: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress Report
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no information in public sources to confirm that defence institutions have formal interests in natural resource companies in the present day. There is evidence of historical, informal practices, that might be considered as the looting of natural resources by individual defence personnel, however there is no concrete information to confirm that these practices continue in the present day.
At present, the main task facing the government is investigating corruption in the awarding of lucrative mining contracts to foreign investors under Conté, the army general who ruled Guinea for 25 years until 2008 [6].
In general, there have been improvements in the public management of extractive sector income. Guinea was accepted as 'EITI Compliant' by the international EITI Board at its meeting in Mexico City in July 2014 [4]. The past year has seen the US, the European Union and the UK push for greater disclosure of payments made by mining and oil firms. Conde's government has produced a new mining code to combat corruption and offer greater environmental protection [6].
However, parliamentary scrutiny remains generally weak in Guinea. There is little indication that parliament regularly debates defence issues, and the president is ultimately responsible for national defence policy and presides over the national defence council [5]. Its democratic institutions are still at an early stage of development in terms of exercising independence and scrutiny.
There is therefore insufficient transparency or public scrutiny on this issue to award a score of 2 or above.
1. Global Witness, ‘How the lack of transparency in resource for infrastructure deals facilitates corruption and undermines development – and what to do about it’, Global Witness Briefing Paper, 12 August 2011, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/Global%20Witness%20policy%20note.pdf
2. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
3. Agence France Presse, ‘Dispute over diamond-rich region key in Guinea, Sierra Leone talks’, AFP via Relief Web, 3 August 2004, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/dispute-over-diamond-rich-region-key-guinea-sierra-leone-talks
4. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Guinea country page, https://eiti.org/Guinea
‘Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight against Corruption’, 21 December 2001, not yet ratified.
5. Union Interparlementaire, &quoute;Guinnee Assemble Nationale&quoute;, last accessed 22 August 2015, http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/reports/CtrlParlementaire/1131_F.htm#defnat
6. Guardian, &quoute;The tycoon, the dictator's wife and the $2.5bn Guinea mining deal&quoute;, 30 July 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/30/africa-guinea-mining-bsgr-steinmetz
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See The Guardian (2013) The tycoon, the dictator's wife and the $2.5bn Guinea mining deal
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The extractive industry is at the heart of Guinea's economy and future. Efforts by the country to comply with EITI requirements have been uneven.
But the history of Guniea;'s EITI involvement is informative.
Implementing the EITI process during the socio-political crisis was difficult and Guinea was granted a temporary suspension of its status in 2009. In 2011 Guinea's ‘EITI Candidate’ status was granted for 18 months. The EITI Board requested a second EITI Validation by April 2014. The Board recommended that Guinea improves its work plans for implementation, and ensures that its Reports cover all companies making material payments to the state for exploring and exploiting mines. The country is once more behind in its reporting deadlines so EITI Guinea began updating its work plan for 2012-2014.
Guinea was accepted as 'EITI Compliant' by the international EITI Board at its meeting in Mexico City in July 2014. This is an important and strong indicator of the capacity for Guinea to move forward into the international anti-corruption arena if the will is there, and there is a monitoring instrument.
Suggested score:
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is strong evidence that organised crime has penetrated the sector, yet no strong evidence that government is actively trying to tackle the problem. While the Guinean government has established a national anti-narcotics bureau, there has been little evidence of progress on combating drug crimes and tackling the problem is reported to be a low priority [3].
There are also reports of the use of a military airfield in Guinea by organised criminal groups [4], the 2009 arrest of Ousmane Conté, son of the former President, and the continued complicity of the military in organised criminal activity [5]. The US Department of State have also stated that there are &quoute;credible allegations that Guinean military officials are facilitating drug trafficking through the country&quoute; [6].
1. David Lewis, &quoute;Insight - Surge in cocaine trade undermines Conde's bid to revive Guinea&quoute;, Reuters, 31 Jan 2014, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/31/us-guinea-drugs-insight-idUSBREA0U0EG20140131
2. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, ‘2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report’, US State Department, 5 March 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol1/204049.htm#Guinea
3. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
4. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 'Transitional Organised Crime in West Africa', 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf -
5. The Brookings Institution, &quoute;Crime, Violence and Politics: Drug Trafficking and Counternarcotics Policies in Mali and Guinea&quoute;, 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Gberie--Mali-and-Guinea-final.pdf?la=en -
6. US Department of State, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/222895.htm
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Kuhne, W. (2013) West Africa and the Sahel in the Grip of Organized Crime and International Terrorism – What Perspectives for Mali after the Elections?
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is internal policing within the military through the Inspectorate, however, there is little public information on the activities of this unit [7]. The work of the UN Peacebuilding Fund has included work in training military magistrates [5]. However, from the public domain, it is impossible to establish evidence of prosecutions in relation to organised crime.
More generally, the US Department of State has commented on the general ineffectiveness of government efforts to combat organised crime [6].
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. David Lewis, &quoute;Insight - Surge in cocaine trade undermines Conde's bid to revive Guinea&quoute;, Reuters, 31 Jan 2014, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/31/us-guinea-drugs-insight-idUSBREA0U0EG20140131
3. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, ‘2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report’, US State Department, 5 March 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol1/204049.htm#Guinea
4. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
5. US Department of State, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/222895.htm
6. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
7. Amara Moro Camara, &quoute;Décrets : nomination des hauts cadres civils et militaires au ministère de la Défense&quoute;, 19 February 2015, accessed 23 August 2015, &quoute;http://guineenews.org/decrets-nomination-des-hauts-cadres-civils-et-militaires-au-ministere-de-la-defence/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See also UNODC (2013) Transnational Organized Crime In West Africa: A Threat Assessment
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: Intelligence services are effectively outside of the current SSR programme and accountable directly to the Presidency. There is no obvious accountability to legislators or civil society.
In 2010 Guinea enacted freedom of information legislation [4], which enshrines the principle of free access and outlines clear procedures government bodies must follow in this regard. However, an exception to the law applies to any information concerning state security institutions or that which is held by them.
In the absence of evidence on oversight and internal controls, I have awarded a score of 0.
1. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
2. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Guinea
3. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
4. Republic Of Guinea Organic Law L 2010/004/Cnt/ Of 24 November 2010 On The Right Of Access To Public Information, note Article 16, “The Information Officer of an administration to whom request is made is not required to disclose information concerning state security institutions or that which is held by them”
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: However, Guinea has the right to information in its Constitution.
Constitute.org Guinea's Constitution of 2010
Appiagyei-Atua, K. (2015) Access to information and national security in Ghana: drawing the balance
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no website for the intelligence services, or the Ministry of Defence for that matter. There is no reference to the intelligence services on the presidency website. There do not seem to be any media reports which confirm the identity of senior intelligence personnel, or discuss an appointment process. A list of senior defence appointments published in February 2015, for example, made no reference to the intelligence services [4].
An informed assumption can, however, be made based on official appointment processes more generally. There have been previous allegations of nepotism in the appointments process [5], and reports of ethnic favourtism in senior appointments still being prevalent under the current Condé government [6].
However, it can not be conclusively determined that appointments are made without any indication of individuals’ suitability or past conduct.
I have therefore maintained a score of 1 on the basis that the selection criteria are unclear.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Guinea (London, 2008 and 2013)
4. Amara Moro Camara, Décrets : nomination des hauts cadres civils et militaires au ministère de la Défense, 19 February 2015, accessed 23 August 2015, http://guineenews.org/decrets-nomination-des-hauts-cadres-civils-et-militaires-au-ministere-de-la-defence/
5. Diallo Boubacar, &quoute;Gouvernance en Guinée : l’UFR de Sidya Touré dénonce une « caporalisation de l’administration&quoute;, date of publication unknown, accessed 23 August 2015
6. Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Guinea Report 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Guinea.pdf
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: Guinea has signed (July 2013) and ratified (21 October 2014) the ATT. However, there is no record that it exports or manufactures arms. It is not yet clear if any future re-exports of arms (which would have to have been produced elsewhere) would have to be approved by parliament.
On the question of compliance, and as indicated by SIPRI, Guinea is not an arms exporter. Clause 7.1 of the ATT is therefore not applicable to it. Clauses 11.5 and 15.6 focus principally on the extent of information sharing to prevent transfers becoming subject to corrupt practices. This is a difficult question to address purely from public record research, and there does not seem to be any specific information in this regard.
An informed view might be taken on the basis of of international cooperation on other points, for example, counter narcotics. The US Department of State notes shortcomings by Guinea in its collaboration on this issue [5]. It could therefore be fair to assume that there would be some shortcomings in collaboration and information sharing on other sensitive issues, such as corruption and arms transfers.
1. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
2. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
3. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, Arms Trade Treaty – List of Signatories, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att
4. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Guinea (London, 2013)
5. US Department of State, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/222895.htm
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: On arms control see UN (2010) Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide on his Mission to Guinea from 7 to 22 March 2010
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is little information on this. There do not seem to be media or civil society reports discussing assets disposals, nor does the defence ministry appear to be publish any information on planned disposals, and the financial proceeds generated. There does not, however, appear to be media speculation about corruption in asset disposals.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Interview with Guinean peace and human rights activist, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
4. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Guinea
5. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is little information available with regard to an internal auditing process, nor is it clear whether the remit of the new defence and security committee includes scrutiny of disposals. In general, the external audit of national budgets in Guinea has been described as being &quoute;confronted with significant constraints and severe delays&quoute; [7, p.21]. Audit reports are only &quoute;rarely&quoute; released to the public, and it is not clear whether any of these are from the defence sector [7, p.54]. There is limited public information, such as media and CSO sources, available on this issue.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Interview with Guinean peace and human rights activist, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
4. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments - Guinea
5. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
6. Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Guinée : l’armée, la corruption et les mobiles possibles de l’attentat contre Alpha Condé&quoute;, 1 August 2011, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/190730/politique/guin-e-l-arm-e-la-corruption-et-les-mobiles-possibles-de-l-attentat-contre-alpha-cond/
7. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: As far as can be determined from public record research, the government has not made any announcements on this issue. There does not seem to be any media or civil society speculation on this point. There is very limited budget transparency generally, and as such, disclosure of secret spending is even less likely. An article shows the total budget for 2013 [6], and the total defence budget for 2015 that was presented to parliament is also publicly reported on [5]. None of these sources reference secret spending.
1. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
2. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013, London: IISS, 2013.
3. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_databaseUN
4. Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
5. Alpha Camara, &quoute;Loi des finances 2015 : Les ministres de la Justice et Délégué à la Défense devant le Parlement&quoute;, 1 December 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, http://leconakryka.com/2014/12/01/loi-des-finances-2015-les-ministres-de-la-justice-et-delegue-a-la-defence-devant-le-parlement/
6. Xinhua, &quoute;Guinée : 52% de réduction du budget de l'armée depuis 2010&quoute; accessed 23 August 2015, http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/96852/8249305.html
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: No current legislative oversight of secret spending can be verified. While there is a new parliamentary defence and security committee, its exact remit, and the extent to which it might scrutinise any form of defence spending, secret or otherwise, is not evident from the public domain. Legislative independence is at an early stage of development, as described by the BTI report [8].
Parliament is presented the budget three months before the end of the financial year, and it has two months within which to adopt it. Parliament has the right to make modifications to the budget, but it cannot alter the total deficit/excess [9]. There is no evidence that secret spending is identified in the budget, and it appears that the defence budget is not separate from the rest of the national budget. Official sources do not exist to show how different sectors are represented in the overall budget, or what level of information is provided.
A media article from August 2015 suggests that the Minister of Defence presented a headline figure for the defence sector budget to Parliament, and that this might then have been broken down into aggregate figures for: naval spending, traffic policing, military engineering, personnel costs, purchasing costs for goods and services, subsidies, and investments [7]. No mention of secret items was reported.
1. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
2. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
3. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
4. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013, London: IISS, 2013.
5. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_databaseUN
6. Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
7. Alpha Camara, &quoute;Loi des finances 2015 : Les ministres de la Justice et Délégué à la Défense devant le Parlement&quoute;, 1 December 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, http://leconakryka.com/2014/12/01/loi-des-finances-2015-les-ministres-de-la-justice-et-delegue-a-la-defence-devant-le-parlement/
8. Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Guinea Country Report 2014, p.8, accessed 22 August 2015, http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Guinea.pdf
9. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: It is first of all not clear whether any auditing is actually undertaken on defence accounts, including on secret spending. A study of the budgetary process in Guinea more generally suggested that audit reports are only &quoute;rarely&quoute; released to the public (and it is not clear whether any of these are from the defence sector), while only somewhere between 0-20% of ministries have audit offices at all [7, p.54]. In general, the external audit of national budgets in Guinea has been described as being &quoute;confronted with significant constraints and severe delays&quoute; [7, p.21].
From online research, there is no indication in any case that military spending is subject to legislative scrutiny, or that substantive parliamentary debate takes place on this issue. A defence committee was formed in 2014 as part of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme, but it is not yet fully resourced or effective [6].
When it comes to secret programs, there is no evidence that Parliament is given access to this information. A media article from August 2015 suggests that the Minister of Defence presented a headline figure for the defence sector budget to Parliament, and that this might then have been broken down into aggregate figures for: naval spending, traffic policing, military engineering, personnel costs, purchasing costs for goods and services, subsidies, and investments [8]. While this concerns budgets rather than audit reports specifically, it does tend to indicate that Parliament is not presented with much sensitive information in general, making it unlikely that they are provided with extensive audit reports.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Interview with Guinean peace and human rights activist, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
4. Sékou Sanoh, 'Parlement : la commission de défense et de sécurité en action', Guineenews, 25 March 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://guineenews.org/parlement-la-commission-de-defence-et-de-securite-en-action/
5. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
6. Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Guinea Country Report 2014, p.8, accessed 22 August 2015, http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Guinea.pdf
7. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
8. Alpha Camara, &quoute;Loi des finances 2015 : Les ministres de la Justice et Délégué à la Défense devant le Parlement&quoute;, 1 December 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, http://leconakryka.com/2014/12/01/loi-des-finances-2015-les-ministres-de-la-justice-et-delegue-a-la-defence-devant-le-parlement/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See also ICG (2008) Guinea: Ensuring Democratic Reforms
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is little information on whether off-budget military expenditure is permitted by law. The relevant budgetary law does not include any specific points on off-budget defence expenditure [6].
In terms of the Guinean budget more generally, the Guinean response to a survey question about whether an overspend on the budget is permitted suggested that there are limits to budget overspend, although it is permitted [7, p.17]. The same study indicates that the Guinean budget does contain a central fund that can be used if there is a crisis [7, p.54]. These responses suggest that there are some mechanisms in place that may serve to avoid off-budget expenditure.
However, there is little evidence that defence expenditure as a whole is well-recorded, whether or not the spending is technically on- or off-budget. The defence ministry does not appear to be publish any information on planned asset disposals, and the financial proceeds generated. Nor does it release any information on secret spending. Financial information for the defence sector is scarce in general - the media produces headline figures (for example for the total budget for 2013 [9]), and the total defence budget for 2015 was also publicly reported on [8], but there is no official release of such data.
It therefore seems unlikely that off-budget expenditure is recorded, and there is no obvious legal process to control them.
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
4. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
5. Interview with Guinean peace and human rights activist, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
6. Republique de Guinee, &quoute;Loi l/2012/n°012/cnt portant loi organique relative aux lois de finances&quoute;
7. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
8. Alpha Camara, &quoute;Loi des finances 2015 : Les ministres de la Justice et Délégué à la Défense devant le Parlement&quoute;, 1 December 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, http://leconakryka.com/2014/12/01/loi-des-finances-2015-les-ministres-de-la-justice-et-delegue-a-la-defence-devant-le-parlement/
9. Xinhua, &quoute;Guinée : 52% de réduction du budget de l'armée depuis 2010&quoute; accessed 23 August 2015, http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/96852/8249305.html
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There have been criticisms, for example of direct defence expenditure by the presidency, which indicate that off-budget expenditure does occur [5]. The article refers to the president hiring private security companies for his personal protection, though it is unclear how the expenditure is formally classified.
Indeed, there is little evidence that defence expenditure as a whole is well-recorded, making it hard to determine what might be on- or off-budget. The defence ministry does not appear to be publish any information on planned asset disposals, and the financial proceeds generated. Nor does it release any information on secret spending. Financial information for the defence sector is scarce in general - the media produces headline figures (for example for the total budget for 2013 [8]), and the total defence budget for 2015 was also publicly reported on [7], but there is no official release of such data.
However, a study of the Guinean budgetary process did suggest that there are limits to budget overspend, although it is permitted [6, p.17]. The same study indicates that the Guinean budget does contain a central fund that can be used if there is a crisis [6, p.54]. These responses suggest that there are some mechanisms in place that may serve to avoid off-budget expenditure.
In the absence of clear information on this issue, it is hard to determine the extent of off-budget expenditure in Guinea.
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
3. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
4. Interview with Guinean peace and human rights activist, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
5. Bah Boubacar Caba, &quoute;Trois ans après, comment Alpha Condé a dépensé près d’un milliard de dollars sans que les Guinéens n’en voient les résultats&quoute;, 13 September 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, http://guineenews.org/trois-ans-apres-comment-alpha-conde-a-depense-pres-dun-milliard-de-dollars-sans-que-les-guineens-nen-voient-les-resultats/
6. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
7. Alpha Camara, &quoute;Loi des finances 2015 : Les ministres de la Justice et Délégué à la Défense devant le Parlement&quoute;, 1 December 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, http://leconakryka.com/2014/12/01/loi-des-finances-2015-les-ministres-de-la-justice-et-delegue-a-la-defence-devant-le-parlement/
8. Xinhua, &quoute;Guinée : 52% de réduction du budget de l'armée depuis 2010&quoute; accessed 23 August 2015, http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/96852/8249305.html
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no specific information with regard to legal provisions for document classification in the public domain. As a result, it appears likely information is provided on a discretionary basis, although there are no public reports of individuals influencing decisions in this regard. Guinea does have freedom of information legislation [6], however there is no obligation on security institutions to disclose information as there are exemptions on information that might affect national security.
The score fits aspects of the criteria for a score of 1 and 0, however, as there is no public evidence of individuals or agencies persistently being able to influence decisions a score of 1 has been selected.
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
3. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
4. Interview with Guinean peace and human rights activist, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
5. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 18 June 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/20140728_PBC_GUI_Summary%20Mtg%20June_English.pdf
6. Republic Of Guinea Organic Law L 2010/004/Cnt/ Of 24 November 2010 On The Right Of Access To Public Information, note Article 16, “The Information Officer of an administration to whom request is made is not required to disclose information concerning state security institutions or that which is held by them”
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no information on military-owned businesses in the public sphere. An informed judgment has to be made which is consistent with both the poor integrity standards in the military, as evidenced by the International Crisis Group report [1], and the lack of transparency around its activities. It is not unlikely that, given the military’s pre-eminence in the commercial sphere and historic influence over fuel supply figures [1], it would have involvement in or ownership of businesses.
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
3. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: FRIDE (2012) Addressing state fragility in Guinea-Conakry: A European success story?
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There do not appear to be any media or civil society reports which give clarity on this point, and there is no information on military-owned businesses in the public sphere. An informed judgment on whether the military is likely to own businesses has to be made which is consistent with both the poor integrity standards in the military, as evidenced by the International Crisis Group report [5], and the lack of transparency around its activities. It is not unlikely that, given the military’s pre-eminence in the commercial sphere and historic influence over fuel supply figures [5], it would have involvement in or ownership of businesses.
There is a general lack of evidence to demonstrate that auditing or scrutiny is strong in Guinea. A study of the budgetary process in Guinea more suggested that audit reports are only &quoute;rarely&quoute; released to the public (and it is not clear whether any of these are from the defence sector), while only somewhere between 0-20% of ministries have audit offices at all [6, p.54]. In general, the external audit of national budgets in Guinea has been described as being &quoute;confronted with significant constraints and severe delays&quoute; [6, p.21].
From online research, there is no indication in any case that military spending is subject to legislative scrutiny, or that substantive parliamentary debate takes place on this issue. A defence committee was formed in 2014 as part of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme, but it is not yet fully resourced or effective [7].
Reports suggest that military activities have &quoute;never been subjected to the external controls applicable
to other government departments&quoute;. Past attempts to change this have either been &quoute;routinely discouraged or met with stiff resistance from well-placed senior officers&quoute; [5].
It is therefore unlikely that any military-owned businesses would be subject to any scrutiny or auditing processes.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Interview with Guinean journalist, 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
4. US Department of State, 2014 Investment Climate Statement – Guinea, June 2014, p. 6, accessed on 29 October 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/229024.pdf
5. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
6. AFDB, &quoute;Pratiques et procédures budgétaires en Afrique 2008&quoute;, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/CABRI%20AfDB%20French.pdf
7. Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Guinea Country Report 2014, p.8, accessed 22 August 2015, http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Guinea.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: UN Department of State (2013) 2013 Investment Climate Statement - Guinea
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The International Crisis Group report refers to the historic problem of unauthorised private enterprise by military personnel, such as through checkpoint fraud and sales of army rations [5, p.9].
There are also reports of the use of a military airfield in Guinea by organised criminal groups [8], the 2009 arrest of Ousmane Conté, son of the former President, and the continued complicity of the military in organised criminal activity [9]. The US Department of State have also stated that there are &quoute;credible allegations that Guinean military officials are facilitating drug trafficking through the country&quoute; [10].
That form of activity aside, I have not found any relevant information in the public domain on the illicit use of defence personnel or equipment, such as for private security work, which might indicate a patronage system between private companies and defence institutions.
There is strong evidence that organised criminal activity continues to afflict the sector, yet no strong evidence that government is actively trying to tackle the problem. While the Guinean government has established a national anti-narcotics bureau, there has been little evidence of progress on combating drug crimes and tackling the problem is reported to be a low priority [7].
However, according to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the Guinean military has developed a code of conduct and held workshops on military justice which have reached 10,000 personnel [6]. This may place on restrictions on commercial activity, but the details are not available in the public domain. Given the priority accorded to security sector reform by the Conde government (2010 - present ), it does seem unlikely there is no official discouragement of these practices at all, however there is no public evidence to demonstrate this.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Interview with Guinean journalist, 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
4. US Department of State, 2014 Investment Climate Statement – Guinea, June 2014, p. 6, accessed on 29 October 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/229024.pdf
5. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
6. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
7. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
8. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 'Transitional Organised Crime in West Africa', 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf -
9. The Brookings Institution, &quoute;Crime, Violence and Politics: Drug Trafficking and Counternarcotics Policies in Mali and Guinea&quoute;, 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Gberie--Mali-and-Guinea-final.pdf?la=en -
10. US Department of State, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/222895.htm
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There has been some commitment to anti-corruption measures by the Guinean government as a whole since 2010, however there is no evidence of any public statements by the presidential delegate for defence, Abdoul Kabelè Camara, or other senior defence leadership [6], on anti-corruption.
The extent to which there might be internal commitment to integrity might be reflected in progress on the security sector reform programme. In this regard, the UN Peacebuilding Fund refers to the adoption of a code of good conduct and military justice training programmes, which have presumably been agreed with senior defence personnel. In an interview in August 2014, the minister responsible for leading the SSR programme, Maramany Cissé, gave an overview of wide-ranging institutional reform and steps toward professionalisation, even though there was no specific reference to corruption [7].
There is therefore some apparent commitment to reform among senior personnel involved in the SSR programme, even if this is not publicly stated. There has been no apparent commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry as an institution.
1. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
2. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
3. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
4. Présidence de la République de Guinée website, 'Grands Dossiers: Restructuration des Forces de defence et de Securite', last updated 28 March 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.presidence.gov.gn/index.php/defence-et-securite
5. Afua Hirsch, ‘Guinea's anti-corruption activists raise doubts over mining crackdown’, The Guardian, 19 July 2013, accessed on 29 October 2014 at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/jul/19/guinea-anti-corruption-mining
6. Amara Moro Camara, “Décrets : nomination des hauts cadres civils et militaires au ministère de la Défense”, 19 February 2015, accessed 24 August 2015, http://guineenews.org/decrets-nomination-des-hauts-cadres-civils-et-militaires-au-ministere-de-la-defence/
7. Ibrahima Kalil Diallo, “Réforme du secteur de la sécurité : Maramany Cissé dresse un état des lieux”, 13 August 2014, accessed 28 August 2015, http://guineeactu.info/actualite-informations/interviews/4703-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-de-la-lutte-contre-la-criminalite-et-le-terrorisme-maramany-cisse-dresse-un-etat-des-lieux.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There do not appear to be publicly available guidelines for military personnel on bribery and corruption, including the appropriate sanctions. With the exception of the high profile prosecution of the former president’s son, Ousmane Conte, a military officer, for involvement in organised crime in 2009 [5], there are no other public reports on military prosecutions.
Military justice reform has been a focus of the SSR programme, though the extent to which this encompasses anti-corruption is unclear. According to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, 10,000 personnel have attended workshops on military justice [6].
There is evidence of bribery and corruption in the military, and a culture of impunity has been noted in reports on military reform in Guinea [7]. There are also reports of the use of a military airfield in Guinea by organised criminal groups [8], the continued complicity of the military in organised criminal activity [9]. The US Department of State have also stated that there are &quoute;credible allegations that Guinean military officials are facilitating drug trafficking through the country&quoute; [10].
At the moment, it is unclear what measures are in place for personnel found to have taken part in bribery and corruption, and there does not appear to be a formal system in place to enforce anti-corruption in defence.
1. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 16 April 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/140514%20Chair%20Summary%20PBC_GUI_Meeting140416.pdf
2. Interview with Guinean peace and human rights activist, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
Sékou Sanoh, 'Parlement : la commission de défense et de sécurité en action', Guineenews, 25 March 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://guineenews.org/parlement-la-commission-de-defence-et-de-securite-en-action/
3. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
4. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
5. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (2013), 'Transitional Organised Crime in West Africa', see https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf
6. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
7. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
8. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 'Transitional Organised Crime in West Africa', 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf -
9. The Brookings Institution, &quoute;Crime, Violence and Politics: Drug Trafficking and Counternarcotics Policies in Mali and Guinea&quoute;, 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Gberie--Mali-and-Guinea-final.pdf?la=en -
10. US Department of State, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/222895.htm
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Africa's Public Procurement & Entrepreneurship Research Initiative (APPERI) (2013) Guinea: Steinmetz $9 Billion Fortune at Risk in Soros-Backed Probe
On anti-corruption actions see AFDB (2012) Guinea - completion point under the enhanced HIPC initiative
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There are no known mechanisms for whistle-blowers to report corruption within the armed forces, despite some government encouragement of reporting corruption at all levels - e.g. a toll-free phone number for citizen reporting [7].There is no public information on the effectiveness of the line, or how many reports it receives.
There does not seem to be any wider whistleblowing legislation which would include protection measures. Furthermore, there is no indication that there are whistleblowing lines specifically open to defence personnel.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
4. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
5. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 16 April 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/140514%20Chair%20Summary%20PBC_GUI_Meeting140416.pdf
6. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
7. Agence Nationale de Lutte contre La Corruption et Promotion de la Bonne Gouvernance, &quoute;Temoignez&quoute;, accessed 28 August 2015, http://www.anlcguinee.org/index.php/temoignez
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no evidence of regular rotation of officers or personnel in or out of procurement or financial management positions. More generally, it has been noted that military &quoute;personnel tend to stay in one place for long periods, allowing them to cultivate social and family links with host communities&quoute; [7, p.19].
There is also no relevant information on post-retirement restrictions. They may be included in the new code of conduct, but this is not publicly available.
Anti-corruption efforts do appear to have focused on financial management, such as the issue of payroll fraud. This may be a sign that these positions are considered as more open to corruption opportunities than others. The 2011-12 census and biometric registration of the security forces established a definite number of personnel on the payroll that was around 42% lower than the figure previously claimed by the military [8]. However, there is not any information in the public domain on specific treatment accorded to financial personnel. This extends to others who might be perceived as vulnerable, such as procurement staff.
There may be some internal provisions on these points, but they cannot be established from public record research.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
4. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
5. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 16 April 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/140514%20Chair%20Summary%20PBC_GUI_Meeting140416.pdf
6. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
7. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
8. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Reforme du Secteur de Securite&quoute;, accessed 24 August 2015, http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/restructuration-des-ressources-humaines-de-larmee
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: On recruitment see ISSAT (2010) Guinea: reforming the army
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: In March 2015 the presidential defence delegate, Abdoul Kabèlè Camara stated the total figure was between 27,000 and 30,000 [3]. The UN Peacebuilding Fund indicated that in April 2012 the number of personnel was 22, 539 [4]. This information is not available through official sources, a problem perhaps stemming from the absence of a defence ministry website.
The range suggests there remains a degree of ambiguity in terms of total personnel despite a 2011-12 census and biometric registration of the security forces, which aimed to establish a definite number of personnel on the payroll. The figure that followed this initiative was around 42% lower than the figure previously claimed by the military.
1. UN Peacebuilding Commission, Mission by the Guinea Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission to the Republic of Guinea - Report (English - Unofficial translation), 11 to 15 March 2012, accessed on 29 October at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/pbc_visits/PBC-GUI%20Visit%20March%202012%20-%20Report%20(EN%20version).pdf
2. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
3. Ibrahima Kalil Diallo, “Réforme du secteur de la sécurité : Maramany Cissé dresse un état des lieux”, 13 August 2014, accessed 28 August 2015, http://guineeactu.info/actualite-informations/interviews/4703-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-de-la-lutte-contre-la-criminalite-et-le-terrorisme-maramany-cisse-dresse-un-etat-des-lieux.html
4. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Reforme du Secteur de Securite&quoute;, accessed 24 August 2015, http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/restructuration-des-ressources-humaines-de-larmee
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no official public information on defence salaries. A recruitment website gives a salary band of between GNF 750,000 (approximately $103) and GNF 2,870,000 ($396) for all defence personnel [6]. There is no clear way to confirm whether this data is accurate. The International Crisis Group report also discusses benefits in kind such as rice rations [3], though it is difficult to place a monetary value on these.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
4. UN Peacebuilding Commission, Mission by the Guinea Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission to the Republic of Guinea - Report (English - Unofficial translation), 11 to 15 March 2012, accessed on 29 October at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/pbc_visits/PBC-GUI%20Visit%20March%202012%20-%20Report%20(EN%20version).pdf
5. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no concrete public information on the payment system. It is of note that financial management has been a focus of SSR reform, as discussed by the UN Peacebuilding Fund [4]. However, it is difficult to assess from public information whether this has translated into more efficient payments.
There are no media articles that suggest public salaries are generally delayed, although there are occasional exceptions [5]. The lack of transparency on the payment system has precluded a higher score.
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 16 April 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/140514%20Chair%20Summary%20PBC_GUI_Meeting140416.pdf
3. UN Peacebuilding Commission, Mission by the Guinea Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission to the Republic of Guinea - Report (English - Unofficial translation), 11 to 15 March 2012, accessed on 29 October at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/pbc_visits/PBC-GUI%20Visit%20March%202012%20-%20Report%20(EN%20version).pdf
4. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Reforme du Secteur de Securite&quoute;, accessed 24 August 2015, http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/restructuration-des-ressources-humaines-de-larmee
5. Jeanne Fofana, “Finances : pourquoi le retard des salaires des fonctionnaires ?”, 30 January 2015, accessed 28 August 2015, http://www.kababachir.com/2015/01/30/finances-retard-salaires-fonctionnaires/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See Voice of America (2009) Guinea Soldiers Hold Paymaster in Mutiny
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is a long history of non payment and delays, sometimes causing the military to riot. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6625573.stm
Suggested score:
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no public information on the appointment system, and there is no evidence to suggest such a system has been implemented. An ICG report, for example, explicitly refers to professionalism and competence having no influence over appointment processes [2].
There do not appear to be reports which explicitly criticise the promotion system for defence personnel. However, public appointments in general appear to remain influenced by favouritism. The BTI report discusses the problem of ethnicity-driven appointments in the civil service, for example [4].
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
3. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
4. Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Guinea Report 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, p.2, p.5, http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Guinea.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Phil Vernon (2011) (How) can new leaders effect change from within? The case of Guinea-Conakry
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no relevant public information with regard to formal promotion processes, including the existence of promotion boards, and oversight. An ICG report provides substantial relevant information on poor promotion practices that do not reflect merit [2]. There is no evidence that proper procedures exist, or that there has been an overhaul in practices under the Conde government [4].
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
3. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
4. Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Guinea Report 2014, accessed 23 August 2015, p.2, p.5, http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Guinea.pdf
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Crisis Group's report is more explicit about the reality of corruption in regards to promotions within the military.
e.g., p.8 &quoute;A former minister in Conté’s regime said that whenever there were problems or tensions within the armed forces, Conté immediately ordered promotions of all serving personnel, though some of the promised benefits were not fully implemented.47 As a result, the normal pyramidal structure of an army was reversed, leaving an estimated two officers to each common soldier. Today, young lieutenants serve as military drivers.48&quoute;
Suggested score:
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no compulsory conscription practised in Guinea. There is also moratorium on hiring new personnel while the armed forces are reduced from about 22,000 to 15,000 by 2020. Guinea has suffered in the past from the problem of forced recruitment of civilians rather than running legislation conscription processes [4] .
With the emphasis on demobilising and retiring serving personnel, it is possible that bribes are paid by enlisted personnel to remain on the payroll and avoid demobilisation. There is legal provision for conscription only &quoute;in times of need&quoute;.
1. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
2. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013, London: IISS, 2013.
3. Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guinea: The age at which Guinean youth are conscripted for military service; information indicating the department that conscripts them; whether a 27-year-old who graduated eight years ago would be conscripted for military service (2002-December 2004) , 22 December 2004, GIN43247.FE, accessed 29 October 2014, http://www.refworld.org/docid/42df60ef1d.html
4. Guinean Organization for the Defence of Human Rights, &quoute;Current situation in Guinea-Conakry&quoute;, 20 July 2001, https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/177973/294915_de.html
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no conscription in Guinea.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there do not appear to be any guidelines on refusing bribes to gain preferred postings. Postings outside of Conakry have been notoriously unpopular with troops because of lack of access to pay and benefits. With the focus on demobilisation, there may also be bribery to avoid compulsory retirement.
An ICG report explicitly refers to officers making bribes to secure posting overseas, though the report is five years old and it is unclear if this continues in the present day [4].
1. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
2. Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guinea: The age at which Guinean youth are conscripted for military service; information indicating the department that conscripts them; whether a 27-year-old who graduated eight years ago would be conscripted for military service (2002-December 2004) , 22 December 2004, GIN43247.FE, accessed 29 October 2014, http://www.refworld.org/docid/42df60ef1d.html
3. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
4. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: Ghost soldiers were a huge issue up until the 2011-12 census and biometric registration of all personnel to avoid payroll fraud. This reduced the assumed number of armed forces by over 40%. The problem of ghost soldiers has been a major focus of security sector reform [5, 6].
However, there are recurrent problems in financial management standards in defence institutions [7]. The number of personnel is not available from the establishment, and the range of estimates available from external sources suggests there remains a degree of ambiguity in terms of total personnel despite the biometric registration initiative [5, 6]. There is also no official public information on defence salaries or the payment system.
It is therefore unclear whether the problem has been addressed and the risk of payroll fraud removed. The score should logically sit somewhere between 0 and 1, but 1 has been selected to reflect SSR efforts to address the issue.
1. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
2. UN Peacebuilding Commission, Mission by the Guinea Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission to the Republic of Guinea - Report (English - Unofficial translation), 11 to 15 March 2012, accessed on 29 October at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/pbc_visits/PBC-GUI%20Visit%20March%202012%20-%20Report%20(EN%20version).pdf
3. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
4. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
5. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
6. Ibrahima Kalil Diallo, “Réforme du secteur de la sécurité : Maramany Cissé dresse un état des lieux”, 13 August 2014, accessed 28 August 2015, http://guineeactu.info/actualite-informations/interviews/4703-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-de-la-lutte-contre-la-criminalite-et-le-terrorisme-maramany-cisse-dresse-un-etat-des-lieux.html
7. Jeanne Fofana, “Finances : pourquoi le retard des salaires des fonctionnaires ?”, 30 January 2015, accessed 28 August 2015, http://www.kababachir.com/2015/01/30/finances-retard-salaires-fonctionnaires/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See also Congressional Research Service (2010) Guinea’s New Transitional Government: Emerging Issues for U.S. Policy
McCallum, N. & Vicky Tyler, V. (2001) International Experience with Civil Service Censuses and Civil Service Databases, International Records Management Trust London, UK
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is little conclusive evidence on this. As of 2010, the two chains were the same and it was widely cited that commanding officers claimed parts of their subordinates' pay and benefits [4]. This is supposed to change under the SSR programme, but it is unclear whether this has yet taken effect.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
4. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
5. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See IMF (1997) A decade of civil service reform in Sub-Sahara Africa
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund specifically refers to several thousand copies of a code of good conduct (“Code de bonne conduite et de fonctionnement de l'Armée”) having been produced as part of the SSR programme [5]. There are, however, no copies of the code in the public domain and, as such, it is impossible to comment on its application. From online research, there do not appear to be published conduct provisions for civil servants in Guinea.
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
3. Plan-cadre des nations unies pour l’aide au developpement, République de Guinée, 2013-2017, February 2012, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.gn.undp.org/content/dam/guinea/docs/pnuad-guinee-2013-2017.pdf
4. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
5. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund specifically refers to several thousand copies of a code of good conduct (“Code de bonne conduite et de fonctionnement de l'Armée”) having been produced as part of the SSR programme [6]. There are, however, no copies of the code in the public domain and, as such, it is impossible to comment on its application. From online research, there do not appear to be published conduct provisions for civil servants in Guinea.
There is, however, limited evidence to show that there are prosecutions for personnel involved in corruption incidents, despite emphasis on military justice reforms. With the exception of the high profile prosecution of the former president’s son, Ousmane Conte, a military officer, for involvement in organised crime in 2009 [7], there are no other public reports on military prosecutions for corruption.
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Chair’s Summary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, Informal meeting of the Guinea Country-Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 16 April 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/140514%20Chair%20Summary%20PBC_GUI_Meeting140416.pdf
3. David Lewis, ‘Five sentenced for life over attack on Guinea president’. Reuters, 13 July 2013, accessed online on 29 October 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/us-guinea-attack-trial-idUSBRE96C08F20130713
4. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
5. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
6. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
7. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (2013), 'Transitional Organised Crime in West Africa', see https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no public information on anti-corruption training provided to defence and military personnel. It is a consistent theme throughout that the lack of training on corruption is an issue across public institutions in Guinea [2].
There may be some relevant training for personnel deployed on UN operations. However, as discussed by TI, peacekeeping training rarely explicitly addresses corruption risk [5].
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
3. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeper Training Centre, Training Courses content, accessed on 29 October 2014, http://www.kaiptc.org/Training.aspx
4. KAIPTC training curricula
5. Transparency International, &quoute;Corruption & peacekeeping: Strengthening peacekeeping and the UN&quoute;, October 2013, http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There are no indications that military prosecutions are made public. An exception, although not recent, was the high profile prosecution of the former president’s son, Ousmane Conte, a military officer, for involvement in organised crime in 2009 [5].
Military justice reform has been a focus of the SSR programme, though the extent to which this encompasses anti-corruption is unclear. According to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, 10,000 personnel have attended workshops on military justice [7].
There is evidence of bribery and corruption in the military, and a culture of impunity has been noted in reports on military reform in Guinea [3]. There are also reports of the use of a military airfield in Guinea by organised criminal groups [5], the continued complicity of the military in organised criminal activity [8]. The US Department of State have also stated that there are &quoute;credible allegations that Guinean military officials are facilitating drug trafficking through the country&quoute; [9].
At the moment, it is unclear what measures are in place for personnel found to have taken part in bribery and corruption, and there does not appear to be a formal system in place to enforce anti-corruption in defence. The 2013 national defence and security policy enshrines the principle of openness in military affairs [6], but there is no specific legislation to confirm prosecutions must be made public.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
4. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
5. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (2013), 'Transitional Organised Crime in West Africa', see https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf
6. &quoute;Politique Nationale de Defence et de Securite 2013&quoute;, November 2013, accessed 22 August 2015, http://pbfguinee.org/sites/default/files/report-documents/politique_nationale_de_defence_et_de_securite_2013.pdf
7. UN Peacebuilding Fund, &quoute;Un bureau conseil strategique au service de la RSS&quoute;, accessed 22 August 2015, &quoute;http://www.pbfguinee.org/axe-prioritaire/reforme-du-secteur-de-securite/un-bureau-conseil-strategique-au-service-de-la-rss
8. The Brookings Institution, &quoute;Crime, Violence and Politics: Drug Trafficking and Counternarcotics Policies in Mali and Guinea&quoute;, 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Gberie--Mali-and-Guinea-final.pdf?la=en -
9. US Department of State, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/222895.htm
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: Guinea is still in the process of developing an anti-corruption law [3]. In the absence of this law, the relevant legislation appears to be the Guinean penal code [4]. In this law articles 192 to 195 refer to corruption, but provide no clear definition, including on the issue of facilitation payments.
There does therefore not appear to be a law making facilitation payments illegal. Facilitation payments are likely common in Guinea, as indicated by the country's low ranking of 145 on the corruption perceptions index. Guinea does not feature in the global corruption barometer.
1. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
2. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
3. Kroll, Anti-Corruption and Compliance Guide, 2014, p.20, http://www.kroll.com/media/pdf/articles/AntiCorruptionGuide_2014_hi.pdf
4. “Loi N ° 98/036 Du 31 Decembre 1998 Portant Code Pénal L’assemblee Nationale De La République De Guinée”, accessed 31 August 2015, http://www.hcch.net/upload/cp_gn.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: On the absence of anti-corruption legislation in Guinea see Kroll (2014) Anti corruption and compliance guide
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The fight against corruption is included in the 2013 national defence and security policy [4]. This suggests some recognition of the problem; however, this has not been formally built into military doctrine.
1. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
2. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
3. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
4. &quoute;Politique Nationale de Defence et de Securite 2013&quoute;, November 2013, accessed 22 August 2015, http://pbfguinee.org/sites/default/files/report-documents/politique_nationale_de_defence_et_de_securite_2013.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no public information on anti-corruption training provided to defence and military personnel. It is a consistent theme throughout that the lack of training on corruption is an issue across public institutions in Guinea [6].
There may be some relevant training for personnel deployed on UN operations. However, as discussed by TI, peacekeeping training rarely explicitly addresses corruption risk [7].
There is evidence of bribery and corruption in the military, and a culture of impunity has been noted in reports on military reform in Guinea [5]. There are also reports of the use of a military airfield in Guinea by organised criminal groups [1], the continued complicity of the military in organised criminal activity [4]. The US Department of State have also stated that there are &quoute;credible allegations that Guinean military officials are facilitating drug trafficking through the country&quoute; [8].
Since the SSR programme began in 2011, there have been very limited deployments of Guinean military personnel on operations, although there are now about 200 troops in Mali with MINUSMA.
1. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 'Transitional Organised Crime in West Africa', 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf -
2. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
3. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeper Training Centre, Training Courses content, accessed on 29 October 2014, http://www.kaiptc.org/Training.aspx
4. The Brookings Institution, &quoute;Crime, Violence and Politics: Drug Trafficking and Counternarcotics Policies in Mali and Guinea&quoute;, 2013, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Gberie--Mali-and-Guinea-final.pdf?la=en -
5. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
6. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
7. Transparency International, &quoute;Corruption & peacekeeping: Strengthening peacekeeping and the UN&quoute;, October 2013, http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs.html
8. US Department of State, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/222895.htm
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: On the lack of conternarcotics policies and training see Gberie, L. (2015) Crime, Violence, and Politics: Drug Trafficking and Counternarcotics Policies in Mali and Guinea
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no evidence that trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field. There is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any anti-corruption training is undertaken, or that corruption has been defined as a strategic issue, which might lead to the appointment of such monitors.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeper Training Centre, Training Courses content, accessed on 29 October 2014, http://www.kaiptc.org/Training.aspx
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no indication that there are specific guidelines on the risks from contracting during operational deployment.
Although some relevant training may be delivered to peacekeeping troops, as discussed by TI, peacekeeper training rarely explicitly addresses corruption risk [3].
1. UN Department of Peacekeeping operations, Conduct and Discipline, UN DPKO website, accessed on 29 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/cdu.shtml
2. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeper Training Centre, Training Courses content, accessed on 29 October 2014, http://www.kaiptc.org/Training.aspx
3. Transparency International, &quoute;Corruption & peacekeeping: Strengthening peacekeeping and the UN&quoute;, October 2013, http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: I can find no evidence that PMCs are used by the Guinean security forces. However, the presidency may have directly employed foreign military consultants, as noted in a September 2013 Guinean media article [6]. There are reports suggesting corruption in their employment, for example an Israeli PMC was fined (in Israel) for negotiating to supply arms and military training to the Guinean regime without prior approval [8].
As far as can be determined from public record research, there is no specific regulation on the use of PMCs in Guinea. Indeed, scrutiny is not good over the behaviour of the armed forces in general, and there is no reason to suspect that PMCs might be better overseen. There is evidence of bribery and corruption in the military, and a culture of impunity has been noted in reports on military reform in Guinea [7].
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score lowered from 1 to 0.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
4. Interview with Guinean peace and human rights activist, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
5. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013
6. Bah Boubacar Caba, &quoute;Trois ans après, comment Alpha Condé a dépensé près d’un milliard de dollars sans que les Guinéens n’en voient les résultats&quoute;, 13 September 2013, accessed 30 August 2015, http://guineenews.org/trois-ans-apres-comment-alpha-conde-a-depense-pres-dun-milliard-de-dollars-sans-que-les-guineens-nen-voient-les-resultats/
7. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
8. Lewis, M. (2012) Guns and bread: it’s not unusual to see private security companies in conflict-hit regions–but as deliverers of development? New Internationalist, http://iissonline.net/guns-and-bread-its-not-unusual-to-see-private-security-companies-in-conflict-hit-regions-but-as-deliverers-of-development/
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: See Lewis, M. (2012) Guns and bread: it’s not unusual to see private security companies in conflict-hit regions–but as deliverers of development? New Internationalist, http://iissonline.net/guns-and-bread-its-not-unusual-to-see-private-security-companies-in-conflict-hit-regions-but-as-deliverers-of-development/
Gumedze, S. (Ed.) (2011) From market for force to market for peace. Private military and security companies in peacekeeping operations ISS Monograph N. 183
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Private security firms (locally registered as well as from outside the country) often support companies working in the extractive industries. They often have a role to play in protecting national interests and in counter terrorism. International agreements push for monitoring of these security activities and I have seen the military defer to the local businesses in how they ensure security of mines, ports, railways etc. Protecting these natural resources seems to trump attempts at military meddling. Extractive industries seem to take this responsibility seriously since there is international anti terrorism monitoring.
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: As discussed by the IMF, Guinea has recently enacted new legislation on public procurement [10], focused on the establishment of a new procurement regulator, the Autorite de Regulation de Marche Publiques. Any 2012 law [12] and a series of decrees passed in 2014 [13], available on the Ministry of Finance website have superseded a 1988 code [11]. There are also media reports that the Guinean government is developing a new procurement code [14].
There is no indication that defence is wholly exempt from this legislation. However, article 11 of the 2012 law clearly states that there is no requirement for defence and security contracts to go to public tender.
The extent to which defence institutions comply with the legislation and are subject to scrutiny is difficult to establish. The regulator has only recently been established and it is too early to determine if it will be effective. There are major flaws in procurement systems in Guinea generally and an absence of accountability [10], which will take time to overturn. The lack of requirement for public tendering may mean defence institutions in particular receive less scrutiny.
1. Interview with civil society facilitator of defence reform process, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
4. Interview with Guinean peace and human rights activist, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
5. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
6. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
7. Maramany Cisse & Georges Shedid Sy, ‘Presentation of the Government of Guinea on the SSR Process’, 13 June 2011, to UN Peacebuilding Commission Meeting, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/gui/informal/gui_informal_ssr_jun_2011.pdf
8. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
9. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
10. International Monetary Fund, Guinea: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, July 2013, accessed 30 August 2015, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13191.pdf
11. “Guinee, Code des Marches Publiques, Ordannance 1988”, accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.droit-afrique.com/images/textes/Guinee/Guinee%20-%20Code%20des%20marches%20publics.pdf
12. “Loi Fixant Les Regles Regissant La Passation, Le Controle Et La Regulation Des Marches Et Delegations Des Service Public”, 2012, accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.finances.gov.gn/images/stories/Documents/documents1/LOI.pdf
13. Decrees 165 – 169, passed 2014 and accessed 30 August 2015 , all available on the Ministry of Finance webpage, http://www.finances.gov.gn/index.php/component/content/article/59-actualites/233-deceret
14. Zézé Enéma Guilavogui, La Guinée travaille sur un nouveau Code des marchés publics, 19 March 2014, http://kaloumpresse.com/guinee-economie/3-economie/5370-la-guinee-travaille-sur-le-nouveau-code-des-marches-publics-
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Procurement contracts are defined in the Government Procurement Code enacted on 3 June 1997 (Law No. L/97/016/AN and Decree No. D/97/250/PRG/SGG of 3 November 1997), see WTO Legal and institutional framework of the foreign trade and investment regimes
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: As described by the IMF [7], the new procurement regulator, the Autorite de Regulation des Marches Publiques, has stipulated a standard government procurement cycle. In theory, this encompasses contract sign-off and monitoring, though it is unclear if it extends to broader risk areas, such as needs assessment and asset disposal [8, 9].
In theory, defence should be subject to this cycle. However, there is no requirement for public tendering on &quoute;defence and security needs requiring secrecy and which are incompatible with publicity&quoute; [8]. In addition, there is no public evidence or examples of defence procurement cycles being publicly disclosed, including procurement which might not fall under the exemption above.
The score is therefore borderline between 0 and 1, but the score is restricted by the lack of evidence of any disclosure on this topic for the defence industry.
1. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
2. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
3. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
4. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
5. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
6. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
7. International Monetary Fund, Guinea: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, July 2013, accessed 30 August 2015, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13191.pdf
8. “Loi Fixant Les Regles Regissant La Passation, Le Controle Et La Regulation Des Marches Et Delegations Des Service Public”, 2012, accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.finances.gov.gn/images/stories/Documents/documents1/LOI.pdf
9. Decrees 165 – 169, passed 2014 and accessed 30 August 2015 , all available on the Ministry of Finance webpage, http://www.finances.gov.gn/index.php/component/content/article/59-actualites/233-deceret
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The Direction Generale de l’Intendance Militaire (DGIM) is responsible for financial mismanagement and has a regulatory division and audit office, but these are not fully functional and far from transparent. There is only minimal public information with regard to its activities, suggesting this monitoring is not transparent.
Outside of defence institutions, the government has recently created a new procurement regulator, the Autorite de Regulation des Marches Publiques [7]. This only became operational in late 2014 [8], and it is unclear whether it will monitor defence procurement.
In addition, the Guinean Court of Auditors has previously undertaken some scrutiny of defence procurement. In 2011, it highlighted irregularities in tender processes for a number of defence contracts under the military junta (2009-2010). These included a conference centre, an officer accommodation block, an order for 50,000 medals and 39,000 military uniforms [9].
Nevertheless, there has been no indication of similar scrutiny by the court of auditors of procurement undertaken by the Conde government (2010 - present). This indicates there is no evidence of activity in the last five years.
1. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
2. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
3. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
4. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
5. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_databaseUN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
6. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
7. International Monetary Fund, Guinea: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, July 2013, accessed 30 August 2015, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13191.pdf
8. Amara Moro Camara, “Présidence : L’Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics mise sur orbite”, 22 November 2014, http://guineenews.org/presidence-lautorite-de-regulation-des-marches-publics-mise-sur-orbite/
9. François Soudan, “Marchés publics sous Dadis et Konaté : la boîte de Pandore guinéenne”, 31 May 2011, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/191529/politique/march-s-publics-sous-dadis-et-konat-la-bo-te-de-pandore-guin-enne/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: Guinea does not make public any of its defence procurement or spending, and it is very difficult to disentangle procurement from other defence spending. There is no evidence any purchases made public by defence institutions. The SIPRI arms transfer database refers to five arms transfers from South Africa in 2014. An article published by defence web [7] indicates this was for the purchase of armoured vehicles. Nevertheless, there is minimal public information regarding this contract, and no indication Guinean defence institutions have actively taken steps to disclose the contract publicly.
1. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
2. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
3. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
4. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
5. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_databaseUN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
6. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
7. Guy Martin, &quoute;More details on South African arms exports for 2014&quoute;, 27 March 2015, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=38561:more-details-on-south-african-arms-exports-for-2014&catid=7:Industry&Itemid=116
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There appear to be no official requirements in place on suppliers. Procurement mechanisms do not appear to have reached this level of sophistication.
As there is no public reporting on procurement, it is difficult to assess to what extent a contractor’s integrity might be a consideration in the selection process. There are no recent media or civil society reports criticising contractor selection. However, with corruption not designated as a strategic priority, it is unlikely this is built into the institutional culture.
1. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
2. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
3. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
4. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
5. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_databaseUN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
6. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: It is important to bear in mind the particularities of Guinea’s national defence and security policy, and the background context. The policy [5] is very much focused on security sector reform and the appropriate role for the military in society. It might better be seen as a conceptual framework rather than a traditional defence strategy. This stems from Guinea’s history of military coups.
There is no parallel strategy which might provide more concrete guidance on Guinea’s military needs, such as size and type of forces, equipment required etc. We therefore have to conclude that any procurement in Guinea is not derived from an audited national strategy, and is more likely to be opportunistic.
Response to peer reviewer:
The source provided does not provide any sort of strategy against which to compare procurement practice.
1. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
2. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
3. UNDP Guinea, Background [to SSR Programme], in Senior Advisor – Security Sector Reform, Job Advertisement, posted c. June 2014 to NDP Jobs website, accessed 27 October 2014, http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=47604
4. Cheick Ah. Tidiane Diallo, ‘Réforme du secteur de la sécurité : Bientôt une Politique nationale de défense et de sécurité’, Guinee7.com, 14 novembre 2013, accessed on 29 October 2014, http://www.guinee7.com/2013/11/14/reforme-du-secteur-securite-bientot-politique-nationale-defence-securite/
5. &quoute;Politique Nationale de Defence et de Securite 2013&quoute;, November 2013, accessed 31 August 2015, http://pbfguinee.org/sites/default/files/report-documents/politique_nationale_de_defence_et_de_securite_2013.pdf
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Procurement contracts are defined in the Government Procurement Code enacted on 3 June 1997 (Law No. L/97/016/AN and Decree No. D/97/250/PRG/SGG of 3 November 1997), see WTO Legal and institutional framework of the foreign trade and investment regimes
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: It is important to bear in mind the particularities of Guinea’s national defence and security policy, and the background context. The policy [7] is very much focused on security sector reform and the appropriate role for the military in society. It might better be seen as a conceptual framework rather than a traditional defence strategy. This stems from Guinea’s history of military coups. There is no parallel strategy which might provide more concrete guidance on Guinea’s military needs, such as size and type of forces, equipment required etc.
Even a review of the new government procurement legislation [5, 6] shows that it does not set out general procedures around needs requirements. The scrutiny of the new procurement regulator appears to begin at the tender stage. There is then the issue that defence has an exemption from the openness criteria [11].
There are no recent reports on procurement with sufficient detail to enable an assessment of whether procurement was based on clearly identified and quantified requirements.
Due to the lack of public information to confirm there is a formal procedure, a score of 0 has been awarded.
1. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
2. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
3. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
4. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
5. “Loi Fixant Les Regles Regissant La Passation, Le Controle Et La Regulation Des Marches Et Delegations Des Service Public”, 2012, accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.finances.gov.gn/images/stories/Documents/documents1/LOI.pdf
6. Decrees 165 – 169, passed 2014 and accessed 30 August 2015 , all available on the Ministry of Finance webpage, http://www.finances.gov.gn/index.php/component/content/article/59-actualites/233-deceret
7. &quoute;Politique Nationale de Defence et de Securite 2013&quoute;, November 2013, accessed 31 August 2015, http://pbfguinee.org/sites/default/files/report-documents/politique_nationale_de_defence_et_de_securite_2013.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: As stipulated in the 2012 procurement law, single-sourcing is permitted for defence institutions where “is a need for secrecy… (and) the protection of the state’s interests would be incompatible with publicity”.
It is difficult to assess from the public domain how this works in practice, for example, how frequently defence institutions use this exemption i.e. whether it is also used for non-lethal equipment where there is little justification for non-disclosure. Article 11 seems as though it could be applied quite broadly.
It’s reasonable to conclude that the principle of open competition does not exist for defence procurement.
1. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf - citing Guinean Association for Transparency (AGT) report of September 2011.
2. “Loi Fixant Les Regles Regissant La Passation, Le Controle Et La Regulation Des Marches Et Delegations Des Service Public”, 2012, accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.finances.gov.gn/images/stories/Documents/documents1/LOI.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: As discussed by the IMF [4], the newly established national regulator, the Autorite de Regulation des Marches Publiques, does have a mandate to monitor procurement for respect of due process. There are two caveats here though: firstly, the body was only operationalised in October 2014 and its effectiveness is to be determined, and secondly, it is not clear how much influence it will be able to exercise over defence procurement. There is no indication that defence is wholly exempt from this legislation. However, article 11 of the 2012 law clearly states that there is no requirement for defence and security contracts to go to public tender.
As noted in previous responses, the Court of Auditors previously audited the spending of the military junta [7]. However, there is no evidence in the public domain that this has occurred as a matter of course for any recent tenders, or that all tender board decisions are subject to audit.
1. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
2. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
3. Discussion with Guinean journalist, 26 August 2014, by telephone.
4. International Monetary Fund, Guinea: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, July 2013, accessed 30 August 2015, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13191.pdf
5. Decrees 165 – 169, passed 2014 and accessed 30 August 2015 , all available on the Ministry of Finance webpage, http://www.finances.gov.gn/index.php/component/content/article/59-actualites/233-deceret
6. “Loi Fixant Les Regles Regissant La Passation, Le Controle Et La Regulation Des Marches Et Delegations Des Service Public”, 2012, accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.finances.gov.gn/images/stories/Documents/documents1/LOI.pdf
7. Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Guinée : l’armée, la corruption et les mobiles possibles de l’attentat contre Alpha Condé&quoute;, 1 August 2011, accessed 23 August 2015, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/190730/politique/guin-e-l-arm-e-la-corruption-et-les-mobiles-possibles-de-l-attentat-contre-alpha-cond/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There does not appear to be any defence-specific legislation. This question must therefore be answered with reference to the national legislation [3, 4]. There are no clauses which specifically outlaw collusion.
The key regulatory body, the Autorite de Regulation des Marches Publiques, does have a mandate to ensure due process is followed, which should encompass collusion. However, as it became operational in late 2014, it is too early to say the extent to which it is actively addressing this risk.
1. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
2. Interview with Guinean peace and human rights activist, 4 September 2014, by telephone.
3. “Loi Fixant Les Regles Regissant La Passation, Le Controle Et La Regulation Des Marches Et Delegations Des Service Public”, 2012, accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.finances.gov.gn/images/stories/Documents/documents1/LOI.pdf
4. Decrees 165 – 169, passed 2014 and accessed 30 August 2015 , all available on the Ministry of Finance webpage, http://www.finances.gov.gn/index.php/component/content/article/59-actualites/233-deceret
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See also CDG (2014) Publishing Government Contracts: Addressing Concerns and Easing Implementation
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The regulatory division of the DGIM and an internal audit unit are tasked with procurement. There is little information in the public domain concerning the activities of the DGIM, though they may be a single internal unit.
Accepting the limitations of public record work here, there are no reports of staff shortages. The military is in the process of downsizing and there are likely excess personnel across the board. Similarly, there is no evidence that there is a policy of rotation. Consistent with a more general lack of training across defence and security, it does not seem as though procurement staff are getting any particular attention.
However, there is no firm evidence that procurement is influenced by senior ranks, and there does appear to be a single procurement unit.
1. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
2. ‘Guinea: Reforming the Army’, Crisis Group, September 2010, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20---%20Reforming%20the%20Army.pdf
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The 2012 regulation on public tendering does include grievance mechanisms. Article 15 allows bidders recourse to the national procurement regulator, the Autorite de Regulation des Marches Publics. However, this is a newly established body and it is not clear whether this mechanism has been tested, particularly in defence.
Article 23 of the regulation stipulates that all complaints will be treated confidentially to protect the complainant. There is no public information to determine how this is applied in practice, and if complainants might be disadvantaged in the future.
1. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
2. US Department of State, 2014 Investment Climate Statement – Guinea, June 2014, p. 6, accessed on 29 October 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/229024.pdf
3. “Loi Fixant Les Regles Regissant La Passation, Le Controle Et La Regulation Des Marches Et Delegations Des Service Public”, 2012, accessed 31 August 2015, http://www.finances.gov.gn/images/stories/Documents/documents1/LOI.pdf
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: Article 25 of the 2012 procurement regulation stipulates a range of sanctions. These include debarment from public tenders for up to 10 years, a fine, and confiscation of a bidder's deposit.
There is no relevant information in the public domain to determine whether these sanctions have been applied in practice in defence.
1. Open Society Foundations, ‘Guinea Anti-corruption Institutions, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa’, September 2013, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Guinea%20Corruption%20Bodies%20ENG.pdf
2. Discussions with Guinean journalists, 26 & 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. “Loi Fixant Les Regles Regissant La Passation, Le Controle Et La Regulation Des Marches Et Delegations Des Service Public”, 2012, accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.finances.gov.gn/images/stories/Documents/documents1/LOI.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: From the media and online research conducted, there are no public references to procurement conducted by Guinean defence institutions which have entailed offset contracts. However, transparency over procurement is extremely low for the defence sector in general. The existence of offsets can therefore not be ruled out.
Response to peer reviewer:
I am not sure this source should be taken into account. It is over ten years old and does not provide any real detail on offset arrangements in Guinea.
1. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
2. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, SIPRI website, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
3. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, accessed on 27 October, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The presence of arms industry is not related to the usage of offset defence agreements. For countertrade practices in Guinea see Islamic Development Bank Islamic Reseach and Training Institute (2002) Countertrade: policies and practices in OIC member countries, Seminar Proceedings Series No. 24
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: From the media and online research conducted, there are no public references to procurement conducted by Guinean defence institutions which have entailed offset contracts. However, transparency over procurement is extremely low for the defence sector in general. The existence of offsets can therefore not be ruled out.
1. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
2. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, SIPRI website, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
3. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, accessed on 27 October, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: From the media and online research conducted, there are no public references to procurement conducted by Guinean defence institutions which have entailed offset contracts. However, transparency over procurement is extremely low for the defence sector in general. The existence of offsets can therefore not be ruled out.
1. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
2. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, SIPRI website, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
3. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, accessed on 27 October, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The 2012 procurement regulation does not include any provisions with regard to the use of agents and intermediaries [5, 6]. There do not appear to be any media or civil society reports which shed light on this particular issue.
As no restrictions appear to be applied, a score of 0 has been awarded.
1. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
2. IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments – Guinea (London, 2009 and 2013)
3. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, SIPRI website, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
4. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, accessed on 27 October, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
5. “Loi Fixant Les Regles Regissant La Passation, Le Controle Et La Regulation Des Marches Et Delegations Des Service Public”, 2012, accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.finances.gov.gn/images/stories/Documents/documents1/LOI.pdf
6. Decrees 165 – 169, passed 2014 and accessed 30 August 2015 , all available on the Ministry of Finance webpage, http://www.finances.gov.gn/index.php/component/content/article/59-actualites/233-deceret
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is a lack of any public information concerning major procurement deals, including financing. There is no indication of legislation to ensure that such arrangements would be made publicly available.
1. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
2. Interview with Guinean journalist, 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. “Loi Fixant Les Regles Regissant La Passation, Le Controle Et La Regulation Des Marches Et Delegations Des Service Public”, 2012, accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.finances.gov.gn/images/stories/Documents/documents1/LOI.pdf
4. Decrees 165 – 169, passed 2014 and accessed 30 August 2015 , all available on the Ministry of Finance webpage, http://www.finances.gov.gn/index.php/component/content/article/59-actualites/233-deceret
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: There is no evident requirement that lead contractors have anti-corruption programmes, nor that requirements should be placed on subcontractors. There is simply not sufficient public information on the details around defence procurement, which would offer insights on typical arrangements for subcontracting. Procurement mechanisms do not appear to have reached this level of sophistication.
1. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
2. Interview with Guinean journalist, 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: The SIPRI arms transfer database indicates that in 2014 Guinea received five arms transfers from South Africa in 2014. There are no reports to suggest that this was motivated primarily by geopolitical considerations, even if the Conde government (2010 - present) has actively sought to deepen ties with South Africa [6]. There is ultimately little public information available regarding these transfers, but there have not nevertheless not been reports criticising the choice of South Africa as supplier.
It is important to bear in mind the particularities of Guinea’s national defence and security policy, and the background context. The policy [7] is very much focused on security sector reform and the appropriate role for the military in society. It might better be seen as a conceptual framework rather than a traditional defence strategy. This stems from Guinea’s history of military coups.
There is no parallel strategy which might provide more concrete guidance on Guinea’s military needs, such as size and type of forces, equipment required etc. We therefore have to conclude that any procurement in Guinea is not derived from an audited national strategy, and is more likely to be opportunistic.
1. Interview with defence journalist covering West Africa, London, 30 September 2014.
2. Interview with Guinean journalist, 28 August 2014, by telephone.
3. UN Register of Conventional Arms, The Global Reported Arms Trade database, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx
4. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013, London: IISS, 2013.
5. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, SIPRI website, accessed on 27 October 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
6. SA News, &quoute;SA, Guinea solidify relations&quoute;, 14 April 2014, http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-guinea-solidify-relations
7. &quoute;Politique Nationale de Defence et de Securite 2013&quoute;, November 2013, accessed 31 August 2015, http://pbfguinee.org/sites/default/files/report-documents/politique_nationale_de_defence_et_de_securite_2013.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See SIPRI (2003) Conflicts and Transfers of Small Arms
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4225: A new Committee on Defence and Security has been established in the new National Assembly (elected late 2013) and is in the process of becoming resourced and operational in 2014. There is no prior culture of scrutiny of defence and security policy and very little independence of the legislature.
Initial workshops have been held by the committee [3], but there is not yet sufficient information, at least in the public domain, to confirm it is fully operational. It has proven impossible to locate the relevant founding legislation online, meaning its rights and formal remit is not clear.
There is little indication that parliament regularly debates defence issues, including in the areas noted, such as budget and procurement. As far as can be determined from online research, there is no indication that parliament has the right to veto legislation. The Interparliamentary Union writes that parliamentary involvement in defence policy is limited. It states that the president is ultimately responsible for national defence policy and presides over the national defence council [5].
The presidential delegate for defence, Abdoul Kabelè Camara, presented a proposal on the defence budget in November 2014 [6], but it is not clear whether this was properly debated and whether parliament has had input on other key matters, such as the 2013 national security and defence policy. However, along with the establishment of the parliamentary committee, it does indicate increasing legislative involvement in defence matters.
More generally, Guinea does have an elected legislature, but it remains a highly presidential system. Guinea has recently transitioned from a military junta regime (2009 – 2010), and its democratic institutions are still at an early stage of development in terms of exercising independence and scrutiny.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score changed from 1 to 0.