- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
Kuwait’s overall GI ranking in Band F places it in the highest risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. Kuwait’s highest risk area is Operations, followed by Procurement, then Political and Finance. To reduce corruption risk and build integrity, security sector reforms are urgently needed across the following areas:
Increased transparency and scrutiny in procurement and budgeting
- While Kuwait publishes an aggregate figure allocated for salaries, no further details on defence spending are available. There is a dedicated committee responsible for scrutiny of the defence budget, the Committee on Interior and Defence, but it cannot access further information. The government should publish a defence budget that includes detailed information on expenditure to allow for effective civilian and parliamentary scrutiny. For Kuwait’s parliament to succeed in providing independent scrutiny of defence it must be guaranteed access to the information it requires.
- Kuwait has no defined process for acquisition planning – the process through which the state identifies what arms it will buy – and all Kuwaiti military procurement is exempted from public tender. To increase accountability for defence procurement, we recommend that the government amend legislation to establish a principle of open competition, with clauses to specifically address corruption risks and narrowly define cases of single source procurement. Exempted or single sourced items should include provisions for other forms of independent scrutiny.
- While there is a State Audit Bureau (SAB), neither it, nor Parliament is permitted to scrutinise defence purchases, leaving Kuwait with no functioning, independent procurement oversight mechanisms for defence purchases. Nor is there evidence identified by our assessment of an internal audit function in the MoD. Such a function, if provided with sufficient resources, training and independence would help ensure that the budget is spent on arms and equipment that actually meet Kuwait’s strategic needs. The independence of the SAB could also be increased by separating it from the National Assembly, and legislative limits removed to allow the SAB to conduct regular audits of defence spending (none has been conducted since 2012). Public confidence would be increase if findings were then made publicly available, and there was clear evidence that audit findings were acted upon by a relevant enforcement body.
Engagement with the Public
- The Kuwaiti government, unlike Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia and Iraq, did not complete a government review of the 2015 GI research. We urge the government to take part in this dialogue during the next review. The Kuwaiti government should allow space in which civil society can operate and assist in formulating policies to enhance transparency and build integrity in the defence sector. This would send a strong signal that the defence sector is there to defend the state and serve the needs of the general population.
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
Institutional website:
- The Government of Kuwait (Diwan), Higher Committee for Defence section http://www.pm.gov.kw/higher-committee-defence.aspx (accessed on April 15, 2014);
Media reports:
- &quoute;Parliament chooses permanent committee''s members&quoute;, KUNA, Aug 6, 2013 http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2327095&language=en (accessed on April 15, 2014);
- &quoute;Ministry of defence Rejects Proposal that Benefits Bedoon Soldiers&quoute;, Bedoon Rights, October 07, 2013 http://www.bedoonrights.org/2013/10/07/ministry-of-defence-rejects-proposal-that-benefits-bedoon-soldiers/ (accessed on April 15, 2014);
- &quoute;Kuwait: Parliament has right to scrutinise GCC security pact&quoute;, Gulf News, February 17, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-parliament-has-right-to-scrutinise-gcc-security-pact-1.1292035 (accessed on April 15, 2014).
Others:
- Helem Chapin Metz, ed. Persian Gulf States: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993. http://countrystudies.us/persian-gulf-states/28.htm (accessed on June 15, 2015).
- The Legislative, Fanack https://chronicle.fanack.com/kuwait/administration-politics/the-legislative/ (accessed on June 15, 2015).
- The Executive, Fanack https://chronicle.fanack.com/kuwait/administration-politics/the-executive/ (accessed on June 15, 2015).
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
Kuwait has an identifiable parliamentary defence and security committee: the Committee for Defence and Interior. It is tasked with providing oversight for defence decision-making.
The Committee's efficacy is difficult to gauge, however, as publicly accessible reports about its work do not seem to exist. The Open Data initiative also holds no information on Kuwait, thus it is impossible to find other information. Media reports have surfaced that give hints for its effectiveness: it was overruled by government in a case of Bedoon soldiers retirement age extension proposal. Lastly, no stand-alone access-to-information framework exists in the country; it thus seems impossible to be provided with such information per request.
In addition, the Committee on Interior Affairs and Defence is also tasked with budgetary oversight. According to Al Najjar, the government must report to the Interior and Defence Affairs Committee, but such discussions are not publicly available.
Institutional website:
- The Government of Kuwait (Diwan), Higher Committee for Defence section http://www.pm.gov.kw/higher-committee-defence.aspx (accessed on April 15, 2014).
- World Bank Open Data blog for Kuwait http://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/taxonomy/term/119/all (accessed on April 15, 2014).
Media reports:
- &quoute;Ministry of defence Rejects Proposal that Benefits Bedoon Soldiers&quoute;, Bedoon Rights, October 07, 2013 http://www.bedoonrights.org/2013/10/07/ministry-of-defence-rejects-proposal-that-benefits-bedoon-soldiers/ (accessed on April 15, 2014)
Research reports:
- &quoute;Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Kuwait&quoute;, Ghanim Al Najjar, Conference Paper for Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), 12-13 July 2004 http://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dcaf.ch%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F33690%2F522597%2Fversion%2F1%2Ffile%2Fev_geneva_04071113_Alnajjar.pdf&ei=ZBRpU6KLCISTOPC_gYAG&usg=AFQjCNEYWFWq-_Vn7yJ0Bc9zvArwGmq4lQ&sig2=-fqrl2vuY_i1gLi3PvEizA&bvm=bv.66111022,d.d2k (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
It appears a formal defence policy officially exists, however no details about it are publicly available and how it influences decisions is unclear. The Ministry of Defence website does not publish any national defence policy documents, although communication from the British Council clearly mentions a National Defence Plan. Kuwaiti doctrine is also mentioned in different secondary publications; e.g. Fanack notes: &quoute;Kuwaiti doctrine focuses on being able to delay a foe from occupying the capital and industrial targets for about two days, which is how long it takes, it is assumed, for American reinforcements to arrive. Nowadays, much more emphasis is put on training, in view of past events.&quoute;
Recent commentary in the international press assesses that the political system has provided opposition MPs some freedom to criticize Kuwaiti foreign policy on legitimate and constitutional terms, but that this has had very clear boundaries, as demonstrated regarding Kuwait's decision to participate in military operations in Yemen. The Ministry's website provides news about official activities, however there is no indication suggesting the holding of open public debate. The Kuwaiti e-gov portal has attempted to provide a service which &quoute;allows receiving all the petitions submitted by citizens to the First Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, and the Minister of Defence and Presenting them to Their Excellencies&quoute;. This endeavour seems to have been stalled, however, and would not constitute a public debate in any case.
Both English and Arabic-language media published within the country mention very little or no information about defence and/or security policy. Information gathered through foreign sources of information (such as the CIA's website) is similarly scarce and out-of-date, focusing on basic military personnel and armed forces composition or else on more broadly discussing the GCC desiderata. Such information does not address country-specific policy nor does it propose a way to publicly debate such matters.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2:
Agreed. Thus, although some sort of defence policy seems to exist, it is not accessible to the public and it is also unclear how often it is updated. Debate in Parliament may be theoretically possible, but evidence shows (see above) that it concerns specific topics and the general doctrine of the country. Minutes are not available to access freely and regularly.
Source added.
Institutional websites:
- Ministry of Defence [Arabic] http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- Petitions to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defence: submission form, e-gov website http://www.e.gov.kw/MOD_en/Pages/ServicesContent/274ResiveCitizensMessagesHisExcellencyFirstDeputyPrimeMinister.aspx (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- Council of Ministers of Kuwait http://www.pm.gov.kw/council-minsters.aspx (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- CIA, the World Factbook, Last updated on June 20, 2014 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ku.html (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;UK and Kuwait hold defence staff talks in London&quoute;, British Embassy Kuwait, 31 May 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/uk-and-kuwait-hold-defence-staff-talks-in-london (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media:
- &quoute;Kuwait''s defence Minister receives Kuwaiti officers engaged in course&quoute;, KUNA, Jan 16, 2014 https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2355854&language=en (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;GCC Still Struggling To Develop Integrated Air defence&quoute;, defence News, May 1, 2014 http://www.defencenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014305010020 (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;GCC Seeks To Form Military Bloc With Jordan, Morocco&quoute;, defence News, Apr 14, 2014 http://www.defencenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014304140018 (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Ministry of defence&quoute; (Kuwait), General Information, Epicos.com, undated http://www.epicos.com/EPCompanyProfileWeb/GeneralInformation.aspx?id=18164 (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Bridging the Gulf: where Kuwait stands on the GCC Union&quoute;, Al Arabiya, May 12, 2013 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/special-reports/bridging-the-gulf/2013/05/12/Bridging-the-Gulf-where-Kuwait-stands-on-the-GCC-Union.html
- &quoute;Sectarianism and authoritarianism in Kuwait&quoute;, Washington Post, April 13, 2015 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/13/sectarianism-and-authoritarianism-in-kuwait/
Others:
- The Military, Fanack https://chronicle.fanack.com/kuwait/administration-politics/the-military/ (Accessed June 15, 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Kuwait's Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee has debated publicly the creation of a Saudi-led GCC force (http://english.alarabiya.net/en/special-reports/bridging-the-gulf/2013/05/12/Bridging-the-Gulf-where-Kuwait-stands-on-the-GCC-Union.html).
There has also been discussion of the security threat posed by opposition speakers (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/kuwait-opposition-citizenship-revoked.html), though it is unclear the extent to which the government considers this an actual threat and the extent to which it constitutes censorship of dissent.
Finally, while Kuwait does not have a national security document, its general security strategy (Neutrality on contentious issues, maintenance of Western alliances, Alignment with Saudi Arabia, mending of ties with Iraq) are well understood by educated Kuwaitis.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
There is an example of the Ministry of Defence demonstrating openness towards civil society organizations (CSOs) relating to issues of corruption in recent years, having hosted a 'Kuwait Transparency Forum' in October 2012. However, a formalised policy does not seem to exist.
There have been efforts by some NGOs to engage in dialogue and to push for reforms, as testified by the Kuwait Transparency Forum (the Ministry of the Interior and National Guard participated, but the Ministry of Defence was absent, despite invitations). The only civil society representatives seem to have been these from the organising party (the Kuwait Transparency Society, Transparency International's Local Chapter, currently suspended, see below) and from Transparency International.
A Wikileaks cable from 2003 highlights the lack of independence of most NGOs in Kuwait. There do not seem to be serious indications that this situation has evolved differently since. This observation is supported by a US State Department note which explains that the government uses licensing to exert political control over NGOs. In addition, Article 6 of Law 24/1962 prohibits licensed NGOs from engaging in political activities. Such a lack of reaction from civil society is clearly seen through recent and socially-relevant corruption scandals, such as that involving the Kuwaiti Housing chief. This cable from 2013 signals the very close interactions between a majority of civil society organisations, dubbed &quoute;essentially quasi-governmental institutions funded, supported, and controlled in large part by the government rather than independent, autonomous organizations able to challenge the status quo or advocate for real social or political change&quoute;. Thus, it is very difficult to describe such organisations as challenging to government and as watchdogs that critically address public policies.
This last point is related to political freedom in Kuwait, as political parties are not authorised in the country. Thus, any political activity, be it from an NGO or a political party, is illegal. In Kuwait, freedom of expression is very much at stake as lèse-majesté and blasphemy laws remain on the statute book and are regularly used to prosecute and jail opposition and punish any flavour of politically motivated discontent (see Freedom House report for details). My comment is solely aimed to highlight the difficulty for Kuwait to see a true vibrant civil society given legal restrictions -- and thus, the difficulty to see genuine civil society engagement in terms of challenge to the ruling elite.
The low score to this indicator is motivated by the fact that no recent event or media report was identified to suggest continued and/or increased openness by the MoD towards CSOs on matters of corruption. The Kuwait Transparency Forum seems to have been an exceptional occurrence, not a regular interaction. More recently, the Kuwait Transparency Society was suspended as a local Chapter by Transparency International's Secretariat in Berlin after the Kuwaiti government directly appointed a board substituting the NGO's elected board.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agreed.
Institutional website:
- Ministry of Defence http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp (accessed on April 15, 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;New Authority to Fight Corruption in Kuwait&quoute;, Kuwait Times (republished on this blog), Apr 12, 2010 http://www.tag-legal.com/legalnews.aspx?id=476&group_key=news&lang=en (accessed on April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait’s Housing chief quits over ‘corruption’ – Al-Mullah slams minister, ‘politicization of housing crisis’ &quoute;, Kuwait Times, Sept 23, 2013 http://news.kuwaittimes.net/kuwaits-housing-chief-quits-corruption-al-mullah-slams-minister-politicization-housing-crisis/ (accessed on April 15, 2014)
Others:
- Kuwait Transparency Forum agenda; Forum held on 1-2 Oct, 2012 http://www.transparency.org.kw.au-ti.org/upload/ads/forum2012/Agenda.pdf (accessed on April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Ngo's In Kuwait: Nearly Governmental Organizations&quoute;, WikiLeaks, http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=03KUWAIT5202 (accessed on April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012&quoute;, US Dept of State http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204370 (accessed on April 15, 2014)
- Kuwait, Freedom House, 2014 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/kuwait#.VYJ5byRsuV4 (accessed on June 15, 2015)
- &quoute;Kuwait chapter of Transparency International under threat&quoute;, Transparency International, 11 Jun 2015 https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/kuwait_chapter_of_transparency_international_under_threat (accessed on June 15, 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Political parties are illegal but there are liberal, Islamist, and tribal blocs in the parliament.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
Kuwait has signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2007. Kuwait has not signed the OECD convention as it is not a full participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions.
Despite being signatory/having ratified UNCAC, Kuwait has been very slow implementing the relevant tools to the national level. There have been calls from (rare) civil society members such as the Director of Kuwait Transparency Society, to hasten the passage of relevant laws. There have indeed been quite a few disagreements over what a dedicated anti-corruption law needs to include. The courts are the entities that deal with corruption in Kuwait.
There have been two documents concerning Kuwait issued by the UNCAC Implementation Review Group:
- Executive Summary for Kuwait, 2013: lists a few successes but also insists on the remaining challenges in implementation (sub-section 2.3, p. 9)
- Good Practices of Implementation, 2014: discusses compliance and implementation of Chapters 3 and 4 of the UNCAC in Kuwait (pp. 21-27). These achievements are a self-assessment by the Kuwait Anti-Corruption Authority, and one can read that &quoute;the development of the national anti-corruption strategy is expected to be completed in the next few months. Then, this strategy will start to be implemented
domestically in coordination with the relevant national stakeholders.&quoute;
These very slow and weak commitments to proper implementation of the UNCAC as well as the fact that the conflict of Interest law was removed from the Anti-corruption authority law shed a doubt on the effectiveness of the the Anti-Corruption Authority.
In 2013, the Kuwait Council of Ministers passed a decree appointing seven members to form a board of trustees of the first ever anti-corruption authority in Kuwait. These seven were selected by the Council among members of the Anti-Corruption Commission. It is still unclear how these different entities will collaborate and how independent from the executive they will be/are. As it is now 2015, it is also disappointing to notice that updates regarding this board of trustees are extremely rare. A report by KUNA in 2014 quotes the Anti-Corruption authority chief acknowledging that &quoute;the authority is still in the stage of foundation.&quoute; The short report provides a few more details on the administrative structure but the information is of bureaucratic interest and mentions no actual anti-corruption activity. Overall, there is some evidence elf compliance, but it is very limited.
Institutional websites:
- United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 2 April 2014 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/fr/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- Review of implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption: Kuwait, Vienna, 27-31 May 2013 http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/ExecutiveSummaries/V1256907e.pdf (Accessed June 15, 2015)
- Good Practices of implementation of UNCAC by States Parties to the United Nations Convention against
Corruption, Vienna, 2-6 June 2014 http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/2-6June2014/V1403544e.pdf (Accessed June 15, 2015)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Kuwait appoints first anti-corruption chief&quoute;, Arabian Business, 4 June 2013 http://www.arabianbusiness.com/kuwait-appoints-first-anti-corruption-chief-504082.html (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait Approves First Anti-Corruption Authority&quoute;, Jeffrey Coonjohn Blog, June 5, 2013 http://jjcoonjohn.com/archives/639 (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait Transparency society calls for enforcing UN anti-corruption deal&quoute;, KUNA, April 15, 2013 http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2304759&language=en (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Saadoun Says No to Draft Law&quoute;, Meyer-Reumann & Partners (Legal Consultants in the Middle East), Oct 2, 2011 http://meyer-reumann.com/saadoun-says-no-to-draft-law/ (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait opposition members acquitted over 2011 storming of parliament&quoute;, The Guardian, 9 December 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/kuwait-opposition-acquitted-2011-storming-parliament (Accessed April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Anti-corruption authority making strides in structure, capacity building &quoute;, KUNA, 04/03/2014 http://news.kuwaittimes.net/anti-corruption-authority-making-strides-structure-capacity-building/ (Accessed June 15, 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Furthermore, the conflict of Interest law was removed from the Anti-corruption authority law, which makes us doubt the effectiveness of the the Anti-Corruption Authority
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
No reports have been found indicating there was any public debate over defence-related policy.
Recent commentary in the international press assesses that the political system has provided opposition MPs some freedom to criticize Kuwaiti foreign policy on legitimate and constitutional terms, but that this has had very clear boundaries, as demonstrated regarding Kuwait's decision to participate in military operations in Yemen.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Although peer reviewers are correct highlighting this evidence from previous years, they also highlight that such debates are a &quoute;red line&quoute; (Peer Reviewer 1) and that &quoute;this communication is predominantly one-way&quoute; (Peer Reviewer 2). I do agree that announcements are made in media, but the examples referred to by Peer Reviewer 2 concern foreign media. In addition, the Al-Monitor piece does not constitute a clearcut debate as, in Peer Reviewer 2's words, &quoute;it is unclear the extent to which the government considers this an actual threat and the extent to which it constitutes censorship of dissent.&quoute; (review for question 1.3 on this same media report). Last but not least, Peer Reviewer 1 provides a lengthy argument the bulk of which relies on historical evidence. Yet, for the current score to be upgraded as asked by reviewers, more current evidence is needed. The latter, they acknowledge, is scarce and very superficial when it exists.
The 3rd Reviewer has commented on the previously mentioned Kuwait Transparency Forum where the questions of transparency in the defence and security sector were discussed with a number of government representatives. This is true but the Forum was held in 2012 and constitutes an exceptional rather than regular event and is not an ongoing dialogue. It is worth noting that the NGO organising the Forum, the Kuwait Transparency Society, has been suspended as a Transparency International official chapter in the country after the government installed a board replacing the elected board.
Institutional websites:
- N/A
Media reports:
- &quoute;Bridging the Gulf: where Kuwait stands on the GCC Union&quoute;, Al-Arabiya English, 12 May 2013 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/special-reports/bridging-the-gulf/2013/05/12/Bridging-the-Gulf-where-Kuwait-stands-on-the-GCC-Union.html (Accessed June 15, 2015)
- &quoute;Kuwait targets opposition by revoking citizenship&quoute;, Al-Monitor, October 3, 2014 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/kuwait-opposition-citizenship-revoked.html (Accessed June 15, 2015)
- &quoute;Sectarianism and authoritarianism in Kuwait&quoute;, Washington Post, April 13, 2015 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/13/sectarianism-and-authoritarianism-in-kuwait/
Others:
- Kuwait Transparency Forum agenda; Forum held on 1-2 Oct, 2012 http://www.transparency.org.kw.au-ti.org/upload/ads/forum2012/Agenda.pdf (accessed on April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Ngo's In Kuwait: Nearly Governmental Organizations&quoute;, WikiLeaks, http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=03KUWAIT5202 (accessed on April 15, 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait chapter of Transparency International under threat&quoute;, Transparency International, 11 Jun 2015 https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/kuwait_chapter_of_transparency_international_under_threat (accessed on June 15, 2015)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is public consultation on defence and security issues that is generally led by members of parliament. Communication may not be two-sided, but important questions and debate have been repeatedly raised and may be made public. That said, the discussions usually fizzle out once brought into the public eye. A Kuwaiti respondent told me that public discussion about defence was &quoute;a red line.&quoute; In the same conversation, however, he mentioned several recent public debates about defence procurement and spending, one on a proposed ammunitions plant in which the funding disappeared.
-Interview, November 17, 2014
There have been some public debates about defence spending, both emanating from the media and politicians. Al-Najjar notes that the media occasionally receive an answer from the Army. The best evidence is from his report published in 2004. Ministers of Parliament (MPs) often use their right to parliamentary questioning on issues of defence. He gives several examples from 2002-3: &quoute;An example of a question concerning the security apparatus was provided by MP Meshari Alusaimi on 18 May 2002 regarding the intention of the Ministry of Defence to buy 16 Apache helicopters, 4 additional motors, and 300 Hill fire missiles, at a cost of USD 2 billion 855 thousand. The question went on to ask about the number of committees that were formed to study the army’s needs between 1991 until 2002, copies the each committee’s formation, the names of its members, and the reason for the members having been changed. Another question was submitted by MP Abdullah Alnaibari on 25 August 2001 asking about the procedures followed by the Ministry of Defence when they signed contracts with local suppliers to obtain supplies, and whether those procedures were compatible with the Tenders Law number 37 of 1964.... The impact of parliamentary questioning goes far beyond the walls of the parliament. The members of parliament always use this type of constitutional tool to disclose full information about the issue raised in the question. More importantly, the MP does not necessarily wait until he receives the answer from the minister to whom the question was put, but makes sure that one the question has been submitted, its text is forwarded to the daily press, so as to exert more public pressure on the government.&quoute; (16).
However, these debates may often be compromised from the start. Al-Najjar contrasts this to the questions emanating from within parliamentary committees, which usually yield few results as they are packed with government loyalists. He gives the example of the Interior and Defence Affairs Committee: &quoute;During the year 2003, there were 68 items on its agenda and the Committee took a decision on 42 of the items and left the 26 remaining items pending. Most of items that the committee took a decision on were of a non-controversial nature, such as requesting that the government build police stations, roads, or residency matters.&quoute; (18).
Lastly, the Kuwaiti Committee on Human Rights, established in 1992, began publishing reports in 2002, some of which allegedly offer criticism of the Interior Ministry and security apparatus. I was unable to find any of these online, but did find the website of the committee (http://www.kna.kw/clt/run.asp?id=268#sthash.hNhp93mY.dpbs)
Report:
Ghanim Al-Najjar, &quoute;Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Kuwait,&quoute; GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF) CONFERENCE PAPER, 2004.
Additionally, while not stated explicitly in policy, It is well-understood by most Kuwaitis that due to the nature of their relationship with Iraq since the 1960s (and as per the constitution), Kuwait's external defence policy is defensive, rather than offensive. This ongoing threat from Iraq has, to a certain extent, pacified public debate about specific defence issues and instead focused them, until 2003, on what authors have called the &quoute;Iraqi complex.&quoute;
For more information, see Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait's Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics, Westview Press, 1990.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Suggested score: 1.
Kuwait's MPs and members of the royal family make statements about issues of defence (see sources in item 1.3), and such statements are covered in Kuwait's various newspapers. However, this communication is predominantly one-way.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
There is some evidence that the government is considering an anti-corruption policy but it is either not in place yet, or evidence that there is no serious action behind it.
Although there has been a relevant decree (published in 2012) and an announcement stating that an Anti-Corruption Chief was nominated in June 2013, the Public Anti-Corruption Authority is &quoute;still in the stage of foundation&quoute;, as its own director frames it. Recent scandals over allegations of corruption are frequently in the headlines, yet it is unclear how the case will be handled and whether the authority will intervene at all. Also, little is known about already existing high-profile corruption cases (see the 17.6-million corruption claim article above).
The Decree itself does not seem to mention defence/security related sector specifically, but the document may cover the defence sector, given that it applies to military officials as well (see Part I, Art. 2, subsection 6 of aforementioned Decree); as per subsection 6:
&quoute;The provisions of this law shall apply to the following categories: [...] 6. Leading figures, whatever the title of their post, working at first class rank, undersecretaries and assistant undersecretaries, managers of directorates, and people of their level occupying supervisory posts designated by executive regulation as regards soldiers or civilians in ministries, governmental directorates, authorities, public institutions and agencies with an additional or independent budget.&quoute;
This subsection possibly includes military officials as well as various financial provisions: although the defence/security sector is not explicitly named here, the descriptions do correspond.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWER: Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 1.
Institutional websites:
- Legislative Decree number 24 of 2012 establishing the Public Anti-Corruption Authority and provisions for disclosure of financial disclosure [Arabic] http://www.gcc-legal.org/BrowseLawOption.aspx?country=1&LawID=4056 (accessed 26 Oct 2014)
- &quoute;THEMATIC COMPILATION OF RELEVANT INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY KUWAIT; ARTICLE 11 UNCAC -- JUDICIAL AND PROSECUTORIAL INTEGRITY&quoute;, UNODC, undated https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/WG-Prevention/Art_11_Judicial_and_prosecutorial_integrity/Kuwait.pdf (see pages 8-10; accessed 26 Oct 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;‘Kuwait Suffers From Corruption’ | MP Al-Mari Affirms Intent ‘To Grill’ Next Oil Minister&quoute;, Arab Times Online, June 15, 2013 http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/197313/reftab/36/Default.aspx
- &quoute;Expose Corruption Details&quoute;, Kuwait Times http://news.kuwaittimes.net/expose-corruption-details/ (article from 9 Dec 2013; accessed 15 Apr 2014)
- &quoute;Anti-corruption authority making strides in structure, capacity building&quoute;, Kuwait Times http://news.kuwaittimes.net/anti-corruption-authority-making-strides-structure-capacity-building/ (article from 26 Mar 2014; accessed 15 Apr 2014)
- &quoute;Barrak’s corruption claims cause furore – PM grilling to be filed today&quoute;, Kuwait Times http://news.kuwaittimes.net/barraks-corruption-claims-cause-furore-pm-grilling-filed-today/ (article from 23 Apr 2014; accessed 25 Apr 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait said to probe $17.6m corruption claims&quoute;, Arabian Business, 1 May 2013 http://www.arabianbusiness.com/kuwait-said-probe-17-6m-corruption-claims-500215.html
Others:
- &quoute;Concerted efforts needed to combat corruption&quoute;, Kuwait Times http://news.kuwaittimes.net/concerted-efforts-needed-combat-corruption/ (article from 16 Feb 2014; accessed 15 Apr 2014) - this relates to the GCC; included here as Kuwait is a GCC member.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The government might be considering an anti-corruption policy, but for now, there is NO openly stated anti-corruption policy, nor there is any evidence yet.
Suggested score: 1
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
There is no special unit within defence and security institutions to fight corruption. The US State Department report for 2012 notes that &quoute;The government took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed abuses, whether in the security services or elsewhere in the government. Impunity was sometimes a problem in corruption cases&quoute;. The Anti-Corruption Authority is a government-wide state body which is, in its own chief's words, &quoute;still in the foundation stages&quoute; and has yet to start operating.
KUNA attributes the formation of this body to Kuwait's accession to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, noting that &quoute;In 2012, the first anti-corruption authority was established by law No. 24, which stipulates that a public authority will be established under the name of Anti-Corruption Public Authority to be supervised by the minister of justice and perform its functions and terms of reference in full independence and impartiality.&quoute;
According to GSN, the Authority's board is constituted by &quoute;former judges and civil servants from the Ministry of Finance&quoute; and the chair is &quoute;a former judge&quoute;. In Jan 2014, an Authority board member complained that the body &quoute;has no staff, very few resources, no office and no budget&quoute;. The Kuwait Times (2014) report mentions budget being drafted for 2014/2015, but does not say anything on its amount or the possible origin of funds. GSN also mentions the UNDP &quoute;is helping to staff the body&quoute; and training abroad, with the World Bank, has happened.
Research shows that the Authority is supposed to work alongside the State Audit Institution, but differs in tasks. The Authority is purported to be able to investigate corruption allegations in both the public and private sectors and to cancel contracts. The Audit Institution, by contrast, can audit public expenditure and report to Parliament but it cannot prosecute.
There are comparative reports indicating that it is also unclear what mechanisms exist to address corruption within the police, suggesting that this is a wider issue for the state. For example, one media piece discusses a police officer having demanded a bribe for the release of a Nepalese detainee from custody. It mentions that the investigation was started by the police director and that the suspected officer was &quoute;taken to the proper authorities for further action&quoute;. No further detail could be found on what the &quoute;proper authorities&quoute; are.
A score of 0 therefore most adequately reflects the situation.
Institutional report:
- &quoute;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012: Kuwait&quoute;, US State Dept http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204370#wrapper (accessed on 15 Apr 2014)
Media reports
- &quoute;Policeman charged with bribery&quoute;, Kuwait Times http://news.kuwaittimes.net/policeman-charged-bribery/ (article from 28 Dec 2013; accessed on 15 Apr 2014)
- &quoute;Anti-corruption authority making strides in structure, capacity building&quoute;, Kuwait Times http://news.kuwaittimes.net/anti-corruption-authority-making-strides-structure-capacity-building/ (article from 26 Mar 2014; accessed 15 Apr 2014)
- &quoute;Anti-Corruption Authority operates by new year’s start – Kuwait improve in Corruption Perception Index&quoute;, KUNA, 20/12/2014 http://news.kuwaittimes.net/anti-corruption-authority-operates-new-years-start-kuwait-improve-corruption-perception-index/ (accessed 15 Jun 2015)
Others:
- &quoute;Kuwait corruption body has a mountain to climb&quoute;, Gulf States Newsletter (GSN), Jan 2014 http://the-mea.co.uk/sites/default/files/GSN_962-MEA-Jan14.pdf (accessed 15 Jun 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
Corruption is a serious problem in Kuwait, but the authorities’ commitment to combating corruption does not seem to transcend their rhetoric. Kuwaitis – and particularly the youth who make up a majority of the population – are increasingly wary of the corrupt realities of their parliament and the authoritarian style of government. [BTI 2014, Kuwait Country Report]
Additionally, &quoute;since 2011 Kuwait has seen the largest demonstrations in its history, with tens of thousands of Kuwaitis taking to the streets, protesting against corruption and a growing authoritarianism. Occasionally, the police ended these demonstrations violently. The military, with approximately 15,500 troops, operates under the supreme command of the emir, and no loyalty conflicts have been reported so far from within the army. [BTI 2014, Kuwait Country Report]
In January 2013, the National Assembly approved an Anti-corruption and Wealth Disclosure Decree that calls for setting up a national anti-corruption authority. It is unclear how this Decree has affected public perceptions of the defence and security establishments commitment to tackle corruption. A KUNA report cites TI Corruption Perception index: &quoute;According to a report by anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International (TI) last week, Kuwait came in two ranks higher in the Corruption Perception Index 2014 in the 67th position compared to 69th last year. Kuwait came in sixth place in the Middle East with 44 points to finish in the upper half of the index.&quoute; This suggests that the Authority created along with the issuance of this Decree may have contributed improving the population's perception. But it would be quite a stretch to assert this for the defence and security sectors which are not mentioned in the Decree.
The Global Corruption Barometer from Transparency International has not surveyed Kuwait for the past five years. The perception from the last report in 2009 was that corruption is most widespread among public servants yet 68% of those surveyed considered the measures their government is taking to be efficient. This is a somewhat contrasted view in comparison to WEF's 2013-2014 report where corruption was one of the biggest obstacles to doing business; reliability of police services, favoritism in decisions of government officials and public trust in politicians were similarly said to be insufficient for proper business implementation in the country. It is thus likely that these depict a truthful picture about how/whether unethical behaviour affects Kuwaiti public trust in the military and the security apparatus in general.
The accountability of officeholders remains limited, although some officeholders, including cabinet members who abuse their positions, can face legal or political penalties. Parliament has forced Prime Minister Nasser Mohamed al-Ahmed al-Sabah to resign four times, each in the context of corruption allegations, but the emir re-appointed him in all four cases. In December 2011, the emir finally dismissed the prime minister after public and parliamentary pressure over corruption allegations; yet the prime minister was not the only officeholder who faced such allegations. At least one-fifth of members of parliament were investigated for graft in 2011, following the discovery of multimillion-dollar transfers into lawmakers’ accounts. [BTI 2014, Kuwait Country Report]
Blogger Kuwaitiful notes, following a press conference by the Interior Assistant Undersecretary of Traffic Affairs Maj. Gen. Abdul-Fatah Al-Ali: &quoute;According to him [Al-Ali], very soon some cops will be sent to court over corruption allegations. Don’t think this has happened in Kuwait before.&quoute; This provides a wider context and tackles the security sector more than the defence and armed forces, but is also an illustration of the difficulty to identify concrete evidence for the defence sector.
The cited laws regulate how the armed forces are organized. According to these, measures against corrupt officers exist: withholding pay during investigations, sending individuals to court (the verdict allows incriminated personnel to be fined and jailed). There have been no reports of such investigations or of cases where military personnel have been judged or convicted in a period relevant to this Index. In addition, the big corruption scandals having shaken the government were in 2009 and 2011, and related to corruption allegations against then-Prime Ministers, not against defence officials.
Overall, the public view is that corruption are not acceptable, but there is a widely-held belief that this is just that: rhetoric, and not seriously intended. The defence and security establishments are hardly featured in these examples, which makes it extremely difficult to gauge the public view of their participation in corrupt activity although an anecdotal evidence suggests the public also negatively reacts to corruption in the defence and security sectors.
Institutional sources:
- Law number 32 of 1967 and Law number 100 of 1999
Media sources:
- &quoute;Corruption Inquiry Rocks Kuwait&quoute;, the NYT, SEPT. 21, 2011
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/world/middleeast/corruption-inquiry-rocks-kuwait.html?_r=0 (accessed 15 June 2015)
- &quoute;Kuwait’s corruption problem&quoute;, Islam Times, 27 August 2014 http://www.islamtimes.org/en/doc/article/406908/ (accessed 15 June 2015)
- &quoute;Anti-Corruption Authority operates by new year’s start – Kuwait improve in Corruption Perception Index&quoute;, KUNA, 20/12/2014 http://news.kuwaittimes.net/anti-corruption-authority-operates-new-years-start-kuwait-improve-corruption-perception-index/ (accessed 15 June 2015)
Others:
- &quoute;AbdulFatah Al Ali Promises to Take Down Corrupt Officials&quoute;, Kuwaitiful blog, Jun 21, 2013 http://kuwaitiful.com/news/abdulfatah-al-ali-promises-to-take-down-corrupt-officials/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Kuwait Corruption perceptions, The Global Economy, 2014 http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Kuwait/transparency_corruption/ (accessed 15 June 2015)
Research sources:
- &quoute;BTI 2014 | Kuwait Country Report&quoute; http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/kwt/index.nc (accessed 15 April 2014)
- World Economic Forum: Kuwait http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2013-14/Kuwait.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014)
- GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER 2009 http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_barometer_20091 (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
Kuwait's National Anti-Corruption Strategy from 2006 mentions independent oversight and the creation of an inspection body to investigate corruption cases. The Strategy also notes that a dedicated judicial department specialised in corruption should be established. Nowhere, however, does it mention oversight of defence and/or security related activities. This body has materialised, after years, in the Anti-corruption Authority, created in 2012.
Two important legislative measures have been taken to address the disclosure and funding of activities but none of this relates explicitly to the country's defence sector per se:
- Early January 2013, the National Assembly passed the Anti-Corruption and Wealth Disclosure decree, which demanded the setting up of a national anti-corruption authority. The decree also requires ministers, MPs and senior bureaucrats to submit a disclosure of their wealth before and after taking office in order to effectively track their wealth.
- In 2013, Kuwait also adopted an anti-money laundering and terror funding law. Organised criminal groups and non-governmental organisations convicted of money-laundering can be sent to prison for up to 20 years.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWER: Agreed. There is no evidence that actual measures have been taken to address the risk of corruption within the defence sector. Neither the Anti-corruption authority nor the country's anti-corruption strategy seem to address the defence and armed forces sectors.
The change of score from the previous assessment (score 1 in 2013, score 0 today) is motivated by the lack of evidence of such a risk assessment. The previous GI assessment referred to a recent transparency forum, the current assessment has not seen such a positive development, in fact quite the contrary with some government crack down on some NGOs (see previous indicators).
Institutional reports:
- &quoute;Kuwait's national anti-corruption strategy&quoute;, UNODC, 2006 http://www.track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/Kuwait/Authorities/Kuwait%20National%20Anti-Corruption%20Strategy.pdf (accessed April 15, 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;MPs Pass Controversial Amiri Electoral Decree – National Unity, Anti-Graft Decrees Also Approved&quoute; http://actu.exiles10.org/page/DOC_IMPRIMER?article=20130108i6iqUVtYh3 (Article originally from Jan 9, 2013 from Kuwait Times but removed from its website; its full-text seems to be accessible here. Accessed on 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait MPs pass anti-money laundering, terror funding law&quoute;, AFP and the Global Post, April 2, 2013 http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130402/kuwait-mps-pass-anti-money-laundering-terror-funding-law (Accessed on 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;KUWAIT: A NEW STANCE ON FINANCIAL CRIME&quoute;, Al-Tamimi (legal firm), Sept 2013 http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-5/september-3/kuwait-a-new-stance-on-financial-crime.html (provides more legal details; accessed on 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: No defence-specific assessment of corruption risk has taken place and no measures are in place.
Moreover, Kuwait official bodies have never prepared a national anti-corruption strategy and the only anti-corruption strategy was prepared and published by a group of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (POGAR).
Suggested score:
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
Although the 2013 GI assessment of Kuwait indicates that anacquisition cycle exists for the Armed Forces, this cycle could not be independently confirmed again for the 2015 assessment. If oversight mechanisms for this process exist, they are also not publicly available and their quality could not be properly assessed.
Evidence was found to indicate that some defined process exists for acquisition planning but it is poorly defined, and there is a lack of clarity over accountability and oversight.
According to the Kuwait Government Online website:
&quoute;Two important exceptions are drawn to the application of the Public Tenders Law:
- Procurement of the Ministry of defence: The Public Tenders Law does not apply to the procurement of military items for the Ministry of defence and Security Forces. Kuwait law broadly defines “military materials” to include land, sea and air weapons, spare parts, military communications, detection equipment and related systems (“strategic military procurement”).
No comprehensive laws or regulations govern strategic military procurement by the Ministry of defence (MOD). Instead, the MOD has developed internal policies and procedures for such procurements that are not available to the public. Such policies are generally more flexible than those of the Public Tenders Law. This comes in an effort to accommodate the MOD’s specialized needs with respect to strategic military procurement.&quoute;
GlobalSecurity.org notes: &quoute;With the exception of FMS [Foreign Military Sales] sales, all major procurements are done on a commercial basis. For commercial purchases above KD 5,000 ($17,000), Kuwait uses a competitive selection (tender) process. [...] This process, however, does not apply to strategic military purchases which are handled through the Military Procurement Committee. Price and satisfaction of MOD technical requirements are important factors in MOD's evaluation process. Information on financing, including the vendor's use of export credit financing, is also required.
The MOD has several internal committees that are responsible for the technical evaluation of bids. The Assistant Undersecretary of defence for External Supply is responsible for the administrative aspects of purchasing military equipment and services. The majority of defence procurements are done on a government-to-government basis, but a substantial number of procurements are done commercially.&quoute;
Institutional sources:
- Doing Business in Kuwait section on the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/pages/visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Ministry of Defence http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp (accessed 15 April 2014)
Others:
- Kuwait Budget, GlobalSecurity.org (last updated 28 June 2013) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/kuwait-budget.htm (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
The only information available from an official source is the budget for 2014/2015 where the Ministry of Defence has communicated a total amount allocated to salaries to the Ministry of Finances.
A recent, more transparent military budget could not be found for this assessment. Some previous budgets are available on the Central Bank's website however these provide summary figures only and no detail. SIPRI only has data for up to 2010-2011, while sources such as the CIA World Factbook records for Kuwait similarly do not provide any recent information. A recent memo by a FAS researcher lists arms deals with the US as well as some insights about foreign military aid that Kuwait may have benefited from.
Research similarly indicated that the Committee on Interior Affairs and Defence at the National Assembly is only presented with certain items in the defence budget such as training and salaries, and nothing on other key areas such as acquisitions. IHS Eurosatory 2012 further states that: &quoute;Defence expenditure in Kuwait is subject to parliamentary scrutiny through the National Assembly of Kuwait’s Committee on Interior Affairs and Defence. Despite this, transparency over defence expenditure is limited and official defence budget information, particularly in English, is scarce&quoute;.
No evidence was identified, either by the current assessor, nor by reviewers, that more details are available through the Parliament. Overall, transparency of the defence budget is extremely reduced, and when available, is outdated.
Institutional sources:
- The World Factbook: Kuwait, CIA https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ku.html (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Central Bank of Kuwait http://www.cbk.gov.kw/cbkweb/servlet/cbkmain?Action=qtbl&archive=20120709&tbl=RQ30 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Central Bank of Kuwait (new website), Annual Reports http://new.cbk.gov.kw/en/statistics-and-publication/publications/annual-reports.jsp (accessed 15 April 2014)
Media sources:
N/A
Others:
- &quoute;Major defence markets - Middle East&quoute;, Eurosatory 2012, IHS, 14 Jun 2012 http://www.ihs.com/events/exhibitions/eurosatory-2012/news/jun-14/english/Major-defence-markets.aspx (from 2012; accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy&quoute;, Kenneth Katzman for FAS, April 29, 2014 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21513.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Military Expenditure Data, SIPRI http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4 (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As of March 2014, Kuwait's defence budget was 5.2 billion dollars. See: http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=kuwait
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
There is a defence committee at the National Assembly: the Committee on Interior Affairs and Defence. IHS Eurosatory 2012 states: &quoute;Defence expenditure in Kuwait is subject to parliamentary scrutiny through the National Assembly of Kuwait’s Committee on Interior Affairs and Defence. Despite this, transparency over defence expenditure is limited and official defence budget information is scarce.&quoute;
Research supports this, indicating the Committee is only presented with certain figures from the defence budget; for example on training and salaries, but not for acquisitions. Defence expenditure thus remains opaque even to this committee. The Parliament seems to have some more breathing space in discussions regarding GCC military agreements (see the DCAF's summary from the 2007 event for further details). No information has been identified since suggesting that the level of detail has significantly changed however.
A workshop was held in 2007, organised by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, UNDP, and Belgian House of Representatives, titled: &quoute;Summary Workshop Report: Strengthening the role of parliament in security and defence budgeting and procurement&quoute;. Kuwaiti officials took part to the event and explained that they were unable to exercise efficient control over defence procurement because their own technical capacities were largely insufficient.
The Committee's status is also somewhat unclear: the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) does not consider it as an existing oversight body, for example. No evidence of its capacity to influence decision making was identified. Lastly, it is also unclear whether the limited information provided to the Committee regarding defence budgets is provided in a timely manner.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1:
Agreed. In addition, according to Al Najjar, the government must report to the Interior and Defence Affairs Committee, but such discussions are not publicly available. Reports on secret programs thus do not seem to be provided to the parliament so they cannot be subject to debate. Score maintained.
Institutional sources:
- PARLINE database: &quoute;Parliamentary oversight&quoute; module, IPU http://www.ipu.org/parline/mod-oversight.asp (accessed 15 April 2014)
- The Government of Kuwait (Diwan), Higher Committee for Defence section http://www.pm.gov.kw/higher-committee-defence.aspx (accessed 15 April 2014)
Media:
- &quoute;Kuwait parliament to debate GCC security pact on April 29&quoute;, Gulf News, April 15, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-parliament-to-debate-gcc-security-pact-on-april-29-1.1319616 (accessed 15 April 2014)
Research/other:
- &quoute;Major defence markets - Middle East&quoute;, June 2012, IHS http://www.ihs.com/events/exhibitions/eurosatory-2012/news/jun-14/english/Major-defence-markets.aspx (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Summary Workshop Report: Strengthening the role of parliament in security and defence budgeting and procurement&quoute;, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 13-14 November 2007 http://www.dcaf.ch/Event/Strengthening-the-Role-of-Parliament-in-Security-and-defence-Budgeting-and-Procurement-by-invitation-only
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Al-Najjar (2004) also mentions the role of the Audit Committee. &quoute;More financial control and scrutiny was given by Article 151 which establishes an “Audit Commission attached to the National Assembly ”. The Audit Committee is a serious functioning body which has the authority to inspect all government accounts and financial records on a regular basis. In many cases, such inspections resulted in cases being taken to court. The Audit Committee publishes its findings in an annual report that is made public and discussed in the Parliament&quoute; (12).
Report:
Ghanim Al-Najjar, &quoute;Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Kuwait,&quoute; GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF) CONFERENCE PAPER, 2004.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
The budget for 2013 or 2014 does not seem to have been released. Neither the National Assembly's website, nor the Central Bank's website contains such information. Previous budgets are available on the Central Bank's website, however these both stop at 2012 and provide summary figures only.
It is unclear how the public, whether CSOs or otherwise, is able to get hold of such information as the country does not have any legislation governing access to information. Research suggests that even in previous years, publishing the global budget did not guarantee public access to the details.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS:
Overall, although this information should be publicly available (through the Official Gazette or the e-gov website), it is not obtainable. It is safest to assume that only the SAI can access given portions of the military budget while other stakeholders are provided with very superficial, summary number. Score maintained.
Institutional sources:
- Kuwait National Assembly website http://www.kna.kw/clt/index.asp (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Central Bank of Kuwait http://www.cbk.gov.kw/cbkweb/servlet/cbkmain?Action=qtbl&archive=20120709&tbl=RQ30 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Central Bank of Kuwait (new website), Annual Reports http://new.cbk.gov.kw/en/statistics-and-publication/publications/annual-reports.jsp (accessed 15 April 2014)
Media reports:
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See link in Question 12. The claim that attempting to access Kuwait's defence budget would be see as &quoute;illegal&quoute; is not substantiated. It would certainly depend on who is asking, but its unclear that attempting to access the defence budget would be seen as a crime. [Comment removed from assessment.]
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The defence budget is declared within the overall budgets of ministries and government departments.
However, the part which is related to Military spending and Military reinforcements it is secret, and only the State Audit Bureau's auditors have access to these accounts.
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
The State Audit Institution does not seem to have published reports regarding the defence budget since 2012 (the budgets used to be published regularly until 2012). The Ministry of Finance does not seem to publish such reports either. Comparison with the 2013 GI assessment where the previous assessor explained that &quoute;full publication of all sources of income, the money received, and the destination. The Audit Office, at the end of the year, publishes complete reports of the MOD budget, with the exception of the secret portion of the defence budget&quoute; shows that the situation has dramatically changed in recent years. Reasons for this shift are unclear; none of the reviewers have been able to contribute to an explanation.
Currently, there is no publication of non-central government sources of funding.
Institutional reports:
- State Audit Institution, Reports http://www.sabq8.org//sabweb/pages/sabmagazineviewall.aspx?ID=uyA59fOrEIdKRItfxILPbe7DSMc840SP1dmXqUhky3Y= (accessed 15 April 2014; Arabic)
- Ministry of Finances, Budget Details section http://www.mof.gov.kw/MofBudget/MofBudgetDetail.aspx# (accessed 15 April 2014; Arabic)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The State Audit Bureau never published any of its reports, however they were sometimes leaked to the press from an anonymous source (usually from parliamentarians -as only they received a copy of the report)
Suggested score:
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
There are no updates or indications about an the internal audit in the Ministry of Defence or how active it is. In addition, the defence budget or the possible outcomes of internal auditing by the Ministry of Defence are not subject to parliamentary oversight.
According to the Kuwait Government Online website:
&quoute;Two important exceptions are drawn to the application of the Public Tenders Law:
- Procurement of the Ministry of defence: The Public Tenders Law does not apply to the procurement of military items for the Ministry of defence and Security Forces. Kuwait law broadly defines “military materials” to include land, sea and air weapons, spare parts, military communications, detection equipment and related systems (“strategic military procurement”).
No comprehensive laws or regulations govern strategic military procurement by the Ministry of defence (MOD). Instead, the MOD has developed internal policies and procedures for such procurements that are not available to the public. Such policies are generally more flexible than those of the Public Tenders Law. This comes in an effort to accommodate the MOD’s specialized needs with respect to strategic military procurement.&quoute;
GlobalSecurity notes: &quoute;The MOD has several internal committees that are responsible for the technical evaluation of bids.&quoute; No evidence was identified that these internal committees actually provide internal audit evaluation or oversight. Thus, it is impossible to gauge their efficiency and the quality of their work.
Institutional sources:
- Kuwait National Assembly website http://www.kna.kw/clt/index.asp (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Doing Business in Kuwait section on the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/pages/visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 15 April 2014)
Media reports:
N/A
Others:
- Kuwait Budget, GlobalSecurity.org (last updated 28 June 2013) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/kuwait-budget.htm (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
&quoute;On July 7th, 1964 Law No. 30 for the year 1964 was issued, establishing the Audit Bureau in the State of Kuwait. Its first Article provides: There shall be established an independent commission for financial control which shall be called the Audit Bureau and shall be attached to the National Assembly.&quoute; - State Audit Bureau Website.
However, both the technical and the administrative supervision as well as the key employees of the institution have to be approved by the Council of Ministers, limiting their independence. Moreover, as noted on the State Audit Bureau's website: &quoute;Article (75) of the law of establishment of SAB stipulates that The president of the Bureau shall prepare the draft budget of the Bureau in agreement with the speaker of the National Assembly.&quoute;
Given these provisions, the State Audit Institution (SAI) does not appear to be an independent body, separate from the National Assembly. Additionally, as can be seen from indicator 14, there has not been a report published on military budget or spending since 2012, meaning that its findings are, in recent years, not transparent.
The State Audit Institution is said to audit the Ministry of Defence but no reports have been published for the examination period (i.e., 2013 - 2015). Lastly, the Audit Institution cannot examine defence procurements. All in all, if external audit by the SAI happens, its results are not made publicly available and it is therefore impossible to gauge whether political influence has or has not undermined it. Lastly, as the SAI findings are not published for the examination period, it is difficult to identify evidence that these findings are acted upon by the government.
Finally, although the Ministry of Finances seems to publish some superficial info on the budget (budget line #210, &quoute;Ministry of Defence&quoute;), it does not appear to act as external auditor in the present case. The bulk of content on the Ministry of Finances website is press releases about its &quoute;achievements&quoute;, no report whatsoever on this subject matter is published.
RESPONSE PEER REVIEWER 3:
Agreed, but the State Audit Institution does not seem to have published reports of the defence budget since 2012 (the budgets used to be published regularly until 2012). In addition, the reviewer acknowledges that the effectiveness of the auditors is questionable. The indicator is specifically concerned with external auditing of military defence expenditure.
Institutional resources:
- State Audit Institution, Reports http://www.sabq8.org//sabweb/pages/paragraph.aspx?ID=XgBqu+zPcGx/MMpCK0RISYw7CMUQQoJ8xSWq1OB1vfw= (accessed 15 April 2014)
- State Audit Institution, Reports http://www.sabq8.org//sabweb/pages/sabmagazineviewall.aspx?ID=uyA59fOrEIdKRItfxILPbe7DSMc840SP1dmXqUhky3Y= (accessed 15 April 2014; Arabic)
- Ministry of Finances, Budget 2014-2015 http://www.mof.gov.kw/MofBudget/PDF/Disproprty-Law01-2014-2015.pdf (accessed 15 June 2015; Arabic)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is, however, an audit bureau. See: http://www.alqabas.com.kw/node/910772
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is evidence of external auditing with some degree of independence and transparency. The Auditors of State Audit Bureau (SAB) are considered external Auditors. SAB is an independent commission which is attached to the National Assembly (Parliament), though the auditors effectiveness are questionable, specially that they don't have full access to the Military financial reinforcements.
Suggested score: 2
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
According to Law number 32 from 1967 on the Armed Forces, confirmed by interviewee's, defence institutions are explicitly prohibited from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation (Article 14). It is also prohibited by law for officials in office to be involved in business activities, although there is no provision regarding these officials' family members or other relatives.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2:
No evidence was identified that the country’s defence institutions have, in practice, controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. Though this issue is not subject to public or parliamentary scrutiny. I was unable to find evidence from CSOs or academia on this, and I note reviewers have not added further sources.
Institutional sources:
- Law number 32 from 1967 on the Armed Forces [Arabic] http://www.e.gov.kw/Documents/Arabic/Forms/MOJ/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A9%20%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%B6%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%AA.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist. (May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It's not entirely clear how well the law is enforced.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
Kuwait signed the International Treaty against Organized Crime in 2006. Numerous media reports and security assessments from other countries are available describing a rather low crime rate in Kuwait.
Media reports about human trafficking and domestic labour abuses also exist. Indeed, human trafficking seems to be widespread and to represent the main face of organised crime in Kuwait. More recently (2014), reports have surfaced discussing a visa trafficking &quoute;organized network&quoute; within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. Along with these, mention is made of the Ministry of Interior and &quoute;a mafia of corrupt individuals&quoute; who operate within it. There are some 140,000 people who are estimated to have entered Kuwait illegally for the timespan of 2012-2014, benefiting from this trafficking network between the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour officials. According to the Kuwait Times article linked to above, the Ministry of Interior is taking measures to investigate the irregularities it is accused of suffering from.
In previous years, the Ministry of the Interior has engaged with the United Kingdom's Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism and the International Organisation for Migration on transnational organised crime and trafficking, indicating an awareness and willingness to address this issue. In the recent 31st Arab Interior Ministers conference in Marakesh (Morocco), the Kuwaiti Minister of Interior seems to have pleaded for enhanced cooperation on security, anti-terrorism and anti-trafficking topics with his Arab counterparts.
Taken together, these observations suggest that some penetration of organised crime into the security sector is likely. No report was found directly linking organised crime to the defence sector however. It is also noted that the big corruption scandals which shook the government in 2009 and 2011 related to allegations against then-Prime Ministers, and not against defence officials.
Institutional reports:
- &quoute;Kuwait 2012 OSAC Crime and Safety Report&quoute;, US Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security https://www.osac.gov/pages/contentreportdetails.aspx?cid=12116 (accessed 15 April 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Kuwait signs UN agreement against Transnational Organized Crime&quoute;, KUNA, Oct 9, 2006 http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1679533&language=en (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Majority of maids victims of organized crime in Kuwait (http://www.q8nri.com/home/2010/12/05/majority-of-maids-victims-of-organized-crime-in-kuwait/) from 2010 and &quoute;Focus on media’s role in human trafficking – Govt shelter to house 700 runaway maids, trafficked victims&quoute; (http://news.kuwaittimes.net/focus-medias-role-human-trafficking-govt-shelter-house-700-runaway-maids-trafficked-victims/ ) from Jan 2014 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Combating Transnational Organised Crime In Focus&quoute;, Arab Times Online, Feb 12, 2012 http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/179563/reftab/96/t/Combating-transnational-organised-crime-in-focus/Default.aspx (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;MP Warns On Rising Crime | 15 To 20 Daily ... Some Double&quoute;, Arab Times Online, Apr 28, 2014 http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/205618/reftab/96/t/MP-warns-on-rising-crime/Default.aspx (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Organized crime gangs behind cable thefts&quoute;, Kuwait Times http://news.kuwaittimes.net/organized-crime-gangs-behind-cable-thefts/ (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute; ‘Arab nations passing through critical period’ &quoute;, Kuwait Times http://news.kuwaittimes.net/arab-nations-passing-critical-period/ (article from 11 Mar 2014; accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Rampant corruption fuels massive visa trafficking – One month ban on visit-to-work transfer&quoute;, Kuwait Times http://news.kuwaittimes.net/rampant-corruption-fuels-massive-visa-trafficking-one-month-ban-visit-work-transfer/ (article from 9 Jan 2014; accessed 15 April 2014) -- detailed account of the visa trafficking issue
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
According to the Law number 32 from 1967 on the Armed Forces and the interviewee, rules exist for corruption to be investigated within the military (Art. 14; Art. 55-58). The interviewee added that the security services have some internal rules about investigating corruption (via the legal section of the MoD), and in case the charges are brought, prosecution is transferred to the (non-military) courts. Military personnel charged with corruption are prosecuted by military courts. Regarding the security services, an internal department is said to handle the cases before they are transferred to the Ministry of Justice.
The interviewee was unable to point to media reports about convictions, trials or any evidence of effective enforcement action. The only public mention of investigating and punishing corruption in the security apparatus seems to be the press conference identified by blogger Kuwaitiful and a report according to which a policeman was investigated over bribery charges (see sources box above). As of May 2014, there has been no update on the policeman's case in the media.
No evidence of these institutions' effectiveness in investigating corruption and organised crime was identified for the examination period.
Institutional sources:
- Law number 32 from 1967 on the Armed Forces [Arabic] http://www.gcc-legal.org/BrowseLawOption.aspx?country=1&LawID=3298
Media reports:
- &quoute;Policeman charged with bribery&quoute;, Kuwait Times http://news.kuwaittimes.net/policeman-charged-bribery/ (article from 28 Dec 2013; accessed 14 May 2014)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist. (May 2014)
Others:
- &quoute;AbdulFatah Al Ali Promises to Take Down Corrupt Officials&quoute;, Kuwaitiful, Jun 21, 2013 http://kuwaitiful.com/news/abdulfatah-al-ali-promises-to-take-down-corrupt-officials/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
Ghanim Al Najjar's 'Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Kuwait' seems to be the only comprehensive review on the topic. According to Al-Najjar, the intelligence services budget is kept secret in order to protect national interest. Research found no evidence of external auditing, and no further information on this subject.
It remains unclear whether the Parliament is able to effectively oversee the intelligence services. Research identified no reports or other proof that internal controls exist. According to Al Najjar, the government must report to the Interior and Defence Affairs Committee, but such discussions are not publicly available. The government is also required to submit information to Parliament if a request is filed but it is not clear whether this occurs in practice.
Kuwait does have an identifiable parliamentary defence and security committee, the Committee for Defence and Interior, which is tasked with providing oversight for defence decision-making as well as budgetary oversight. Research suggests parliament does directly engage with vital issues, however the Committee's efficacy is difficult to gauge as publicly accessible reports about its work do not seem to exist. No stand-alone access-to-information framework exists in the country; it thus appears impossible to guarantee any requests for such information would be successful. The Open Data Initiative holds no information on Kuwait and no other information sources were found. Media reports do provide some hints about its limitations: for example, the committee was overruled by government on a proposed extension to Bedoon soldiers retirement age.
Institutional website:
- The Government of Kuwait (Diwan), Higher Committee for Defence section http://www.pm.gov.kw/higher-committee-defence.aspx (accessed on April 15, 2014).
- World Bank Open Data blog for Kuwait http://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/taxonomy/term/119/all (accessed on April 15, 2014).
Media reports:
- &quoute;Ministry of defence Rejects Proposal that Benefits Bedoon Soldiers&quoute;, Bedoon Rights, October 07, 2013 http://www.bedoonrights.org/2013/10/07/ministry-of-defence-rejects-proposal-that-benefits-bedoon-soldiers/ (accessed on April 15, 2014)
Research reports:
- &quoute;Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Kuwait&quoute;, Ghanim Al Najjar, Conference Paper for Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), 12-13 July 2004 http://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dcaf.ch%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F33690%2F522597%2Fversion%2F1%2Ffile%2Fev_geneva_04071113_Alnajjar.pdf&ei=ZBRpU6KLCISTOPC_gYAG&usg=AFQjCNEYWFWq-_Vn7yJ0Bc9zvArwGmq4lQ&sig2=-fqrl2vuY_i1gLi3PvEizA&bvm=bv.66111022,d.d2k (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is no evidence of internal controls, however the State Audit Bureau is considered an independent oversight body that examines the budget.
Suggested score:
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
From the very scarce information available, and cable disclosed by Wikileaks, positions within the intelligence services seem to be given upon personal considerations from the ruling family's members rather than on a merit basis.
No evidence to indicate that senior positions within the intelligence services are filled on the basis of objective selection criteria without the opportunity for intervention by third parties, nor that there is a full investigation of candidates’ suitability.
Institutional reports:
N/A
Media reports:
N/A
Other reports:
- &quoute;(u) Change Of Leadership At State Security&quoute;, WikiLeaks, cable #02KUWAIT5166, time uknown http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=02KUWAIT5166 (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: &quoute;Gifting&quoute; is common within the Kuwaiti bureaucracy, beyond the intelligence services.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
No evidence was identified about the extent of oversight exercised on arms trades in Kuwait. No public information on the Kuwaiti government's process for arms export decisions was found. According to PRIO's NISAT database, the annual value of small arms and ammunition exports from Kuwait is reported by Customs to be 73,584 USD whereas the annual value of small arms and ammunition imports to Kuwait is reported by Customs to be 15,101,210 USD.
Kuwait has abstained from signing the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). A 2013 report on the Final Conference on the Arms Treaty notes that &quoute;The representative of Kuwait, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, said that it would not accept any legal provisions that could lead to the use of the treaty as a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of States. Efforts should focus on reaching “tangible goals free of ambiguities and loopholes” that would not leave the country open to political selectivity, double standards and manipulations&quoute;.
Kuwait seems to have been a relatively active participant with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Its 2013 report indicates Kuwait's participation in the votes; the most notable observations are: in favour of &quoute;Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction&quoute; and abstaining in the votes on &quoute;The Arms Trade Treaty&quoute; (see above) and on the &quoute;Transparency in armaments&quoute;. Kuwait also submitted its report on UN Resolution 1540, which addresses nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation, on 31 March 2005. The report details how its provisions have passed into Kuwaiti law.
Kuwait is also not a participant in the Wassenaar Agreement. Kuwait has however signed and ratified the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.
Institutional reports:
- &quoute;Brief report on the conventions on weapons of mass destruction by which the State of Kuwait has agreed to be bound and on national legislation&quoute;, UNSC, 1 April 2005 http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/AC.44/2004/(02)/109 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Disarmament Resolutions and Decisions of the Sixty-eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly&quoute; http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/yearbook/2013/ (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty New York, 18-28 March 2013, Kuwait Statement http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/373042756F14E9A785257B44004A97F0 (accessed 15 April 2014)
- The Wassenaar Arrangement, Participants http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Lists of signatories, and of states that later ratifed the Firearms Protocol http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/countrylist-firearmsprotocol.html (accessed 15 Jun 2015)
- Absence of Global Standards for Arms Trade ‘Defies Explanation’, but after Long Journey, Final Destination in Sight, Secretary-General Tells Conference, 2013 http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/dc3420.doc.htm (accessed 15 Jun 2015)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Explainer: What Is The United Nations Arms Trade Treaty?&quoute;, Radio Free Europe, September 25, 2013 http://www.rferl.org/content/un-arms-trade-treaty-explainer/25117736.html (accessed 15 April 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait discusses Arms Trade Treaty draft at UN&quoute;, KUNA, March 20, 2013 http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2299516&Language=en (accessed 15 April 2014)
Others:
- Marsh, Nicholas. 2013. ‘Database of Authorised Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons.’ NISAT Small Arms Trade Database. Oslo: Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers. http://www.prio.no/NISAT/Small-Arms-Trade-Database/ (accessed 15 Jun 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
Research found a theoretical framework may exist for asset management and disposals, and a dedicated entity to manage them, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA). This is all the information available on asset management in the country however. The Ministry of Finance has only published press releases and extremely general information on the MoD budget for 2014-2015 during the whole research period for the 2015 assessment; no specific financial information was available regarding asset disposal.
The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) is Kuwait's sovereign wealth fund. According to its website, &quoute;In 1982, KIA was created by Law No. 47 as an autonomous governmental body responsible for the management of the assets of the country.&quoute;
According to KIA's own website, there are no publications as of mid-May 2014. KIA's 'Transparency and Disclosure of Information' page explicitly states: &quoute;Law No. 47 of 1982 regarding the establishment of KIA has select clauses [...] ii. Clause 8 prohibits generally the disclosure to the public of any information related to KIA's work. iii. Clause 9 states the penalties for unauthorized disclosure of information to the public.&quoute;
Regarding oversight of activities, KIA's overview notes: &quoute;As part of its corporate governance structure, KIA also provides frequent reports to concerned parties, including the Minister of Finance, KIA’s Board of Directors, the Chairman and Executive Committee of KIA’s Board of Directors, the independent State Audit Bureau (whose on-site personnel also provides ongoing monitoring), the Council of Ministers, and the National Assembly. Senior representatives of KIA report periodically to the National Assembly’s various committees (including the Finance and Economic Committee, Budget Committee, and Closing Accounts Committee) to discuss any issues raised by the State Audit Bureau. KIA’s accounts are reviewed, audited, and approved jointly by two of the world’s leading external audit firms.&quoute;
In recent developments, the Opposition Coordination, coordinated by prominent opposition figure Mussallam Al Barrak, has launched a campaign rooting for fundamental change of governance highlighting that: &quoute;All governments since 1962, when Kuwait’s constitution was issued, have been led by a senior figure from the Al Sabah family, whose members have also always occupied the key ministries of interior, defence and foreign affairs.&quoute;
Foreign media sometimes report on developments related to Kuwait's asset management in general.
Institutional sources:
- Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Overview http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Overview_of_KIA/Pages/OverviewofKIA.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Publications http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/Press_Room/Publications/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Transparency http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Tansparency/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Kuwait opposition calls for full democracy&quoute;, Gulf News, April 12, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-opposition-calls-for-full-democracy-1.1318449 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- 'Kuwait Investment Authority' category at Bloomberg.com http://topics.bloomberg.com/kuwait-investment-authority/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
Research suggests that there is no independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments; no reports by audit institutions/firms or by the Ministry of Finances were identified.
As explained in the previous indicator assessment, the national asset management body is within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finances. Thus, the Ministry of Defence seem to have no control on the disposal of assets. The sole mention in the Ministry of Finances publicly accessible documents that might from afar look like asset-related information is a number in the 2014-2015 budget, under budget line #210 (Ministry of Defence), labeled as &quoute;Other expenses and transfer payments&quoute;. There is no other information provided for these &quoute;others&quoute;, although the amount is huge (1,302,405,000 Kuwaiti dinars).
According to KIA's own website, there are no publications as of mid-May 2014. The KIA is said to be an independent body and to report to the Parliament, &quoute;at least yearly&quoute; (see KIA's website, &quoute;Overview&quoute;, point 4).
No reports are published by the Ministry of Finances. The same is true for CSOs academia. The State Audit Institution (SAI) has only the right to audit public spending but does not have access to defence procurement (see previous indicators for details). No concrete mention was identified authorising the SAI to have a say over asset disposal process and oversight over them.
Institutional sources:
- Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Overview http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Overview_of_KIA/Pages/OverviewofKIA.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Publications http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/Press_Room/Publications/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Transparency http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Tansparency/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- Ministry of Finances, Budget 2014-2015 http://www.mof.gov.kw/MofBudget/PDF/Disproprty-Law01-2014-2015.pdf (accessed 15 Jun 2015)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Kuwait opposition calls for full democracy&quoute;, Gulf News, April 12, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-opposition-calls-for-full-democracy-1.1318449 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
The percentage is not available to the public. The only remotely related information is through the Ministry of Finances. It seems to publish some superficial info on the budget (see document linked to above): budget line #210 is for the &quoute;Ministry of Defence&quoute;. The amounts are about salaries, infrastructures, purchases and -- the biggest amount -- &quoute;other expenses&quoute;.
There is no evidence suggesting that the government has announced formally that its spending on such secret items is zero. There is no evidence the government has announced anything whatsoever related to such spending.
The 2013 GI assessment states that &quoute;The government has the ability to issue a 'special budget' for defence support, which is not subject to the same regulations on transparency and parliamentary control as other public spending.&quoute; This claim has not been independently verified for the current assessment, so no speculation relating to it is made above.
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Finances, Budget 2014-2015 http://www.mof.gov.kw/MofBudget/PDF/Disproprty-Law01-2014-2015.pdf (accessed 15 June 2015; Arabic)
Media sources:
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
No law exists to allow such oversight of secret spending. The Kuwaiti Parliament is formally entitled to scrutinise defence policy (some secret projects excepted). It is unclear whether the legislature or any committee is given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence? No information is provided anyway, regardless of the type of spending (secret or not).
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
- &quoute;Kuwait opposition calls for full democracy&quoute;, Gulf News, April 12, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-opposition-calls-for-full-democracy-1.1318449 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
No, legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items. Overall, the ruling family is in charge of handling defence spending in all its forms, as shown by calls for reforms and research assessments:
&quoute;The military, with its approximately 15,500 troops, operates under the supreme command of the emir, and no loyalty conflicts have been reported so far from within the army. [...] The parliament has never been a “rubber-stamp” body, and openly discusses vital issues. In particular, it has often pressed for more democracy, transparency as regards state financial matters, a greater role for itself in defining oil policies, and more parliamentary oversight over foreign defence contracts.&quoute; (Gulf News piece)
&quoute;All governments since 1962, when Kuwait’s constitution was issued, have been led by a senior figure from the Al Sabah family, whose members have also always occupied the key ministries of interior, defence and foreign affairs. [...] “We want to end the faulty confusion between the presidential and parliamentary systems,” said the reform document released by Opposition Coalition coordinator and former MP Mussallam Al Barrak at a press conference.&quoute; (BTI 2014 report)
Reports on secret programs thus do not seem to be provided to the parliament so they cannot be subject to debate. No institutional reports/publications were identified where such spending is mentioned. (This comment includes the military, police, and intelligence services.)
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
- &quoute;Kuwait opposition calls for full democracy&quoute;, Gulf News, April 12, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-opposition-calls-for-full-democracy-1.1318449 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Research:
- BTI 2014 | Kuwait Country Report http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/kwt/index.nc (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
Off-budget military spending has been legally allowed since the 1990s, as per Law Number 100 of 1999 on the Armed forces.
Yet no publicly available reports are available - for example, the National Bank of Kuwait publishes summary reports with general figures and no details; although general figures are also discussed in various media, no mention is made on defence or security spending, let alone off-budget military expenditure.
I have been unable to identify the level of control exercised over off-budget military spending.
Institutional sources:
- Law number 100 of 1999 on the Armed forces
- National Bank of Kuwait, &quoute;Kuwait budget FY 13/14: projected spending off 1% - but actual spending could still rise&quoute;, 24 Aug 2013 http://www.kuwait.nbk.com/InvestmentAndBrokerage/ResearchandReports/$Document/MonthlyBriefs/en-gb/MainCopy/$UserFiles/PFBudget24Aug2013E.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Kuwait budget surplus drops as spending rises 18%&quoute;, Gulf News, February 9, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/business/economy/kuwait-budget-surplus-drops-as-spending-rises-18-1.1288582 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Caution, out the window: Kuwait eyes $77bn budget spending in 2014-15&quoute;, Al-Bawaba Business, March 20, 2014 http://www.albawaba.com/business/kuwait-budget-spending-562798 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
Off-budget military expenditure is permitted by law but no reports were identified that detail it (e.g., the State Audit Bureau/Institution publishes no reports).
A recent memo by a FAS researcher lists arms deals with the US gives insights about foreign aid Kuwait may have benefited from. This foreign aid may count as part of off-budget expenditure but no additional information is available.
This indicator is difficult to grade as no evidence exists on licit or illicit economic activity. The 2013 GI Assessor for Kuwait gave this indicator a much higher score on the basis that: &quoute;In 1993 the National Assembly passed a law where all military spending had to be included in the government budget. Prior to that, most arms purchase were made on off-budget accounts.&quoute; This law seems to be still relevant and no evidence was identified that the law is not enforced. Score 1 selected to reflect the lack of transparency and assumes that &quoute;There is evidence of are some off-budget military expenditures, but the extent to which this is a practice is unclear.&quoute;
Institutional sources:
- State Audit Bureau oversight institutions [Arabic] http://www.sabq8.org//sabweb/pages/paragraph.aspx?ID=Pyg7u9jcuaSNstxYoXvkuaS2k76NsWkvteKactIrqsw= (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media reports:
N/A
Others:
- &quoute;Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy&quoute;, Kenneth Katzman for FAS, April 29, 2014 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21513.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
There is no clear legal mechanism for regulating information classification. Law number 32 of 1967 on the Armed Forces regulates classifying performance and disciplinary information on the grounds of protecting national security (see Chapter II, Article 55), however research found no further provisions.
It is likely that information is classified at the discretion of the individuals, parties, or groups in power with no specific or clearly defined legal basis. There is evidence of senior individuals persistently being able to influence decisions.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: As Peer Reviewer 2 highlights, many governments classify information without necessarily using a specifically framed legal provision. The case cited by the reviewer is not a clear cut one however as it may just be considered as censorship/quelling dissent.
The law regulating classification because of national security concerns remains vague. It is unclear who can request information to be classified on the grounds of protecting national security. Given the very little public oversight (see previous indicators), it is difficult to discriminate between how much these legal requirements are upheld in practice and how much the culture of secrecy prevails, legally justified or not. Lastly, no provisions for the oversight of such regulations seem to exist.
In the 2013 review, the Kuwait Assessor notes, &quoute;There are provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security. National Assembly members can ask the speaker of the house to release classified information on the basis of specified conditions.&quoute; It has not been possible to independently confirm this. Finally, influence by agencies is unclear: it would be likely to originate from the extended royal family which occupies key positions in government, but no evidence elf this was found in public sources.
Institutional sources:
- Law number 32 of 1967 on the Armed Forces [Arabic] http://www.gcc-legal.org/DisplayLegislations.aspx?country=1&LawTreeSectionID=7905
Media sources:
- &quoute;Kuwait opposition calls for full democracy&quoute;, Gulf News, April 12, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-opposition-calls-for-full-democracy-1.1318449 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Justifying government action on the grounds of national security is widespread. See: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/09/29/Kuwait-revokes-citizenship-of-opposition-figure-17-others-.html
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
National defence and security institutions are prohibited by law from beneficial ownership of any kind of commercial businesses. This provision is especially explicit for Ministers in office who are prohibited from being involved even indirectly in any commercial activities.
There is no publicly available evidence found of defence and security institutions, or military personnel, breaking this law and having beneficial ownership in businesses.
Institutional sources:
- The Constitution of Kuwait: http://www.pm.gov.kw/en/state_Of_Kuwait/kuwaitConstitution.jsp (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
The Constitution of Kuwait explicitly prohibits such businesses. No evidence was identified pointing towards the existence of military-owned businesses. I have thus chosen to grade this indicator with &quoute;N/A&quoute; as none of the other indicators apply.
Institutional sources:
- The Constitution of Kuwait: http://www.pm.gov.kw/en/state_Of_Kuwait/kuwaitConstitution.jsp (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
No reports were identified discussing such activities at the time of research. Research found existing legislation (albeit vaguely worded) outlawing participation in unauthorised private enterprise for defence personnel. Sanctions to deal with offenders are not specified. Nor does the legislation extend to examining the the participation by family members of defence sector employees in unauthorised private enterprise.
The researcher found no clear evidence of whether or not such unauthorised activities do take place, or of sanctions applied.
Institutional sources:
- Law number 32 of 1967 on the Armed Forces, Article 14
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section on the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/pages/visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- 2013 Investment report: Kuwait, the US State Dept http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204672.htm (accessed 14 May 2014)
Others:
- &quoute;Newsletter 27 : 6/7 - PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES IN IRAQ&quoute;, Corporate Watch, January 2006, http://www.corporatewatch.org/?q=node/2182%3F (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
Research identified no online data or other information referencing any relevant commitment by senior Ministry of Defence or Armed Forces staff. Speeches and official declarations from officials seem to solely relate to security and anti-terrorism measures, with no mention regarding public integrity or the fighting against corruption in any form.
For example, from a Gulf News article on the launch of GCC police: &quoute;GCC Secretary General Abdul Lateef Al Zayani said that the GCC interior ministers had stressed, 'the determination of the GCC states to combat terrorism and to uproot its causes in order to protect the GCC societies from its negative impact on their security and stability.'&quoute; Cited by The National, Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, a professor of political science at Emirates University, said the goal of establishing a joint military command would be to create a “Gulf-version of Nato”. In addition to police force, this formation would also benefit a joint naval force and a joint military command.
There is no evidence of any commitment by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs, and there is no evidence that any such commitments are made by senior ministry of defence or armed forces staff.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2:
This source is 5 years old. I agree, and while such a reaction might be reasonable to expect I have not been able to identify any such declarations for the examination period. Score maintained.
Media reports:
- &quoute;GCC countries to set up Gulf police&quoute;, Gulf News, May 1, 2014 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/gcc-countries-to-set-up-gulf-police-1.1326744 (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;GCC to set up regional police force based in Abu Dhabi&quoute;, The National, http://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/gcc-to-set-up-regional-police-force-based-in-abu-dhabi (accessed 15 Jun 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Suggested score: 2
In July 2010, acting Kuwait National Guard Undersecretary Major-General Eng. Hashem Abdulrazzaq Al-Rifae highlighted that the Kuwait National Guard won Kuwait’s Transparency and Reform Award which reflected determination of its administration in integrity and transparency. See: http://news.kuwaittimes.net/amir-visits-army-police-national-guard-clubs/
Corruption was the focal point of unprecedented opposition protests in 2011 in Kuwait. It's highly unlikely that defence officials have made no commitment at all to combatting corruption - even if in reality these commitments may not be honored.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
The cited laws regulate how the armed forces are organized. According to these, measures against corrupt officers exist: including withholding pay during investigations, sending individuals to court (the verdict allows incriminated personnel to be fined and jailed). There have been no reports of such investigations or of cases involving military personnel. The score here is awarded due to the difficulties with judging the effectiveness of these measures given the lack of information on the subject.
&quoute;The US State Department report for 2012 notes that, &quoute;The government took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed abuses, whether in the security services or elsewhere in the government. Impunity was sometimes a problem in corruption cases.&quoute;
Institutional sources:
- Law number 32 of 1967 and Law number 100 of 1999
- &quoute;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012: Kuwait&quoute;, US State Dept http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204370#wrapper (accessed on 15 Apr 2014)
Media sources:
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
According to the 2013 Human Rights Reports on Kuwait: &quoute;On January 8 [2013], the National Assembly ratified an anti-corruption law to establish the Public Anti-corruption Authority and financial disclosure provisions. In compliance with it, the government established an anti-corruption authority within the executive branch, and principal officers took their oath of office on June 19 [2013].
The January anti-corruption law includes protection for whistleblowers from retaliation for making internal or lawful public disclosures about alleged illegal activity.&quoute;
In addition, there was a previous attempt (back in December 2009), to comply with international agreements on combating corruption, Kuwait introduced to Parliament a draft law specifically dedicated to the protection of whistleblowers. No updates were available as of mid-June 2015 on the approval of the whistleblower protection framework, both from the whistleblower-specific draft law and from the 2013 anti-corruption legislation.
There is no legal whistleblowing protection for public officials nor for private sector employees reporting corruption. Despite this, private sector workers may benefit from varying levels of protection, depending on their employer (e.g. a bank employee may receive a reward for reporting wrongdoing). There is, however, no clear reporting mechanism for whistleblowers. The most effective way to report corruption seems to be through the media. This last sentence conveys the idea that a person will be more protected if s/he speaks on conditions of anonymity to a journalist who then publishes a story/investigates than if the employee went to report corruption internally. The aforementioned draft legislation has no clear mention of military/defence personnel.
RESPONSE TO PERR REVIEWER 3: Agreed. The reviewer has commented in previous indicators that this Decree is more of a policy than a law. The reviewer also emphasises that no evidence of implementation exists.
Score changed from 0 to 1 to reflect these arguments.
Institutional reports:
- 2013 Human Rights Reports: Kuwait, US State Dept http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013#wrapper (accessed 15 April 2014)
- Decree by Law no 24 of 2012 establishing the Public Authority for Combating Corruption and conditions of disclosure of financial disclosure, Chapter 5 http://www.gcc-legal.org/BrowseLawOption.aspx?country=1&LawID=4056
Media reports:
- Kuwait Overview, Blueprint For Free Speech https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/document/kuwait-overview (accessed 15 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Decree by law no 24 of 2012 regarding the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Public Authority includes a full chapter (Chapter 5) on protection of whistle-blowers, including procedures on whistle-blowing and the protection program.
So the Legislation and mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel do exist to report corruption; however, there is no evidence that they are implemented, nor is whistle-blowing actively encouraged. There is little trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.
Suggested score: 1
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
There is no publicly available recent information on this. Law number 32 of 1967 gives some indications as to what criteria military personnel applying for promotions need to satisfy in order to be promoted (need to have good reputation, not accused of a felony, etc. See Chapter III of the Law for details); art. 61 states that the Minister sets the criteria according to which one can apply for a promotion, but no other details are provided. In practice the final decision is taken by the Amir, and loyalty to the Amir, family links and tribal roots are among the essential criteria for such appointments. Any promotion is announced by a decree. No mention exists regarding corruption, in the entirety of the legal text.
The source linked to above outlines that low-ranking positions are given to Bedoon (stateless) but officer and responsibility positions are given to members of the ruling family or relatives: &quoute;Most Kuwaiti officers are members of the ruling family or related tribal groups. Education standards are high--many are graduates of Sandhurst--and living conditions, pay, and benefits are excellent. [...] Traditionally, the officer corps--with its close links to the ruling family--was considered to be a loyal and trustworthy defender of the regime.&quoute;
In another, older research paper (2004), Ghanim Al-Najjar outlines:
&quoute;The procedures for the appointments of key positions in the security apparatus starts by the minister [of Defence] who submits the nomination(s) to the Council of Ministers, which, if approved, submits the names to the Amir, who then appoints those approved by a decree. There is no legal framework for appointments, despite there being some rules for dismissals.&quoute;
Law number 32 of 1967 gives very limited indications as to the special attention to personnel in sensitive positions. Art. 32 poses the requirements for officers: &quoute;For the officer to be recruited, he: 1. Has to be a Kuwaiti national; 2. Must be twenty-one in that calendar year, exception made for pilots [...] 3. Have to be medically fit for military service [...] 4. Have to be of respectable reputation. 5. Must not have been convicted of a felony or of a crime involving moral turpitude (conduct that is considered contrary to community standards of justice, honesty or good morals), unless he has been rehabilitated; 6. Has to be a graduate of one of the military colleges [...] excluded from this requirement are specialist officers referred to in Articles 35 and 36&quoute; (these articles concern admission of graduate degree holders and medical doctors, respectively). These provisions seem to be the only specific ones for higher-ranking positions. No mention of corruption is made here, the only mention of criminality being felony or &quoute;moral turpitude&quoute;.
In conclusion: There is no evidence that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions (including time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management.) There is no evidence of recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 3: The (vague) provisions in Law number 32 of 1967 are not sufficiently specific to this indicator, no further sources found, score maintained.
Institutional reports:
- Law number 32 from 1967 on the Armed Forces [Arabic] http://www.gcc-legal.org/DisplayLegislations.aspx?country=1&LawTreeSectionID=7906 (accessed 8 May 2014)
Other sources:
- &quoute;Personnel, Training, and Recruitment&quoute; section in Kuwait entry from the Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the [US] Library of Congress http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-7616.html (accessed 8 May 2014)
- &quoute;Summary Workshop Report: Strengthening the role of parliament in security and defence budgeting and procurement&quoute;, November 2007 http://www.dcaf.ch/Event/Strengthening-the-Role-of-Parliament-in-Security-and-defence-Budgeting-and-Procurement-by-invitation-only (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There may be special attention paid to personnel in sensitive positions, but this is not publicly available or cannot be verified
Suggested score: 1
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
Number of civilian and military personnel are available from external sources i.e. websites such as Global Fire Power, Global Security and the CIA World Factbook however all provide different numbers.
Details on personnel serving per section are not always declared, and in the case of sensitive units such as the intelligence services, enrolment numbers are unknown.
The Ministry of Defence website is accessible but the closest thing to information on staff is the overall organisation of the institution. No numbers, no base installation information, only &quoute;achievements&quoute; and vacancies. The website of the Kuwaiti army does not seem to function, so it impossible to see what is communicated there.
The Ministry of Interior website was not accessible at the time of assessment, thus it is impossible to check whether specific information would be available there. The website was accessible at the time of review, but contains only e-services related information (issuance of ID documents, addresses of police stations, very limited information on the functions of police vehicles).
Official websites:
- Ministry of Interior: http://www.moi.gov.kw/portal/venglish/ (accessed 18 June 2015)
- Ministry of Defence: http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp (accessed 18 June 2015)
- Kuwaiti Army (link from MoD homepage): http://www.kuwaitarmy.gov.kw/ (not accessible)
Media reports:
- Country Military Strength: Kuwait, GlobalFirePower.com http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=kuwait (accessed 28 April 2014)
- Kuwaiti Army, GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/kuwait-army.htm (accessed 28 April 2014)
- The World Fact Book by the CIA: Kuwait https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ku.html (accessed 28 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Pay rates for all civilian and military personnel have to be published as per Law number 32 of 1967 which dictates organisation of the armed forces. The current rates are not published on the Ministry of Defence website however; neither does the Ministry of Finance seem to publish them online. They do appear to be available through Parliamentary publications and accessible to journalists.
Any modification of pay rates as well as their approval has to be submitted to the Ministry of Finances and to the National Assembly (see example of media report above).
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS:
Agreed. Although the law poses the criteria for pay rates, both peer reviewers highlight that such information is not easily accessible: while it may perhaps be obtainable in an offline version, this is not confirmed. No information on employees or salaries exist on any of the surveyed governmental websites (also see indicator 38 for details). The only information available from an official source is the budget for 2014/2015 where the Ministry of Defence has communicated a total amount allocated to salaries to the Ministry of Finances.
Score changed from 2 to 1 to reflect the lack of reliable information on this subject.
Institutional sources:
- Law number 32 of 1967 [Arabic] http://www.gcc-legal.org/BrowseLawOption.aspx?country=1&LawID=3298
- Social Security System http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2012-2013/asia/kuwait.html (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Finances http://www.mof.gov.kw/# (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Finances, budget 2014-2015 [Arabic] http://www.mof.gov.kw/MofBudget/PDF/Disproprty-Law01-2014-2015.pdf (accessed 15 June 2015)
- Ministry of Defence http://www.mod.gov.ae/ (accessed 8 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Salary Raise In Military To Cost State About KD 300m | Increments Will Motivate Kuwaiti Youths To Join The Forces&quoute;, Arab Times Online, Jan 23, 2013 http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/164797/reftab/73/t/Salary-raise-in-military-to-cost-State-about-KD-300m/Default.aspx (accessed 8 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There are also several news articles reveal tables claiming to give info on salary increases for military and security personnel in 2010 or 2011. (For example see http://www.alriyadh.com/606596 or https://translate.google.com/#ar/en/زيادة%20رواتب%20العسكريين%20الكويتيين%20تتجاوز%20المئة%20في%20المئة%20لبعض%20الرتب%0A%0Aزيادة%20رواتب%20العسكريين%20الكويتيين%20تتجاوز%20المئة%20في%20المئة%20لبعض%20الرتب%20%0A%0Aالراي(ضوء)%3A%20فيما%20بات%20طريق%20زيادة%20رواتب%20العسكريين%20في%20القطاعات%20الأربعة،%20الجيش%20والشرطة%20والحرس%20الوطني%20والإدارة%20العامة%20للإطفاء%20«سالكا»%20لجهة%20الاهتمام%20النيابي%20والحكومي%20بالموضوع،%20والتي%20قد%20تقر%20في%20دور%20الانعقاد%20الحالي%20لمجلس%20الأمة%20إن%20سارعت%20الحكومة%20إلى%20الموافقة%20على%20توصية%20مجلس%20الدفاع%20الاعلى%20بالزيادة%20واحالتها%20إلى%20مجلس%20الأمة%20بمشروع%20قانون،%20حصلت%20«الراي»%20على%20أرقام%20الزيادة%20المقترحة.%0Aوبموجب%20الأرقام%20فإن%20الزيادة%20تتجاوز%20في%20بعض%20الرتب%20نسبة%20المئة%20في%20المئة.%0Aوترفع%20الزيادة%20الراتب%20الأساسي%20للفريق%20أول%20إلى%201970%20دينارا،%20والفريق%20من%20940%20إلى%201730،%20واللواء%20من%20780%20إلى%201530%20والعميد%20من%20675%20إلى%201330%20والعقيد%20من%20575%20إلى%201170%20والمقدم%20من%20495%20إلى%201010%20والرائد%20من%20435%20إلى%20850%20والنقيب%20من%20370%20إلى%20730%20والملازم%20اول%20من%20310%20إلى%20610%20والملازم%20من%20280%20إلى%20550%20والوكيل%20اول%20من%20251%20إلى%20640%20والوكيل%20ضابط%20من%20227%20إلى%20560%20والرقيب%20اول%20من%20207%20إلى%20500%20والرقيب%20من%20191%20إلى%20440%20والعريف%20من%20171%20إلى%20380%20والوكيل%20عريف%20من%20156%20إلى%20340%20والجندي%20والحارس%20الوطني%20والشرطي%20والاطفائي%20من%20144%20إلى%20300%20والمهني%20أولى%20من%20190%20إلى%20274%20والمهني%20ثانية%20من%20170%20إلى%20246%20والمهني%20ثالثة%20من%20146%20إلى%20210%20والمهني%20رابعة%20من%20128%20إلى%20180%20والمهني%20خامسة%20من%20110%20إلى%20150.). The first article states that the salary hike was announced by the Minister of defence.
Additionally, another website reported a salary increases to the military and posted schedules of wage increases, sourcing their information from &quoute;well-informed military sources&quoute; who leaked the figures. I could not corroborate these figures on government websites. It could be the case that they received these in hard copy or in public statement before posting them online. For example, see: http://www.nationalkuwait.com/forum/index.php?threads/120705/
Selective parliamentary publications are available online. They are usually publications about the overall activities of the parliament, or publications that give innocuous general statistics. The availability of reports by year and committee online is spotty and inconsistent at best. Sometimes links do not work. It is possible that pay rates are published in physical publications rather than online. The Ministry of Statistics, for example, publishes an extensive statistical report every year in hard copy. I could not find any official website with the salary information, however.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Pay rates for civilian and military personnel are available only in a cursory, abbreviated, or unreliable way; information on allowances is not available.
Furthermore, there is no easy access to such information.
Suggested score: 1
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
A salary system is required and outlined under Articles 46-54 of Law 32 (1967). The Ministry of Defence asserts that both civilian and military personnel receive their salary at the end of the third week of the month, at which point the payment is processed automatically via bank transfer.
There is no evidence that part of the payment is discretionary, and no reports have been identified that payments are not being processed on time.
Institutional sources:
- The Constitution [Arabic] http://www.gcc-legal.org/BrowseLawOption.aspx?country=1&LawID=2674
- Ministry of Defence http://www.mod.gov.kw/ (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Law number 32 of 1967 on the Armed Forces [Arabic] http://www.gcc-legal.org/BrowseLawOption.aspx?country=1&LawID=3298
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
There is no publicly available recent information on this. The only legal framework for this is the one described in Law number 32 of 1967 on the Armed Forces which gives some indications as to what criteria military personnel applying for promotions need to satisfy in order to be promoted (need to have good reputation, not accused of a felony, etc. See Chapter III of the Law for details); art. 61 states that the Minister sets the criteria according to which one can apply for a promotion, but no other details are provided. In practice the final decision is taken by the Amir, and loyalty to the Amir, family links and tribal roots are among the essential criteria for such appointments. Any promotion is announced by a decree. No mention exists regarding corruption, in the entirety of the legal text.
The source linked to above outlines that low-ranking positions are given to Bedoon (stateless) but officer and responsibility positions are given to members of the ruling family or relatives: &quoute;Most Kuwaiti officers are members of the ruling family or related tribal groups. Education standards are high--many are graduates of Sandhurst--and living conditions, pay, and benefits are excellent. [...] Traditionally, the officer corps--with its close links to the ruling family--was considered to be a loyal and trustworthy defender of the regime.&quoute;
In another, older research paper (2004), Ghanim Al-Najjar outlines:
&quoute;The procedures for the appointments of key positions in the security apparatus starts by the minister [of Defence] who submits the nomination(s) to the Council of Ministers, which, if approved, submits the names to the Amir, who then appoints those approved by a decree. There is no legal framework for appointments, despite there being some rules for dismissals.&quoute;
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agreed. In addition to these comments, it is important to mention that there is no evidence of the use of objective job descriptions despite the explicitly labelled &quoute;Job vacancies&quoute; tab on the Ministry of Defence website. There is no evidence of assessment processes of applicants being conducted at all. I was not able to identify a provision for oversight of the appointment process by independent personnel; the Law number 32 of 1967 only says that promotions are announced by a ministerial decree. Source added.
Institutional sources:
- Law number 32 of 1967 on the Armed Forces [Arabic] http://www.gcc-legal.org/BrowseLawOption.aspx?country=1&LawID=3298 (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Ministry of Defence, &quoute;Job vacancies&quoute; http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/jobs/special_contract/index.jsp (accessed 18 June 2015)
Research reports:
- &quoute;Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Kuwait&quoute;, Ghanim al-Najjar, Conference paper for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 12-13 July 2004 http://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dcaf.ch%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F33690%2F522597%2Fversion%2F1%2Ffile%2Fev_geneva_04071113_Alnajjar.pdf&ei=d4hyU-GXFKKq0QWM8oD4BQ&usg=AFQjCNEYWFWq-_Vn7yJ0Bc9zvArwGmq4lQ&sig2=9q78sJ-VOKTKIC3NZYPgQA&bvm=bv.66330100,d.d2k (accessed 8 May 2014)
Other sources:
- &quoute;Kuwait: Personnel, Training, and Recruitment&quoute;, from the Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, January 1993, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-7616.html (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Fred Wehrey, &quoute;Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings&quoute;, Columbia University Press, 2013
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is also worth noting that that most high-level jobs in the armed forces and security are not available to Shi'a. This is important because it limits the pool from which candidates could be meritocratically selected.
Books:
Abdul-reda Assiri, &quoute;Kuwait's Foreign Policy City-State in World Politics,&quoute; Westview Press, 1990,
Fred Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings, Columbia University Press, 2013.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
There is no publicly available recent information on this. Information on how promotion occurs in lower ranks is not easy to find; the only information available at time of research was from the provisions on Law number 32 of 1967. These could not be corroborated for being respected as no evidence was available that what is stipulated by law is actually applied in practice.
It is likely that many promotions are not meritocratic. The country has been governed by the Al-Sabah clan for the past half a century and currently, the highest governmental positions including those in the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior (in addition to Prime Ministers and the Ministry of Information) are held by members of the Al-Sabah family. A 2004 research paper by Ghanim Al-Najjar indicates that: &quoute;The procedures for the appointments of key positions in the security apparatus starts by the minister [of Defence] who submits the nomination(s) to the Council of Ministers, which, if approved, submits the names to the Amir, who then appoints those approved by a decree. There is no legal framework for appointments, despite there being some rules for dismissals.&quoute;
Chapter III of the Law provides a vaguely worded indication on how a soldier can be promoted to a higher rank. Personnel promotions do not appear to be effected through formal appraisal processes and promotions boards for personnel. Promotions to senior ranks are not open to scrutiny by independent personnel.
Institutional sources:
- Council of Ministers (Diwan website) http://www.pm.gov.kw/en/government/councilOfMinisters.jsp (accessed 8 May 2014)
- Law number 32 of 1967 [Arabic] http://www.gcc-legal.org/BrowseLawOption.aspx?country=1&LawID=3298 (accessed 8 May 2014)
Research reports:
- &quoute;Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Kuwait&quoute;, Ghanim al-Najjar conference paper for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 12-13 July 2004 http://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dcaf.ch%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F33690%2F522597%2Fversion%2F1%2Ffile%2Fev_geneva_04071113_Alnajjar.pdf&ei=d4hyU-GXFKKq0QWM8oD4BQ&usg=AFQjCNEYWFWq-_Vn7yJ0Bc9zvArwGmq4lQ&sig2=9q78sJ-VOKTKIC3NZYPgQA&bvm=bv.66330100,d.d2k (accessed 8 May 2014)
Other sources:
- &quoute;Kuwait: Personnel, Training, and Recruitment&quoute;, from the Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-7616.html (accessed 8 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is also worth noting that that most high-level jobs in the armed forces and security are not available to Shi'a. This is important because it limits the pool from which candidates could be meritocratically selected or promoted.
Books:
Abdul-reda Assiri, &quoute;Kuwait's Foreign Policy City-State in World Politics,&quoute; Westview Press, 1990,
Fred Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings, Columbia University Press, 2013.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Parliament passed a conscription law in April 2015, which should officially come into effect within 12 months of official publication. In practice, media reports suggest it is more likely the process will be implemented by 2017. There is uncertainty regarding the status of the compulsory conscription law as it has been through multiple debates and revisions.
MPs have indicated that a carefully staged process is necessary as the Ministry of Defence is not yet administratively prepared for the influx of personnel. Media commentary has also indicated that Kuwait faced well-identified issues with avoidance of service during its previous period of conscription (1977-1990).
There are no known policies, rules or mechanisms against bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription.
Media sources:
- &quoute;Panel To Discuss Modifications To Conscription Law: Al-Tamimi&quoute;, Arab Times Online, 19 Oct 2013 http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/200626/reftab/69/Default.aspx
- &quoute;Mandatory Military Service For All Citizens 18 Years And Above | Govt To Tighten Security On Iraq Border&quoute;, Arab Times Online, apparently from 26 July 2013 http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/171899/reftab/36/t/Mandatory-military-service-for-all-citizens-18-years-and-above/Default.aspx (accessed 28 April 2014)
- &quoute;Conscription – Kuwait investment in future&quoute;, Kuwait Times, 30 Aug 2013 http://news.kuwaittimes.net/conscription-kuwait-investment-future/ (accessed 28 April 2014)
- &quoute;Lawyers challenge new law – Compulsory conscription in Kuwait military?&quoute;, Kuwait Times, 5 Sept 2013 http://news.kuwaittimes.net/lawyers-challenge-new-law-compulsory-conscription-kuwait-military/ (accessed 28 April 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait Reintroduces Compulsory Military Service For Citizens&quoute;, Gulf Business, April 9, 2015 http://gulfbusiness.com/2015/04/kuwait-reintroduces-compulsory-military-service-citizens/#.VYPp8yRsuV5 (accessed 15 June 2015)
- &quoute;Nothing New About Conscription&quoute;, Kuwait Times, April 16, 2015 http://www.pressreader.com/kuwait/kuwait-times/20150416/281698318276816/TextView (accessed 04 August 2015)
- &quoute;Kuwait- MP Queries Curriculum Ideology&quoute;, Arab Times Online, 13 July 2015 http://www.menafn.com/1094279526/Kuwait--MP-Queries-Curriculum-Ideology (accessed 04 August 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Agreed that it's often seen as advantageous to join the army. Interviewees have confirmed that historically some Kuwaitis would change their last name to be more attractive candidates for the security services, which are heavily &quoute;bedu&quoute; (historically tribal) rather than &quoute;hadhar&quoute; (historically merchant families).
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
There are no known policies, rules or mechanisms against bribery for soliciting preferred postings.
Institutional sources:
- Applying for voluntary military conscription, Kuwaiti e-gov portal http://www.e.gov.kw/mod_en/pages/servicescontent/272askedvolunteeredmilitaryservicekuwaitis.aspx (accessed 19 Jun 2015)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Mandatory Military Service For All Citizens 18 Years And Above | Govt To Tighten Security On Iraq Border&quoute;, Arab Times Online, apparently from 26 July 2013 http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/171899/reftab/36/t/Mandatory-military-service-for-all-citizens-18-years-and-above/Default.aspx (accessed 28 April 2014)
- &quoute;Conscription – Kuwait investment in future&quoute;, Kuwait Times, 30 Aug 2013 http://news.kuwaittimes.net/conscription-kuwait-investment-future/ (accessed 28 April 2014)
- &quoute;Lawyers challenge new law – Compulsory conscription in Kuwait military?&quoute;, Kuwait Times, 5 Sept 2013 http://news.kuwaittimes.net/lawyers-challenge-new-law-compulsory-conscription-kuwait-military/ (accessed 28 April 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait Reintroduces Compulsory Military Service For Citizens&quoute;, Gulf Business, April 9, 2015 http://gulfbusiness.com/2015/04/kuwait-reintroduces-compulsory-military-service-citizens/#.VYPp8yRsuV5 (accessed 15 June 2015)
- &quoute;Nothing New About Conscription&quoute;, Kuwait Times, April 16, 2015 http://www.pressreader.com/kuwait/kuwait-times/20150416/281698318276816/TextView (accessed 04 August 2015)
- &quoute;Kuwait- MP Queries Curriculum Ideology&quoute;, Arab Times Online, 13 July 2015 http://www.menafn.com/1094279526/Kuwait--MP-Queries-Curriculum-Ideology (accessed 04 August 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
There is no evidence of ghost soldiers; payment systems are strong however oversight is less than robust. The exact numbers of soldiers is unknown and Bedoon soldiers are often fired before legal retirement age. Payments are automatically processed through bank transfers; payment and allowances schemes are established by law and by MoD rules (see indicator 40 for fuller details). Also, as stated in previous indicators regarding oversight of military budgets, at least a part of the payment system is said to be controlled by the Parliament and the Audit Bureau.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWER 3:
Agree with comments, score lowered from 4 to 3.
Institutional reports:
N/A
Media reports:
- &quoute;Ministry of defence Rejects Proposal that Benefits Bedoon Soldiers&quoute;, Bedoon Rights, October 07, 2013 http://www.bedoonrights.org/2013/10/07/ministry-of-defence-rejects-proposal-that-benefits-bedoon-soldiers/ (accessed 15 June 2015)
Others:
N/A
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no firm evidence of ghost soldiers; however, some laxity of enforced accountability in payment systems suggests that the phenomenon could occur.
Suggested score: 3
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
The legislation does not elaborate on this. It is likely that chains of command are strictly separated from chains of payment throughout the ministry and armed forces; however, this is not a published policy and there is no evidence to support this.
Institutional reports:
- Law number 32 of 1967 on the Armed Forces [Arabic] http://www.gcc-legal.org/BrowseLawOption.aspx?country=1&LawID=3298 (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media reports:
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
According to the interviewee, there is a Code of Conduct but its content has never been made public, so it is unknown what the provisions are. Neither media nor institutional reports were identified with a mention of such a Code.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media reports:
N/A
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist. (May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
Security services personnel would be prosecuted through civilian courts while military personnel charged with corruption would be prosecuted by military court. The interviewee stated that the Ministry of Defence has never agreed to making outcomes of military trials public.
The interviewee was unable to point to media reports about convictions or trials. The Al Kuwait Al Youm website, which the previous assessor had used to show official publication of punishment by civilian courts, was not accessible during the research period. The only public mention of fighting and punishing corruption in the security apparatus seems to be the presser identified by blogger Kuwaitiful and a report according to which a policeman was investigated over bribery charges (see sources box above). As of May 2014, there has been no update on the case in the media.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media reports:
- &quoute;Policeman charged with bribery&quoute;, Kuwait Times, 28 Dec 2013 http://news.kuwaittimes.net/policeman-charged-bribery/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
Others:
- &quoute;AbdulFatah Al Ali Promises to Take Down Corrupt Officials&quoute;, Kuwaitiful Blog, Jun 21, 2013 http://kuwaitiful.com/news/abdulfatah-al-ali-promises-to-take-down-corrupt-officials/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist. (May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
No anti-corruption training takes place. The MoD has some announcements about discounts provided to personnel about training, but these concern university or other, non-corruption related training activities. Same for training announced at the MoD website (engineering courses).
The only mention of modifications relative to military personnel training is about amendments of Law number 32 of 1967: &quoute;of the Law number 32 (1967) regarding the army, where non-commissioned officers will be entitled to proceed with their studies and get a university certificate -- a matter that is intended to 'strengthen the Kuwaiti Army.' &quoute;
Institutional reports:
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Defence, &quoute;Training Courses&quoute; http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/training/tranning_c/d_courses.jsp (accessed 15 June 2015)
- Ministry of Defence, &quoute;Discount Offers for Training Courses&quoute; http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/offers/index.jsp (accessed 15 June 2015)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Kuwait parliamentary committees tackle housing issue&quoute;, Arab Today, 25 December 2013 http://www.arabtoday.net/bk-geyggikg/kuwait-parliamentary-committees-tackle-housing-issue.html (accessed on 15 April 2014)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist. (May 2014)
Research/Specialised:
- &quoute;Summary Workshop Report: Strengthening the role of parliament in security and defence budgeting and procurement&quoute;, November 2007 http://www.dcaf.ch/Event/Strengthening-the-Role-of-Parliament-in-Security-and-defence-Budgeting-and-Procurement-by-invitation-only (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
Outcomes are not made public, and is there no evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years. The interviewee stated that the Ministry of Defence has never agreed to making outcomes of military trials public. The US State Department report for 2012 notes that the government &quoute;took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed abuses, whether in the security services or elsewhere in the government. Impunity was sometimes a problem in corruption cases&quoute;.
Although the Defence Ministry under-secretary, Faisal Dawood, was sentenced to jail in 2007 for personal enrichment in the framework of his work (see report from Al-Wasat News, in Arabic), this dates from 7 years ago, no more recent examples were found.
The government was shaken by corruption scandals in 2009 and 2011, related to corruption allegations against then-Prime Ministers, which were made public, but this was not specifically related to the defence sector.
Institutional report:
- &quoute;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012: Kuwait&quoute;, US State Dept http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204370#wrapper (accessed on 15 Apr 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Policeman charged with bribery&quoute;, Kuwait Times, 28 Dec 2013 http://news.kuwaittimes.net/policeman-charged-bribery/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait profile&quoute;, 'Timeline' tab, BBC http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14647211 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Former under-secretary of Defence judged for corruption&quoute;, Al-Wasat News, 1 Oct 2007 [Arabic] http://www.alwasatnews.com/1851/news/read/255227/1.html (Arabic; accessed 14 May 2014)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist. (May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
According to a legal brief by Meyer-Reumann, &quoute;Offering gifts to &quoute;public officers&quoute;...with the intention to have a duty performed, is punishable according to Article 41 of the Penal Code of 1970, no matter whether the officer's action is in line with his duties or not. A gift is defined in Article 38 as every interest no matter if it is material or immaterial&quoute;. Sanctions include up to 5 years imprisonment or a 1000 dinar fine, which can be increased in certain circumstances. The authors note that the definition of public officers in Article 43 is very broad; it is not clear that defence personnel would be covered under the catch-all of 'any person assigned to public service' in practice.
US State Department reports suggest that the practice of facilitation payments may be embedded at a wider level in state institutions. Although these details do not relate to the defence sector they are contextually relevant and it is reasonable to believe that the comparable practices may occur, noting that any punishments (if they exist) have not been publicised. The State Department's 2013 Human Rights Report notes that practices of favouritism among Kuwaiti police officials are common and that corruption is most likely to occur when a party involved in a dispute has personal connections to the police officer assigned to the case. Police officers are similarly held to have refrained at times from investigating criminal acts after receiving bribes from an involved party, while reports show that the police tend to favour Kuwaitis over non-nationals. In addition, the report mentions &quoute;cases of visa-related corruption at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, namely selling visas or visa fraud. Several officials at the ministry faced prosecution after their August arrest on charges of falsifying labor import documents to profit from the sale of visas.&quoute;
While facilitation payments are illegal and mechanisms are in place to punish offenders there is little indication that mechanisms are effectively used or capable of discouraging occasional facilitation payments.
Sources:
- Law No. 31 of 1970 amending provisions of the Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 - &quoute;Crimes against the duties of public office&quoute; http://www.gcc-legal.org/DisplayLegislations.aspx?country=1&LawTreeSectionID=2155
- &quoute;Measures against Corruptibility, Gifts and Gratification: &quoute;Bribery&quoute; in the Middle East&quoute;, Arab Law Quarterly
Vol. 15, No. 4 (2000), pp. 363-367 www.jstor.org/stable/3382185 (legal brief from 2000; accessed 10 May 2014)
- Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Kuwait, US State Department http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220363 (accessed 18 June 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
Neither official sources (provision or law) nor media reports was identified relating to such a military doctrine. The interviewee was not aware of such a rule either. There is no evidence that the armed forces are aware of corruption as a strategic issue for operations or at least as an aspect of governance. The country has no known military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
N/A
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist. (May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
Neither official sources (provision or law) nor media reports were identified presenting evidence on training in corruption issues for commanders at any level. The Ministry of Defence website provides training but not on corruption.
As mentioned in previous indicators, there is no evidence of handling of corruption cases by commanders. This involves both mishandling or accurate punishment. As mentioned in previous indicators too, bribery and favouritism are common practice in the country, and there is no policy to specifically address and penalise corruption in the defence sector. It is likely that such activities are mishandled and not identified as problematic.
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Defence, &quoute;Training Courses&quoute; http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/training/tranning_c/d_courses.jsp (accessed 15 June 2015)
- Ministry of Defence, &quoute;Discount Offers for Training Courses&quoute; http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/offers/index.jsp (accessed 15 June 2015)
Media sources:
N/A
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist. (May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
Neither official sources (a Ministry's website or report) nor media reports were identified presenting evidence on the deployment of trained professionals in corruption issues at any level on mission. The interviewee was also not aware of related information.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
N/A
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist. (May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
Neither official sources (a Ministry's website or report) nor media reports were identified presenting evidence on such guidelines or training. The interviewee was also unaware of related information.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
N/A
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist. (May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
Private security contractors exist in Kuwait but what laws regulate them in Kuwait are unclear. Generally, the information one obtains on such involvement is through foreign media. For example, a CNN article cites two Kuwaiti private military contractors that were awarded multi-billion dollar contracts to support American military and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Many online resources around PMCs refer to CSA, or Combat Support Associates, a joint venture company dedicated to meet the US Army's Combat Support Service Contract - Kuwait (CSSC-K) until September 2009. The three partners in this venture are AECOM Government Service (AGS), Inc., Research Analysis and Maintenance, Inc. (RAM), and SMI, International. AGS is the managing partner. A number of online resources also offer assistance for PMCs willing to work in &quoute;dangerous zones&quoute; such as Kuwait along with &quoute;Sunday evening bids&quoute; and advice.
There is no mention of PMCs in Kuwait's private sector labour law. The interviewee was unable to identify a placeholder of official guidelines or rules. No reports were identified that PMCs operating in Kuwait are subject to scrutiny. No reports were identified that relate to corrupt activities by these PMCs or any sanctions being taken against them for this. The evidence of wide-scale corruption and fraud among contractors involved with US operations in Iraq suggests this could be a significant risk area.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
- &quoute;Contractors reap $138B from Iraq war&quoute;, CNN/FT.com, March 19, 2013 http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/19/business/iraq-war-contractors/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Troops or Private Contractors: Who Does Better in Supplying Our Troops During War?&quoute;, ThruthOut.org, 23 February 2011 http://www.truth-out.org/article/item/76:troops-or-private-contractors-who-does-better-in-supplying-our-troops-during-war (accessed 14 May 2014)
Interviews:
- Phone interview with interviewee 1, Journalist (May 2014)
Others:
- &quoute;New Kuwait Private Sector Labor Law Explained&quoute;, Arab Times Online, undated http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/148031/reftab/96/t/New-Kuwait-private-sector-labor-law-explained/Default.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Find jobs in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq & Others Faster in 2015&quoute; http://www.dangerzonejobs.com/artman/publish/article_7.shtml (accessed 19 June 2015)
- &quoute;Tactical Veteran: Private security contractor jobs offer good money - with risks&quoute;, 8 Jul 2014 http://archive.armytimes.com/article/20140708/JOBS07/307080063/Tactical-Veteran-Private-security-contractor-jobs-offer-good-money-risks (accessed 19 June 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
Law firm Ali & Partners states: &quoute;There are no comprehensive laws or regulations that govern strategic military procurement by the Ministry of defence (“MOD”) Instead, the MOD has developed internal policies and procedures for such procurements, and such policies and procedures are not available to the public. In general, such policies are more flexible than those of the Public Tenders Law in an effort to accommodate MOD’s specialized needs with respect to strategic military procurement.&quoute;
The e-government website Kuwait Government Online states that procurement by the Ministry of Defence is &quoute;more flexible&quoute; than non-defence procurement, to accommodate the Ministry's &quoute;specialised needs with respect to strategic military procurement&quoute;. Rules governing defence procurement are thus separate from the general public procurement cycle. These rules are not publicly available; this lack of transparency is one of the reasons contributing to this indicator's low score.
Moreover, according to GlobalSecurity.org: &quoute;Major defence trade opportunities exist in the MOD [Ministry of Defence] at the Ministry level, as well as in Kuwait's Land Forces, Air Force, and Navy. Most of the larger sales are handled through the U.S. Government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, while the smaller sales tend to be procured on a commercial basis.
With the exception of FMS sales, all major procurement deals are done on a commercial basis. For commercial purchases above KD 5,000 ($17,000), Kuwait uses a competitive selection (tender) process [the Competitive Tender Committee]. This process requires vendors to respond to an invitation for bids, submit a bid package, and comply with a schedule and formal contracting rules and specifications.&quoute;
This process, however, does not apply to strategic military purchases which are handled through the Military Procurement Committee. Price and satisfaction of MOD technical requirements are important factors in MOD's evaluation process. Information on financing, including the vendor's use of export credit financing, is also required. I have not identified a situation where the procurement done on a commercial basis has been bypassed: if this has happened, it is not mentioned as such in the scarce media reports on purchases. The recent report regarding Canada-Kuwait negotiations on defence procurement do not seem to go against this observation (see report from &quoute;Dissident Voice&quoute;).
The Kuwaiti MOD has several internal committees that are responsible for the technical evaluation of bids. The majority of defence procurements are done on a government-to-government basis, but a major part of procurements are done commercially.
Details on some procurement outcomes are reflected in foreign and specialized media outlets. No detailed information on defence procurement seems publicly available. Even the Parliament may not have access to all the details.
Notes in 2013 assessment include: &quoute;Recent pressure from the media and some MPs has forced the government to work with the National Assembly and State Audit Bureau to enforce laws relating to defence and security procurement. In the past, procurement -especially that of weapon systems, was exempt from these laws.&quoute; I have not been able to identify updates on these observations.
Institutional reports:
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section on the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/Pages/Visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed April 25, 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait: Budget&quoute;, GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/kuwait-budget.htm (accessed April 25, 2014) (Info on GlobalSecurity.org is from Kuwait's e-gov site and verified by other US sources)
Media reports:
- 'Kuwait' category on defenceProcurementNews.com http://www.defenceprocurementnews.com/topics/countries/kuwait-countries/ (accessed April 25, 2014)
- &quoute;Canada’s Flourishing Arms Trade with Middle East Dictatorships&quoute;, Dissident Voice, January 22, 2015 http://dissidentvoice.org/2015/01/canadas-flourishing-arms-trade-with-middle-east-dictatorships/ (accessed 19 June 2015)
Others:
- Ali & Partners, Doing Business in Kuwait http://www.mideastlaw.com/middle_eastern_laws_kuwait.html (accessed 19 June 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
Evidence suggests that the defence procurement process is likely to be disclosed in some detail to the National Assembly, but is not available to the public. Money laundering opportunities consequently exist during defence procurement and news reports have also headlined cases involving Kuwaiti defence contractors to the US military in the past. Foreign specialized media run articles providing details on contracts but such communication does not represent disclosure of the military procurement cycle to the public.
The lack of access to information on defence procurement is of concern. According to 2013 US State Department report, the Public Access to Information law was enacted and &quoute;provides for public access to unclassified government information by citizens and non-citizens alike&quoute;. Research was unable to find any supporting evidence that this has been passed or promulgated however, and there is an unusual lack of referencing of it online.
Institutional reports:
- Ministry of Defence http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp (accessed 25 April 2014)
- &quoute;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013&quoute;, US State Dept http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013#wrapper (accessed 25 April 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Offshore Security Drives Gulf Naval Procurements&quoute;, defence News, Mar 24, 2014 http://www.defencenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014303240013 (accessed 25 April 2014)
- &quoute;Pentagon: Kuwait To Receive Patriot Missiles&quoute;, defence News, Jan 6, 2014 http://www.defencenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014301060021 (accessed 25 April 2014)
- &quoute;Former defence Department Contract Employee Sentenced to 35 Months in Prison for Participating in Corruption Scheme at Camp Arifjan in Kuwait&quoute;, US Department of Justice, April 2, 2013 http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-defence-department-contract-employee-sentenced-35-months-prison-participating
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
There is no evidence of procurement oversight mechanisms. Law firm Ali & Partners states: &quoute;There are no comprehensive laws or regulations that govern strategic military procurement by the Ministry of defence (“MOD”) Instead, the MOD has developed internal policies and procedures for such procurements, and such policies and procedures are not available to the public. In general, such policies are more flexible than those of the Public Tenders Law in an effort to accommodate MOD’s specialized needs with respect to strategic military procurement.&quoute;
A Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, UNDP and Belgian House of Representatives 2007 event titled &quoute;Summary Workshop Report: Strengthening the role of parliament in security and defence budgeting and procurement&quoute; concluded that MPs are unable to control defence procurement as an informed and efficient oversight structure in terms of parliamentary follow-up bodies is absent.
The workshop report also identified a number of issues that appear to remain unaddressed. Defence procurements were reported to follow a different set of procedures given that they are processed by a dedicated Military Tenders Committee. The State Audit Bureau is not able to exercise a priori oversight and the Kuwaiti Parliament is formally not authorised to scrutinise secret projects. The workshop participants also noted that the parliamentary committee is often prevented from accessing necessary information on defence contracts. Finally, the 2007 document notes that the government can legally issue a 'defence strengthening budget' when the parliament is out of session or has been dissolved. There has been no evidence that these mechanisms have been modified.
Notes in 2013 assessment include: &quoute;Recent pressure from the media and some MPs has forced the government to work with the National Assembly and State Audit Bureau to enforce laws relating to defence and security procurement. In the past, procurement -especially that of weapon systems, was exempt from these laws.&quoute; I have not been able to identify updates on these observations.
Institutional reports:
- State Audit Bureau website http://www.sabq8.org/sabweb/home.aspx
Others:
- &quoute;Summary Workshop Report: Strengthening the role of parliament in security and defence budgeting and procurement&quoute; - a PDF with minutes is available to download at the bottom (from November 2007) http://www.dcaf.ch/Event/Strengthening-the-Role-of-Parliament-in-Security-and-defence-Budgeting-and-Procurement-by-invitation-only (accessed 15 April 2014)
Others:
- Ali & Partners, Doing Business in Kuwait http://www.mideastlaw.com/middle_eastern_laws_kuwait.html (accessed 19 June 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
There is no evidence that defence purchases are made public in any sort of detail. Research indicated many defence purchases have not been made public with no security justification as to why this information has been withheld. Purchases that have been publicised have only been done so by foreign specialised media outlets, indicating that they are not made public in Kuwait. There is no government guidance detailing why this may be the case.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2:
Agreed. These details come from foreign sources, but this limited availability does not mean that the information is released and publicly available in Kuwait, by the Ministry of Defence. Additionally, no reaction has been observed from the latter when visibility is given on foreign media, indicating there is no security justification as to why these are made -- or as to why information is not provided domestically.
Institutional sources:
N/A
Media sources:
- 'Kuwait' category on defenceProcurementNews.com http://www.defenceprocurementnews.com/topics/countries/kuwait-countries/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Other examples of procurements include:
A C-17 aircraft: http://boeing.mediaroom.com/Boeing-Delivers-Kuwait-Air-Force-s-1st-C-17-Globemaster-III
Patriot missiles: http://www.defenceindustrydaily.com/gulf-states-requesting-abm-capable-systems-04390/
Helicopters and combat aircraft: http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1010.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
No requirements are placed on companies beyond what is generally in company law.
According to GlobalSecurity.org: &quoute;Major defence trade opportunities exist in the MOD at the Ministry level, as well as in Kuwait's Land Forces, Air Force, and Navy. Most of the larger sales are handled through the U.S. Government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, while the smaller sales tend to be procured on a commercial basis. At the MOD level, opportunities exist in the areas of information technology, specifically command and control systems integration, and medical hospital management and equipment upgrades.
[...] With the exception of FMS sales, all major procurements are done on a commercial basis. For commercial purchases above KD 5,000 ($17,000), Kuwait uses a competitive selection (tender) process. This process requires vendors to respond to an invitation for bids, submit a bid package, and comply with a schedule and formal contracting rules and specifications. This process, however, does not apply to strategic military purchases which are handled through the Military Procurement Committee. Price and satisfaction of MOD technical requirements are important factors in MOD's evaluation process. Information on financing, including the vendor's use of export credit financing, is also required.
MOD has several internal committees that are responsible for the technical evaluation of bids. The Assistant under-secretary of defence for External Supply is responsible for the administrative aspects of purchasing military equipment and services. The majority of defence procurements are done on a government-to-government basis, but a substantial number of procurements are done commercially.&quoute;
According to Kuwaiti e-gov portal explanation: &quoute;Instead, the MOD has developed internal policies and procedures for such procurements that are not available to the public. Such policies are generally more flexible than those of the Public Tenders Law.&quoute;
Grading this indicator is thus difficult with respect to integrity as policies are unclear. According to the Public Tenders Law that the MoD does not comply with, companies need to be &quoute;registered in the Register of Commerce in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Kuwait&quoute; (Ali & Partners description). The requirements for the defence procurement procedures are not available to the public. Yet, with respect to the limited information available:
- bidding companies do not seem to be required to show that they have a formal and publicly declared compliance programme;
- bidding companies do not seem to be required to show evidence that they insist on an ethical supply chain;
- the information that companies with prosecutions for corrupt activities may be partially or totally barred from bidding (from the 2013 GI assessment) could not be independently verified for the 2015 assessment;
- bidding companies do not seem to be required to sign 'no-corruption’ (or equivalent) clauses in all contracts with the government. Similarly, neither for the Public Procurement Law nor for the very unclear defence procurement process, the government does not seem to make some reference to the need for companies to avoid corruption.
Institutional websites:
- Ministry of Defence http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp (accessed 25 April 2014)
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section n the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/Pages/Visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 25 April 2014)
Others
- &quoute;Kuwait: Budget&quoute;, GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/kuwait-budget.htm (accessed 25 April 2014)
- Ali & Partners, Doing Business in Kuwait http://www.mideastlaw.com/middle_eastern_laws_kuwait.html (accessed 19 June 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
This seems to be among the most opaque of Kuwait's defence processes. The State Audit Institution does not audit this procurement.It is unclear if procurement requirements are at least formally derived from a national defence and security strategy.There is likely to be a large element of procurement outside of the national strategy or through opportunistic purchases.
A communication from the British Council mentions a National Defence Plan: &quoute;The Talks included an Intelligence update and threat assessment from Kuwait as well as the Kuwait Defence Plan.&quoute; How comprehensive this is as a national defence and security strategy from which procurement requirements can and are derived is not known.
It is likely that preferential interactions with some countries (the US, UK, France, Canada) play a substantial role in military procurement. Procurement also seems to be influenced by pressure from allied governments and sellers which further blurs opportunities to identify where contracts are derived from. The announcement about Patriot missiles being purchased from Kuwait offers one example of this, given the platform requires highly qualified personnel that Kuwait struggles to train. An official report from the US army, dated 2012, showcases common training initiatives. In addition, training and capacity building seem to be one of the main obstacles to compulsory conscription in Kuwait: &quoute;The insufficiency of adequately-equipped training grounds was also cited to explain the reluctance to reinstate the mandatory military service.&quoute;
Lastly, from what is sometimes communicated through foreign vendors/outlets, it comes out that purchases come with training capability from the vendor; ex. with the CAE deal in 2013: &quoute;CAE today announced it has won a series of military contracts during the final month of its fiscal year 2013 fourth quarter valued at approximately C$130 million, including options. They include contracts to provide an MH-60R avionics maintenance trainer and weapons load trainer for the Royal Australian Navy, a C-130J weapon systems trainer for the United States Air Force (USAF), construction of a training facility for the Kuwait Air Force and additional training support services as part of the KC-135 aircrew training system program for the USAF.&quoute;
Institutional sources:
- &quoute;UK and Kuwait hold defence staff talks in London&quoute;, British Embassy Kuwait, 31 May 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/uk-and-kuwait-hold-defence-staff-talks-in-london (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media reports:
- &quoute;Pentagon: Kuwait To Receive Patriot Missiles&quoute;, defenceNews.com, Jan 6, 2014 http://www.defencenews.com/article/20140106/DEFREG04/301060021/Pentagon-Kuwait-Receive-Patriot-Missiles (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Canada’s Flourishing Arms Trade with Middle East Dictatorships&quoute;, Dissident Voice, January 22, 2014 http://dissidentvoice.org/2015/01/canadas-flourishing-arms-trade-with-middle-east-dictatorships/ (accessed 19 Jun 2015)
- &quoute;Training milestone solidifies Kuwait-U.S. partnership&quoute;, the official website of the US army, 17 May 2012 http://www.army.mil/article/80094/Training_milestone_solidifies_Kuwait_U_S__partnership/ (accessed 19 Jun 2015)
- &quoute;Kuwait lawmakers approve military conscription&quoute;, Gulf News, MARCH 25, 2015 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-lawmakers-approve-military-conscription-1.1478464 (accessed 19 Jun 2015)
- &quoute;CAE awarded military contracts and options valued at approximately $130 million&quoute;, CAE, 4/3/2013 http://www.cae.com/CAE-awarded-military-contracts-and-options-valued-at-approximately-130-million/?contextualBUID=103
Research/Specialised:
- &quoute;Summary Workshop Report: Strengthening the role of parliament in security and defence budgeting and procurement&quoute;, November 2007 http://www.dcaf.ch/Event/Strengthening-the-Role-of-Parliament-in-Security-and-defence-Budgeting-and-Procurement-by-invitation-only (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
Insufficient evidence available to judge to what extent purchases are based on quantification of requirements or if there is a formal porcedure for quantifying requirements. Purchases are often opportunistic in nature.
Secondary evidence such as references to a National Defence Plan indicate that defence strategy officially exists, however there is a lack of detail available about it and how it motivates purchases is unclear. The information from the 2013 GI assessment regarding a ten year-plan entitled the Strategic Defence Plan that is allegedly followed by the Armed Forces, was not able to be independently verified.
A number of issues were identified during research with respect to specifying the exact features and quantities required in equipment purchases. No formal procedure for defining purchase requirements is publicly accessible or has been mentioned in media reports or through other sources. No evidence was identified that work is undertaken to define and quantify the need for all significant purchases before the purchase procedure commences. In practice, it is also unclear how frequently opportunistic and unplanned purchases may be occurring.
It is impossible to evaluate how much sellers and foreign, allied countries influence defence contracting but it is likely that preferential interactions with some countries (the US, UK, France, Canada) play a substantial role in military procurement. Evidence suggests procurement seems to be influenced by pressure from allied governments and sellers which further blurs opportunities to identify where contracts are derived from. The announcement about Patriot missiles being purchased from Kuwait offers one example of this, given the platform requires highly qualified personnel that Kuwait struggles to train.
Institutional sources:
- &quoute;UK and Kuwait hold defence staff talks in London&quoute;, British Embassy Kuwait, 31 May 2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/uk-and-kuwait-hold-defence-staff-talks-in-london (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Pentagon: Kuwait To Receive Patriot Missiles&quoute;, defenceNews.com, Jan 6, 2014 http://www.defencenews.com/article/20140106/DEFREG04/301060021/Pentagon-Kuwait-Receive-Patriot-Missiles (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Canada’s Flourishing Arms Trade with Middle East Dictatorships&quoute;, Dissident Voice, January 22, 2014 http://dissidentvoice.org/2015/01/canadas-flourishing-arms-trade-with-middle-east-dictatorships/ (accessed 19 Jun 2015)
- &quoute;Training milestone solidifies Kuwait-U.S. partnership&quoute;, the official website of the US army, 17 May 2012 http://www.army.mil/article/80094/Training_milestone_solidifies_Kuwait_U_S__partnership/ (accessed 19 Jun 2015)
- &quoute;CAE awarded military contracts and options valued at approximately $130 million&quoute;, CAE, 4/3/2013 http://www.cae.com/CAE-awarded-military-contracts-and-options-valued-at-approximately-130-million/?contextualBUID=103 (accessed 19 Jun 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
Evidence indicates that, with the exception of FMS sales, all major procurements are done on a commercial basis. For commercial purchases above KD 5,000 ($17,000), Kuwait uses a competitive selection (tender) process. This process requires vendors to respond to an invitation for bids, submit a bid package, and comply with a schedule and formal contracting rules and specifications. This process, however, does not apply to strategic military purchases which are handled through the Military Procurement Committee. Price and satisfaction of MOD technical requirements are important factors in MOD's evaluation process. Information on financing, including the vendor's use of export credit financing, is also required.
According to the Kuwaiti e-gov portal explanation: &quoute;The Public Tenders Law does not apply to the procurement of military items for the Ministry of defence and Security Forces. Kuwait law broadly defines “military materials” to include land, sea and air weapons, spare parts, military communications, detection equipment and related systems (“strategic military procurement”).
No comprehensive laws or regulations govern strategic military procurement by the Ministry of defence (MOD). Instead, the MOD has developed internal policies and procedures for such procurements that are not available to the public. Such policies are generally more flexible than those of the Public Tenders Law. This comes in an effort to accommodate MOD’s specialized needs with respect to strategic military procurement.&quoute;
GlobalSecurity.org notes that: &quoute;Major defence trade opportunities exist in the MOD at the Ministry level, as well as in Kuwait's Land Forces, Air Force, and Navy. Most of the larger sales are handled through the U.S. Government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, while the smaller sales tend to be procured on a commercial basis. At the MOD level, opportunities exist in the areas of information technology, specifically command and control systems integration, and medical hospital management and equipment upgrades.
MOD has several internal committees that are responsible for the technical evaluation of bids. The Assistant Undersecretary of defence for External Supply is responsible for the administrative aspects of purchasing military equipment and services. The majority of defence procurements are done on a government-to-government basis, but a substantial number of procurements are done commercially.&quoute;
Given that the defence procurement follows a set of rules which are unknown - and may indeed not exist - it is difficult to verify that open competition really happens. Previous indicators from this section have outlined the record regarding the opacity of this process as well as the foreign pressure which might be exerted on procurement. Any estimate of the extent of single-sourcing would be purely speculative; the risk of this being high must therefore be assumed to be significant.
Institutional websites:
- Ministry of Defence http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp (accessed 25 April 2014)
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section n the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/Pages/Visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 25 April 2014)
Others
- &quoute;Kuwait: Budget&quoute;, GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/kuwait-budget.htm (accessed 25 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
There is no transparency of tender board procedure and practice. Audits are not normally undertaken of tender boards They are not subject to regulations and codes of conduct, nor are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness.
According to GlobalSecurity.org: &quoute;Major defence trade opportunities exist in the MOD at the Ministry level, as well as in Kuwait's Land Forces, Air Force, and Navy. Most of the larger sales are handled through the U.S. Government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, while the smaller sales tend to be procured on a commercial basis.
[...]
With the exception of FMS sales, all major procurements are done on a commercial basis. For commercial purchases above KD 5,000 ($17,000), Kuwait uses a competitive selection (tender) process. This process requires vendors to respond to an invitation for bids, submit a bid package, and comply with a schedule and formal contracting rules and specifications. This process, however, does not apply to strategic military purchases which are handled through the Military Procurement Committee. Price and satisfaction of MOD technical requirements are important factors in MOD's evaluation process. Information on financing, including the vendor's use of export credit financing, is also required.
MOD has several internal committees that are responsible for the technical evaluation of bids. The Assistant Undersecretary of defence for External Supply is responsible for the administrative aspects of purchasing military equipment and services. The majority of defence procurements are done on a government-to-government basis, but a substantial number of procurements are done commercially.
According to the Kuwaiti e-gov portal, &quoute;the MOD has developed internal policies and procedures for such procurements that are not available to the public. Such policies are generally more flexible than those of the Public Tenders Law.&quoute; Audits do not seem to occur.
Institutional websites:
- Ministry of Defence http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp (accessed 25 April 2014)
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section n the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/Pages/Visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 25 April 2014)
Others
- &quoute;Kuwait: Budget&quoute;, GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/kuwait-budget.htm (accessed 25 April 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
National legislation outlawing collusion exists but it does not seem to be specific to defence, it is unknown if the legislation applies to defence purchases.
A few years ago, there were media reports illustrating weak enforcement of this national legislation but no such report was identified for the period of relevance for this index. No collusion cases were identified from scarce reports within the examination period.
According to the Kuwaiti e-gov portal, &quoute;the MOD has developed internal policies and procedures for such procurements that are not available to the public. Such policies are generally more flexible than those of the Public Tenders Law.&quoute; It is impossible to assert whether there are provisions regarding collusion.
Institutional sources:
- Law number 32 of 1967 on the Armed Forces
- Ministry of Finances rules on tendering: http://en.mof.gov.kw/Desicions/MOFPublish/PDF/Ttpsd2.pdf
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section n the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/Pages/Visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 25 April 2014)
Media sources:
- &quoute;Former defence Department Contract Employee Sentenced to 35 Months in Prison for Participating in Corruption Scheme at Camp Arifjan in Kuwait&quoute;, US Dept of Justice, April 2, 2013 http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-defence-department-contract-employee-sentenced-35-months-prison-participating (accessed 27 Oct 2014)
Interviews:
- Interview with Interviewee 1, Journalist. 27 Oct 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
Procurement staff are expected to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations, but there is no evidence of training and staff are likely rotated in and out from other functions. There are likely to be significant staff shortages. There may be evidence of undue influence from higher grades within the organisation.
Institutional sources:
- Ministry of Defence, &quoute;Training Courses&quoute; http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/training/tranning_c/d_courses.jsp (accessed 15 June 2015)
- Ministry of Defence, &quoute;Discount Offers for Training Courses&quoute; http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/offers/index.jsp (accessed 15 June 2015)
Media sources:
N/A
Research/Specialised:
- &quoute;Summary Workshop Report: Strengthening the role of parliament in security and defence budgeting and procurement&quoute;, November 2007 http://www.dcaf.ch/Event/Strengthening-the-Role-of-Parliament-in-Security-and-defence-Budgeting-and-Procurement-by-invitation-only (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
According to the Central Tenders Committee it has established frameworks which protect local companies; these are published in detail on their website. The non-local companies willing to file a complaint go through their agent who sends the complaint to both the Cabinet of Minsters and to the Ministry of Defence. No independent sources could be found that reference these frameworks or verify how well they function in practice however. It is also unclear how this impacts the specific rules for defence procurement, set up by the Ministry of Defence and unavailable to the public.
The 2013 GI states that &quoute;The companies are well protected by the court of law, and some of them have won actions against the MOD and the MOF, receiving substantial compensation&quoute;. I was unable to verify this through publicly available sources.
It is not known if companies are disadvantaged in future procurements if they attempt to complain.
Institutional sources:
- Central Tenders Committee www.ctc.gov.kw (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
Companies identified as engaging in corrupt activities are blacklisted and banned from participating in future bids. Evidence shows such sanctions have been applied in previous years, however no recent cases were identified.
Institutional sources:
- Central Tenders Committee www.ctc.gov.kw (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Wife of Former Army Major Sentenced to 72 Months in Prison for Role in Bribery and Money Laundering Scheme Related to Dod Contracts&quoute;, the US Dept of Justice, February 23, 2012 http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wife-former-army-major-sentenced-72-months-prison-role-bribery-and-money-laundering-scheme (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media reports:
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
The Kuwaiti e-gov website indicates that the National Offset Company (NOC) is responsible for the management of the Kuwait Offset Program on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. The NOC's website notes that &quoute;Kuwait Offset Program was established in accordance with the Council of Ministers’ Decision NO. 694/1992, and was managed through the countertrade “Offset” Department within Kuwait Ministry of Finances (MOF).&quoute;
Offset guidelines are published on the NOC website but no relevant laws have been identified. Legal commentary (Ali & Partners) also suggests that the due diligence or auditing of such contracts is not stipulated in the relevant legislation. The NOC does not appear to publish any performance or integrity reports and this general information appears to be the most that is known about the company.
The Kuwaiti government thus engages in offsets, however due to the total lack of both institutional and media reports on offset delivery and activities, the grade for this indicator is '0'. No compelling public evidence has been identified that the government imposes due diligence or auditing requirements on offset contracts.
Institutional sources:
- National Offset Company (NOC), 'Guidelines' section http://www.kuwaitnoc.com/offset-program/guidelines/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section on the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/Pages/Visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Others:
- Ali & Partners (independent law firm), Doing Business in Kuwait http://www.mideastlaw.com/middle_eastern_laws_kuwait.html (accessed 19 June 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
The Kuwaiti e-gov portal indicates that the National Offset Company (NOC) exists within the Ministry of Finances and &quoute;was formed as a government owned closed shareholding corporation, adopting private sector practices in conducting its business&quoute;. The government does not seem to have published any details regarding defence offsets however, including copies of awarded or planned offset contracts, or current performance of offset programmes.
The government does not appear to have made a list of contracts publicly available for any sector, including any details of the investments and the supplying companies. For example, an opportunity to invest in medical research (http://www.kuwaitnoc.com/projects/opportunities/detail/investment-opportunity-in-diabetes-prevention-and-/) is briefly advertised on the NOC website, but no further information has been made available as a follow-up, including where a detailed call for bids has been published, whether proposals were submitted, or details of any contract awarded. The NOC's website makes no mention or publication regarding details of contracts. Only three opportunities falling under the examination period have been announced but these only provide very superficial information on program and no information on contracting and financials. &quoute;Partnerships&quoute; listed on the NOC website are all dated from 2012 and it is unclear why this page has not been updated since.
Although there are provisions described such as the Disclosure Law that favour transparency, the company does not appear to publish any performance or integrity reports. Due to the complete lack of both institutional and media reports on offset delivery, activities and the possible enforcement of integrity requirements, the score of '0' has been given.
Institutional sources:
- National Offset Company (NOC) website http://www.kuwaitnoc.com/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- National Offset Company (NOC) 'Opportunities' section http://www.kuwaitnoc.com/projects/opportunities/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- - National Offset Company (NOC) 'Partnership announcement' section http://www.kuwaitnoc.com/projects/partnership-announcement/ (accessed 19 June 2015)
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section on the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/Pages/Visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
No information on any competition requirements for offsets was identified on the dedicated institutional platforms as compared to requirements for the main contract. Since it is unclear what the exact requirements for the main contract are, it is impossible to use these &quoute;guidelines&quoute; (they don't seem to be a legal framework) as a comparison. In addition, no media reports were found speaking about such topics (even referring to them from afar).
Thus, '0' has been awarded rather than 'N/A' as regulations surrounding the offset program exist but none relate to competition.
Institutional sources:
- National Offset Company (NOC) website http://www.kuwaitnoc.com/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- National Offset Company (NOC), 'Guidelines' section http://www.kuwaitnoc.com/offset-program/guidelines/ (accessed 14 May 2014)
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section on the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/Pages/Visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Others:
- Business in Kuwait, 'The Offset Process' section, Kuwaitiah http://www.kuwaitiah.net/business.html#THE%20OFFSET%20PROCESS (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
According to LexMundi: &quoute;Ministry Circular number 4A/88, dated June 8, 1972 provides that, contracts for arms, ammunition and spare parts should be concluded between the MOD and its suppliers directly without the intervention of any agent or intermediary.&quoute;
According to GlobalSecurity.org: &quoute;The MOD prohibits the payment of commissions to defence agents. Agents, however, may charge U.S. suppliers set fees for specified services, as long as the amount of the fees does not vary with the size of the sale. U.S. companies have found it practical and convenient to have a local agent/representative provide them with market intelligence and take care of necessary formalities in the procurement process.&quoute;
The e-gov portal indicates that Law number 25 of 1996 on the disclosure of commissions in connection with government contracts is in force and imposes &quoute;full transparency and accountability in all government contracts, which value exceeds (100.000) KD, approximately ($300,000).&quoute; Again, however no information which detailed actual contracts was identified during the research. It is unclear whether citizens can actually use this law to file access to information requests -- and it is also unclear whether defence purchases fall under this law's requirements for disclosure.
The degree of control over their usage is unclear, there is evidence that this legislation is frequently not enforced effectively, or not obeyed
Sources:
- &quoute;Guide to Doing Business&quoute; in Kuwait, by LexMundi member firm Abdullah Kh. Al-Ayoub & Associates, dated: 2014 www.lexmundi.com/Document.asp?DocID=6574 (accessed 14 May 2014)
- &quoute;Kuwait: Budget&quoute;, GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/kuwait-budget.htm (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
Research suggests that although the rules according to which contracting is (theoretically) conducted are detailed and made publicly available before any contract is signed by the Ministry of Finance, the actual information on the financing packages for specific contracts is not available. After the contract is signed, in the case of weapon deals, the information goes to the National Assembly for review. As noted in Q57, &quoute;Price and satisfaction of MOD technical requirements are important factors in MOD's evaluation process. Information on financing, including the vendor's use of export credit financing, is also required.&quoute; This information is not made publicly available however as the researcher was unable to locate anything of relevance online during the research period.
The e-gov portal indicates that Law number 25 of 1996 on the disclosure of commissions in connection with government contracts is in force and imposes &quoute;full transparency and accountability in all government contracts, which value exceeds (100.000) KD, approximately ($300,000).&quoute; Again, however no information which detailed actual contracts was identified during the research. It is unclear whether citizens can actually use this law to file access to information requests -- and it is also unclear whether defence purchases fall under this law's requirements for disclosure.
Institutional sources:
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section on the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/Pages/Visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
According to the e-gov brief: &quoute;The tenderer must be registered in the Classification List of Contractors and Suppliers in conformity with the following Articles:
* Only through a Kuwaiti entity in which it has an ownership interest or by acting directly but with the assistance and support of a Kuwaiti agent or commercial representative, that a foreign entity may act as a government contractor.
The Public Tenders Law does not apply to the procurement of military items for the Ministry of defence and Security Forces.
No comprehensive laws or regulations govern strategic military procurement by the Ministry of defence (MOD). Instead, the MOD has developed internal policies and procedures for such procurements that are not available to the public. Such policies are generally more flexible than those of the Public Tenders Law. This comes in an effort to accommodate MOD’s specialized needs with respect to strategic military procurement.&quoute;
It thus appears that the main contractor (i.e., the one directly interacting with the government) sets out the rules down the chain of intermediaries. There are no reports regarding anti-corruption/integrity policies being enforced though. Lastly, there is no evidence that the government encourages the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes.
Institutional sources:
- 'Doing Business in Kuwait' section on the Kuwait Government Online (e-gov) portal http://www.e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/portal/Pages/Visitors/DoingBusinessInKuwait/GoverningBody_OverView.aspx (accessed 14 May 2014)
Media reports:
N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
As mentioned before in Q57, the MOD has several internal committees that are responsible for the technical evaluation of bids. The majority of defence procurements are done on a government-to-government basis, but a major part of procurements are done commercially
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, UNDP, and Belgian House of Representatives held a workshop named &quoute;Summary Workshop Report: Strengthening the role of parliament in security and defence budgeting and procurement&quoute; back in 2007, where many of the Kuwaiti attendees provided testimonies on strong pressure exerted by foreign governments which actually led to contracts materialising.
The cited slideshow mentions some cases of very close US-Kuwait interactions which suggest that sellers such as the US do influence defence contracting. No media reports clearly outlining such a case were identified.
The announcement about Patriot missiles being purchased offers one example of this, given the platform requires highly qualified personnel that Kuwait struggles to train.
According to SIPRI database, in recent years the main supplier has been the USA, with arms supplies in the last 10 years ordered from Russia, UK, France, Italy and Norway.
Institutional sources:
- &quoute;Summary Workshop Report: Strengthening the role of parliament in security and defence budgeting and procurement&quoute;, Nov 2007 http://www.dcaf.ch/Event/Strengthening-the-Role-of-Parliament-in-Security-and-defence-Budgeting-and-Procurement-by-invitation-only
Media sources:
N/A
Others:
- &quoute;Case study on Kuwait&quoute;, Homework assignment for Public Relations Bachelor focusing on &quoute;Kuwaits foreign policy, country overview. Kuwait's trade barriers and trading blocks, kuwait economic parameters, Kuwait's Import and export market&quoute;, Apr 19, 2014 http://fr.slideshare.net/vaishnavimeghe/case-study-on-kuwait (accessed 14 May 2014)
-SIPRI Kuwait Arms Transfers - http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
The Kuwaiti Parliament is formally entitled to scrutinise defence policy (excepting some secret projects). The Constitution requires there to be a Supreme Council of Defence (constituting the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, President of the National Guard, Minister of Defence, Minister of the Interior, Minister for Cabinet Affairs, Finance Minister, Transport Minister, Chief of Staff, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, and the President of the National Security Bureau). There is also a permanent Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Interior, whose composition is publicly announced in the media.
Although the Parliament includes members of the opposition, the power to make decisions ultimately rests with the Emir and his Diwan. Indeed, the Parliament may oppose proposals by government but this opposition will not necessarily be heard.
As Helem Chapin Metz notes: &quoute;Although the constitution affords the assembly considerable power, the body is limited by two major restrictions: the small size of the electorate as defined by law, which restricts suffrage to most adult male nationals whose ancestors were present in Kuwait in 1920; and the power of the amir to dissolve the assembly virtually at will. Nonetheless, the assembly plays a prominent role in raising issues of public importance, reviewing and challenging government policies and programs, and responding to constituent concerns. It helps give Kuwait a much more open and public political life than that in other gulf states.&quoute; This holds true albeit being written in the 1990s. In addition, all cabinet has the right to sit in the Parliament (number of seats limited to one third of all 50 MPs). Explaining the interplay between the executive and the legislature, Fanack notes: &quoute;Cabinet members (one of whom must be an elected member of the legislature) have the same voting power as elected legislators, giving the Emir more formal power than is typical in a parliamentary system.&quoute;
An illustration of influence by the executive on the legislature can be found in the recent article on the age of retirement for Bedoon soldiers, with the article saying &quoute;[o]nce again, Kuwait’s parliament fails to challenge any of the regulations set by ministries against their few remaining Bedoon employees. The parliamentary committee for defence and interior affairs has made a proposal to raise “the age of retirement” for Bedoon soldiers to be 60 instead of 55.&quoute; The Defence Ministry said the Cabinet would reject these proposals outright. (Bedoon soldiers used to make up for nearly the entirety of the Kuwaiti army prior to the war against Iraq, although officers positions have been held by Kuwaiti nationals generally members of the ruling family. Since the war, a policy of removing Bedoon soldiers from the army has been implemented translated into harsh treatments and oft-abusive removals.)
A recently news article by Gulf News (17 Feb 2014) showcases the above: the newspaper announced that Kuwait’s &quoute;parliament had the right to look at the proposed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) security pact meticulously, but insisted that the government did not engage in any agreement that would breach local laws&quoute; highlighting that national legislation and the decision-making hierarchy have precedence.
Overall, there are formal provisions for effective and independent legislative scrutiny and some formal rights exist to review defence policy. There is also some limited evidence that defence policy is debated in parliament. Yet, final decision rests with the executive which can overrule Parliament's decision and may or may not abide by Parliament's recommendations.