Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Under the terms of article 84 of the constitution, the National Assembly passes laws, approves taxes and monitors government activity, including asset disposal.

Information about asset control and disposal in Burkina Faso are not accessible and there is very little public knowledge of the process involved. Given Burkina Faso’s poor political corruption record and weak law enforcement agencies, as indicated by the Business Anti-Corruption Portal, there is likely to be widespread corruption in asset disposal.

The BTI report notes that laws or regulations guaranteeing information access do not exist in Burkina Faso; nor does a provision for the president and major officeholders to declare assets acquired during public service. The BTI report further notes that there are few reliable public sources of information about corruption in Burkina Faso, and the media are often left to publish rumors and accusations. Few government agencies provide customer- friendly services (for example on Web sites), which seriously compromises citizens’ ability to obtain information about government operations, including the proposed national budget.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security within the National Assembly is likely to be responsible for the scrutiny of assets disposal in Burkina Faso. However, according to Bayala (2011), the independence of this body and the transparency of its dealings, is questionable. Public access to government information is virtually non-existent in Burkina Faso and the law is mute on this matter. In accordance with the constitution, oversight of the security forces falls to the National Assembly and the judicial branch of power. Under the terms of article 84 of the constitution, the National Assembly passes laws, approves taxes and monitors government activity, including asset disposal.

In practice, there is no evidence that the National Assembly scrutinises asset disposal; nor are reports of such scrutiny made publicly available.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no publicly available source showing the percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services.

A 2011 survey by Budget Office of the Federation (BoF) on military expenditure within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) shows that Burkina Faso (with $112 million) is among the top largest spenders. According to the World Fact Book of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Burkina Faso spends 1.39 percent of its GDP on defence and security expenditure. Similarly, military expenditure (% of GDP) in Burkina Faso was last measured at 1.39 in 2012, according to the World Bank. Sources from MilitaryBudget.org and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIRPI) shows that Burkina Faso spent $153,000,000 on their military in 2012 which amounted to 1.5% of the country’s GDP that year.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence suggest that the legislature is provided with clear information on expenditure on secret items. This is likely to be entirely aggregated in the budget.

In Burkina Faso, the National Assembly is in charge of voting the budget and passing laws aimed at guaranteeing general peace and tranquillity for all citizens throughout the national territory.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Burkina Faso’s Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) is charged with evaluating the government’s accounts and producing Audit Reports. It reports whether the government has raised revenues and spent public funds in accordance with the authorised budget, whether the government’s bookkeeping is balanced and accurate, and whether there were problems in the management of public funds.

In reality, there is no evidence that the SAI produces an Audit Report. If it does, it is not made public. This makes it difficult for the public to hold the government accountable for the management of funds. According to the Open Budget Survey, budget oversight provided by Burkina Faso’s legislature is inadequate because it does not hold open budget discussions at which the public can testify.The national archives do not contain any records of enquiries, audits or reports drafted by the successive parliamentary majorities that relate to
oversight of the internal security forces.

According to the BTI report, the Public Accounts Court (PAC) audits the government’s accounts and complements the functions of the Superior Authority of State Control (ASCE) , and the Regulatory Authority of Government Tenders, which monitors government contract processes. The Open Budget Survey notes that budget oversight provided by Burkina Faso’s legislature is inadequate because it does not hold open budget discussions at which the public can testify.According to the Open Budget Survey, budget oversight provided by Burkina Faso’s SAI (or Cour des Comptes) is weak because it:

1. is not fully independent from the executive; the executive can remove the head of the SAI
without seeking final consent from the legislature or judiciary;
2. does not have sufficient resources to meaningfully exercise its mandate;
3. does not issue timely Audit Reports on the final expenditures of national departments; and
4. does not have adequate reporting on the follow-up steps taken by the executive to
address audit recommendations for remedial action.

Burkina Faso’s Open Budget Index (OBI) 2010 score is 5 out of 100, which shows that in the period surveyed the government provided the public with almost no information on central government’s budget
and financial activities. This made it virtually impossible for citizens to hold the government
accountable for its management of the public’s money.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is reporting structure in Burkina Faso - WSA Burkina - that oversee off-budget expenditure in the military. The law in Burkina Faso seem to support off-budget (military) expenditure. However, this is hardly reported or made publicly available. In 2013, for instance, the Burkina Faso Country Office (WSA Burkina) set quite ambitious goals and did everything possible to achieve them in partnership with the government and with support from the headquarters. Among others, WSA Burkina focused on massive stakeholder mobilisation for the High level Forum, effective implementation of the “Let’s Count on Ourselves Initiative” (ICON), resource mobilisation for government off-budget military priority projects, strengthening of partnerships with government and other institutions, and ensuring good progress in the implementation of all on-going projects.

Burkina Faso’s Open Budget Index (OBI) 2010 score is 5 out of 100, which shows that in the period surveyed the government provided the public with almost no information on central government’s budget
and financial activities. This made it virtually impossible for citizens to hold the government
accountable for its management of the public’s money.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Evidence from Freedom House suggests that there are significant off-budget military expenditures in Burkina Faso. This off-budget military spending is likely to involve illicit economic activity - including extra-legal arms trafficking - according to public evidence and media reports.

Burkina Faso is one of Africa’s poorest countries, with per capita GDP standing at around $1 200. The country cannot afford much in the way of new equipment, but recorded its biggest purchase in thirty years when it procured three Super Tucano trainer/light attack aircraft in September 2011. However, Burkina Faso’s economy has been growing steadily - this has resulted in an increase in defence spending, including off-budget military expenditure, but much of this goes towards salaries. The Office of the President continues to maintain discretionary authority over a number of budget lines (BTI 2014). These are less well-monitored than ministerial budgets, giving considerable scope for President Compaoré to reward political favors - this refer to off-budget government projects (ie. unofficial, 'through the back door' payments). The budget of the armed forces, moreover, offers considerable scope for personal enrichment by higher-level officers. (Freedom House 2012). Very little is verifiable in these areas of potential corruption.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: In Burkina Faso, mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security are not subject to effective scrutiny in Burkina Faso. In fact, according to the BTI report of 2014, the law does not provide for public access to government information. There is no procedure to appeal denials of requests for information on the grounds of protecting national security. No further evidence could be found.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Burkina Faso is one of the countries in the sub-region where the military has played, and continues to play, a major role in the management of internal affairs, including commercial businesses. According to an interviewee, evidence suggests that national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of small commercial businesses, but these businesses are rarely publicised and their operational and financial details cannot be accessed.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that military-owned businesses in Burkina Faso are subjected to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard.

There is a culture of corruption and impunity among the military in Burkina Faso (Business Anti-Corruption Portal 2015). One of the major sources of foreign exchange earnings of Burkina Faso comes from gold mining. Military and other officials have been implicated in corruption in this sector. Amongst the worst offenders for self-enrichment and cronyism are the military elites.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Burkina Faso law permits private ownership by government officials and there is no evidence that the government of Burkina Faso explicitly outlaws private enterprise within the state’s defence and security operations. There is no evidence that the Burkinabe government publicly discourages private enterprise; nor are there any repercussions for those individuals found to be engaged in private enterprise.

According to the Salone Monitor, &quoute;Gold mining – one of the country’s biggest foreign exchange earners – is a deeply criminal business implicating military personnel&quoute; Amongst the worst offenders for self-enrichment and cronyism are the military elites.

According to the interviewee, in practice, it is very likely that defence ministry employees engage in unauthorised private enterprises with impunity, and under the guise of ‘official’ military operations. In June 2013 the president of the Constitutional Council ordered the establishment of commissions to verify assets declared by state officials, including those in defence. In August the council organised a national workshop to strengthen mechanisms for enforcing compliance with financial disclosure laws. Private sector corruption is poorly covered by current anti-corruption legislation in Burkina Faso.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of public commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures on the part of defence ministers in Burkina Faso. However, the Business Anti-Corruption Portal reports that the government adopted a National Anti-Corruption Policy in 2004. It aims at strengthening regulatory and legal measures, making existing monitoring systems and law enforcement more effective, improving the efficiency and transparency of public services, strengthening international cooperation and improving civic participation in the fight against corruption.

The perception of corruption is widespread and the government’s rhetoric and institutional action in fighting bribery and corruption is significant. Besides the Superior Authority of State Control (ASCE), an entity under the authority of the prime minister that merges the High Commission for the Coordination of Anti-Corruption Activities, the State Inspector General, and the National Commission for the Fight against Fraud, there is the Public Accounts Court, which audits the government’s accounts and complements the functions of the ASCE, and the Regulatory Authority of Government Tenders, which monitors government contract processes. All of these bodies have comprehensive mandates and they have already exposed corruption at different levels of government and administration.

However, in almost no cases have their findings or recommendations been implemented. Transparency International ranks Burkina Faso number 79 on its corruption index. According to Chantal Uwimana, the Africa Director of Transparency International, the main reasons for Burkina Faso's low score on the Index this year could be that the country ‘has a low score with regards to government's capacity to punish and contain corruption. The country could make an effort in making public efforts made - if any - to prosecute corrupt officials.’

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: In Burkina Faso, the law provides criminal penalties for official corruption. Articles 154 to 159 of the Penal Code (in French) criminalise corruption, embezzlement, abuse of office and influence-peddling in the public sector. According to 2013 Human Rights report by the US Department of State, the government of Burkina Faso did not enforce the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Local NGOs criticised what they called the overwhelming corruption of senior civil servants. They reported pervasive corruption in the customs service, gendarmerie, tax agencies, national police, municipal police, public health service, municipal governments, education sector, government procurement, and the Ministry of Justice.The government prosecuted several senior government officials for corruption, but no high-profile defendants were convicted during the year. The State’s Supreme Audit Authority (ASCE) is responsible for investigating corruption and ensuring the sound management of public funds in Burkina Faso. In 2013, the audit authority, which collaborated with civil society, published an annual report documenting financial irregularities, embezzlement, and improper use of public funds in various ministries, government agencies, and state-run companies. The agency had limited impact because it lacked independence and had no prosecutorial powers. The public perception of corruption is widespread in Burkina Faso. The reluctance to disclose reports about official corruption casts doubt on the government's will to fight corruption.

The BTI reports that in the 2011 mutinies, 171 police officers were disciplined for their participation, the national director-general of the police was replaced, and 567 mutinous soldiers were dismissed from the military ranks, about 300 of whom were placed in detention. While holding the security forces accountable for their acts (looting, property destruction, human rights abuses and killings) was an important step toward more justice and accountability.

The BTI further reports that fighting rampant political and bureaucratic corruption, including the criminal prosecution of corrupt officeholders, has been one of the public’s main demands for many years and that demand continued during the period under review. Isolated cases of corruption are prosecuted.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Whistleblower protection laws are lacking in Burkina Faso. The African Peer Review Mechanism Burkina Faso 2008 reports that the country is lacking whistleblower legislation, which poses a hindrance to the fight against corruption. The Government of Burkina Faso has stated that it wishes to facilitate anti-corruption efforts, and several institutions have been set up and international conventions ratified in recent years. However, the lack of access to information and an absence of whistle-blower laws are indeed severe impediments to fighting corruption in Burkina Faso.

Information from the Global Corruption Barometer (2014), the BTI report (2013) and the US 2013 Human Rights Reports on Burkina Faso shows no evidence of informal mechanisms to facilitte whistleblowing in the MOD/army or the broader government.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no recognition by the establishment that certain positions are more vulnerable to corruption than others; nor are there any procedures/codes of conduct in place that cover rotation of post, vetting, post-retirement restrictions etc. There is no evidence that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions in Burkina Faso nor is the selection criteria publicly available. Indeed, there is no clarity over the mechanisms for selection and oversight.

Context: The president of Burkina Faso is key to the appointment of officials into sensitive positions in Burkina Faso. For example, the Office of the Ombudsman was established by law in 1994 and handles written complaints against the public administration from the public. The Ombudsman is appointed by the President for a non-renewable five-year term and cannot be removed during this term. According to the US Department of State 2009, the Ombudsman has limited resources and no report of the Ombudsman's work was published during 2009. The Constitutional Council Judges are appointed by the President upon the proposal of the Minister of justice. The Judges are appointed for 9-year terms with one-third of judges renewed every 3 years. Article 55 of the Burkina Faso Constitution states that the President of Faso appoints to the offices of the high civil and military administration[,] as well as in the societies and enterprises of strategic character determined by the law. He appoints the ambassadors and the extraordinary envoys to the foreign powers and to international organizations. The foreign ambassadors and extraordinary envoys are accredited to him. He appoints the Grand Chancellor of the Order Burkinabe. A law determines the functions or offices for which the power of appointment of the President of Faso is exercised after [the] opinion of the Parliament as well as the modalities and effects of this consultation.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Information on the number of civilian and military personnel is not officially made available by the defence establishment. According to Index Mundi, the value for Armed forces personnel, total in Burkina Faso was 11,450 as of 2011. Armed forces personnel (% of total labor force) in Burkina Faso was 0.15 as of 2011. Its highest value over the past 21 years was 0.25 in 2001, while its lowest value was 0.15 in 2011. Armed forces personnel (% of total labor force) in Burkina Faso was last measured at 0.16 in 2011, according to the World Bank. The Army of Burkina Faso (L'Armée de Terre – Ground Forces or LAT) is a skeletonized force structure of some 5,800–6,000 officers and men, augmented by a conscript force or People's Militia of some 45,000 men and women. The IISS estimated in 2011–12 that Burkina Faso had 6,400 personnel in the Armee de Terre in three military regions, one tank battalion (two tank platoons), five infantry regiments that may be understrength, and an airborne regiment. Artillery and engineer battalions are also listed. The accuracy of these figures could not be verified.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no available information on the pay rate and allowances for civilian and military personnel. These are not openly published.

General context: The BTI report notes that extensive economic grievances (poor pay, housing, etc.) among the security forces persist despite the government’s efforts to meet their demands. The political aspects of the incidents have not been addressed at all. These include a clear breakdown in command; a lack of respect for the forces’ leaders, whom the soldiers accuse of corruption, favoritism and embezzlement; and deep anger toward the state’s authorities, including the president.

According to a BBC News Africa report, dated 15 January 2015, members of parliament in Burkina Faso have decided to cut their salaries by half. BBC notes that the move followed heated exchanges on social media after it was revealed that MPs were paid more than $3,000 (£1,985) a month.The average salary in Burkina Faso is about $150 a month. Revelations about MPs' pay prompted angry reactions on social media, with many saying the pay levels amounted to an abuse of power.

Public access to government information is difficult. World Bank reports suggest that Burkina Faso’s public service entered the decade of the 1990s with a three-year total freeze on salary increases, including those due on staff promotions. In those thee years, in real terms, the salary levels of all public servants, including defence, inevitably declined. The freeze was lifted in January 1993. Concurrently, the salary adjustment index which had been slashed to 1919 points in the revolutionary austerity measures in 1987, was reinstated to 2132 points. Burkina Faso’s economy has been growing steadily - this has resulted in an increase in defence spending, but much of this goes towards salaries, according to defence Web.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Public evidence suggest that there are significant delays in payment in Burkina Faso and there is evidence that some personnel do not receive the correct pay. This is further complicated by lack of public access to relevant information on the pay system because since this is not published. Reports have emerged in recent years of disputes over pay and conditions within defence and security. The coup against former Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore started with the presidential special guard and later spread to other military camps, was reportedly in protest of soldiers’ unpaid housing allowances. There is no evidence that the payment system has been improved since.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Information on the selection process for military personnel at middle and top management level in Burkina Faso remains unclear and difficult to access. There appears to be no established system for the appointment of military personnel in Burkina Faso. The BTI reports that there is evidence of nepotism and favouritism in the selection process, especially within defence and security. Report from Ref World suggest that recruitment into the armed forces is on a voluntary basis. No information is available about recruitment into the peoples' militia.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Evidence suggest the existence of some formal process in the selection process in Burkina Faso.

The following example is instructive. Permanent civil servants (functionaries or state employees) in Burkina Faso are evaluated every year. The evaluation is a quotation between 0 and 10 that is supposed to measure the output (rendement) of the employee during the last year. It is in line with that quotation that s/he will be promoted to a higher step or higher class –as described above- with financial gain in her/his salary. Every two years with an average quota of at least 60 percent, the civil servant is promoted to the next step [article 80 law no 13/98/AN].

For promotion to higher class, a public notice is issued by the by Ministry employing the concerned civil servant, after recommendation from an ad hoc Ministry board. This promotion is merit based and requires at minimum: For promotion to Class 2, the civil servant should have accomplished a minimum of 10 year period in Class 1, with an average quotation of 80 percent. For promotion to Class 3, the civil servant should have accomplished at least 8 years in Class 2 with an average quote of 80 percent. Beside these two common promotions, articles 84 to 90 of Act no. 13/98/AN defines the requirements for promotion from a category to another. It is generally after a training of acquisition of a new academic degree. This notwithstanding, there is potential for corruption or other inappropriate conduct in the promotion process.

Then mentioned process is inclusive of the defence and security ministries.There is no evidence that promotions to senior defence and security ranks are scrutinised by an independent panel. As mentioned in Question 41 there is evidence of nepotism and favouratism in broader government appointments, which is likely a feature of promotions as well.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Burkina Faso has no compulsory military conscription. A two-year conscription term is listed for a part-time People’s Militia, although service is voluntary in the regular active forces. However, there is a form of civilian conscription. In September 1990 compulsory military training for conscripts was abolished and replaced by 'civil and patriotic' training, which lasts for one and a half month, followed by 10 months work in the production sector. Previously, conscription consisted of a one-year compulsory military service. In Burkina Faso, 18 years of age is for compulsory military service; while 20 years of age is for voluntary military service. No evidence of conscription-related bribery and corruption could be verified. However, it is likely that bribery is widespread.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There seem to be no established or known policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process, aside from broader measures to address corruption and bribery as discussed in Question 35). However, Burkina Faso does have laws and institutions that discourage bribery and corruption in general. These extend to bribery in voluntary conscription. The research could not find evidence of bribery to gain preferred postings. However, given the poor record of political and bureaucratic corruption in Burkina Faso, as cited by the Business Anti-Corruption Portal, this form of posting is likely to flourish in Burkina Faso.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Owing to administrative weakness in Burkina Faso, there have been problems properly identifying civil servants and defence officials on the payroll, resulting in salaries been paid to ghost workers. In 2011 Burkina Faso’s government pledged to improve the impoverished country’s defence and civil service by cracking down on ghost workers. ‘We usually end up with 50, 100 or 200 ghost civil servants’ recorded each year', Civil Service Minister Soungalo Apollinaire Ouattara said in an interview with AFP and Voice of America. ‘A ghost worker is a civil servant who was hired, is on the payroll but does not show up at work. It can be a case of long-term leave or it can be a civil servant whose post doubles up with another’s,’ he said. Ouattara further noted that ‘We are currently bent on eradicating these duplications’, adding that his ministry was comparing notes with the budget ministry to expose fraudsters.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is a lack of clarity surrounding the separation between chains of payment and chains of command in Burkina Faso.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: While the constitution establishes some general principles and obligations for higher official, there is no specific code of conduct for government employees, including defence staff, offering guidance with respect to bribery, gifts, conflict of interest, etc.

There is no code of conduct for military and civilian personnel. The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption in general. However the government did not enforce these laws effectively and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity, according to the Human Rights reports by the US Department of State. Local NGOs bemoaned what they described as the overwhelming corruption of senior civil servants. They reported pervasive corruption in the customs service, gendarmerie, taxing agencies, national police, municipal police, public health service, municipal governments, the education sector, government procurement, and the Ministry of Justice. There is the National Ethics Committee (NEC) which was established by President Compaoré in 2001 with the main task to 'moralise' public life. According to African Peer Review Mechanism Burkina Faso 2008, the NEC prepared a draft on ethics that is applicable to various areas such as general administration and financial administration. Furthermore, the NEC highlighted in its 2007 report, that corruption, impunity and politicisation were significant trends in the current government system. It also emphasised that a strengthened and credible democracy is needed to ensure sustainable development, which in return, relies on the ability of stakeholders. In 2013, the government of Burkina Faso prosecuted several senior government officials for corruption, but no high-profile defendants were convicted during the year. In response to the 2011 police mutinies, the government announced during the March 6 Council of Ministers the dismissal of 136 police officers for ‘collective acts of indiscipline, insubordination, attitude, or behaviour detrimental to ethics or honour.’ Another 32 police officers received administrative reprimands, and one officer retired.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: While the constitution establishes some general principles and obligations for higher official, there is no specific code of conduct for government employees, including defence staff, offering guidance with respect to bribery, gifts, conflict of interest, etc.

There is no comprehensive law that governs anti-corruption in Burkina Faso. However, Articles 154 to 160 of the Penal Code criminalise corruption, embezzlement, abuse of office and conflict of interest in the public sector. Human rights advocates in Burkina Faso have repeatedly criticized the military and police for committing abuses with impunity. Police often use excessive force and disregard pretrial detention limits. The sentencing in August 2011 of three police officers charged with the torture and death of Zongo was seen as a positive step. The High Commission for the Coordination of Anti-Corruption Activities (HACLC) was established by President Compaoré in late 2001. It was mandated to enforce the Anti-Corruption Policy, as well as to coordinate the fight against corruption and to assist the government in the prevention, detection and fight against fraud and corruption within government. In 2013, the government of Burkina Faso prosecuted several senior government officials for corruption, but no high-profile defendants were convicted during the year. In response to the 2011 police mutinies, the government announced during the March 6 Council of Ministers the dismissal of 136 police officers for ‘collective acts of indiscipline, insubordination, attitude, or behaviour detrimental to ethics or honour.’ Another 32 police officers received administrative reprimands, and one officer retired.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is some evidence of anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel in Burkina Faso; however, its regularity is unclear. In 2006, Ambassador-designate Jackson, who had a parallel career as an Army reservist, recently retiring with the rank of full colonel, announced that a U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has now been established in the country. She told Senator Russell Feingold (Democrat of Wisconsin) that IMET is appropriate because, as well as standard military training, &quoute;it includes human rights training [and] anti-corruption training&quoute; for &quoute;core military personnel in Burkina Faso, and I believe it is an important link … to human rights progress.” With that in mind, Jackson said, &quoute;We need to increase our IMET program in Burkina Faso,&quoute; pledging that she would work with the Department of defence &quoute;to increase military cooperation and training to help ensure Burkina Faso is a positive contributor to regional security.” The researcher could not find evidence of training with anti-corruption components for defence and security personnel since 2006.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities; nor is there evidence of effective prosecutions in this sector in recent years.

The BTI report notes that fighting rampant political and bureaucratic corruption, including the criminal prosecution of corrupt officeholders, has been one of the public’s main demands for many years and that demand continued during the period under review. Isolated cases of corruption are prosecuted, but often without consequence. High- level impunity experienced a further boost when a blanket amnesty was granted for all former heads of state whose rule has been marked by numerous human rights abuses, rampant corruption and self-enrichment as well as illegal involvement in insurgencies in neighbouring countries.

More generally, there is some evidence of public prosecution in Burkina Faso in recent years but these are hardly publicised. The law itself does not provide for public access to government information. While government ministries released some non-sensitive documents, local journalists complained that ministries generally were unresponsive to requests for information, citing national security and confidentiality as the reasons. There is no procedure to appeal denials of requests for information. In 2013, the government of Burkina Faso prosecuted several senior government officials for corruption, but no high-profile defendants were convicted during the year. In response to the 2011 police mutinies, the government announced during the March 6 Council of Ministers the dismissal of 136 police officers for “collective acts of indiscipline, insubordination, attitude, or behaviour detrimental to ethics or honor.” Another 32 police officers received administrative reprimands, and one officer retired. The gendarmerie is responsible for investigating abuse by police and gendarmes, but the results of their investigations were not always made public. Military courts held a number of public trials in which civilians pressed charges against military personnel; verdicts were reported in the press.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The assessor could not find information specific to facilitation payments in defence and security institutions. However, according to sources such as Freedom House 2010 and the Bertelsmann Foundation 2010, corrupt practices such as facilitation payments remains widespread, despite a number of public and private anti-corruption initiatives. The courts have been unable to effectively prosecute a range of senior officials charged with corruption. A June 2009 public survey cited in the Heritage Foundation 2010 shows that two-thirds of the surveyed population believes that corruption is becoming rampant, and nearly half of the respondents have been directly affected by corruption. In response to the high level corruption, the government has launched a national anti-corruption policy and developed several anti-corruption institutions. However, Burkina Faso still lacks comprehensive anti-corruption legislation that can govern all relevant institutions. In Burkina Faso, the law provides criminal penalties for official corruption in general. However the government did not enforce these laws effectively and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. The World Bank and IFC Enterprise Surveys 2009 report that nearly 71% of companies identify corruption as a major constraint, and close to 9% of companies expect to make informal or facilitation payments in order ‘to get things done.’

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that the Burkinabe armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. However, there is evidence that the military are aware of corruption as a strategic issue for operations. According to the US Department of State 2011, the High Commission for the Coordination of Anti-Corruption Activities (HACLC) was replaced by the Superior Authority of State Control (ASCE) in November 2007. The ASCE is an anti-corruption structure under the Prime Minister's Office that merges the HACLC, the General State Inspectorate (GSI) and the National Commission for the Fight Against Fraud. Reportedly, this latest initiative is more independent than the HACLC, and has a larger mandate to investigate corruption cases. In addition to releasing annual reports from auditing entities, the ASCE is mandated to prosecute ethics breeches committed by civil servants and defence officials.

In 2006, Ambassador-designate Jackson, who had a parallel career as an Army reservist, recently retiring with the rank of full colonel, announced that a U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has now been established in the country. She told Senator Russell Feingold (Democrat of Wisconsin) that IMET is appropriate because, as well as standard military training, &quoute;it includes human rights training [and] anti-corruption training&quoute; for &quoute;core military personnel in Burkina Faso, and I believe it is an important link … to human rights progress.” With that in mind, Jackson said, &quoute;We need to increase our IMET program in Burkina Faso,&quoute; pledging that she would work with the Department of defence &quoute;to increase military cooperation and training to help ensure Burkina Faso is a positive contributor to regional security.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is little evidence that commanders in Burkina Faso engage in any known training on corruption.

Information on whether (or not) there are guidelines and staff training on addressing corruption during deployed operations could not be verified. However, it is likely that there are corruption risk guidelines of a very general nature. The Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI) welcomes military personnel and police from Burkina Faso to enroll in E-Learning on Peacekeeping at no cost.

Context: In December 2004, the government issued a decree on the conduct of the national police force, setting the standards for behaviour and disciplinary sanctions for breaches of trust, as outlined in Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2006. The decree aimed at increasing citizens' knowledge of police officers duties and informing them about the right to file complaints about illegal acts committed by the police, including corruption. Nevertheless, corruption within the police force is widespread and impunity is a serious problem. According to the US Department of State 2010, a 2007 report by the National Network to Fight against Corruption (REN-LAC) (see 'Private Anti-Corruption Initiatives' in the Initiatives section) identified the police and gendarmerie as among the most corrupt institutions in Burkina Faso. In response to the 2011 police mutinies, for example, the government announced during the March 6 Council of Ministers the dismissal of 136 police officers for ‘collective acts of indiscipline, insubordination, attitude, or behaviour detrimental to ethics or honour.’ Another 32 police officers received administrative reprimands, and one officer retired.

In 2006, Ambassador-designate Jackson, who had a parallel career as an Army reservist, recently retiring with the rank of full colonel, announced that a U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has now been established in the country. She told Senator Russell Feingold (Democrat of Wisconsin) that IMET is appropriate because, as well as standard military training, &quoute;it includes human rights training [and] anti-corruption training&quoute; for &quoute;core military personnel in Burkina Faso, and I believe it is an important link … to human rights progress.” With that in mind, Jackson said, &quoute;We need to increase our IMET program in Burkina Faso,&quoute; pledging that she would work with the Department of defence &quoute;to increase military cooperation and training to help ensure Burkina Faso is a positive contributor to regional security.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: As of June 2010, Burkina Faso was contributing 909 personnel (80 police officers, 22 military observers and 807 troops) to six UN peacekeeping operations. It remains unclear whether or not corruption monitors (trained official) are deployed by Burkina Faso during peace operations. Given the limited attention given to anti-corruption operations and in defence institutions more broadly, this is highly unlikely.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Information on whether (or not) there are guidelines and staff training on addressing corruption during deployed operations could not be verified. However, it is likely that there are corruption risk guidelines of a very general nature. However, the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI) welcomes military personnel and police from Burkina Faso to enroll in E-Learning on Peacekeeping and anti-corruption at no cost.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Private military contractors in Burkina Faso are regulated by Decree N°97-533/PRES/PM/MATS of 28 November 1997. The law on internal security in Burkina Faso grants private companies the right to carry out public security activities, on condition that these relate exclusively to protecting persons and goods. They do not enjoy any of the benefits of public law enforcement, although their agents, like any citizen, can report crimes and offences and, if necessary, arrest the perpetrators. By virtue of this law, more than sixty private companies now contribute to consolidating public security. Apart from these companies, there are no guerrillas, militias, or any other form of private security organisations in the country. These types of bodies are characteristic of countries experiencing internal armed conflict, or in an advanced state of instability.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Burkina Faso has no procurement legislation specific to defence and security. Procurement by central authorities, state companies and local and regional authorities is regulated by a decree of 7 March 1996. Reports by the World Trade Organisation Trade Policy Review 2010 suggest that the new procurement rules came into effect in July 2008, aiming to increase transparency and efficiency in the public procurement system.

Under the new rules, any procurement contract below XOF 1 million only requires a purchase order. For a procurement contract that equals XOF 1 million or above, but below XOF 20 million, a publication in the Government Procedure Review and a letter of purchase is needed. Any procurement contract worth XOF 20 million or above is mandated to have an open invitation.

The Directorate General of Government Procurement (DGMP, in French) within the Ministry of Finance (in French) has exclusive power over the awarding and performance of public contracts, and the monitoring of compliance with the relevant legislation. The DGMP also maintains an online database where companies can search for public procurements for relevant tenders. According to the US Department of State 2011, the Autorité de Regulation des Marches Publics (ARMP, Government Tenders Regulation Authority) was set up in April 2008 and aims at establishing and enforcing bidding criteria, as well as ensuring free access to government contracts, equality in the bidding process and overall transparency. The ARMP has the authority to impose sanctions, initiate lawsuits and publish the names of fraudulent or offending companies. Bids are published in local papers, international magazines, e-mailed to interested foreign and local investors and published on the Internet on websites such as www.tradepoint.bf and www.dgmarket.com, though there is limited information available specifically with regards to defence and security procurement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is little evidence that the defence procurement cycle process is disclosed in any meaningful form to the public. However, occasionally, some limited information is published online and in local newspapers. There is evidence of an accessible procurement plan (GPP) (from 2009 to 2014) on the official procurement website of Burkina Faso: Direction Generale des Marches Publics (http://www.dcmp.bf/SiteDcmp/index.jsp). However, this procurement plan is piecemeal. The GPP define the procurement cycle process.

The law in Burkina Faso does not provide for public access to government information. While government ministries released some non-sensitive documents, local journalists complained that ministries generally were unresponsive to requests for information, citing national security and confidentiality as the reasons. There is no procedure to appeal denials of requests for information.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There appears to be some defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place in Burkina Faso, but their transparency and independence are in doubt. The Directorate General of Government Procurement (DGMP, in French) within the Ministry of Finance (in French) is the supervisory body with exclusive power over the awarding and performance of public contracts, and the monitoring of compliance with the relevant legislation. The DGMP also maintains an online database where companies can search for public procurements for relevant tenders. In short, the DGMP does the following: monitor the implementation of legislation and regulations on procurement and outsourcing of public services; provides in relation to the Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement, training, information and advice to all stakeholders of public order on regulations and procedures by publishing and distributing documents and texts on procurement for information and awareness of stakeholders on public procurement regulations and ensure the extension; to issue notices, public permits and exceptions to the request of the Contracting Authority when required by the regulations; help in relation to the regulatory authority of public procurement to the collection of information and documents for the creation of a database. It is unclear weather these mechanisms apply to defence and security contracts.

According to the US Department of State 2011, the Autorité de Regulation des Marches Publics (ARMP, Government Tenders Regulation Authority) was set up in April 2008 and aims at establishing and enforcing bidding criteria, as well as ensuring free access to government contracts, equality in the bidding process and overall transparency.

According to African Peer Review Mechanism Burkina Faso 2008, many stakeholders recognise that bribes are needed in order to win a public contract. Furthermore, some stakeholders revealed that the excessive centralisation of the administration fuels corrupt practices at each level, and at the end of the contract award process, only a small amount of funds will be left to carry out the work or deliver the services.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is very limited information on defence purchases, actual or potential, in Burkina Faso. However, occasionally, some limited information is published online and in local newspapers. There is evidence of an accessible procurement plan (GPP) (from 2009 to 2014) on the official procurement website of Burkina Faso: Direction Generale des Marches Publics (http://www.dcmp.bf/SiteDcmp/index.jsp). Consultation on the review of public procurement is also available on the official website. However, this procurement plan is not sufficiently detailed. According to the US Department of State 2011, the Autorité de Regulation des Marches Publics (ARMP, Government Tenders Regulation Authority) was set up in April 2008 and aims at establishing and enforcing bidding criteria, as well as ensuring free access to government contracts, equality in the bidding process and overall transparency.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The procedures and standards required by companies bidding for work at the Ministry of Defence are documented in the following decrees:
DECREE No. 2008-314 / PRES / PM / MEF regulating the control of public project ever delegated. DECREE No. 2008-173 / PRES / PM / MEF for the general regulation of public procurement and outsourcing of public services in Burkina Faso.
DECREE No. 2009-849 / PRES / PM / MEF provides for the responsibilities, organisation and functioning of the Regulatory Authority for Public Procurement.
DECREE No. 96-059 / PRES / PM / MEF , aims to improve the absorption of funds and increase transparency in public procurement, which should result in an equal luck to all bidders in good standing and with quality offerings.

Over the last decade, the government of Burkina Faso has undertaken a series of institutional and legislative reforms in an attempt to create a favourable climate for foreign investment as part of its 2011-15 strategy for accelerated growth and long-term investment (in French, Stratégie de croissance accélérée et de développement durable or SCADD).

The decrees mentioned are generally limited to what required in company law in Burkina Faso. There is no evidence that defence and security companies are required to show they have anti-corruption initiatives or formal and public compliance programmes.

According to the US Department of State 2011, the Autorité de Regulation des Marches Publics (ARMP, Government Tenders Regulation Authority) was set up in April 2008 and aims at establishing and enforcing bidding criteria, as well as ensuring free access to government contracts, equality in the bidding process and overall transparency. The ARMP has the authority to impose sanctions, initiate lawsuits and publish the names of fraudulent or offending companies. Bids are published in local papers, international magazines, e-mailed to interested foreign and local investors and published on the Internet on websites such as www.tradepoint.bf and www.dgmarket.com.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The DGMP maintains an online database where companies can search for public procurements for relevant tenders. There is no evidence that a national strategy guiding the formulation of procurement requirements is openly published. Decree 96-059/PRES/PM/MEF of 7 March 1996 governs procurement by the central authorities, State enterprises and local and regional authorities. The Directorate General of Government Procurement (DGMP, in French) within the Ministry of Finance (in French) is the supervisory body with exclusive power over the awarding and performance of public contracts, and the monitoring of compliance with the relevant legislation.

Procurement below an amount XOF1 million only requires a straightforward order form. A letter of contract is required for purchases of more than XOF1 million but not exceeding XOF15 million: these purchases are supervised by the Procurement Committee in each Ministry or State company; at least three suppliers must be approached to submit sealed bids. Orders for over XOF15 million must comply with the full government procurement procedure and are therefore under the supervision of the Central Directorate for Government Procurement.

The form of procurement most commonly used is tendering open to all enterprises established in Burkina Faso; foreigners may bid if the contract involves special features that require foreign competence or is financed by foreign funds. According to the US Department of State 2009, the Court of Accounts published an annual report in 2007, revealing mismanagement in government agencies, including by the Mayor of Ouagadougou. The report found that the government had failed to comply with proper public procurement procedures for government tenders. No known action has been taken in connection with any of the report's recommendations.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Public evidence suggest that defence purchases are frequently not based on identified and quantified requirements; purchases often present opportunities for corruption.

According to African Peer Review Mechanism of Burkina Faso 2008, many stakeholders recognise that bribes are needed in order to win a public contract. Furthermore, some stakeholders revealed that the excessive centralisation of the administration fuels corrupt practices at each level, and at the end of the contract award process, only a small amount of funds will be left to carry out the work or deliver the services. According to the World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2009: The value of the gift expected to secure a government contract is 1.2% of the value of the contract. Nearly 19% of the companies surveyed expect to give gifts to get a government contract. There is no further evidence that defence purchases are based on clearly identified and quantified requirements.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that single-sourcing for defence and security contracts have to be justified to scrutinisers. There are no up-to-date sources on defence procurement online.

As mentioned in Question 57, there is no legislation covering defence and security procurement. It is likely, however, that mundane equipment may be subject to open competition.

In terms of general procurement, the government of Burkina Faso makes effort to use transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition. Bidding requirements are assessed as being equal for all bidders. Hence, foreign investors receive the same treatment as local investors in the bidding process. The bidding criteria for public procurement is established and enforced by the newly established Government Tenders Regulation Authority. According to National Assembly Law No 15-94, prices of products, goods, and services must be established according to fair and sound competition. The government believes that cartels, the abuse of a position of superiority, restrictive practices, refusal to sell to consumers, discriminatory practices, unauthorised sales, and selling at a loss are practices that distort free competition. The government is in the process of adopting more sophisticated and transparent laws that foster competition. Although some price controls have been lifted, the price of fuel, essential generic drugs, tobacco, cotton, school supplies, water, electricity, and telecommunications are still regulated by the government. According to the US Department of State 2009, the Court of Accounts published an annual report in 2007, revealing mismanagement in government agencies in Burkina Faso, including by the Mayor of Ouagadougou. The report found that the government had failed to comply with proper public procurement procedures for government tenders, including evidence of dubious single sourcing. No known action has been taken in connection with any of the report's recommendations. This notwithstanding, according to the US Department of State 2011, there have been some improvements in relation to equality in the bidding process and in the transparency of procedures. Reportedly, bidding criteria, established and enforced by the Autorité de Regulation des Marches Publics (ARMP, Government Tenders Regulation Authority) in spring 2008, are clear and the competition process is transparent.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is evidence that tender boards are subject to some regulations, scrutiny and code of conduct, however audit reports are difficult to access; they are not publicly available. According to the Business Anti-Corruption Portal, the transparency of the process appears to be weak and allegations of widespread corruption abound.

Public procurement regulations are not very effective in practice, as companies found guilty of major violations (i.e. bribery) of procurement regulations are not always blacklisted. The Directorate General of Government Procurement (DGMP, in French) within the Ministry of Finance (in French) is the supervisory body with exclusive power over the awarding and performance of public contracts, and the monitoring of compliance with the relevant legislation.

Procurement below an amount XOF 1 million only requires a straightforward order form. A letter of contract is required for purchases of more than XOF 1 million but not exceeding XOF 15 million: these purchases are supervised by the Procurement Committee in each Ministry or State company; at least three suppliers must be approached to submit sealed bids. Orders for over XOF 15 million must comply with the full government procurement procedure and are therefore under the supervision of the Central Directorate for Government Procurement.

In order to promote a &quoute;modern and transparent administration,&quoute; the Ministry of Economy and Finance has initiated a process of developing several computerized systems for management of public finances. To this end, the Financial Administration has been able to build for a number of years of a computerized management device whose implementation has achieved significant results. The auditing information Integrated Public Procurement System (SIMP) was designed to meet among others the issue of the unavailability of reliable data on public procurement.

According to the US Department of State 2011, the Autorité de Regulation des Marches Publics (ARMP, Government Tenders Regulation Authority) was set up in April 2008 and aims at establishing and enforcing bidding criteria, as well as ensuring free access to government contracts, equality in the bidding process and overall transparency. It is unclear to what extent the aforementioned procedures apply to defence and security procurement.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The presence of a legislation on collusion specific to defence in Burkina Faso cannot be verified.

The Business Anti-Corruption Portal notes that national laws on corruption and collusion are weakly enforced. Companies report collusion between bidders and authorities before the tendering process begins and that tenders are often not officially publicised. In general, public procurement regulations are not very effective in practice, as companies found guilty of major violations (i.e. bribery) of procurement regulations are not consistently blacklisted.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Available evidence reveals inadequate training for procurement staff in Burkina Faso (source 1). As a result, their ability to ensure that defence contractors fulfil their task of reporting and delivery is greatly undermined. This explains why procurement in Burkina Faso affords ample opportunity for corruption and collusion.

It is very likely that there is undue influence from higher grades in the organisation, given the legacy of corruption and nepotism in Burkina Faso (Business Anti-Corruption Portal 2014).

The Directorate General of Government Procurement (DGMP, in French) within the Ministry of Finance has exclusive power over the awarding and performance of public contracts, and the monitoring of compliance with the relevant legislation. The DGMP also maintains an online database where companies can search for public procurements for relevant tenders. There is no evidence that procurement staff offer any control or oversight over defence contractors.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There are several public institutions that manage complaints handling mechanisms in Burkina Faso. These include:
(i) the Autorité Supérieur de Contrôle d’Etat (ASCE) (High Authority for State Oversight) which deals with issues of corruption,
(ii) the Autorité de Regulation des Marches Publics (ARMP) (Public Procurement Regulatory Agency) which received complaints related to public procurement;
(iii) the Ombudsman who mediates between citizens and public administrations on administrative issues, and (iv) the RENLAC , a network of civil society organisations which operates a hotline for citizens who have been victims of corruption.

These complaint mechanisms are likely to be ineffective and discriminatory, according to public evidence and surveys. According to African Peer Review Mechanism Burkina Faso 2008, many stakeholders recognise that bribes are needed in order to win a public contract

Burkina Faso is very poor on whistleblower legislation, which poses a hindrance to the fight against corruption, according to the Business Anti-Corruption Portal. It is therefore likely that companies do not receive (adequate) protection from discrimination when they use the mentioned mechanisms.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: A range of sanctions to punish corrupt suppliers are likely to exist, including fines, prosecution or debarment. However these sanctions are very likely to be weakly enforced in Burkina Faso (due to low government capacity and poor judiciary). According to African Peer Review Mechanism Burkina Faso 2008, many stakeholders recognise that bribes are needed in order to win a public contract.

In the official website of the Direction Generale des Marches Publics, the section on ‘Suppliers failing’ displays as ‘under construction.’ No information is provided. However, a basic list of suspended suppliers and businesses, delisted companies, and sanctioned public officials is detailed in the official website of the Direction Generale des Marches Publics. This demonstrates that there is some implementation of penal measures.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: With regards to offset contracts, there is likely to be some anti-corruption due diligence requirements imposed on contractors by the Government of Burkina Faso (GOBF) (US State Department 2013). These requirements, however, are likely to be weakly enforced (due to low government capacity). There is no evidence that the government of Burkina Faso follows up on offset contract performance and performs audit checks on performance and integrity.

The GOBF wishes to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) and has been implementing, over the years, reforms to make Burkina Faso more attractive to international investors. While the country is ranked 151 out of 183 according to the World Bank's &quoute;Doing Business 2011&quoute; report, it cited Burkina Faso as one of ten economies that made the largest strides in making their regulatory environment more favourable to business and ranked it fourth for countries “narrowing the distance to frontier between 2005 and 2011.”

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Evidence from the US State Department suggests that offset contracts exist in Burkina Faso. Details of offset programmes, contracts and performance in Burkina Faso are difficult to access, besides some limited, basic information on supplying companies, delisted companies, and sanctioned public officials. Information on the official website of the Direction Generale des Marches Publics is far from comprehensive.

According to the US Department of State, the Government of Burkina Faso (GOBF) does not impose &quoute;offset&quoute; requirements, which dictate that major procurements be approved only if the foreign supplier invests in Burkinabè manufacturing, research and development, or service facilities in areas related to the items being procured.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Government of Burkina Faso (GOBF) does not impose &quoute;offset&quoute; requirements, which dictate that major procurements be approved only if the foreign supplier invests in Burkinabè manufacturing, research and development, or service facilities in areas related to the items being procured. All investment specific incentives are outlined in the revised investment code, Act number 007-2010/AN, and two other Acts number 025-2012/AN and number 023-2013/AN. The GOBF does not require investors to purchase materials from local sources or to export a certain percentage of output. The incentives are applied uniformly to both domestic and foreign investors. In principle, all contracts are subjected to the same level of competition. However, there is no evidence that offset contracts are competed.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is some evidence that agents and intermediaries are used in the procurement cycle and that the government of Burkina Faso imposes restrictions on companies' use of them (source 1). The use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle increases the likelihood of bribery and corruption in Burkina Faso, according to the US Department of State.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence which shows that the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deal are made publicly available before signing of contracts.

The law in Burkina Faso does not provide for public access to government information. While government ministries released some non-sensitive documents, local journalists complained that ministries, including defence and finance, generally were unresponsive to requests for information, citing national security and confidentiality as the reasons.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Given Burkina Faso’s poor record of anti-corruption enforcement in procurement, it is very unlikely that the government formally requires the main contractor to ensure subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes&quoute; - (Business Anti-Corruption Portal 2014) There is no evidence of a legislation that refers to subsidiaries adopting anti-corruption.
According to African Peer Review Mechanism Burkina Faso, many stakeholders recognise that bribes are needed in order to win a public contract. Furthermore, some stakeholders revealed that the excessive centralisation of the administration fuels corrupt practices at each level, and at the end of the contract award process, only a small amount of funds will be left to carry out the work or deliver the services.

Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is evidence of some level of political influence in Burkina Faso with regards to defence acquisition and military cooperation. According to the interviewee, some implicated countries and organisations include France, USA and US AFRICOM. There is no evidence that political considerations affect procurement at the cost of actual military need. No further sources could be found online.

Exercise Flintlock is one example of how the U.S. Africa Command is influencing and engaging Burkina Faso in training exercises, defence acquisitions and operations areas to meet common objectives. The three-week exercise, led by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, is designed to build relationships and develop capacity among security forces throughout the Trans-Saharan region of Africa. The bilateral cooperation between Burkina Faso and U.S. Africa Command dates back to August 2008 when a bilateral military agreement went into effect allowing the exchange of logistic support, supplies, equiptment, and services between the two nations. The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement is designed to simplify the exchange process and provide more flexibility for the militaries to work collaboratively during training and exercises.