- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
Country Policy Recommendations
this country's assessment is currently unavailable due to technical difficulties
Recommendations will appear here soon - Thank you for your patience
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
- International Security Sector Advisory Team. &quoute;Provision of Technical advice: Establishing a Steering Committee in the Central African Republic.&quoute; n.d. http://issat.dcaf.ch/Home/Community-of-Practice/Resource-Library/Case-Studies/Provision-of-Technical-advice-Establishing-a-Steering-Committee-in-the-Central-African-Republic.
- Nyagalé Bagayko, &quoute;Multi-Level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic,&quoute; Institute of Development Studies 351(November 2010), 33.
- RP Defence, &quoute;EU establishes mission to advise armed forces in the Central African Republic,&quoute; January 19, 2014, http://rpdefence.over-blog.com/tag/central%20african%20republic/
- Security Sector Reform Resource Centre. &quoute;Country Profile: Central African Republic.&quoute; 2015, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/countries/country-profile-central-african-republic/.
- Tamekamta Zozime, Alphonse, &quoute;Gouvernance, rébellions armées et déficit sécuritaire en RCA,&quoute; GRIP, February 22, 2013, http://issat.dcaf.ch/sqi/content/download/18670/219286/file/NA_2012-02-22_FR_A-TAMEKANTA.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Complete constitutional order suspended as a result of the March 2013 coup has not been restored to the country as of May 2015.
Note: This is likely to remain the case at least until August 2015.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree. The EU Foreign Affairs Council has directly mandated EUMAM to 'provide the government of the CAR with expert advice ... with a view to reforming the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA) to make it into a professional army, democratically accountable and representative of the entire nation.'
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-conclusions-conseil-r%C3%A9publique-centrafricaine/, para 4)
This clearly implies that part of its accepted role is helping to re-establish an effective and independent legislative system of scrutiny for defence, however I have also seen no evidence of how this will be practically established yet.
Suggested score:
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Prolonged historical and contemporary episodes of insecurity in CAR have compromised the effectiveness of the country's legislative branch altogether. There is no evidence that the existing Committee on Defence is operational and can successfully carry out its functions - if it were, one of its capacities would be to scrutinise the MOD. There is no explicit information regarding its use of expert witnesses.
Currently, the transitional parliament, National Transition Council (Conseil National de Transition, CNT), is in the process of drafting a new constitution that can provide an institutional framework for peace-building. Details on the new constitution's drafting are unavailable. While institutional provisions for defence policy scrutiny might be formally strengthened, ongoing violent conflict makes it unlikely that in practice the transition to coherent and transparent defence policy-making will happen rapidly.
- AFP, &quoute;C. African parliament starts work on new constitution,&quoute; March 14, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/c-african-parliament-starts-work-new-constitution.
- EU External Action, &quoute;Fact Sheet: Central African Republic,&quoute; March 17, 2014, No.140317/02, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140317_02_en.pdf.
- Kasper Agger, &quoute;Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic,&quoute; Enough, May 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf.
- Le Nouvel Observateur, &quoute;Catherine Samba-Panza devient présidente de transition,&quoute; January 20, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/centrafrique/20140120.OBS2996/centrafrique-election-du-president-de-transition-a-10-heures.html.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The transitional government adopted a draft law on the new constitution in February 2015 (http://www.centrafriquelibre.info/?p=16792) , but agree with assessor, no further information on content of draft found online. It's likely to become available when a referendum on its passage is held, no date for this has been confirmed.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: This is a little difficult to mark accurately. I agree that it is likely that the new constitution will include revised provisions here, given the focus is on establishing a framework for peace. The new EUMAM mission is also mandated to improve democratic control of the defence force, and IHS Jane's also predict that the external intervention in CAR is likely to influence formation of a technocratic government, which could suggest that frameworks such as the parliamentary committees may also have received or be due to receive some structural guidance. The National Transitional Council has now adopted a draft constitution intended to replace its charter. Although I was unable to get further details, it is intended to be put to national referendum prior to the elections scheduled later this year.
Unfortunately a more critical contextual assessment would suggest that it is very unlikely there will be substantial external support or engagement to structural reform however, as there continues to be very limited foreign commitment to support CAR, noting for example that the elections themselves are massively underfunded and the ongoing shortfall of humanitarian funding for the crisis. In practice British parliamentary reporting also shows that there has been little political appetite for a mission to last more than one year, and emphasis is on &quoute;non-operational training&quoute; for FACA (ie., train and equip), which would substantially limit significant structural reform.
Finally, although I do not have citeable evidence to include here, power sharing has of course been a key challenge for the transitional government. It is reasonable to assess that the new legislature may become co-opted by those involved in the conflict and the defence committee will be of particular political sensitivity to all stakeholders. This may compromise its effectiveness.
https://www.amnesty.org/press-releases/2015/05/central-african-republic-new-constitution-should-leave-no-space-for-impunity-1/
http://www.janes.com/article/49888/central-african-republic-elections-under-threat
http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/One-Pager/2015/Central-African-Republic-One-Pager.aspx
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/feb/16/central-african-republic-elections-united-nations
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/12/12/undp-to-support-central-african-republic-elections-in-2015.html
http://www.irinnews.org/report/101111/why-democracy-may-have-to-wait-in-the-central-african-republic
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAR/Central%20African%20Republic%20Crisis%20and%20its%20Regional%20Humanitarian%20Impact%20June%202014.pdf, p17
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eumam-rca/index_en.htm
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeuleg/219-xxviii/21917.htm, para 14.19
Suggested score:
Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The only publicly available materials regarding CAR's defence policy present general measures to stop the violent attacks that are still affecting communities in many parts of the country - they are published by international peacebuilding actors. President Samba-Panza has made several public commitments to reversing the institutional failure of FACA and addressing the illicit proliferation of small arms, but more specific details on defence policy decision-making are unavailable. Government online platforms have not been updated since 2014.
The ongoing debates concern primarily the establishment of order and peace until the presidential elections scheduled for February 2015 are held. These discussions are happening in a context of heightened tensions and recurring violence by an increasingly complex constellation of armed groups and are facilitated by international actors such as the EU. There has been no formal consultation process with the public and civil society groups, who continue to express their dissatisfaction with the levels of insecurity prevailing in the country.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score changed from 1 to 0.
- Andreas Mehler, &quoute;The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic,&quoute; GIGA Research Programme: Violence and Security 114 (November 2009), 16. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534620
- Centrafrique Presse, &quoute;Une nouvelle rébellion lancée à Bangui,&quoute; June 25, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2014/06/une-nouvelle-rebellion-lancee-a-bangui.html.
- Hubert-Mary Djamany, &quoute;Central African Republic president says to make new government inclusive,&quoute; Reuters, May 16, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/06/us-centralafrica-politics-idUSBREA450PS20140506.
- Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Centrafrique : le gouvernement appelle la population de Bangui à déposer les armes,&quoute; March 19, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140319110529/bangui-desarmement-armee-centrafricaine-crise-centrafricaine-crise-centrafricaine-centrafrique-le-gouvernement-appelle-la-population-de-bangui-a-deposer-les-armes.html.
- John Campbell, &quoute;Djotodia Goes But Chaos in the Central African Republic Remains,&quoute; January 16, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/01/16/djotodia-goes-but-chaos-in-the-central-african-republic-remains/.
- Republique Centrafricaine, &quoute;Nouvelles et Evenments&quoute;, 2014, http://www.primature-rca.org/actu.asp.
- Security Council Report. &quoute;Central African Republic: April 2014 Monthly Forecast.&quoute; http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-04/central_african_republic_12.php?print=true.
- US Senate, &quoute;Senate Resolution 375--concerning The Crisis In The Central African Republic And Supporting United States And International Efforts To End The Violence, Protect Civilians, And Address Root Causes,&quoute; 113th Congress, 2nd Session Issue: Vol. 160, No. 37, March 5, 2014, https://beta.congress.gov/congressional-record/2014/3/5/senate-section/article/S1325-1.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The elections were pushed back from February to (most likely) August 2015.
There have been some consultations with the public/civil society through initiatives such as the Brazzavilee Peace Talks (http://www.undispatch.com/car-peace-talks/) and the Bangui Forum (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50878#.VVm6omRViko). These attempted to tackle political and insecurity issues in the country.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The current government has not been able to form a coherent defence policy. The assessor's evidence shows that state security is firmly in the hands of international actors such as MINUSCA / Op SANGARIS rather than the transitional government. It is unlikely that a serious defence policy would be formed until the country has been able to transition back to an elected government and there is a roadmap for a security handover back to the state in line with the rearmament of FACA and a detailed SSR plan.
The government has identified a number of national security priorities but these are sensitive and not necessarily openly expressed. For example, members have privately expressed specific concerns about the continued unwillingness of international forces to focus on the sensitive northwestern border with Chad, which the current government is unable to secure without a standing armed force, and where there has been extensive long-term evidence of cross-border insecurity alleged to be encouraged by the Chadian government. There was also a degree of consolidated pressure on foreign forces to address this in 2014 that indicated internal agreement on this priority. My observations from various meetings where government officials or senior SANGARIS personnel were present is that this was a politically sensitive issue and there is likely to be ongoing French pressure to avoid this because of France's military and trading relationship with Chad.
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf, pp3,17-19
http://reliefweb.int/report/chad/chad-shuts-border-conflict-torn-central-african-republic
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=190451#_edn28
http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/eu-and-darfurisation-eastern-chad
http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-chads-ambiguous-role-in-african-security/
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0217conflictcar.pdf, pp3,18
Suggested score: 0
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: CSOs in CAR have united in the face of continued unrest to voice their concerns regarding the country's stability and have demanded consolidation of the currently fragmented armed forces, as well as a rigid war-to-peace transition programme. Their requests have been largely ignored and there is no evidence to suggest that the defence forces have engaged in any meaningful dialogue on corruption issues with representatives of CSOs.
This is due to the fact that there are no formal channels to ensure CSO-government dialogue on issues such as corruption within and beyond the defence sector. No recent evidence points towards informal CSO-government engagement on such matters.
Response to peer reviewers:
Agree to a certain extent - score changed to from 0 to 1 to reflect the recent developments cited by the peer reviewer while reflecting the fact their impact is unlikely to be immediate.
- Centrafrique Presse, &quoute;Memorandum des Organisation de la Société Civile sur la Transition en RCA,&quoute; March 30, 2013, accessed June 25, 2014, http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-memorandum-des-organisations-de-la-societe-civile-sur-la-transition-en-rca-116675695.html.
- Groupe De La Banque Africaine De Developpement, &quoute;Document D’assistance Interimaire A La Transition 2014-2016,&quoute; June 2014, xv, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/RCA_-_Document_d_assistance_int%C3%A9rimaire_%C3%A0_la_transition_2014-2016.pdf.
- Réseau des ONG de Promotion et Défense des Droits de l’Homme en République Centrafricaine, &quoute;Déclaration des organisations de la société civile relative à la situation sécuritaire en RCA,&quoute; March 28, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://rongdhrca.wordpress.com/2014/03/28/declaration-des-organisations-de-la-societe-civile-relative-a-la-situation-securitaire-en-rca/.
- Sabine Sessou, &quoute;RCA: la société civile veut faire entendre sa voix à New York,&quoute; RFI, September 25, 2013, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130924-rca-centrafrique-societe-civile-new-york-onu/.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a National Committee for the Fight Against Corruption in CAR that aims to have a country wide outreach in order to engage with the population - this would be the obvious channel for CSO's to engage with. However, given that the priority in the last two years has been stability and limiting violence it is not surprising that CSOs have not focussed on corruption in this period. However at the end of 2014 some civil society groups were very critical of Angolan financial aid to CAR citing that it had been embezzled by the President. They held a radio debate and engaged with the transitional council on the matter. It's not defence sector specific but does denote a willingness to engage.
Government and defence forces have engaged with CSOs (and religious groups that stand in for CSOs in the context) more generally at the Brazzaville Peace Talks, and more recently the Bangui Forum of May 2015.
I think a score of 2 would be a better depiction of CAR context.
http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/centrafrique-le-comite-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-promet-la-creation-de-l-autorite-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption.html#VQMWwbYhdhuBOk9P.99
http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/bangui-le-rjdh-convoque-par-le-hcct-pour-une-emission-sur-rnd.html
http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/centrafrique-bangui-le-pape-appelle-les-eveques-centrafricains-a-soutenir-la-paix.html
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There are a range of contributing reasons why CSO engagement has not occurred, however I agree with the assessor's findings overall. Civil society groups have largely focussed on presenting a common voice on peacebuilding as a more effective way to engage with the government. I am also not aware of any civil society organisations in CAR that focus on defence specifically, other than DDR.
A number of humanitarian and civil society actors have also privately expressed that it has been difficult to present a common voice to the government in general. Reasons cited included fractured public opinion, weak cohesion between civil society groups, and the limited number of individuals or independent bodies that are perceived to be authoritative or representative enough of the major demographic groups to either shape or represent public opinion at a national level (source: various discussions with NGO directors, civil society representatives, humanitarian workers and journalists in CAR between March and August 2014). These factors are likely to also limit civil society's capacity to engage the government on defence or anti-corruption issues in general.
Suggested score:
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: As of October 6, 2006 CAR is a state party to UNCAC - the country has signed and ratified the convention. CAR has not, however, signed the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption or the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Countries which are not OECD member countries or countries which are not full participants in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions cannot sign or ratify the OECD convention. CAR is not involved in any OECD working party schemes or programmes that may lead to future accession talks.
Since there have been no UNCAC implementation reviews, there is no evidence to suggest any compliance with the convention. The government has not officially presented its reasons for refusing to sign the AU Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption. There are no other relevant regional legal anti-corruption instruments applicable to CAR.
- African Union Advisory Board on Corruption. &quoute;Status of ratification of the Convention on Corruption.&quoute; March 15, 2015, http://www.auanticorruption.org/auac/about/category/status-of-the-ratification.
- Marie Chêne &quoute;Update on UNCAC implementation in Africa,&quoute; Anti-Corruption Resource Centre,October 2008, www.u4.no/publications/uncac-and-africa/downloadasset/335.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: CAR is not an OECD member state or a full participant in the Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, so would not be eligible to adopt the OECD Convention, as per Article 13 (Signature and Accession) of the Convention.
Source:
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf, p11;
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Defence matters are subject to frequent discussions in the public space due to CAR's unfolding violent conflict. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that government officials are actively engaged in receiving feedback and analysis from opinion-formers.
During a consultation meeting in Congo Brazzaville in July 2014, the transitional government of President Samba-Panza made a commitment to encourage inter-community and community-government discussions on the possibilities for establishing peace among the many armed groups within the country. ICG notes that so far, the government has failed to provide such opportunities for discussion.
In January 2015, the CAR government rejected a ceasefire deal between two militia groups aimed at ending more than a year of violent clashes, which shows that the government acts unilaterally in implementing security policy decisions.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 1.
- Agence Centrafrique Presse, &quoute;Mme. Florence Limbio émet le vœu de mettre en place un réseau de médiateurs communautaires pour promouvoir la médiation inter- communautaire en Centrafrique,&quoute; June 23, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.acap-cf.info/Mme-Florence-Limbio-emet-le-voeu-de-mettre-en-place-un-reseau-de-mediateurs-communautaires-pour-promouvoir-la-mediation_a5995.html.
- ICG, &quoute;RCA : Le temps des questions difficiles,&quoute; November 4, 2014, http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/2014/11/04/rca-le-temps-des-questions-difficiles/.
- Radio Ndeke Luka, &quoute;Exécutif et législatif en concertation à l’initiative du parlement,&quoute; June 5, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.radiondekeluka.org/politique/item/19508-ex%C3%A9cutif-et-l%C3%A9gislatif-en-concertation-%C3%A0-l%E2%80%99initiative-du-parlement.html.
- Radio Ndeke Luka, &quoute;André Nzapayéké: la restructuration de l'armée progresse,&quoute; May 26, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.radiondekeluka.org/securite/item/19444-andr%C3%A9-nzapay%C3%A9k%C3%A9-la-restructuration-de-l-arm%C3%A9e-progresse.html.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It may be worth updating by referencing the Bangui Forum, which involved CSO and religious group representatives and covered issues of security, held in May 2015 - http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50878#.VVm9uWRViko
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: While there has been extensive public debate regarding the role of the defence & security institutions in relation to the ongoing conflict, I have seen very little evidence to suggest any government engagement with the public (or commitment to engage) on defence issues has been more than window dressing. There is a certain amount of one-way communication through press reporting, as evidenced by the assessor's sources, but this is typically of limited detail and it is unclear how accurate or open to scrutiny it has been.
One key indicator of this is that to date all negotiations between the state and the armed actors have failed to provide for any meaningful participation from civil society or the population, a point admitted by the chief mediator at the most recent Nairobi talks (source: http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Central-African-Republic-Peace-Talks-Kenneth-Marende/-/1950946/2614388/-/format/xhtml/-/4p4gsl/-/index.html).
Suggested score: 1
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: In 2009, CAR's executive adopted an explicit anti-corruption discourse and policy. In particular, a National Committee to Combat Corruption (Comité National de Lutte contre la Corruption) was established, alongside with a Public Procurement Oversight Authority (Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics). During his rule, President Bozizé approved the most recent Criminal Code (2010), which acknowledges some of the governance issues associated with corruption, but does not provide for strategic planning in tackling them. The subsequent deterioration of the security situation in the country has prevented any meaningful anti-corruption implementation endeavours and thus, the establishment of the committee has led to no progress vis-a-vis the anti-corruption agenda.
The Committee to Combat Corruption was relaunched in January 2015 - this represents an openly-stated anti-corruption policy, although it is too early to judge its implementation.
- Ali El Hadj Tahar, &quoute;République Centrafricaine Corruption, despotisme, misère et guerres civiles,&quoute; Liberte, January 12, 2014, http://www.liberte-algerie.com/international/corruption-despotisme-misere-et-guerres-civiles-republique-centrafricaine-213680.
- Faustin Archange Toudera. &quoute;Discours a l'Occasion du Lancement de la Journée Internationale de Lutte contre la Corruption.&quoute; December 9, 2009, Office of the Prime Minister, http://www.primature-rca.org/docs/DiscoursduPMsurlacorruption.pdf.
- Gervais Douba, &quoute;Faire De La Lutte Contre La Corruption En Republique Centrafricaine Un Enjeu Fondamental,&quoute; AUF/ OPPE, July 20, 2013, http://www.sangonet.com/afriqg/PAFF/Dic/prodecoC/GDjT1-lutte-c-corruption-rca.pdf.
- RFI, &quoute;RCA: sur la corruption, le Premier ministre Kamoun attendu au tournant,&quoute; October 16, 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20141016-rca-violences-bangui-onu-casques-bleus-samba-panza-kamoun-concertations-fonds-angola-anti-balaka-seleka/.
- RJDH-Centrafrique, &quoute;Centrafrique : Le comité de Lutte contre la Corruption promet la création de l’Autorité de Lutte contre la Corruption,&quoute; December 9, 2014, accessed June 2, 2015,
Read more at http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/centrafrique-le-comite-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-promet-la-creation-de-l-autorite-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption.html#99kb2R4Sgg8cySVH.99
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Just to confirm that the Committee to Combat Corruption relaunched in January 2015: http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/centrafrique-le-comite-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-promet-la-creation-de-l-autorite-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption.html
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Analysts agree that CAR's defence and security apparatus has been plagued by corruption, in-fighting and political manipulation since independence. The armed forces are frequently disbanded and even defeated by militias and rebel groups led by prominent political figures. High levels of social fragmentation and conflict, alongside with the illicit privatisation of state-led security forces for political survival purposes, have made the establishment of independent anti-corruption monitoring and training institutions extremely difficult. There have been no attempts to establish integrity-building bodies to curb the levels of corruption among the armed forces and defence personnel.
- Andreas Mehler, &quoute;The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic,&quoute; GIGA Research Programme: VIolence and Security 114 (November 2009), 16.
- Clary, Timothy, &quoute;Centrafrique: l’ONU et les pays voisins s’impatientent,&quoute; RFI, September 27, 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140927-centrafrique-onu-catherine-samba-panza-general-babacar-gaye-bangui-pays-voisins-imp/.
- Marielle Debos, &quoute;Fluid Loyalties in a Regional Crisis: Chadian ‘Ex-Liberators’ in the Central African Republic,&quoute; African Affairs 107 (2008), 233.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition,&quoute; Africa Report N°203, June 11, 2013, 24, 34, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/203-central-african-republic-priorities-of-the-transition.pdf.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: For several decades, CAR has been mired in a complex conflict in which the country's military is playing a crucial role. As a result, there is little popular expectation of integrity and performance by CAR's armed forces or Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA). The country's military leadership and on-the-ground officers have been involved in countless human rights violations and have been co-opted by various rebel militias, as evidenced in reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The defence establishment is seen not only as corrupt, but also as a potential threat to citizens' lives (interview).
Due to difficulties in collecting data from CAR, studies such as Afrobarometer have not published country-specific results. Civil society expressions of discontent with the current situation are confined to the findings of international human rights NGOs due to the lack of a safe platform from which citizens can lobby for better defence management.
- Amnesty International, &quoute;Central African Republic: Action Needed to End Decades of Abuse,&quoute; October 20, 2011, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr19/001/2011/en/.
- Alexis Arieff, &quoute;Crisis in the Central African Republic ,&quoute; Congressional Research Service, May 14, 2014, 5, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43377.pdf.
- Alphonse Zozime Tamekamta, &quoute;Gouvernance, Rébellions Armées et Déficit Sécuritaire en RCA - Comprendre les Crises centrafricaines (2003-2013),&quoute; GRIP February 22, 2013, http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/18670/219286/file/NA_2012-02-22_FR_A-TAMEKANTA.pdf.
- France 24, &quoute;L’armée centrafricaine lynche à mort un jeune homme à Bangui,&quoute; February 6, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.france24.com/fr/20140206-armee-centrafrique-lynchage-seleka-ceremonie-officielle-faca.
- Human Rights Watch, &quoute;Dispatches: Chaos and Catastrophe in the Central African Republic,&quoute; January 27, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/27/dispatches-chaos-and-catastrophe-central-african-republic.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation,&quoute; Africa Report N°219, June 17, 2014, 3-4, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/219-la-crise-centrafricaine-de-la-predation-a-la-stabilisation-english.pdf.
- Interview with Interviewee 1: Humanitarian aid worker in CAR, London, 20 June 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I would argue that citizens can lobby for better defence management through active CSOs that are engaged in the Bangui Forum for example.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Political structures in CAR are unstable and uncoordinated and therefore provide little support for the establishment of regularised corruption risk assessment. There are no assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency on corruption risks to ministry and armed forces personnel.
The National Committee to Combat Corruption demonstrated no signs of activity for a long time - it used to be quite unclear who its members are an whether it is operational at all. However, it relaunched in January 2015, and some activity is now expected, entailing some awareness regarding some risk areas.
In terms of resource allocation, it is the security of the country's political leaders that is prioritised. For instance, upon his inauguration, former president Djotodia invested heavily in the renovation of a Séléka army base close to his residence.
Government agencies are clearly indifferent to corruption risk in the defence sector and so is the CNLC. However, there is a new military reform programme run by the EU and the UN, which is likely to have contained some good governance elements.
Response to reviewer:
Agreed. Score raised from 0 to 1 in line with recent developments.
- Fred Krock, &quoute;Centrafrique : validation du document de politique nationale de lutte contre la corruption,&quoute; Afrik, September 25, 2012, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.afrik.com/article27176.html.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation,&quoute; Africa Report N°219, June 17, 2014, 3, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/219-la-crise-centrafricaine-de-la-predation-a-la-stabilisation-english.pdf.
- La Croix, &quoute;Rébellions et exactions déchirent la Centrafrique,&quoute; September 10, 2013, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Rebellions-et-exactions-dechirent-la-Centrafrique-2013-09-10-1012095.
- RJDH-Centrafrique, &quoute;Centrafrique : Le comité de Lutte contre la Corruption promet la création de l’Autorité de Lutte contre la Corruption,&quoute; December 9, 2014, accessed June 2, 2015,
Read more at http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/centrafrique-le-comite-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-promet-la-creation-de-l-autorite-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption.html#99kb2R4Sgg8cySVH.99
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: To confirm that the National Committee to Combat Corruption relaunched in January 2015: http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/centrafrique-le-comite-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-promet-la-creation-de-l-autorite-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption.html
It may be worth mentioning that the army is currently under reform with support from international bodies such as the EU and the UN (http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_15968_en.htm) as a result it is likely that some peripheral awareness of corruption has been mentioned in line with international standards.
I would suggest increasing the score to represent the additional information.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There does not appear to be any existing body either within the Defence Ministry that has previously been mandated to conduct corruption risk assessments for the ministry and armed forces personnel. I would assess that although personnel could certainly be recruited with the potential to fulfil the role, even if such a body was established, it is likely that there would need to be a comprehensive ongoing commitment to training and resourcing for this to develop into an effective institutional capacity.
Suggested score:
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: According to relevant legislation (Code des marchés publics), acquisition planning follows a specific process. Its details, however, are not made clear and the mechanisms put in place to ensure its transparency are only vaguely referred to using ambiguous wording - for example, in terms of needs assessment, article 27 stipulates that 'it needs to respect the rules of public finances' without any explicit mention of the relevant rules or legislation. There is no explicit mention of the defence sector in acquisition planning legislation and no provisions are made to establish a monitoring body.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed to a certain extent, but given the existence of some evidence for acquisition planning the score has been lowered from 2 to 1.
- African Development Bank, &quoute;Projet d’Appui au Renforcement des Capacités de Gestion Economique et Financière,&quoute; October 2010, 20, http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/centrafrique-projet-dappui-au-renforcement-des-capacites-de-gestion-economique-et-financiere-parcgef-rca-formation-des-cadres-de-la-direction-generale-des-douanes-et-droits-indirects-et-la-direction-generale-des-impots-eoi-29996/
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-017 du 6 juin 2008, Articles 27, 28.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Given the poor state of CAR's finances (in 2014 the budget predicted a total spending of only USD50m for the following year - http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=6756) it is highly unlikely that any significant acquisition takes place.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I do not consider the provisions outlined in the Code des marchés publics to be provide a structure that would enable any defence acquisition to occur in an appropriate way or for suitable oversight to happen. Eg., there are no appropriate provisions for how the conceptualisation, capability development, deployment/introduction into service, in-service maintenance or disposal should occur.
Also I could not get http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/RCA%20-%20PARCGEF%20%20-%20APPROUVE.pdf to work.
Suggested score: 0
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The defence budget is unavailable - even World Bank statistics on military expenditure for CAR are only available up until 2010. Defence budget figures for 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 are unavailable.
There does not seem to be any difference in defence budget formulation between the different governments since Bozize's ousting. There is no information to suggest that the transitional government has put in a process of budget formulation that differs from previous administrations.
Most of the recent military acquisitions in CAR have been aimed at restoring peace through foreign military assistance and therefore constitute off-budget expenditures. Off-budget acquisitions are funded by foreign assistance. There is substantial evidence that suggests that the defence budget not only lacks transparency, but is also misappropriated. In October 2014, for example, the Prime Minister was called to testify before the transitional legislature after the government was accused of embezzling a quarter of a £6.7 million donation from Angola. No evidence suggests subsequent prosecution.
- Crispin Dembassa-Kette, &quoute;Six killed in violence in Central African Republic's capital,&quoute; Reuters, October 15, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/15/us-centralafrica-violence-idUSKCN0I41U920141015.
- International Crisis Group, &quoute;The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation,&quoute; Africa Report N°219, June 17, 2014, 4, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/219-la-crise-centrafricaine-de-la-predation-a-la-stabilisation-english.pdf.
- World Bank. &quoute;Military expenditure (% of GDP): Central African Republic.&quoute; 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS/countries/CF?display=graph.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no such legislative committee - it is unclear whether the Committee on Defence has functions specific to budgetary oversight and whether it is operational at all in the CNT.
- Arrêtant le budget de l'état pour l'année 2012, Loi N° 11.007, December 30, 2011.
- RJDH Centrafrique, &quoute;Bangui : Le projet de loi de Finances adopté en retard par le CNT,&quoute; June 11, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bangui-le-projet-de-loi-de-finances-adopte-en-retard-par-le-cnt.html.
- Radio Ndeke Luka, &quoute;260 milliards présentés comme budget pour l’exercice 2013 en RCA,&quoute; November 9, 2012, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.radiondekeluka.org/economie/item/12171-260-milliards-pr%C3%A9sent%C3%A9s-comme-budget-pour-l%E2%80%99exercice-2013.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: A defence budget has not been formulated, which is in line with the fact that there has traditionally been a pronounced lack of transparency with regard to the defence budget of CAR. It is not made publicly available or mentioned in the official addresses of government figures. There are no legal provisions that allow citizens the right to access budgetary figures. There is no freedom of information act to ensure that citizens have a legal right to request budget-related information from the government.
- Alain Lamessi, &quoute;Maître Nicolas Tiangaye: le Premier Ministre paratonnerre,&quoute; Journal de Bangui, August 30, 2013, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=5193.
- Centrafrique Presse, &quoute;Les députés sont favorables pour que le budget alloué à l’armée soit majoré,&quoute; November 28, 2011, accessed June 25, 2014, http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-les-deputes-sont-favorables-pour-que-le-budget-alloue-a-l-armee-soit-majore-90307275.html.
- Reuters, &quoute;Central African Republic sets budget dependant on foreign donations,&quoute; June 11, 2014, accessed June 2, 2015, http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN0EM1E320140611.
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Sources of defence income are not publicly accessible. Available annual budget documents (up until 2012) have no specific breakdown of sources of income other than the most general categories - military expenditure has not been listed as a discrete category since 2010. Due to fragmentation, disobedience and decentralisation of the armed forces, it is impossible to track their sources of income, some of which are likely to be illicit. Their illicit nature is likely to entail localised, individual extortion and racketeering as opposed to bulk defence sector income.
Foreign military assistance is a crucial factor to consider when examining defence budgets. CAR receives substantial financial aid from the World Bank, the EU and the UN, some of which is aimed at reforming the defence sector. The EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA), for example, was set up in January 2015 to assist SSR reform in the country with a budget for its first year of operation amounting to €7.9 million.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed that illicit activity is likely to entail localised, individual extortion and racketeering as opposed to bulk defence sector income. However, there is still no publication (by the CAR government) of non-central government sources of funding. Score maintained.
- Alexis Flynn, &quoute;Central African Republic Faces Diamond Ban,&quoute; Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2013, accessed June 25, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323744604578474582168939340.
- Arrêtant le budget de l'état pour l'année 2012, Loi N° 11.007, December 30, 2011.
- EU@UN, &quoute;EU establishes mission to advise armed forces in the Central African Republic', January 19, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_15968_en.htm.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no evidence to suggest that sources of defence income are illicit, I think that is an unfair statement. Individual soldiers may substitute their wages with localised extortion or racketeering but this does not make up defence sector income. CAR receives substantial financial aid from the World Bank, the EU and the UN (e.g. http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_15968_en.htm), much of which is aimed at reforming the defence sector. This is openly stated - the assessor has already noted foreign donor bought acquisitions. I would suggest raising the score to depict this.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No relevant information could be obtained from publicly available government sources, which indicates the lack of internal audit procedures for military expenditure. As the provision of security and the termination of violence have been among the budgetary priorities since the last violent crisis unfolded, it is likely that Ministry of Defence expenditures are not painstakingly reviewed and audited.
- Arrêtant le budget de l'état pour l'année 2012, Loi N° 11.007, December 30, 2011.
- Radio Ndeke Luka, &quoute;Equipement et Défense, ministères budgétivores pour 2013,&quoute; November 13, 2012, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.radiondekeluka.org/economie/item/12238-equipement-et-d%C3%A9fense-minist%C3%A8res-budg%C3%A9tivores-pour-2013.html.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no evidence to suggest that such a process has been established - prior to the current violent episodes there were parliamentary discussions on the matter, but no identifiable outcomes. Recently, it has been reported that most ministries do not have a clearly designated budget and rely on external assistance and donations. Ministry of Defence personnel and armed forces are also likely to be depend on fluctuating and not entirely formal budgetary provisions. External auditing of such budgets is not feasible as the country has been in a state of civil war since March 2013 when the constitution was effectively suspended.
Currently there are plans for a new constitution referendum in May, parliamentary elections in June and July and presidential elections in August 2015. Most political observers see those as over-ambitious. Prolonged conflict has led to the current economic collapse. External donations and financial support have been subject to some auditing attempts at auditing, but recently (last World Bank and African Development Bank audits date back to 2011). Plans for the establishment of an Auditor-General's Office were officially presented in 2013, but no evidence confirms any progress in this initiative.
- African Development Bank, &quoute;Projet d’Appui au Renforcement des Capacités de Gestion Economique et Financière: République Centrafricaine,&quoute; October 2010, 15-17, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/RCA%20-%20PARCGEF%20%20-%20APPROUVE.pdf.
- Centrafrique Presse, &quoute;Audits à l’Assemblée nationale et à la Socatel,&quoute; May 31, 2011, accessed June 26, 2014, http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-centrafrique-audits-a-l-assemblee-nationale-et-a-la-socatel-75231271.html.
- CESAG, &quoute;Audit Externe Des Comptes Financiers,&quoute; July 2013, http://bibliotheque.cesag.sn/gestion/documents_numeriques/P0051MBF14.PDF.
- Olivier Rogez, &quoute;En RCA, l'administration redémarre, avec d'énormes difficultés,&quoute; RFI, April 15, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/mfi/20140425-rca-administration-redemarrage-enormes-difficultes/.
- Morten Boas, &quoute;Central African Republic: the long and winding road,&quoute; Open Security, May 12, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/morten-b%C3%B8%C3%A5s/central-african-republic-long-and-winding-road
- World Bank, &quoute;République Centrafricaine - Rapport sur le respect des normes et codes (RRNC/ROSC) : compatabilite et audit (French),&quoute; April 7, 2014, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/04/16602909/r%C3%A9publique-centrafricaine-rapport-sur-le-respect-des-normes-codes-rrncrosc-compatabilite-audit.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is certain involvement of rebel groups in the country's resource extraction industry (gold and diamonds). Many analysis attribute the prolongation of CAR's conflict namely to the lack of regulation of the mining sector. The country's defence institutions are known to have cooperated with rebel groups, including the co-option of Séléka rebels. For instance, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement, UFDR) and Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix, CPJP) were part of the Séléka rebel militia alliance, which was promoted to national armed forces during the rule of its leader President Michel Djotodia.
It is often difficult to disentangle the operations of rebel groups from those of the formal armed forces of the country. Therefore, there is some room to assume that their resource extraction agendas overlap. In November 2014, a UN expert panel confirmed that gold and diamond sales are being used by militias who have previously or currently been involved in the armed forces. In 2010, CAR was recommended to be declared compliant with the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative, but its status has been subsequently revoked.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed that there is a significant amount of fluidity over what constitutes an official defence institution in this case. However, there is enough opacity to warrant a low score, particularly given the lack of institutional and legislative control in this area.
- Alex Thompson, &quoute;Seleka: the militia terrorising Central African Republic's Christian population,&quoute; The Telegraph, December 7, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/centralafricanrepublic/10502752/Seleka-the-militia-terrorising-Central-African-Republics-Christian-population.html.
- Daniel Flynn, &quoute;CORRECTED-Gold, diamonds fuelling conflict in Central African Republic- U.N. panel,&quoute; Reuters, November 4, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/centralafrica-un-panel-idUSL6N0SU3FH20141105.
- EITI. &quoute;EITI Countries: Central African Republic.&quoute; March 15, 2015, http://eiti.org/countries.
- ICG, &quoute;Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic,&quoute; Report N°167, December 16, 2010, 21, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/167%20Dangerous%20Little%20Stones%20-%20Diamonds%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic.pdf.
- Ken Matthysen and Iain Clarkson, &quoute;Gold and diamonds in the Central African Republic,&quoute; ActionAid and Cordaid, Antwerp, February 2013, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Gold%20and%20diamonds%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic.pdf.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: While I agree with the comments here, I was unable to find any evidence at all that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation. Militia members and groups have certainly been involved in the management of diamond extraction operations (as the ICG report mentioned indicates) however this is separate from MoD or FACA institutions. There is no score that can accurately depict this.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is unclear if the defence institutions as a whole might be or have been engaged in natural resource exploitation, however I agree that it is highly likely that senior members of FACA and the Ministry of Defence have been engaged in natural resource exploitation.
It is notable that in 2013 there was heavy public controversy in South Africa over speculations that its military involvement in CAR was the result of diamond and other mineral extraction deals brokered between senior ANC members and the then-minister of defence in CAR, Francois Bozize (also the president's son).
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-28-00-central-african-republic-is-this-what-our-soldiers-died-for
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-04-12-00-bozize-zuma-in-backroom-deal
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf, p19
Suggested score:
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The complex relationship between rebel groups and CAR's defence and security sector indicates that the two are difficult to disentangle and have substantial involvement in shadow economies, especially in the extraction industry and illicit arms trade.
Since the beginning of the most recent episodes of violence in 2013, official defence personnel have been complicit in the activities of non-state armed groups and bandits. It might be difficult to categorise armed groups' activities as 'organised' crime, considering the chaotic nature of CAR's conflict, but the patterns of banditry, extortion and intimidation that characterise their behaviour are undoubtedly criminal.
Transborder road bandits, or zarguinas, also wield some political power and are capable of influencing defence policy (Lombard, 2014), but the transitional government has taken steps to limit their influence.
Response to peer reviewer:
As the transitional government is taking steps to address this problem I have raised the score from 0 to 1. However, I do not agree that there is no evidence of organised crime in CAR.
- Alphonse Zozime Tamekamta, &quoute;Gouvernance, Rébellions Armées et Déficit Sécuritaire en RCA - Comprendre les Crises centrafricaines (2003-2013),&quoute; GRIP February 22, 2013, http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/18670/219286/file/NA_2012-02-22_FR_A-TAMEKANTA.pdf.
- ICG, &quoute;Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic,&quoute; Report N°167, December 16, 2010, 15, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/167%20Dangerous%20Little%20Stones%20-%20Diamonds%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Republic.pdf.
- Louisa Lombard, &quoute;Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands&quoute; (PhD diss., Duke University, 2012), 275.
- Louisa Lombard, &quoute;Is the Central African Republic on the Verge of Genocide?,&quoute; Africa is a Country, December 5, 2013, accessed June 26, 2014, http://africasacountry.com/is-the-central-african-republic-on-the-verge-of-genocide/
- Louisa Lombard, &quoute;Pervasive mistrust fuels C.A.R. crisis,&quoute; Al Jazeera, April 11, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/4/central-africa-republicgenocideselekaantibalaka.html.
- Reuters, &quoute;Armed groups recruit 10,000 child soldiers in Central African Republic – NGO,&quoute; December 18, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/12/18/uk-centralafrica-children-fighters-idUKKBN0JW1PZ20141218.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I agree with the assessor's reading of the situation, but I would not consider the criminal activity examined here to be structured enough to count as organized crime (see http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf, p14 regarding the anti-balaka for example). It is possible that associations between FACA members and the anti-balaka groups or zarguinas/'coupeurs de route' could be for the purposes of sustained organized criminal activity, however I have seen no evidence to support this. I would also consider the existence of the zarguinas to be more a reflection of the state's long-term inability to dominate security outside Bangui (see http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/440573a04.pdf for example). It is possible other organised criminal groups exist in the region (such as in Chad or Cameroon) that could demonstrate the specific capability, motive and opportunity to present a legitimate threat but I am not qualified to judge this.
I see no other evidence that any organised criminal group has penetrated the defence force, but it is clearly very unlikely that the government would have the capability to tackle such a problem.
Suggested score: 3
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no institution mandated to police and investigate corruption in the defence services. Investigation of malpractice by state-mandated armed forces is impossible given the current conflict in the country. Lack of resources prevents the adequate management of CAR's defence services and their monitoring is further complicated by the infiltration of members of various existing rebel groups into FACA, as well as the formation of new ones.
- Andreas Mehler, &quoute;Why Security Forces Do Not Deliver Security: Evidence from Liberia and the Central African Republic,&quoute; Armed Forces and Society 38 (2012): 49-69.
- Louisa Lombard, &quoute;Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands&quoute; (PhD diss., Duke University, 2012), 339.
- Press TV, &quoute;Foreign troops ineffective in CAR,&quoute; Apri l23, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.presstv.com/detail/2014/04/23/359793/foreign-troops-ineffective-in-car/.
- The Herald, &quoute;Central African Republic: Regional Body Urges End to Abuse in Central African Republic,&quoute; September 13, 2013, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.herald.co.zw/regional-body-urges-end-to-abuse-in-central-african-republic/
- Voice of America, &quoute;Central African Republic: President Disbands Rebel Group,&quoute; September 13, 2013, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/car-president-disbands-rebel-group/1749466.html.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is a much more significant challenge in establishing accountability for the extensive range of human rights abuses allegedly perpetrated by members of FACA. I do not believe any policing function intended to investigate corruption or organised crime within the defence services is likely to be practicable (or hold any credibility) until these more fundamental problems have been addressed.
See for example:
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_rca_2014-uk-04.pdf
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/car_-_amnesty_international_report_-_time_for_accountability_july_2014.pdf, pp16-18
Suggested score:
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No relevant information could be obtained from publicly available government sources, which are extremely limited. A 2013 report on the CAR states that the intelligence service is under the control of the Presidency. There appear to be no provisions for legislative oversight.
Response to peer reviewer:
Considering the recent episodes of political turbulence, covert intelligence structures existing during Bozize's regime are likely to have been dismantled. French involvement in the country has also been heavily scrutinised, so existing support for intelligence services is highly unlikely.
GSDRC, “State fragility in the Central African Republic – what prompted the 2013 coup?” July 2013, www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/car_gsdrc2013.pdf
No government or other sources addressing CAR's intelligence policies are available.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I can confirm that CAR does not have a formal intelligence services.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There are certainly allegations that CAR covertly received long-term state security and intelligence support from the French government under the Bozize regime, but unfortunately I can't indicate reliable sources on this topic.
Suggested score:
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No relevant information could be obtained from publicly available government sources, which are extremely limited. The intelligence service is reportedly under the control of the Presidency. Given the lack of established systems for the appointments and promotions of military and civilian personnel (as discussed in Questions 41) and 42), it is unlikely that formal processes are in place.
- Eric Schmitt, &quoute;U.S. Takes Training Role in Africa as Threats Grow and Budgets Shrink,&quoute; New York Times, March 5, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/world/africa/us-takes-training-role-in-africa-as-threats-grow-and-budgets-shrink.html?_r=0.
- GSDRC, “State fragility in the Central African Republic – what prompted the 2013 coup?” July 2013, www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/car_gsdrc2013.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: CAR voted in favour of the ATT in 2013, and acceded in October 2015. It does not export arms and most of the imported small arms and ammunition are not government-authorised. In December 2013, due to the escalation of violence, the UN imposed an arms embargo against the country, whose re-assessment was requested by President Samba-Panza at the end of 2014.
The central African region in general is renowned for its massive illicit flows of arms. Under the ATT, CAR is not a legitimate buyer of arms, but it is highly likely that China, Russia, and Belarus are supplying the region (Chad, Sudan, CAR, also DRC) as it is a very lucrative market for illegal or unregulated arms trade.
There are no other relevant international instruments that CAR has signed or national legislation affecting arms exports that has been enforced. No formal public statements by government officials recognising corruption as an issue in arms exports have been issued. The most reliable sources of aggregate data on arms exports do not feature any information on CAR's arms exports.
- Amnesty International, &quoute;Central African Republic,&quoute; April 1, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/un-atrocities-fuelled-inaction-arms-trade-treaty-promises-2014-04-01.
- Deutsche Welle, &quoute;Central African Republic Seeks Looser Arms Embargo At U.N,&quoute; September 28, 2014, http://www.dw.de/central-african-republic-seeks-looser-arms-embargo-at-un/a-17959817.
- European Parliament, &quoute;Arms Trade Treaty: “There are weaknesses, but it's nevertheless a major step forward,&quoute; February 5, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140205STO34919/html/Arms-Trade-Treaty-%E2%80%9CThere-are-weaknesses-but-it%27s-still-a-major-step-forward.%E2%80%9D.
- Madeleine Kuhns, &quoute;Africa: Notable Absence of African States On First Anniversary of Arms Trade Treaty,&quoute; Media Global, April 3, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201404070566.html.
- Nicholas Marsh, &quoute;Database of Authorised Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons,&quoute; NISAT Small Arms Trade Database, Oslo:Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, February 14, 2013, http://workshop.chromeexperiments.com/projects/armsglobe/.
- SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. &quoute;Central African Republic Importer/Exporter TIV Tables 2010-2013.&quoute; http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php
- United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs, Arms Trade Treaty, Status of the Treaty, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Lack of data is likely to be due to the prevalence of small arms imports over other types of weaponry - see SIPRI comments in The Guardian:
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/datablog/2015/mar/20/africa-arms-imports-algeria-morocco-global-weapons-trade.
Conflict Armament Research indicates that &quoute;CAR has experienced a near-total breakdown of the physical security and stockpile management systems since the start of the current crisis,...and the country risks becoming a source of illicit supply to its neighbours in the region.&quoute; It also notes that imports are not being controlled - for example, that Iranian- and Chinese-manufactured ammunition supplied to Sudan appears to have been repackaged in Sudan and re-exported; and European-manufactured shotgun ammunition appears to have been trafficked into CAR from neighbouring countries.
http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/NONSTATE_ARMED_GROUPS_IN_CENTRAL_AFRICAN_REPUBLIC2.pdf, p25
Suggested score:
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No relevant information could be obtained from publicly available government sources, national or international media, or relevant analytical reports. Since the completion of UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in December 2010, the country's government has received substantial donations from the mission's assets, but no disposal controls beyond the mission's mandate have been implemented.
In April 2014 the multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation - MINUSCA - was deployed. Its key priorities were protection of civilians; support for the transition process; facilitating humanitarian assistance; promotion and protection of human rights; support for justice and the rule of law; and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation processes. In September 2014, the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) transferred its authority over to MINUSCA. MISCA has not publicised its disposal policy.
- Arrêtant le budget de l'état pour l'année 2012, Loi N° 11.007, December 30, 2011.
- MINUSCA, &quoute;Mandated to protect civilians and support transition processes in the Central African Republic,&quoute; September 15, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/.
- Office of Internal Oversight Services, &quoute;Audit Report: Assets disposal relating to MINURCAT's liquidation,&quoute; Internal Audit Report, Assignment No. AP2010/636/09, May 18, 2011, 2-4, http://usun.state.gov/documents/organization/167896.pdf.
- UN, &quoute;Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2127 (2013), Mandates Mission in Central African Republic to Protect Civilians, Restore State Authority,&quoute; December 5, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11200.doc.htm.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The transitional government did sign a charter on the use of arms in February 2015 that delimited who could carry what - however it did not detail what would be done with the seized and catonned surplus. It does however demonstrate a willingness to address the issue of illegal weapons ownership and use. http://www.centrafriquelibre.info/?p=16939
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The core anti-balaka elements responding to the Seleka were able to recruit heavily from the army in 2013, and in line with the general instability were able to gain access to weapons and vehicles in particular. This was an important factor leading to the military being disarmed.
It can be reasonably concluded that this period resulted in a collapse of the appropriate mechanisms, leading to an unverified level of asset loss.
Source: author's various observations and conversations with SSR experts, Bangui, June 2014.
Suggested score:
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Asset disposals are not documented and no oversight mechanism has been established according to the little available government-published information.
- Arrêtant le budget de l'état pour l'année 2012, Loi N° 11.007, December 30, 2011.
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-017, June 6, 2008.
- Didier Niewiadowski, &quoute;La République centrafricaine : le naufrage d’un Etat, l’agonie d’une Nation,&quoute; 8, 14, January 10, 2014, http://blogs.rue89.nouvelobs.com/sites/news/files/assets/document/2014/01/la___republique_centrafricaine.pdf.
- République Centrafricaine. &quoute;Arrêtés de la Primature.&quoute; 2012. http://www.primature-rca.org/arretes.asp.
- UN, &quoute;Security Council Renews Targeted Sanctions on Central African Republic, Authorizing States to Seize, Register or Dispose of Banned Items,&quoute; January 22, 2015, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11747.doc.htm.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As indicated in the previous question, the anti-balaka were able to gain access to weapons and vehicles during the 2013 instability. This was the result of the collapse of the appropriate command of the FACA and the movement of numerous personnel into the militias. To my knowledge, the exact extent of the losses has not been established or documented. Based on my conversations with SSR experts in country, I believe that an approximate set of figures was established and passed internally to president Samba-Panza's inner circle, but I have no further information on this.
I would conclude that no credible independent scrutiny is likely to have occurred for the last twelve months, nor is this likely to occur until there is a negotiated DDR plan for the different militias and an accepted restructuring plan for FACA.
Suggested score:
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No relevant information could be obtained from publicly available government sources, analytical reports, INGO databases, as well national and international media. It is highly likely that secret items are purchased using budgetary allotments without open consultation or scrutiny. National security might not always be the goal of these purchases. Rather - military leaders in power use them for their own political survival.
- Andreas Mehler, &quoute; Why Security Forces Do Not Deliver Security: Evidence from Liberia and the Central African Republic,&quoute; Armed Forces and Society 38 (2012): 54.
- Open Budget Survey. &quoute;The Open Budget Index.&quoute; March 15, 2015, http://survey.internationalbudget.org/#map.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Given the poor state of CAR finances (with access to only USD50m in the 2014-15 budget) spending is limited. Therefore it may be unlikely that a huge amount of secret spending takes place. CAR has no intelligence services, a relatively defunct army and no significant arsenal further highlighting a lack of relative spending. There is no evidence that national security is not the goal of the transitional governments current budgetary spending. However larger scale national security initiatives are funded by international bodies, for example ground security for the upcoming elections will be provided by the UN: http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=8107
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Publicly available government information does not provide any indication of the transmission of such information to the legislature. No sources demonstrate any provisions for the Committee on Defence to obtain information on secret items. CAR's secretive long-standing military cooperation with and support by France has also obscured budgetary information from the legislative (Hermann).
The annual budget for 2014 was passed by CNT with significant delay in June 2014 and is pending presidential approval at the time of writing. There are no budget scrutiny mechanisms in place and no public consultation has been held regarding the budget in general and military spending in specific.
- Centrafrique Presse, &quoute;La France et la Centrafrique signent un nouvel accord de défense,&quoute; April 8, 2010, accessed June 26, 2014, http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-la-france-et-la-centrafrique-signent-un-nouvel-accord-de-defence-48267469.html.
- Hermann, Burkley, &quoute;Humanitarian Warfare: “Stabilizing” Central Africa for the Multinationals,&quoute; Global Research, January 10, 2014, http://www.globalresearch.ca/stabilizing-central-africa-for-the-multinationals/5364423.
- La Nouvelle Centrafrique, &quoute;Des combattants centrafricains incluant des soudanais en fuite au Darfour central,&quoute; December 29, 2013, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.lanouvellecentrafrique.org/centrafrique-car-fighters-including-sudanese-cross-border-to-central-darfur/.
- Melly, Paul and Vincent Darracq, &quoute;A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande,&quoute; Chatham House, May 2013, 18, 24, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0513pp_franceafrica.pdf.
- RJDH, &quoute;Le projet de loi de Finances adopté en retard par le CNT,&quoute; June 11, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bangui-le-projet-de-loi-de-finances-adopte-en-retard-par-le-cnt.html.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: It is highly unlikely that in recent years the security sector has been able to consolidate and present its annual accounts. The latter definitely lack transparency and are likely to be haphazardly put together, especially considering the heavy reliance of the country on foreign military assistance for the restoration of peace.
The Government of CAR does not provide any relevant information and there are no other official records of the preparation of annual accounts by the security sector.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Worth mentioning that the parliament has not been functioning since March 2013.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: CAR's defence budget has not been publicly accessible since 2010 and there has never been any official declaration of off-budget military expenditures. Considering the crisis situation in the country, the latter are likely to have increased significantly since the resumption of violence. There are no legal provisions against such expenditures and no oversight authority is responsible for monitoring them. Given the relative economic collapse of the country, off-budget expenditures are likely to have increased.
- Agence Centrafriqaine de Presse, &quoute;Les surprises de la Loi de finances 2013,&quoute; March 3, 2013, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.lanouvellecentrafrique.info/centrafrique-les-surprises-de-la-loi-de-finances-2013/.
- Decret portant organisation et fonctionnement de l'Autorité de Régulation de Marchés Publics de la République Centrafricaine, Decret n°08-01, February 27, 2009.
- Journal Globe Le Visionnaire, &quoute;Le projet de loi des finances 2013 soumis aux parlementaires par le ministre Albert BESSE pour examen et adoption,&quoute; November 12, 2012, accessed June 26, 2014, http://globevisionnaire.6mablog.com/post/Le-projet-de-loi-des-finances-2013-soumis-aux-parlementaires-par-le-ministre-Albert-BESSE-pour-examen-et-adoption.
- RJDH, &quoute;Le projet de loi de Finances adopté en retard par le CNT,&quoute; June 11, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bangui-le-projet-de-loi-de-finances-adopte-en-retard-par-le-cnt.html.
- World Bank. &quoute;Military expenditure (% of GDP) : Central African Republic.&quoute; March 15, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS/countries/CF?display=graph.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Given that the constitution is currently under debate it is not possible to comment on the legality of off budgetary expenditures. However, as opposed to the comments put forward by the assessor, large off-budget expenditure is unlikely given the poor state of CAR finances - i.e. that limit purchases. However, given the instable nature of the political situation it is likely that many expenditures are of an informal and unprocessed nature.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Political leaders are known to be involved with rebel factions and are likely to use state resources to support (para)military operations (Mehler, 2012). The disproportionate size of presidential guards or similar forces demonstrates this tendency rather well - for example at the end of 2014, President Samba-Panza announced plans for the creation of a new rapid intervention unit, drawn from FACA members, but it is unclear how their remuneration will be ensured.
Off-budget expenditures are not reported, audited and monitored. Given the volatile state and the suspension of constitutional order in the country, it is likely that off-budget defence-related expenditures will continue to be substantial.
- African Development Bank, &quoute;République Centrafricaine Évaluation Des Finances Publiques Selon La
Méthodologie Pefa (dépenses Publiques Et Responsabilité Financière), Final report, July 2010, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Evaluation-Reports/RCA_-Evaluation_des_finances_publiques_selon_la_m%C3%A9thodologie_PEFA_Final.pdf.
- Andreas Mehler, &quoute; Why Security Forces Do Not Deliver Security: Evidence from Liberia and the Central African Republic,&quoute; Armed Forces and Society 38 (2012): 51.
- Ilya Gridneff, &quoute;Blood Gold Flows Illegally From Central African Republic,&quoute; Bloomberg, March 8, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-08/blood-gold-exports-pour-illegally-from-central-african-republic
- Crispin Dembassa-Kette, &quoute;Central African Republic to create rapid intervention unit, reform army,&quoute; Reuters, October 22, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22/us-centralafrica-army-idUSKCN0IB2B920141022.
- ICG, &quoute;The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation,&quoute; Africa Report No. 219, June 17, 2014, 3, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/219-la-crise-centrafricaine-de-la-predation-a-la-stabilisation-english.pdf.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Maybe worth stressing that political leaders of the past i.e. Bozizé and Djotodia were known to be involved with rebel factions. There is no evidence to suggest for example that the current political leader - Samba-Panza is affiliated with rebel factions.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no legislation that covers specifically the process for classification of information and any mechanisms for the regulation of this process. At the same time, according to the Penal Code of CAR, disclosure of classified information carries severe penalties, including capital punishment (Article 267). There is no information that data on the defence budget and weapons procurement has been systematically classified or where individuals have asked for information from the government and been refused.
- Code Pénal Centrafricain, Article 267
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Freedom of information is generally problematic in CAR:
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/central-african-republic#.VUKJeSFVhBc
Suggested score:
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no evidence to suggest that defence institutions have ownership over commercial businesses. However, CAR's economy, especially since 2013, is largely informal and ownership over businesses are hard to determine. There is evidence, suggested by (for example, several rebel-cum-ministers being key diamond traders), that defence officials are directly involved in illegal trading rackets. This is neither publicly declared nor disguised.
There is no evidence to suggest what types of businesses the executive has ownership of presently. The agglomeration of rebel combatants and national armed forces is difficult to analyse due to the fluid nature of their configurations and the shifting ad-hoc organisation of their activities. Their involvement in the extractive industries (diamonds normally make up over 40% of CAR's export earnings), however, is undeniable and has been recently reported by business analysts (Bloomberg, 2015). For example, in 2012, Séléka rebels captured crucial mining towns. It is unclear how their relationship with relevant commercial businesses has changed since they were formalised by former president Djotodia.
The capture of Bangui in 2013 also established business relationships between Séléka leaders and key merchants from the city. The fact that the country's treasury coffers are empty also points towards the profitability of illicit military-business alliances and resultant embezzlement. The score has been selected on the basis that there is a risk that there may be ownership of such businesses at the institution level.
- Alexis Arieff, &quoute;Crisis in the Central African Republic,&quoute; Congressional Research Service, R43377, May 14, 2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43377.pdf.
- BBC, &quoute;Central African Republic rebels take diamond-mine town,&quoute; December 18, 2012, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20775788.
- Ilya Gridneff, &quoute;Blood Gold Flows Illegally From Central African Republic,&quoute; Bloomberg, March 8, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-08/blood-gold-exports-pour-illegally-from-central-african-republic
- Katherine Caulderwood, &quoute;How European, Chinese Weapons Fuel Conflict In Central African Republic,&quoute; IB Times, January 21, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/how-european-chinese-weapons-fuel-conflict-central-african-republic-1788996.
- Thierry Vircoulon, &quoute;Central African Crisis,&quoute; Al Jazeera, May 4, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/04/201443095434720966.htm.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is unclear if the defence institutions as a whole might be or have been engaged in natural resource exploitation, however I agree that it is highly likely that senior members of FACA and the Ministry of Defence have been engaged in natural resource exploitation.
It is notable that in 2013 there was heavy public controversy in South Africa over speculations that its military involvement in CAR was the result of diamond and other mineral extraction deals brokered between senior ANC members and the then-minister of defence in CAR, Francois Bozize (also the president's son).
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-28-00-central-african-republic-is-this-what-our-soldiers-died-for
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-04-12-00-bozize-zuma-in-backroom-deal
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf, p19
Suggested score:
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Military-owned businesses are not assessed independently to verify their compliance with international standards. Financial oversight is extremely limited and there is no evidence of its exercise during the recent conflict episodes (interview). The conjunction of public office and private business ventures is a frequent occurrence, as revealed by a recent UN-expert panel, even though there are definitive legislative provisions against it (see, for example, the Mining Code). The score has been selected on the basis that there is a risk that there may be ownership of such businesses at the institution level.
- Charles Ntapaka, &quoute;Gouvernance Foncière En Afrique Centrale,&quoute;Organisation Des Nations Unies Pour L’alimentation Et L’agriculture, December 2008, 48, ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/ak018f/ak018f00.pdf.
- Daniel Flynn, &quoute;Gold, diamonds fuelling conflict in Central African Republic: U.N. panel,&quoute; Reuters, November 5, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/us-centralafrica-un-panel-idUSKBN0IO21420141105.
- Décret n° 09.126, fixant les conditions d'application de la loi n° 09.005 du 29 avril 2009 portant Code minier. April 30, 2009, Chapter VIII.
- Interview with Interviewee 1: Humanitarian aid worker in CAR, London, 20 June 2014.
- Katherine Caulderwood, &quoute;How European, Chinese Weapons Fuel Conflict In Central African Republic,&quoute; IB Times, January 21, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/how-european-chinese-weapons-fuel-conflict-central-african-republic-1788996.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no explicit legislative provision against private enterprise by defence ministry employees.There is a historical continuity in CAR's military (and political) leaders' involvement in unauthorised private enterprise and particularly in diamond mining. Jean-Bedel Bokassa, the country's self-crowned 'emperor' was globally notorious for his conflation of public and private funds and use of the state as a business platform. During the rule of President Bozizé, his son, Jean-Francis Bozizé, was also Minister of Defence and was linked to irregular equity operations in France. As a result, his financial assets in France were frozen, but no similar action was taken in CAR.
The current interim president is much more disengaged from rebel formations and business interests, but her key role is the organisation of the 2015 elections, in which military leaders with financial prowess are likely to have the upper hand. It is unclear whether any action has been taken to control or regulate private enterprise by defence and security personnel.
- Centrafrique Presse Info, &quoute;Centrafrique: la France gèle les avoirs financiers de Jean-Francis Bozizé et Cie,&quoute; November 3, 2014, http://www.centrafrique-presse.info/site/info-annonce_et_divers-6388.html.
- Hilke Fischer, &quoute;From mayor to interim president of CAR: a portrait of Catherine Samba-Panza,&quoute; Deutsche Welle, January 24, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.dw.de/from-mayor-to-interim-president-of-car-a-portrait-of-catherine-samba-panza/a-17376200.
- Howard French, &quoute;Jean-Bedel Bokassa, Self-Crowned Emperor Of the Central African Republic, Dies at 75,&quoute; New York Times, November 5, 1996, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/05/world/jean-bedel-bokassa-self-crowned-emperor-central-african-republic-dies-75.html.
- International Business Publications, Central African Republic Mineral & Mining Sector Investment and Business Guide, (Washington DC) 2012, 51.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There have been occasional public declarations of anti-corruption initiatives of senior Ministry of Defence officers from CNT. These have been very sporadic and only secondary to other priorities within the ministry. The most recent official anti-corruption strategy dates back to 2011 and pertains to the CAR cabinet of ministers in general, rather than the Ministry of Defence in particular.
Response to peer reviewer:
Whether or not commitments are substantial, they are occasionally made. Score maintained.
- Arrêté Portant Creation d'un Comité Ad Hoc Chargé de la Préparation de la Mission Examen de Pays de République Centrafricaine par ses Pairs Signataires de la Convention des Nations Unies contre la Corruption, No. 013, September 13, 2011. http://primature-rca.org/docs/arretes/2011/Crat.%20Comit%C3%A9%20Ad%27hoc%20pr%C3%A9parat.Mission%20Examen%20des%20pays%20RCA%20NU%20Contre%20la%20Corruption%20%281%29.jpg.
- Fred Krock, &quoute;Centrafrique : validation du document de politique nationale de lutte contre la corruption,&quoute; September 25, 2012, http://www.afrik.com/article27176.html.
- Gervais Douba, &quoute;Faire De La Lutte Contre La Corruption En Republique Centrafricaine Un Enjeu Fondamental,&quoute; ETD, July 20, 2013, http://www.sangonet.com/afriqg/PAFF/Dic/prodecoC/GDjT1-lutte-c-corruption-rca.pdf.
- Radio Ndeke Luka, &quoute;Centrafrique : Un élément des FACA tué par les FACA ; le général Tchimangoa déplore l’effectif des FACA,&quoute; February 5, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.radiondekeluka.org/securite/item/18627-centrafrique-un-%C3%A9l%C3%A9ment-des-faca-tu%C3%A9-par-les-faca-le-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-tchimangoa-d%C3%A9plore-l%E2%80%99effectif-des-faca.html.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I do not see any evidence that would suggest any expression made by members of the current regime could be considered substantial, noting also that the military is disarmed and effectively non-operational, and that the much more significant issue of FACA personnel being implicated in human rights abuse and militia activity remains unaddressed. I would agree if the assessor can show commitment was made within a context of discussing restructuring or reasserting control and discipline.
Suggested score: 0
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Misappropriation and corruption characterised the rule of the Séléka formation under President Djotodia from mid 2013 to early 2014 (Campbell, 2014). For instance, the rebel group's leaders who were stationed in Bangui took control of the Water and Forest Ministry, in which fraud was frequently reported (ICG, 2014).
While anti-corruption measures exist formally - mostly as a result of the adoption of UNCAC and AU anti-corruption legislation, their implementation on the ground is difficult given the unwaning prowess of armed groups, including the country's military apparatus. FACA personnel have been found to engage in violent and corrupt activities with impunity, as most recently documented by Amnesty International. There is no evidence for any government figures are being investigated for corruption based on existing legislation.
Response to peer reviewer:
None of the measures that you mention appear to concern defence and security personnel directly. Score maintained.
- AIP, &quoute;Amnesty International dénonce les ‘’violations persistantes’’ des droits humains (Rapport),&quoute; February 25, 2015, http://news.abidjan.net/h/527137.html.
- Arrêté portant Creation d'un Comité Ad Hoc Chargé de la Préparation de la Mission Examen de Pays de République Centrafricaine par ses Pairs Signataires de la Convention des Nations Unies contra la Corruption, No. 013, September 13, 2011. http://primature-rca.org/docs/arretes/2011/Crat.%20Comit%C3%A9%20Ad%27hoc%20pr%C3%A9parat.Mission%20Examen%20des%20pays%20RCA%20NU%20Contre%20la%20Corruption%20%281%29.jpg.
- ICG, &quoute;The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation,&quoute; Africa Report N°219, June 17, 2014, 4, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/219-the-central-african-crisis-from-predation-to-stabilisation.aspx.
- IMF, &quoute;Central African Republic: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,&quoute; Country Report No. 09/241, July 2009, 4, http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ppRmfHJFZkYC&pg=PA8&lpg=PA8&dq=anti-corruption+legislation+and+central+african+republic&source=bl&ots=6VM7orE3f6&sig=1kJ1EAtIwDr11KdyZoNWpZSmGhg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=_zusU4DZMtHH7AaijYDYDw&ved=0CEoQ6AEwCDgK#v=onepage&q=anti-corruption%20legislation%20and%20central%20african%20republic&f=false.
- John Campbell, &quoute;Djotodia Goes But Chaos in the Central African Republic Remains,&quoute; January 16, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/01/16/djotodia-goes-but-chaos-in-the-central-african-republic-remains/.
- Loi portant ratification de la Convention de l’Union Africaine sur la prévention et la lutte contre la corruption, No. 06.010, July 3, 2006. 03 juillet 2006 p;
- Loi portant ratification de la Convention des Nations Unies contre la corruption, No. 06.011, July 3, 2006.
- Marino Donatti, &quoute;IMF increases support for Central African Republic,&quoute; Public Finance International, November 20, 2014, http://www.publicfinanceinternational.org/news/2014/11/imf-increases-support-for-central-african-republic/.
- UNODC, &quoute;Central African Republic: Anti Corruption Strategy,&quoute; December 9, 2009, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.acap-cf.info/Le-Premier-ministre-centrafricain-appelle-a-la-constitution-d-une-coalition-contre-la-corruption_a2979.html.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The last comment on investigations is inaccurate. For example, police investigated reports of counterfeit bank notes circulating in Bouar in 2014 (http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/centrafrique-bouar-des-billets-de-banque-falsifies-en-circulation-dans-la-ville.html); in 2014 the government launched investigations into false employees on the civil service payroll (http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=6398); the President herself was investigated for alleged corruption in early 2015 (http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bangui-le-cnt-decide-de-creer-une-commission-d-enquete-sur-le-don-angolais.html).
The Penal Code (http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/88116/100661/F1881819351/CAF-88116.pdf) provides penalties for corruption in chapter XIV these include fines and imprisonment.
Given that there are measures, and some existence of investigations into reports of corruption I would suggest raising the score to 2.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Whistle-blowers within the defence sector are not offered any legislative protection. The most recent whistle-blowing episode in the country dates back to 2011, when journalists Faustin Bambou and Emmanuel Cyrus Sandy were jailed for several weeks, following their investigative work on misappropriation of funds in the MOD. No similar stories have surfaced since then, but whistle-blowers from within the Ministry of Defence are likely to be silenced or be exercising auto-censure. According to the Penal Code of CAR, disclosure of classified information carries severe penalties, including capital punishment (Article 267).
- Juliette Abandokwe, &quoute;Trois ans de prison ferme requis pour deux journalistes,&quoute; July 8, 2011, accessed June 27, 2014, http://juliette.abandokwe.over-blog.com/article-rca-journaliste-denonciateur-de-detournement-bozizesque-condamne-a-3-ans-ferme-79102025.html.
- Kim Willsher, &quoute;French photojournalist Camille Lepage killed in Central African Republic,&quoute; The Guardian, May 13, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/may/13/french-photojournalist-camille-lepage-killed-central-african-republic.
- UNODC, &quoute;Central African Republic: Anti Corruption Strategy,&quoute; December 9, 2009, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.acap-cf.info/Le-Premier-ministre-centrafricain-appelle-a-la-constitution-d-une-coalition-contre-la-corruption_a2979.html.
- Code Pénal Centrafricain, Article 267
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I found no evidence that whistleblowers are protected, nor any evidence to suggest that they would be silenced if they were to try.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: In 2008, CAR adopted public procurement legislation that is well structured, clear and comprehensive. The Public Procurement Act is compliant with international standards and its elaboration was carried out under World Bank and World Trade Organisation guidance. It includes some general provisions for the integrity of procurement personnel in sensitive positions, but no specific attention is paid to recruitment and supervision processes for these members of staff. In addition, the law does not appear to address defence procurement.
There is no evidence that the special provisions for the integrity of procurement personnel are followed and considering the constitutional order suspension currently in place, it is highly unlikely that they are adhered to.
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-017, Article 102, June 6, 2008.
- WTO, &quoute;Marchés publics, Annexe 4: République Centrafricaine,&quoute; WT/TPR/S/285, 2012, 349, http://www.wto.org/french/tratop_f/tpr_f/s285-03_f.pdf.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree, however I think the assessor should clarify that the law does not seem to specifically engage anywhere with defence procurement.
Suggested score:
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no publicly available information that presents the number of civilian personnel at the Ministry of Defence. Considering the shifting armed forces configurations that have resulted from ongoing violence, it is difficult to determine and let alone publish an accurate, formal number of CAR's military personnel.
FACA has been disarmed since March 2013 and its remaining 'skeleton' is projected to comprise around 8,000 soldiers altogether (Jourdain, 2014). The unavailability of figures is likely to reflect the lack of capacity of the transitional government to exert control over the partially disbanded forces, rather than a carefully devised strategy to embezzle resources.
A fresh attempt to restart the stalled DDR programme and a proposed re-armament of FACA might formalise some of these statistics by separating national armed forces from rebel combatants. However, it is important to highlight the fact that DDR initiatives are often seen as a business opportunity by rebel groups (interview).
- Interview with Interviewee 1: Humanitarian aid worker in CAR, London, 20 June 2014.
- Louisa Lombard, &quoute;Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands&quoute; (PhD diss., Duke University, 2012), 275.
- RJDH, &quoute;Bangui : Les partis politiques réclament la réhabilitation des FACA et le désarmement forcé,&quoute; June 23, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bangui-les-partis-politiques-reclament-la-rehabilitation-des-faca-et-le-desarmement-force.html.
- Stéphane Jourdain, &quoute;Central Africans call for rearming of their ragtag army,&quoute; June 12, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/central-africans-call-rearming-their-ragtag-army.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no publicly available official statement pertaining to the pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel. There are no public sources - neither NGO documents nor media reports - providing further information on this.
There are no published sources or interview material that provide definitive or concrete information with regard to this point.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Generally civil service pay rates are under review: http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=6398
The transitional government is also heading an army overhaul which is likely to review military salaries, the payment of which has faced several complications: http://www.centrafriquelibre.info/?p=17965
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Defence staff have not been remunerated regularly over the past two years and there is no indication of if/when their regular payment will be resumed. Substantial delays have caused frustration and frequent engagement in violent, corrupt and illicit activities. The government does not publish any details on the system of payment for FACA. President Samba-Panza has been urging FACA's rearmament since she took office in January 2014, but has made no explicit reference to the projected remuneration method.
- David Blair, &quoute;Central African Republic soldiers murder man in cold blood after presidential speech,&quoute; The Telegraph, February 5, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/centralafricanrepublic/10620376/Central-African-Republic-soldiers-murder-man-in-cold-blood-after-presidential-speech.html.
- ReliefWeb, &quoute;Central Africans call for rearming of their ragtag army,&quoute; June 12, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/central-africans-call-rearming-their-ragtag-army.
- Yuki Yoshida, &quoute;Understanding the 2013 Coup d’état in the Central African Republic,&quoute; January 17, 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=1026.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Further evidence showing that military salaries have not been paid: 'LE GOUVERNEMENT PAIE UN MOIS D’ARRIERES DE SALAIRES AUX FONCTIONNAIRES ET OUBLIE L’ARMEE' May 2015 http://www.centrafriquelibre.info/?p=17965
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Personal observations and conversations in country during BINUCA handover (March-August 2014) support this. The government was strongly encouraged to prioritise empowering the gendarmerie over the FACA for a number of reasons, including its separation from the militias, its lower risk of conversion against the state, and its perceived comparative potential to build public confidence. However this also meant that pay was allocated for the gendarmerie as an incentive to enable it to run smoothly and to mitigate against petty corruption, while FACA was not providing any significant public service and was - to an extent - essentially being paid to prevent it from dissolving.
In line with the assessor's comments elsewhere, the army has a history of mutinies following extended periods of underpayment and other related grievances. For example, the military was regularly and deliberately kept underpaid under Bozize for long periods of time while the presidential guard was perceived to be paid and empowered unequally. Journalists also report there were occasional cash injections from France during the 2000s to prevent mutinies.
Andrew McGregor, &quoute;AFRICAN TROOPS POUR INTO CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC TO HALT REBEL ADVANCE&quoute;, January 14, 2013. http://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?cat=19
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2007/central-african-republic#.VV7zIPlVhBc
http://www.sangonet.com/ActualiteC17/spec_desarm1_RCA-irinVA2.html
Suggested score:
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Appointments have historically been highly nepotistic with a tendency towards conflation of the presidential office and the defence sector. Current interim president Catherine Samba-Panza initially had an 'incorruptible' reputation and the first senior leadership appointments in the transitional government appeared to have been done on a more meritocratic basis. However, currently there is no transparency and streamlining of the appointment system.
In August 2014, Africa Confidential reported that Samba-Panza's 'appointees include a number of officials who do not have the country's best interests at heart' and that nepotism in the highest political circles has caused the withdrawal of IMF from Bangui.
- Africa Confidential, &quoute;Allies lose faith,&quoute; vol. 55, no. 17, August 29, 2014, http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5750/Allies_lose_faith
- Al Jazeera, &quoute;CAR's Seleka rebels appoint new commander,&quoute; May 16, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/car-seleka-rebels-appoint-new-commander-20145117483119252.html.
- Andrew Katz, &quoute;Meet Catherine Samba-Panza, Central African Republic’s New Interim President,&quoute; Time, January 23, 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/23/meet-catherine-samba-panza-central-african-republics-new-interim-president/.
- VoA, &quoute;CAR President Fires defence Minister, Army Chief,&quoute; January 2, 2013, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/central-african-republic-bozize-fires-defence-minister-army-chief/1576693.html.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I have seen no evidence of an established system. Defence appointments in the new government were alleged by numerous sources I spoke to in 2014 to have been made on the basis of power-sharing agreements rather than merit. Unfortunately I could not find publicly available evidence to pursue this at time of reading, however I strongly recommend the CA examines further.
Suggested score:
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Promotion and demotion processes in the defence sector have been notoriously chaotic, subjective and corrupt since independence (Mehler, 2009). Presently the command chain is not particularly clear and no oversight body is responsible for independent scrutiny of the application and appraisal processes.
Appointments are sometimes announced but without details regarding the mechanisms behind them. International political analysts have pointed out that in her most recent government appointments, President Samba-Panza has been pursuing 'the interests of her own friends, relations and allies' (Africa Confidential, 2014). There is no updated government platform announcing new appointments - sporadic media reports are the only available sources of information on such matters.
- Africa Confidential, &quoute;Allies lose faith,&quoute; vol. 55, no. 17, August 29, 2014, http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5750/Allies_lose_faith
- Andreas Mehler, &quoute;Rebels and parties: the impact of armed insurgency on representation in the Central African Republic,&quoute; Journal of Modern African Studies (49): 2011, 132.
- Andreas Mehler, &quoute;The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic,&quoute; GIGA Research Programme: VIolence and Security 114 (November 2009), 15.
- ICG, &quoute;The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation,&quoute; Africa Report N°219, June 17, 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/219-the-central-african-crisis-from-predation-to-stabilisation.aspx.
- Decree for the Appointment of Regional Military Commanders, No. 13/406, October 8, 2013.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Defence appointments in the new government were alleged by numerous sources I spoke to in 2014 to have been made on the basis of power-sharing agreements rather than merit. Unfortunately I could not find publicly available evidence to pursue this at time of reading, however I strongly recommend the CA examines further.
Suggested score:
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no evidence of compulsory conscription and the current government is not actively continuing conscription due to severe budgetary constraints. There have been allegations of child soldier conscription by FACA and rebel forces alike.
There is no specifically formulated policy to prevent corruption as part of the conscription avoidance process as existent anti-corruption legislation addresses only some of the main provisions of UNCAC. The voluntary conscription process itself lacks transparency in terms of selection criteria and training. Due to the impunity with which alleged FACA officers have perpetrated a variety of crimes (Wairagala, 2013), it is likely that bribery is common to ensure - rather than eschew - conscription. In that sense, conscription in CAR can be seen as facilitated and selective.
Response to peer reviewers:
Agree. Score changed from 0 to N/A.
- Andreas Mehler, &quoute;The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic,&quoute; GIGA Research Programme: VIolence and Security 114 (November 2009), 17.
- CIA. &quoute;The World Factbook, Military Service and Age Obligation: Central African Republic.&quoute; Last updated 2012, March 15, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html.
- Wakabi Wairagala, &quoute;Les anciens soldats de la RCA déchargent les combattants de M. Bemba et attribuent les atrocités aux rebelles,&quoute; Le procès de Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Open Society Institute, June 22, 2013, http://french.bembatrial.org/2013/06/les-anciens-soldats-de-la-rca-dechargent-les-combattants-de-m-bemba-et-attribuent-les-atrocites-aux-rebelles/.
- United Nations Radio, &quoute;Armed groups in Central African Republic to release thousands of children,&quoute; May 5, 2015, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2015/05/armed-groups-in-central-african-republic-to-release-thousands-of-children/#.VW2H9M9VhBc.
- War Resisters International. &quoute;Country report and updates: Central African Republic.&quoute; March 15, 2015, http://www.wri-irg.org/programmes/world_survey/country_report/en/Central%20African%20Republic.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: It may be that NA is most appropriate. I found no evidence that compulsory conscription currently takes place in the CAR. Given the inability of the central government to govern the country and the ongoing overhaul of the defence forces it is unlikely that such a policy would be implementable.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I believe that the current government is not actively continuing conscription in practice. I could not find any further evidence on the existing framework, however I would agree with the assessor's conclusion on it.
Suggested score:
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are no known or published policies to discourage illicit payment for preferred postings - such bribery is highly likely to be practiced. The voluntary conscription process itself lacks transparency in terms of selection criteria and training. Due to the impunity with which alleged FACA officers have perpetrated a variety of crimes (Wairagala, 2013), it is likely that bribery is common to ensure - rather than eschew - conscription. In that sense, conscription in CAR can be seen as facilitated and selective
An undercover investigative journalist released a documentary film in 2012 detailing his abilities to &quoute;buy&quoute; various important government positions under the guise of a Liberian diplomat (The Ambassador 2012). Former president Bozizé’s military recruitment strategy was known for its ethnic and clan favouritism, which has contributed to the creation of a highly politicised, nepotistic organisation of the national army (Lombard, 2012).
- Louisa Lombard, &quoute;Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands&quoute; (PhD diss., Duke University, 2012), 332.
- Mads Brugger, &quoute;The Ambassador,&quoute; 2012.
- Siân Herbert, Nathalia Dukhan, and Marielle Debos, &quoute;State fragility in the Central African Republic: What prompted the 2013 coup?&quoute; GSDRC, International Development Department, July 2013, 18, http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CAR_GSDRC2013.pdf.
- Wakabi Wairagala, &quoute;Les anciens soldats de la RCA déchargent les combattants de M. Bemba et attribuent les atrocités aux rebelles,&quoute; Le procès de Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Open Society Institute, June 22, 2013, http://french.bembatrial.org/2013/06/les-anciens-soldats-de-la-rca-dechargent-les-combattants-de-m-bemba-et-attribuent-les-atrocites-aux-rebelles/.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Many functions are defunct and civil service salaries have been suspended/unpaid for 2 years, as a result 'ghost soldiers' are not something that is likely to be prevalent in CAR.
Nonetheless, there is no publicly available information that presents the number of civilian personnel at the Ministry of Defence. Considering the shifting armed forces configurations that have resulted from ongoing violence, it is difficult to determine and let alone publish an accurate, formal number of CAR's military personnel.
FACA has been disarmed since March 2013 and its remaining 'skeleton' is projected to comprise around 8,000 soldiers altogether (Jourdain, 2014). The unavailability of figures reflects the lack of capacity of the transitional government to exert control over the partially disbanded forces, rather than a carefully devised strategy to embezzle resources. Nevertheless, it is possible that non-existent soldiers appear on the payroll (they may, or may not, be paid).
Depending on the future economic recovery trajectory of the country and military budgetary allocations, the ghost soldier business could prosper as the current registration and remuneration system is flawed, inconsistent and easy to manipulate.
- Boubacar N'Diaye. &quoute;The Central African Republic.&quoute; in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform, ed. Alan Bryden and Vincenza Scherrer,115-142. Geneva: Geneva DCAF, 2012.
- Conciliation Resources, &quoute;Briefing: Crisis in the Central African Republic,&quoute; August 2013, http://www.c-r.org/sites/default/files/CAR_briefing_ConciliationResources201308.pdf.
- National Security Encyclopedia, &quoute;Central African Republic - Politics, government, and taxation,&quoute; March 15, 2015, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Central-African-Republic-POLITICS-GOVERNMENT-AND-TAXATION.html#ixzz3UUyRdM2H
- Richard Reeve, &quoute;Special Briefing: Building Sustainable Peace and Security in the Central African Republic,&quoute; Oxford Research Group, December 11, 2013, http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/building_sustainable_peace_and_security_central_african_rep.
- Interview with Interviewee 1: Humanitarian aid worker in CAR, London, 20 June 2014.
- Louisa Lombard, &quoute;Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands&quoute; (PhD diss., Duke University, 2012), 275.
- RJDH, &quoute;Bangui : Les partis politiques réclament la réhbilitation des FACA&quoute; http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bangui-les-partis-politiques-reclament-la-rehabilitation-des-faca-et-le-desarmement-force.html
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In 2014 the transitional government launched a project to rid the general civil service payroll of fake claimants which indicates that some ghost civil servants may have existed and that the government is proactive in stopping the phenomenon: http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=6398
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no official information on this matter. Considering that the country's military personnel have been involved not only in informal promotions, but also in co-option of rebel fighters and road bandits through direct illegitimate payments, chains of command and payment are likely to overlap.
No government department is tasked exclusively with payments. Rebel groups are also often engaged in the political negotiation process with the aim of attaining political party status through which they can exert formal influence on chains of command and payment.
Response to peer reviewer:
Given that there is no evidence of how soldiers are paid (and no evidence that there is only one, formal system to do so), score has been maintained.
- Andreas Mehler, &quoute;Rebels and parties: the impact of armed insurgency on representation in the Central African Republic,&quoute; Journal of Modern African Studies (49): 2011, 117.
- IRIN, &quoute;Central African Republic: Who’s who with guns,&quoute; June 17, 2009, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/84886/central-african-republic-who-s-who-with-guns.
- UNDP, &quoute;UN supports the re-establishment of core public services in Central African Republic,&quoute; June 25, 2014, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2014/06/25/un-supports-the-re-establishment-of-core-public-services-in-central-african-republic.html.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: While there is no official to confirm how the military is paid the following article on failure to pay army salaries indicates that central government coffers, as opposed to the defence ministry, pays military salaries: http://www.centrafriquelibre.info/?p=17965
It is therefore likely that chains of command are separate from chain of payment, thus supporting a higher score.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: SSR programmes (initiated in 2008 with international assistance) had among their key priorities the establishment of a rigid Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel. However, no final version of the code was produced or implemented.
Previously, CAR contributed to the the preparation of a Draft Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa. There is no evidence that the code was finalised, published or implemented. The current MINUSCA mandate does not include the finalisation or re-elaboration of such a code.
- Adedeji Ebo, &quoute;Towards a Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges,&quoute; Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), March 2005, www.dcaf.ch/content/download/34942/525101/.../pp05_towards-code.pdf.
- MINUSCA. &quoute;MINUSCA Mandate.&quoute; March 16, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/mandate.shtml.
- Security Sector Reform Resource Centre. &quoute;Country Profile: Central African Republic.&quoute; March 15, 2015, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/countries/country-profile-central-african-republic/.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Worth mentioning that the Penal Code provides for corruption and is applicable to all civil servants: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/88116/100661/F1881819351/CAF-88116.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The newly formed EUMAM mission has a responsibility for SSR and the remobilization of FACA. There is limited evidence of what it intends to work on but it is likely that a Code of Conduct would be part of this, in line with indications by EU actors such as the UK Minister for Europe, and the national discussion around DDR and peacebuilding and reconciliation.
&quoute;...a 'phased approach' for EUMAM CAR — starting off as an advisory mission, which ... could transition to conduct targeted non-operational training, in co-ordination with the UN. Non-operational training will involve improving the capabilities of existing units' chain of command, increasing military leadership skills and competences, courses on basic citizenship and military knowledge modules (Human Rights, Gender Equality, international humanitarian law etc.).
&quoute;The mission would consist of 50-60 military advisors. The further Security Sector Reform process depends on the elections in CAR as a prerequisite to set up a democratically elected and recognised government. Since elections are scheduled for July 2015, the mission will have a duration of 12 months from the time of reaching full operational capacity.&quoute; (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeuleg/219-xxviii/21917.htm, para 14.18)
Other background:
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eumam-rca/index_en.htm
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50878#.VV3b5vlVhBc
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: A comprehensive Code of Conduct has not been made publicly available or implemented, even though the 2008 SSR programme made provisions for the elaboration of such a document. Copies of working drafts are not available and it is unclear whether there has been adherence to any form of a similar framework in general and to anti-corruption measures in particular.
Recent instances of FACA misconduct point towards widespread impunity and breach of fundamental integrity rules. As part of international support, in March 2014, the AU and partners concluded a joint country assessment and workshop in CAR, addressing the possibilities for restarting the stalled SSR. No specific outcomes have been publicised.
No relevant information is available from the Ministry of Defence, which has no formal online presence and is only marginally mentioned in CAR's other ministries' official communication channels.
- International Security Sector Advisory Team. &quoute;Central African Republic Background Note.&quoute; March 2, 2015, http://issat.dcaf.ch/Home/Community-of-Practice/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Central-African-Republic-Background-Note.
- La Nouvelle Centrafrique, &quoute;Centrafrique: FACA soldiers lynch ‘ex-rebel’ at military ceremony,&quoute; February 5, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.lanouvellecentrafrique.org/centrafrique-faca-soldiers-lynch-ex-rebel-at-military-ceremony/.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See previous question. The newly formed EUMAM mission has a responsibility for SSR and the remobilization of FACA. There is limited evidence of what it intends to work on but it is likely that a Code of Conduct would be part of this, in line with indications by EU actors such as the UK Minister for Europe, and the national discussion around DDR and peacebuilding and reconciliation.
&quoute;...a 'phased approach' for EUMAM CAR — starting off as an advisory mission, which ... could transition to conduct targeted non-operational training, in co-ordination with the UN. Non-operational training will involve improving the capabilities of existing units' chain of command, increasing military leadership skills and competences, courses on basic citizenship and military knowledge modules (Human Rights, Gender Equality, international humanitarian law etc.).&quoute; (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeuleg/219-xxviii/21917.htm, para 14.18)
Suggested score:
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No anti-corruption training is currently taking place. The current situation in CAR has challenged the central state to consolidate its exercise of power over its armed forces. It is further compromised by the presence and operations of an array of strong rebel movements. Organisation and mobilisation of the country's military personnel would be difficult given their delayed remuneration and culture of impunity. Thus, any anti-corruption training would be a highly implausible task.
The current top priority of CNT is to guarantee security and transparency concerns are not addressed promptly within that framework. There is no indication that civilian Ministry of Defence staff have been involved in similar training programmes either. Even though Séléka ex-rebels no longer control the ministry, its agenda is still closely intertwined with that of various violent movements.
- International Security Sector Advisory Team. &quoute;Central African Republic Background Note.&quoute; March 2, 2015, http://issat.dcaf.ch/Home/Community-of-Practice/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Central-African-Republic-Background-Note.
- Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Centrafrique : le gouvernement appelle la population de Bangui à déposer les armes,&quoute;
March 19, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140319110529/bangui-desarmement-armee-centrafricaine-crise-centrafricaine-crise-centrafricaine-centrafrique-le-gouvernement-appelle-la-population-de-bangui-a-deposer-les-armes.html.
- Journal de Bangui, &quoute;Centrafrique: la formation du 3ème gouvernement de transition,&quoute; January 28, 2014, accessed June 24, 2014, http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=6043.
- La Nouvelle Centrafrique, &quoute;Le gouvernement cible les détenteurs d’armes comme des “cibles militaires”,&quoute; March 19, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.lanouvellecentrafrique.info/centrafrique-le-gouvernement-cible-les-detenteurs-darmes-comme-des-cibles-militaires/.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: As a result of the ongoing conflict, most judicial authorities have not been able to carry out their functions and few have managed to resume work. Other than corruption, military personnel have been documented to have perpetrated a number of crimes, including murder and summary executions, torture, forced displacement, and ethnic/religious-motivated violent attacks. No adequate prosecution of any of these offences has been undertaken and there is no policy to make outcomes of any such prosecutions public. There have been no attempted prosecutions recently and notorious former FACA members and current rebel commanders, such as Alfred Yekatom, alias “Rambo”, are still active.
- Amnesty International, &quoute;CAR: Failure to effectively investigate war crimes fuels further atrocities and fear,&quoute; December 11, 2014, https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/12/car-failure-effectively-investigate-war-crimes-fuels-further-atrocities-and-fear/.
- Amnesty International, &quoute;La crise des droits humains en République centrafricaine. Questions et réponses,&quoute; April 9, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.amnistie.ca/sinformer/communiques/international/2014/republique-centrafricaine/crise-droits-humains-en.
- Human Rights Watch, &quoute;Compendium: A Country in Turmoil (May, 2013 - March, 2014),&quoute; 2014, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/car0314compendium_web.pdf.
- Human Rights Watch, &quoute;ICC Investigation Needed - National and International Judicial Efforts Needed for Stability,&quoute; June 26, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201406270836.html.
- UNHCR, &quoute;La RCA a besoin d'un système de justice avant la réconciliation,&quoute; April 4, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.unhcr.fr/534ce04cc.html.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Following the 2008 rebellion an amnesty was a greed thus preventing the prosecution of several defence personnel (https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_cf_rule159). It is likely that a similar bill be discussed following the end of the transitional government, it was already mentioned at the 2014 peace talks (http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/20/central-african-republic-no-amnesty-serious-crimes).
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are extensive legislative provisions (an entire chapter with six sections in the Penal Code) to discourage facilitation payments, but those are vaguely worded and not effectively implemented (Krock, 2014). CAR's former political leaders have sporadically declared interest in strengthening the country's anti-facilitation payment framework, but no tangible outcomes have been produced.
It is very commonplace for public officers to demand facilitation payments to perform their professional duties (Dörrie, 2014). The national anti-corruption committee has not been consistently active since its inauguration.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agree. Score changed from 2 to 1.
- Code pénal centrafricain. Loi n° 10.001, January 6, 2010, Chapter XIV.
- Fred Krock, &quoute;Centrafrique : validation du document de politique nationale de lutte contre la corruption,&quoute; Afrik, September 25, 2012, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.afrik.com/article27176.html.
- Ian Lucas, &quoute;Crisis in Central African Republic,&quoute; Huffington Post, January 19, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ian-lucas/central-african-republic-car-crisis_b_4615610.html.
- Janet Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University PRess, 2004), 18.
- Pacôme Pabandji, &quoute;Le commerçant libanais et corrupteur de Ndoutingaï s'affiche au grand jour,&quoute; Centrafrique Presse Info, February 14, 2012, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.centrafrique-presse.info/site/info-politique-457.html.
- Peter Dörrie, &quoute;The Same Corrupt Politicians and Dangerous Warlords Still Haunt Central African Republic,&quoute; Medium, July 14, 2014, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/corrupt-politicians-and-dangerous-warlords-still-haunt-central-african-republic-956358bf1d6b
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I do agree with the comments and the sources but I think all the evidence meets the criteria for score 1 or even 0 as A) the Code pénal and 'Document Stratégique National de Lutte Contre la Corruption' are too vaguely worded, and B) facilitation payments are commonplace across the government. However please note the sources by Dörrie and Lucas do not discuss the extent of facilitation payments in CAR.
Suggested score: 1
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no military doctrine where corruption is addressed as a strategic issue for operations. The current political leadership of the country has acknowledged the need to tackle corruption in government, but only broadly, without explicit reference to the military.
Historically, CAR's president and commander-in-chief have had an intertwined political mandate. During his rule, President Bozizé approved the most recent Criminal Code (2010) in his position as chief of staff. This fundamental piece of legislation recognises the governance issues associated with corruption, but does not provide for strategic planning in tackling them. A general national anti-corruption strategy was never fully elaborated and it was not applied to the defence sector in particular.
The need for more stringent and coherent measures for addressing corruption in the resource exploitation sector (which is directly linked to formal and informal armed groups) has been unanimously highlighted by analysts of CAR's most recent violent episodes.
- Andreas Mehler, &quoute; Why Security Forces Do Not Deliver Security: Evidence from Liberia and the Central African Republic,&quoute; Armed Forces and Society 38 (2012): 49-69.
- Alphonse Zozime Tamekamta, &quoute;Gouvernance, Rébellions Armées et Déficit Sécuritaire en RCA - Comprendre les Crises centrafricaines (2003-2013),&quoute; GRIP February 22, 2013, http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/18670/219286/file/NA_2012-02-22_FR_A-TAMEKANTA.pdf.
- Cecilie Feuillatre and Christian Panika, &quoute;Catherine Samba-Panza: My plan to save Central Africa,&quoute; Africa Review, January 22, 2014, http://www.africareview.com/News/Samba-Panza-My-plan-for-Central-Africa/-/979180/2155484/-/qomors/-/index.html.
- Code pénal centrafricain. Loi n° 10.001, January 6, 2010, Chapter XIV, section III.
- ICG, &quoute;The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation,&quoute; Africa Report N°219, June 17, 2014, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/219-the-central-african-crisis-from-predation-to-stabilisation.aspx.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no evidence demonstrating that a training scheme for commanders has ever been developed. According even to the UN Security Council, external training provided by international actors so far also has not included and meaningfully engaged CAR's military leadership. According to a recent (2014) in-depth report by Amnesty International, many current members of FACA are actively engaging in rebel activities, leading rebel groups and committing acts of violence and corruption with impunity.
- Amnesty International, &quoute;CAR: Failure to effectively investigate war crimes fuels further atrocities and fear,&quoute; December 11, 2014, https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/12/car-failure-effectively-investigate-war-crimes-fuels-further-atrocities-and-fear/.
- GPAD-UPECA, &quoute;Regional Anti-Corruption Programme for Africa (2011-2016),&quoute; UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Union Advisory Board on Corruption, programme document, http://www.auanticorruption.org/uploads/Regional_Anti-Corruption_Programme.pdf.
- Hugues Tchoua, &quoute;Centrafrique, l’armée sans défenses,&quoute; Cameroon Tribune, June 10, 2014, accessed June 27, 2014, https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81888:centrafrique-larmee-sans-defences&catid=39:politique&Itemid=5.
- Peter Dörrie, &quoute;The Same Corrupt Politicians and Dangerous Warlords Still Haunt Central African Republic,&quoute; Medium, July 14, 2014, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/corrupt-politicians-and-dangerous-warlords-still-haunt-central-african-republic-956358bf1d6b.
- UN Security Council, &quoute;Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic,&quoute; November 28, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1464202.pdf.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The findings attributed to Amnesty International here are widely accepted by most independent commentators.
See also:
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf
http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-62
Suggested score:
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: It is reasonable to believe that, since an anti-corruption strategy was never fully developed and implemented, corruption risk monitoring in the field is also not practised. There is no evidence to suggest that such programmes are to be elaborated and carried out in the near future.
No record of deployment of corruption risk monitors by CAR's Ministry of Defence exists.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: CAR's armed forces have no track record of overseas deployment or peacekeeping mission participation. Due to its fragmentation and unruliness FACA has not been used in in-country peacekeeping missions, which rely entirely on external support, currently administered through MINUSCA.
- Bjoern H. Seiber, &quoute;EUFOR Tchad/RCA – A Cautionary Note,&quoute; European Security Review 37 (March 2008), http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2008_artrel_148_esr37euforchad-mar08.pdf.
- Louisa Waugh, &quoute;Will MINUSCA deployment make a difference in CAR?,&quoute; African Arguments, September 15, 2014, http://africanarguments.org/2014/09/15/will-minusca-deployment-make-a-difference-in-car-by-louisa-waugh/.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Since the late 2000s, PMCs have been expanding their presence in CAR - mostly through their employment by foreign government and regional actors. They are playing a crucial role in current international peacebuilding operations. For example, the Pentagon uses private contractors for transportation of troops, as well as pursuit of war criminals in CAR. French PMCs have been involved in providing security to the president since 2014.
There is no evidence that suggests these actors' de facto commitment to complying with any external standards. Neither is there any publicly-stated endeavour on the part of the country's leadership to develop monitoring mechanisms. Accountability issues due to lack of regulation of the PMCs used by foreign peacebuilding actors, as well as intergovernmental organisations, have been highlighted by a number of observers. At the same time, there is no evidence that PMCs are complicit in corruption.
- Eurasia Review, &quoute;Security Threats Facing Africa And Its Capacity To Respond – Analysis,&quoute; March 5, 2015, http://www.eurasiareview.com/05032015-security-threats-facing-africa-and-its-capacity-to-respond-analysis/.
- James Cockayne and Emily Speers Mears, &quoute;Private Military and Security Companies: A Framework for Regulation,&quoute; International Peace Institute, March 2009, 3, http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/pmsc_epub.pdf.
- Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Sécurité : des retraités français très spéciaux débarquent en Centrafrique,&quoute; July 17, 2013, accessed June 30, 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2740p008.xml6/.
- Hen Lustig, &quoute;What Was the South African Military Doing in the Central African Republic?&quoute; Vice, April 25, 2013, http://www.vice.com/read/what-were-the-south-african-military-up-to-in-central-african-republic.
- Nigel D. White and Sorcha MacLeod, &quoute; EU Operations and Private Military Contractors: Issues of Corporate and Institutional Responsibility,&quoute; The European Journal of International Law 19 (2008): 966-967.
- Marco Boggero, &quoute;Local dynamics of security in Africa: The Central African Republic and private security,&quoute; African Security Review 17 (2008): 17.
- Pierre Haski, &quoute;Des mercenaires français pour protéger le président centrafricain,&quoute; Le Nouvel Observateur, July 19, 2013, accessed June 30, 2014, http://rue89.nouvelobs.com/2013/07/19/mercenaires-francais-proteger-nouveau-president-centrafricain-244375.
- Professional Overseas Contractors, &quoute;Pentagon to Hire Private Contractors to Transport Troops in Africa,&quoute; July 12, 2013, http://www.your-poc.com/pentagon-to-hire-private-contractors-to-transport-troops-in-africa/#sthash.TQuTmdRW.dpuf.
- The Washington Post, &quoute;Contractors run U.S. spying missions in Africa,&quoute; June 14, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/contractors-run-us-spying-missions-in-africa/2012/06/14/gJQAvC4RdV_story.html.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: British PMC's were also providing presidential security as late as March 2013 - the details of this are not publically available and there is no suggestion that independent oversight mechanisms impose any controls on their activities.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: CAR has comprehensive public procurement legislation, which includes defence and security procurement procedures and de jure recognises corruption risks. The latter are exempt from compliance when they are treated as state secret due to national security concerns (Article 9). Thus, authorities are given substantial leeway to decide which defence procurement procedures should not be disclosed. These are not explicitly defined and are not subject to other forms of scrutiny. As a result the government can easily manipulate the classification of military expenditures. The enforcement of the legislation with regard to non-exempt items is not demonstrated by any recent events. Large-scale embezzlement suggests that procurement legislation is completely overlooked.
CAR's armed forces often rely on illicitly traded arms, whose acquisition, by default, lacks transparency. In 2010, the Kinshasa Convention was signed in an effort to combat illicit trafficking and misuse of small arms in the region, but there is evidence that it is poorly enforced.
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-01, June 6, 2008, Article 9.
- Crispin Dembassa-Katte, &quoute;Six killed in violence in Central African Republic's capital,&quoute; Reuters, October 15, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/15/us-centralafrica-violence-idUSKCN0I41U920141015.
- Journal de Bangui, &quoute;Sassou Nguesso demande plus de ressources financières pour la RCA,&quoute; January 6, 2015, http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=7726
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: A comprehensive examination of available government and local media sources revealed no public disclosure of any stage of the defence procurement cycle.
There are no records of the formalisation of defence procurement cycles.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Can confirm that this information does not seem to be publicly available.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The Public Procurement Act of 2008 provides for the establishment of a Public Procurement General Directorate (Direction Générale des Marchés) and a Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (Autorité de régulation des marchés publics, ARMP). The latter's mandate is outlined in detail in subsequent pertinent legislation, but does not explicitly cover the defence sector. There are no specialised defence procurement oversight mechanisms and no evidence to demonstrate ARMP's exercise of supervision over defence and security public procurement procedures. There is only reference to specific requirements for information disclosure in applications by defence procurement candidates. Currently, the Public Procurement General Directorate and the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority are not active.
CAR's armed forces often rely on illicitly traded arms, whose acquisition, by default, lacks transparency. In 2010, the Kinshasa Convention was signed in an effort to combat illicit trafficking and misuse of small arms in the region, but there is evidence that it is poorly enforced.
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-01, June 6, 2008, Article 21, Articles 31 and 32.
- Decret portant organisation et fonctionnement de l'Autorité de Régulation de Marchés Publics de la République Centrafricaine, Decret n°08-01, February 27, 2009.
- Journal de Bangui, &quoute;Sassou Nguesso demande plus de ressources financières pour la RCA,&quoute; January 6 , 2015, http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=7726.
- République Centrafricaine, &quoute;Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté Premier Rapport Annuel d’Étape,&quoute; March 2009, 36, http://www.imf.org/external/french/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09240f.pdf.
- République Centrafricaine, &quoute;Réponse Au Questionnaire Sur Le Développement Durable,&quoute; 2012, 5, http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/584QUESTIONNAIRE_Rep_Centrafricaine.pdf.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Defence purchases are not made public even though for certain budget years, military spending has been publicised. According to the Public Procurement Act, defence procurement is exempt from publication due to national interest and security concerns, which are not always fully justified. Bilateral defence assistance and trade agreements between France and CAR have historically lacked transparency (Melly, 2013).
Considering the fragmentation of the FACA, the current weapons embargo and the involvement of foreign troops in peacekeeping, it is unlikely that CAR has made any defence purchases in the last three years. The presidential guard have not been known to use sophisticated weapons that could have been acquired from regional or international sellers, but rebel groups are known to be using illicitly imported foreign-produced arms (Caulderwood, 2015).
No public records or statements detailing defence purchases could be obtained.
- Centrafrique Presse, &quoute;La France et la Centrafrique signent un nouvel accord de défense,&quoute; April 8, 2010
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-01, June 6, 2008, Article 9.
- Katherine Caulderwood, &quoute;How European, Chinese Weapons Fuel Conflict In Central African Republic,&quoute; IB Times, January 21, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/how-european-chinese-weapons-fuel-conflict-central-african-republic-1788996.
- Paul Melly, &quoute;Central African Republic crisis: Another French intervention?,&quoute; BBC, December 2, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25183377.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree, the arms embargo has effectively halted any defence procurement from happening. Previous procurement under President Bozize was typically opaque, such as over the procurement of at least two Ukranian MI-24 helicopters that were later used on civilians, as well as the Ka-50 deal through arms broker Ari Ben-Menashe.
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/how-heenan-blaikies-stunning-collapse-started-with-a-rogue-african-arms-deal
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/280306ziguele.pdf, p6
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/notorious-canadian-lobbyist-hired-by-militants-seeking-breakaway-from-libya
http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-bozize-a-reussi-a-se-procurer-deux-helicopteres-de-combat-ukrainiens-mi-24-78808754.html
Suggested score:
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are general integrity requirements for companies, which are outlined in pertinent legislation (Public Procurement Act) - specific requirements regarding the avoidance of corruption are listed under the 'violations' category. There is no explicit mention of the need for compliance by bidders for Ministry of Defence tenders. No recent evidence suggests the government outlines the need to meet anti-corruption standards in its tenders.
Response to peer reviewers:
As there is mention of corruption as a violation of a contract, score has been maintained.
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-01, June 6, 2008, Articles 104 and 105.
- Philippe Chapleau, &quoute;Corruption dans le secteur de la défense,&quoute; January 29, 2013, http://lignesdedefence.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2013/01/29/corruption-dans-le-secteur-de-la-defence-transparency-intern.html.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I have seen no evidence that any discrimination is made between companies on the grounds of integrity.
Suggested score: 0
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No national strategy for defence and security exists in CAR and thus procurement is not based on any form of audited or scrutinised procurement plan. Procurement requirements are established on an arbitrary basis and are likely to be erratic, especially considering the rapidly shifting dynamics of the ongoing violent conflict (World Bank, 2014).
Some SSR-related procurements (DDR ones in particular) appear to have been derived from a more coherent national strategy, but no streamlining of this strategy has occurred since it elaboration in 2009. CAR's armed forces often rely on illicitly traded arms, whose acquisition, by default, lacks transparency. In 2010, the Kinshasa Convention was signed in an effort to combat illicit trafficking and misuse of small arms in the region, but there is evidence that it is poorly enforced.
The current MINUSCA mandate includes SSR and might produce more specific strategic planning documents in the future.
- African Development Bank, &quoute;République centrafricaine (RCA): Document de stratégie de partenariat pays conjointe (DSPPC) 2009 du 2012 du Groupe de la Banque africaine de développement et du Groupe de la Banque mondiale, &quoute;June 2009, 8, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/RCA%20-%20Document%20de%20strat%C3%A9gie%20de%20partenariat%20pays%20conjointe%202009-2012%20du%20Groupe%20de%20la%20Banque%20africaine%20de%20d%C3%A9veloppement%20et%20du%20Groupe%20de%20la%20Banque%20mondiale.pdf.
- Cameroon Tribune, &quoute;Sécurisation des frontières Cameroun-RCA: le réconfort du chef de l’Etat aux troupes,&quoute; January 2, 2015, https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=86955:securisation-des-frontieres-cameroun-rca-le-reconfort-du-chef-de-letat-aux-troupes&catid=1:politique&Itemid=3.
- République centrafricaine. &quoute;Contexte et justification: Réforme du secteur Sécuritaire.&quoute; 2009, http://rss.minplan-rca.org/Home/contexte.
- World Bank, &quoute;République Centrafricaine - Rapport sur le respect des normes et codes (RRNC/ROSC) : compatabilite et audit (French),&quoute; April 7, 2014, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/04/16602909/r%C3%A9publique-centrafricaine-rapport-sur-le-respect-des-normes-codes-rrncrosc-compatabilite-audit.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Procurement under Bozize was typically opaque, such as over the procurement of at least two Ukranian MI-24 helicopters that were later used on civilians, as well as the Ka-50 deal through arms broker Ari Ben-Menashe.
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/how-heenan-blaikies-stunning-collapse-started-with-a-rogue-african-arms-deal
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/280306ziguele.pdf, p6
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/notorious-canadian-lobbyist-hired-by-militants-seeking-breakaway-from-libya
http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-bozize-a-reussi-a-se-procurer-deux-helicopteres-de-combat-ukrainiens-mi-24-78808754.html
Suggested score:
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: No military acquisition requirements have been systematised and presented publicly by the Ministry of Defence. It is unlikely that purchases are based on such requirements, especially considering the highly fluid configuration of CAR's armed forces. The high levels of insecurity in the country are further complicating the quantification of defence-related requirements.
There are no government sources demonstrating any process of definition and quantification of necessary military acquisitions.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I don't feel there is enough evidence to support this score choice. If there have been no purchases in recent years (as posited by the assessor in Q62) then one cannot judge whether they are in line with requirement or not. Given the current state of conflict in the country one could alternatively find justification for a wide range of purchases. No score allows for this context.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Procurement under Bozize was typically opaque, such as over the procurement of at least two Ukranian MI-24 helicopters that were later used on civilians, as well as the Ka-50 deal through arms broker Ari Ben-Menashe.
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/how-heenan-blaikies-stunning-collapse-started-with-a-rogue-african-arms-deal
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/280306ziguele.pdf, p6
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/notorious-canadian-lobbyist-hired-by-militants-seeking-breakaway-from-libya
http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-bozize-a-reussi-a-se-procurer-deux-helicopteres-de-combat-ukrainiens-mi-24-78808754.html
Suggested score:
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The current crisis in CAR's public financial management is having a serious impact on the defence sector - public procurement is likely to be happening on an extremely ad-hoc basis, without any adequate regulation (African Development Bank, 2014). Open competition might be discouraged for the sake of rapid procurement of necessary items. Single-sourcing is likely to be favoured (World Bank, 2014), but there is no unequivocal evidence demonstrating this tendency.
There are no sources available that detail competition in defence procurement in CAR.
- African Development Bank, &quoute;Republique Centrafricaine Document D’assistance Interimaire A La Transition 2014-2016,&quoute; June 2014, 4, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/RCA_-_Document_d_assistance_int%C3%A9rimaire_%C3%A0_la_transition_2014-2016.pdf
- Global Tenders. &quoute;Govt. Tenders from Central Africa.&quoute; March 15, 2015, http://www.globaltenders.com/government-tenders-central-africa.php.
- World Bank, &quoute;WB Endorses Emergency Funds to Restore Public Financial Management in the Central African Republic,&quoute; April 24, 2014, accessed June 30, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/04/24/wb-emergency-funds-public-financial-management-car.
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: A UN arms embargo is currently in place and although CAR was able to secure some limited exceptions, these are still subject to the Sanctions Committee's approval. Research suggests this has effectively halted any significant defence procurements within the last twelve months.
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11747.doc.htm
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/27/us-un-assembly-centralafrica-idUSKCN0HM0O620140927
http://www.dw.de/central-african-republic-seeks-looser-arms-embargo-at-un/a-17959817
Approved exceptions:
- &quoute;Supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment to the CAR security forces, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of SSR, as approved in advance by the Committee&quoute; and
- &quoute;Other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee&quoute;.
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/2127/
Suggested score:
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are a number of legislative provisions that outline the regulations to which tender boards are subject, but audit reports and factual evidence that these regulations are adhered to could not be obtained. Existing regulations are highly unlikely to be adhered to. External audits are not regularised and the most recent ones were carried out by international bodies and concern bodies other than the tender board and issues other than defence procurement (see, for instance, WWF, 2012).
Response to peer reviewer:
Agreed. Score lowered from 1 to 0.
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-01, June 6, 2008, Section III.
- City Press, &quoute;DA wants auditor-general to probe ‘dodgy defence force’ tenders,&quoute; August 29, 2014, http://www.citypress.co.za/news/da-wants-auditor-general-probe-dodgy-defence-force-tenders/.
- Decret portant organisation et fonctionnement de l'Autorité de Régulation de Marchés Publics de la République Centrafricaine, Decret n°08-01, February 27, 2009, Section II.
- WWF, &quoute;Central African Republic begins independent ivory audit,&quoute; October 26, 2012, http://wwf.panda.org/?206551/Central-African-Republic-Begins-Independent-Ivory-Audit.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: 1) I have seen no evidence that the defence institutions in CAR conducted any form of transparent tender board process or that audits were conducted, either under Bozize or presently. I think competitive tendering is very unlikely to have occurred to any auditable standard; for example, a story broken by a South African paper in 2013 suggest an arms deal may have been under direct negotiation between President Bozize and a South African weapons manufacturer immediately prior to the 2013 coup (http://m.timeslive.co.za/specialreports/stinvestigations/?articleId=8691020).
2) More recently, the UN arms embargo has halted effectively all significant procurement for the interim.
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/2127/
3) http://www.citypress.co.za/news/da-wants-auditor-general-probe-dodgy-defence-force-tenders/
This case is not relevant, as it concerns the SADF (albeit while they were operating in Bangui) - the applicable tender regulations are for a foreign defence force.
Suggested score: 0
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Public procurement legislation explicitly prohibits collusive practices, but does not make specific provisions for the defence sector. Sanctions are imposed on companies who 'participate in collusion practices [...] to establish an offer price at an artificial level [...] depriving the contracting authority from the advantages of free and open competition' (translated from French original text, Article 104).
There is no evidence that companies have been previously investigated on suspicions of collusion and no collusion cases have recently surfaced in the media.
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-01, June 6, 2008, Article 104.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Considering CAR's protracted financial management crisis, substantial government payroll delays and overall bureaucratic confusion, it is unlikely that defence procurement staff are well organised and specifically trained. They are not overseen by procurement staff. In the context of a defunct national army, staff shortages is not something that can be commented on at this stage.
Corruption in public procurement in CAR has been subject to criticism by foreign donors over the past decade. Foreign military presence has currently taken over the security and defence functions of CAR's government and is subject to little internal and external scrutiny. CAR's armed forces often rely on illicitly traded arms, whose acquisition, by default, lacks transparency. In 2010, the Kinshasa Convention was signed in an effort to combat illicit trafficking and misuse of small arms in the region, but there is evidence that it is poorly enforced.
- Africa Confidential, &quoute;Allies lose faith,&quoute; vol. 55, no. 17, August 29, 2014, http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5750/Allies_lose_faith
- Centrafrique Presse, &quoute;La France appuie la RCA pour mieux lutter contre la fraude et la corruption dans les marchés publics,&quoute; October 18, 2011, accessed June 30, 2014, http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/tag/Politique/42.
- Gaspard Lenckonov, &quoute;La MISCA entend user du droit à la légitime défense en RCA,&quoute; December 28, 2013, accessed June 30, 2014, http://www.congo-site.com/La-MISCA-entend-user-du-droit-a-la-legitime-defence-en-RCA_a16388.html.
- Human Rights Watch, &quoute;Dispatches: Chaos and Catastrophe in the Central African Republic,&quoute; January 27, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/27/dispatches-chaos-and-catastrophe-central-african-republic.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I consider it unlikely that any formal procurement department has existed to now.
Suggested score:
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are institutions that companies can refer to in case they would like to lodge a complaint regarding the transparency of the tender award process. The Arbitration Committee (Comité de Règlement des Différends, CRD) is in charge of processing such complaints, but there are no legislative provisions that address the issue of discrimination for companies that file complaints. There is also no indication in media reports or independent research that the existing mechanisms have been used by companies in the past.
Response to peer reviewer:
Agree. Score changed from 3 to 1.
- Bowman Gilfillan, &quoute;Doing Business in Central African Republic,&quoute; March 16, 2015, http://www.bgafricagroup.com/BankingFinance/CentralAfricanRepublic/Index.asp
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-01, June 6, 2008, Articles 31, 32 and 107.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Firstly I do not see substantive evidence in Bowman Gilfillan, &quoute;Doing Business in Central African Republic,&quoute; March 16, 2015, http://www.bgafricagroup.com/BankingFinance/CentralAfricanRepublic/Index.asp, as this is concerned with the legislation governing foreign loans to domestic borrowers.
Secondly I disagree that there is a suitable enough formal mechanism, as the assessor mentioned the code des marchés public is weak in this area.
Suggested score: 1
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are some general provisions for such sanctions included in the 2008 Public Procurement Act, but no public record of their implementation exists. Corruption in public procurement in CAR is known to be a persistent and widespread issue (African Development Bank, 2014) It is therefore unlikely that corrupt suppliers are regularly and adequately sanctioned. There are no recent known cases of corruption by suppliers in defence procurement - their absence is unlikely to be due to diminishing corruption rates, but rather, the lack of capacity to prosecute effectively.
- African Development Bank, &quoute;Document D’assistance Interimaire A La Transition 2014-2016,&quoute; June 2014, 3, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/RCA_-_Document_d_assistance_int%C3%A9rimaire_%C3%A0_la_transition_2014-2016.pdf.
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-01, June 6, 2008, Article 105.
- IMF, &quoute;Central African Republic: Use of Fund Resources - Request for Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance,&quoute; IMF Country Report No. 06/42, February 2006, 16.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There is no evidence demonstrating CAR's government current engagement in offset contracts. It is likely that offset contracts still exist but there is no public record of them. In 2007, now ousted president François Bozizé was widely criticised for concluding a number of controversial offset agreements with Chinese and French suppliers without disclosing any information to the public. There is no evidence the government has discontinued offset contracts from the past.
The lack of transparency and unavailability of official information vis-à-vis CAR's government's policy on offset contracts points towards the lack corruption assessment practices, as well as ineffective auditing.
There are no available sources that demonstrate the government's stance on this matter.
- Global Security, &quoute;Central African Republic - Francois Bozize,&quoute; March 16, 2015, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/car-3.htm.
- Johann Hari, &quoute;Inside France's secret war,&quoute; The Independent, October 5, 2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/inside-frances-secret-war-396062.html.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: There are no accessible public records that present details of offset programmes and their performance. Ousted president François Bozizé was widely criticised for concluding a number of controversial offset agreements with French and Chinese suppliers without disclosing any information to the public (Hari, 2007; Paris, 2013). There is no evidence that currently CAR's government is involved in offset programmes.
- Cyril Bensimon, &quoute;Soldats sud-africains tués en Centrafrique: les chiffres divergent,&quoute; RFI, April 4, 2013, accessed July 1, 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130403-afrique-sud-morts-centrafrique-rca-bangui-bozize-seleka/.
- Johann Hari, &quoute;Inside France's secret war,&quoute; The Independent, October 5, 2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/inside-frances-secret-war-396062.html.
- Katherine Caulderwood, &quoute;How European, Chinese Weapons Fuel Conflict In Central African Republic,&quoute; IB Times, January 21, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/how-european-chinese-weapons-fuel-conflict-central-african-republic-1788996.
- Kumran Ira, &quoute;French war in Central African Republic intensifies humanitarian crisis,&quoute; WSWS, December 16, 2013, accessed July 1, 2014, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/16/care-d16.html.
- Robert Paris, &quoute;Pourquoi l’impérialisme français a lâché Bozizé, son dictateur du Centrafrique, son homme de paille?,&quoute; Matiere Revolution, April 29, 2013, http://www.matierevolution.org/spip.php?article3333
- Thierry Vircoulon, &quoute;Central African Crisis,&quoute; Al Jazeera, May 4, 2014, accessed July 1, 2014, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/04/201443095434720966.htm.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: CAR's government is likely to impose little competition regulation both for main contracts and offset agreements. There are no official statements addressing the issue of offset programmes. The score selected reflects this lack of information and transparency.
No government, media or INGO sources that provide information on CAR's offset contracts could be found
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The use of agents and intermediaries in public procurement is allowed by law in CAR, but is not subject to specifically elaborated scrutiny. Article 103 of the Public Procurement Acts states that 'bidders in the public procurement procedure and delegations public service are required to inform the contracting authority of any payment, benefit or privilege granted for the benefit of any person acting as an intermediary or agent in consideration for any service provided to them (translated from French original).
There are very few control mechanisms, however, and those pertain solely to the sanctions that tender candidates can incur in case of malpractice vis-à-vis their contractors and agents. The controls they are subject to are not well known to the public and companies at all. It is unlikely that any control mechanisms are enforced.
- Code des marchés publics, Loi n°08-01, June 6, 2008, Articles 103 and 104.
- Radio Ndeke Luka, &quoute;La France appuie la RCA pour mieux lutter contre la fraude et la corruption dans les marchés publics,&quoute; October 17, 2011, http://www.radiondekeluka.org/justice/item/5728-la-france-appuie-la-rca-pour-mieux-lutter-contre-la-fraude-et-la-corruption-dans-les-march%C3%A9s-publics.html.
- République Centrafricaine, &quoute;Questionnaire relatif aux Objectifs du Développement Durable,&quoute; 2012, http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/584QUESTIONNAIRE_Rep_Centrafricaine.pdf.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Firstly, behaviour under president Bozize shows that the legislation could be ignored without concern. Patronage networks within the state also mean this has probably been a long-term norm. There is a lot of evidence to suggest he regularly used arms brokers, such as in the case of Ari Ben-Menashe.
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/how-heenan-blaikies-stunning-collapse-started-with-a-rogue-african-arms-deal
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/280306ziguele.pdf, p6
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/notorious-canadian-lobbyist-hired-by-militants-seeking-breakaway-from-libya
http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-bozize-a-reussi-a-se-procurer-deux-helicopteres-de-combat-ukrainiens-mi-24-78808754.html
http://m.timeslive.co.za/specialreports/stinvestigations/?articleId=8691020
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-28-00-central-african-republic-is-this-what-our-soldiers-died-for
Currently, president Catherine Samba Panza is limited by strong UN sanctions and is not pushing for any significant procurements.
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-05-disarmed-to-the-teeth-in-bangui
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/2127/index.shtml
Suggested score:
Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: The financing packages of formal arms deals are not publicly available. Considering the current arms embargo imposed by the EU since 2013, arms deals simply do not take place. There is very little information on the country's arms deals in general and in a historical perspective. It is important to note that CAR's armed forces often rely on illicitly traded arms, whose acquisition, by default, lacks transparency. In 2010, the Kinshasa Convention was signed in an effort to combat illicit trafficking and misuse of small arms in the region, but there is evidence that it is poorly enforced.
- Council of the European Union, &quoute;EU gives full effect to Uu0006 arms embargo against the Central African Republic,&quoute; December 23, 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/140278.pdf.
- Eric Berman and Louisa Lombard, &quoute;The Central African Republic And Small Arms: A Regional Tinderbox,&quoute; Small Arms Survey, December 2008, 11, 41, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-07-CAR/SAS-Central-African-Republic-and-Small-Arms.pdf.
- IRIN, &quoute;Central Africa: New arms deal elicits optimism,&quoute; November 22, 2010, accessed July 1, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/91158/central-africa-new-arms-deal-elicits-optimism.
- Scott Stearns, &quoute;UN: Illegal Arms Trade Fuels Central African Conflicts,&quoute; VOA, March 21, 2010, accessed July 1, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/illegal-arms-trade-fuels-central-african-conflicts-88828077/153799.html.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/how-heenan-blaikies-stunning-collapse-started-with-a-rogue-african-arms-deal
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/280306ziguele.pdf, p6
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/notorious-canadian-lobbyist-hired-by-militants-seeking-breakaway-from-libya
http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-bozize-a-reussi-a-se-procurer-deux-helicopteres-de-combat-ukrainiens-mi-24-78808754.html
http://m.timeslive.co.za/specialreports/stinvestigations/?articleId=8691020
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-28-00-central-african-republic-is-this-what-our-soldiers-died-for
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-05-disarmed-to-the-teeth-in-bangui
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/2127/index.shtml
Suggested score:
Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: CAR's government has demonstrated a pronounced weakness in managing its defence forces and the growing international military presence in the country illustrates that well. There are no clear anti-corruption guidelines for main contractors and sub-contracting is not sufficiently regulated at all. It is highly unlikely that there are informal initiatives to guarantee sub-contractors' integrity. Foreign, EU and AU troops' use of sub-contractors in CAR does not appear to be subject to national regulation (Whitlock, 2012).
- Andrew Hansen, &quoute;The French Military in Africa,&quoute; Council on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/france/french-military-africa/p12578.
- Craig Whitlock, &quoute;Contractors run U.S. spying missions in Africa,&quoute; The Washington Post, June 14, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/contractors-run-us-spying-missions-in-africa/2012/06/14/gJQAvC4RdV_story.html.
- Deutsche Welle, &quoute;France, EU to reinforce peacekeepers in Central African Republic,&quoute; February 15, 2014, accessed July 1, 2014, http://www.dw.de/france-eu-to-reinforce-peacekeepers-in-central-african-republic/a-17434780.
- Kim-Jenna Jurriaans, &quoute;U.N. Increasingly Reliant on Private Security Contractors,&quoute; IPS, July 12, 2012, http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/07/u-n-increasingly-reliant-on-private-security-contractors/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The assessor seems to be confusing American private security contractors to USDOD (I presume their contracts come under US law) with the CAR defence contracting.
However tI have no evidence of the CAR government having formally required any contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, nor knowledge of the government encouraging this informally. Given that Bozize's tenure fit a fairly typical model of tight dictatorial control over defence and of using cabinet appointments to build a patronage coalition, and that the current government is effectively limited from making major defence purchases by the current arms embargo, it is unlikely this has been occurring.
eg.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/B055-central-african-republic-untangling-the-political-dialogue.aspx
http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3618/Arriola_2009.pdf
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/2127/
Suggested score:
How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: Political influence overrides military necessity when it comes to procurement. Historically, however, the political influence of seller nations, has driven arms purchases.
France's interventions in CAR have created a strong defence-trade relationship between the two countries. CAR's proxy position during the Cold War has also prompted a formal arms export relationship with Slovakia. Since 2013, the EU has banned arms exports to CAR, but there is no evidence to suggest the curbing of illicit flows and informal acquisition. Most of CAR's armed forces and rebel groups rely on indirect arms transfers from regional armies and groups which are embroiled in a complex web of conflict. Regional political manoeuvring, therefore, is among the decisive factors behind military acquisition in the country. The previously existing arms trade relationships with transcontinental actors were mostly result of favouritism, but France specifically has been criticised for pursuing a specific political agenda.
Response to peer reviewer:
There seems to be substantial evidence of political influence over arms flows in CAR. Score maintained.
- Andrew Hansen, &quoute;The French Military in Africa,&quoute; Council on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/france/french-military-africa/p12578.
- Eric Berman and Louisa Lombard, &quoute;The Central African Republic And Small Arms: A Regional Tinderbox,&quoute; Small Arms Survey, December 2008, 11, 41, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-07-CAR/SAS-Central-African-Republic-and-Small-Arms.pdf.
- Johann Hari, &quoute;Inside France's secret war,&quoute; The Independent, October 5, 2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/inside-frances-secret-war-396062.html.
- Paul Melly and Vincent Darracq, &quoute;A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande,&quoute; Chatham House, May 2013,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0513pp_franceafrica.pdf.
- Paul Melly, &quoute;Central African Republic crisis: Another French intervention?,&quoute; BBC, December 2, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25183377.
- Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman and Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, &quoute;Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa,&quoute; SIPRI Policy Paper No. 30, December 2011, 12, 155, http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP30.pdf.
- Reuters, &quoute;EU bans arms exports to Central African Republic,&quoute; December 23, 2013, accessed July 1, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/23/us-centralafrican-france-eu-arms-idUSBRE9BM0BC20131223.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: While I agree with the comments here I don't think the evidence is strong enough to warrant a 0.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4108: In 2008, CAR's government, assisted by international stakeholders, initiated a set of Security Sector Reforms (SSR). Key to the SSR process was the establishment of functioning legislative oversight of defence policy-making, mostly through empowerment of the formally existing, but latent Committee on Defence. Due to CAR's long-standing volatile political situation, however, there is little separation of powers: members of the committee are usually parliamentarians who support the president and are highly unlikely to exercise their substantial oversight powers.
Complete constitutional order is yet to be restored in the country. In 2014, the EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) was established to support the Central African authorities in restarting the stalled reform of the security sector, especially with respect to the management of the CAR armed forces (FACA). The mission so far has proposed no specific action regarding the reinstitution of the Committee on Defence.