This country is placed in Band F

DRC’s GI ranking in Band F places it in the highest risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. DRC’s highest risk area is Financial, followed by Procurement, Political and Personnel. Corruption risk needs to be tackled to reduce state fragility and improve security provision:

Strengthen inclusive civilian control over the defence and security sector:

A combination of factional control over the armed forces, and widespread human rights abuses have contributed to history of large-scale instability in the DRC, leaving behind a climate of fear among civilians, and precarious central control over troops.
International efforts to reform defence and security need to focus on building the capacity of the MOD and parliament to fulfil their constitutional powers of oversight, increasing civilian control while broadening it beyond the executive.
An inclusive national dialogue is needed to discuss the role of the security services and to start a process of reconciliation between armed forces and the communities they are meant to protect.
This process should establish mechanisms for CSO oversight and monitoring of the defence and security sector, with greater safeguards for the freedoms of speech, information, and the press that are enshrined in the constitution.
DDR should focus on further broadening the national character of the army, while breaking militia and political ties. Security cooperation and security assistance should take care not to inadvertently fuel factionalism by privileging one group to the detriment of others.

Reduce military predation and build the integrity of the armed forces:

The systematic looting of state resources, a culture of impunity for extortion and abuse of civilians, and low or inconsistent pay have undermined troop discipline.
Systems need to be established to punish soldiers who predate, while dealing with the root causes of this behaviour, such as a lack of basic pay, and the theft of salaries by those higher up the command chain. Salaries as well as operating costs should be systematically paid through bank transfers across the country. The Inspectorate General should be provided with adequate tools, resources and personnel to carry out its mandate efficiently.
The biometric identification system for personnel in the defence and security sector should be strengthened to deal with the dissolution of various battalions and the partial reallocation of their troops to other units under the DDR process.
In addition, the protection of civilians and integrity building should be central to military training.

Leadership 30
01.
score
1

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Researcher4306: According to Interviewee 24 all governmental actions are supposed to be subject to control by the parliament, according to Provision 100 of the DRC Constitution and Regulations of the parliament. Formal mechanisms for legislative scrutiny of defence policy include commissions in the National Assembly and the Senate (Commission of defence, Security and Surveillance of Borders). Each member of the Senate can apply to become member to the defence committee, which has a president, vice president, a rapporteur, and vice rapporteur.

Regarding the independence and effectiveness of these commissions, Interviewee 10 indicated that the question “assumes the organisations are run on a much more formal basis than they are. Invariably policy is formed by a few key individuals with close access to Kabila.” The interviewee echoed the Bertelsmann Foundation, which remarked in 2012 that “power, policy-making and coordination have become increasingly concentrated in the presidency.”

Interviewee 2 noted that while there is a formal legislative process these laws are not at all or only erratically implemented, describing the Ministry of defence as a &quoute;toothless tiger&quoute;. Interviewee 2 further indicated that the Parliamentary defence Commission was similarly powerless, although they did sometimes exercise their rights to summon the Minister. Interviewee 17 agreed, stating that while there is partial scrutiny, these institutions could play a bigger role, as their current actions are insufficient.

Meanwhile, interviewee 25 lamented that &quoute;the big problem is the lack of political will to implement its [the commissions'] observations and recommendations.” Asked whether legislative committees scrutinize and analyze the defence budget, Interviewee 17 said, “officially, yes but practically no”, adding that both commissions are seen as ineffective and are subject to tampering from external sources.

Interviewee 11 shares the sentiment, arguing that while there are formal structures in place, they do not function properly. Interviewee 24 added that the defence sector is subject to “political management rather than legal management.”

Notwithstanding the legal and technical powers granted to these committees, it is important to note that, according to interviewees 7 and 24, a national defence policy does not formally exist yet. Between December 2013 and March 2014, MONUSCO and international partners urged the Government to adopt a programmatic law for the defence sector, which would define a future national defence strategy and priorities.

In January 2015, parliament passed an election bill that provided for the next Presidential elections in the DRC only after a national census took place. The bill, proposed by the incumbent President, Joseph Kabila, was interpreted widely as a step to prolong his hold on power, given he has been President since 2001, fresh Presidential elections were due next in 2016 and a national census would take a significant amount of time to be completed. After reported violent protests which included the excessive use of force by the government, the Senate voted to exclude the controversial provisions regarding the census from the bill.

As a general note, the DRC is seriously under-reported on and only interviewees can provide the necessary in-depth details to authoritatively inform this study.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 2: Scholar, e-mail correspondence, 22 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 10 : Diplomat, email correspondence, 25 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1.United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2014/157,&quoute; 2014, para. 47, p.10. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/157.

2. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/757,” 2013, para. 9, p.2. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/96&Lang=E.

3. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/388,&quoute; 2013, para.12, p. 25, paras.16-17, p. 26. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/388.

4. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2012/838,&quoute; 2012. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/838&Lang=E.

5. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,&quoute; 2012, p. 23. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

6. Congolese Senate. “Commissions permanents.” Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.senat.cd/index.php?option=com_content&task=view=article&id=17

7. Congolese Parliament. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.parlement-rdc.org/.

8. Présidence de la République, &quoute;Constitution de la République démocratique du Congo,&quoute; 2006. Accessed March 9, 2015, http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Constitution_de_la_RDC.pdf.

9. Congolese Senate. &quoute;Règelement intérieur,&quoute; Art. 35-42, 99-106. Accessed March 8, 2015, http://www.senat.cd/images/reglement_interieur.pdf.

10. Reuters, “Congo parliament says to drop controversial part of election law,” January 24, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/24/us-congodemocratic-politics-idUSKBN0KX0GO20150124#hrQML4kM1ZgYfw3w.99

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
1

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Researcher4306: According to Interviewees 11, 17, 18 and 24, there are defence and security committees in the Senate (Commission of defence, Security and Surveillance of Borders) and the National Assembly. As per Articles 35-42, and 99-106 of the Senate's regulatory framework, the committee has minimal formal rights.

Interviewee 11 noted that both committees are politically compromised to some extent, as the respective chairs hail from the ruling party. In addition, Interviewee 10 mentioned that policy making and decisions are taken by only a few key individuals within the inner circle of President Kabila. This echoes the Bertelsmann Foundation, which remarked in 2012 that “power, policy-making and coordination have become increasingly concentrated in the presidency.” Interviewee 2 noted that while there is a formal legislative process these laws are not at all or only erratically implemented, describing the Ministry of defence as a &quoute;toothless tiger&quoute;.

Interviewee 2 further indicated that the Parliamentary defence Commission was similarly powerless, although they did sometimes exercise their rights to summon the Minister. Interviewee 17 opined that these committees could play a bigger role in scrutiny, adding that the current levels of scrutiny were insufficient.

Meanwhile, Interviewee 25 lamented that &quoute;the big problem is the lack of political will to implement its [the commissions'] observations and recommendations.” Asked whether legislative committees scrutinize and analyze the defence budget, Interviewee 17 said, “officially, yes but practically no”, adding that both commissions are seen as ineffective and are subject to tampering from external sources.

Interviewee 11 shares the sentiment, arguing that while there are formal structures in place, they do not function properly. Interviewee 24 added that the defence sector is subject to “political management rather than legal management.”

As a general note, the DRC is seriously under-reported on and only interviewees can provide the necessary in-depth details to authoritatively inform this study.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 2: Scholar, e-mail correspondence, 22 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 10 : Diplomat, email correspondence, 25 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014.
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014


1. Congolese Senate. “Commissions permanents.” Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.senat.cd/index.php?option=com_content&task=view=article&id=17

2. Congolese Senate. &quoute;Règelement intérieur,&quoute; Art. 35-42, 99-106. Accessed March 8, 2015, http://www.senat.cd/images/reglement_interieur.pdf.

3. Congolese Parliament. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.parlement-rdc.org/.

4. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,&quoute; 2012, p. 23. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The parliamentary oversight on the defence and Security sector is close to nil.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
0

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

Researcher4306: According to Interviewee 7, the national defence policy is not publicly available. Indeed, a national defence strategy does not formally exist yet. Between December 2013 and March 2014, echoing sentiments by Interviewee 7, MONUSCO and international partners urged the Government to adopt a programmatic law for the defence sector, which would define a national defence strategy and priorities.

However, interviewee 17 asserted that some elements of defence policy, if not a formal defence strategy, are available. No public sources - including from the website of the Congolese Ministry for the Interior, Security, Decentralisation and Customary Affairs - were available at the time of writing, however.

As for debating the formulation of a policy, Interviewee 7 stated that the Ministry of defence does not consult international partners about formulating its policy. The Bertelsmann Foundation noted in 2012 that “power, policy-making and coordination have become increasingly concentrated in the presidency.”

According to Interviewee 24, “national defence policy is generally debated publicly in the parliament often with live reporting by the state media Radio Télévision Nationale Congolaise. However, there are often secret defence questions that are debated behind closed doors.” Source 6 above is an example of such a report - no more recent ones were found.

Interviewee 11 confirmed that there are some debates which take place behind closed doors (e.g. after the occupation of the province of Goma by the rebel group M23 in November 2012). The interviewee denied that members of the opposition or civil society partake in these debates, adding that national defence policy is formed by political elites, adding that while there are some MPs and committee members who table positive and constructive proposals, these are often refused by the committee for defence and security.

As a general note, the DRC is seriously under-reported on and only interviewees can provide the necessary in-depth details to authoritatively inform this study.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2014/157,” 2014, para. 47. Accessed August 14, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/157.

2. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/757,” 2013, para. 9. Accessed August 14, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/96&Lang=E.

3. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2012/838,&quoute; 2012, paras.12, 16-17. Accessed August 14, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/838&Lang=E.

4. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,” 2012, p. 23. Accessed August 14, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

5. Ministère de l'Intérieur, Sécurité, Décentralisation et Affaires Coutumières. &quoute;Actualités.&quoute; Last modified 2015. Accessed March 8, 2015, http://www.misdac-rdc.net/.

6. Radio Okapi, &quoute;Parlement: le Sénat vote le projet de loi sur le Conseil supérieur de la défense,&quoute; December 25, 2010. Accessed March 8, 2015, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/12/25/parlement-le-senat-vote-le-projet-de-loi-sur-le-conseil-superieur-de-la-defence/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The adoption of a national strategy is considered as a corner stone for the implementation of an SSR strategy. Almost all recent Security Council's resolutions regarding the situation in the DRC have called for the adoption of such strategy.

Up to now, the international community as well as national authorities have failed to build a common approach to foster the adoption of the national security and defence strategy. Moreover, Member States as well as MONUSCO have constantly promoted a project approach (piecemeal approach) which lead to repeated failures in the SSR approach.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
0

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

Researcher4306: There has been no sustained and substantive engagement between defence and security institutions and Congolese civil society on matters of corruption. While international organizations mandated to assist in security sector reform have reached out to civil society organizations and pressured domestic defence and security institutions to follow suit, there appears to be no official policy for permanent engagement with civil society on matters of corruption in matters of defence and security.

It is unlikely that requests by CSOs to work with the government are often accepted. Interviewee 24 noted the current absence of an inclusive defence steering committee which includes the government, its partners and civil society members, which would, if established, provide for greater transparency. A Bertelsmann Foundation report from 2012 pointed out that “political leadership often ignores the opinions of civil society, which is rarely involved in decision-making.” Generally speaking, civil society faces repression for reporting on corruption.

In its 2013 human rights report for the DRC, the US State Department asserted that “[n]o law exists to provide protection to public and private employees for making internal disclosures or lawful public disclosures of evidence of illegality.” Further, it argued that “[p]ublic criticism,[…] of government officials and government conduct or decisions regarding matters such as […] corruption sometimes resulted in harsh responses […]. Certain regulating bodies restricted freedom of the press and intimidated journalists and publishers into practicing self-censorship.”

Generally speaking, freedom of speech and press is not adequately protected. Reporters Without Borders ranked DRC 151 out of 180 countries surveyed. In 2013, Freedom House found the press not to be free. “Reporters exposing high-level corruption are at particular risk,” according to scholar Theodore Trefon. In 2012, Bertelsmann Foundation claimed that “[m]edia editors have become increasingly reluctant to report cases of corruption, fearing repressive responses from the perpetrators.”

The Government of Congo scored only 3 for public engagement on the Open Budget Index (OBI), providing scant or no information on its budget. Under Art. 24 and Art. 27 of the constitution, Congolese have the right to information and to submit a petition to authorities, which have to respond within three months. It is unlikely that authorities respond, however.

More recently, however, the Government has started to include civil society in budget reform discussions (such as in 2012) and has now published a citizens' budget for 2014 and 2015 on the website of the Ministry of Budget (a citizens' budget is a a simplified, non-technical version of the budget that helps the citizenry understand the government’s spending patterns and potentially identify corruption as an ongoing problem).

According to the United Nations Secretary-General, President Kabila announced a law establishing the National Council for Economic and Social Affairs on 31 October 2013. This will provide a forum for civil society to present its views on government policies, among other things, although this does not specifically apply to defence. It is too early to assess the Council’s effectiveness in earnest.

As noted by peer reviewers 2 and 3, tentative outreach projects to forge a coalition of goodwill around SSR and transparency on the defence sector have failed up to now. While civil society has been involved in reform efforts to a certain extent, transparency and anti-corruption remain topics that the army is unwilling to debate in public, including as part of the SSR process.

As peer reviewer 1 reports, CSOs are generally viewed with deep suspicion by the government. Any CSOs perceived to be anti-government or fulfilling the role of watch dogs are clamped down upon and targeted by the government. They also suggest that CSOs can be co-opted or created by government in an attempt to provide pro-government propaganda and to counter more critical CSOs.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. International Budget. “Open Budget Index (OBI) 2012,” 2012, pp.7, 13-14, 28-29, 52, 54. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf.

2. République démocratique du Congo, Ministère du Budget. &quoute;Budget Citoyen.&quoute; Last updated 2015. Accessed March 9, 2015, http://www.budget.gouv.cd/budget-citoyen/

3. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,” 2012, pp.24-25. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

4. Open Society. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform.” April 2012. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/democratic-republic-congo-taking-stand-security-sector-reform.

5. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2013. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

6. Reporters Without Borders. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Accessed August 29, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/democratic-republic-of-congo.html, http://rsf.org/index2014/data/index2014_en.pdf.

7. Freedom House. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/congo-democratic-republic-kinshasa#.U_dGRSgwKlI.

8. Protection Line. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://protectionline.org/country/dr-congo/.

9. Human Rights Watch. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/africa/democratic-republic-congo.

10. Amnesty International. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/democratic-republic-congo.

11. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/757,” 2013, para. 13, p.3. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/96&Lang=E.

12. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2013. Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Freedom of Speech and Press, pp.14-16; Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government, Whistleblower Protection, p.22. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

13. Theodore Trefon, “Congo Masquerade, The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure,” London/New York: Zed, 2011.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: CSOs are viewed with deep suspicion by the government. Any CSOs perceived to be anti-government or fulfilling the role of watch dogs are clamped down upon and targeted by the government. The NGO Voice of the Voiceless and the assassination of its head, Floribert Chebeya in 2011 by state agents is just one example of state targeting of CSOs.

Other CSOs can be co-opted or created by government in an attempt to provide pro-government propaganda and to counter more critical CSOs.

The authorities do not respond to official requests from CSos or the public at large. The three month time frame is rarely respected if at all. Financial transactions and bribery is the common avenue of interacting with authorities.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Tentative outreach projects to forge a coalition of goodwill around SSR and transparency on the defence sector have failed up to now.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: La Société Civile avait été impliquée dans la réforme de l'Armée. C'est à travers le Groupe des ONG travaillant pour la réforme de la justice, sécurité et armée. Toutefois, les questions de transparence et d'anti corruption ne sont pas débattus en public. Ces sont des thèmes sensibles que les officiers de l'armée ne veulent jamas discuté.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
2

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Researcher4306: The Government of Congo has signed up to many but not all international anti-corruption instruments.

The DRC acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption on 23 September 2010, although it has not yet ratified the treaty. The Government ratified the protocol agreement of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on fighting corruption in September 2010. According to the United States Department of State's June 2014 Investment Climate Statement, DRC is also in the process of ratifying the African Union Convention on the Prevention and Fighting of Corruption. As DRC is not part of the OECD, it has not signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction.

The government has passed some relevant supporting legislation such as the 2004 Money Laundering Act, obliging the Government to cooperate with African and European entities tasked to fight crime. In the same year, DRC also passed its own anti-corruption law. An NGO called the &quoute;Ligue Congolaise de Lutte Contre de Corruption (LICOCO)&quoute; has the mandate to facilitate compliance with UNCAC.

Despite the formal existence of these laws, compliance and implementation are questionable. Corruption in the public and private sphere remains a serious problem, as elaborated on in detail by Trefon.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
Noted that DRC acceded (which is equivalent to ratification) to UNCAC on 23 Sep 2010. Score raised from 1 to 2 accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

1. United Nations Convention against Corruption. Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.

2. OECD. “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf.

4. United States Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. “2014 Investment Climate Statement - Democratic Republic of the Congo, ” 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/227134.htm

5. Theodore Trefon, “Congo Masquerade, The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure,” (London/New York: Zed, 2011) , p.118.

6. &quoute;Ligue Congolaise de Lutte Contre de Corruption (LICOCO)&quoute;, https://www.unodc.org/ngo/showSingleDetailed.do?req_org_uid=21742

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: La RDC a ratifié l'UNCAC mais depuis 2013, elle devait soumettre le rapport de mise en application dans le droit interne de l'UNCAC qui traine à être envoyé car le Ministère de la Justice ne semble pas être préoccupé de cette thématique.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
0

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

Researcher4306: Asked whether there is a regular, active public debate on issues of defence, Interviewee 5’s immediate response was negative, adding that journalists and scholars, among others, do comment on issues of defence but that there is no concerted and sustained debate spearheaded by the government, which often cites national security to prevent debates taking place (see also question 29).

This is supported by the DRC's low ranking on the World Press Freedom Index (150 out of 180 countries, as referenced above), and incidents such as in November 2014, when the Information Minister called for several independent radio stations to be shut down on the grounds that they were inciting insurrection (Committee to Protect Journalists, cited above).

Interviewee 7, part of the military establishment, doubted the existence of a regular public debate too, adding that international partners are not involved in the public debate. Interviewee 15 echoed this sentiment while Interviewee 18 remarked that if any debates occur they revolve almost exclusively around the issues surrounding armed groups in the region. Interviewee 20 denied the existence of public debates.

According to Interviewee 24, “national defence policy is generally debated publicly in the parliament often with live reporting by the state media Radio Télévision Nationale Congolaise. However, there are often secret defence questions that are debated behind closed doors.” Source 12 above is an example of such a report - no more recent ones were found.

Interviewee 11 confirmed that there are some debates which take place behind closed doors (e.g. after the occupation of the province of Goma by the rebel group M23 in November 2012). The interviewee denied that members of the opposition or civil society partake in these debates, adding that national defence policy is formed by political elites, adding that while there are some MPs and committee members who table positive and constructive proposals, these are often refused by the committee for defence and security.

There is no reported engagement from the government towards the media or the public regarding defence issues, and no public records to contradict the above statements. Complicating matters, “[t]he channels of governmental decision-making remain extremely opaque,” as the Bertelsmann Foundation remarked in 2012. Note that public debates in general are curtailed by a limited freedom of press and the targeting of people who criticise the government.

In its 2013 human rights report for the DRC, the US State Department asserted that “[p]ublic criticism,[…] of government officials and government conduct or decisions regarding matters such as […] corruption sometimes resulted in harsh responses […]. Certain regulating bodies restricted freedom of the press and intimidated journalists and publishers into practicing self-censorship.”

Reporters Without Borders ranked DRC 151 out of 180 countries surveyed. In 2013, Freedom House found the press not to be free. “Reporters exposing high-level corruption are at particular risk,” according to scholar Theodore Trefon. In 2012, Bertelsmann Foundation claimed that “[m]edia editors have become increasingly reluctant to report cases of corruption, fearing repressive responses from the perpetrators.”

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 5 : Researcher, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 15 : International observer, DRC, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 20 : Journalist, DRC, 2 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,” 2012. II Management Performance, 16 Consensus Building, Credibility, p. 26. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

2. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo.” 2013. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

3. Reporters Without Borders. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/democratic-republic-of-congo.html, http://rsf.org/index2014/data/index2014_en.pdf.

4. Freedom House. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/congo-democratic-republic-kinshasa#.U_dGRSgwKlI.

5. Protection Line. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://protectionline.org/country/dr-congo/.

6. Human Rights Watch. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/africa/democratic-republic-congo.

7. Committee to Protect Journalists. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://cpj.org/africa/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/.

8. Amnesty International. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/democratic-republic-congo.

9. Journaliste en Danger. Last modified 2014. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.jed-afrique.org/.

10. &quoute;2015 World Press Freedom Index: Democratic Republic of Congo&quoute;, February 2015, Reporters without Borders, Accessed April 28, 2015, http://index.rsf.org/#!/index-details/COD

11. &quoute;Authorities order radio stations to be closed in the DRC&quoute;, Committee to Protect Journalists, November 24, 2014, Accessed April 28, 2014, https://cpj.org/2014/11/authorities-order-radio-stations-to-be-closed-in-t.php

12. Radio Okapi, &quoute;Parlement: le Sénat vote le projet de loi sur le Conseil supérieur de la défense,&quoute; December 25, 2010. Accessed March 8, 2015, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/12/25/parlement-le-senat-vote-le-projet-de-loi-sur-le-conseil-superieur-de-la-defence/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Day to day survival, personal insecurity, illness or fight for the bread for the day are the concerns of a population which is kept afar from national concerns and public policies issues.
The political class is focused on politicians debates and shows little taste for long term debates.
Security and defence are considered as part of the &quoute;domaine réservé&quoute; of the President.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
2

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

Researcher4306: While the military penal code prohibits corruption and the Institute of Civic and Patriotic Education of the Ministry of defence formulated a code of conduct for appropriate behaviour of army elements, any formal anti-corruption policy is not openly stated or actively implemented.

According to interviewees 11,18, and 21, and own research, there is no evidence to suggest that there is currently a specific anti-corruption policy in existence for the defence sector, nor any sign that a political momentum exists for such a policy to come into fruition.

Outside of defence, there is an Anti-Corruption Pact, which entered into force on 9 December 2013. The DRC’s Prime Minister, a number of cabinet ministers, representatives of the private sector and civil society came together to sign the tri-partite agreement which commits the parties to refrain from corruption, instill ethical values in their organisations, and adhere to the principles of integrity, good governance, respect and transparency.

The Pact also commits the parties to establishing an anti-corruption forum to serve as a platform for communication and coordination between stakeholders, and to launch a national campaign against corruption. The Pact also provides a mandate for sanctions for parties violating it, and establishes an independent monitoring process. The text of the Pact is available online (3). The Ministry of Defence was not present at this signing.

A special adviser for counter-corruption, counter-money laundering and counter-terrorism (conseiller spécial pour la lutte contre la corruption, le blanchiment et le terrorisme) has recently been inaugurated to supervise anti-corruption in the DRC (4). This is a very new position so it is hard to comment on effectiveness, although in June 2015 it was announced that Joseph Kabila had filed his first complaints against corrupt officials, through the special adviser. The complaints are reportedly the result of information provided by whistleblowers, although it is unclear whether they were submitted with evidence that could be used as a basis for prosecution (9).

There is also a national anti-corruption strategy (la stratégie nationale de lutte contre la corruption) that was created jointly between experts from the DRC, South Africa and ONUDC in 2010 (7). However, in the past there have been complaints that new anti-corruption legislation has not tackled corruption in the DRC (5). While there is a steering committee responsible for scrutinising the application of the anti-corruption strategy (le comité de pilotage pour le suivi de la mise en application du code de la lutte contre la corruption), they do not appear to produce regular reporting on this.

There is some evidence of their activity - in 2010 they organised a Forum on anti-corruption (le Forum de la lutte contre la corruption), which culminated in some of the core principles of the strategy. Also in 2010, they launched a new International Academy on counter-corruption (6). They do not, however, seem to have produced any implementation plans for the strategy, and even the strategy itself does not appear to be available online.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, Kinshasa, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 21 : Diplomat, phone interview, Kinshasa, 2 September 2014

1. Loi N° 024/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant Code Penal Militaire, section 5. November 18, 2002. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.024.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.

2. Ministère De La defence Nationale et Des Anciens Combattants, Service D’Education Civique Et Patriotique, Code de Conduite Du Soldat De La Republique Democratique Du Congo, December 2009.

3. &quoute;Signing of the National Anti-Corruption Pact in DRC&quoute;, British Embassy Kinshasa, 9 December 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/signing-of-the-national-anti-corruption-pact-in-drc

4. &quoute;Luzolo Bambi nommé conseiller spécial de Joseph Kabila pour la lutte contre la corruption&quoute;, Radio Okapi, 01/04/2015, http://www.radiookapi.net/regions/kinshasa/2015/04/01/luzolo-bambi-nomme-conseiller-special-de-joseph-kabila-pour-la-lutte-contre-la-corruption

5. &quoute;La corruption s'est aggravée en RDC malgré l’adoption de nouvelles lois anticorruption&quoute;, Kongo Times, 08/12/2012, http://afrique.kongotimes.info/rdc/politique/5293-corruption-au-congo-des-initiatives-sans-echo.html

6. &quoute;La lutte contre la corruption en Rdc nécessite une stratégie bien concertée, recommande Vincent Tohbi, Directeur résidant de Eisa à Kinshasa&quoute;, Digital Congo, 24/09/2010, http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/70325

7. &quoute;RDC: le document de la stratégie nationale de lutte contre la corruption remis au gouvernement&quoute;, FOCAC, 2010/10/27, http://www.focac.org/fra/fzsz/t764479.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
2

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

Researcher4306: Formally, there is a Inspector General and a Military Auditor charged with overseeing the conduct of the army, but there is no more publicly available evidence that speaks to their effectiveness, independence, staffing or funding at the time of writing.

Interviewee 11 concluded that while these institutions have some power to act against corruption, they do not exercise it, with Interviewee 8 adding that they did not function as viable, independent institutions. Interviewee 17 further remarked that personal conflicts often affect this oversight process. With regards to funding, Interviewee 25 stated that the inadequate financial resources allocated to the different parliamentary committees are among their biggest challenges.

Note also that in December 2013, MONUSCO assisted the Government in preparing draft decrees for the organization and functioning of provincial commissariats and the Inspectorate General of the Congolese national police. According to the United States Department of State, “[t]he Ministry of Justice and Human Rights has an internal anti-corruption team. According to a high-level internal source, this structure lacked independence and, therefore, the power to fight corruption.”

Based on this information, one can conclude that military and civilian courts are commonly under-resourced and regularly subjected to political interference.

Outside of defence, a special adviser for counter-corruption, counter-money laundering and counter-terrorism (conseiller spécial pour la lutte contre la corruption, le blanchiment et le terrorisme) has recently been inaugurated to supervise anti-corruption in the DRC (8). This is a very new position so it is hard to comment on effectiveness, although in June 2015 it was announced that Joseph Kabila had filed his first complaints against corrupt officials, through the special adviser. The complaints are reportedly the result of information provided by whistleblowers, although it is unclear whether they were submitted with evidence that could be used as a basis for prosecution (9).

Response to peer reviewer 3:
Agreed that there is an inspector general in FARDC and that poor financial and human resources are at the root of its inactivity. I have raised the score from 1 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 6 : Researcher, DRC, 9 May, 16 May, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 12 : Lawyer, DRC, 10 May 2014
Interview with Interviewee 13 : Lawyer, DRC, 10 May 2014
Interview with Interviewee 14 : Lawyer, DRC, 8 May 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. United States Department of State, Human Rights Report Democratic Republic of Congo, Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government, Corruption, p.22. Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

2. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/757,&quoute; II. Major Development, Security sector reform, para. 9, p.2. 2013. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/96&Lang=E.

3. Freedom House. “Congo, Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa).” Last modified 2015. Accessed March 7, 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/country/congo-democratic-republic-kinshasa.

4. Human Rights Watch. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/africa/democratic-republic-congo.

5. Amnesty International. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/democratic-republic-congo.

6. International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/democratic-republic-congo-drc.

7. Word Bank. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports.

8. &quoute;Luzolo Bambi nommé conseiller spécial de Joseph Kabila pour la lutte contre la corruption&quoute;, Radio Okapi, 01/04/2015, http://www.radiookapi.net/regions/kinshasa/2015/04/01/luzolo-bambi-nomme-conseiller-special-de-joseph-kabila-pour-la-lutte-contre-la-corruption

9. &quoute;RDC : Joseph Kabila dépose sa première plainte contre la corruption au Parquet général&quoute;, Radio Okapi, 23/06/2015, http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2015/06/23/rdc-joseph-kabila-depose-sa-premiere-plainte-contre-la-corruption-au-parquet-general

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: A l Etat Major des FARDC, il existe une direction d'Inspection Générale en charge de l'audit et lutte contre la Corruption. Cette Inspection n'est pas active car elle n'a pas des moyens financiers ou humain pour réaliser la mission lui assignée.

Il y a un Général qui est à la tête de cette Inspection mais par manque des moyens financiers, elle n'est pas active dans la lutte contre la corruption

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
0

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

Researcher4306: Research indicates that Congolese citizens, especially in the eastern part of the country, have little overall trust in the defence and security sector. According to a large-scale survey in eastern Congo in 2014, only 20.1% and 19% of the people interviewed trust the army and police respectively when it comes to their security. The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) reported in 2008 that 37.8% and 11.3% of respondents entrusted the army and police respectively with their protection.

As for the matter of fighting corruption, the public heavily mistrusts the establishment to tackle the endemic problem, and “[t]he population is growing more and more aware of high-level corruption through the “naming and shaming” of suspects,” as Bertelsmann Foundation reported in 2012.

According to a survey of more than 5,000 randomly selected adult residents conducted by HHI and the UN Development Program in late 2013, only 25% of the respondents believed that the government is serious about fighting corruption. Note that earlier in 2008, HHI’s study revealed that 44% of respondents believed that the government was fighting corruption.

According to Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, 65% of all respondents in Democratic Republic of the Congo felt that military was corrupt/extremely corrupt.

Response to peer reviewer 1:
Agreed and sources added to the references list.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 1: Humanitarian, DRC, April 2014
Interview with Interviewee 16 : Researcher, DRC, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army, 2013, p.9.”

2. Baaz, Maria Eriksson and Stern, Maria, “The Complexity of Violence: A critical analysis of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)”, Sida Working Paper on Gender based Violence, Sida Stockholm, 2010.

3. Tagesspiegel, “Ein robster Gruener,” March 2, 2014. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/im-blick-ein-robuster-gruener/9556728.html.

4. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report,
2012,&quoute; 2012, p. 11. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

5. Transparency International. “Global Corruption Barometer ” 2013. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=democratic_republic_of_the_congo.

6. Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. “Living with Fear, A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice and Social Reconstruction in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,” August 2008, pp.26-27.

7. Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, United Nations Development Programme. “ Search for Lasting Peace, Population-Based Survey on Perceptions and Attitudes about Peace, Security and Justice in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,” p.27. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/sites/m/pdf/DRC2014_Searching_for_Lasting_Peace.pdf, Priorities, p.2, Security.

8. Stearns, J., Verweijen, J. and Eriksson-Baaz, M. 2013. The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of Insecurity, Usalama project (London: Rift Valley Institute). Accessed August 22, 2014, http://hhi.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/publications%20-%20vulnerable%20-%20living%20with%20fear.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No confidence what so ever in FARDC in both East and West. Eriksson Baaz, M. and Verweijen, J. 2013, Between Integration and Disintegration. The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army. Prepared for the DRC Affinity Group, Social Science Research Council (New York: SSRC, 2013)
Stearns, J., Verweijen, J. and Eriksson-Baaz, M. 2013 The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of Insecurity, Usalama project (London: Rift Valley Institute)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: One of the aggravating factors of the crisis in the East is that soldiers are not paid in time or not paid at all.
People know the situation and have a vision of the army or even the police as corrupt and not reliable.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
1

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

Researcher4306: No publicly available information was available with which to answer this question, hence this is based on interviews. As stated elsewhere, the media landscape in DR Congo is very weak and given the threat for repression journalists shy away from reporting on controversial topics. As a result, interviewees are often they only source of authoritative information on the subject matter.

Interviewee 24, who has intimate knowledge of parliamentary affairs, could not identify any such assessments, adding that the parliament defence committee does however conduct some regular assessments but that its observations and recommendations are often subject to political considerations and hence not followed through on.

Interviewee 18 stated that in theory, each unit should have inspections but this was not accepted practice, with interviewee 8 adding that though the government pays lip-service to counter-corruption activity, such as the General Inspector's initiation of ad-hoc assessments, these are not pursued fully - there are no systematic, regular checks, for example. Nevertheless, the interviewee did feel that there was a general feeling about the importance of combating corruption despite the lack of political will.

Neither Interviewee 7 nor 11 had knowledge of regular assessments taking place, the conclusion seeming to be that assessments take place in an ad-hoc manner.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
1

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Researcher4306: There was no available public information on the planning process or any associated oversight at the time of writing.

According to Interviewees 11 and 25, DR Congo does not have a publicly available process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight. Interviewee 25 also responded in the negative, stating that acquisition of army materials is seen as secret and handled by the presidency through commissioned individuals.

Interviewee 11 argued that the government did not seem committed to establishing a formal process of acquisition planning with clear oversight. They pointed to examples of the government “buying things in a hurry; for example for the M23 crisis or for big events such as Congo’s 50th anniversary of its independence. […].&quoute; Interviewee 11 also doubted that the existing acquisitions process was efficient, pointing to a recent example where the government bought three kinds of tank unnecessarily.

This is supported by the wider evidence of systemic concerns around public financial management. According to the International Monetary Fund in 2013, an evaluation of the management system of public finances has revealed a &quoute;lack of credibility of the budget, […] poor budget preparation and execution procedures […].”

Response to peer reviewer 3:
Agreed that there is a semblance of an acquisition process, as also acknowledged by Interviewee 11. There is indeed a commission in charge of this, including an acquisitions planner for the Congolese army. I have raised the score from 0 to 1. I do agree with peer reviewer 1, however, that there is no agreed procurement and acquisition strategy and that oversight is poor, see Interviewee 11's example of the unnecessary purchase of tanks. This precludes a higher score.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. International Monetary Fund. “Democratic Republic of Congo, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,&quoute; para.150. 23 July 2013. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40814.0

2. Radio France International, &quoute;Congo marks independence amid rights abuse row,&quoute; July 1, 2010. Accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20100630-congo-celebrates-50-years-independence.

3. Jason K. Stearns, From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in Eastern Congo, (Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2012). Accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23#.VO8P2LOUcrM.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Acquisition planning is individually based and incoherent. There is no agreed procurement and acquisition strategy. there is no oversight or only in as much as senior officials give a tacit approval to informal and illicit activities, especially if they are given a cut of the profits.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no culture of transparency, accountability and reporting in the public procurement process, would it be civilian or military.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: La Loi sur la passation des marchés public est en application meme au Ministère de la Défense. Au niveau de l'Etat Major des FARDC, il existe une Commission chargée des passations des marchés publics.
Le problème est que cette commission ne respecte pas la loi sur la passation des marchés. En théorie, la loi existe mais elle n'est pas appliquée.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
1

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

Researcher4306: The website of the Ministry of Budget publishes the annual budget and breakdown by ministry. However, it does not show key items of expenditure, including comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance. In addition, interviewee 17 said that while the breakdown was available, the published system is confusing in reality - there are two different budgets and many, including the interviewee, do not know which one the actual army budget is.

Cognizant of the problem of budget management and transparency, EUSEC worked on a program called Execution Budgetaire, or EXEBU, to help the army administer its budget and track its expenses. Finalized on 1 July 2014, it is awaiting official probation by the army. While EUSEC sees budget lines for food supplies and salaries, it still has no insights into the operational budget.

Interviewees 7 and 17 denied that the operational budget was transparent. Interviewee 7 stated further that it is currently hard to know where the budget was sourced from, let alone who is in control of it, due to its being both 'very complicated' and 'secret'. The interviewee added that there seemed to a lack of political will to make it transparent.

Asked whether the budget is transparent, interviewee 25 denied it, saying that &quoute;Transparency in defence expenditure is not possible without key laws structuring the army and spelling out in detail the needs in every year. Such laws have yet to be presented to the parliament.”

According to the International Monetary Fund in 2013, an evaluation of the management system of public finances has revealed that “[…] lack of credibility of the budget, […], weaknesses in the accounting and cash-flow management system, poor budget preparation and execution procedures […].”

In 2012, the Government published its executive budget proposal, enacted budget, and in-year reports. It made its mid-year review available for internal use. However, the published documents are not comprehensive, lacking details. In addition, the government produced neither a pre-budget statement, citizens budget, year-end report, nor its audit report, according to the Open Budget Index (OBI).

Asked whether legislative committees scrutinize and analyze the defence budget, Interviewee 17 summarised that while they did have the ability to do so, both commissions are &quoute;rather ineffective and politically tampered with&quoute;, rather than operating independently.

Committees do not receive information on a regular basis regarding the defence budget, the interviewee added. Interviewee 25 stated that the budget is made available “but only in broad terms. […]. Neither the parliament nor the public has access to the [budget] details.&quoute;

Asked whether legislative committees scrutinize and analyze the defence budget, Interviewee 17 said, “officially, yes but practically no”.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I disagree that the formulation of the budget is transparent. The website of the Ministry of Budget does not show key items of expenditure, and the published system is confusing in reality - there are two different budgets and many, including the interviewee, do not know which one the army budget is. For example, the interviewee cited the recent purchase of “hundreds of trucks” for which no budget was available. Nevertheless, the fact that it's at least partially published caused me to reconsider and change the score from 0 to 1.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. International Monetary Fund. “Democratic Republic of Congo, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” p.54, para .150, 23 July 2013. Accessed August 21, 2014,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40814.0, 2.3.3

2. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “The World Factbook, Democratic Republic of Congo, Military.” Last modified June 22, 2014. Accessed August 21, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html.

3. International Budget. “Open Budget Index (OBI),&quoute; 2012. Accessed August 21, 2014, http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf.

4. Governance, Social Development, Humanitarian Conflict (GSDRC). “Off-Budget Military Expenditure and Revenue: Issues and Policy Perspectives for Donors.” January 2002. Accessed August 21, 2014, http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=279.

5. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). “Military Expenditure Database.” Last modified 2013. Accessed August 21, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database

6. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). “Military Spending.” Last modified 2013. Accessed August 21, 2014, http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Milex/.

7. Ministère du Budget. Ministère du Budget. &quoute;Project Du budget de 'Etat pour L'Exercice 2014, Synthese du Budget.&quoute; Accessed March 7, 2015, http://www.budget.gouv.cd/projet-budget-2014/, http://www.budget.gouv.cd/2012/budget2014/projet2014/exposes/03_annexe_1_synthese_du_budget_2014.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Ministry of defence is a black box out with no reporting on funds management or purchase processes whatsoever.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Le Budget de la défense est transparent. Lorsqu'on vote le budget au Parlement, nous savons ce qui est alloué au Ministère de la Défense. Mais c'est lorsqu'on exécute le budget qu il devient non transparent.
Il y a des fonds qui sont alloués au Ministère de la Défense que la Commission Economique et Financière de l Assemblée Nationale ne connait pas.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
1

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

Researcher4306: Formally, both the National Assembly and the Senate (Commission of defence, Security and Surveillance of Borders) have defence and security commissions. In practice, evidence suggests these bodies are provided with limited information on defence spending and have little capacity to influence decision making.

Interviewee 25 clarified the parliamentary defence and security committee does have this power, but there is nevertheless a lack of political will to implement its observations and recommendations. Asked whether legislative committees scrutinize and analyze the defence budget, Interviewee 17 summarised that while they did have the ability to do so, both commissions are &quoute;rather ineffective and politically tampered with&quoute;, rather than operating independently.

Committees do not receive information on a regular basis regarding the defence budget, the interviewee added. Interviewee 25 stated that the budget is made available “but only in broad terms. […]. Neither the parliament nor the public has access to the [budget] details.&quoute;

In positive developments, however, the United Nations has recorded that on 28 October 2013 the Congolese Council of Ministers adopted three draft laws on accounting standards to improve legal and institutional framework for managing public finances in general.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Congolese Senate. “Commissions permanents.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.senat.cd/index.php?option=com_content&task=view=article&id=17

2. Congolese Parliament. Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.parlement-rdc.org/.

3. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/773” IV. Implementation of the commitments under the PSCF, A. Commitments of the DRC, 2013. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/773.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Defence budgets are still shrouded in secrecy and are not scrutinised to any degree by commissions and/or other government oversight bodies.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The budget and finance committee both of the Senate and the National Assembly get lately and partial information from the Executive.
It receives no actual information from the Court of Accounts regarding the budget implementation.
It has very poor investigation capacities and willingness to implement any oversight or controls.
Laws and procedures regarding finances, budget or procurement might be adopted here and there to please the International Community and Donors, but there is no will to implemented them.
Internal or External controls are weak or non existent.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
1

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

Researcher4306: The website of the Ministry of Budget publishes the annual budget and breakdown by ministry. However, Interviewee 17 said that while the breakdown was available, the published system is confusing in reality - there are two different budgets and many, including the interviewee, do not know which one the army budget is. For example, they cited the recent purchase of “hundreds of trucks” for which no budget was available. In 2010, Freedom House noted that there are no “comprehensive laws regulating access to government data.”

Note that in 2012, according to International Budget, the Government published its executive budget proposal, enacted budget, and in-year reports. It made its mid-year review available for internal use. However, the published documents are not comprehensive, lacking details. In addition, the government produced neither a pre-budget statement, citizens budget, year-end report, nor its audit report. The absence of the latter three are concerning. (The citizens' budget is a simplified, non-technical version of the budget that would help the citizenry understand the government’s spending patterns.)

The year-end report would give a final account at the year of the year and evaluate progress made in realizing goals initially stipulated in the enacted budget. The audit report would provide for an assessment of the financial performance of the government. Given their importance, all three documents should be published in a regular and timely manner.

In 2012, the Government of Congo scored 3 out of 100 for public engagement on the Open Budget Index (OBI). With a score of 18 out of 100, it remains in the bottom category, however, publishing “scant or no information” on its budget. According to OBI, the Government of Congo has gradually improved, scoring 1, 6 and 18 in 2008, 2010 and 2012 respectively.

In positive developments, the Congolese Council of Ministers adopted on 28 October 2013 three draft laws on accounting standards to improve legal and institutional framework for managing public finances in general, according to the United Nations Secretary-General.

Note that according Art. 24 and Art. 27 of the constitution, Congolese have the right to information and to submit a petition to authorities, who have to respond within three months.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. International Budget. “Open Budget Index (OBI) 2012,” 2012. Accessed August 26, 2014, http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf, pp. 7, 13, 18-19, 26, 28, 31-35, 50, 52.

2. Freedom House. “Countries at crossroads - DRC country report, 2010,” 2010. Accessed August 26, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140 &edition=9&ccrpage=43&ccrcountry=181.

3. Ministère du Budget. Ministère du Budget. &quoute;Project Du budget de 'Etat pour L'Exercice 2014, Synthese du Budget.&quoute; Accessed March 7, 2015, http://www.budget.gouv.cd/projet-budget-2014/, http://www.budget.gouv.cd/2012/budget2014/projet2014/exposes/03_annexe_1_synthese_du_budget_2014.pdf.

4. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/773” IV. Implementation of the commitments under the PSCF, A. Commitments of the DRC, 2013. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/773.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is a huge gap between the voted bill of law for budget and its actual implementation, especially in the field of Security and defence sector.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
0

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Researcher4306: According to Interviewee 11, the lack of transparency surrounding the origin of defence income that is not centrally allocated has raised questions within the military regarding how budgets are financed. Note that the reason for this absence is not simply because the government is hiding it but also because the government also has serious capacity shortcomings and no internalized culture of documentation. “We do not know where the money comes from,” Interviewee 17 clarified.

Interviewee 25 confirmed that sources of defence income are never published, adding that “the ‘presidency-parallel government’ handles everything and neither the parliament nor the public knows what the other revenue sources [of the country’s defence] are. For example, when the government bought important weaponry before the Independence Day parade [30 June 2010], nobody in the parliament knew how much, how and from whom the materials were purchased. When asked, the government would simply say ‘it’s a secret defence process’.”

No further information was publicly available at the time of writing. As a general note, the DRC is seriously under-reported on and only interviewees can provide the necessary in-depth details to authoritatively inform this study.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

Personal experience: Personal experience, 2012-2014, capacity of researcher.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Procurement and equipment sales are subject to informality and illicit activity. Corruption is rife in military procurement at all levels.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
0

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

Researcher4306: Formally speaking, there are mechanisms for internal audit. According to article 47 of the law governing the military, the General Inspector of the Armed Forces controls the administration of materials and budgetary remunerations allocated to the armed forces.

Interviewee 11 argued an effective internal audit process does not exist, as did interviewee 7. Interviewee 17 demurred somewhat, stating instead that while there officially should be a system of internal audit, it is unclear whether it operates in reality.

As noted by peer reviewer 2, The military auditor has no actual role in the procurement process. In addition, as peer reviewer 1 states, informal avenues of command dominate the military not least due to the fractured nature of the institution (7, 8).

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Loi n°04/00023 du 12 novembre 2004 portant organisation générale de la défense et des forces armées, Art. 47. November 12, 2004. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://desc-wondo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Loi-Organique-sur-les-FARDC.pdf.

2. Freedom House. “Countries at crossroads - DRC country report, 2010,&quoute; 2010. Accessed August 19, 2014,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140 &edition=9&ccrpage=43&ccrcountry=181.

3. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,&quoute; 2012, p. 23. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

4. International Budget. “Open Budget Index (OBI) 2012,” 2012, pp.37-40, 52. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf.

5. International Monetary Fund. “Democratic Republic of Congo, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,&quoute; 23 July 2013, p.54, para .150, box 7, p.55, box 8, p.60. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40814.0.

6. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/757,” para. 45, p.9, 2013. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/96&Lang=E.

7. Eriksson Baaz, M. and Verweijen, J. 2013, Between Integration and Disintegration. The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army. Prepared for the DRC Affinity Group, Social Science Research Council (New York: SSRC, 2013)

8. Stearns, J., Verweijen, J. and Eriksson-Baaz, M. 2013 The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of Insecurity, Usalama project (London: Rift Valley Institute)&quoute;

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no effective auditing process in the Congolese military. In practise the FARDC remains highly corrupt and decision making is opaque. Informal avenues of command dominate the military not least due to the fractured nature of the institution.

See Eriksson Baaz, M. and Verweijen, J. 2013, Between Integration and Disintegration. The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army. Prepared for the DRC Affinity Group, Social Science Research Council (New York: SSRC, 2013)
Stearns, J., Verweijen, J. and Eriksson-Baaz, M. 2013 The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of Insecurity, Usalama project (London: Rift Valley Institute)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Auditorat militaire as well as any other public audit institution have no actual role in the procurement processes.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
0

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

Researcher4306: According to the International Monetary Fund in 2013, the Government listed the “strengthening the external audit of the management of public funds” as major reform initiative to be pursued. Speaking independently of each other, interviewees 7, 8, 11 and 17 denied the existence of an external audit mechanism for defence expenditure. No further public information was available at the time of writing.

According to interviewee 24, “on paper, there are anti-corruption committees in the Ministry of Justice and others by the Presidency. The establishment of such committees is often announced during big public meetings by the President but never followed through. There have been people designated to lead such commissions with no infrastructures nor financial resources put at their disposal.” No further public information is available to corroborate this statement.

According to the International Monetary Fund in 2013, an evaluation of the management system of public finances has revealed “[…] lack of credibility of the budget, inefficiency of government auditing, weaknesses in the accounting and cash-flow management system, […].” The report listed the passing of an organic law relating to powers, organization and functioning of an Audit Office as a major reform initiative to be undertaken. It does acknowledge the existence of an audit committee.

A year earlier, in 2012, the Open Budget Index (OBI) revealed that the Government of Congo had moderately independent audit offices to scrutinize public financial management. The Government did not, however, publish its audit report. In the same year, Bertelsmann Foundation argued that “[a]uditing and expenditure tracking is the exception. Public auditors’ reports are often ignored and if offenders’ actions have drawn significant public attention, they are simply moved to other posts.” In 2010, Freedom House found the state auditor responsible for reviewing public expenditures “to be largely ineffective.”

The score has been selected on the basis of the interviewees' statements that there is no audit of defence expenditure.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. International Monetary Fund. “Democratic Republic of Congo, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” p.54, Box 7. 23 July 2013. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40814.0.

2. Freedom House. “Countries at crossroads - DRC country report, 2010,&quoute; 2010. Accessed August 19, 2014,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140 &edition=9&ccrpage=43&ccrcountry=181.

3. International Budget. “Open Budget Index (OBI) 2012,” 2012, pp.37-40, 52. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
0

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

Researcher4306: There is ample evidence provided by the United Nations Group of Experts and several non-governmental organizations such as Global Witness, Enough Project and the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) that elements of the Congolese defence and security sector have been extensively involved in the exploitation of the country’s natural resources, including tin, tantalum, tungsten, diamonds, gold, timber, fish, and charcoal. While the exploitation of natural resource exploitation is prevalent among army elements no evidence suggests that the army as an institution has financial or controlling interests in related businesses.

In November 2013, IPIS reported that the army had interfered in at least 265 mining sites in that year, reaping very profitable margins whilst enjoying near total impunity. The military's interests are not publicly stated. There is a wide level of consensus that high-level military personnel have had large stakes in commercial businesses, particularly in mining in the east (see peer reviewer 2's comments too). This military entrepreneurship is widespread, according to the United Nations Group of Experts, the Enough Project, IPIS and other research organizations.

More generally, “[…] FARDC is an economic network with wide geographical coverage,” according to Verweijen adding later that ”[…] civilians and the military have become highly economically interdependent.”

Response to peer reviewer 3:
Given that the involvement of high-ranking army officials is so extensive and prevalent I strongly doubt that it makes much sense to differentiate between institutions and its agents. The government explicitly outlaws unauthorised private enterprises of elements in the defence and security sector but evidence shows it seriously lacks enforcement of the provision.

According to the November 2002 military penal code (Art. 78), elements of the army are punishable for a prison term between five to ten years and a monetary fine for the supervision or control of a private enterprise, the awarding of a contract to a private enterprise or private individual on behalf of the state, and working, giving advice to and investing into a private company or person for the period of five years after service in the army. That said, elements of the Congolese defence and security institutions are engaged in a wide range of different economic activities and suffer hardly any repercussions, with interviewee 2 estimating that many FARDC staff members are involved in such side-businesses, from selling cigarettes to importing stolen cars. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 2: Scholar, email correspondence, 22 August 2014

1. WWF. “Congo Basin.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/congo_basin_forests/.

2. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo.” Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government, Illicit Trade in Natural Resources, p.2. 2013. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

3. United States Congressional Research Service, Alexis Arieff. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Policy,” pp.12-13. February 24, 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43166.pdf.

4. World Bank. “Project Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector Project (PROMINES).” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P106982/drc-growth-governance-mineral-sector?lang=en&tab=overview.

5. United Nations Secretary-General.” Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo; Extraction and Trade in Natural Resources. Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/reports.shtml.

6. United Nations Group of Experts. “Reports of the Group of Experts submitted through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo.“ Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtm.

7. Revenue Watch Institute. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.revenuewatch.org/countries/africa/drc/overview.

8. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity.” February 2013.

9. African Mining Intelligence. Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.africaintelligence.com/AMA/pays/CONGO-K.

10. Enough Project. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/eastern_congo.

11. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://eiti.org/DRCongo.

12. Global Witness. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.globalwitness.org/all-regions/countries/democratic-republic-congo.

13. Greenpeace International. “Forests, Congo Basin.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/forests/africa/.

14. International Peace Information Service (IPIS). “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.ipisresearch.be/search_publications.php, http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_detail.php?id=428.

15. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army, 2013.”

16. Verweijen, Judith, “Military business and the business of the military in the Kivus,” Review of African Political Economy 40, no.35, 2013:67-82, pp.68-69, pp.75-76.

17. Loi N° 024/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant Code Penal Militaire, Section 5, Art. 78. November 18, 2002. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.024.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no doubt the the Army is vastly involved in natural resources exploitation, especially in the Kivus and in Eastern Province. However, this has nothing to do with open and accounted for business and is related to undisclosed private interests.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: La Constitution de la RDC interdit aux militaires de s'impliquer dans l'exploitation des ressources naturelles ou dans les activités commerciales.
Toutefois, étant donné que les militaires sont mal payés, pas mal d'éléments des FARDC sont impliqués individuellement dans l'exploitation des ressources naturelles et dans les activités commerciales.
Cette implication individuelle n'engage pas l'armée comme Institution. Nul part dans la constitution ou la loi sur la défense, il y a un article qui donne aux éléments de l'armée l'autorisation de faire des activités commerciales ou de s'impliquer dans l'exploitation des ressources naturelles.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
0

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

Researcher4306: This is a complex question to score in the context of the DRC, as the army has certainly displayed many of the same behaviours as those considered to be organised criminals or militias in other countries. For example, the armed forces are among the major perpetrators of systematic gross human rights violations, acting as a criminal gang and carrying out operations amounting to war crimes and/or crimes against humanity, including systematic rape, summary executions, and recruitment of child soldiers, according to numerous reports by the United Nations Group of Experts, Enough Project, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch.

In addition, “[m]any in senior positions in the government and military continue to profit from corruption, either in raking off salaries, taking kickbacks, or involvement in illegal mining, trade or protection rackets,” according to a joint NGO report published in April 2012. According to a January 2015 infographic of mines visited by the International Peace and Research Institute (IPIS), the Congolese armed forces are the biggest exploiter of natural resources in eastern Congo.

Aside from the army, the Republic Guards created in 1997 as personal arm of President Joseph Kabila are particularly notorious human rights abusers, enjoying near complete impunity; so do the intelligence services, ANR. The serious misconduct of the latter two was most visible during the national elections in 2006 and 2011, according to reports by Human Rights Watch.

Organised crime perpetrated by army personnel is therefore a problem in DRC, although it is widespread enough to consider it more of an internal problem rather than an external penetration of organised criminals. Either way, the government lacks the political will to seriously tackle the problem, according to numerous reports by non-governmental organizations. As noted by peer reviewer 2, The FARDC are part of the country's major problems and are certainly also part of their solution.

COMMENTS -+

1. United States Department of State, Human Rights Report Democratic Republic of Congo. Last modified 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

2. United States Congressional Research Service, Alexis Arieff. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Policy.” February 24, 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43166.pdf.

3. United Nations Secretary-General.” Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo,&quoute; Sections on Human Rights, Sexual Violence, Children and armed conflict, and Extraction and Trade in Natural Resources. Last updated 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/reports.shtml.

4. United Nations Group of Experts. “Reports of the Group of Experts submitted through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo.“ Last updated 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml.

5. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity,” February 2013.

6. Enough Project. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last updated 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/eastern_congo.

7. Global Witness. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last updated 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.globalwitness.org/all-regions/countries/democratic-republic-congo.

8. International Peace Information Service (IPIS). “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last updated 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.ipisresearch.be/search_publications.php, http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_detail.php?id=428.

9. Amnesty International. &quoute;If You Resist, We'll Shoot You&quoute;: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Case for an Effective Arms Trade Treaty,” pp.11-12, 24-27, June 11, 2012. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/if-you-resist-we-ll-shoot-you-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-case-for-an-effective-arm.

10. International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last updated 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/democratic-republic-congo-drc.

11. Human Rights Watch. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last updated 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/africa/democratic-republic-congo.

12. Freedom House. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last updated 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/congo-democratic-republic-kinshasa#.U_dGRSgwKlI.

13. Open Society. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform.” April 2012. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/democratic-republic-congo-taking-stand-security-sector-reform.

14. Theodore Trefon, “Congo Masquerade, The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure,” London/New York: Zed, 2011.

15. Physicians for Human Rights. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last updated 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/about/places/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/.

16. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army,&quoute; 2013. Accessed August 29, 2014,

17. International Peace and Research Institute (IPIS). &quoute;Infographic - Mapping mining areas in eastern DRC,&quoute;
January 28, 2015. Accessed March 9, 2015, http://ipisresearch.be/2015/01/infographic-mapping-security-human-rights-mining-areas-eastern-drc/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: See also Eriksson Baaz, M. and Verweijen, J. 2013, Between Integration and Disintegration. The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army. Prepared for the DRC Affinity Group, Social Science Research Council (New York: SSRC, 2013)
Stearns, J., Verweijen, J. and Eriksson-Baaz, M. 2013 The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of Insecurity, Usalama project (London: Rift Valley Institute)

The FARDC functions much like a mafia organisation with competing hierarchies with interests in substantial illicit activities, in part due to the systematic erosion of the institution over the last four decades but also due to executive strategies of co-option and control.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The FARDC and to some extent the PNC are part of the country's major problems and certainly part of their solution.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
1

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

Researcher4306: Under the 2002 military penal code, corruption and organized crime are prohibited and subject to investigations by military prosecutors. While government has the institutional structures to police and bring offenders to justice, they are used inconsistently and suffer from serious flaws, according to all interviewees.

According to a joint NGO briefing on the security sector in 2012, “[s]upport to justice, investigation and anti-corruption efforts are minimal and inadequate- the Justice Ministry was allocated just 0.1% of government spending in 2011 […].” As a case in point, on 22 November 2012, President Kabila suspended the Chief of Land Forces, Amisi, after the UN Group of Experts accused him of partnering with poachers and armed groups. However, on 31 July 2014, authorities cleared him of all charges without clear information on any earlier investigations, according to the Enough Project.

According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, “[b]ribery [in general] is illegal in the DRC and, in principle, is investigated and prosecuted. While current laws call for imprisonment and fines of both parties involved in bribery no matter the circumstances, enforcement remains a challenge.” As noted by peer reviewer 2, impunity is almost total among the armed forces, even for the worst crimes against humanity.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 6 : Researcher, Goma, 9 May, 16 May, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 14 : Lawyer, Goma, 8 May 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, Goma, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Loi N° 024/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant Code Penal Militaire, particularly section 5. November 18, 2002. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.024.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.

2. Enough Project. “Brutal Conflict Minerals Smuggling General Escapes Justice.” August 8, 2014. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/brutal-conflict-minerals-smuggling-general-escapes-justice.

3. Human Rights Watch. “Democratic Republic of Congo: UPR Submission September 2013.” 2013. Accessed August 19, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/24/democratic-republic-congo-upr-submission-september-2013/; http://www.hrw.org/drc.

4. Open Society. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform.” April 2012. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/democratic-republic-congo-taking-stand-security-sector-reform.

5. Amnesty International. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/democratic-republic-congo.

6. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President. “Democratic Republic of Congo,” p.118. 2012. Accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%20Congo_0.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The &quoute;Police militaire&quoute; or the military Justice seem to be rather a protection for military staff against prosecution than a way to tackle crime and corruption.
The Auditorat miltaire is an empty shell.
Impunity is almost total, even for the worst crimes against humanity.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
0

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

Researcher4306: In numerous reports, the Congolese intelligence services (ANR) are being accused of serious human rights violations. Nonetheless, it enjoys near total impunity and remains a secretive entity not subject to external oversight regarding its conduct but also its policies, administration and budgets.

While the military justice system does very occasionally hold officials to account for their abuses, the extent of this internal control is very limited in its efficiency, resources and independence. Interviewee 7, 9, 18 and 19 doubt that there is independent oversight, with the latter asserting that ANR enjoys extreme impunity. There are no provision for effectively independent external oversight.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 9 : Military establishment, DRC, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo.” Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention, Role of the Police and Security Apparatus, pp. 6-7. 2013. Accessed August 18, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

2. Human Rights Watch. “Democratic Republic of Congo: UPR Submission September 2013.” September 2013. Accessed August 18, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/24/democratic-republic-congo-upr-submission-september-2013/; http://www.hrw.org/drc.

3. Amnesty International. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 18, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/democratic-republic-congo.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is strictly no control on intelligence services (ANR, DGM, Special Adviser to the President for Security...).

Suggested score: 0

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
0

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Researcher4306: A range of evidence indicates that the appointment system for the selection of personnel at senior management level in the defence sector, including the intelligence services, is characterized by nepotism, favoritism, and political calculations. It proved impossible to authoritatively establish whether there are currently formal selection criteria for senior positions, however according to a country report by Bertelsmann Foundation in 2012, “[t]here are no competitive recruitment procedures […]” in the government.

In effect, the appointment system is neither independent, transparent nor objective. According to Interviewee 5, recruitment for the ANR is seen as being led by coteries, nepotism and clientelism, linking this to the perceived inefficiency of the DRC intelligence services, later adding that the ANR's senior officers &quoute;are either family members, people from the same ethnic groups, or friends/trusted people.” Interviewee 18 denied knowledge of an open and transparent selection process. According to information collected by Interviewee 19, there is a training centre, however.

Interviewee 5 stated that the suitability and prior conduct before and during the service of senior staff is not factored in. Research also indicated that certain elements of the intelligence agency ANR have routinely committed grave human rights violations but have yet to face justice.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I cannot verify that the law is applicable to positions in the ANR. I therefore changed the score from 0 to 1, but cannot award higher.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 5 : Researcher, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo.” Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention, Role of the Police and Security Apparatus, pp. 6-7. 2013. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

2. Human Rights Watch. “Democratic Republic of Congo: UPR Submission September 2013.” 2013. Accessed September 2, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/24/democratic-republic-congo-upr-submission-september-2013/; http://www.hrw.org/drc.

3. Amnesty International. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/democratic-republic-congo.

4. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,” II Management Performance, 15 Resource Efficiency, p. 23. 2012. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Staffing and oversight of the ANR is completely personalised and informal. Kabila appoints and dismisses senior figures without any scrutiny. Appointments and hiring at lower ranks and less senior positions is still largely informal given the murky nature of state security services. Kith and kin networks and patronage dominate selection procedures.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: La Loi sur le recrutement des agents de la sécurité existe mais elle n'est pas mise en application par les politiciens.

Le recrutement se déroule à la bonne volonté du chef qui ne respecte pas la loi.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
0

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Researcher4306: At the time of writing, the Government has not yet shared national laws and regulations on arms export with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

According to the Small Arms Survey, the Government reports that it does not have legislative provisions prohibiting the export of arms to states that are not respectful of human rights and international humanitarian law, adding that it uses authenticated end-user certificates to control transfers. It also does not have national regulation on the re-export of arms but notifies the original exporting state when re-exporting small arms and light weapons (SALWs). No evidence suggests that there is a body to scrutinise arms exports from the defence industry, nor that the government recognises corruption as an issue in export decisions.

That said, interviewee 7 did not believe that the government does export arms and related equipment. Interviewee 11 stated that it was possible that individual officers sent arms elsewhere but that this was not an official policy.

The DRC has voted for the adoption of ATT but has yet to sign or ratify it. (On 19 November 2010, the Government signed the Central African Convention For the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly.)

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014


1. Amnesty International. &quoute;If You Resist, We'll Shoot You&quoute;: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Case for an Effective Arms Trade Treaty,” June 11, 2012. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/if-you-resist-we-ll-shoot-you-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-case-for-an-effective-arm.

2. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 “International arms transfers.” http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers.

3. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 “Arms Transfers Database.” http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

4. Control Arms. “Treaty.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://controlarms.org/en/treaty/.

5. Arms Treaty. “DR Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://armstreaty.org/state/dr-congo/.

6. Small Arms Survey. “A Decade of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2012,” p.176. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-UNIDIR-2012-Decade-of-Implementing-the-UNPoA.pdf.

7. Small Arms Survey. “The Transparency Barometer.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/tools/the-transparency-barometer.html.

8. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx?CoI=CD&type=0&year=0&#lnkreg.

9. United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). Last modified 2013. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://comtrade.un.org/.

10. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). “Military Spending.” Last modified 2013. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Milex/.

11. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “The Military Balance 2014, The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics,” 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Obviously, the DRC does not export arms.
Regarding importations, it is under the Security Council control.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
0

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

Researcher4306: The defence sector suffers from serious shortcomings in managing and controlling its assets, including arms, ammunitions and related equipment. It is defined by a lack of transparency in marking, tracing, identification, storing and record keeping of arms. The public is not kept informed about asset disposals, including any knowledge of where the proceeds of asset disposals go.

Theft and diversion of arms to rebel groups is a very common phenomenon. The United Nations Group of Experts found in late 2011 that “[a]rmed groups continue to obtain most of their arms, ammunition and uniforms from FARDC. Leakage from FARDC stocks, whether through small-scale barter, larger transactions, abandonment or seizure on the battlefield, is widespread and largely uncontrolled.”

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 9 : Military establishment, DRC, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 23 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. Amnesty International. &quoute;If You Resist, We'll Shoot You&quoute;: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Case for an Effective Arms Trade Treaty,” June 11, 2012. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/if-you-resist-we-ll-shoot-you-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-case-for-an-effective-arm.

2. Small Arms Survey. “A Decade of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2012,” 2012, pp. 51, 110, 275, 300-301, 418. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-UNIDIR-2012-Decade-of-Implementing-the-UNPoA.pdf.

3. United Nations Group of Experts. “Reports of the Group of Experts submitted through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo,“ 2011. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no control whatsoever on military equipment disposal. Several arms and ammunition depots have been looted or thieved.
Many equipment - mostly of Russian origin - are out of order with no monitoring or spare parts.
Disposal of these items are totally uncontrolled.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
0

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

Researcher4306: The management and disposal of defence assets is not subject to transparent, independent institutional control. Assets such as arms, ammunitions and related equipment are often not marked, traced, stored and recorded. No evidence of an existing audit system for the disposal of assets seems publicly available.

The United Nations Group of Experts found in late 2011 that “[a]rmed groups continue to obtain most of their arms, ammunition and uniforms from FARDC. Leakage from FARDC stocks, whether through small-scale barter, larger transactions, abandonment or seizure on the battlefield, is widespread and largely uncontrolled.”

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 9 : Military establishment, DRC, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Amnesty International. &quoute;If You Resist, We'll Shoot You&quoute;: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Case for an Effective Arms Trade Treaty,” June 11, 2012. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/if-you-resist-we-ll-shoot-you-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-case-for-an-effective-arm.

2. United Nations Group of Experts. “Reports of the Group of Experts submitted through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo,“ 2011. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: A part les armes, les uniformes, les équipements, les camps militaires sont sujets de vente aux particuliers? Aucun inventaire indépendant n'existe pour évaluer les besoins de l'armée en matière d'habitations. Ce qui fait que la plus part des soldats habitent en cité au lieu qu'ils soient dans les camps militaires. Chaque année dans le budget de l'armée, il y a une rubrique pour la réhabilitation des camps militaires mais jusqu'aujourd'hui, cette rubrique n'est pas exécuté ou ne nous savons pas si l'argent est débloqué mais détourné quelque part.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
0

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

Researcher4306: Interviewee 11 was quite certain that “at least 20%” of the defence and security expenditure is spent on secret items. While secret items related to national security are listed on the budget, interviewee 24 stated that would be hard to check the accuracy of the budget lists due to military procurement usually being conducted in a non-transparent manner solely by those in the presidency.

However, it was impossible to find evidence to support this from the public domain, and as peer reviewer 3 notes, this information is not included (even in aggregate) in any public budgetary documents. Interviewee 7 asserted that the defence budget was not at all transparent and overly complex, adding that there seemed to be a lack of political will aimed at making it transparent.

No information was publicly available at the time of writing that details the percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7: Military establishment, interview, 28 August 2014.
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Le budget de l'armée est voté par le parlement et à ce niveau, nous savons tous le montant voté par le parlement pour l'armée. Mais c'est à l'exécution que cela pose problème. En tout cas, nous ne savons pas le pourcentage des fonds qui sont alloué aux services secrets militaires car c'est top secret

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
0

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

Researcher4306: Interviewee 11 stated that the legislature was not provided with full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items. Interviewee 24 – currently sitting in parliament – corroborated this, saying such information had not been made available to them in a professional capacity. Interviewee 17 expressed similar doubts, while Interviewee 8 concluded that, even were such information to be made available to the legislature, it was doubtful whether their oversight would make much of an impact on the budget or decisions surrounding it.

Interviewee 17 specified that while the legislative committees officially do scrutinize and analyse the defence budget, there are no practical results, stating that the commissions were somewhat ineffective and vulnerable to political considerations. They added that these committees do not receive information on a regular basis regarding the defence budget. By contrast, Interviewee 25 said that to the best of their knowledge, the budget is indeed made available “but only in broad terms.&quoute;

As a general note, the DRC is seriously under-reported on and only interviewees can provide the necessary in-depth details to authoritatively inform this study.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The defence budget is a black box totally out of control of Parliamentarian oversight or Government auditors.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
0

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

Researcher4306: There is no publicly available evidence that shows whether or not secret budget items get audited, however the available evidence suggests it is unlikely. Interviewee 11 and 17 argue that legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items, which interviewee 24 also confirmed.

A Bertelsmann Foundation report in 2012 states that “[v]irtually none of the mechanisms associated with the effective bureaucratic administration of human and financial resources, including monitoring, evaluation and auditing procedures, is in place&quoute;. The report notes that auditing and expenditure tracking is the exception, although it offers no evidence that this applies to secret items. The report also points out that public auditors’ reports are often ignored by policy makers and that offenders whose actions have drawn significant public attention are often simply transferred.

As peer reviewer 3 notes, there has never been an audit of the army. The only recent scrutiny has come from a report from the UN on the illicit exploitation of natural resources in DRC, which puts the spotlight on military personnel.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012.” II Management Performance, 14 Steering Capability, 15 Resource Efficiency, pp. 22. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Il y a aucun rapport d'audit qui est envoyé au Parlement pour débat. Même l'organe d'audit de l'armée n'a pas des moyens pour réalisé cet audit. Nous n'avons jamais entendu ou lu qu'il y a eu un rapport d'audit de l'armée sauf les rapports venant des Nations Unies sur le pillage des ressources naturelles de la RDC qui pointent du doigt les comportements de certains officiers généraux. D'ailleurs, le récent rapport du panel des nations unies sur le pillage des ressources naturelles pointaient le Général Amisi Tango Fort, alors Chef d'Etat Major des forces terrestres. Il avait été suspendu mais par une commission de l'armée, il avait été blanchi je ne sais pas de quelle manière. La composition de cette commission de l'armée est restée cachée car l'intégrité de ces membres pose problème

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
0

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

Researcher4306: At the time of writing, no public information was available on this subject. No evidence suggests that off-budget spending is reported on.

According to Interviewee 2, there is a lot of off-budget military financing in the DRC, with none of the foreign military assistance or equipment appearing on the formal budget. The interviewee noted that China was believed to have delivered such assistance without notifying the UN's Sanctions committees.

Interviewee 25 confirmed that off-budget spending is neither explicitly allowed nor outlawed by law but that the budgets show that the practice is widespread - military equipment bought recently by DRC goes far beyond the annual $400 million budget of the army. Interviewee 11 was unsure as to the legal status of the off-budget spending which occurs, but stated that while the situation could feasibly be improved, the DRC lacked the political will to do so.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
I disagree - there is no evidence provided that off-budget spending is actually reported on, which is the key distinction between scores 0 and 1.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 2: Scholar, e-mail correspondence, 22 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. United Nations Sanctions Committee. “Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Member States Reports and Annual Reports.&quoute; Last modified 2014. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/reports.shtml.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The military budget is totally off controls. For the 50th anniversary of the Independance, on 30th June 2010, Ukrainian tanks, various trucks, AK47 and loads of ammunition were bought from an unknown budget. Even the IMF could not identify the origin of the funds, probably coming from the State House.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Les fonds secret de recherche sont permit par la loi financière. Le plus grand problème est que pour l'armée ou les services secret, nous ne savons pas réellement les montants qui sont débloqué par le Ministère des finances. Il n'existe aucun mécanisme transparent pour savoir sur ces fonds secret de recherche. Nous pensons que ces fonds sont débloqué mais les responsables militaires et de sécurité utilisent ces fonds de facon non transparente. Par exemple, il nous a été rapporté que le Conseiller Spécial du Chef de l'Etat en matière de sécurité, avait détourné 3 millions des dollars alloué aux Provinces de l'Est de la RDC , comme fonds secret de recherche.
A part l'armée, les Parlements , la primature, le sénat, le Ministère des finances, de Justice, le Parquet Général de la République possèdent aussi des fonds secret de recherche. D'ailleurs, dans le rapport de la LICOCO de 2010, nous avions constaté que la Primature s'octroyaient entre 2-3 millions des dollars des fonds secret de recherche par mois. Le Sénat avaient entre 1-2 millions des dollars par mois des fonds secret de recherche.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
0

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

Researcher4306: It is likely that off-budget military spending occurs and may be linked to illicit economic activity. Information on the volume of illegal economic activities by the Congolese army is not available and too dangerous for the researcher to gauge. The subject area is highly confidential and requires investigative reporting for which Congolese media lacks the capacity and institutional protection. International media coverage is too sparse and selective to report on off-budget military spending, while academic and think tank research does not appear to have examined the topic.

No interviewee was available to give a clear estimate. According to Interviewee 2 however, off-budget military financing is common in the DRC, with no mention of foreign military assistance or donated equipment appearing on the formal budgets. The interviewee further stated that China used to carry out this practice without even notifying the UN's sanctions committees. Interviewee 25 specified that the army would be underfunded (it is currently not) if the published figures, showing a military budget of roughly $400 million a year out of a $8 billion national budget, were correct.

Interviewees 11 and 25 pointed out that the official budget did not at all match the size and scale of a country such as the DRC, making it likely that they are inaccurate. Both interviewees indicated there is a great likelihood that this off-budget spending involves substantial corruption and illicit activity. DRC has not submitted data on its military expenditures to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, however according to SIPRI, the country increased its annual military spending annually between 2009 and 2014, growing from 1.1% of GDP (2009) to 2.3% in 2013. This corresponds to totals of US$122m (2009), US$184m (2010), US$239m (2011), US$308m (2012), and US$428m (2013).

Military spending as a percentage of overall government spending also steadily increased from 4.1% (2009) to 6.7% (2013). SIPRI's figures differ minimally from the CIA's, which state that the Government of Congo spent 1.72% of its GDP on military matters in 2012, 1.53% in 2011 and 1.72% in 2010.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 2: Scholar, e-mail correspondence, 22 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014


1. Amnesty International. &quoute;If You Resist, We'll Shoot You&quoute;: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Case for an Effective Arms Trade Treaty,” June 11, 2012. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/if-you-resist-we-ll-shoot-you-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-case-for-an-effective-arm, pp.30-33.

2. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). “Military Expenditure Database.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database

3. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “The World Factbook, Democratic Republic of Congo, Military.” Last modified June 22, 2014. Accessed August 27, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html.

4. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). “Military Spending.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Milex/.

5. Governance, Social Development, Humanitarian Conflict (GSDRC). “Off-Budget Military Expenditure and Revenue: Issues and Policy Perspectives for Donors,” January 2002. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=279.

6. United Nations Sanctions Committee, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Member States Reports and Annual Reports. Last modified 2014. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/reports.shtml.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It is rather uneasy to give an account about the origin of the off budget military funding.
The official budget of the Ministry of defence is obviously insufficient to fund all the military expenditure of a country which has been enduring a proxy war for more than a decade.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
0

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

Researcher4306: No evidence was found during research to indicate what formal or informal systems may exist for classifying information.

Interviewee 11 argued that most information surrounding the military was automatically considered to be restricted information, rather than being taken through initial levels such as &quoute;limited&quoute; or &quoute;confidential&quoute;. Interviewees 8, 9 and 24 doubted that the classification system for information was subject to effective scrutiny, with Interviewee 7 specifying that there is “no real system” for classifying information, let alone for assessing it.

All interviewees believed that there is a measure of discretion involved in classifying information, but it is hard to ascertain whether or not individuals or agencies outside of the military chain of command can persistently influence decisions surrounding classification, as the process is not disclosed publicly.

As a general note, the DRC is seriously under-reported on and only interviewees can provide the necessary in-depth details to authoritatively inform this study.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 9 : Military establishment, DRC, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 12 : Lawyer, DRC, 10 May 2014
Interview with Interviewee 13 : Lawyer, DRC, 10 May 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
0

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

Researcher4306: The government explicitly outlaws unauthorised private enterprises of elements in the defence and security sector. According to the November 2002 military penal code (Art. 78), elements of the army are punishable for a prison term between five to ten years and a monetary fine for the supervision or control of a private enterprise, the awarding of a contract to a private enterprise or private individual on behalf of the state, and working, giving advice to and investing into a private company or person for the period of five years after service in the army.

Interviewees 11, 18, and 19 said that while defence and security institutions as such do not explicitly have beneficial ownership, there are instances of individuals having such interests. The United Nations Group of Experts confirms that certain individuals inside the army own a number of different businesses. There is a wide level of consensus that high-level military personnel have had large stakes in commercial businesses, particularly in mining in the east.

The lack of formal military-owned businesses is perhaps a reflection of the fragmentation of the army itself - it is unlikely to be sufficiently organised to own and run large-scale enterprise. However, the risks associated with opaque military business are not controlled at the moment given the poor levels of scrutiny over the sector as a whole, and a low score has been selected to reflect this.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 2: Scholar, e-mail correspondence, 22 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 3: Military establishment, DRC, 1 February 2014
Interview with Interviewee 4: Scholar, phone interview, 27 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity.” February 2013.

2. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army, 2013.”

3. Verweijen, Judith, “Military business and the business of the military in the Kivus,” Review of African Political Economy 40, no.35, 2013:67-82, pp.68-69, pp.75-76.

4. United Nations Group of Experts. “Reports of the Group of Experts submitted through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo.“ Last modified 2014. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml.

5. Schouten, Peer, “Brewing security? Heineken’s engagement with commercial conflict-dependent actors in the Eastern DRC,” University of Gothenburg, School of Global Studies, 2013, pp. 11-12, 25. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.gu.se/english/research/publication/?publicationId=182955.

6. Arrêté ministériel N°98/008 relatif aux conditions d’exploitations des sociétés de gardiennage, ci- après Arrêté ministériel de 1998. 1998. Accessed August 28, 2014 http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Public/Ordre/AM98.008.31.03.1998.htm.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The FARDC are an income generating force for several high level commanders and government officials. But these businesses are not official and related to off the record traffics.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
0

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

Researcher4306: The government explicitly outlaws unauthorised private enterprises of elements in the defence and security sector. According to the November 2002 military penal code (Art. 78), elements of the army are punishable for a prison term between five to ten years and a monetary fine for the supervision or control of a private enterprise, the awarding of a contract to a private enterprise or private individual on behalf of the state, and working, giving advice to and investing into a private company or person for the period of five years after service in the army.

Interviewees 11, 18, and 19 said that defence and security institutions as such do not have beneficial ownership but that certain elements of the military have high stakes in commercial enterprises and even own some businesses. Reporting by the United Nations Group of Experts confirms this.

Despite reporting by international non-governmental organizations and international outcry, enterprises owned by individual army elements are not subjected to transparent independent scrutiny, let alone to scrutiny at a recognised international standard, according to the United Nations Group of Experts, Global Witness, and the Enough Project.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 2: Scholar, e-mail correspondence, 22 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 3: Military establishment, DRC, 1 February 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity.” February 2013.

2. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army,&quoute; 2013.

3. Verweijen, Judith, “Military business and the business of the military in the Kivus,” Review of African Political Economy 40, no.35, 2013:67-82, pp.68-69, pp.75-76.

4. United Nations Group of Experts. “Reports of the Group of Experts submitted through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo.“ Last modified 2014. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml

5. Loi N° 024/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant Code Penal Militaire, Section 5, Art. 78. November 18, 2002. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.024.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.

6. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo,” Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government, Illicit Trade in Natural Resources, p.22. 2013. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

7. Global Witness. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.globalwitness.org/all-regions/countries/democratic-republic-congo.

8. International Peace Information Service (IPIS). “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.ipisresearch.be/search_publications.php, http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_detail.php?id=428.

9. Enough Project. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/eastern_congo.

10. Enough Project. “Brutal Conflict Minerals Smuggling General Escapes Justice.” Last modified 2014. August 8, 2014. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/brutal-conflict-minerals-smuggling-general-escapes-justice.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
1

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

Researcher4306: The government explicitly outlaws unauthorised private enterprises of elements in the defence and security sector but evidence shows it seriously lacks enforcement of the provision.

According to the November 2002 military penal code (Art. 78), elements of the army are punishable for a prison term between five to ten years and a monetary fine for the supervision or control of a private enterprise, the awarding of a contract to a private enterprise or private individual on behalf of the state, and working, giving advice to and investing into a private company or person for the period of five years after service in the army.

That said, elements of the Congolese defence and security institutions are engaged in a wide range of different economic activities and suffer hardly any repercussions, with interviewee 2 estimating that many FARDC staff members are involved in such side-businesses, from selling cigarettes to importing stolen cars.

There is a wide level of consensus that high-level military personnel have had large stakes in commercial businesses, particularly in mining in the east. This military entrepreneurism is widespread, according to the United Nations Group of Experts, the Enough Project, IPIS and other research organizations.

More generally, “[…] FARDC is an economic network with wide geographical coverage,” according to Verweijen adding later that ”[…] civilians and the military have become highly economically interdependent.”

As peer reviewer 3 notes, the fact that troops are badly paid means that they are often pushed towards engaging in external enterprise to subsidise their living costs. As the government is aware of this situation, the fact that it closes its eyes to the problems that it is creating almost equates to the government sanctioning private enterprise.

A score of 1 has been selected given the widespread nature of such phenomena.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 2: Scholar, email correspondence, 22 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 3: Military establishment, DRC, 1 February 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity.” February 2013.

2. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army, 2013.”

3. Verweijen, Judith, “Military business and the business of the military in the Kivus,” Review of African Political Economy 40, no.35, 2013:67-82, pp.68-69, pp.75-76.

4. United Nations Group of Experts. “Reports of the Group of Experts submitted through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo.“ Last modified 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml

5. Loi N° 024/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant Code Penal Militaire, Section 5, Art. 78. November 18, 2002. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.024.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.

6. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2013, Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government, Illicit Trade in Natural Resources, p.22. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

7. Global Witness. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.globalwitness.org/all-regions/countries/democratic-republic-congo.

8. International Peace Information Service (IPIS). “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.ipisresearch.be/search_publications.php, http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_detail.php?id=428.

9. Enough Project. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/eastern_congo.

10. Enough Project. “Brutal Conflict Minerals Smuggling General Escapes Justice.” August 8, 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/brutal-conflict-minerals-smuggling-general-escapes-justice.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Il est interdit par la loi aux militaires d'avoir des activités commerciales. Mais comme les militaires sont mal payés, certains officiers s'adonnent aux activités commerciales pour subvenir aux dépenses quotidiennes de la vie. Le Gouvernement sachant cette situation, ferment les yeux sur ces activités commerciales des militaires.
Je peux dire que c'est le Gouvernement qui favorise les activités des militaires car il ne paye pas bien les militaires.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
2

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

Researcher4306: In September 2009, President Joseph Kabila, as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Art. 19, Law of Armed Forces), publicly declared zero tolerance to corruption, a mission statement later repeated by other ministries including the defence sector. (Note that interviewee 7 could not recall statements made publicly by the Ministry of defence, neither could interviewees 11 and 19). A month later, Kabila established the Financial Intelligence Unit to fight money laundering and corruption in the public sector.

In its 2012 country report for DRC, the Bertelsmann Foundation argued that “[t]he population is growing more and more aware of high-level corruption through the “naming and shaming” of suspects.” Addressing the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2013, Kabila pledged to reform the security sector and public financing.

Following the national consultations held in Kinshasa from 7 September and 5 October 2013, the President pledged to “a fight against all forms of corruption, fraud, and embezzlement of public funds” during a speech in front of the two houses of parliament on 23 October 2013. During his State of the Nation address on 15 December 2013, he further committed to professionalize his army. (Note, however, that on 30 June 2014, the United Nations Secretary-General reported “[p]rogress on army reform continued to be limited.”)

On 8 April 2014, the provincial commissioner of the national police in Kinshasa Célestin Kanyama pledged on national public radio to fight corruption. According to interviewee 18 who participated in many army parades, “during each parade, commanders call for good behaviour.” The problem is the implementation [of such statements], however.”

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012.” 3 Rule of Law, p. 11. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

2. United Nations General Assembly of the United Nations. “General Debate of the 68th Session, Democratic Republic of Congo.” September 25, 2013. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://gadebate.un.org/68/democratic-republic-congo.

3. President RDC. “Discours du Chef de l’Etat.” October 23, 2013, pp.12-14. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.presidentrdc.cd/IMG/pdf/Discours_du_Chef_de_l_Etat_sur_l_etat_de_la_Nation_2013.pdf.

4. US Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs.“ 2010 Investment Climate Statement, Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2010/138056.htm.

5. Theodore Trefon, “Congo Masquerade, The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure,” London/New York: Zed, 2011, p.118.

6. United Nations Secretary-General. Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2014/450,” 2014. II. Major Developments, Security Sector Reform, para. 11, p. 2. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/450.

7. Loi n° 04/00023 du 12 novembre 2004 portant organisation générale de la défense et des forces armées, November 12, 2004, Art. 19. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://desc-wondo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Loi-Organique-sur-les-FARDC.pdf.

8. Radio Okapi, “Les agents de la PCR mis en garde contre la corruption à Kinshasa, “ April 8, 2014. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://radiookapi.net/regions/kinshasa/2014/04/08/les-agents-de-la-pcr-mis-en-garde-contre-la-corruption-kinshasa/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Commitment to anti-corruption is really only rhetoric to satisfy external patrons. In practise corruption in the armed forces is rampant at all levels.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The statements here above mentioned are made just to please the IC and donors. There is strictly no evidence of any implementation of them.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Researcher4306: Formally, measures are in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption. For example, in positive developments, the President promulgated the law on the Constitutional court on 15 October 2013, which will have jurisdiction over the prosecution of the President and Prime Minister.

Evidence suggests that in practice this law and other anti-corruption laws are being enforced only occasionally. As reported by Bertelsmann Foundation in 2012, “[d]espite the existence of anti-corruption laws, most officeholders who exploit their offices for private gain have gone unpunished. The prosecution of corrupt officeholders was usually motivated by the desire to weaken political competitors rather than promote the rule of law, per se. However, there are signs that total freedom to abuse power no longer exists […]. The population is growing more and more aware of high-level corruption through the “naming and shaming” of suspects. In general, however, the rule of law remains seriously undermined by political corruption.”

For example, over the last two years, the most prominent case was of the former Chief of Land Forces, who was suspended by President Kabila on 22 November 2012 after a UN Group of Experts report implicated him of illegal mineral extraction and partnering with poachers and armed groups. However, the Major General was never actually arrested and authorities cleared him of all charges on 31 July 2014 without giving further details about its investigation, as reported by the Enough Project. Civil society groups in DRC have denounced this action.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, military staff cannot be prosecuted by civilian courts but only by military courts. This leads to a heightened sense of impunity for defence personnel.

COMMENTS -+

1. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/757,” 2013. II. Major Development, National political developments para. 3, p.2; para. 14, p.3. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/96&Lang=E.

2. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012.” 3 Rule of Law, pp.10-11. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

3. Enough Project. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified in 2014. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/eastern_congo.

4. Enough Project. “Brutal Conflict Minerals Smuggling General Escapes Justice.” August 8, 2014. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/brutal-conflict-minerals-smuggling-general-escapes-justice.

5. International Center for Transitional Justice. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified in 2014. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/democratic-republic-congo-drc.

6. Freedom House. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified in 2014. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/congo-democratic-republic-kinshasa#.U_dGRSgwKlI.

7. Human Rights Watch. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified in 2014. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/africa/democratic-republic-congo.

8. Amnesty International. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified in 2014. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/democratic-republic-congo.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Military staff cannot be prosecuted by civilian courts but only by military courts.
Moreover, any offense or crime involving a military arm must be prosecuted by a military court.
Generals cannot be prosecuted if not by a General heading the tribunal. For example, General John Numbi, the PNC Commissioner, could not be prosecuted by the military court which was in charge of the Floribert Chebeya case because the president of the Court was a Colonel.
This incredible system leads to a total impunity of the military.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
0

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

Researcher4306: Asked about the existence of mechanisms to encourage whistle blowing, Interviewees 7 and 19 stated that there were none in place, with Interviewee 19 adding that with no incentives, it was unlikely that any potential whistleblowers would come forward.

In its 2013 human rights report for the DRC, the US State Department asserted that “[n]o law exists to provide protection to public and private employees for making internal disclosures or lawful public disclosures of evidence of illegality.” Further, it argued that “[p]ublic criticism,[…] of government officials and government conduct or decisions regarding matters such as […] corruption sometimes resulted in harsh responses […]. Certain regulating bodies restricted freedom of the press and intimidated journalists and publishers into practicing self-censorship.” In this environment, whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries are not afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption. Subsequently, there have not been any known cases of whistleblowing in the ministry of defence and/or army.

Generally speaking, freedom of speech and press is not adequately protected, making whistle-blowing a dangerous undertaking. Reporters Without Borders ranked DRC 151 out of 180 countries surveyed. In 2013, Freedom House found the press not to be free. “Reporters exposing high-level corruption are at particular risk,” according to scholar Theodore Trefon. In 2012, Bertelsmann Foundation claimed that “[m]edia editors have become increasingly reluctant to report cases of corruption, fearing repressive responses from the perpetrators.”

Nevertheless, outside of defence the Ministry of Finances has created a special email address for whistleblowers (fraudeetcorruption@minfinrdc.com) so that the public can report instances of corruption and fraud (12). In addition, in June 2015 it was announced that Joseph Kabila had filed his first complaints against corrupt officials, through the new special adviser for counter-corruption, counter-money laundering and counter-terrorism (conseiller spécial pour la lutte contre la corruption, le blanchiment et le terrorisme).

The complaints are reportedly the result of information provided by whistleblowers, although it is unclear whether they were submitted with evidence that could be used as a basis for prosecution (14). It therefore appears that, outside of defence, there might be an improving climate for whistleblowers. Until this is replicated in the defence sector, however, a higher score cannot be awarded.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2013. Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Freedom of Speech and Press, pp.14-16; Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government, Whistleblower Protection, p.22. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

2. Reporters Without Borders. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/democratic-republic-of-congo.html, http://rsf.org/index2014/data/index2014_en.pdf.

3. Freedom House. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/congo-democratic-republic-kinshasa#.U_dGRSgwKlI.

4. Journaliste en Danger. Last modified 2014. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.jed-afrique.org/.

5. Committee to Protect Journalists. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://cpj.org/africa/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/.

6. Protection Line. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://protectionline.org/country/dr-congo/.

7. Human Rights Watch. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/africa/democratic-republic-congo.

8. Amnesty International. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/democratic-republic-congo

9. Theodore Trefon, “Congo Masquerade, The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure,” London/New York: Zed, 2011.

10.Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012.” 2 Political participation, pp. 9-10; 15 Resource Efficiency, p. 23. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

11. Transparency International. International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation.” November 5, 2013. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/international_principles_for_whistleblower_legislation.

12. &quoute;Une adresse e-mail officielle pour dénoncer la corruption en RDC&quoute;, Radio Okapi, 29/04/2011, http://www.radiookapi.net/economie/2011/04/29/une-adresse-e-mail-officielle-pour-denoncer-la-corruption-en-rdc

13. &quoute;Luzolo Bambi nommé conseiller spécial de Joseph Kabila pour la lutte contre la corruption&quoute;, Radio Okapi, 01/04/2015, http://www.radiookapi.net/regions/kinshasa/2015/04/01/luzolo-bambi-nomme-conseiller-special-de-joseph-kabila-pour-la-lutte-contre-la-corruption

14. &quoute;RDC : Joseph Kabila dépose sa première plainte contre la corruption au Parquet général&quoute;, Radio Okapi, 23/06/2015, http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2015/06/23/rdc-joseph-kabila-depose-sa-premiere-plainte-contre-la-corruption-au-parquet-general

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Being a whistle blower in the DRC is dangerous: ask Floribert Chebeya...

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
0

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Researcher4306: On the basis of the Bertelsmann Foundations' Transformation Index, there is no evidence to suggest that the appointment system for the selection of government officials at middle and top management level in the defence sector and beyond is independent, transparent, objective nor necessarily based on meritocracy. Neither is there evidence that certain positions are recognized as more open to corruption opportunities.

According to Interviewee 5, there is no special attention paid to vetting, rotation or post-retirement restrictions for personnel in sensitive positions in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. Officials often remain in these positions for a very long time despite reported inefficiencies, the interviewee added.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 5 : Researcher, DRC, 28 August 2014

1. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,” 2012. II Management Performance, 15 Resource Efficiency, pp. 22-23. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The right criteria to be hired in a sensitive position in the Army is to be a Luba from Katanga.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
0

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

Researcher4306: In February 2012, EUSEC completed a nationwide census of the Congolese armed forces. Earlier in 2011, it completed a national police census. Interviewee 7 stated that the number of civilian and military personnel is known by the defence establishment and international partners but not actively shared publicly.

No publicly accessible information was available on the number of civilian government employees. However, public documents issued by other institutes give relatively fair estimates of the numbers for military personnel. For instance, the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in DRC (EUSEC) reportedly believes that the total number of army personnel stood at 105,000 men and women in April 2012, of which 60% are deployed in North and South Kivu provinces. The Rift Valley Institute estimated hat the number of FARDC troops was between 120,000-130,000 in February 2013.

As for the number of police, EUSEC says it is around 100,000. Rift Valley Institute estimates the number of the men in the presidential guard to be between 10,000-15,000. The number of female soldiers in the spring of 2013 was estimated to be less than 2%, according to the Social Sciences Research Council.

According to Interviewee 7, a certain number of ghost soldiers remain on the payroll of the military, albeit at a much, much smaller number than just years before.

The fact that no figures are released by the government or the defence ministry precludes a higher score.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014

1. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army,&quoute; p.6, 2013.

2. Open Society. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform,” p.16 and endnotes 78, 8. April 2012. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/democratic-republic-congo-taking-stand-security-sector-reform.

3. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity.” February 2013. pp.45, 81.

4. Baaz, Maria Eriksson and Stern, Maria. “Whores, men, and other misfits: Undoing ‘feminization’ in the Armed Forces in the DRC.” African Affairs 110, no.441 (August 2011): 563-585.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Ghost soldiers are common, even after EU SEC's census.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are still significant discrepancies between the payroll communicated to the Treasury and the actual payments made to soldiers.
The difference is pocketed in between the Ministry of defence, the FARDC headquarters and the commanding officers on the ground.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
0

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

Researcher4306: The latest and most formally accurate pay rates are apparently known by the defence sector and international partners but not published, according to Interviewee 7. An international partner called the researcher's request to access the information “delicate.” For citizens in the DR Congo, it is a more difficult undertaking to acquire his information.

It is thus not a common practice to publish the rates. However, a number of NGO reports have mentioned a few figures in recent years. For instance, according to the Social Science Research Council, the official income for soldiers was around $70 a month in spring 2013, insufficient to sustain a family in Congo. A joint NGO report on Security Sector Reform in Congo in 2012 asserted that the monthly income for rank-and-file in police and army was around $40 and $60 for a general.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014

1. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army,&quoute; 2013, pp.5, 7, 9, 24.

2. Open Society. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform,” April 2012, endnote 4. Accessed August 23, 2014, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/democratic-republic-congo-taking-stand-security-sector-reform.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although not officially disclosed, this information is widely known.
However, it remains rather theoretical since soldiers are often paid late or partly.
Furthermore, it is obviously insufficient to guarantee discipline, commitment, loyalty and respect of wars laws and regulation.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
2

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

Researcher4306: In late 2012, the UN Secretary-General announced that EUSEC would initiate salary payments directly to individual soldiers through an electronic bank transfer system. However, the establishment of a rigorous banking system is “still ongoing” and is not as of yet established in the provincial regions, Interviewee 7 asserted. Recent complaints surrounding the late payment of salaries were linked to the transition to an electronic system, with the majority of complaints reportedly coming from commanding officers who are now unable to withdraw salaries on their soldiers' behalf (7).

Overall, there are occasional indications of late payment, which interviewee 7 calls “still reasonable,” adding that irregularities in payment only affect a minority. “It will take another 3-5 years for all personnel to receive pay on time.” Interviewee 9 acknowledged that payment trends had definitely improved. Payments at the moment are generally the correct amount but they are sometimes delayed and/or subject to discretionary commissions.

According to EUSEC, the official income for rank-and-file soldiers was around $70 a month in spring 2013, insufficient to sustain a family in Congo. (A joint NGO report on Security Sector Reform in Congo in 2012 asserted that the monthly income for rank-and-file in police and army was around $40 and $60 for a general). Officially, there is a clear and structured payment scheme, although this is not made public by the government or the defence ministry.

Apart from payment, personnel often receive little material support, including but not limited to accommodation, ammunition, education, equipment, food, medicine, and social benefits. This among other reasons explains why members of the security services often commit theft, extortion and are corrupted, as reported by the Rift Valley Institute. Note that according to a survey of more than 5,000 randomly selected adult residents conducted by Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and the UN Development Program in late 2013, 27% and 26% of the respondents remarked that the FARDC and PNC respectively need to be paid for security to improve.

Response to peer reviewer 1:
Without sources to support your suggestion that delays of up to three months are frequent, I cannot raise the score.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 9 : Military establishment, DRC, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Directives ministerielles permanentes sur le fonctionnement de l’administration dans FARDC DMPADM 01, Septembre 2009. September 1, 2009.

2. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army,&quoute; p.6, 2013.

3. Open Society. “Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform,” p.16, endnotes 78, 8. April 2012. Accessed September 3, 2014, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/democratic-republic-congo-taking-stand-security-sector-reform.

4. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity.” February 2013. pp.45, 81.

5. Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, United Nations Development Programme. “ Search for Lasting Peace, Population-Based Survey on Perceptions and Attitudes about Peace, Security and Justice in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.” 2014. Accessed September 3, 2014, http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/sites/m/pdf/DRC2014_Searching_for_Lasting_Peace.pdf.

6. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2014/157,” 2014. Accessed September 3, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/157.

7. &quoute;RDC: colère de l’armée après un retard dans le paiement des salaires&quoute;, RFI, 14-11-2014, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20141114-rdc-colere-armee-apres-retard-le-paiement-salaires

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: 1 Criteria
There are regular indications of late payment (of up to up to 3 months) and payment amounts may regularly be incorrect. The payment system is not clear or published.

Payment is regularly delayed from the ministry of defence to a significant number of the armed forces. Especially those on operations or those stationed in rural areas.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Il y a quand même des avancées significatives qui ont été fournie dans la payé des militaires. Depuis 2012, la plus part des militaires sont payé à la banque et il y a plus des retards dans le paiement. Dans les coins du pays où il n'existe aucune banque, il y a encore de retard de paiement.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
1

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

Researcher4306: A system for appointment does exist, according to article 20 of the Décret Loi n° 003-2003 portant création et organisation de l’Agence nationale de renseignements and articles 7-14 of the Loi 81-003 du 17 juillet 1981 portant statut du personnel de carrière des services publics de l’État,

However, the appointment system for the selection of military and civilian personnel at middle and top management level in the defence sector is characterized by nepotism, favoritism, and political calculations. In addition, as noted by peer reviewer 2, the last decade saw a lot of uncontrolled integration of militia, armed groups, rebels within the FARDC including at senior levels.

According to the Rift Valley Institute, the Congolese government has for years now allotted army positions to pay off and/or secure the buy-in of rebel leaders and deserters. With parallel command structures in place, positions frequently matter more than ranks. “Appointments based on connections rather than merit have […] diminished FARDC’ fighting capabilities. Subordinates lose respect for incompetent commanders, leading to insubordination and the refusal to obey orders.”

Note that on 24 December 2013, President Kabila signed a five-year police reform to establish criteria for recruitment, and promotion for police officers. It is actively bolstered by MONUSCO and EUPOL. Note also that the Bertelsmann Foundation remarked in 2012 that “[t]ere are no competitive recruitment procedures […]” across public sectors in DRC.

No evidence suggests that there is oversight over appointments nor that recruiting guidelines are published and assessed.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
The system for the appointment of military personnel is not published in full - only the legal requirements for there to be a system could be found. This precludes a higher score.

COMMENTS -+

1. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2014/157,” II. Major Developments, Security sector reform, para.9, p.3. 2014. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/157.

2. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army,&quoute; 2013.

3. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity,” pp. 49, 51-53. February 2013.

4. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,” II Management Performance, 15 Resource Efficiency, p. 23, 2012. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

5. DÉCRET-LOI n° 003-2003 portant création et organisation de l’Agence nationale de renseignements, Art. 20. 11 January 2003. Accessed March 7, 2015,
http://www.droitcongolais.info/files/4.69.7_decret-loi__agence_nationale_de_renseignemen.pdf.

6. Loi 81-003 du 17 juillet 1981 portant statut du personnel de carrière des services publics de l’État, Art. 7-14. July 17, 1981. Accessed March 7, 2015, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20administratif/Agents/L.81.003.17.07.1981.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: On the top of the above comments, the last decade saw a lot of uncontrolled integration of militia, armed groups, rebels within the FARDC including at senior levels. Tihs is the result of the integration and &quoute;brassage&quoute; processes due to several peace agreements which led to the disintegration of the Army discipline, training and organization.
Uneducated warlords or heads of militia, such as Mai Mai elements, were integrated in the Army sometimes with the rank of Colonel, Major or Captain. It lead to a total confusion and demotivated the well trained officers of the former FAZ (forces armées du Zaïre).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: La loi sur la défense de l'armée possède un système pour le recrutement des officiers de l'armée. Avec les guerres que la RDC a connus ces 20 dernières années, on a mis de côté le système de recrutement qui existe pour privilégier les accords politiques pour la paix.
Mais, il existe un système transparent de recrutement des officiers de l'armée.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
0

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Researcher4306: No meritocratic system is in place. Instead, a 2013 study by the Social Science Science Research Council shows that positions have often been given to corrupt and unqualified army elements and rebel factions, leading to demoralization of troops, lack of cohesion and even sabotage, causing poor performances from the troops. According to the Social Science Research Council, “[s]ystematic favoritism” is &quoute;common,” which interviewee 5 confirmed.

Interviewee 19 also denied that there was a meritocratic system in place, implying that it was possible to become a commander or colonel in the army without having completed high school education or building up a long service record. Bertelsmann Foundation remarked in 2012 that “[t]here are no competitive recruitment procedures […]” across public sectors in DRC.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 5 : Researcher, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army, 2013, pp. 6, 26-29.”

2. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012.” II Management Performance, 15 Resource Efficiency, p. 23. Last modified August 19, 2014. http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

3. Maria Eriksson Baaz, Judith Verweijen, Was the Congolese army ordered to rape in Minova? April 15, 2013. Last modified February 25, 2014. http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2013/04/was-congolese-army-ordered-to-rape-in.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Whatever the guidelines, they are not implemented at all.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
N/A

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4306: No conscription exists in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Art. 53 of the Law of Armed Forces stipulates that it is a professional army. Note that Art. 2.12, 7-11 allow for general mobilization of both sexes aged 18 or above in times of crisis. While crises are very frequent in the eastern part of the country, the government has not yet evoked the clause. Given the prevailing culture of bribery, it is very likely that citizens would be able to opt out.

COMMENTS -+

Loi n° 04/00023 du 12 novembre 2004 portant organisation générale de la défense et des forces armées, http://desc-wondo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Loi-Organique-sur-les-FARDC.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
N/A

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4306: Neither compulsory nor voluntary conscription exists in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Article 53 of the Law of Armed Forces stipulates that it is a professional army.

Art. 2.12, 7-11 allow for general mobilization of both sexes aged 18 or above in times of crisis. While crises are very frequent in the eastern part of the country, the government has not yet evoked the clause. Given the prevailing culture of bribery, it is very likely that citizens would be able to opt out.

COMMENTS -+

1. Loi n° 04/00023 du 12 novembre 2004 portant organisation générale de la défense et des forces armées. November 12, 2004. Accessed September 3, 2014, http://desc-wondo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Loi-Organique-sur-les-FARDC.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
1

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

Researcher4306: In October 2009, authorities have launched a biometric identification system for personnel in the defence and security sector to combat the problem of ghost soldiers. The issuing of biometric ID cards is said to have reduced the number of ghost soldiers by 220,000, according to an estimate gathered by the Rift Valley Institute in February 2013.

According to the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in DRC (EUSEC), in April 2014,”35% of all military personnel have been through multiple biometric ID checks. Distribution of military ID cards, now the sole piece of Congolese military identification, also continues. To date, 80% of all personnel possess their military ID card.” The process remains ongoing, but the large numbers of ghost soldiers identified does show the extent of the problem in DRC.

According to Interviewee 7, while there is a willingness to combat the phenomenon of ‘ghost soldiers’, and an acknowledgement that it would benefit people across the industry, there is much resistance to reform, and progress on the matter remains fragile. In addition, as peer reviewer 2 notes, although EUSEC did its best to complete the biometric military census, its efforts were complicated by the dissolution of various battalions and the partial reallocation of their troops to other units. This led to a new disorder in the staff lists and payroll.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Radio Okapi, “RDC: recensement biométrique des agents et fonctionnaires de l’administration publique,” August 4, 2010. Accessed September 3, 2014, http://radiookapi.net/emissions-2/parole-aux-auditeurs/2010/08/04/rdc-recensement-biometrique-des-agents-et-fonctionnaires-de-l’administration-publique/.

2. European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in DRC (EUSEC). Last modified 2014. Accessed September 3, 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eusec-rd-congo/.

3. European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in DRC (EUSEC). “Fiche d'info/Factsheets Mission de conseil et d'assistance en matière de réforme du secteur de la sécurité en République Démocratique du Congo dans le domaine de la défense (EUSEC RD Congo),” p.2. Last modified 2014. Accessed September 3, 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eusec-rd-congo/pdf/factsheet_eusec_rd_congo_en.pdf, p.2.

4. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity,” p.81, February 2013.

5. Gérard Prunier, Africa’s world war. Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe, (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press,‎ 2009), p. 306.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: These steps have not had any real effect in terms of combatting 'ghost soldiers'.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although EUSEC did its best to complete the biometric military census, its efforts were somehow dilapidated with the dissolution of various battalions and the partial reallocation of their troops to other units. This led to a new disorder in the staff lists and payroll. One may suspect it was intentionally done...

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
2

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

Researcher4306: Following a request from the Government of Congo, the European Union decided on 1 December 2005 to assist the government in modernizing its payment system for armed forces and separate the chain of command (General HQ, HQ Forces, Military Region, Region Brigades, Battalions) from the chain of payment (budget finance directive, finance director MR, Regiment/Bdes Accountant, Battalion Paymaster). The separation of the two chains is a published policy, stipulated in two instructions by the Ministry of defence, namely N0600/MDNACIGG-DEF/DBF 2013 and N 001/EMG/FARDC/COMDT /2013.

While the Rift Valley Institute states that “[o]ne of the main achievements of the army reform projects backed by EUSEC has been the separating of the chain of payments from the chain of command,” implementation remains a challenge in certain locations: For example, given that only 6% of the 30,000 soldiers serving in North Kivu are paid through commercial banks, the so-called Chef de l’administration, or Chef S1, continues to be involved in distributing cash to his subordinates, who are frequently compelled to pay commission, a phenomenon called ‘rapportage.’ As an officer of the chain of command, the S1 should officially not be involved in the payment and be replaced by a battalion paymaster. Interviewee 11 stated that while this was not an ideal system, it was not currently seen as a grave problem.

There is confusion regarding chains of command and payment in the Ministry of defence, according to Interviewee 7, who says there are problems with it daily. Nevertheless, they acknowledged that evident and very serious progress was made in this regard. Interviewees 11 and 17 shared the sentiment that the chains are generally separated. Recent complaints surrounding the late payment of salaries were linked to the transition to an electronic system, with the majority of complaints reportedly coming from commanding officers who are now unable to withdraw salaries on their soldiers' behalves (5).

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, Goma, 28 August 2014 
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014 
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014  
 
1. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity,” pp. 47, 81, February 2013. 
 
2. Mission of the European Union to the United Nations. “Security sector reform in DRC – Chain of payments.” Last modified December 1, 2005. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_5383_fr.htm. 
 
3. Baaz, Maria Eriksson and Olsson, Ola. “Feeding the Horse: Unofficial Economic Activities within the Police Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” African Security, 4(4), 223-241, 2011.
 
4. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2013, Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government, Corruption, p.21. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

5. &quoute;RDC: colère de l’armée après un retard dans le paiement des salaires&quoute;, RFI, 14-11-2014, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20141114-rdc-colere-armee-apres-retard-le-paiement-salaires

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The separation of the chains of command and payments - which is anyhow very partly implemented - is not a solution. The only way to avoid misappropriation and bribes is to pay soldiers salaries directly on a bank account or equivalent, with no cash manipulation.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
2

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

Researcher4306: A military code of conduct exists but is not made publicly available. A copy was obtained during research however. The Ministry of defence published the only and most updated code of conduct for military and civilian personnel in the defence sector in December 2009. It does not contain specific guidance with respect to bribery, gifts, hospitality, conflicts of interest and post-separation activities. The codes are relatively widely distributed but applied inconsistently, according to interviewee 7.

However, according to the November 2002 military penal code (Art. 78), elements of the army are punishable for a prison term between five to ten years and a monetary fine for the supervision or control of a private enterprise, the awarding of a contract to a private enterprise or private individual on behalf of the state, and working, giving advice to and investing into a private company or person for the period of five years after service in the army.

In October 2002, the government established an Observatory for the Code of Professional Ethics to promote ethical behaviour of its civil servants. No further public information was available regarding the Observatory for the Code of Professional Ethics, how strictly it enforces the code, or whether it is maintained and implemented today.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014

1. Ministère De La defence Nationale et Des Anciens Combattants, Service D’Education Civique Et Patriotique, Code de Conduite Du Soldat De La Republique Democratique Du Congo, December 2009.

2. Loi N° 024/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant Code Penal Militaire, Section 5, Art. 78. November 18, 2002. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.024.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.

3. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. “2013 Investment Climate Statement, Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2013. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204623.htm.

4. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo,” Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government, Corruption, p.22, 2013. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is a code of conduct and discipline but it is not implemented.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
1

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

Researcher4306: A military code of conduct exists but is not made publicly available. A copy was obtained during research however.

According to Interviewees 6 and 7 general breaches of the code of conduct are being sanctioned. For example, in May 2014 soldiers were imprisoned for conduct. While military authorities have achieved progress in gradually improving its sanctions system to punish individual cases of misconduct, this system lacks consistent application and has too many gaps and exceptions to be called effective.

The lack of publicly available information suggests breaches of code of conduct from ministry officials are unlikely to be reported on.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 6 : Researcher, DRC, 9 May, 16 May, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014

1. Ministère De La defence Nationale et Des Anciens Combattants, Service D’Education Civique Et Patriotique, Code de Conduite Du Soldat De La Republique Démocratique Du Congo, December 2009.

2. Loi N° 024/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant Code Penal Militaire, November 18, 2002, Art. 78. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.024.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.

3. BBC, &quoute;DR Congo rape trial: Many soldiers cleared, two guilty,&quoute; May 5, 2014. Accessed March 8, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27285268

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
1

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

Researcher4306: The defence sector offers few to no training sessions on any topic. Refresher courses are few in numbers.

“There are some ad hoc trainings, now and again, organized by donors. But there is no regular, systematic training initiated by [the Congolese government]” according to Interviewee 8. International partners are instrumental in organizing and conducting some trainings for the military. However, as of 2012, foreign military personnel have only provided or supervised specialized training to an estimated six percent of Congolese troops since 2007.

According to interviewees 17, 18 and 19, there are anti-corruption seminars in place, primarily for the military justice system, but it is not a systematic policy initiated and pursued by the Government, calling their sustainability into question. Interviewee 11 argued that these trainings are only &quoute;for external consumption”, adding that while there is a will to change within the government, progress in implementation is slow and very difficult.

On a positive note, in mid-2013, two draft decrees were prepared for the organization and functioning of a general directorate for police schools and training centres. The government also established an Observatory for the Code of Professional Ethics in October 2002 to promote ethical behaviour of its civil servants, but no more information regarding it or its findings is publicly available.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 9 : Military establishment, DRC, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. “2013 Investment Climate Statement, Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2013. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204623.htm.

2. Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, “Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army,” p.28, February 2013.

3. Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project, “The National Army And Armed Groups In The Eastern Congo. Untangling The Gordian Knot of Insecurity,” pp. 71, 82, February 2013.

4. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/388,” para. 36 p.8, 2013. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/388.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
1

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

Researcher4306: According to all interviewees, elements of the army stand occasionally trial for embezzlement and related charges. But this is the exception rather the rule and involves neither high-ranking members of the defence sector nor large-scale corruption. While some of the cases are made public, there is no clear formal policy to do so.

As reported by Bertelsmann Foundation in 2012, “[d]espite the existence of anti-corruption laws, most officeholders who exploit their offices for private gain have gone unpunished. The prosecution of corrupt officeholders was usually motivated by the desire to weaken political competitors rather than promote the rule of law, per se. However, there are signs that total freedom to abuse power no longer exists […]. The population is growing more and more aware of high-level corruption through the “naming and shaming” of suspects. In general, however, the rule of law remains seriously undermined by political corruption. [...] “Effective prosecution of corruption is unheard of.”

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 5 : Researcher, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 6 : Researcher, DRC, 9 May, 16 May, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 12 : Lawyer, DRC, 10 May 2014
Interview with Interviewee 13 : Lawyer, DRC, 10 May 2014
Interview with Interviewee 14 : Lawyer, DRC, 8 May 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 21 : Diplomat, phone interview, 2 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,” 2012, p. 23. Accessed August 26, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: My feeling is that high level commanding officers' penal cases are made public when for some reason their acts countered higher interests among the regime nomenclature.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
0

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

Researcher4306: According to the 2013 Human Rights Report on the DRC by the US State Department, “PNC and FARDC units throughout the country regularly engaged in illegal taxation and extortion of civilians. They set up checkpoints to collect “taxes,” often stealing food and money and arresting individuals who could not pay bribes.” There are no specific measures in place to discourage facilitation payments. On the contrary, the system is largely built on it.

Note, however, that scholar Verweijen cautions not to “uncritically project the victim/victimiser dichotomy onto economic relations between the military and civilians, while paying little attention to how military revenue- generating activities are co-produced and instrumentalised by populations […] ” adding later that […] military revenue-generation is shaped by militarised structures that are in part (re)produced by the routine practices of civilians.&quoute;

COMMENTS -+

1. Verweijen, Judith, “Military business and the business of the military in the Kivus,” Review of African Political Economy 40, no.35, 2013, pp.68-69, pp.75-76.

2. Oxfam. “In the Balance – Searching for protection in eastern DRC.” 179 Briefing Paper, January 27, 2014. Accessed August 23, 2014, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-in-the-balance-protection-eastern-drc-270114-en.pdf.

3. United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2013. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention, Role of the Police and Security Apparatus, 2013, p.6. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No business is possible in the Congo without facilitation (&quoute;matabiche&quoute;).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
0

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

Researcher4306: Asked whether the armed forces have military doctrine specifically addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations, Interviewee 11 said there might be one but was not able to recall specifics, while Interviewee 19 doubted the existence of doctrine addressing corruption, arguing, however, that there might a general directive. Interviewee 22 denied the existence of such a piece of writing altogether.

Generally, the 2002 Military Penal Code prohibits corruption, while the 2009 Code of Conduct does not specifically address corruption, including as a strategic issues while on operations.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 22 : Military expert, phone interview, 2 September 2014

1. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/757” II. Major Development, Security sector reform, para. 7, p.2. 2013. Accessed September 3, 2014. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/96&Lang=E.

2. Code Penal Militaire, particularly section 5. November 18, 2002. Accessed September 3, 2014. http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.024.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.

3. Code de Conduite Du Soldat De La Republique Democratique Du Congo. Forces armées de la République démocratique. 2009.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
0

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

Researcher4306: There is no evidence that any systematic training is provided; let alone specifically on matters of corruption and to commanders at all levels.

Interviewee 8 indicated that there are &quoute;some ad hoc trainings, now and again, organized by donors. But there is no regular, systematic training initiated by [the Congolese government]”. International partners are instrumental in organizing and conducting some trainings for the military. However, as of 2012, foreign military personnel have only provided or supervised specialized training to an estimated six percent of Congolese troops since 2007.

According to interviewees 17, 18 and 19, there are anti-corruption seminars in place, primarily for the military justice system, but it is not a systematic policy initiated and pursued by the Government, calling their sustainability into question. Interviewee 11 argued that these trainings are only &quoute;for external consumption”, adding that while there is a will to change within the government, progress in implementation is slow and very difficult.

Note that in December 2013, MONUSCO was finalizing the establishment of a training unit to support the training and mentoring of instructors in Congo’s armed forces, but no further information on the progress of this project was publicly accessible.

According to all interviewees, officers engage in or turn a blind eye to corrupt activities.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 7 : Military establishment, DRC, 28 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/757,” 2013, para. 7, p.2. Accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/96&Lang=E.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: MONUSCO (Police Component, SSR unit), EUPOL and EUSEC trained PNC or FARDC staff on several occasions in the fields of conduct and discipline, rule of law, humanitarian law, accountability, etc. No significant improvement in their behavior and performance came out of these training.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
0

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

Researcher4306: It is unclear whether or not corruption monitors are deployed. No publicly available information was found at the time of writing. According to Interviewee 8, there are currently no systematically scheduled missions, adding that while the authorities do have this in mind as a future goal, they are at present &quoute;ad hoc and irregular.” Auditors lack sufficient training to support this, however.

Interviewee 17 expressed doubts too, arguing that while some seminars are held in Kinshasa, there is no similar coverage across the country, adding that it was not a current priority for the authorities. Interviewee 19 also implied this, stating that the authorities did not currently have time to follow up with professionals in this manner. Interviewee 18 had not heard of any deployments of corruption monitors.

Response to peer reviewer 2:
Agreed. Score lowered from 1 to 0.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is no evidence of such deployments. Military auditors have no sufficient capacities, no back up for the hierarchy and no facilities to patrol the country.

Suggested score: 0

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
0

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

Researcher4306: Article 78 of the 2002 Military Penal Code spells out provisions for military personnel on how to engage commercial actors. Punishable by a prison sentence between five to yen years and a fine of 5,000- 10,000 Congolese Francs, military personnel are not allowed to control a private enterprise, sign contracts with private companies and/or person on behalf of the state, make offers to private companies and persons and work for a private enterprise or person for five years after leaving military service.

However, these provisions are frequently violated (see also questions 30-32), applied very selectively and irregularly. No regular training is heard of.

Nothing in the provision suggests that the provisions do not apply whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions. However, the guidelines themselves don't cover official operational contracts, only private business.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 18 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 19 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014

1) Loi N° 024/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant Code Penal Militaire, particularly art. 78. November 18, 2002. Accessed August 23, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.024.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: DRC is not a significant contributing nation to peacekeeping missions. However the DRC has recently sent a small number of soldiers and police to MISCA in CAR. These forces are unlikely to have anti-corruption training.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Training would rather be dispensed by the UN on arrival, by the Conduct and Discipline Unit of by the Force HQ.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
1

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Researcher4306: A multitude of private security companies are employed in DRC, including ASCO, G4S, GESI, GSA Security, HADEC, Hdw-SD Security, KAMI HSS, KK Security, Latlong International, Magenya, Top S.I.G and Warrior Security. Research by Schoutten indicates that around 30,000 private security guards are stationed in DRC, predominantly in the capital Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and the eastern part of the country. Amongst others, they provide security and logistical support to international corporations (notably in the mining sector), international non-governmental organizations, and the United Nations.

Interviewee 4 indicated that private security contractors are employed rather than private military contractors. The former are explicitly &quoute;disallowed to carry arms and this is strongly enforced, although arms are sometimes sneaked in through the back door through structural cooperation with PNC/FARDC.&quoute;

Schouten indicates that private security companies obviously “benefit financially from prolongation of insecurity&quoute;. Private security companies often operate together with public security forces including elements of the army, police and navy, partially because private security companies are not allowed to carry arms (Arrêté ministériel N°98/008, Art. 6). There is a risk that corporations may become complicit in human rights abuses when employing public security forces notorious for their misconduct.

Mechanisms for oversight and accountability are formally in place and stipulated in a ministerial decree from 1998, albeit they are not consistently enforced and the decree does not define sanctions. There is also no evidence of cases involving PMCs in this situation. According to Interviewee 4, “there is some level of scrutiny through informal circuits,” amongst them by the Intelligence Services of ANR, who have a wide network of human intelligence officers deployed throughout the country. Moreover, there is evidence indicating that public security services also privatize and commercialize their own services. Schouten reports that the national police has a special unit called ‘Brigade de Garde’ mandated for private guarding, and that 9,000 police in Kinshasa alone are believed to be in its service. In North Kivu province, this system is believed to have generated over US$1m in 2012.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 4: Scholar, phone interview, 27 August 2014.

1. Arrêté ministériel N°98/008 relatif aux conditions d’exploitations des sociétés de gardiennage, ci- après Arrêté ministériel de 1998. March 31, 1998. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Public/Ordre/AM98.008.31.03.1998.htm.

2. OECD. “Guidelines for companies operating in weak governance zones.” June 8, 2006. Accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/weakgovernancezones-riskawarenesstoolformultinationalenterprises-oecd.htm.

3. Schouten, Peer, “Brewing security? Heineken’s engagement with commercial conflict-dependent actors in the Eastern DRC,” University of Gothenburg, School of Global Studies, pp. 11-12, 25. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://gup.ub.gu.se/publication/182955-brewing-security-heinekens-engagement-with-commercial-conflict-dependent-actors-in-the-eastern-drc.

4. Guidebook Living in Goma, Health and Safety. Last modified February 26, 2015. Accessed February 26, 2015, http://livingingoma.com/health-and-safety/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: To my best knowledge, there are no private military contractors in the DRC. But indeed, there are plenty of private security firms, with hardly any monitoring from the Government and most likely a lot of corruption in the sector.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
0

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

Researcher4306: “Parliament passed a new procurement law in April 2010 [&quoute;Loi relative aux marches publiques] and the GDRC [Government of the DR Congo] has also adopted key implementing steps, institutions, and a manual of procedures to implement the new procurement law,” according to the US Department of State in July 2014, which added that “bribery is still routine in public and private business transactions, especially in the areas of government procurement”, an assessment shared by scholar Theodore Trefon.

However, articles 44-46 of the 2010 &quoute;Loi relative aux marches publiques&quoute; provide for exemptions regarding the purchase of military equipment, making it subject to a decree of the Prime Minister.

According to Interviewee 11, procurement processes are fully ad-hoc and non-transparent, with Interviewee 24 adding that the defence sector is subject to “political management rather than legal management.” There is no publicly available evidence that an effective measure of scrutiny is being applied.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 21 : Diplomat, phone interview, 2 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014
24

1. United States Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. “2014 Investment Climate Statement - Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 2014. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/227134.htm

2. International Monetary Fund. “Democratic Republic of Congo, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” 23 July 2013. p.54, para .151. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40814.0.

3. Theodore Trefon, “Congo Masquerade, The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure,” London/New York: Zed, 2011, p.118.

5. Transparency International. “Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement: A Practical Guide.” July 24, 2014. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/curbing_corruption_in_public_procurement_a_practical_guide

6. Cabinet du Président de la République. &quoute;Loi relative aux marches publiques,&quoute; April 2010. Accessed March 8, 2015, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2010/JOS.04.10.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
0

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

Researcher4306: Parliamentarians are unaware of when the procurement process is started, who initiated it, or when it has ended, according to information from Interviewee 25, while Interviewee 11 denied that the defence procurement cycle process is disclosed to the public. Asked to comment on defence procurements, Interviewee 2 called it a “vastly non-transparent process.” Public procurement systems are opaque and ineffective in the DRC, as noted by the Bertelsmann Foundation in 2012.

No media reporting seemed available at the time of writing.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 2: Scholar, e-mail correspondence, 22 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,” II Management Performance, 15 Resource Efficiency, p. 23. 2012. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
0

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Researcher4306: The parliament has at times requested information on procurement details and so the government submitted reports to the parliament, including ‘Rapport Lutundula’, and ‘Rapport des Biens Mals Acquis’. The National Assembly Special Commission on Peace and Security does not provide oversight on the specific aspect of defence procurement, according to Interviewee 25 who has experience in government. Interviewee 25 added, however, that the recommendations in the submitted reports were not followed through.

Interviewee 8 does not believe defence procurement oversight mechanisms exist, and neither do interviewees 17 and 25. Interviewee 11 believes that the absence of an oversight mechanism is a “very serious problem&quoute;, leading to a lot of decisions being taken by just one person.

Response to peer reviewer 3:
The legislation that you cite specifically exempts military procurement. There is no evidence of defence procurement oversight mechanisms. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: La loi sur la passation des marchés publics existe mais elle n'est pas mise en application par le MOD.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
0

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

Researcher4306: Some defence purchases are made public, although not through official sources, with suppliers notifying the UN Sanctions Committee of weapons deliveries to DRC. At the time of writing no media outlets had published public information on details of defence purchases however. No publicly available evidence suggests that there is a policy in place about the disclosure of defence purchases.

According to Amnesty International the main suppliers of arms to DR Congo between 2000 and 2012 have been China, France, Ukraine and the USA. Evidence from Amnesty International, SIPRI, and the UN Register for Conventional Arms indicates that other exporters included Albania, Belgium, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Serbia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.

The website of the Ministry of Budget publishes the annual budget and breakdown by ministry, which in turn offers an aggregate total figure for defence purchasing. However, Interviewee 17 said that here, two different budgets are provided, and many, including the interviewee, do not know which one the army budget is, leading to confusion rather than accountability. The interviewee cited as an example the purchase of hundreds of trucks, for which no budget was indicated. Interviewee 11 argued that the government itself “never publishes” defence purchases in practice.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014

1. Amnesty International. &quoute;If You Resist, We'll Shoot You&quoute;: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Case for an Effective Arms Trade Treaty,” June 11, 2012. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/if-you-resist-we-ll-shoot-you-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-case-for-an-effective-arm.

2. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx?CoI=CD&type=0&year=0&#lnkreg.

3. United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). Last modified 2013. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://comtrade.un.org/.

4. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). “Military Spending.” Last modified 2013. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Milex/.

5. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “The Military Balance 2014, The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics,” 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance.

6. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). “International arms transfers.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers.

7. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). “Arms Transfers Database.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

8. Small Arms Survey. “The Transparency Barometer.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/tools/the-transparency-barometer.html.

9. United Nations Sanctions Committee. “Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/reports.shtml.

10. Ministère du Budget. Ministère du Budget. &quoute;Project Du budget de 'Etat pour L'Exercice 2014, Synthese du Budget.&quoute; Accessed March 7, 2015, http://www.budget.gouv.cd/projet-budget-2014/, http://www.budget.gouv.cd/2012/budget2014/projet2014/exposes/03_annexe_1_synthese_du_budget_2014.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The National Assembly Special Commission on Peace and Security is largely ineffectual with its members susceptible to bribery and co-optation.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: defence purchases are only made public when suppliers notify the UN Sanctions Committee of weapons deliveries to DRC. China does not.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
0

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

Researcher4306: According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, foreign suppliers have been able to bid on government contracts since 2002. (The Government has yet to sign the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.) That said, foreign suppliers of arms interested in selling material to the DRC are not required to comply with existing procedures and standards.

Asked whether companies need to comply with standards to bid, Interviewee 11 immediately responded that there are no such official procedures known to parliament, and that the government of the DRC is hurting itself through this lack of legislation enforcing standards. Given the endemic corruption, it is very likely that if they were procedures or standards they would be applied inconsistently and with discretion.

No publicly available information nor interviewees could speak to possible discrimination made between bidding companies on matters of integrity or the possibility that bidding companies have to adhere to the pre-existing company law.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014


1. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President. “Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2012, p.116. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%20Congo_0.pdf.

2. Transparency International. “Raising the bar on bidding standards,” July 24, 2013. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.ti-defence.org/what-we-do/news-events/blog/105-raising-bar-bidding-standards.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
0

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

Researcher4306: According to Interviewee 24, the DRC government has been lagging for years on drafting legislation defining national defence and security strategy. Interviewee 9 sees “gaps and holes” in the army’s capabilities in eastern Congo, which they suggested implied the lack of a clear strategy, adding that they would be surprised if there were such a strategy in place. In terms of procurement, MONUSCO pays a lot of money each year, delivering fuel, rations, and other small items to the army.

Asked whether procurement requirements are derived from a well-audited strategy, Interviewee 11 strongly denied it, citing as evidence a recent incident where the government had allegedly bought rocket launchers without realising that they did not have the compatible rockets to use with them (NB: no further publicly available information about this incident was available at the time of writing).

The government has yet to formulate a national defence and security strategy from which to derive procurement requirements. Between December 2013 and March 2014, MONUSCO and international partners urged the Government to adopt a programmatic law for the defence sector, which would define a national defence strategy and priorities.

Interviewee 8 denied the existence of a multi-year procurement planning, remarking that he heard that the US reportedly proposed training in procurement planning, a claim that could not be verified by public information. “There is no cogent system.” According to Bertelsmann Foundation in 2012, “[p]ublic procurement systems are opaque and ineffective.“ […]. “Those individuals or companies awarded government tenders are often linked to the country’s elites,” which suggests that procurement is opportunistic. Procurement requirements are not disclosed to the public in any case.

As peer reviewer 2 notes, despite several resolutions from the UN Security Council urged for the adoption of a national defence and security strategy from which to derive procurement requirements the Government has not made any move toward a comprehensive, national, debated and shared defence and Security strategy. Nevertheless, Member States and donors went on cooperating with the Army and defence sector without any prior conditionalities related to such strategy. This scattered and piecemeal approach to the Sector has led to no progress up to now despite the fact that significant amounts of money were invested on SSR.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 9 : Military establishment, DRC, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 24 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2014/157,” III. Implementation of the mandate of MONUSCO, Support to security sector reform and police reform, para. 47, p.10. 2014. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/157.

2. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2013/757,” II. Major Development, Security sector reform, para. 9, p.2. 2013. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/96&Lang=E.

3. United Nations Secretary-General. “Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2012/838, para.12, p. 25, paras.16-17, p. 26. 2012. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/838&Lang=E.

4. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,” II Management Performance, 15 Resource Efficiency, p. 23. 2012. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

5. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “The Military Balance 2014, The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics.” 2014. Accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although several resolutions of the UN Security Council urged for the adoption of a national defence and security strategy from which to derive procurement requirements the Government has not made any move toward a comprehensive, national, debated and shared defence and Security strategy.
Nevertheless, Member States and donors went on cooperating with the Army and defence sector without any prior conditionalities related to such strategy. This scattered and piecemeal approach to the Sector has led to no progress up to now although significant amount of money were invested on SSR.
For example, the UK interrupted last year their cooperation with the PNC after having spent millions of pounds on the sector.
In the same vein, EUSEC and EUPOL missions were stopped having reached no significant results after almost a decade of dilapidated funds of FARDC and PNC.
As long as Member States will go on cooperating with the Ministry of defence and the PNC/FARDC on a bilateral basis without any national strategy and ownership, without any coordination and according to piecemeal projects, their efforts will be useless.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
0

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Researcher4306: Interviewees 25 and 11 denied that defence purchases are based on clearly identified requirements; Interviewee 11 further argued that the government did not seem committed to establishing a process of acquisition planning with clear oversight or a logical flow from identified requirements. As evidence, the interviewee cited examples of inefficiency where the government purchased three different models of tanks, and rocket launchers for which they did not possess compatible rockets. This inconsistency in the types of weapons procured is especially noteworthy in eastern Congo, where civilians and military alike have a wide range of arms at their disposal.

Interviewee 11 also asserted that the government seems to be purchasing in a hurry and responding to events when they occur rather than planning ahead, referencing the M23 crisis of 2012-2013, where the Congolese army struggled to mobilize the necessary equipment and manpower to defeat the powerful adversary of M23 in 2012, one of the many reasons it later lost the provincial capital of Goma to the rebels. In the following year, the army reportedly purchased a number of heavy weapons and eventually defeated M23 in November 2013.

Similarly, Interviewee 11 cited Congo’s 50th independence anniversary in 2010 as another example, with 15,000 soldiers parading the streets of the capital, as reported by Radio France International.

Arms purchases are often opportunistic in the sense that political and business elites personally profit from them, and they do not correspond to the armed forces' requirements at the given time.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014
.

1. Radio France International, &quoute;Congo marks independence amid rights abuse row,&quoute; July 1, 2010. Accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20100630-congo-celebrates-50-years-independence.

2. Jason K. Stearns, From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in Eastern Congo, (Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2012). Accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23#.VO8P2LOUcrM.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
0

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

Researcher4306: There is no open and objective system of competition for defence procurement. Many arms deals are not reported on, and research indicates that it is widely accepted that instead discretion and political calculations are the norm. For example, Interviewee 8 had never come across a tender process in the DRC's defence sector, saying that &quoute;people come unofficially from Israel, Ukraine, Russia, China and others, […] see politicians and make proposals.” Interviewee 11 also stated categorically that no competition occurred during army procurement tendering processes.

There is also a well-recognized lack of effective competition regulation for the country overall: a Bertelsmann Foundation assessment in 2012 indicated that there are “no safeguards&quoute; against monopolies and cartels for the wider market, and that “those individuals or companies awarded government tenders are often linked to the country’s elites.”

It is significant to note that according to the SIPRI international arms transfers database only two countries supplied arms to DRC in 2012: Serbia (60x mortars) and Ukraine (2x ground attack). Evidence suggests there are likely to be more, however. According to Amnesty International in 2012, the main suppliers of arms to DR Congo between 2000 and 2012 have been China (half of DRC’s tanks are reportedly sourced from China), France, Ukraine and USA. (On the Small Arms Survey’s Transparency Barometer for exporters, China scored 7, France 15, Ukraine 8 and the United States 15.75 on a scale of 25). Other exporters included Albania, Belgium, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Serbia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, according to Amnesty International, SIPRI, and the UN Register for Conventional Arms.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Amnesty International. &quoute;If You Resist, We'll Shoot You&quoute;: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Case for an Effective Arms Trade Treaty,” June 11, 2012. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/if-you-resist-we-ll-shoot-you-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-case-for-an-effective-arm.

2. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). “International arms transfers.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers.

3. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). “Arms Transfers Database.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

4. Control Arms. “Treaty.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://controlarms.org/en/treaty/.

5. Arms Treaty. “DR Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://armstreaty.org/state/dr-congo/.

6. Small Arms Survey. “A Decade of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons,&quoute; p.176. 2012. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-UNIDIR-2012-Decade-of-Implementing-the-UNPoA.pdf.

7. Small Arms Survey. “The Transparency Barometer.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/tools/the-transparency-barometer.html.

8. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2013. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx?CoI=CD&type=0&year=0&#lnkreg.

9. United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). Last modified 2014. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://comtrade.un.org/.

10. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). “Military Spending.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Milex/.

11. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “The Military Balance 2014, The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics,” 2014. Accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance.

12. Bertelsmann Foundation. “Transformation Index (BTI), Democratic Republic of Congo country report, 2012,&quoute; 7 Organization of the Market and Competition, p. 15; 15 Resource Efficiency, p. 23. 2012. Accessed August 23, 2014, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance.http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Congo_DR.pdf.

13. UN Register of Conventional Arms (UN Register). Last modified 2013. Accessed August 23, 2014, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att/deposit/asc, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/kinshasa.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
0

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Researcher4306: According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Ministry of Budget supervises a tender board established with the sponsorship and technical assistance from the World Bank. However, Interviewee 11 strongly denied that tender boards for the defence and security sector are subject to regulations and code of conduct, as their operations are conducted in secret. Interviewee 25 could not think of any such regulations, and neither could interviewee 21.

The Ministry of Budget itself provides no publicly available information regarding tender boards, and there were no mentions of their existence in local media sources.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 17 : Military establishment, phone interview, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 21 : Diplomat, phone interview, 2 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 23 : Military expert, DRC, 1 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014


1. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President. “Democratic Republic of Congo, p.116.” http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%20Congo_0.pdf.

2. United States Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. “2014 Investment Climate Statement - Democratic Republic of the Congo.” http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/227134.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
1

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Researcher4306: Formally, collusion between bidders is subject to legislation in the DRC, namely 
&quoute;La loi relative aux marches publics, Le Décret du 30 janvier 1940 portant Code Pénal tel que modifié et complété à ce jour&quoute;, &quoute;L’Ordonnance-loi no82-020 du 31 mars 1982 portant Code d’organisation et la compétence judiciaries&quoute;, &quoute;Le Décret du 06 à1959 portant Code de procédure pénale tel que modifié et complété à ce jour&quoute;, and &quoute;La loi no 023-2002 portant Code de Justice militaire et la loi no024-2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant code judiciaire militaire&quoute;.

In practice, according to Interviewees 21 and 25 the provisions are frequently violated however and hardly, if at all, enforced across all industries, let alone the defence sector. There are no anti-collusion legislation or procedures in place specific to defence and security. As peer reviewer 2 also notes, the law related to public procurement encompasses a large exception for military procurement.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 21 : Diplomat, phone interview, 2 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014


1. Loi relative aux marches publics, Cabinet du President de la Republique, Kinshasa. April 27, 2010. Accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2010/JOS.04.10.pdf.

2. Le Décret du 30 janvier 1940 portant Code Pénal tel que modifié et complété à ce jour. Mis à jour au 30 novembre 2004. November 30, 2004. Accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2004/JO.30.11.2004.pdf.

3. L’Ordonnance-loi no82-020 du 31 mars 1982 portant Code d’organisation et la compétence judiciaries. March 31, 1982. Accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/OL.31.03.82.n.82.020.htm.

4. Le Décret du 06 août à 1959 portant Code de procédure pénale tel que modifié et complété à ce jour. August 6, 1959. Accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/D.06.08.1959.ccp.htm

5. La loi no 023-2002 portant Code de Justice militaire et la loi no 024-2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant code judiciaire militaire. November 18, 2002. Accessed February 26, 2015, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.023.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: 1) Military staff and army commanders are not subject to the jurisdiction of civilian penal courts.

2) The law related to public procurement encompasses a large exception for military procurement.

3) The is no example of recent military Courts sentences against senior staff of the FARDC or PNC for crimes of corruption.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
0

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

Researcher4306: Interviewee 8 doubted the existence of procurement staff specifically trained and empowered to ensure defence contract meet their obligations. Interviewee 11 shares this sentiment, arguing that procurement is dealt with privately and summarising the current process thus: &quoute;Individuals receive orders, cash and then go [buy arms].&quoute; Interviewee 25 could not think of any training.

There is no legal obligation for procurement staff to receive training, and, at the time of writing, there was no information pertaining to the issue publicly available.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 8 : Military establishment, phone interview, 29 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The &quoute;Service de l'Intendance&quoute; has no control on significant procurement operation.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
0

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

Researcher4306: Research found no evidence of any existing formal complaint mechanisms. The defence procurement process in Congo overall is not transparent and generally secretive, with Interviewee 25 asserting that even parliament can be unaware of the identity of the country's arms suppliers. Interviewee 11 was not aware of any mechanisms allowing companies to complain about perceived malpractice, pointing out that most of the companies involved in procurement in the DRC are from Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, Russia China, and North Korea - companies which have a reputation for being &quoute;discreet&quoute;. If they were to complain, it is possible that they would be disadvantaged in future procurements.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
0

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

Researcher4306: The Congolese parliament &quoute;passed a new procurement law in April 2010 and the GDRC [Government of the DR Congo] has also adopted key implementing steps, institutions, and a manual of procedures to implement the new procurement law,” according to the US Department of State in July 2014.

Articles 77-81 of this law (&quoute;Loi relative aux marches publiques&quoute;) spell out the sanctions available for punishing misconduct, including imprisonment and a fine for up to 50.000.000 Congolese Francs. However, according to Interviewee 25, there is &quoute;no such case [of sanctioning] in the history of the DRC army&quoute;, with Interviewee 11 adding that the only punishment faced is that a different firm will be hired for the next tender.

It is also worth noting that this legislation specifically exempts military procurement. There are therefore no formal sanctions for the defence sector.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 21 : Diplomat, phone interview, 2 September 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014


1. United States Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. “2014 Investment Climate Statement - Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 2014. Accessed August 17, 2014 http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/227134.htm.

2. Cabinet du Président de la République. &quoute;Loi relative aux marches publics,&quoute; Art. 77-81. April 27, 2010. Accessed March 9, 2015, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2010/JOS.04.10.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
0

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

Researcher4306: While no information is publicly available and any details pertaining to possible off-set contracts would be kept very secret, Interviewee 11, who has intimate insights into the military establishment, strongly rejected the existence of off-set contracts. It is indeed very unlikely that they exist because DRC purchases mostly second-hand military equipment in an informal manner.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
0

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

Researcher4306: While no information is publicly available and any details pertaining to possible off-set contracts would be kept very secret, Interviewee 11, who has intimate insights into the military establishment, strongly rejected the existence of off-set contracts. It is indeed very unlikely that they exist because DRC purchases mostly second-hand military equipment in an informal manner. Nevertheless, the opacity surrounding the arms deals in general means that the existence of offset contracts cannot be ruled out, and a score of 0 has been awarded accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
0

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

Researcher4306: While no information is publicly available and any details pertaining to possible off-set contracts would be kept very secret, Interviewee 11, who has intimate insights into the military establishment, strongly rejected the existence of off-set contracts. It is indeed very unlikely that they exist because DRC purchases mostly second-hand military equipment in an informal manner. Nevertheless, the opacity surrounding the arms deals in general means that the existence of offset contracts cannot be ruled out, and a score of 0 has been awarded accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
1

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

Researcher4306: Formally, there are legislative and administrative procedures in place regarding brokering. According to the Small Arms Survey, the Government of Congo reported in 2010 that “Law No. 85- 035 of 3 September 1985 does not provide a brokering system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo because any import, export, transfer, transit and brokering depends on the prior authorization” of several ministries. “To carry out activities of brokering in SALW [small arms and light weapons] in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: authorization of the responsible authorities is required.” (Note that DRC expressed support for the inclusion of brokering in the scope of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).)

That said it is extremely likely that the authorization process is heavily corrupted or can be circumvented altogether. Interviewee 11 does not believe that agents and/or intermediaries are being used but that deals are made privately by elites in the defence and security sector. No information was publicly available at the time of writing.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Small Arms Survey. “A Decade of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Analysis of National Reports, 2012”, 2012, pp.248-249, accessed August 27, 2014, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-UNIDIR-2012-Decade-of-Implementing-the-UNPoA.pdf.

2. Arms Treaty. “Brokering Dealers,” 2013. Last modified July 24, 2014. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://armstreaty.org/issue/brokering-dealers/.

3. Droit Congolais. Last modified January 2014. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.droitcongolais.info.

4. Legal Net. Last modified 2013. Accessed August 28, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No business is possible in the DRC without intermediaries or facilitators.

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Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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74.
score
0

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

Researcher4306: Art. 44-46 of the Loi Relative Aux Marches Publics state that purchases of national defence materials need to be discussed within the Council of Ministers and then adopted by decree. In practice however, the surrounding evidence suggests that the very existence of a contract is often not disclosed, let alone the identity of the seller or aspects of the financing package.

According to interviewee 11, financial packages are “totally obscure&quoute;, with no details being made public, adding that deals are paid in cash and that nobody involved dares to ask further questions. Leasing is sometimes believed to be a method of payment, although no further information was available to corroborate this.

The two leading research organizations Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the UN Register for Conventional Arms do not have information on the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals in the DR Congo.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). “International arms transfers.” Last modified 2013. Accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

2. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). &quoute;Arms Transfers Database.&quoute; Last modified 2013. Accessed August 24, 2014 http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers.

3. UN Register for Conventional Arms. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2013. Accessed August 24, 2014 http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx?CoI=CD&type=0&year=0&#lnkreg.

4. UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comrade). Last modified 2013. Accessed August 24, 2014 http://comtrade.un.org/.

5. Loi relative aux marches publics, 2014. Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2010/JOS.04.10.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
0

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

Researcher4306: According to Art. 80 of the Congolese law pertaining to public business (Loi Relative Aux Marches Publics), corruption is illegal. However, the provision does not formally require subsidiaries and sub-contractors to adopt anti-corruption measures nor is it likely that the article is rigorously enforced in light of prevailing corruption across the DRC.

Interviewee 11 believes that this is an ideal far from the DRC at present, as the government uses only a few contractors. Interviewee 25 added that there was no single case they could recall wherein such a requirement was in place.

No publicly available information existed at the time of writing that could contradict this assertion.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014

1. LOI RELATIVE AUX MARCHES PUBLICS, CABINET DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE, Kinshasa, April 27, 2010, Art. 80. Accessed on February 26, 2015, http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2010/JOS.04.10.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
2

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

Researcher4306: According to the interviewees, acquisitions are largely independent of political influence.

According to Interviewee 11 who has extensive experience in the military establishment, political influence by selling nations plays a minimal role, with the two biggest suppliers being China and the Ukraine. In Interviewee 11's analysis, China sells when approached by the DRC rather than exert pressure on the DRC to buy. Instead of political gain, &quoute;they are more interested in barters - using their own companies to build things in the DRC&quoute;. Interviewee 11 also deemed it unlikely that Ukraine had a sustained political interest in the DRC, especially given that the country does not have an embassy or official representatives there.

Interviewee 25 agreed with this analysis, positing that defence acquisitions are more likely to be determined by potential financial gains to be made by those within the procurement system rather than international political concerns. However, given the lack of a procurement framework and processes for strategic planning, the risk of political considerations preceding military need in purchases is present.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with Interviewee 11 : Military establishment, phone interview, 30 August 2014
Interview with Interviewee 25 : Parliamentarian, phone interview, 30 August 2014


1. Amnesty International. &quoute;If You Resist, We'll Shoot You&quoute;: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Case for an Effective Arms Trade Treaty,” June 11, 2012. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/if-you-resist-we-ll-shoot-you-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-case-for-an-effective-arm.

2. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 “International arms transfers.” http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers.

3. Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 “Arms Transfers Database.” http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

4. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Last modified 2014. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx?CoI=CD&type=0&year=0&#lnkreg.

5. United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). Last modified 2013. Accessed August 26, 2014 http://comtrade.un.org/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It is difficult to assess China's current political influence on DRC's military options, but it is undoubtedly growing and it might very well become a criteria in the coming years for military expenditure.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+