This country is placed in Band D

Turkey’s GI ranking in Band D places it in the high risk of corruption category. The country’s lowest corruption risk areas is Personnel (Band C).The highest corruption risk areas are Political and Operations in Band E (very high risk).

Parliamentary Scrutiny and Oversight

The Turkish Grand National Assembly has limited to no formal powers to oversee the defence sector and spending. It cannot formally oversee the defence budget, monitor procurement, or scrutinize the military’s commercial activities. Furthermore, laws requiring that external audit reports be submitted to Parliament are frequently ignored.  While the National Assembly has a specialized commission devoted to defence – the National Defence Commission – its powers are highly circumscribed, relating mostly to the examination of draft bills. The commission therefore has no role in shaping the defence budget, acquisition planning, the procurement process, and Turkey’s top secret “National Security Policy Document.” 

We recommend that the National Security Policy Document be made public and provisions be made for more effective civilian and parliamentary oversight. With regards to acquisition planning and procurement, for example, this expanded oversight would necessitate debate of Turkey’s Ten-Year Procurement Plan (OYTEP), which is currently unavailable to the public. Even the National Assembly lacks sufficient details regarding how those decisions are made and has no ability to influence them.  

Engagement with the Media and Civil Society

Turkey’s specific national security policy – the “National Security Policy Document” – is classified and unavailable to the public. Furthermore, there is no evidence of the Turkish government participating in public debates regarding issues of defence more broadly conceived. Journalists seeking to report on critical defence issues have increasingly been challenged by authorities using criminal defamation/anti-terrorism legislation. Freedom House reports that conditions for media freedom have been steadily deteriorating since 2010.   We recommend that the government be more proactive in its efforts to engage civil society on defence issues and that the legal right to free of speech be upheld.

Budget Transparency and Audit Mechanisms

The Ministry of National Defence does not consult the National Assembly when formulating its budget. While some details of the budget are made public, they are highly aggregated to avoid scrutiny, and there is evidence that parliamentarians largely misinformed of critical details of military spending and procurement projects.

Sources of defence income are similarly opaque.  Central government allocations notwithstanding, the SSDF (Defence Industry Support Fund) and the TSKGV (Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces) constitute the Ministry of Defence’s two major sources of income.  The SSDF is a financial instrument connected to the Under Secretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) and thus subject to some scrutiny through SSM’s reports. The TSKGV, conversely, is a foundation - not a public institution - and therefore remains largely free from scrutiny despite the fact that it owns funds of eighteen companies, finances Turkish defence projects, and makes significant contributions to military defence projects.

We recommend that the government publish an annual defence budget that includes detailed information on expenditure across functions and sources of defence income. The TSKGV should be subjected to enhanced scrutiny and the details of an external audit be made publicly available.

Organizational Capacity for Effective Auditing

Turkey’s mechanisms for internal and external auditing are opaque and suffer from insufficient organizational capacity.

With regards to internal auditing, evidence suggests that the Ministry of National Defence’s Department of Inspection lacks sufficient specialist personnel and financial resources to audit and critically evaluate the budget.

With regard to external auditing, the Court of Accounts officially audits defence expenditure on behalf of the Grand National Assembly. However, its auditing mechanisms have been rendered overall ineffective in recent years and the publication of auditing reports to the public is restricted.

We recommend that attention be devoted towards enhancing Turkey’s organizational capacity to conduct internal audits and that internal audit reports be supplied to Parliament on a consistent basis. We recommend that external audit reports similarly be made publicly available.

Implementation of international anti-corruption instruments

Turkey has ratified the relevant international anti-corruption conventions (e.g. OECD Convention, UNCAC), however a lack of political will has undermined their effective implementation. The European Commission Progress Report on Turkey (2013) highlights the lack of sufficient resources to investigate and prosecute foreign bribery, protect whistle-blowers, and educate the public on the negative effects of bribery.

While Turkey signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on the June 3, 2013, it has yet to ratify it. No particular provisions related to the anti-corruption articles of the ATT have been implemented, limiting transparency of the arms trade process.  According to reports in May 2015 by a prosecutor and court testimony, Turkey's intelligence agency aided the delivery of arms to rebel-controlled parts of Syria in 2013 and 2014. While the government has denied this, the Turkish Statistics Institute also published an official report which revealed the level of arms exports to Syria. 

We recommend that Turkey ratify the ATT and comply with its regulations of the arms trade.  Similarly, we recommend that Turkey enhance its implementation of UNCAC and the OECD in line with the European Commission’s review.

Leadership 30
01.
score
1

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Legislative scrutiny in Turkey has very limited formal provision and is largely ineffective. Aside from oversight performed by the National Defence Commission and the Planning and Budget Commission (which oversees the budget), ministers are presented with questions by members of parliament (MPs), there are general debates, inquiries and investigation demands. Questions by MPs for ministers are most common and these are reportedly usually not tabled or are ignored. There is evidence of parliamentary debate and parliamentary authorisation has been sought in the past year, for example, for army operations.

The defence policy is prepared by the National Security Council and enforced in the National Security Policy Document, classified as &quoute;top secret&quoute;. The military command has a decisive authority over the decisions made in the council and is answerable directly to the prime minister, a structure which does not allow for inspection by the parliament. The National Defence Commission oversight mechanisms in the context of defence policy are ineffective, as the commission plays no role in its determination. Non-compliant to the parliamentary rules, no minutes are taken during its activities.

It must be noted that Turkey’s ruling party, the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) lost parliamentary majority for the first time since 2002 in June 2015. As attempts to form a coalition alliance failed, fresh elections are to be held on 1 November 2015 and an interim government was formed until then in late August 2015. Commentators have stated this was the preferred approach for the AKP as it may give them a chance to win back majority in parliament.

COMMENTS -+

Hale Akay, Security Sector in Turkey: Questions, Problems and Solutions (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2010) 9-12, http://www.tesev.org.tr/security-sector-policy-report-1--the-security-sector-in-turkey--questions,-problems-and-solutions/Content/314.html

Nezir Akyeşilmen, “Legislation: the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,” in Almanac Turkey 2006-2008: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight, edited by Bayramoğlu, A. İnsel (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2010) 14, http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/6233670f-ac67-49fa-9e9e-f86698f4b56e/gsr-almanac-2006-08.pdf.

Biriz Berksoy, Military, Police and Intelligence in Turkey: Recent Transformations and Needs for Reform (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2013) 17-18, http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/01082013160934.pdf

Defence News, &quoute;Turkey To Broaden Possible Army Operations Against Militants in Iraq, Syria&quoute; September 24. 2014, http://archive.defencenews.com/article/20140924/DEFREG01/309240026/Turkey-Broaden-Possible-Army-Operations-Against-Militants-Iraq-Syria

Website of the General Secretariat of National Security Council accessed April 26, 2014. http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/

The Guardian, “Turkey's president calls for new election after government deadline passes”, 24 August, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/24/turkey-president-new-election-government-deadline

Al Jazeera, Two pro-Kurdish MPs part of Turkey's interim government, 28 August 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/pro-kurdish-mps-part-turkey-interim-government-150828190339081.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although it is true that security challenges and policy are discussed at the National Security Council, this body in recent years has been largely reduced to a role in which it recommends policy unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s when it also watched over enforcement. In line with their sharply reduced role in politics, the generals have retreated to a primarily enforcement/consultative position. Practically speaking the final policy is made by an inner cabinet consisting of the foreign minister, head of the intelligence and the prime minister who makes the final decision.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
1

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

The National Defence Commission of the parliament is one of the permanent specialised commissions of the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly). However, it has minimal authority of oversight and considerable concerns are raised over its effectiveness. The commission plays no role in the determination of the defence policy, including the defence budget, arms purchases and the National Defence Policy Document. The task of the National Defence Commission is limited to the examination of draft bills and proposals referred by the Presidency of the TBMM according to the legal grounds of the Parliamentary bylaw. Contrary to the regulation of the TBMM, and as practiced by all other permanent commissions, the National Defence Commission does not record minutes of its meetings and is therefore not publicly transparent.

The composition of the National Defence Commission is based on the numerical strength of parties. Turkey’s ruling party, the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) lost parliamentary majority for the first time since 2002 in June 2015. As attempts to form a coalition alliance failed, fresh elections are to be held on 1 November 2015 and an interim government was formed until then in late August 2015. Commentators have stated this was the preferred approach for the AKP as it may give them a chance to win back majority in parliament.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Nezir Akyeşilmen, “Legislation: the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,” in Almanac Turkey 2006-2008: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight, edited by Bayramoğlu, A. İnsel (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2010) 16, http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/6233670f-ac67-49fa-9e9e-f86698f4b56e/gsr-almanac-2006-08.pdf.

Biriz Berksoy, Military, Police and Intelligence in Turkey: Recent Transformations and Needs for Reform (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2013) 18, http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/01082013160934.pdf

Website of the Turkish Parliament (TBMM). &quoute;The Internal Regulations of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.” Accessed April 16, 2014. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ictuzuk/ictuzuk.htm

The Guardian, “Turkey's president calls for new election after government deadline passes”, 24 August, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/24/turkey-president-new-election-government-deadline

Al Jazeera, Two pro-Kurdish MPs part of Turkey's interim government, 28 August 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/pro-kurdish-mps-part-turkey-interim-government-150828190339081.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
1

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

The national defence policy, expressed in the National Security Policy Document, is classified as “top secret” and is not officially debated in public. The parliament plays no role in the determination of the National Security Policy Document. While some parts of the original draft have been leaked to the press, it remains that the National Security Policy Document is not made officially available to the public.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Although the document has been leaked and is discussed in part, its de-facto secret nature does not allow for a public debate on equal terms. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Hale Akay, Security Sector in Turkey: Questions, Problems and Solutions (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2010) 9-12, http://www.tesev.org.tr/security-sector-policy-report-1--the-security-sector-in-turkey--questions,-problems-and-solutions/Content/314.html

Nezir Akyeşilmen, “Legislation: the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,” in Almanac Turkey 2006-2008: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight, edited by Bayramoğlu, A. İnsel (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2010) 14, http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/6233670f-ac67-49fa-9e9e-f86698f4b56e/gsr-almanac-2006-08.pdf.

Website of the National Defence Council. Last reached on 21.04.2014. http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Ingilizce/index_en.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although it is true that the National Security Policy Document remains classified there has been vibrant public debate around most if not all threats and security challenges the white paper contains, including old and emerging asymmetrical threats.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
1

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

Turkey is known to have a vibrant civil society. However, reports (EC, 2013) find that it still needs to netogiate a space for itself as a &quoute;legitimate stakeholder&quoute; in democracy by those involved in political processes and the current legal framework is detrimental to the empowerment of the civil society.

While the precedence for the involvement of civil society organisations (CSO) exists for anti-corruption discourse in general, it does not, however, for the issue of defence and security. The involvement of civil society in the implementation of the 2010-2014 National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan, for example has been limited and ad hoc. CSOs such as TEPAV (Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı), TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı) and Transparency International (TI) were consulted in preparing the 2010 action plan, however no active participation has taken place since. Even general government anti-corruption initiatives hence greatly lack civil society monitoring and involvement.

COMMENTS -+

The Inspections Board of the Prime Ministry. “Strategy to Raise Transparency and Strengthen the Fight against Corruption,” accessed April 20, 2013, http://www.teftis.gov.tr/webform2.aspx?ShowPageId=16

European Commission, “Turkey 2013 Progress Report,” (Brussels: October 16, 2013) 12-13 (Fight Against Corruption), http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/strateji/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf

Ayşe Üstünel Yırcalı, “Corruption and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Turkey: The role of CSOs in providing advocacy and policy advice” Powerpoint of a speech held at the Opening Conference of the SELDI network Good Governance in South-East Europe and Turkey, Zagreb, March, 5 2013. Accessed April 21,2014. www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=21230

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
2

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Although the relevant conventions are ratified, a lack of political will to achieve concrete results is observed by both Transparency International's (TI's) OECD Convention Progress Report (2013) and the European Commission Progress Report on Turkey (2013). In its progress report, TI finds inadequacies in the legal framework and the enforcement system. In particular, the resources available to investigate and prosecute foreign bribery, protection of whistle-blowers and legislation requiring detailed accounting and auditing procedures, as well as public awareness about the negative effects of bribery, are still lacking. The findings of OECD's phase 3 report from 2014 on the implementation of the convention in Turkey indicated no significant developments, although some progress appears to be made to address foreign bribery. According to the European Commission report (2013) in the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) process, financing of political parties, parliamentary immunity, asset verification of public figures and officials, track record of investigation, indictment and conviction need to be prioritised. Further concerns remain about impartiality in the processing of anti-corruption cases. Turkey needs to ensure dissuasive penalties in all corruption cases.
Turkey has yet to have an UNCAC implementation review despite having ratified the UNCAC in 2006.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agreed and score lowered from 3 to 2 accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Country Profiles, Turkey, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/cac/country-profile/index.html

OECD Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Convention in Turkey (October 2014), page 10, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/TurkeyPhase3ReportEN.pdf.

Transparency International, Exporting Corruption, Turkey, http://www.transparency.org/exporting_corruption/Turkey

Transparency International. Exporting Corruption Progress Report 2013: Assessing Enforcement of the OECD Convention On Combating Foreign Bribery. Berlin: 2013. http://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Internationales/2013_ExportingCorruption_OECDProgressReport_EN.pdf

European Commission. Turkey 2013 Progress Report. Brussels: October 16, 2013, p. 48 (Anti-Corruption Policy). http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/strateji/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The ratification of international anti-corruption treaties have not produced any evidence of compliance: Not a single prosecution on charges of corruption in the year is being examined. Due to government's curbs on press freedoms there was not even a case of &quoute;reporting,&quoute; let alone prosecution.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
0

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

The recent strengthening of civil society, as demonstrated by the Gezi Park protests in 2013 in Turkey, has created more public debate on topics previously considered as highly sensitive. Following the leaking on the video-sharing site YouTube of a recording of top security officials discussing possible military action in Syria, the site was subsequently blocked, but the discussion among the public continued to be fervent. Nonetheless, the government, beyond condemning the leak, remained very restrained and did not engaged in a debate on the issue.

According to reports, journalists reporting on issues of corruption and national security have faced unprecedented hurdles. Freedom House reports that conditions for media freedom have been deteriorating steadily for the past five years, with authorities cracking down on journalists and media agencies using legislation relating to criminal defamation and anti-terrorism, especially with the lead up to fresh parliamentary elections in November 2015. This has also included verbal attacks by senior politicians, as well as harassment and death threats against journalists on social media. Several journalists have become unemployed as a result of this pressure.

There is no evidence that the government communicates or participates in public debate on issues of defence.

COMMENTS -+

European Commission, “Turkey 2013 Progress Report” Brussels: October 16, 2013, 1-2 (Conclusions on Turkey), http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/strateji/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf

Radikal Newpaper. “Dışişleri kaseti doğruladı: Alçakça bir saldırı” (Foreign Affairs Cassette was Confirmed: A Villainous Attack), March 27, 2014, accessed April 17, 2014, http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/disisleri_kaseti_dogruladi_alcakca_bir_saldiri-1183554

Tattersall, Nick, “Turkey calls Syria security leak 'villainous,' blocks YouTube,” Reuters, March 27, 2014, accessed April 17, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/27/us-syria-crisis-turkey-idUSBREA2Q17420140327

Freedom House, Freedom of the Press, Turkey 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/turkey

Business Insider UK, &quoute;One tweet shows just how ridiculous Turkey's media crackdown has become&quoute;, September 14, 2015, http://uk.businessinsider.com/media-crackdown-in-turkey-2015-9?r=US&IR=T

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is often a two-way dialogue between non-governmental actors and the government, not on defence policy-making, but on defence industry policy-making.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are ongoing, fervent debates on issues of defence. It is indeed not possible to turn on the TV and not come across a debate between journalists, academics, civil society organizers and activists at any given day. Sometimes, government officials also join in on these debates and pass on the government's perspective on these issues to the public. Further discussion ensues on newspaper columns, editorials, radio shows, and etc.

Yet, the presence of debates does not guarantee participation of civilians into the policy making process. On the contrary, government draws the policies, measures, etc. on issues of defence, and only later on, when the consequences of these become visible (at various levels, through various instances like the tapes for example), public debate takes them on.

Moreover, regardless of the medium for these debates, they are often coated under strong discourses of nationalism and national security. Given the long and recent history of Kurdish conflict in Turkey, the pertinence of these discourses should not be surprising. Nonetheless, their prevalence especially when discussing issues of defence should be a source of concern.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
1

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

There is no evidence of an actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (2010 - 2014) was launched in 2010. The EU accession process is believed to have driven the anti-corruption strategy to the front of Turkey's policy agenda. It was aimed at preventing corruption, enforcing sanctions on the corrupt and raising awareness of corruption. However, it did not specify policy or implementation plans regarding the defence and security sector. Its implementation period was between 2010 and 2014, it doesn't appear that a new strategy and plan have been put in place after 2014.

As has been widely criticised by the European Commission in their Progress Report of 2013, codes of ethics have not been extended to military personnel.

While this cannot be regarded as an anti-corruption policy, Military Criminal Law counts corrupt actions such as bribery, defalcation, extortion, fraud, and bid rigging as criminal offences that are punished by discharge from the Turkish Armed forces along with other measures.

COMMENTS -+

European Commission, “Turkey 2013 Progress Report,” Brussels: October 16, 2013, p. 48 (Anti-Corruption Policy). http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/strateji/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf

Southeast Asian Leadership for Development and Integrity, Corruption Assessment Report, February 2015, http://seldi.net/publications/publications/corruption-assessment-report-turkey/

1632 Sayılı Askeri Ceza Kanunu (Military Criminal Law No. 1632), Section B of Article 30, March 22, 2000, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.1632.pdf

Kıvanç Ulusoy, &quoute;Turkey's Fight Against Corruption: A Critical Assessment&quoute;, Istanbul Policy Center, November 2014, https://www.academia.edu/9432038/Turkey_s_Fight_Against_Corruption_A_Critical_Assessment

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
1

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

While an anti-corruption agency does not exist in Turkey, several institutions possess an anti-corruption mandate. The oversight of the military from these institutions is limited due to it reportedly being subject only to cursory oversight by the institution of the Ombudsman and the Court of Auditors. The Military Criminal Law counts corrupt actions such as bribery, defalcation, extortion, fraud, and bid rigging as criminal acts that are punished with discharge from the Turkish Armed forces along with other measures. Military jurisdiction however lacks independence. Since the judges that carry out their duties, are appointed within a hierarchical structure and are audited by an inspection board connected to the Ministry of National Defence, the independence of their prosecution is questionable.

COMMENTS -+

Chêne, Marie, “U4 Expert Answers: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Turkey,” Anti-Corruption Resource Center. 2012, 7, http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-turkey/

1632 Sayılı Askeri Ceza Kanunu (Military Criminal Law No. 1632), Section B of Article 30, March 22, 2000, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.1632.pdf

Biriz Berksoy, Military, Police and Intelligence in Turkey: Recent Transformations and Needs for Reform (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2013) 13-16, http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/01082013160934.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
2

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer 2013 on Turkey shows a clear decrease of respondents who feel that the military is very or extremely corrupt to 30 per cent (in comparison to the Transparency International report “Corruption Perceptions of the Military Around the World” of 2007 showed that 60 per cent of respondents regarded the Turkish military as very or extremely corrupt). On the other hand, according to the Gallup Survey of 2013, a sharp fall has occurred among the urban population concerning their general confidence in the military, losing its position as the most trusted institution in Turkey. While in previous reports, the Turkish population has been described as trusting in the military as an institution, but as when it comes to judging it as an institution in terms of corrupt, this now appears to have been reversed. The Turkish population in the urban centres appear to have lost faith in the military as an institution, that has been traditionally regarded as the safe keeper of the secular state, although it does appear to trust in the reforms that have brought the military more centrally under governmental oversight.

COMMENTS -+

Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2013, “Turkey,” accessed April 04, 2014, http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=turkey

Serkan Demirtas, “Turkey learns how to fight against corruption from Singapore”, Hürriyet Daily News, March 5, 2014. Accessed April 24, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-learns-how-to-fight-against-corruption-from-singapore-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=63213&NewsCatID=429

Transparency International UK. Corruption Perceptions of the Military around the World. November 2007, accessed April 04, 2014, http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/675-corruption-perceptions-of-the-military-around-the-world

Gallup Survey, “Urban Turks' Trust in Major Institutions Drops Sharply,” August 15, 2013, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/163979/urban-turks-trust-major-institutions-drops-sharply.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
0

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

There is no evidence that such assessments are conducted by the Defence Ministry or another government agency. No evidence could be found that regulations or practices, which would facilitate such an evaluation, are in place.

COMMENTS -+

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, accessed April 19, 2014, www.msb.gov.tr

Website of Turkish General Staff, accessed April 19, 2014, www.tsk.tr

Marie Chêne, “U4 Expert Answers: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Turkey,” Anti-Corruption Resource Center. 2012, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-turkey/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
1

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Acquisition planning by Turkey's defence procurement agencies, the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) and the Ministry of National Defence Deputy Undersecretary Related with Procurement and Infrastructure (MND-MITY), is based on the OYTEP (Ten Year Procurement Plan), which is prepared according to the Strategic Objective Plan and the determined needs of the armed forces. The OYTEP is reported to severely lack oversight and is not publicly available. The SSM, which is the main defence procurement agency in Turkey, prepares a strategic plan of procurement projects, which is made publicly available. Details of the procurements however are not available and decision-making procedures are for the most part not transparent. Furthermore, the parliament merely ratifies arms procurement and has no oversight over the process of planning. This is reportedly due to the lack of political will, as well as the unequal distribution of expertise between military and civilian public servants in favour of the military. Plans are further understood to be lacking accountability and oversight due to the frequent use of “urgent requirements” and the absence of evidence whether plans are in fact complied with. As interviewee 2 stated, the &quoute;procurement decisions are changed all the time (...) and the procedures are made deliberately confusing&quoute; to keep oversight in check.

Act no. 3238 (1985) is credited with having strengthened the defence acquisition process. However, experts recommend a &quoute;proper Defence Acquisiton Act&quoute; and a procurement process to ensure more flexibility and a dynamic process which enables knowledge sharing.

COMMENTS -+

Caymaz et al, Defence Acquisition Transformation: The Turkish Case&quoute;, the 8 th International Scientific Conference, Defence Resources Management in the 21st Century, November 2014, https://www.academia.edu/9251279/defence_ACQUISITION_TRANSFORMATION_THE_TURKISH_CASE

Law no.5018, the Public Financial Management and Control Law:
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.5436&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations, Telephone Interview, 3rd of May 2014

Handbook on the use of standards in defence procurement (Turkish Ministry of National Defence (MND) Answers). Undated. Accessed 24.04.2014: http://www.defence-handbook.org/pdf/turkey_proc.pdf

Ismet Akça, Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems and Solutions (Istanbul: TESEV Publication, 2010), http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/gsr-2-eng.pdf

Chêne, Marie. “U4 Expert Answers: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Turkey.” Anti-Corruption Resource Center. 2012. Accessed April 25, 2014. http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-turkey/

Website of the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries. Accessed April 23, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/home/Sayfalar/default.aspx;

Website of the Ministry of National Defence Deputy Undersecretary Related with Procurement and Infrastructure (MND-MITY). Accessed April 23, 2014. http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/TEDKOOR/html/tanitim.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: One reason why there is poor oversight is the potential abuse of one particular contractual clause: commercial and/or security secrecy which the government institutions often cite for their reluctance to share information with the public.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
1

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

The Ministry of National Defence does not involve or seek the opinion of parliament or the National Defence Committee when the defence budget is being formulated.

While details of some of military spending in Turkey are publicly accessible, such as the budgets of the Ministry of National Defence (MND), public access to information with regard to many elements is limited (highly aggregated) or impossible. It is telling to compare the budget requirements of the MND, which is 2.5 pages long, and the General Command of the Gendarmerie (JGK), which is 2 pages is length, with that of the Ministry of Finance, which is 41 pages long.

Information on the Defence Industry Support Fund (SSDF), Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKEK), village guards and expenditure on the secret services (MIT) are easily accessible for the years 2006-2012, however estimates for 2013-2015 are not publicly available. While military-related R&D expenditure and repayment of military-related foreign loans, can be calculated from the activity reports and financial statistics of the related institutions, here too the long-term estimates are not available. There is also no publicly available information with regard to the expenditure of the the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV) and the pension payments to the Turkish Armed forces. These imbalances in transparency are furthermore due to significant levels of extra-budget expenditures, distributed among other budget lines, a practice that is legally permitted.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: As I have stated, the transparency of the budget is very limited, both in regard to their public availability, as well as the vague and aggregated forms of the break-down of budgets which are available publicly. The accuracy and availability of the Court of Accounts reports has further deteriorated in the last years. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure,” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014). http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Transparency International - UK Defence and Security Programme, “The Transparency of National Defence Budgets,” October 2011, accessed April 19, 2014, http://www.ti-defence.org /publications/893-the-transparency-of-defence-budgets

Public Expenditures Monitoring Platform, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.kahip.org/index_en.html

Inter-Parliamentary Union, Turkey, Parliamentary Oversight, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2323_F.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Budget bill traditionally details all spending. Also, the reports of annual oversight by the Court of Accounts (the state audit authority) are available publicly. Procurement authorities almost in all contracts specify which contender bid at what price and terms in general (though they may abstain from going into contractual details citing secrecy clauses). One area that is not transparent is the penalties Turkish agencies impose on bidders due to breach of terms/specifications, citing, again, secrecy clauses.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
1

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

Military institutions submit their annual budget requirements to the Ministry of Finance and the Grand National Assembly, which is scrutinized by the Planning and Budget Commission. However, the information provided is so scant (2.5 pages budget requirements of the MND while the budget of the ministry of Finance comprises 41 pages) that the parliament cannot effectively monitor expenditures. Furthermore, during the meetings of the Planning and Budget Committee, parliamentarians are reportedly largely misinformed on details of military spending and procurement projects. Investigation is limited to broad categories of expenditure; military programs and projects are not investigated. However, in November 2013, a step was made, when the opposition deputies for the first time debated the defence budget during the Parliament’s Planning and Budgetary Commission, in addition to questioning the lack of democratic oversight over defence, security and arms procurement spending. For example, the rationale behind the recent acquisition of a Chinese missile system was questioned during the debate. In particular, the long-term request to present a strategic overview of the Turkish arms-procurement policies rationale has been understood as a first step towards greater accountability.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014). http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Yentürk, Nurhan. Askeri ve İc Güvenlik Harcamalarını İzleme Kılavuzu. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi: 2009.

Ismet Akça, Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems and Solutions (Istanbul: TESEV Publication, 2010), http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/gsr-2-eng.pdf

Transparency International - UK Defence and Security Programme, “The Transparency of National Defence Budgets,” October 2011, http://www.ti-defence.org /publications/893-the-transparency-of-defence-budgets

Lale Kemal, “Turkey’s defence spending rises as lack of transparency criticized,” Today’s Zaman, November 20, 2013, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-331941-turkeys-defence-spending-rises-as-lack-of-transparency-criticized.html

Today's Zaman, &quoute;Debate over Turkish defence budget highlights government’s shortcoming&quoute;, November 27, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_debate-over-turkish-defence-budget-highlights-governments-shortcoming_365504.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
2

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

Sections of Turkey’s defence budgets are publicly available online, but they are presented in very broad categories and lack the detail necessary for transparency and effective oversight. Since the adoption of Law no. 5018 on public financial management and control in 2003, the General Directorate of Public Accounts of the Ministry of Finance is published. Nonetheless, considerable sections of the budget, as well as parliamentary discussions on the budget are not made publicly available. Defence budgets that are not made publicly available can be found in the Public Expenditures Monitoring Platform (the website link is provided in the sources section).

COMMENTS -+

5018 Sayılı Kamu Malî Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu (Public Financial Management and Control Law No. 5018), December 10, 2003, accessed 23.04.2014, http://www.sgb.gov.tr/Sayfalar/Basimi-Yapilan-Mevzuat.aspx

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014). http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Public Expenditures Monitoring Platform. Accessed April 28, 2014. http://www.kahip.org/index_en.html

Transparency International - UK Defence and Security Programme. “The Transparency of National Defence Budgets.” October 2011. Accessed April 19, 2014: http://www.ti-defence.org /publications/893-the-transparency-of-defence-budgets

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
1

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

The SSDF (Defence Industry Support Fund) and the TSKGV (Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces) are two substantial sources of defence income other than from central government allocations. The SSDF is the financial instrument to enable the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) to ensure a continuous and stable extra-budgetary financing for the modernisation of the TAF and the modernisation of the Turkish defence industry. The SSDF's income and expenditures can be monitored (as bulk sums) from SSM activity reports. The TSKGV, a foundation with the objective to establish a national defence industry, makes substantial contributions to Turkish military spending. The Foundation directly or indirectly owns funds of 18 companies, finances Turkish defence projects and makes significant contributions to military defence projects. The TSKGV is not scrutinised as a public institution, and it is not subject to auditing by the Court of Audits. No information is published on the absolute value of the TSKGV expenditure.

COMMENTS -+

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV), accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.tskgv.org.tr/tskgv/

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure,” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Website of the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries, “2013 Activity Report,” accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Faaliyet%20Raporlar/2013%20Yılı%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
1

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

Internal audit in Turkey, according to the OECD-Sigma Assessment of Turkey (2012), “continues to suffer from the persistent confusion between the respective objectives, roles and responsibilities of internal audit and inspectorate functions”. Even though the Public Financial Management and Control Law should have reformed this process, problems have been faced in the design of a structure and mechanism to actively promote internal audit because the law was not implemented effectively. The Ministry of National Defence’s (MND) Department of Inspection lacks civilian specialist personnel in order to audit and critically evaluate the budget. Bahadır Topal, the representative of the Public Sector Internal Auditors Association, stated at an anti-corruption conference at TEPAV in October 2013, that the internal audit units in Turkey still suffer majorly from organisational and budgetary problems. The statements by interviewee 2 and the cited sources support the conclusion that the process is largely ineffective, including insufficiency in the transparency of the process and a lack of parliamentary scrutiny.

COMMENTS -+

OECD-Sigma, “Assessment Turkey,” May 2012, 6, http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Turkey_Assess_2012.pdf

Law 5018 on Public Financial Management and Control (2003)

Biriz Berksoy, Military, Police and Intelligence in Turkey: Recent Transformations and Needs for Reform (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2013), http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/01082013160934.pdf

TEPAV news, “An Anti-Corruption Conference at TEPAV,” November 11, 2013, accessed April 24, 2014, http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/3578

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations, Telephone Interview, 3nd of May 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
1

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

The Court of Accounts (Sayıştay) officially audits defence expenditure on behalf of the Grand National Assembly (TBMM). However, its auditing mechanisms have been rendered overall ineffective in recent years, as both interviewees underlined. Inspection of spending and assets of defence institutions had been exempt from auditing by the Court of Accounts until the implementation of a new law of accounts in 2010. The Law No. 6085 covering the amendments, tasks the Court with carrying out performance auditing. However, the legislative changes lacked key mechanisms of transparency, making it impossible for the Court of Accounts to question expenditures or their underpinning policies. In 2012, the law was further amended to restrict its scope. Although this amendment has been since overturned, the ambiguity of the law, the reported lack of cooperation from the relevant institutions, and the withholding of the reports from the parliament, has rendered the audit in Turkey non-transparent and totally ineffective. The publication of auditing reports to the public is restricted.

COMMENTS -+

Law No. 6085 on Turkish Court of Accounts

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations, Telephone Interview, 3nd of May 2014

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist, Telephone Interview, 7th of May 2014

Yentürk, Nurhan, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, 2014. http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Boyacioglu, Haci. “3 yıl daha denetimsiz” (3 more years without audit). Radikal Newspaper, December 12, 2013. Accessed April 24, 2014 http://www.radikal.com.tr/ekonomi/3_yil_daha_denetimsiz-1165731

Baş, Hasan. “Sayıştay’ın Denetimi Etkisiz Hale Geliyor” (The Court Of Accounts’ Audit Is Becoming Ineffective). Milliyet Newspaper. May 21, 2013. Accessed 2nd of May 2014. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/sayistay-in-denetimi-etkisiz-hale/gundem/ydetay/1711558/default.htm

Kemal, Lale. “Hiding behind the shield of secrecy.” Today’s Zaman. May 11, 2011. Accessed April 24, 2014 at: http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/lale-kemal_243564-hiding-behind-the-shield-of-secrecy.html

6085 Sayili Sayistay Kanunu (Law of the Court of Accounts No. 6085), December 12, 2010. Accessed April 21,2014, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6085.pdf

Website of the Court of Accounts (English), Accessed 18.04.2014: http://www.sayistay.gov.tr/en/?p=2&CategoryId=15

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
4

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

The Ministry of Defence and Turkish Armed Forces budgets are allocated from the general budget. The extra-budgetary fund of the Undersecretariat of Defence Industry, the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation and its companies, and OYAK (the Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund), have other sources of revenue and do not include interests in businesses related to natural resource exploitation.

However, there do not appear to be constitutional or statutory provisions removing defence institutions from having controlling or financial interests in businesses related to natural resource exploitation either.

COMMENTS -+

Website of OYAK (Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund), &quoute;Sürdürülebilir ve Güvenli bir Gelecek icin” (For a sustainable and secure future), accessed April 17, 2014, http://www.oyak.com.tr/TR/kurumsal/oyak-nedir/gelir-kaynaklari.html

Website of the TSKGV (Turkish Armed Forces Foundation), “Statute of the
Foundation”, “Assests of the Foundation” and “Revenue sources of the foundation”, accessed April 17, 2014, http://www.tskgv.org.tr/tskgv/?page_id=111

Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV). Tanıtım Kitabı 2010-2011 (Introduction Book 2010-2011), (TSKGV: Ankara, 2010) 4-6, http://demo.renklisayfa.net/tskgv/bo2.pdf

3238 Sayili Yasa Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarliğinin Kurulmasi (Law No. 3238 on the Foundation of Undersecretariat of Defence Industry), July 11, 1985, accessed April 25, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Sayfalar/mevzuat.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
2

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

There have been cases of the involvement of organised criminal activity in the armed forces and of activities with alleged ties to the defence staff. Recently, due to the high tension in connection with the peace process of the Turkish state with the Kurds, several cases including the killings of soldiers and a chief of police have emerged in which the perpetrators of the crimes are unknown. Although the state has accused the PKK of these crimes, they have not stepped up to the allegations and doubts remain as to who may be behind the offences. However, there is no clear evidence that organised crime has penetrated and is a permanent aspect of the defence sector.

There is evidence that the government is alert to the risk of organised crime regionally and internationally. Apart from having acceded to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Turkey is also party to regional cooperation efforts in the fight against organised crime in the Balkans and Black Sea Regions and has had in place the &quoute;Agreement on Cooperation between the European Police Office (EUROPOL) and the Republic of Turkey&quoute; since 2004. Turkey has also set up the Turkish International Academy Against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC) with the cooperation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with the aim of fostering regional and international collaboration and network building. There is evidence, however, that the government does not have the capacity to tackle the issue and may not be entirely prepared for the risks it entails. While cases of organised crime relating to corruption have been prosecuted, there is no real incentive today, according to the interviewee, for this issue to make it onto the political agenda.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Vatan Newspaper, “Daha önce rütbeleri sökülen komutanlar!” September 22, 2012, accessed April 22, 2014 http://haber.gazetevatan.com/daha-once-rutbeleri-sokulen-komutanlar/482627/1/gundem

Keskin, Adnan, “Yüksekova çetesi yokmuş,” Radikal, November 23, 2005, accessed April 17, 2014, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=170851

Millyet Newspaper, “Susurluk Dosyasi” (The Susurluk File), February 12, 2001, accessed May 22, 2014, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/content/dosya/susurluk/susur1.html

Radikal Newspaper, &quoute;Bingöl saldırısında soru işaretleri: Beş dakikada yirmi kilometre kat edilir mi?&quoute; (Question marks in Bingöl attack: Can 20 kilometers distance be covered in 20 minutes?), November 5, 2014, accessed December 11, 2014, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/bingol_saldirisi_bes_dakikada_yirmi_kilometre_kat_edilir_mi-1224348

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Efforts In Combating Organized Crime, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-efforts-in-combating-organized-crime.en.mfa

Habertürk, &quoute;3 askerin şehit edildiği hain saldırının detayları ortaya çıktı&quoute; (Details revealed of 3 soldiers killed in treacherous attack) October 27, 2014, accessed December 11, 2014, http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1003618-3-askerin-sehit-edildigi-hain-saldirinin-detaylari-ortaya-cikti

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: One major problem in this area is the highly politicised nature of the Turkish judiciary. There have been ongoing prosecutions into alleged organised crime into various military departments including into some defence contracts but indictments often produced flimsy and factually incorrect evidence strengthening suspicions that these trials may be politically motivated to discredit some officers.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
1

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

In the Military Criminal Law and Military Judiciary, legal provisions to this effect exist. However, the effectiveness of these provisions, as well as the political will to implement them is highly questionable. The reluctance to control criminal activity can be seen for example in an inquiry by the Corruption Investigation Commission in 2003 over allegations related to early warning and control aircraft procurement contracts. The investigation into losses of around 180 million dollars was closed down even before any clear results could be obtained. Military jurisdiction further lacks independence since its judges carry out their duties, are appointed within a hierarchical structure and are audited by an inspection board connected to the Ministry of National Defence (MND). The MND furthermore has the authority to appoint military judges which can allow the government to exercise undue control and impact judges' impartiality.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Website of the MoD Justice Department, accessed 17.04.2014, http://www.msb.gov.tr/asad/

Ismet Akça, Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems and Solutions (Istanbul: TESEV Publication, 2010), http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/gsr-2-eng.pdf

Ümit Kardaş, “Military Jurisdiction,” in A. Bayramoğlu, A. İnsel (eds.), Almanac Turkey 2006-2008: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight (Istanbul: TESEV, 2009) http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/6233670f-ac67-49fa-9e9e-f86698f4b56e/gsr-almanac-2006-08.pdf

Biriz Berksoy, Military, Police and Intelligence in Turkey: Recent Transformations and Needs for Reform (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2013), http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/01082013160934.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
1

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

The Court of Accounts has the official authority to audit the performance of the National Intelligence institution (MIT). However, the audit of the Court of Accounts is reportedly ineffective and is not made available to the parliament. Currently, the oversight of the organisation is carried out through its internal inspection board and is at the disposal of the Prime Minister. The lack of oversight became evident in connection with an investigation of the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) in the year 2012. The legal amendments of Article 26 of Law No. 2937, which took place in connection to this investigation, arbitrarily provide impunity to civil servants and reinforce the legal framework that leaves the MIT free from oversight. A recent change to the MIT law in April 2014, has widened the authority and scope of duty of the intelligence agency to an unprecedented high. While it will also introduce a parliamentary commission, it is highly questionable whether the commission will in fact have the authority to subject the MIT to appropriate controls. As Interviewee 3 stated: “We do not know whether this commission will be functionary or whether it will in fact just be window dressing.” The changes will give agents of MIT legal immunity and extraordinary protection from the oversight by the national media. In this regard, Interviewee 2 stated, &quoute;the changes show a return to a security state in which “the oversight is going to get less and less.”


Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agreed and score lowered from 2 to 1.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Biriz Berksoy, Military, Police and Intelligence in Turkey: Recent Transformations and Needs for Reform (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2013), http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/01082013160934.pdf

“MIT teklifinin birinci bölümü kabul edildi” (The first part of the MIT proposal was accepted), April 16, 2014, accessed April 21, 2014, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/mit_teklifinin_birinci_bolumu_kabul_edildi-1187067

Ali Ünal, “Turkish Parliament Approves National Intelligence Bill,” Daily Sabah, April 17, 2014, accessed April 21, 2014http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/04/17/turkish-parliament-approves-national-intelligence-bill

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Auditing of the intelligence services remains an internal one, with no effective external auditing. The amendments to the MIT law, as discussed in the comments box above, make it even more difficult to financially scrutinise the agency. It is widely speculated, probably accurately, that both MIT's and the prime minister's slush funds are used to finance some foreign operations which the government wishes to keep classified.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
1

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Personnel of the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) are regarded as state officials within the State Officials Law No. 657. The careers website of the MIT states the requirements for recruitment of personnel (for non-senior personnel), indicating that at least four years of higher education and ability assessments are required. According to Law No. 2937, which regulates the MIT, the Undersecretary of National Intelligence is appointed with the approval of the Prime Minister and the President after consultation with the National Security Council. Directors and assistants to the Undersecretariat of National Intelligence are appointed on the suggestion of the Undersecretary with the approval of the Prime Minister and the President. The Undersecretariat appoints other personnel. However, the by-laws, which state the regulations concerning the appointment for other senior positions are classified, and therefore their selection criteria are not transparent.

COMMENTS -+

657 Sayılı Develet Memurları Kanunu (State Officials Law No. 657), July 14, 1965, accessed April 18, 2014. http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.657&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=Devlet

2937 Sayılı İstihbarat Hizmetleri ve Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı Kanunu (Law on State Intelligence Services and National Intelligence Organisation No.2937), Website of the National Intelligence Organisation, November 1, 1983, accessed April 18, 2014, http://www.mit.gov.tr/2937.pdf

Website of the National Intelligence Organisation, “MIT Kariyer” (Career site), accessed April 18, 2014, http://www.mit.gov.tr/iksayfasi/index.html

Website of the National Intelligence Organisation, “Merak Edilenler – Kariyer” (For interested individuals – Career), accessed April 18, 2014, https://www.mit.gov.tr/me_ik.html

Radikal Newspaper, “MİT'te şike tayini” (Match-fixing appointment at MIT), February 24, 2012, accessed April 18, 2014, http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/mitte_sike_tayini-1079747

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
1

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Turkey signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on the 3rd of June 2013, but has not yet ratified it. There are no particular provisions in relation to the relevant anti-corruption articles of the ATT. While the Turkish government, according to interviewee 3, aims to stay clear of illegal arms trade activities, its control is so far not a well scrutinised process. In spring of 2014, a tape was leaked, allegedly a conversation between an Turkish airlines official and Mustafa Varank, a senior aide to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in which a shipments of weapons to Nigeria with the country’s national airline is discussed. Additionally, according to reports in May 2015 by a prosecutor and court testimony, Turkey's intelligence agency aided the delivery of arms to rebel-controlled parts of Syria in 2013 and 2014, which was denied by the government. The Turkish Statistics Institute also published an official report which revealed the level of arms exports to Syria, another confirmation, despite the government's denial. This is a clear infringement of the ATT.

The Ministry of Defence annually announces the permitted export material and technology according to Law no. 5201. The 2014 announcement can be accessed on the website of the Ministry of National Defence. Turkey is further aligned to the following protocols and agreements: The Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Given the limited parliamentary oversight of defence in general, it is unlikely that exports are subject to considerable debate. A news report from 2014 does mention the defence minister's written response to a parliamentary inquiry related to exports, which may mean that there is a process in place, however.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Website of UNODA (United Nations Office for Disarmament affairs), “Turkey,” accessed April 23, 2014, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/s/turkey

Website armstreaty.org, “Turkey,” accessed April 23, 2014, http://armstreaty.org/state/turkey/

Ministry of National Defence, “Announcement,” January 25, 2014, accessed April, 23, 2014, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/01/20140125-13.htm

The Times, &quoute;Turkey shipped arms to Nigeria, leaked tape claims&quoute; March 20, 2014, accessed 11 November 2014, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4038738.ece

Reuters, &quoute;Exclusive: Turkish intelligence helped ship arms to Syrian Islamist rebel areas&quoute; May 21, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/21/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-arms-idUSKBN0O61L220150521?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report&utm_campaign=SitRep0522

Today's Zaman, &quoute;Turkey’s statistics institute reveals scale of arms exports to Syria&quoute; June 2, 2015, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkeys-statistics-institute-reveals-scale-of-arms-exports-to-syria_383004.html

defenceNews,&quoute;Turkey Targets $1.6 Billion in Arms Exports, August 4, 2014, http://archive.defencenews.com/article/20140804/DEFREG/308040015/Turkey-Targets-1-6-Billion-Arms-Exports

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
1

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

Law No. 3212 regulates the disposal of assets of the armed forces in the form of surplus sales of goods and sevices, grants, acquisitions and disposal. Since the 2012 changes to the reports of the Court of Audit, state property holdings and the assets of related institutions were to be censored before being presented to the Grand National Assembly. Hence, there are official controls, but official information, according to interviewee 2, is not obtainable and there are no effective controls over their disposal. However, interviewees 2 and 3 also stated that the media shows an interest in the subject of state assets and reports on their disposal frequently. Early in 2014, the law 3212 was adapted in order to open the sale of immovable property from a restriction to natural persons, to companies and institutions, hence making it easier for the military to liquidate significant assets.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

3212 Sayili Kanun Silahli Kuvvetler Ihtiyaç Fazlasi Mal ve Hizmetlerinġi Satis, Hibe, Devir ve Elden Çikarilmasi (…) (Armed Forces Surplus Sales of Goods and Services, Grants, Acquisition and Disposal Law No. 3212), May 30, 1985, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.3212.pdf

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 17-18, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Lale Kemal, Zayıf Kalan Meclis İradesi: Yeni Sayıştay Yasasında Askeri Harcamaların Denetimi Sorunu (The Parliamentary Will Remains Weak: The New Law on the Turkish Court of Accounts and the Ongoing Problems of Monitoring Military Spending), (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2012).

Adnan Keskin, &quoute;Hükümetten TSK’ya sus payı&quoute;, Taraf newspaper, Feburary 23, 2014, accessed May 29, 2014, http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber-hukumetten-tskya-sus-payi-149002/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
1

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

Assets of the armed forces are within the audit scope of the Court of Accounts as of December 2010 with the adoption of Law 6085, but amendments to the law, have limited its authority in such a way that its auditing has been rendered ineffective. Furthermore, the adoption of the “principle of secrecy” regarding the reports of the Court of Accounts on the oversight of the security institutions’ assets conceals the monitoring of its results from the public.

COMMENTS -+

Law no. 6085 on Court of Accounts, accepted December 3 2010, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmî Gazete, 19 Dec. 2010, English translation at http://www.sayistay.gov.tr/en/?p=2&CategoryId=15

Lale Kemal, “Zayıf Kalan Meclis İradesi: Yeni Sayıştay Yasasında Askeri Harcamaların Denetimi Sorunu” (The Parliamentary Will Remains Weak: The New Law on the Turkish Court of Accounts and the Ongoing Problems of Monitoring Military Spending), 2012, Istanbul: TESEV Publications.

Şahin Binici, Mustafa Can Türkyene, &quoute;Güvenlik Sektörünün Sayiştay Denetimi ve 6085 Sayili Sayiştay Kanunu'nun Getirdiği Yenilikler (Court of Accounts' Auditing of Security Sector and Innovations of Court of Accounts Law No.6085), Dış Denetim Dergisi, year: 1, no: 3, 2011, http://www.sayder.org.tr/e-dergi-guvenlik-sektorunun-sayistay-denetimi-ve-6085-sayili-sayistay-kanununun-getirdigi-yenilikler-11-4.pdf

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 17-18, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
0

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

The Secret Fund is established under law no. 5018 within the budget of the Prime Ministry for confidential intelligence and defence services. The amount that is allocated from the general budget to the secret fund for any given year cannot exceed 0.5 per cent. However, since the secret fund is used for domestic security, military purposes, as well as for political, social and cultural purposes, the share allocated to military or intelligence expenditure is not available to the public. According to estimations, the allocation of the secret fund to the military is high. It is further assumed that a large share of military spending is financed through these allocations. In 2012, an unplanned increase of the secret service expenditure reportedly occurred, most likely in connection with the war in Syria.

COMMENTS -+

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 6-7, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

International Budget Partnership, “Open Budget Index Turkey Questionnaire,” (June 2011), 77, accessed April 21, 2014, http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Turkey_Questionnaire_OBS2012.pdf

Public Expenditures Monitoring Platform, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.kahip.org/index_en.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: This information is unavailable to the public. Furthermore, there is little (if any) incentive to make it available to the public in the future.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
1

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

The legislature is reportedly not given full information on secret items. The ‘secret fund’ of the secret services is included in the budget of the Prime Ministry and only limited information is available to the legislature. Some information regarding the fund are available in the activity reports of the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Finance. The interviewee stated that with the increase of a concept of national security over the last years and the recent changes to the security services law, oversight over secret items is at a particular low.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

International Budget Partnership, “Open Budget Index Turkey Questionnaire,” (June 2011), 148, accessed April 21, 2014,
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Turkey_Questionnaire_OBS2012.pdf

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 7, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
0

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

While the Court of Accounts audit reports should be provided to the legislature and subsequently debated in parliament, the report has not been submitted to parliament in the last few years. In November 2013, the opposition deputies debated the defence budget during the Parliament’s Planning and Budgetary Commission, questioning the lack of democratic oversight over defence spending. According to interviewee 3, this “has been the first time in fact that the Turkish opposition deputies displayed a more questioning nature on the Turkish defence expenditures.” Secret items are further often excluded from the MND’s budget and rather included in budgets that are not subject to the audit of the Court of Accounts, such as the budgets of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSKGV) and the Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKEK). Alternatively they may be part of the budget of the Defence Industry Support Fund (SSDF), whose procurement projects under the SSM are officially to be subject to audit by the Court of Accounts since 2010, but do not appear to have been submitted to parliament in the past few years.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Sayistay Kanunu (Law of the Court of Accounts) No. 6085, December 12, 2010, accessed April 21, 2014, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6085.pdf

Lale Kemal, Zayıf Kalan Meclis İradesi: Yeni Sayıştay Yasasında Askeri Harcamaların Denetimi Sorunu (The Parliamentary Will Remains Weak: The New Law on the Turkish Court of Accounts and the Ongoing Problems of Monitoring Military Spending), (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2012).

Şahin Binici, Can Mustafa Türkyene, &quoute;Güvenlik Sektörünün Sayiştay Denetimi ve 6085 Sayili Sayiştay Kanunu'nun Getirdiği Yenilikler” (Court of Accounts' Auditing of Security Sector and Innovations of Court of Accounts Law No. 6085), Dış Denetim Dergisi, 1 no: 3 (2011) 28-29.
http://www.sayder.org.tr/e-dergi-guvenlik-sektorunun-sayistay-denetimi-ve-6085-sayili-sayistay-kanununun-getirdigi-yenilikler-11-4.pdf

Lale Kemal, “Turkey’s defence spending rises as lack of transparency criticized,” Today’s Zaman, November 20, 2013, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-331941-turkeys-defence-spending-rises-as-lack-of-transparency-criticized.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
1

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

There appear to be no restrictions on off-budget expenditure in Turkey. While there is no specific legislation on off-budget spending, different government agencies appear to have their own laws or policies that allows them to contribute to military expenditure.

Treasury-backed loans is one form of off-budget spending.

Treasury-backed loans is an instrument of such spending. The Defence Industries Research and Development Institute (TUBITAK) is a state institution and not listed as part of the military. However, it spends part of its budget on military R & D.

The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV, Türk Silahli Kuvvetleri Güclendirme Vakfi) is a military foundation and a leading actor in the military industry sector in Turkey. The foundation is established by Law No. 3388, which exempts from scrutiny as a public institution. It is set up with the purpose of “work[ing] towards increasing the fighting strength of the Turkish Armed Forces by developing the national armaments industry of Turkey, establishing new branches of the armaments industry, and purchasing weapons, vehicles and equipment.” According to article 6 of its statute, the foundation spends 20 percent of its net income on upkeep and administration and allocated 80 percent on military spending in line with its objective. The funding of the foundation is secured mainly by the profits of the 18 private companies it holds considerable shares in, with the four largest of its affiliated companies, namely Aselsan, Havelsan, Roketsan and the Turkish Aerospace Industries being responsible for a great majority of its profits. These companies operate in line with the law for private commerce but are managed by a board of public officials. It also makes profit from rents collected from property and facilities, partnership protocols, returns on bank deposits, and profits from commercial fairs.

The Defence Industry Support Fund (SSDF) would also be of relevance here although it is an extra budgetary fund and is the financial instrument to enable the SSM to ensure a continuous and stable extra-budgetary financing for the modernization of the TAF and the modernisation of the Turkish defence industry. The main income of the fund are corporate tax allocations, fees imposed on alcohol and tobacco, lottery, gambling and betting. The fund was envisioned as a purpose-built financial instrument with high flexibility and lack of bureaucratic formality. Law no. 3238 places the SSDF within the Central Bank and under supervision of the SSM.

Recording of such expenditure is incomplete at best and the score has been selected accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

“European Handbook on the use of standards in defence procurement” (Turkish Ministry of National Defence (MND) Answers), accessed April 24, 2014 at: http://www.defence-handbook.org/pdf/turkey_proc.pdf

Ismet Akça, Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems and Solutions (Istanbul: TESEV Publication, 2010), http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/gsr-2-eng.pdf

Arzu Küflü and Bülent Beyoğlu“Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarliğinin (SSM) Tedarik Faaliyetleri ve Hukuki çerçeve” (The Undersecretariat of defence Industries (SSM) and the Legal Framework of its Procurement Activities), Dış Denetim Dergisi 1, 2 (2010). 109-110, http://www.sayder.org.tr/e-dergi-savunma-sanayii-mustesarliginin-ssm-tedarik-faaliyetleri-ve-hukuki-cerceve-9-14.pdf

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 5-6, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Burak Bekdil and Ümit Enginsoy, “Turkey’s New Procurement Rules Give Greater Control to Civilians,” Defence News, October 29, 2012, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.defencenews.com/article/20121029/DEFREG04/310290005/Turkey-8217-s-New-Procurement-Rules-Give-Greater-Control-Civilians

3238 Sayili Yasa Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarliğinin Kurulmasi (Law No. 3238 on the Foundation of Undersecretariat of Defence Industry), July 11, 1985, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Sayfalar/mevzuat.aspx

US Department of State, Foreign Military Financing Account Summary, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm

United States European Command, Turkey, http://www.eucom.mil/mission/the-region/turkey

Burak Bekdil, &quoute;Turkey Expects $1.2B-$1.6B Procurement Boost&quoute;, defence News, February 10, 2015, http://www.defencenews.com/story/defence/policy-budget/budget/2015/01/26/turkey-conscription-fee-procurement-ssm/22361701/

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV, Türk Silahli Kuvvetleri Güclendirme Vakfi), “Foundation Notes” http://www.tskgv.org.tr/foundation-notes/, accessed October 01, 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
2

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

The expenditures of the SSM (Undersecretariat of Defence Industry) funded by the SSDF (Defence Industry Support Fund) are substantial. There is no indication, however, of illicit economic activity. The fund (by its founding Law No. 3238) is supported by allotments from the corporate tax, fees and levies imposed on alcoholic and tobacco products, as well as all forms of gambling and lottery. It is possible to monitor the expenditures made from the fund through the Activity Reports of the SSM. The Undersecretariat provides information and is nearly as transparent as the Ministry of Defence and the Turkish Armed Forces. SSDF's income and expenditures can be monitored (as bulk sums) from its activity reports.

A considerable contribution to military spending is allocated from the profits of private companies run by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV, Türk Silahli Kuvvetleri Güclendirme Vakfi). For the military expenditure that is conducted through this foundation, very little information is available. The Foundation directly or indirectly owns funds of 18 companies and finances Turkish defence projects, making substantial contributions to the Land, Naval and Air Force Commands. The TSKGV is not scrutinised as a public institution, and it is not subject to auditing by the Court of Audits. No information on the absolute value of the TSKGV can be acquired.

COMMENTS -+

Arzu Küflü and Bülent Beyoğlu“Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarliğinin (SSM) Tedarik Faaliyetleri ve Hukuki çerçeve” (The Undersecretariat of defence Industries (SSM) and the Legal Framework of its Procurement Activities), Dış Denetim Dergisi 1, 2 (2010). 109-110, http://www.sayder.org.tr/e-dergi-savunma-sanayii-mustesarliginin-ssm-tedarik-faaliyetleri-ve-hukuki-cerceve-9-14.pdf

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 5-6, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

3238 Sayili Yasa Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarliğinin Kurulmasi (Law No. 3238 on the Foundation of Undersecretariat of Defence Industry), July 11, 1985, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Sayfalar/mevzuat.aspx

Website of the Undersecretariat of Defence Industry, “SSM Activity Report 2013” (2014), http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Faaliyet%20Raporlar/2013%20Yılı%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.pdf

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV, Türk Silahli Kuvvetleri Güclendirme Vakfi), “Foundation Notes” http://www.tskgv.org.tr/foundation-notes/, accessed October 01, 2015

Ismet Akça, Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems and Solutions (Istanbul: TESEV Publication, 2010), http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/gsr-2-eng.pdf

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 5-6, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no reliable evidence to suggest whether off-budget military expenditures involve do or do not involve illicit activity.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
2

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

The definition of a “state secret” is not well defined in Turkey. Based on a vague concept of “national security”, it is a definition that allows almost any information to be classified as such. A classified document or information can be kept concealed for up to 50 years. The authority to classify is held by the “State Secrets Review Board,” which consists of the Ministries of Justice, National Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs and is held under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, placing the monopoly de facto into the hands of the Prime Minister. Law 5201 or the Law On Defence Industrial Security And Classified Military Information In Turkish Defence Industry,furthermore provides the legal framework for &quoute;all classified military agreement, information, documentation, project, purchase, sell, manufacturing, research and development, storage of material or services, facilities to conduct those activities related to defence industry excluding the staff of and the facilities belong to Turkish Armed Forces&quoute;. The authority for classification is the Ministry of Defence. Article 8 of the Draft Law Amending the State Secrets, the text adopted by the Commission of Justice, further exempts classified information from judicial review for the state institutions, exempting it from effective scrutiny.

An example of the insufficiency of oversight and the influence that the Prime Minister has upon decisions relating to classification is exemplified in a case from February 2012, in which the Undersecretary and four members of MIT were requested to testify in the investigation relating to the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), the grounds of which had been allegations that MIT had previous intelligence of some activities of the PKK. The government reacted instantaneously, dismissing the prosecutor and many officials, as well as amending article 26 of law no. 2937 on the State Intelligence Services and The National Intelligence Agency to extend the impunity granted to MIT members, as well as resting the decision on whether to open future investigation relating to MIT members solely in the hands of the Prime Minister.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Biriz Berksoy, Military, Police and Intelligence in Turkey: Recent Transformations and Needs for Reform (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2013), 9, http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/01082013160934.pdf

Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). “Devlet Sırrı Kanunu Tasarısı ve Avrupa Birliği Uyum Komisyonu ile Adalet Komisyonu Raporları” (The Draft Law Amending the State Secrets, European Union Harmonization Commission and Judicial Commission Reports, accessed April 18, 2014, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss287.pdf

Website of the Parliament. &quoute;Information on Law Proposal.&quoute; Accessed April 18, 2014.
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tasari_teklif_sd.onerge_bilgileri?kanunlar_sira_no=95752

Adnan Keskin, “Sır rejimi kapıda,” Taraf Newspaper, December 12, 2013, accessed April 24, 2014, http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber-sir-rejimi-kapida-141909/

2937 Sayılı Devlet İstihbarat Hizmetleri ve Milli İstihbarat Teşkilati Kanunu (Law No. 2937 on the State Intelligence Services and The National Intelligence Agency), Article 26, February 17, 2012, accessed November 11, 2014, https://www.mit.gov.tr/2937.pdf.

Herdem Attorneys at Law, Turkey: Outline Of The Law On Defence Industrial Security And Classified Military Information In Turkish Defence Industry, Last Updated January 5 2015, http://www.mondaq.com/turkey/x/364632/Terrorism+Homeland+Security+Defence/Outline+Of+The+Law+On+Defence+Industrial+Security+And+Classified+Military+Information+In+Turkish+Defence+Industry

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
2

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV) was founded with the aim of establishing a national defence industry in Turkey. The foundation directly or indirectly owns shares of 18 companies, including some of the largest companies in Turkey. The companies owned by the TSKGV operate subject to the laws for private commerce. However, public officials nonetheless manage the companies with the Board of Trustees including the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, the MND Undersecretary and the MND Undersecretary for Denfence Industries. Being private commercial industry, however, they cannot be audited by the Court of Accounts. The TSKGV has published its balance sheets showing net profit since 2010; however the absolute value of its expenditure is not published.

COMMENTS -+

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014). 9-11, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Public Expenditures Monitoring Platform. Accessed April 28, 2014. http://www.kahip.org/index_en.html

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV). Accessed April 20, 2014.
http://www.tskgv.org.tr/tskgv/?page_id=463&lang=en

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Details of such businesses' operations and finances may not be totally transparent but it would be wrong to claim they are not transparent at all. For instance, military electronics specialist Aselsan, Turkey's biggest defence firm, is publicly listed at the Istanbul stock exchange.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
1

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

Since the businesses are owned by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV) and are subject to the law for private commerce, the Court of Audits does not audit their funds. The TSKGV has published balance sheets showing net profit since 2010, although no profit sheets are available for earlier years.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Although it is true that some companies are scrutinised independently, the process is externally enforced and hence not reliable nor are details available to the public. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 9-11, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Public Expenditures Monitoring Platform. Accessed April 28, 2014. http://www.kahip.org/index_en.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Most companies publish annual reports and due to different reasons are subject to some scrutiny. Most big companies have western partners which require independent auditing reports before signing up partnerships on long-term programmes. One company, Aselsan, is listed on the Istanbul stock exchange and must have fully independent reporting and scrutiny. The Armed Forces Fund plans further public offering of some other defence businesses too.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
4

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

Law No. 657 on Public Officials prohibits public officials from being involved in any commercial actitvity, including consultancy services for any private entity, during employment with the government. While there is evidence of the military having influence over economic enterprises at an institutional level, parochial economic gain does not seem to be the motivation in these instances. As Cook (2014) argues: &quoute;The instances in which Turkish commanders have engaged in corruption or used their status to extract rent from state-owned or private enterprises are few.&quoute; When there has been reason for suspicion however, a reluctance to control criminal activity can be observed as is examined further in Question 35.

The score has been awarded on the basis that public officials are prohibited from having private entrepreneurial activities and there is no evidence of the same in recent years.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Law 657 on Public Officials (1965)

Steven A. Cook, “Closing the Channels of the Military’s Economic Influence in Turkey,” Middle East Institute Essay, April 20, 2014, http://www.mei.edu/content/closing-channels-militarys-economic-influence-turkey

Ismet Akça, Military-Economic Structure in Turkey: Present Situation, Problems and Solutions (Istanbul: TESEV Publication, 2010), http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/gsr-2-eng.pdf

“Daha önce rütbeleri sökülen komutanlar!” Vatan September 22, 2012, retrieved April 22, 2014, http://haber.gazetevatan.com/daha-once-rutbeleri-sokulen-komutanlar/482627/1/gundem

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
0

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

There has been no such commitment expressed at present on the issue, as both interviewees confirmed, and there are very few examples of commitments to anti-corruption by the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs in the past.

One example dates back to 2005 in which under the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök, the Deputy Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ stated in a speech that the Turkish Armed Forces would “continue the fight for transparency and against corruption, a topic of great awareness in society”. Previously, in 2004, under Özkök the prosecution of one of the force commanders for bribery took place. This case was regarded as a first step in the commitment to anti-corruption, but has reportedly not been as effectively continued as hoped for.

According to interviewee 1, anti-corruption policy is intricately connected to the political atmosphere in the country, which at the moment leaves no particular room for commitment to transparency. Given Turkey has had presidency of the G20 in 2015, corruption was highlighted as a priority by the Prime Minister and in the Turkish Presidency's priorities for 2015. However, this was not specifically in relation to Turkey, rather all the G20 countries, not was any priority given to addressing corruption in defence.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, &quoute;Turkish Armed Forces,” in Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in Turkey: 2005/2006, edited by Ümit Cizre, (Istanbul: TESEV publications, 2006), 68-69.

Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, &quoute;Başbuğ'un yolsuzluk vurgusu” (Başbuğ's corruption emphasis), Sabah Newspaper, January 27, 2005, accessed April 22, 2014. http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/01/27/yaz40-50-115.html

Today's Zaman, &quoute;Davutoğlu places emphasis on ‘corruption,’ Erdoğan stresses ‘parallel’&quoute;, November 23, 2014,http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_davutoglu-places-emphasis-on-corruption-erdogan-stresses-parallel_365168.html

G20, Turkish G20 Presidency Priorities for 2015, https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2015-TURKEY-G-20-PRESIDENCY-FINAL.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Article 30 of the Military Criminal Law defines forms of bribery and corruption as reasons for sanctions, which include discharge from the Turkish Armed Forces. While the law is very clear, only few examples can be found of such measures being carried out in practice, which makes it difficult to evaluate whether the sanctions are effective. One prominent example, however, prevails, despite it having taken place a decade ago. A former commander was prosecuted by the Military Court in 2004 on grounds of bribery accusations. He was stripped of his title of admiral and imprisoned for one year. This was regarded as a first in Turkish history.

Constitutional amendments in 2010 entitled civilian courts to try military officials for crimes committed against the constitutional order and the total (de facto) impunity of the Chief of Staff and force commanders was abolished. The High Military Administrative Court maintains duality between civilian and military courts while the decisions of the Military Appeals Court are not subject to civilian oversight. The level of military autonomy in judicial oversight remains high and is still a concern, according to reports.

However, according to both interviewees, in recent years the government has slowed down reforms that were creating more transparency and the situation today is rather reversing itself. According to them, while operations against corruption and smuggling do make it into the newspapers from time to time, sanctioning, particularly at high levels, has not been continued effectively in recent years.

Political dynamics in Turkey appear to contribute to the stance the government takes in terms of the enforcement of sanctions on the military. Civilian-military relations, which have historically been tense, came to an all-time high with the well-known 2010 Sledgehammer case, over 400 active and retired officers (including generals) were tried for plotting a coup to overthrow the government. Several high ranking officials including commanders resigned in protest and while some considered this as a way to end the impunity enjoyed by the military, others stated the charges were false and an attempt to ensure the government's ultimate power. Reports indicate that in an apparent attempt to appease the military to cover up a high profile corruption case scandal (reportedly implicating high rank government officials), after December 2013, the suspects were released, retrials were held and all were acquitted of charges.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, &quoute;Turkish Armed Forces,” in Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in Turkey: 2005/2006, edited by Ümit Cizre, 69-118. Istanbul: TESEV publications, 2006.

1632 Sayılı Askeri Ceza Kanunu (Military Criminal Law No.1632), Section B of Article 30, May 22, 1930, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.1632.pdf

“Rüşvet operasyonunda 46 kişi adliyeye sevk edildi,” Zaman Newspaper, September 30, 2013, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_rusvet-operasyonunda-46-kisi-adliyeye-sevk-edildi_2144697.html

Lale Kemal, “Military’s upper hand in politics?” Today’s Zaman, August 3, 2015, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/lale-kemal/militarys-upper-hand-in-politics_395406.html

Samira Lindner, ”Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Turkey”, U4 Expert Answer, 27 February 2014, http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in_turkey1

Mehtap Söyler, “The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy” Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, January 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
1

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

While legal regulations exist in the Military Criminal Law to fight corruption, they do not offer any facilitation in the reporting of corrupt behaviour. There is no comprehensive legislation; rather ad hoc provisions in law. While the Turkish Constituion provides for the right to petition the government in one’s own or in public interest, there is no real protection offered from reprisal. The 2007 Law on the Protection of Eyewitnesses does provide for some protection for eyewitnesses to crimes, but this is restricted to extreme circumstances. Further, Article 18 of Law No. 3628 Concerning the Declaration of Assets and Combating Bribery and Corruption per its Article 18 forbids the disclosure of the identity of a whistle-blower without his/her consent.

Turkey’s recent government corruption affair in December 2013, in the course of which ten government ministers reportedly had to be replaced and Prime Minister Erdogan came under increasing pressure, indicates that whistleblowing is not encouraged, but rather sanctioned. Under Turkish legislation there is no specific protection for whistle-blowers. While article 18 of Law No. 3628 states that confidentiality over the identity of whistle-blowers cannot be broken without their consent, in reality, the prosecuted person in a corruption case can reportedly request the identity of the whistle-blower to be made public.

COMMENTS -+

Law 3628 on Declaration of Property and Fight Against Bribery and Corruption (1990)

Blueprint for Free Speech. “Turkey – Whistleblowing Protection.” Accessed April 28, 2014. https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/document/turkey

1632 Sayılı Askeri Ceza Kanunu (Military Criminal Law No.1632), Section B of Article 30, May 22, 1930, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.1632.pdf

3628 Sayılı Mal Bildiriminde Bulunulmasi Rüşvet ve Yolsuzluklarla Mücadele Kanunu (Law on the Declaration of Property in the Fight Against Bibery and Corruption No. 3628), Article 18, April 19, 1990, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.3628&sourceXmlSearch=&MevzuatIliski=0

Transparency International, Whistleblower Protection Laws in G20 Countries, September 2014, https://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Hinweisgebersysteme/Whistleblower-Protection-Laws-in-G20-Countries-Priorities-for-Action.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
1

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

The law prescribes that retired government officials cannot, following their retirement, join a private company that operates in the official’s field of service for a period of two years. However, it has been claimed that a practice is tolerated, in which retired officials are hired by foreign manufacturers and agents in Turkey. Interviewee 3 stated that the practice of a waiting period has never in fact been applied and that “there is no mechanism which will really make an inspection into these matters&quoute;. Furthermore, special attention does not seem to be paid to time in post of officials in sensitive positions as seen in the case of the former head of the Undersecretariat for the defence Industries (SSM) . As interviewee 3 stated, “the Turkish Defence Industry Undersecretariat Head served as the Undersecretary of the arms purchasing agency for about a decade before being removed from office in March 2014.” This event has been reported on by the media as well.

There is no public evidence that the MND or the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) identify any specific positions as sensitive or that special attention is given to any personnel aside from the regulation on post-retirement restrictions which appear not to be followed.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Accepted. It should however be noted that evidence of overall caution concerning personnel in sensitive position is not available, as some of the more high-profile cases have shown. Verification of such cases (where special attention may have been given) is not possible. Furthermore, the removal of officials known to be or alleged to be corrupt is reactive, rather than indicative of institutional provisions to vet specific positions to ensure the risk of impropriety is minimised.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Burak Bekdil, “Defence Procurement Reform in Turkey: What goes Wrong?” Paper presented at the 12th IACC Conference, Guatemala City, November 15, 2006, http://iacconference.org/en/speakers/details/burak_bekdil/

Marie Chêne, “U4 Expert Answers: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Turkey,” Anti-Corruption Resource Center (2012), 5, accessed April 25, 2014. http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-turkey/

Todays Zaman, &quoute;Turkey's top arms procurement official removed from post&quoute;, March 28, 2014, retrieved May 26, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-343225-turkeys-top-arms-procurement-official-removed-from-post.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In the last 10 years, there were several moves at the SSM to reshuffle personnel. Some of these moves were related with unproven but widely circulating speculation that some SSM personnel may have been involved in unethical relations with some players in the market. I personally know a number of cases in which officials with &quoute;bad reputation&quoute; were removed from the projects they ran before.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
4

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

Since 2011, the number of armed forces has been officially publicised yearly by the Turkish General Staff and includes both information on both civilian and military personnel.

COMMENTS -+

Daily Sabah, &quoute;Turkish Armed Forces getting more professional&quoute;, February 2, 2015, http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/02/02/turkish-army-reveals-personnel-count-36-pct-are-professional-soldiers

“TSK personel sayısını açıkladı” (The number of TAF was announced), Sabah Newspaper, Feburary 3, 2014, accessed April 17, 2014 at: http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2014/02/03/tsk-personel-sayisini-acikladi

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 17, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
2

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

While pay rates of public officials are made available by the Ministry of Finance, military officials' salaries are not publicly disclosed. Information on the salaries of professional staff and total expenditure allocated to professionals and conscripts is not publicly available (Yentürk, 2014), nor could official information be retrieved for civilian defence officials from a general internet and media search. Information on pay rates are available through several media outlets and sometimes, information on allowances or bonuses is also provided.

Reponse to Peer Reviewer: Score raised from 1 to 2 in line with comments. Sources added and comments (above) adjusted.

COMMENTS -+

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 6, 11, 13 http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Yentürk, Nurhan. Askeri ve İç Güvenlik Harcamalarını İzleme Kılavuzu (Guide to monitoring military and internal security expenditure). Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2011.

Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, &quoute;Turkish Armed Forces,” in Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in Turkey: 2005/2006, edited by Ümit Cizre (Istanbul: TESEV publications, 2006) 69-118.

iskur.us, &quoute;İşte Tsk’da Görevli Askerlerin Maaşları&quoute; (Here are the military pay rates in the Turkish Armed Forces), 2013, accessed May 28, 2014, http://www.iskur.us/haber-2/iste-tskda-gorevli-askerlerin-maaslari.html

TSK'dan Profesyonel Ordu Sistemine Geçişte Önemli Adım, December 2014, http://www.sondakika.com/haber/haber-mehmetcige-binbasi-maasi-6748157/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Pay rates including new recruits and conscripts are publicly available; and in some cases even information on allowances is available.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
4

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

The legislation, Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law No. 926, on which the system of salary payments in the Turkish Armed Forces is based is rigid. Monthly salaries are paid via bank transfer to all military personnel in the Turkish Armed Forces on the first of every month as an advance payment. Civil servants are paid on the 15th of every month. A general media and internet search returned no relevant results, which suggests that the personnel receive their pay on time and that the system is well established. Salary payments are handled by the Ministry of Finance.

In terms of whether basic pay is non-discretionary, while no direct sources could be found to confirm they are (or are not), given chains of command and payment are separated (as indicated in Question 46), the system of payment is published and salaries of personnel are published (as indicated in Question 39), a reasoned assumption can be made that basic pay is non-discretionary.

COMMENTS -+

926 Sayılı Türk Silâhli Kuvvetleri Personel Kanunu (Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law No. 926), accessed April 22, 2014 at: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.926.pdf

Istanbul Muhasebat Genel Müdürlüğü Tebliği (Notice of the Ministry of Finance's General Directorate of Public Accounts) No. 6 Aylık ve Ücret ödemeleri (Monthly Payments and Fees), Official Gazette Date: February 20, 2004, No. 25379 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/default.aspx#

Rauf Gönenç, Willi Leibfritz and Erdal Yilmaz, &quoute;Reforming Turkey's Public Expenditure Management&quoute;, Economics Department Working Papers No. 418, February 10, 2005, accessed on May 27, 2014, http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=eco/wkp(2005)5

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
3

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

The appointment system of military personnel is regulated under the Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law No. 926. Further specifications can be found in the by-law on the appointment of officers and non-commissioned officers. A recent change has taken place in the definition of “adequacy”, by adding physical requirements to the qualifications necessary. Henceforth, a physical competency assessment is to be included in the registry system. No information could be found to confirm or question whether this system is adhered to in all cases. The system has been described as very rigid, with statutory entry levels determined by education and the determining factor of seniority for promotions.

Söyler (2015) found that the level of military autonomy when it comes to senior appointments and promotions has become low between 2000 - 2014 as compared to pre-2000, when it was very high which indicates there is oversight independent of the military.

COMMENTS -+

926 Sayılı Türk Silâhli Kuvvetleri Personel Kanunu (Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law No. 926), accessed April 22, 2014 at: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.926.pdf

Subay ve Astsubay Atama Yönetmeliği (Bylaw on the Appointment of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers), Official Gazette, April 9, 2011, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/04/20110409-26.htm

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, Human Resources, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.tsk.tr/7_insan_kaynaklari/7_1_tsk_birimlerinin_personel_temini/tsk_birimlerinin_personel_temini.htm

Askerlik Kanunu Tasarısı Meclis'te kabul edildi , Hürriyet, February 7, 2014, retrieved April 22, 2014 at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/25755047.asp

Rauf Gönenç, Willi Leibfritz and Erdal Yilmaz, &quoute;Reforming Turkey's Public Expenditure Management&quoute;, Economics Department Working Papers No. 418, February 10, 2005, accessed on May 27, 2014, http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=eco/wkp(2005)5

Mehtap Söyler, “The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy” Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, January 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: It is difficult to verify whether officers' internal employment records, which often make the basis of officers' promotions and postings, are prepared objectively.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
2

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Promotions are attained along a formally regulated system. In order to be promoted, certain waiting periods are required and a clean record is a condition. However, while the laws and by-laws refer to meritocratic evaluation, no promotion boards outside of the command chain are in place to ensure independent oversight of the promotion processes.

Söyler (2015) indicates that while the level of military autonomy currently when it comes to senior promotions is currently low, it remains to be very high in junior-level personnel decision-making.

COMMENTS -+

926 Sayılı Türk Silâhli Kuvvetleri Personel Kanunu (Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law No. 926), accessed April 22, 2014 at: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.926.pdf

Subay ve Astsubay Atama Yönetmeliği (Bylaw on the Appointment of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers), Official Gazette, April 9, 2011, accessed April 22, 2014, Askerlik Kanunu Tasarısı Meclis'te kabul edildi , Hürriyet, February 07, 2014, accessed April 22, 2014 at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/25755047.asp

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, Human Resources, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.tsk.tr/7_insan_kaynaklari/7_1_tsk_birimlerinin_personel_temini/tsk_birimlerinin_personel_temini.htm

Mehtap Söyler, “The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy” Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, January 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
3

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

The Military Service Act clearly states compulsory conscription for every male in Turkey. The Military Criminal Law has a clear policy on bribery. Some cases of bribery are known (for example, ones involving fake medical reports to avoid conscription), are covered by the media and are severely punished by the military courts. As a case in 2013 shows, both the potentially corrupt officers, as well as the bribing individuals were punished.

The official practice of payment for release from military service has become increasingly common practice in the past few years. While in previous decades, it was an irregular occurrence that males of a certain age could free themselves from compulsory conscription by paying a fee, this has now become a standard practice. This practice has, according to interviewee 2, further decreased the occurrence of bribery to avoid compulsory conscription.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

1111 Sayılı Askerlik Kanunu (Military Service Act No. 1111), June 21, 1927, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.1111.pdf

1632 Sayılı Askeri Ceza Kanunu (Military Criminal Law No. 1632), Section B of Article 30, March 22, 2000, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.1632.pdf

Sahte çürük raporu davasında karar, Sabah Newspaper, April 4, 2013, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2013/04/04/sahte-curuk-raporu-davasinda-karar

Today's Zaman, &quoute;Gov’t unveils military service paid exemption option for 2015&quoute;, December 2, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_govt-unveils-military-service-paid-exemption-option-for-2015_365914.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There have been several cases of bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription in the last decade. Insiders often say the public cases constitute only a fraction of real cases. Bribes are paid also to make sure a conscript is posted to a desirable unit, most often where there is no chance of anti-terror fighting.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
3

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

The Military Criminal Law punishes all forms of bribery but there does not appear to be a specific policy in place to address bribery for preferred postings. An information brochure given to conscript candidates explains the posting process as a &quoute;computer-based determination in which no individual privilege are granted”. It suggests on two occasions in the information brochure that the conscript should not listen to rumours telling them such preferred posting occurs. It is not clear how often such bribery takes place and no public evidence could be found in the media of sanctions carried out against bribery in connection to bribery for preferred posting.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

1632 Sayılı Askeri Ceza Kanunu (Military Criminal Law No. 1632), Section B of Article 30, March 22, 2000, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.1632.pdf

“Asker Alma Dairesi Başkanlığı, Bilgilendirme Broşürü” (MND Conscript Recruitment Department, Information Brochure), accessed April 24, 2014 www.asal.msb.gov.tr

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As mentioned in the comments for the previous questions, insiders often say the public cases constitute only a fraction of real cases. Bribes are paid to make sure a conscript is posted to a desirable unit, most often where there is no chance of anti-terror fighting.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although bribing to get preferred postings is not too common, conscripts often refer to various acquaintances, kin, or friends to get their desired postings. In cases where the preferred posting has not been received due to the computer based assignment program, conscripts again use acquaintances, kin, or friends to move to easier and/or safer posts within the divisions they were assigned to. Use of these informal networks are pretty common, and they are often not considered as corruption and not discussed and/or reported in the media.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
4

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

The legislation on which the system of salary payments in the Turkish Armed Forces is based is rigid. A general internet and media search returned no results. There is no evidence that ‘ghost soldiers’ could be maintained, or that such cases have occurred in the recent past.

COMMENTS -+

926 Sayılı Türk Silâhli Kuvvetleri Personel Kanunu (Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law No. 926), accessed April 22, 2014 at: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.926.pdf

Rauf Gönenç, Willi Leibfritz and Erdal Yilmaz, &quoute;Reforming Turkey's Public Expenditure Management&quoute;, Economics Department Working Papers No. 418, February 10, 2005, accessed on May 27, 2014, http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=eco/wkp(2005)5

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
4

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

Salary payments are handled by the Ministry of Finance in cooperation with the accountant personnel of the institutions in question. The system of salary payments of both civil servants and military personnel is separate from the chains of command.

COMMENTS -+

926 Sayılı Türk Silâhli Kuvvetleri Personel Kanunu (Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law No. 926), accessed April 22, 2014 at: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.926.pdf

Istanbul Muhasebat Genel Müdürlüğü Tebliği (Notice of the Ministry of Finance's General Directorate of Public Accounts) No. 6 Aylık ve Ücret ödemeleri (Monthly Payments and Fees), Official Gazette Date: February 20, 2004, No. 25379 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/default.aspx#

Rauf Gönenç, Willi Leibfritz and Erdal Yilmaz, &quoute;Reforming Turkey's Public Expenditure Management&quoute;, Economics Department Working Papers No. 418, February 10, 2005, accessed on May 27, 2014, http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=eco/wkp(2005)5

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 17-18. http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
1

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

According to Law No. 5176 “Policy Regulations for Public Officers, Application Procedures and Principles Of Ethical Conduct”, most public offices in Turkey have a board of ethics, which subject employees to training in ethical codes, including corruption related issues such as gifts, bribery, hospitality, and conflicts of interests. However, the code of ethics has, as per the European Commission Progress Reports of 2013 and 2014, not been extended to cover military personnel. This exception of military personnel has been severely criticised by the European Commission.

Law No. 657 on Public Officials prohibits public officials from receiving gifts and giving benefits. However, this does not apply to military personnel.

As mentioned in the comments for Question 35, the Military Criminal Law does cover bribery and corruption and as such there are some conduct standards defined in legislation. Score 1 has been selected accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

Kamu Görevlileri Etik Davraniş İlkeleri İle Başvuru Usul Ve Esaslari Hakkinda Yönetmelik (Policy Regulations for Public Officers, Application Procedures and Principles Of Ethical Conduct), Official Gazette No. 25785, April 13, 2005, accessed April 22.04.2014 at: http://mevzuat.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.8044&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=

European Commission, “Turkey 2013 Progress Report,” Brussels: October 16, 2013, 12-13 (Fight Against Corruption). http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/strateji/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf

European Commission, “Turkey 2014 Progress Report,” Brussels: October 2014, 12-13 (Fight Against Corruption). ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-turkey-progress-report_en.pdf

1632 Sayılı Askeri Ceza Kanunu (Military Criminal Law No.1632), Section B of Article 30, May 22, 1930, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.1632.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
1

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

The code of conduct does not extend to military personnel and hence violations related to it cannot be addressed or made publicly available. The Military Criminal Law does cover bribery and corruption and as mentioned in the comments for Question 35, there are issues in relation to its enforcement.

COMMENTS -+

Kamu Görevlileri Etik Davraniş İlkeleri İle Başvuru Usul Ve Esaslari Hakkinda Yönetmelik (Policy Regulations for Public Officers, Application Procedures and Principles Of Ethical Conduct), Official Gazette No. 25785, April 13, 2005, accessed April 22.04.2014 at: http://mevzuat.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.8044&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=

European Commission, “Turkey 2013 Progress Report,” Brussels: October 16, 2013, 12-13 (Fight Against Corruption). http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/strateji/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf

1632 Sayılı Askeri Ceza Kanunu (Military Criminal Law No.1632), Section B of Article 30, May 22, 1930, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.1632.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
1

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

There is no evidence of formal anti-corruption training taking place on a regular basis in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). The training subjects of the TSK do not include anti-corruption training. The ‘Partnership for Peace Training Centre’ of the Turkish General Staff gives courses on an irregular basis on &quoute;Combating Organized Crimes Course” (last course: 29 April-10 May 2012). Under the NATO “Building Integrity Program” two informal courses on building transparency have been offered by the Partnership for Peace Training Center, providing training to limited personnel (last course: 07-11 May 2012). Approximately 25 middle ranking officers of the TSK attended the courses.

COMMENTS -+

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, &quoute;News from the Turkish Armed Forces – Training subjects other than military training given to conscripts and non-commissioned officers”, March 12, 2014, retrieved 22.04.2014, http://www.tsk.tr/3_basin_yayin_faaliyetleri/3_4_tsk_haberler/2014/tsk_haberler_19.html

Turkish Armed Forces, &quoute;News from the Turkish Armed Forces - Education in Turkish Armed Forces, July, 23, 2014, retrieved 22.04.2014, http://www.tsk.tr/3_basin_yayin_faaliyetleri/3_4_tsk_haberler/2012/tsk_haberler_89.htm

Partnership for Peace Training Centre of Turkish General Staff, “Courses”, accessed April 24, 2014, http://www.bioem.tsk.tr/eng/1courses.htm

NATO – “Building Integrity Program”, 07.12.2012. Accessed April 24, 2014: http://www.nato.int/cps/tr/natolive/official_texts_93045.htm?selectedLocale=en

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
1

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

There are very few examples of the prosecution of defence personnel. One well known case is that of the prosecution of a navy commander who was stripped of his title and was sentenced to one year in prison for corrupt activities. This case in 2004 was a first for Turkey, but has not been able set the standard for further effective prosecutions in recent years. According to both interviewees, the reform process for more transparency has been stopped, creating a political atmosphere in which according to Interviewee 2 “the motivation for prosecution does not exist (…) and in which the army is not questioned, as it was questioned 5 or 6 years ago”. Interviewee 3 stated that in recent years, &quoute;since the government has given a break to its military reforms, there have been no new cases reported on&quoute;, a result of policy which has rather reversed transparency and reform endeavours. According to the European Commission Report 2013, statistics of the court decisions in corruption cases are collected, with a breakdown for bribery, embezzlement, extortion and misuse of power. These are not specific to the defence sector, however, and a policy for a more comprehensive tracking of data is needed.

Constitutional amendments in 2010 entitled civilian courts to try military officials for crimes committed against the constitutional order and the total (de facto) impunity of the Chief of Staff and force commanders was abolished. The High Military Administrative Court maintains duality between civilian and military courts while the decisions of the Military Appeals Court are not subject to civilian oversight. The level of military autonomy in judicial oversight remains high and is still a concern, according to reports.

As discussed in Question 35, the political dynamics of theTurkey appear to contribute to the stance the government takes in terms of the enforcement of sanctions on the military. Civilian-military relations, which have historically been tense, came to an all-time high with the well-known 2010 Sledgehammer case, over 400 active and retired officers (including generals) were tried for plotting a coup to overthrow the government. Several high ranking officials including commanders resigned in protest and while some considered this as a way to end the impunity enjoyed by the military, others stated the charges were false and an attempt to ensure the government's ultimate power. Reports indicate that in an apparent attempt to appease the military to cover up a high profile corruption case scandal (reportedly implicating high rank government officials), after December 2013, the suspects were released, retrials were held and all were acquitted of charges.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 2: Professor of International Relations. Telephone Interview, May 3, 2014.

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, &quoute;Turkish Armed Forces,” in Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in Turkey: 2005/2006, edited by Ümit Cizre (Istanbul: TESEV publications, 2006) 69-118.

“Daha önce rütbeleri sökülen komutanlar!” Vatan September 22, 2012, retrieved April 22, 2014, http://haber.gazetevatan.com/daha-once-rutbeleri-sokulen-komutanlar/482627/1/gundem

European Commission. “Turkey 2013 Progress Report”. Brussels: October 16, 2013, 48 (Anti-Corruption Policy), http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/strateji/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf

Lale Kemal, “Military’s upper hand in politics?” Today’s Zaman, August 3, 2015, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/lale-kemal/militarys-upper-hand-in-politics_395406.html

Samira Lindner, ”Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Turkey”, U4 Expert Answer, 27 February 2014, http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in_turkey1

Mehtap Söyler, “The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy” Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, January 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

By the Military Criminal Law, bribery is considered a crime and carries sanctions such as exclusion from the Turkish Armed Forces. Facilitation payments are considered a form of bribery in Turkey. At intervals, reports in the media are found in which small bribes and facilitation payments are uncovered. The fact that the Minister of National Defence holds the authority of overseeing military judges, makes the independence and impartiality of judges and therefore the effectiveness of measures questionable.

COMMENTS -+

1632 Sayılı Askeri Ceza Kanunu (Military Criminal Law No. 1632), Section B of Article 30, March 22, 2000, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.1632.pdf

Ümit Kardaş, “Military Judiciary,” in Almanac Turkey 2006-2008 Security Sector and Democratic Oversight, edited by A. Bayramoğlu, A. İnsel (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2009).

Biriz Berksoy, Military, Police and Intelligence in Turkey: Recent Transformations and Needs for Reform (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2013) 15-17, http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/01082013160934.pdf

Türkiye Gazetesi, &quoute;Rüşvet operasyonunda 20'si asker 46 kişi adliyeye sevk edildi&quoute; (In bribery operation 20 soldiers of 46 individuals questioned in court) September 30, 2013. Accessed 11th of December 2008, http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/gundem/83101.aspx

Milliyet Newspaper, &quoute;Askerde &quoute;Temiz Eller&quoute; Operasyonu&quoute; (&quoute;Clean Hands&quoute; Operation in the Military) May 21, 2013. Accessed 11th of December 2008. http://www.habervitrini.com/gundem/askerde-temiz-eller-operasyonu-rusvet-carki-boyle-kurul-339300/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
0

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

There is no information evidencing the existence of a military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue in operations or of the recognition of corruption as a strategic issue in operations in any other form. An internet and media search revealed no relevant results. Further, on the basis of the rest of the assessment, it does not appear that corruption is considered a strategic issue by the establishment even as an aspect of governance, which could have extending to the approach in operations.

COMMENTS -+

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, &quoute;Training and Education Objective of the Turkish Armed Forces&quoute;, accessed April 26, 2014: http://www.tsk.tr/ing/5_training/5_1_training_and_education_objective_of_the_turkish_trmed_forces/training_and_education_objective_of_the_turkish_armed_forces.htm

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, &quoute;News from the Turkish Armed Forces - Training subjects other than military training given to conscripts and non-commissioned officers,” accessed April 22, 2014: http://www.tsk.tr/3_basin_yayin_faaliyetleri/3_4_tsk_haberler/2014/tsk_haberler_19.html

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, &quoute;News from the Turkish Armed Forces – Training in the Turkish Armed Forces Institutes of Education”, accessed April 22, 2014: http://www.tsk.tr/3_basin_yayin_faaliyetleri/3_4_tsk_haberler/2012/tsk_haberler_89.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
2

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

There is no evidence of formal anti-corruption training taking place on a regular basis in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). However, the ‘Partnership for Peace Training Centre’ of the Turkish General Staff gives a course entitled the ‘Combating Organized Crimes Course’ (last course: 29 April-10 May 2012) on an irregular basis. The courses realised within the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program ‘Building Integrity’ focus &quoute;on developing practical tools to help nations build integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector&quoute; (NATO). They are informal trainings offered by the 'Partnership for Peace Training Center' and are given to only a limited number of personnel. There is limited information available on these courses and an internet search wielded no relevant results as to how the knowledge from these courses are applied in the field.

COMMENTS -+

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, &quoute;News from the Turkish Armed Forces - Training subjects other than military training given to conscripts and non-commissioned officers,” accessed April 22, 2014: http://www.tsk.tr/3_basin_yayin_faaliyetleri/3_4_tsk_haberler/2014/tsk_haberler_19.html

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, &quoute;News from the Turkish Armed Forces – Training in the Turkish Armed Forces Institutes of Education”, accessed April 22, 2014: http://www.tsk.tr/3_basin_yayin_faaliyetleri/3_4_tsk_haberler/2012/tsk_haberler_89.htm

Partnership for Peace Training Centre of Turkish General Staff, “Courses”, accessed April 24, 2014, http://www.bioem.tsk.tr/eng/1courses.htm

NATO – “Building Integrity Program”, December 07, 2012, Accessed April 24, 2014: http://www.nato.int/cps/tr/natolive/official_texts_93045.htm?selectedLocale=en

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
1

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

There is no information provided by the Turkish Armed Forces concerning the deployment of professionals to monitor corruption risks in the field.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Trained professionals&quoute; here can include both external contracted experts, as well as trained internal inspectors.

COMMENTS -+

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, “Contributions of Turkish Armed Forces to Peace Support Operations”, accessed 26.04.2014: http://www.tsk.tr/ing/4_international_relations/4_1_contribution_of_turkish_armed_forces_to_peace_support_operations/contribution_of_turkish_armed_forces_to_peace_support_operations.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: If &quoute;trained professionals&quoute; are non-officers who may have been contracted from outside the military structure then the scoring here should be 0. The score should be maintained if military internal inspectors who deal with all illegalities including corruption are considered &quoute;trained professionals.&quoute;

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
0

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

No information is available on guidelines and staff training on addressing corruption risks in contracting during deployment or peacekeeping missions.

COMMENTS -+

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, “Contributions of Turkish Armed Forces to Peace Support Operations”, accessed 26.04.2014: http://www.tsk.tr/ing/4_international_relations/4_1_contribution_of_turkish_armed_forces_to_peace_support_operations/contribution_of_turkish_armed_forces_to_peace_support_operations.htm

Website of the Turkish Armed Forces, “Military Training Cooperation Activity Topics”, accessed 26.04.2014: http://www.tsk.tr/ing/4_international_relations/4_2_turkish_armed_forces_military_training_and_cooperation_activities/issues/Military_Training_Cooperation_Activity_Topics.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
2

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Turkey does not employ private military contractors (PMCs). While private security companies are heavily employed in the urban centres (regulated by the Private Security Services Law No. 5188), these are never military in nature. The legislation also only regulates civil Private Security Companies (PSCs). American military bases in Turkey employ PMCs, however the US Army, not Turkey, employs these soldiers.

The score has been selected on the basis that while PMCs and PSCs are not employed by the military, there are no regulations forbidding their employment.

COMMENTS -+

Özel Güvenlik Hizmetlerine Dair Kanun No.5188 (Private Security Services Law No. 5188), Official Gazette No. 25504, June 10, 2004, accessed April 20, 2014, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2004/06/20040626.htm#2

Filiz Çulha Zabci, “Yeni Savaşlarin Gizli Yüzü: Özel Askeri Şirketler” (The secret face of the new wars: Private Military Contractors), Stratejik Rapor No: 56, 2013, http://www.tasam.org/Files/PDF/Raporlar/yeni_savaslarin_gizli_yuzu_ozel_askeri_sirketler_d3ad2e36-9fa4-4222-a919-a4d2177e86c3.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
1

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

The Public Procurement Law No. 4734 covers all public procurement processes requiring competitive bidding in the public sector. The law includes defence and security, but exceptions for the sector are stated in Clause 3/b: &quoute;goods, services and works procurement which are decided by the relevant ministry that these are related to the defence, security or intelligence or that these require to be treated confidentially, or procurements requiring special security measures during the performance of the contract pursuant to related legislation or those concerning the cases in which the basic interests of the stateʼs security needs to be protected&quoute;.

The law states corrupt acts as prohibited conduct in tender proceedings. Exemptions for the defence and security sector are not subject to the same competitive bidding requirements and are regulated by by-laws that, although also subject to corruption clauses, are not well scrutinised, as was confirmed by interviewee 3. One such exemption are the tenders by the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT), which has recently been exempted from the Public Procurement Law by a new decree in March 2014.

The level of military autonomy when it comes to arms procurement is high, as was found by Söyler (2015). As mentioned in the comments for Questions 59 and 63, oversight of purchases is weak and the need &quoute;urgent requirements&quoute; is frequently used to bypass legislation.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Todays Zaman Newspaper, &quoute;Turkey’s spy agency to be exempt from procurement oversight&quoute;, March 16, 2014, accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/national_turkeys-spy-agency-to-be-exempt-from-procurement-oversight_342266.html

4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu (Public Procurement Law No. 4734). January 22, 2002, accessed April 22 2014, http://www.ihale.gov.tr/Mevzuat.aspx; http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf (English translation).

4734 Sayili Kanunun 3 Üncü Maddesindeki İstisnalara İlişkin Yapilan Düzenlemeler (Law No. 4734. Exemption Regulations in Relation to Article 3), July 08, 2009, accessed April, 22, 2014, http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/mevzuat/istisnalar%5Cistisnalar.html.

Mehtap Söyler, “The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy” Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, January 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
1

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

The procurement law regulates procurement cycles, with exceptions for the sector stated in Clause 3/b. The SSM (Undersecretariat of Defence Industries), which is responsible for long-term international and national defence procurement, publishes its strategic plan and annual reports, press releases, and announcements that disclose information on the bidding process online. However, the information provided does not disclose detailed information. The Ministry of National Defence Deputy Undersecretary Related with Procurement and Infrastructure (MND-MTIY) manages armament procurement covering all technological areas, ranging from land vehicles and weapons, to food, clothing and medical equipment. The MND-MTIY is not required to publish a strategic plan. Items classified as secret are not subject to the law and are not made public.

There is evidence that since institutions in control of military spending interpret secrecy very broadly, many items fall under this category. While there is a new law proposal on ‘state secrets’, including the establishment of a ‘state secret’ committee, it is highly questionable whether the changes will create more transparency concerning 'secret' items within the defence procurement cycle process. On the other hand, interviewee 1 indicated that up to 95 per cent of procurement of the SSM is, in fact, published although this disclosure does not extend to all aspects of the procurement cycle.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014

4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu (Public Procurement Law No. 4734). January 22, 2002. Accessed April 22 2014. http://www.ihale.gov.tr/Mevzuat.aspx; http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf (English translation).

4734 Sayili Kanunun 3 Üncü Maddesindeki İstisnalara İlişkin Yapilan Düzenlemeler (Law No. 4734. Exemption Regulations in Relation to Article 3), July 08, 2009, accessed April, 22, 2014, http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/mevzuat/istisnalar%5Cistisnalar.html.

European Handbook on the use of standards in defence procurement (Turkish Ministry of National Defence (MND) Answers), retrieved 24.04.2014: http://www.defence-handbook.org/pdf/turkey_proc.pdf

Undersecreteriat of Defence Industries Website, Strategic Plan 2012-2016, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.ssm.gov.tr/home/institutional/Documents/Sp2012_2016/index.html

Undersecreteriat of Defence Industries Website, Project Announcements, accessed April 23, 2014,
http://www.ssm.gov.tr/home/quick/announcements/project/Sayfalar/default.aspx

Undersecreteriat of Defence Industries Website, Press Releases, accessed April 23, 2014,
http://www.ssm.gov.tr/home/quick/announcements/press/Sayfalar/default.aspx

Website of the Parliament, &quoute;Information on Law Proposal&quoute;, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tasari_teklif_sd.onerge_bilgileri?kanunlar_sira_no=95752

Keskin, Adnan, “Sır rejimi kapıda”, Taraf, December 12, 2013, accessed April 24, 2014: http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber-sir-rejimi-kapida-141909/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
1

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Oversight of defence procurement is restricted and the audit mechanisms of defence procurement, both internal and external, are not transparent. Audit reports of the Department of Inspection are classified and are not disclosed even to the Court of Accounts. The publication of reports prepared by the Court of Accounts is restricted and cannot be viewed by the public or the parliament. A government regulation issued on the 15th of August 2012 established the limitations on public dissemination of the audit reports of the defence, security and intelligence institutions. However, in November 2013 the opposition deputies debated the defence budget during the Parliament’s Planning and Budgetary Commission, questioning the lack of democratic oversight over defence, security and arms procurement spending. According to interviewee 3, this “has been the first time in fact that theTurkish opposition deputies displayed a more questioning nature on Turkish defence expenditures&quoute;.

There have been instances of corruption investigation committees being commenced by the Grand National Assembly in response to corruption allegations in weapons procurement, but these have always been shut down before any viable results were obtained. A procurement cancellation of the military tender for the national warship project MilGem in early 2014 exemplifies this lack of active mechanisms in the face of unfair competition. A phone call came to light between the Prime Minister and a company owner, who had filed a complaint questioning fair competition in the original bid that had been awarded to Koç holding. It has been alleged that that had in fact been a setup to punish Koç holding for supporting the Gezi protesters in the summer of 2013. Yet neither the parliament, nor the judiciary, have made any indication that an investigation of the allegations will be conducted.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Nurhan Yentürk, “Measuring Turkish Military Expenditure” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014), 17-18. http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=474

Şahin Binici, Can Mustafa Türkyene, &quoute;Güvenlik Sektörünün Sayiştay Denetimi ve 6085 Sayili Sayiştay Kanunu'nun Getirdiği Yenilikler” (Court of Accounts' Auditing of Security Sector and Innovations of Court of Accounts Law No. 6085), Dış Denetim Dergisi, 1 no: 3 (2011) 28-29. Ministry of Defence' Department of Inspection: http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/TEFTIS/html/TeftisAna.html

Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, &quoute;Turkish Armed Forces.” In Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in Turkey: 2005/2006, edited by Ümit Cizre (Istanbul: TESEV publications, 2006), 58.

Decision no. 2012/3179, Regulation concerning defence, security and intelligence public affairs, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmî Gazete, 15 Aug. 2012, accessed 23.04.2014, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/08/20120815-2.htm

Lale Kemal, “Turkey’s defence spending rises as lack of transparency criticized,” Today’s Zaman, November 20, 2013, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-331941-turkeys-defence-spending-rises-as-lack-of-transparency-criticized.html

Lale Kemal, “Suspicions about conduct of military tenders” March 10, 2014, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/lale-kemal_341712-suspicions-about-conduct-of-military-tenders.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
2

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

There does not appear to be any policy to disclose all defence purchases, although they are made public through a number of channels. Tender announcements are available on the Ministry of Defence website and some planned procurement projects. Actual purchases can be viewed on the website of the Undersecretariat of Defence Industry (SSM) and are made public through press releases - however the information provided is limited. Classified procurement is not publicly available. There is evidence that since institutions in control of military spending interpret secrecy very broadly, many items fall under this category. On the other hand, interviewee 1 indicated that up to 95 per cent of the procurement of the SSM is, in fact, published.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Although it is true that many purchases are disclosed, it is yet difficult to evaluate the number and nature of non-disclosed purchases due to the broad interpretation of the secrecy clause. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

Website of the Ministry of Defence. “MND tender announcements.” Accessed April 18, 2014 http://www.msb.gov.tr/anasayfa/html/ihaleler.htm

Website of the Ministry of Defence. “Regional procurement offices.” Accessed April 18, 2014. http://www.msb.gov.tr/ictedihl/phpscr/ictedihalemsb.php

Website of the Undersecretariat of Defence Industry (SSM). “Procurement projects of the SSM.” Accessed April 18, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/projeler/Sayfalar/default.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Only a very limited number of programmes are not disclosed such as purchases for the Special Forces and intelligence services.

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
1

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

For a company to be able to bid for tenders, a security clearance is required. Procurement legislation bans corrupt behaviour and companies that have been sanctioned for corrupt behaviour are listed and cannot bid on tenders. Banned companies are publicly listed on the Electronic Public Procurement Platform website. Other than this, no other requirements are placed on companies regarding business conduct or ethics programmes.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu (Public Procurement Law No. 4734). January 22, 2002. Accessed April 22 2014. http://www.ihale.gov.tr/Mevzuat.aspx; http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf (English translation).

4734 Sayili Kanunun 3üncü Maddesindeki İstisnalara İlişkin Yapilan Düzenlemeler (Law No. 4734. Exemption Regulations in Relation to Article 3). July 08, 2009. Accessed April, 22, 2014. http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/mevzuat/istisnalar%5Cistisnalar.html.

Website of the Electronic Public Procurement Platform (EKAP). “EKAP Yasakli Sorgumala.” Accessed April 24, 2014: https://ekap.kik.gov.tr/EKAP/Yasaklilik/YasakliSorgu.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
2

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

The overarching national defence and security strategy is defined within the National Security Policy Document. Procurement planning is based on the OYTEP (Ten Year Procurement Plan), which is prepared according to the Strategic Objective Plan and determined needs of the armed forces. However, these plans are not publicly available, and the parliament plays no role in the determination, or the audit of the National Security Policy Document. It cannot be determined whether actual procurement decisions and procurement planning are consistent.

COMMENTS -+

Handbook on the use of standards in defence procurement (Turkish Ministry of National Defence (MND) Answers), 2011, accessed 24.04.2014, http://www.defence-handbook.org/pdf/turkey_proc.pdf

Chêne, Marie, “U4 Expert Answers: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Turkey,” Anti-Corruption Resource Center, 2012, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-turkey/

General Secretariat of National Security Council's web site, accessed April 26, 2014: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/

Website of the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries. Accessed April 23, 2014.
http://www.ssm.gov.tr/home/Sayfalar/default.aspx;

Website of the Ministry of National Defence Deputy Undersecretary Related with Procurement and Infrastructure (MND-MITY). Accessed April 23, 2014. http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/TEDKOOR/html/tanitim.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is typically little justification for a purchase. And little public debate whether a) the country really requires that particular equipment and b) whether that particular equipment is needed in the timeframe and specifications the authorities insist is.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
2

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Procurement planning is based on the OYTEP (Ten Year Procurement Plan), which is prepared according to the Strategic Objective Plan and determined along the needs of the armed forces. None of these plans are open to the public and therefore there is not enough information available to determine whether the purchases are based on clearly identified and quantified requirements. While interviewee 1 stated that about 95 per cent of all procurement is public and planned, there is no clear information on the number of unplanned purchases. The plans are, according to reports, understood to be lacking accountability and oversight due to the frequent use of “urgent requirements” as well as a weak and ineffective auditing system.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

Handbook on the use of standards in defence procurement (Turkish Ministry of National Defence (MND) Answers), 2011, accessed 24.04.2014, http://www.defence-handbook.org/pdf/turkey_proc.pdf

Chêne, Marie. “U4 Expert Answers: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Turkey.” Anti-Corruption Resource Center. 2012. Accessed April 25, 2014. http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-turkey/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
1

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

The 12 month Public Procurement Agency report of 2013 provides aggregated statistics for the types of procurement that governmental bodies partake in. The proportion of both direct and exempted procurement is available from the Public Procurement Agency's reports, but the report does not clearly state the percentage of single sourcing among exempted procurement. The MND’s procurement is available in the report, splitting the procurement into open tenders, single sourcing and exempted procurement. However, since exempted procurement is a large portion of the budget, and single sourcing among this portion of the budget is possible, but not classified, an exact percentage cannot be publicly accessed. The accumulation of statistics further prevents the SSDF budget indicators to be publicly accessible, since it cannot be distinguished from other “special budgeted institutions” in the report. The Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) is responsible for large defence procurement programmes and decides on the ideal modality of the procurement in every individual case. When it deems necessary due to “national interest, confidentiality, monopoly of technological capabilities and meeting urgent requirements”, it can also buy from a single source. According to interviewee 1, single sourcing constitutes about 30% of the procurement in the defence sector. Interviewee 1 further stated that due to the favouring of national companies, the de-facto single sourcing may be even higher.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: It is true that the de facto single-sourcing is higher than officially stated. The extent of national industry favouring is not verifiable, but the evidence provided corresponds with the comments by interviewee 1, as well as media reports. While the extent of single sourcing is unclear, it is likely it is significant. Agreed and score lowered from 2 to 1.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

The Public Procurement Agency's 12 month report of 2013, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/duyurular2012/2013_yılsonu_kamu_alimlari_istatistik_raporu.pdf

Burak Bekdil, “Turkish PM Seeks More Control Over Military Procurement”, defence News, 04.02.2014, accessed, 24.04.2014: http://www.defencenews.com/article/20140204/DEFREG01/302040020/Turkish-PM-Seeks-More-Control-Over-Military-Procurement

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In recent years the dominant strategy has been to seek &quoute;a national solution&quoute; for a certain requirement. That routes contracts to specialised &quoute;local (and mostly government-owned) companies without competition with foreign rivals. There is rivalry mostly for subcontracts and imported systems. For example since Turkey has only one credible aerospace company (TAI) it is out of the question that it must compete with local or foreign rivals for aerospace programmes it typically automatically wins without competition.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
1

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Turkey has two acquisition boards, the Ministry of Defence and the SSM board. Tender processes are subject to audits by the Department of Inspection and the Court of Accounts. While the Department of Inspection has been criticised for its lack of transparency, audit by the Court of Accounts has been rendered ineffective and its results have not been presented to parliament in the last few years. The code of ethics for public personnel does not extend to military personnel and hence there is no oversight over ethical conduct in tender boards.

A case was reported by the media in early 2014 in relation to the tender of a national warship project (Milgem), which had been originally awarded to Koç holding, further questions fairness and due process in procurement contracts. A phone call has been reported between the Prime Minister and a company owner, who had filed a complaint questioning fair competition in the original bid that had been awarded to Koç holding. It is alleged that this had in fact been set up to punish Koç holding for supporting the Gezi protesters in the summer of 2013.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

European Commission, Turkey 2011 Progress Report, 12.10.2011. Available here: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/tr_rapport_2011_en.pdf

4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu (Public Procurement Law No. 4734). January 22, 2002. Accessed April 22 2014. http://www.ihale.gov.tr/Mevzuat.aspx; http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf (English translation).

4734 Sayili Kanunun 3 Üncü Maddesindeki İstisnalara İlişkin Yapilan Düzenlemeler (Law No. 4734. Exemption Regulations in Relation to Article 3). July 08, 2009. Accessed April, 22, 2014.
http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/mevzuat/istisnalar%5Cistisnalar.html.

Lale Kemal, “Suspicions about conduct of military tenders” March 10, 2014, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/lale-kemal_341712-suspicions-about-conduct-of-military-tenders.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
3

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Article 17 &quoute;Forbidden Actions and Behaviours” of the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 covers collusive bidding under section b). The interviewee indicated that collusion is taken very seriously and that in his/her years of experience in the defence industry, collusive bidding has been a very rare occurrence. A general media search returned few relevant results to verify that such cases, if and when they occur, are addressed seriously. One recent case from November 2014 reports of collusive bidding for contracts in catering for military institutions. In the trial that is under way, penalties for 21 individuals ranging from 4-198 years are being demanded.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu (Public Procurement Law No. 4734), January 22, 2002, accessed April 22 2014, http://www.ihale.gov.tr/Mevzuat.aspx; http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf (English translation).

CNN Türk, &quoute;Askeri birliklerde &quoute;ihaleye fesat karıştırma&quoute; davası başladı&quoute; (Troops &quoute;bid-rigging&quoute; trial has begun), November 25, 2014. Accessed December 11, 2014, http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/turkiye/askeri-birliklerde-ihaleye-fesat-karistirma-davasi-basladi

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
3

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

The ‘Command of Training Centre of Defence Industry and Technology’ offers courses to personnel in the Turkish Armed Forces, the defence industry, public institutions and organisations to meet the training needs of defence industry issues on aspects of defence technology, application of procurement regulations and personal development and management. On the website of SSM the strategy of the working methods in the years of 2007-2011 set an emphasis on the training of employees of the SSM to face the challenges and to work more effectively in defence procurement. As the summary of the strategic report 2023 states, a particular emphasis is further being placed on training for the coming years. The strategic plan of 2012-2016 stresses the importance of training in order to become one of the 10 largest global defence industries. Collaborations with universities on research and particular higher education courses are offered in order to meet the needs for trained human resources. In a general media and internet search, no relevant results could be obtained whether the trainings for defence procurement staff are effective, nor is there any information on staff rotation or resourcing.

COMMENTS -+

Command of Training Centre of Defence Industry and Technology, accessed April 28, 2014: http://www.msb.gov.tr/satem/phpscr/anamenu.php

Command of Training Centre of Defence Industry and Technology, “List of trainings,” accessed April 28, 2014: http://www.msb.gov.tr/satem/phpscr/KurslariListele.php

“Güvenlik, Savunma Ve Savunma Sanayii 2023 Kongresi Stratejik Rapor (Özet)” (Security, Defence, and Defence Industry 2023 congress strategic report), October 2012, accessed May 29, 2014, http://www.tasam.org/FileDownload.ashx?p=Etkinlik&i=566&f=DEKLARASYON

SSM website &quoute;Çalışmalarda Yöntem&quoute; (Working methods), accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Documents/SP/calis.html

SSM &quoute;2012-2016 Stratejik Plan&quoute;, 2012, accessed 11 November 2014, http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Documents/SP/Sp2012_2016/index.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
2

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

The MND has a phone hotline for companies’ complaints about perceived malpractice. Notifications and complaints also need to further be sent in written form. This mechanism is based on the right to petition (Law No. 3071). There is no indication or evidence, however, that companies are protected from discrimination when making use of this mechanism.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of National Defence Complaint Reporting Line: http://www.msb.gov.tr/anasayfa/html/aloihbar.htm

Turkey, Law on the Use of the Right to Petition (No. 3071), November 1984.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
3

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

The Public Procurement Law No. 4734 provides sanctions for corrupt activities of suppliers. According to the legislation, evidence of corrupt activities is punished by exclusion from tenders. In accordance with the Public Procurement Law, barred companies are listed on the Electronic Public Procurement Platform (EKAP), which can be accessed online. Crime reports are further issued, according to the legislation, to the authorised prosecution office. While it is questionable whether these sanctions are uniformly applied to all bidders, a Manager in the Defence Industry interviewed affirmed that no distinctions are made.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Given that no public sources to support your comments and suggested score have been provided, and that I have not been able to find any such public information, score is maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu (Public Procurement Law No. 4734), January 22, 2002, accessed April 22 2014, http://www.ihale.gov.tr/Mevzuat.aspx; http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf (English translation).

4734 Sayili Kanunun 3üncü Maddesindeki İstisnalara İlişkin Yapilan Düzenlemeler (Law No. 4734. Exemption Regulations in Relation to Article 3), July 08, 2009, accessed April, 22, 2014, http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/mevzuat/istisnalar%5Cistisnalar.html.

Website of the Electronic Public Procurement Platform (EKAP), “EKAP Yasakli Sorgumala,” Accessed April 24, 2014, https://ekap.kik.gov.tr/EKAP/Yasaklilik/YasakliSorgu.aspx

Burak Bekdil, “Defence Procurement Reform in Turkey: What goes Wrong?” Paper resented at the 12th IACC Conference, Guatemala City, November 15, 2006. http://iacconference.org/en/speakers/details/burak_bekdil/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: It is rare that these sanctions are applied in practice. And when they are applied there is often credible suspicion that they are not applied fairly to all players and/or may be politically-motivated.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
1

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

The Industrial Participation/Offset Guidelines by the Undersecretariat of Defence Industry, according to the Offset policy under law 3238, regulate offset contracts and their negotiation. No requirements of due diligence or auditing are stated in the guidelines. However, the SSM may request the independent audit of documents requested from the contractor in order to verify the DNAV (Domestic Net Added Value) of an offset contract. The government does not specifically address corruption risks by imposing anti-corruption due diligence requirements on contractors.

COMMENTS -+

Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM), &quoute;Industrial Participation/Offset Guideline,” April 2011, accessed April 23, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/home/institutional/Sayfalar/regulation.aspx

3238 Sayili Yasa Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarliğinin Kurulmasi (Law No. 3238 on the Foundation of Undersecretariat of Defence Industry), July 11, 1985, accessed April 25, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Sayfalar/mevzuat.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
1

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

Offset contracts are based on the Industrial Participation/Offset Guideline issued by the Undersecretariat of Defence Industry. The details of offset contracts are not made public, but certain information, such as the multiplier of the agreement can be obtained on request through official channels of information, according to interviewee 1. However, as stated by interviewee 1, no details can be obtained on the contracts details, since the contract holds information with regard to the company and is therefore treated with confidentiality.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM). &quoute;Industrial Participation/Offset Guideline.” April 2011. Accessed April 23, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/home/institutional/Sayfalar/regulation.aspx

3238 Sayili Yasa Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarliğinin Kurulmasi (Law No. 3238 on the Foundation of Undersecretariat of Defence Industry). July 11, 1985. Accessed April 25, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Sayfalar/mevzuat.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
0

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

The Industrial Participation/Offset Guidelines by the Undersecretariat of Defence Industry regulate offset contracts and their negotiation. There is no evidence that offset contracts are subject to competition regulations.

COMMENTS -+

Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM). &quoute;Industrial Participation/Offset Guideline.” April 2011. Accessed April 23, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/home/institutional/Sayfalar/regulation.aspx

3238 Sayili Yasa Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarliğinin Kurulmasi (Law No. 3238 on the Foundation of Undersecretariat of Defence Industry). July 11, 1985. Accessed April 25, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Sayfalar/mevzuat.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
0

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

There is no written policy with regard to restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries in defence procurement. It has been suggested that agents are often influential in defence procurement decisions, however, neither their influence nor their commissions are made public. Interviewees 1 and 3 both stated that the SSM does not actively promote the use of agents and rather advises against the high commissions that agents will charge. Nonetheless, according to interviewee 1, the use of agents of foreign companies is very common. The subject is very rarely discussed in the media.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Both experts interviewed stated that there are no legal provisions in place by the government to restrict the use of agents and no evidence to this effect could be found. Although the use of agents is not promoted, this does not state a form of official control. Given no evidence has been provided or can be found to support your comments, score is maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Burak Bekdil, “Defence Procurement Reform in Turkey: What goes Wrong?” Paper presented at the 12th IACC Conference, Guatemala City, November 15, 2006. http://iacconference.org/en/speakers/details/burak_bekdil/

Eser Karakaş. “Çin füzeleri ve milli egemenlik” (Chinese Missiles and National Sovereignty), January 31, 2014, accessed April, 23 2014, http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/cin-fuzeleri-ve-milli-egemenlik/yazi-836928

Lale Kemal, “Silah alimlarinda rüşvet çarkı...” (The machine of bribery in arms acquisitions), Taraf Newspaper, November, 10, 2010, accessed April, 23 2014. http://www.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/lale-kemal/silah-alimlarinda-rusvet-carki/13743/

4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu (Public Procurement Law No. 4734), accessed April 22 2014. http://www.ihale.gov.tr/Mevzuat.aspx ; http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf (English translation).

4734 Sayili Kanunun 3 Üncü Maddesindeki İstisnalara İlişkin Yapilan Düzenlemeler (Law No. 4734. Exemption Regulations in Relation to Article 3). July 08, 2009. Accessed April, 22, 2014. http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/mevzuat/istisnalar%5Cistisnalar.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There are formal and informal control mechanisms although they can be rarely effective. Military's (especially) project officers are banned from meeting with agents, there are also restrictions on agents' official contacts at the military departments. Informally, an established, regular relationship between an agent and a procurement official may lead to an investigation against the official.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

74.
score
1

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

The principal aspects of financing surrounding major arms deals are regulated by the procurement legislation. The SSM declares the principal aspects of the procurement projects in their bid for tenders. However, there is no evidence that the principal financial aspects of the arms deals are made publicly available. Under the information law, certain information can be obtained related to arms deals, which is confirmed by Interviewee 1. However, it is questionable whether this includes detailed information on payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu (Public Procurement Law No. 4734), accessed April 22 2014. http://www.ihale.gov.tr/Mevzuat.aspx ; http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf (English translation).

4734 Sayili Kanunun 3 Üncü Maddesindeki İstisnalara İlişkin Yapilan Düzenlemeler (Law No. 4734. Exemption Regulations in Relation to Article 3). July 08, 2009. Accessed April, 22, 2014. http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/mevzuat/istisnalar%5Cistisnalar.html.

Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM). &quoute;Industrial Participation/Offset Guideline,” April 2011, accessed April 23, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/home/institutional/Sayfalar/regulation.aspx

3238 Sayili Yasa Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarliğinin Kurulmasi (Law No. 3238 on the Foundation of Undersecretariat of Defence Industry (SSM)), July 11, 1985, accessed April 25, 2014. http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Sayfalar/mevzuat.aspx

Arzu Küflü and Bülent Beyoğlu“Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarliğinin (SSM) Tedarik Faaliyetleri ve Hukuki çerçeve” (The Undersecretariat of defence Industries (SSM) and the Legal Framework of its Procurement Activities), Dış Denetim Dergisi 1, 2 (2010). 109-110, http://www.sayder.org.tr/e-dergi-savunma-sanayii-mustesarliginin-ssm-tedarik-faaliyetleri-ve-hukuki-cerceve-9-14.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
0

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

Since contractors are not obliged to adopt anti-corruption programmes, there is no evidence that main contractors are required to ensure sub-contractors and subsidiaries adopt such programmes. However, companies with a record of corruption are listed in the banned companies list. They cannot be main contractors, sub-contractors, or subsidiaries. Further, the government does require the liability of sub-contractors. The “Subcontractors Article 15” of the Public Procurement Law states that “the liabilities of the sub-contractors with regard to the portion of the contract assigned to them shall not release the contractor from its own liabilities.”

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu (Public Procurement Law No. 4734), accessed April 22 2014, http://www.ihale.gov.tr/Mevzuat.aspx; http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf (English translation).

4734 Sayili Kanunun 3 Üncü Maddesindeki İstisnalara İlişkin Yapilan Düzenlemeler (Law No. 4734 Exemption Regulations in Relation to Article 3), July 08, 2009, accessed April, 22, 2014, http://www1.ihale.gov.tr/mevzuat/istisnalar%5Cistisnalar.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
2

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

Political influence by selling nations allegedly plays a role in Turkish defence acquisition. Interviewee 1, for example, claimed that the negative policy of France under president Sarkozy towards Turkey affected relations bilaterally to such a degree that commercial defence procurement from France to Turkey came to a halt for a decade. However, Turkey was dependent for decades on defence acquisition from the US and other countries in Europe. In the last year however, Turkey has diversified its arms suppliers, due to its staunch demands on knowledge transfer to strengthen its national defence industry, a requirement that US companies in particular cannot provide. A recent decision, favouring a bid from the China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corp (CPMIEC) for tender of a long-range defence system, shows the independence from the influence of NATO partners in favour of the technology and knowledge transfer ensured by the Chinese company. While this decision is read as a strong message to the NATO partners for more openness to sharing know-how in defence technology, it comes at a high political price. The current emphasis on the possibility of reconsideration shows that this decision may still be overruled in favour of one of the NATO allies' defence systems. A mid-score is thus awarded.

COMMENTS -+

Interview with interviewee 1: Senior Manager in the Defence Industry, Istanbul, 2nd of May 2014.

Interview with interviewee 3: Journalist. Telephone Interview, May 7, 2014.

Burak Bekdil, &quoute;French Industry Seeks a Comeback to Turkish Market&quoute;,March 10, 2014, accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.defencenews.com/article/20140310/DEFREG01/303100023/French-Industry-Seeks-Comeback-Turkish-Market

Aaron Stein, Can Kasapoglu and Sinan Ulgen, “Turkey Goes Chinese for Missile defence,” EDAM Discussion Paper Series 2013/12, October 7, 2013, accessed April 21, 2014.
http://www.edam.org.tr/Media/Files/1147/TR_China_MD.pdf.

Lale Kemal, “Did China missile deal trigger dismissal of top official?“ Today’s Zaman, April 7, 2014, accessed April 28, 2014. http://www.zaman.tv/columnistDetail.action?newsId=344057&columnistId=75

“Turkey right in awarding China missile defence system tender, analysts say.” Today’s Zaman, October 06, 2013, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-328099-turkey-right-in-awarding-china-missile-defence-system-tender-analysts-say.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+