Bosnia and Herzegovina

There are rules and procedures of military assets disposals, as stated in MoD audit reports in previous years. However, the MoD does not have an efficient system for the records and disposal of moveable assets. This has caused many cases of disappearances and possibly illicit trade of weapons and ammunition.

There have been several cases of corruption in the process of disposal and destruction of military weapons and ammunition that were investigated by the State Investigation and Protection Agency and Prosecutor's Office. The cases included collusion between MoD officials and private companies in charge of weapons destruction and disposal, which resulted in illegal sales of weapons. The NATO Self Assessment Peer Review Report for Bosnia (2014) identified the disposal of excess ammunition and weapons as one of the areas of greatest risks.

In 2013, the valuation of moveable parts of military property was undertaken by a Commission formed by the Chief of Joint Staff. However, there is clear need for further improvement, given the NATO Self Assessment Peer Review Report also recommended that the development of a plan to “review equipment holdings and determine appropriate valuations to improve accountability.&quoute;

Response to Government Reviewer: This is useful contextual information; however the score has been selected on the basis that the rules and procedures in place appear to be weak and prone to corruption.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2 and TI Reviewer: Accepted. Relevant information added and score raised to 1.

The Supreme Audit Institution reviews all contracts of MoD, including those related to assets disposal. It has on several occasions identified the practice of MoD signing off on assets without records of its disposal or sales. As mentioned in Question 15, audit recommendations are not implemented in a timely manner and there appear to be are no consequences for violations of procedures and law.

Asset disposals also came under scrutiny by media and law enforcement agencies after investigations were conducted into irregularities related to asset disposal and sales of surplus weapons in 2013 and 2014. Investigations highlight the limited reporting on oversight during the period in question. This leads to the conclusion that there is a lack of efficient preventive and pre-emptive scrutiny within defence institutions that could prevent such irregularities. As mentioned in Question 22, the NATO Self Assessment Peer Review Report for Bosnia (2014) highlighted the disposal of excess ammunition and weapons as one of the areas of greatest risks. As such, strong oversight mechanisms are needed.

The evidence warrants a score between 1 and 2 to reflect the limitations of oversight which have led to cases of corruption in the disposal of assets in recent times. However, given that the SAI is an independent institutions, score of 2 has been selected.

Response to Government Reviewer: This is useful information for context; however, the information provided does not justify a score increase. Score maintained.

(Relevant information by Peer Reviewer 2 has been added to the main answer)

According to the MoD, the Intelligence and security sector does not have a separated budget within the defence sector and there are no planned funds for secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services.

However, the questions appears to be misunderstood as the spending on intelligence services is considered as &quoute;secret&quoute; for the purpose of the question. The Law on the Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA) of Bosnia and Herzegovina states that &quoute;Financial means for the work of the Agency shall be provided entirely from the State budget, in accordance with the Law regulating the Treasury of the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina&quoute; and further sets out the planning for the budget.

The 2015 budget of the OSA was 32.809.000 KM, while the overall defence budget (which did not the OSA funding) was 286.066.000 KM. Taking the defence and security budget here as the defence budget and the OSA budget, the percentage of spending on &quoute;secret&quoute; items (here, intelligence agencies) is 10.3 per cent. The score has been selected accordingly.

The Law on the OSA has been considered an example of best practice in modern democracies in terms of the provisions for oversight of the OSA. The Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA) is accountable to the Council of Ministers and the Parliament of BiH, including the Joint Committee for the Oversight of the Intelligence-Security Agency. The Parliament approves the budget and supervises intelligence agency activities and policies.Information on the activities and policies of the Intelligence Agency is very scarce and this appears to be the case even with the institutions charged with monitoring the work of the Intelligence Agency.

The Joint Committee is empowered to inquire into the OSA’s work if there is suspicion of illegal activity, which includes accessing documents and calling upon the Chair of the Council of Ministers or the Director General to begin investigation. While the Chair of the Council of Ministers of the Director General may withhold information on the basis of national security concerns, during such investigations, the Committee may compel such information to be provided. However, there is no evidence such powers have ever been used. Further, reports indicate failure on the part of the Chair of the Council of Ministers to provide required reports to the Joint Committee to perform oversight.

The score has been selected on given there appear to be ommissions in the information made available for legislative oversight.

As in previous years, the Parliamentary Committee still has the competence to review the reports on budget execution, as well as audit reports of defence institutions. The Audit Office of BiH Institutions is in charge of undertaking a detailed audit of accounting and financial statements of MoD. The audit reports are discussed and adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly.

According to the Annual Report of Joint Committee for Oversight over Intelligence-Security Agency of BiH for 2013, this committee has discussed the Annual Report of the audit of Intelligence-Security Agency of BiH that was conducted by Supreme Audit Institution of BiH. However, it should be noted that the Supreme Audit Institution has only limited access to financial information of the Intelligence-Security Agency. The score has been selected accordingly.

Off-budget military expenditure is not permitted by BiH legislation and this has not changed recently. The source of military funding is the budget of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and all expenditure is audited by the Audit Office, whose reports do not indicate the existence of any off-budget expenditure.

There is no evidence of off-budget military expenditure: all expenditure is audited by the Audit Office, whose reports do not allude to the existence of such expenditure.

The Law on Protection of Secret Data regulates the protection of classified information related to the defence and security sector and provides procedures for permissions to access this data. Additionally, the Law on Access to Information prescribes exemptions from the law covering the issues of defence and security. The Law on Access to Information also obliges public institutions to undertake public interest tests in order to measure the benefits or detriments of publishing any information before denying access to it.

According to the Annual Report of the Ombudsman for the Human Rights in BiH for 2013, in practice certain institutions have refused to give access to certain information, justifying doing so on the basis of protection of personal data. This is done without passing the above-mentioned public interest test and the exemptions provided are often misused in order to prevent the public from accessing information, even if it is information that should be made available. Citizens then have a right to complain and to appeal to the court, but the judicial practice in this area is still inconsistent.

As mentioned in Question 12B, however, according to BiH’s Building Integrity Self-Assessment Report (2014), the MoD has a good record for responses to media requests. the MoD has taken steps to increase transparency regarding it activities to the public, with the aim of empowering the public and stakeholders to participate in discussion and debate. It has in place a Policy on Public Relations to govern the correct and timely disclosure of information to the public.

As mentioned by Peer Reviewer 2, the level of scrutiny for the classification of information is unclear.

According to the information provided by the Ministry of Defence BiH, defence institutions have no beneficial ownership of commercial businesses. There is no public information that refutes this.

The BiH government (although not Ministry of Defence directly) owns 51% of the Binas d.d. Bugojno, explosive fuse company. The MoD does not have any stake in this company.

According to the information provided from the Ministry of Defence BiH, defence institutions have no beneficial ownership of commercial businesses. There is no public information to indicate otherwise.

The Law on Defence forbids members of the Armed Forces of BiH to have engagements outside of the Armed Forces or conduct any kind of activities which are in conflict with official duties and responsibilities. Besides that, the Law on Service in the Armed Forces of BiH forbids members of the Armed Forces from having any financial interests that are in conflict with conscientiously performing their duties, as well as, involvement in any activities that are in conflict with official government duties and responsibilities.

An inquiry with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic relations of BiH revealed no evidence of the existence of illegal private enterprise by military or other MoD employees. A search of relevant public sources also yielded no results.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: The source provided relates to an interview from 1999 during the reduction of active soldiers. There is no evidence that members of the AF are engaged in private business currently. Score maintained.

The Minister of Defence has made public statements expressing sincere interest in every form of anti-corruption; a speech is available on the MOD website expressing personal commitment to the fight against corruption and calling on relevant stakeholders to report irregularities. Commitment is also expressed through policies and initiatives such as participation in the NATO Building Integrity process. There is also an open ethical line on the official website of the Ministry of Defence (www.mod.gov.ba), through which all interested parties can report any corrupt practices in the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of BiH. MOD officials have also shown commitment to integrity measures by endorsing institutional changes. However, the NATO BI Peer Review report identified some shortcomings in commitment as expressed in implementation of anti-corruption plans and measures.

Evidence of commitment from senior armed forces officers has not been found.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Comments incorporated, score lowered to 3.

Articles 380-386 of the BiH Criminal Code criminalise active and passive bribery, giving and receiving of gifts, and abuse of office. Sanctions include forfeiture of illegally gained advantages and term of imprisonment between six months and five years. Disciplinary sanctions include demotion and dismissal from service.

The Ministry of Defence is having difficulties implementing effective measures against personnel who have been found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption. The last case of sanctioning such behaviour was related to a disciplinary proceeding that was conducted against high ranked officers who were sanctioned by being made to &quoute;return to the next lower rank“ (Source 3). However, the main reason for this lack of effectiveness lies within the judiciary which does not prosecute reported cases. After the MOD General Inspectorate, the first instance for issues of misconduct among civilian and military personnel, conducts investigations and discloses the offenders, it is the judiciary's obligation to file criminal charges against the offenders. However, none of the reported cases were closed in courts even in more than three years since filing. Monitoring of the Courts and Prosecutor Offices in BiH showed that the prosecution of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2013 was most inefficient in the past five years. The number of verdicts and the investigation of crimes of corruption reduced several times from past years (Source 3).

According to a monitoring report published by TI BiH and Open Society in 2014 (Source 3), corruption prosecution levels have fallen to their lowest in 5 years. Monitoring showed that the number of prosecutions, including applications for prosecution, investigations conducted, indictments brought and the number of convictions for corruption have all fallen dramatically. In 2012, there were 3,174 indictments for corruption compared to 2,363 in 2013 - a decrease of 25 percent. The number of investigations for corruption has also fallen dramatically, halving to 747 in 2013.The largest decrease was recorded in the Republic of Serbia where there were 60 percent fewer investigations in 2013 than 212, while in the Federation of BiH, this figure fell by 45 percent. Data relating to court judgments show that in punishing the perpetrators of corruption achieved by far the worst results in the past five years, both in the number of court decisions, as well as sentences for these crimes. For example, the Court of BiH in 2013 brought only three convictions for corruption offenses, of which one was found guilty.

Processing corruption in courts in the Federation of BiH has also fallen compared to the previous four years - in 2013 issued a total of 78 convictions for corruption offences, compared to 124 of the judgment in 2012, 113 judgments in 2011, and by 91 Judgment 2010 and 2009. The same decline is reflected in the number of 60 convictions in the Federation in 2013, which is also less than in the previous year.

These results also show that the judiciary in BiH continues to prosecute corruption cases mostly at lower levels, as such the biggest corruption scandals that feature in the media remain uninvestigated and unprosecuted, which further erodes public confidence in the justice system.

A law meant to ensure the protection of whistle blowers was adopted in late 2013 (Law on the protection of persons reporting corruption in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16th December 2013) and came into effect on 1 January 2014.

Following the adoption of this Law, all institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina were obliged to adopt internal regulations to ensure protection of whistleblowers within 90 days. According to a written contribution from the MoD, prior to adoption of this Law, the MoD had made provisions for the protection of whistle-blowers for all types of irregularities in Article 5 of the guidelines for the work of the General Inspectorate and the inspectors of the Armed forces of BiH, which was passed by the Minister of Defence on 28th July 2006. The BiH Law on Defence obliges military personnel to report cases of corruption and fraud in the command chain (Article 46) and the Inspector General has established a whistleblowing hotline. (see Source 6)

Further provisions have been made in Paragraph 14 of the Guidelines to the Parties Concerned, Amendment 25 passed by the EUFOR commander and NATO commander in Sarajevo on 01.07.2008.

The Rules on the Procedure for Cooperation between the Military Commissioner and The General Inspectorate guarantees protection for all members of the Armed Forces of The MoD who report violations to the Parliamentary Military Commissioner, as well as protection from discrimination and immunity from disciplinary measures.

Employment procedures are set by the Law on Civil Service and applications are checked and proofed by the Civil Service Agency. The conditions for employment in the civil service are common for all civil servants. For higher positions, such as deputy ministers, appointments are made based on political arrangements, as well as the &quoute;national key&quoute;, ensuring that all three BiH ethnicities are represented. The resumes of key personnel are available on the MoD official website. The administrative inspectorate is in charge of oversight over the organisation of public administration. However, it does not have direct control over the work of individual civil servants. It is left to the discretion of ministries to appoint appropriate personnel and to ensure their efficiency. When it comes to the positions within armed forces, according to the Law on Service in the Armed Forces, there are a series of general conditions which need to be fulfilled in order to be enrolled in the military service. Aside from that, a person must fulfill the following general conditions in order to be enrolled in the military service, which include not having been sentenced to an unconditional prison sentence of more than six months.

Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 14, Instructions to the Parties, Amendments 25, which were adopted on 01.07.2008. by the EUFOR Commander and Commander of NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo, a special security check for all persons who are placed in the general's position, the position of Assistant Secretary of Defence, the Secretary Ministry of Defence, advisers to the presidency for military Affairs, Adviser to the Minister and two Deputy Minister, and inspectors at all levels, has been introduced. They also provided security checks for all persons who have access to the documents of a certain degree of secrecy. Aside from security checks for access to documents of a certain degree of confidentiality, no specific checks for those who work in the field of public procurement appear to exist nor can staff be substituted because the employment is regulated by the Law on Civil Service in BiH, which does not provide for such a possibility.

In the NATO Building Integrity Peer Review Report of Bosnia (2014), vetting of personnel assigned to sensitive positions was noted to not take place. The report recommended establishing “special procedures for selecting, vetting and training members of the tender boards/procurement commissions, in order to deter corruption in these areas as well.” The report does mention that a new concept was being considered: selection 60 personnel to train them in conflict of interest and vetting to work on tender boards. It is unclear whether this has been implemented.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Accepted. Relevant information added; score raised to 2.

The number of military and civilian personnel is known and accurately recorded. Separate lists with names and identification data are in the database and are available to those who need it while performing certain tasks. However, this data is not publicly available due to limitations prescribed by the Law on Personal Data Protection and the Law on the Protection of Classified Information.

According to the 2011 MoD brochure, in commands and units of Armed Forces of BiH, there are 9,073 employees. The armed forces altogether may total a maximum of 16,000, with 10,000 military personnel, 5,000 reservists and 1,000 civilians. The numbers are set by the Presidency. Overall personnel numbers are also provided in annual budgets.

Pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel are prescribed by the Law on Salaries and Allowances in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (&quoute;Official Gazette&quoute; No. 50/08, 35/09, 75/09, 32/12, 42/12 and 50/12), which is publicly available. The law defines pay grades and calculation coefficients for military and civilian personnel. Special allowances for military personnel are defined by law, which is adopted by Council of Ministers on the proposal of the Ministry of Defence. The total amount of pay rates and allowances for the MoD and the Armed Forces is published as a budget item in the Law on Budget of BiH institutions and international obligations and is available to the public. Specific pay of individuals is not publicly available exclusively due to the restrictions imposed by the Law on Personal Data Protection and the Law on the protection of classified information, but information related to calculations and baseline amounts is available.

There is no evidence of this information not being reliable.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agreed, score raised to 4.

Civilian and military personnel receive pay in accordance with the Law on Salaries and Allowances in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (&quoute;Official Gazette&quoute; No. 50/08, 35/09, 75/09, 32/12, 42/12 and 50/12). The salaries are paid regularly once a month, at the latest by the 12th of the month. The pay system is centralized and run through a unified treasury account. Pay rates are set by laws (see Q39) and basic pay is non-discretionary.

While there were problems with payment of pensions in 2011-2012, evidence of more recent shortcomings has not been found.

Response to Government Reviewer: Agree, score raised to 4.

The system of selection and appointment of military personnel is described in Chapter XV of The Situation in the Course of Service to the Law on Service in the Armed Forces of BiH. It is also regulated by the Regulations on Management and Professional Development in the MoD and AF BiH No. 10-02-3-3172/13 of 08/28/2013. According to the Law on Service in the Armed Forces of BiH, the commission for the appointment of military personnel, established by the Minister of Defence of BiH, is in charge for the appointment of professional military staff, excluding generals in the Armed Forces. The Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, according to the Law on Defence of BiH, is in charge of the appointment of generals in the Armed Forced of BiH.

Oversight over the process is provided by the Parliamentary Military Commissioner, who reviews appeals and complaints from soldiers re., among other issues, promotions and appointments.

The NATO BI peer review report recognises that while systems are mostly in place, meaningful, rather than merely formal, implementation of criteria and performance evaluations remains a challenge. The report identifies the recruitment and promotions processes as two top areas of corruption risk within the Bosnian MOD. In 2010-early 2014, the Parliamentary Military Commissioner handled about 450 complaints related to recruitment and promotions issues.

Promotion of military personnel in the Armed Forces of BiH is done in accordance with the Law on Service in the Armed Forces of BiH, the Regulations on the advancement of military personnel in the Armed Forces of BiH and the Annual Plan for Promotion.

Each year a committee is formed for the promotion of various categories of military personnel, which reviews the available documentation and makes ranking lists that are available to interested parties. The chain of command makes decisions on promotions based on the conclusions of these commissions. Supervision of this process is undertaken by the Parliamentary Military Commissioner, to whom appeals and complaints may be directed. According to reports of the Military Commissioner, in the process of certain promotions it was observed that procedures were not transparent and that the rankings were not available to all members of the Armed Forces.

The by-laws, on basis of which promotions are made, in certain cases lead to collisions and different interpretations of the same legal issue, as they are not harmonized with the general laws. The Military Commissioner found it unacceptable that one of the by-laws excludes the obligation of the Commission to provide a written response to applicants, which deprives them of legal remedy and the right to appeal. When it comes to the MoD, there are regular employee assessments, however the practice of promotion of civil servants is not common.

The NATO BI peer review report recognises that while systems are mostly in place, meaningful, rather than merely formal, implementation of criteria and performance evaluations remains a challenge. The report identifies the recruitment and promotions processes as two top areas of corruption risk within the Bosnian MOD. In 2010-early 2014, the Parliamentary Military Commissioner handled about 450 complaints related to recruitment and promotions issues.

Response to Government Reviewer: Improvements are noted. However, as this area has been identified as one of the most significant corruption risks, score 2 seems adequate.

There is no compulsory conscription in BiH.

There is no conscription in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has professional armed forces. Recruitment is carried out through public competition and military service is voluntary (there is no voluntary conscription). Therefore the question is not applicable for the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There is no evidence of the existence of &quoute;ghost-soldiers“ in the Armed forces of BiH. The publicly stated number of civilian and military personnel; openly set salary levels; separation of chains of command and payment; and strong payment chains with little history of delays make the likelihood of this phenomenon occurring very small.

Chains of command are separate from the chains of payment: human resources management is performed by the Army's Support Command, separate from operational commands. There is also a separate Personnel Management Section within the MOD. Law on Salaries and Allowances in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Articles 13, 14, 15 and 16 determines the salary grades and fees for all categories of professional military personnel, meaning that commanders do not have influence over salaries.

Regulations and codes of conduct are in place for both military and civilian staff. The Code of Conduct in the Armed Forces and the Code of Ethics of military personnel in the armed forces have both been adopted by the Armed Forces of BiH and are applicable to professional military personnel. They have guidelines on standards of conduct, conflicts of interest and acceptance of gifts. They also have other provisions which contain guidance on what to do when faced with ethical and professional dilemmas, in both on-duty and off-duty situations.

The Code for Civil Servants is applicable to civilian personnel employed in the institutions of BiH. This code establishes the rules and principles of good conduct, prevention of conflicts of interest, dealing with gifts and has other provisions relating to good behavior. The code of conduct in the armed forces of BiH and the code of ethics of military personnel in the armed forces of BiH are not publicly available.

There are also legal regulations applicable to officers and civil servants, which specify principles of good conduct and disciplinary sanctions for breaches. Sanctions for civilian personnel include reprimand, suspension, demotion and dismissal. The Law on Defence, which contains provisions on professional conduct and conflict of interests for armed forces personnel, stipulates that oversight shall be provided by the office of the Inspector General. The Law does not enumerate disciplinary sanctions; however, there is evidence of an officer having been demoted for corruption. (see Q48, Q35)

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agreed that regulations are in place and that the Codes are most likely available to relevant personnel. However, they do not seem to be publicly available and thus it was not possible to assess the detail provided in the guidance. Score raised to 2.

The General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defence has conducted investigations for breaches of the code of conduct, however the results of the prosecutions have not been made publicly available. In cases where irregularities are reported, General Inspectorate of the MoD takes necessary measures, from investigations to conducting disciplinary procedures. If criminal offences are committed, they are reported to civilian courts (there is no military justice system). The courts publish the verdicts and the media report on them on a case-by-case basis, but there is no policy to make outcomes of prosecutions or internal investigations into Code breaches public. Concerns regarding the efficacy of court proceedings and the low number of convections (see Q35 and Q51) suggest that the effectiveness of addressing Code breaches is probably low. The last case of sanctioning Code breaches was related to a disciplinary proceeding that was conducted against high ranking officers who were sanctioned by being made to &quoute;return to the next lower rank&quoute; (Source 4).

The NATO Self Assessment Peer Review Report for Bosnia, which was published in August 2014, noted that &quoute;established building integrity education and training for civilian or military personnel&quoute; was yet to be established. The interviews for the Peer Review were conducted in March 2014.

According to a written contribution by the MoD in April 2014, the Inspector General, inspectors in command and units of the AF BiH are obliged to plan and organize anti-corruption training at least once a year. This could not be publicly verified. Further, the Peace Support Operations Training Centre in Butmir which offers &quoute;Building Integrity&quoute; courses is a NATO Building Integrity Implementing Partner and offers courses both for domestic and international forces. The MoD also partnered with the Naval Postgraduate School in 2010 to provide training which included anti-corruption and integrity.

For key personnel of the MoD and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a strategic political-military seminar was held in 2012. The number of persons from the MoD and Armed Forces involved in trainings organized by other institutions on this subject is increasing as well. The subject of a 5th strategic political-military seminar, was &quoute;Building integrity and fighting against corruption in defence and security sector&quoute;.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments incorporated.

Since the creation of the unified MoD and AF BiH, cases of investigations on offenses related to corruption have been registered. After the investigators of the MoD and AF BiH completed their investigations, cases were handed over to the Prosecutor's Office of BiH. However, so far none of them has been concluded or verdicts passed. (see Q35 and Q51 for further comments on the effectiveness of the justice system)

There is no established policy of publishing the results of the investigation and prosecution of persons for these crimes. The media do report on these issues, but it's case-by-case coverage. Results of civil cases are published by courts.

RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Comments incorporated. Agree with comments, score changed to 1.

According to the Criminal law of BiH, facilitation payments are explicitly regarded as bribery and all the same measures as for bribery apply (the Code prohibits bribery for performing actions which lie within the scope of duties of a given official). According to the Law on Defence of BiH, officers cannot &quoute;have a financial interest that conflicts with the conscientious performance of duty or engagement beyond current duties, or any other activity that conflicts with official duties and responsibilities.&quoute; They are also obliged to to use government property only for authorized purposes and to, through the chain of command, report any perceived illegalities and corruption.

The General Inspectorate is in charge of undertaking investigations into any violations of these provisions. The Parliamentary Commissioner is responsible for the military control of conduct and other issues related to the human rights and freedoms of military personnel and cadets. He is also responsible for researching specific issues at the direction of the Parliamentary Assembly and the Joint Commission for Defence and Security of BiH. He is supposed to respond to reports of the members of the Armed Forces if there is a violation of law. Measures of sanctioning violation of codes of conduct include disciplinary sanctions. The judiciary is in charge of the sanctioning of perpetrators of criminal acts of corruption. The MoD also launched an &quoute;ethical line&quoute; for reporting any irregularities and corruption, including bribery. During the period from December until March, there were 28 reports of various irregularities and abuses, of which 3 reports were related to the corrupt activities.

Overall concerns related to the efficacy of the judicial system and low number of cases ending in convictions create question marks over the effectiveness of prosecution and application of sanctions.

No evidence was found of a doctrine addressing corruption risks in operations.

As mentioned by the Government Reviewer, there is in place a policy of building integrity, reducing risks and fighting corruption which has been adopted by the MoD and AF BiH. “This policy is aimed at establishing organizational, operational and management controls to accomplish the above mentioned tasks. The policy is applicable to all appointed persons, civil servants, employees, civilians, military personnel and cadets who are assigned to duty in the MoD and the Armed Forces as well as to persons who are engage, on any grounds, with the MoD and the Armed Forces.”

Response to Government Reviewer: The information in regard to the policy has been incorporated in the main answer. However, the score is maintained as the policy indicates awareness of corruption as an aspect of governance, not of corruption as a strategic issue in operations specifically.

According to the NATO SAQ (2014) “Anti-corruption matters related to operations are routinely included in pre-deployment training for the AFBiH, however there are no dedicated training modules on the subject” and one the recommendations of the report is to include a Building Integrity training course in pre-deployment training for all personnel.

Currently, there are courses focused on building integrity at the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) in Butmir; however they appear to cover only officers and non-commissioned officers. It is unclear whether they cover commanders and if so, whether they cover all levels.

There is also a mobile training team which operates outside the country, but the scope of the training and the number of persons it encompasses needs to be enlarged for it to be more relevant. Occasional seminars have been organized within certain projects which are aimed at increasing awareness on corruption in general. The commanding staff of the Armed Forces has participated in these seminars.

Civil society organisations have implemented various projects aimed at raising awareness on corruption and working with public institutions, including the MoD, on corruption issues more generally, that has resulted in more training activities that involve defence representatives.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Relevant information has been incorporated in the main answer. The timeline of the answer is restricted to the last two years.

As assessed by the NATO SAQ (2014), the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina have a relatively small number of people engaged in NATO missions. It states that &quoute;there are regular visits to deployed units by BiH leadership, including the Minister of Defence, members of the Joint Committee for Defence and Security of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, the Parliamentary Military Commissioner, the Inspector General and military commanders.” However, it is unclear whether any of these visits is with the purpose of anti-corruption monitoring, and if those deployed are trained for this purpose.

(Relevant information from the Government Reviewer has been incorporated in the main answer)

The Building Integrity in Peace Support Operations Course, implemented by Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) has aimed to to deliver a skill set to selected military and police officers in order to enable them to identify and counter the various types of corruption that undermines mission success in multinational Peace Support Operations. The subjects covered in this course are: Corruption elements, Personal and Professional Integrity, Legal Framework, Personnel Issues, Interactions within Host Nation/AOR and Values-Based Stability Operations, Unit Assets, Contracting, Building Sustainable Trust in AOR, Developing Host Nation Capacity in Transparency, Good Governance and Ethics, Capstone Exercise.

The score has been selected on the basis that there is training on contracting (within a more general anti-corruption framework), but there appears to be none focused on corruption risk in contracting on deployed operations and it is conducted only for selective personnel.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: The score has been revised to 2, with the justification provided above.

No private military contractors nor private security providers are employed by defence institutions. Yet there is also no evidence of regulations forbidding their use.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: The score has been selected on the basis that there are no regulations prohibiting the employment of private military contractors or private security providers by the military either.

The 2014 Law on public procurement of Bosnia and Herzegovina regulates public procurement rules and procedures for all public institutions, including defence and security bodies. However, Article 8 establishes a 'special regime' for a number of items exempt from regular procurement procedures, and this includes defence- and security-related items such as arms, military equipment, and related services. Additionally, the Law on the Protection of Secret Data defines that some data related to security and defence are labelled as classified. (Article 10) The Law contains some anti-corruption provisions, including a prohibition on contracting with companies convicted of corruption and a requirement to exclude a bidder who has either offered or accepted a bribe during the procurement process, or if a conflict of interest exists.

The Ministry of defence BiH has an internal document within the sector for public procurement and logistics - &quoute;Rules on Financial and Material operations in the Ministry of defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina&quoute;, which thoroughly describes public procurement rules and procedures. Additionally, procurement from other countries is also regulated by NATO and EU rules. The process of public procurement within the defence sector is scrutinised by the Public Audit Service, which has in several cases been critical of the Ministry of Defence due to irregularities in the process of public procurement.

These audit reports suggest that the system of public procurement in Ministry of Defence is not transparent and that internal rules and the laws are often violated. The Audit Report for 2012 suggests that procurement reports are not inserted on time into the Wisppa procurement system. It also states that the auditors were not presented with the MoD reports on procurement procedures in accordance with chapter 1 and 2 of the Law on Public procurement. On the other hand, in the Audit Report for 2013 this problem was not mentioned which suggests that the MoD made improvements in this regard.

The degree and comprehensiveness of scrutiny over defence and security procurement exempt from public procurement procedures is not clear, although it can be assumed that the Internal Audit Office is active in this respect.

The disclosure of public procurement is prescribed the Law on Public Procurement, with the exception of procurement of armaments, military equipment and special equipment, which are defined by a special regulation as confidential goods. Public calls have to be issued.

The MoD's annual procurement plan for 2015 available online and audit reports suggest that the MoD produces regular procurement plans. However, the reports criticize the plans as too general and lacking concrete deadlines or allocation of responsibility to staff. Since the Public Procurement Law refers to the 'life cycle' of defence equipment and services, it is assumed that there is a broader acquisition planning framework in place (beyond just procurement planning) which covers the entire life cycle of acquired systems: conceptualization, design, development, test, contracting, production, deployment, logistics support, modification, and disposal of weapons and other systems, supplies, or services etc. for use or in support of military missions. However, little information is available publicly. Some information can be gleaned from stages of the planning process, aside from procurement planning mentioned above. For instance, as mentioned in Questions 22 and 23, asset disposals (the end of the life cycle of systems) are not well managed or scrutinised.

It is assumed that oversight of the procurement cycle planning is undertaken by the Supreme Audit Institution and the Public Procurement Agency (see Question 59).

There is an internal document “Rules on Internal Control” (January 2009), which defines the operations internal control system within the Ministry of defence and Armed Forces, and sets out principles to which civil servants must comply with when carrying out financial-material operations and using resources of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces. Additionally, there are the &quoute;Rules on Financial and Material operations in the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.&quoute;

External oversight is under the authority of the Public Procurement Agency and the Appeals Office. The internal accounting control determines whether the procurement of goods, delivery of services and execution of works has been carried out in accordance with the Law on public procurement and whether decisions complied with the directives for application of specific clauses from this law and other internal acts of Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces. Results of internal oversight are not available to the public.

However, the Audit office of the Institutions of BiH has stated that the internal control mechanisms Ministry of Defence are not fully functional. The report also states the lack of clear systematisation and division of responsibilities between the staff in charge of public procurement, which weakens internal oversight. A new mechanism for reporting irregularities, the &quoute;Ethical line,&quoute; might be seen as an additional tool, for the oversight and identification of irregularities in the procurement, as well, but it is yet to be seen how efficient it will be.

Previous cases of irregularities within the MoD's public procurement which damaged the budget of MoD, also lead to the conclusion that the oversight mechanisms were not sufficiently strong. Also, the existing mechanisms are not timely, and often the oversight bodies (such as the audit service) point out to irregularities once the damage has already been done.

The publishing of purchases is regulated by the provisions of the Act on Public Procurement, except procurement of armaments and military equipment and special equipment, which are defined by a special regulation as confidential goods.

According to the Ministry, purchase announcements are regularly published, however the Audit Report for 2012 suggests that the procurement reports are not inserted on time in the Wisppa system (an application for easy, fast and reliable way to to submit reports on the public procurement process). The Audit service even stated that they were not presented with the MoD reports on procurement from chapter 1 and 2 of the Law on Public procurement. There have been media articles suggesting individual cases of procurement that were not available to the public.

In March 2014, the Ministry of Defence established and promoted a section on their official website (&quoute;Tenders“) where all procurement is to be published. However, it only contains information on purchase announcements.There is no information on realized purchases and contractors on this webpage.

Some information on forward plans is available: the MOD's annual procurement plans, including one for 2015, are available online.

The Law on Public procurement excludes from bidding companies which have been convicted of corruption and provides for disqualification based on conflict of interest or corruption during the procurement process (such as paying bribes to further the bid). Companies are required to declare that they have not engaged in corrupt practices, such as active or passive bribery, in the course of the procurement process, which is here considered equivalent to a 'no-corruption' or 'integrity' clause. However, there are no requirements regarding adoption of full compliance or business integrity by companies bidding for work with the MOD.

Due to poor economic situation in the country, procurement mainly relates to the current needs of units, though more significant procurements are derived from needs for the fulfilment of the BiH NATO Partnership goals. The consideration of whether procurements are justified is under the supervision of the Audit Service, whose reports indicate cases of irrational procurement decisions. The reports also point out the lack of a strategic approach and insufficient and weak procedures of planning in public procurement.

It is unclear to what extent purchases are derived from a national strategy. While the need for strategy is legally defined, a strategic document does not appear to be publicly available. (see Q3) Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that there is a large element of procurement outside of the national strategy or through opportunistic purchases.

The armed forces are responsible for analysing requirements and presenting them to the MOD procurement office, which then executes the procurement process. According to the Rules on Financial and Materiel Operations in the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces, the purchase starts with the written report that in principle, includes information on what is to be purchased and at what cost; the unit which is to be charged and through which budget; technical specifications; and a list of potential suppliers. The object of the procurement must be pre-prescribed by technical conditions and appropriate technical documentation must be prepared, except for products that are produced by the applicable national or international standards or when the manufacturer supplies a standard product.

It should be noted that though the above mentioned procedure exists, audit reports emphasize that a large percent of procurements is cancelled or repeated due to bidders' appeals based on unclear and vague tender documentation.

The Law on Public Procurement states that in principle, procurement in defence sector should be conducted as open competition, except for procedures described as &quoute;operationally necessary&quoute; and &quoute;single source&quoute; procurement exceptions. The audit reports in the past suggested a large number of restricted tenders, even though the last audit report does not suggest the same. According to the interview with the Ministry of Defence, 90% of procurement is carried out through open procedures, while 10% are carried out through other forms. This is confirmed by the NATO BI SAQ report. However, the cited audit report suggest that purchases have been made without a sufficient number of bidders.

Conduct and procedures governing the tender committee are regulated by the Public Procurement Law and the Rulebook on Financial and Materiel Operations of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces. The Rulebook contains provisions relating to the prohibition of receiving gifts from contractors or suppliers, but there is no special code of conduct relating to tenders. The NATO Peer Review report states that members of tender boards need to be experts on items being procured, and need to include at least one public procurement expert among them. Board members are required to confirm absence of conflicts of interest in writing, but there are no other requirements or procedures. Written records of procurement procedures are kept by the MOD.

Tender board decisions are overseen by the Internal Audit Office and, on occasion, verified externally by the Office for Audit of the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The audit report for 2012 suggests that responsibilities for persons in charge of public procurement are not adequately distributed, since persons from the Ministry sector for procurement and logistics who are in charge for the tender documentation, are often in the tender boards. Bidders can also complain to the Procurement Review Board if irregularities are suspected.

The Bosnian Procurement Law does not specifically prohibit collusion. However, the issue is regulated by the 2011 Competition Law, which prohibits agreements, contracts (explicit or informal) and other actions aimed at distorting competition. This includes price-fixing, informal division of the market, limitation of production, etc. However, the Act provides for a possibility of exemptions based on contribution to the country's economic and technical progress, and approved by the Competition Council. (article 4) The Act imposes fines of up to 10% of the total annual income of the economic entity which has violated its provisions. Fines between 15.000 KM - 50.000 KM can also be imposed on individuals.

The MOD procurement staff are organised into the Sector for Logistics and Procurement; there is also an additional unit ascertaining the quality of procured items. Bidders are also required to guarantee the contract with 1-2% of the price. (NATO Peer Review report) However, the NATO Peer Review report states that there are significant staff shortages and that personnel lack qualifications and training that would enable them to carry out their roles effectively. There are sporadic training sessions and other specialized courses organized by the Public Procurement Agency. However, the procurement committees are not permanent and are appointed for each procurement, so there is no evidence that any training program can reach all prospective members of committees. The Public Procurement Agency has also established on-line course on public procurement for civil servants that are working on public procurement issues, for both the private and the public sector, as well as, for individuals interested in process of public procurement. This course is an additional way to gain new knowledge on public procurement in BiH.

According to the Law on Public Procurement, dissatisfied bidders who suspect irregularities or malpractice in the bidding process may appeal to the body responsible for making decisions on the results of the competition. Subsequently, the appeal may be filed with the Procurement Review Body (PRB).

When the PRB determines that there was a violation of the law on public procurement it may:
a) cancel the decision of the contracting authority, in whole or in part,
b) order the contracting authority to correct the violation,
c) order the termination of procurement procedure,
d) award compensation to the complainant.

Decisions of the PRB can be appealed in the court system, through an administrative procedure.

However, due to the amendments to the Law on Public Procurement in November 2013, the fees for bidders have been raised significantly, which led to a general decrease in the number of appeals and discouraged bidders from appealing. Additionally, the PRB has not acted upon any appeals in the period between November 2013 and May 2014. The amendments also mentioned two new offices for the PRB that have not been open or functional. This caused a complete deadlock in the appeal system. It is unclear how the 2014 Public Procurement Law will influence the appeals process. In 2013, 16 out of 85 tenders were contested by bidders, and three complaints were upheld. (NATO Peer Review report)

The PPL does not contain specific provisions protecting companies which had filed appeals from discrimination in future procurement, although Article 3 does enshrine a general principle of non-discrimination of bidders in any procurement process.

The Law on Public Procurement states that contractors and suppliers who had been convicted of corruption may not bid for Ministry of Defence work, and those who commit bribery in the course of a procurement procedure will be disqualified. The sanctions for suppliers might also be found in the Criminal Code, under the crimes of illegal brokerage, where a sentence of one to 10 years imprisonment is prescribed, and abuse of office, where the sentence depends on the amount of material gain (for the illegal gain from 10.000 to 50.000 KM - one to 10 years imprisonment, for over 50.000 KM a minimum of 3 years in prison).

No information was found as to whether these sanctions have been prescribed so far in the defence sector or if they are effective.

The Ministry of defence does not negotiate offset contracts. The NATO Peer Review report confirms this and there is no evidence to the contrary.

According to the written contribution, the MoD does not negotiate offset contracts. The NATO Peer Review report confirms this and there is no evidence to the contrary.

The MoD does not negotiate offset contracts. The NATO Peer Review report confirms this and there is no evidence to the contrary.

The use of agents by companies is not regulated by the Law on Public Procurement of BiH. Moreover, procurement of arms is not public, and it is impossible to gain insights whether intermediaries are used in this process.

All data necessary for a successful preparation of bids are defined in the tender documentation, including: delivery time, payment term, sources of financing, guarantees of supply and good performance, etc. Decisions on selection of the best bidders is publicly avaliable for open tenders on the MoD website.

According to the Law on Public Procurement, there are no specific demands towards subcontractors when it comes to anti-corruption standards. The procedures only prescribe that the supplier must notify the contractor about any subcontractors and contracts, and that subcontractors must satisfy the formal conditions given in the tender documentation. No evidence of informal encouragement re. adoption or anti-corruption programmes by subcontractors has been found.

According to the information provided by the Ministry of Defence, acquisitions for goods/works/services are carried out at the multi-year level in the form of needs. Based on anticipated funds, the needs are translated into plans. Upon approval of plans, the procurement process is initiated in accordance with the Law on Public Procurement in BiH. All public procurements are published in the Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the website of the Ministry of Defence of BiH. Any interested potential bidder fulfilling the required conditions can participate in procurement process. However, it has to be noted that it is very common in all institutions in BiH for acquisitions to be made based upon political criteria. Furthermore, for all decisions there needs to be consensus between members of all three ethnicities, therefore the decisions are politically influenced from the start. There also does not appear to be a publicly available defence or security strategy, which means that it is difficult to verify the strategic need for particular procurement processes.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Score 3 has been selected as no specific examples of purchases based on seller nation influence have been found.