South Africa

Researcher4124: The National Conventional Arms Control Bill Act 42, (2002) establishes the controls over asset disposals in the Republic of South Africa. There are formal and rather bureaucratic systems and structures involved with reporting lines and publications procedures. However, there is little detail in the public domain as to what these controls entail. In the past, the effectiveness and transparency of the bodies has come into question as the NCACC has been said to have become an almost dysfunctional body, as they do not hold regular meetings. There are also allegations that the Ministry of Defence cannot account effectively for its assets, making it difficult to monitor or oversee their disposal. There have been some improvement starting with the South African Defence Review 2014, which has being recognised as an important first step on the rejuvenation of the SANDF. If implemented this could assist the Ministry with its accounting of its assets. However this is still in an early stage.

Assessor Response to Comments: the bodies overseeing disposal are the NCACC (in the case of the export of controlled items). The NCACC is supposed to oversee the exports of the only body mandated to dispose of surplus state owned materiel, the Defence Materiel Disposal Agency (DMDA) of Armscor. As noted in the previous answer, the NCACC has been inconsistent and late in providing regular reports to Parliament and public oversight is difficult as a result. In terms of advertising disposals, the DMDA is supposed to advertise disposals in national newspapers and via the Armscor Business Tender Bulletin. A search through the current Armscor Tender Bulletin does not list any materiel for disposal. This may be because there is no equipment to dispose, but this seems unlikely - it may be that these tenders have not been uploaded timely.

Researcher4124: The NCACC has recently released its annual report which was presented to Parliament in June 2014 as well. This is a step forward as opposed to previous years. According to media reports, the first annual arms export report that the NCACC publicly released was in regard to the year 2004, but it was only released in 2007, in flagrant violation of the National Conventional Arms Control Act, which requires the NCACC to release the annual report by the end of the first quarter of the following year. The NCACC remained in arrears in regard to the public release of the 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 annual arms export reports. While the contents have been publicly scrutinized, there have been unexplained inconsistencies in the findings. For example it came out in the report that Al Mansour armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were transferred to Saudi Arabia, ostensibly the country where they are manufactured. The Arms Procurement Commission has also been set up and first round of hearings has been completed. The commission has to finalise its report and present it to President Jacob Zuma. There is, as yet, no indication of whether the final report will become a document in the public domain. However the hearings of this commission are in the public domain which can be considered as progress.

Assessor's response to questions to further support the score: the NCACC is the primary body that is responsible for overseeing the disposal of controlled items only (i.e. items that are considered to be arms requiring approval under the terms of national legislation). Disposals of non-controlled items form part of DoD functions, and would thus be subject to audit. However, it is unclear whether disposals are accounted for via the Special Defence Account, which would limit the disclosure regarding disposals as the SDA is not reported on on a line-item basis. The Seriti Commission has no role on overseeing disposals. As noted in question 21, the functioning of the NCACC has been questioned and criticised, particularly with regards to punctually publishing reports of its activities. Details of the exact items sold by Armscor via the DMDA is not reported with a great deal of detail. The most recent Armscor Annual Report available (2013/2014), provides only a total figure (ZAR14m) of items disposed, but no line-item accounting is given.

Researcher4124: According to the Open Budget Index (OBI) 2012, transfers by the National Treasury of R 3.3 billion were made to the Secret Services Account and R 705 million for Defence Intelligence. According to the OBI 2012 Questionnaire, information on these expenditures is available online at the Treasury Department Website. It should be noted though that the Open Budget Survey evaluates the percentage of the overall budget spent on secret items and programmes and not the percentage of the defence and security budget allocated to secret spending.
As per the South African government's 2013 budget, within the Defence budget, defence intelligence has accounted for 2.08%, 1.9% and 1.8% of the overall Defence budget in 2010/2011, 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 respectively. However, it should be noted that the secret services budget is a part of a programme under the National Treasury budget called the Financial Intelligence and State Security (which in turn has the Financial Intelligence Centre and the Secret Services as its sub-programmes) and therefore is not included within the Defence budget. Since they don't come under a single budget, by aggregating the two - total expenditure on defence intelligence and secret services has been 11.61%, 11.23% and 12.9% of the Defence and the Financial Intelligence and State Security budgets in 2010/2011, 2011/2012 and 2012/2013. Accordingly, the score awarded here is 1.

Researcher4124: According to the Open Budget Index, the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (Parliamentary Portfolio Committee) is provided with all of the relevant information regarding secret items including details about annual accounts and audit reports. The JSCI hears complaints from the public, scrutinizes the finances and operations of the Services and reports to Parliament on these matters. However, all JSCI reports stress that when it comes across irregularities, it can only make recommendations and, in the case of these annual reports, the findings and recommendations are made public only years after the fact.
According to the news agency Business Day, a 2014 report by the JSCI highlighted the limited oversight that MPs have over the intelligence budget and the activities of senior intelligence officials and the ministers overseeing them. According to the Democratic Alliance in 2013, Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee of Intelligence (JSCI) has failed to report to the Parliament on its activities since 2011, and the latest information available on the committee’s work refers back to 2010.
Therefore, while systems for oversight are in place andinformation for the budget year on the spending of all secret items is provided to the JSCI, it does not have the appropriate powers for enforcement, nor does this does not translate to the rest of Parliament.

Assessor Response: agreed with Peer Reviewer 2, score changed to 2.

Researcher4124: The Auditor General's report and annual reports (including Audit Report) of all public entities are tabled in parliament and also referred to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), which scrutinizes these reports and calls upon the Accounting Officers responsible to question them on issues highlighted by the Auditor General. While there is an indication that the Auditor General is independent, the reports that are tabled to the Portfolio Committee do not always have complete information. According to Parliamentary Monitoring Group's 2012 presentation on the Defence and Military Veterans budget vote, &quoute;This due to the fact that the National Treasury has previously granted the department of Defence a departure to only disclose certain categories of assets for the financial year ended 31 March 2012.&quoute; However, there is no evidence of reports relating to the exempt categories being implemented as of now.

Assessor Response: agree with Peer Reviewer responses. Score changed to 1.

Researcher4124: Off-budget military expenditure may be referred to as contingency funds, which are not accommodated in the Department of Defence (DOD) budget, and are managed by the Minister of Finance. Hence should unforeseen events arise, the DOD can make requests to the National Treasury for extra funds.
The process by which is these funds are accessed is not publicly known. The Defence Review of 2014 however, raises and recommends that all contingency funds should be accounted for in the DOD budget and allocated as such. Contingency Funds have not been appropriately recorded within the Department of Defence's budget. There is no clear indication as to what warrants a request for these contingency funds other than peacekeeping missions as mentioned in Defenceweb's article in regard to South Africa's armed forces' mission in Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013.

Researcher4124: Off-budget military expenditure may appear in the form of contingency funds, and there was a request by the Department of Defence to the National Treasury for a peacekeeping contingency fund in 2011. According to Le Roux (2004), there appear to be checks and balances in place for such expenses.
In 2011, there was commentary in the news in regard to the funding of the new African Force as agreed at the 23rd bi-annual African Union (AU) summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. Additionally, in 2013, there was news in relation to an armed forces' mission in CAR. However, there were no official cases of contingency funds reported in 2012, 2013 and 2014. These do not appear to have been budgeted for.
The latest Defence review 2014, does recommend that contingency peacekeeping funds be put in place within the budget for such an event.

Researcher4124: The Joint Standing Committee on Defence established by Parliament deals with classified and sensitive information from the military. Currently, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has the ability to classify sensitive information that is related to national security. Any sensitive and classified information from the SANDF must be tabled with this Committee.
Recently, South Africa’s classification of information on the grounds of protecting national security has been met with controversy, especially with the introduction of the Protection of State Information Bill. According to the Bill, its provisions contained in the bill are &quoute;a coherent approach to protection of state information&quoute;. It has also been noted that &quoute;the classification and declassification of state information will create a legislative framework for the state to respond to espionage and other associated hostile activities&quoute;. Sensitive information includes matters &quoute;relating to the protection and preservation of all things owned or maintained for the public by the state', state security, economic growth, scientific achievements and diplomacy.&quoute; Any head of an organ of the state may classify or reclassify information.
The State Security Ministry is the gate keeper for the classification. Any person who publishes or discloses state secrets faces up to 10 years in prison and those conspiring with that person also face jail terms. The concern is that this will lead to greater corruption within the system and will offer little protection for whistle-blowers. The bill lacks an independent appeal mechanism. While the Bill has been approved by parliament, it is currently still sitting on President Zuma's desk and has not been ratified into law. It has been argued that the bill may be unconstitutional and will be appealed in the South African Constitutional Court.

Assessor Response: Peer Review comments useful and provides additional useful information that supports the current score. A score of 0 is avoided as, under the terms of PAIA, individuals and entities requesting information can take state departments to court to access information if needed. Should the Secrecy Bill pass, however, PAIA will effectively become difficult to use as it will become impossible to know what is in the State's hands. In future reports, should the Secrecy Bill be passed, a score of 0 should be seriously considered.

Researcher4124: National defence institutions do not own any commercial businesses. The score has been selected accordingly.

The South African government, however, does have State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). These enterprises are managed by the Department of Public Enterprise as a key shareholder. The Department of Defence has no control or running of this entity. Denel, the state-owned defence company, is subject to independent scrutiny and all financials are published for public scrutiny.

Researcher4124: Given there are is no ownership of businesses by national defence institutions, N/A has been selected.
For contextual information in regard to SOEs:
All SOEs (including Denel, the state-owned defence company mentioned in the comments for Question 30) are independently scrutinised and audited. They are often surveyed by the Centre of Corporate Governance and Auditing Firm Nkonki on their processes, reporting and transparency. The financial statements and annual reports then need to be presented to a Parliamentary Portfolio Committee. Denel is subject to independent scrutiny and all related financials are published for public scrutiny.

Assessor Response: as noted in previous question, Denel commercial enterprises are still majority state owned. They are also not owned directly by military institutions but the state as a whole.

Researcher4124: According to the policy on ‘remunerative work outside employment’, public servants (including those within defence institutions) have a duty to obtain prior approval for remunerative work. The policy also states that &quoute;remunerative work to be undertaken by an employee should in no way hamper them in the performance of their official duties. Officers commanding units, or in the case of Staff Divisions, the relevant Director/Chief Director or Deputy Director-General in whose section an official is staffed, are delegated to approve requests for the performance of remunerative work performed by an official outside the DOD&quoute;.
There has been some evidence of unauthorized private enterprise by military or other military defence employees. The current chair of Denel (the State Owned Enterprise) heads a private company that trades in the defence sector, creating a potential conflict of interest. The Department of Public Enterprise has dismissed this conflict of interest and has been slow to react with sanctions. This is also the case with the investigation of the multi-billion dollar Strategic Defence Procurement Package (known commonly as the arms deal). President Jacob Zuma, after being taken to court, has finally set up an Arms Procurement Commission to investigate this. It is unclear as to how findings of this commission will result in actions. There has been no reports within the public domain other than the above mentioned of instances of unauthorized private enterprise by individuals within defence and security institutions.

Researcher4124: There is some evidence of publicly stated commitment by the government in regard to anti-corruption:
President Jacob Zuma's appointment of a commission to investigate the multi-billion dollar Strategic Defence Procurement Package. However, this was only after retired banker Terry Crawford-Browne (who is also an anti-arms deal campaigner), took President Zuma to the constitutional court (the Guardian covered this extensively in late 2014). There has been some progress made, with the release of the “Strategic Defence Packages Performance Review Report” by the Department of Trade and Industry which audited 40 of 121 arms offset projects.
President Jacob Zuma has also appointed several inter-ministerial committees (IMCs) in 2014, including one to fight corruption. “The purpose of this anti-corruption IMC is to co-ordinate and oversee the work of state organs aimed at fighting and combating the scourge of corruption in the public and private sectors&quoute;
There have been some public media statements from the Former Department of Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu in her current capacity as Public Service and Administration Minister. She has recently established an anti-corruption bureau will to target private sector officials with intentions of impropriety in the public sector. The current Defence Minister Mapisa-Nqakula while she was Minister of Correctional Services has came out strongly against corruption and laziness within the department. However, it should be noted that there are no specific speeches regardng anti-corruption from these two ministers while they were serving as Minister of Defence.
The score has been selected given the lack of public committment to anti-corruption in defence by members of the Department of Defence and the SANDF.

Researcher4124: South Africa has strict legislation in place to counter bribery and corruption, namely in the form of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004. President Jacob Zuma has also appointed several inter-ministerial committees (IMCs) in 2014, including one to fight corruption. “The purpose of this anti-corruption IMC is to co-ordinate and oversee the work of state organs aimed at fighting and combating the scourge of corruption in the public and private sectors&quoute;. There has been some progress with 100 officials and South Africans (not only in the defence sector) arrested and prosecuted on charges of corruption. However, despite this progress, a recent OECD report on the implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention found that South Africa has a lack of enforcement in this regard. This included a case of a &quoute;state-owned company, (where) a bribe of US$35-million (approximately R385-million) is alleged to have been paid through a UK-based intermediary to secure an arms contract with a South Asian country&quoute;. South Africa opened an investigation in the same year, only to suspend it in 2006 pending the outcome of a commercial arbitration over a contractual dispute between the company and the foreign country.&quoute; A recent report by ENS, found that 88% of public officials (not only in the defence sector) tried for financial misconduct were found guilty, only 19% were fired. The rest remained in the public sector, where they would have potentially able to continue with their criminal activities.

Assessor Response: Peer review content noted. These tend to support the assertion that there are formal mechanisms in place, but that implementation is patchy and often politically driven, hence a score of 2. In 2015, for example, Pikkie Greef of the South African National Defence Force Union claimed in a meeting facilitated by Transparency International that corruption was widespread in the Defence Force, and that anti-corruption enforcement is seriously hampered by political considerations and lack of political will. This has led to major demoralisation of defence force personnel.

Researcher4124: South Africa does have legal mechanisms in place to protect employees (both in the private and public sector) in the form of the Protected Disclosures Act, Act 26 of 2000 (“the Act”), also known as the Whistle Blowers Act. The Act makes provisions for employees to report unlawful or irregular conduct by employers and fellow employees, while providing for the protection of employees who undertake the reporting of corruption. However it is unclear how effective this protection is within the defence sector. Interviewee 1 indicated that there is a level of mistrust in this regard in at the entry and lower levels of employee units. Often crimes or misconduct within the defence sector will be dealt with internally and not brought to the public's attention. Activists have also argued that the new Protection of State Information law will deter whistle-blowers. The current version, while improved, remains unclear on the key question of whether whistle-blowers and journalists seeking to expose certain sensitive issues, such as corruption, would be protected under the law.

Assessor Response for Clarification: the most recent evidence suggests that in 2014 the Department of Defence received 37 reports of corruption via its whistleblowing mechanisms, leading to 17 active investigations and the closure of 4 cases. This number seems particularly low considering the anecdotal evidence of corruption in the Department of Defence (as claimed by the South African National Defence Force Union), and the levels of corruption in state departments generally. The hostile treatment of so-called Arms Deal 'critics', who were whistleblowers, in the Seriti Commission of Inquiry may send the message that whistleblowing is not to be encouraged, and that whistleblowers would receive a particularly hostile reception.

Researcher4124: There may be special attention and vetting requirements for personnel in sensitive positions, however these requirements are not particularly transparent. There is no declaration of sensitive positions or information relating to rules relating to senistive positions on the websites of the Department of Defence or the Armscor (the State Tender Board).
According to the Defence Department's Annual Report 2012/13 anti-corruption and fraud awareness training was conducted. The training also forms part of the induction training of members of the Defence Act Personnel (DAP) and Public Service Act Personnel (PSAP). Training of personnel in high risk areas was prioritised and follow up training is being scheduled on an annual basis. The areas of highest risk were identified as Finance, Personnel, Acquisition, Procurement and Logistics. This indicates some level of recognition of sensitive positions.
Cases from the past indicate that the appointment of officials in sensitive positions may have been guided by intentions for impropriety. For example, in the 1998 case relation to an arms deal awarded to BAE, the former Secretary of Defence indicated that he was made to appoint the Chief of Acquisitions on the basis of his alignment with the interests of those implicated in the controversial deal.

Researcher4124: The full figures of personnel (including information on race, gender and department) in the Defence Force is published in the Annual Report 2012/2013 that is available on the website of the Department of Defence.

Researcher4124: All salaries according to the level of management are published in the Department's Annual Report. However, the amounts do not include bonuses or any adjustments, rather a bulk sum for each management level.

Researcher4124: While there have historically been some administrative hitches which have delayed payment, evidence indicates that the Department worked hard to find the funds to pay the soldiers on time. South African Defence personnel salaries are adjusted to recognise the years of services rather than only being linked to rank. However, a 2014 report indicates that SANDF is currently facing a funding crisis. TheDefence Secretary was reported as stating that a R1.1 billion budget shortfall could compel the SANDF &quoute;into large-scale retrenchments and compulsory early retirement in order to survive and pay salaries&quoute;. This may have implications on the timeliness of payments at present as well.

Assessor Clarifications: the salary payment system has attracted little controversy, hence the score. The total amounts spent on salaries, as well as force levels, are published annually by the Department of Defence. It is unclear if discretionary adjustments are applied from the existing literature.

Researcher4124: South African legislation with the inclusion of the Defence Amendment Bill (signed into law in December 2011), provides a framework for the appointment of senior military staff. This includes the creation of a permanent National Defence Force Service Commission that will investigate and make recommendations to the minister on the conditions of service for military personnel as a grouping separate from the larger public service.
However, recently, senior promotions in the Defence force have come into question. A DefenceWeb article reported that Dr Pieter Groenewald, Freedom Front Plus defence and security spokesman, has stated that a candidate was promoted to the rank of Major General despite evidence of&quoute;alleged drunk driving and unlawful conduct against subordinates&quoute; which were not investigated.

Assessor Response to Peer Reviewers: to clarify in reference to Peer Reviewer 2, the Commission is entitled to look at conditions of service. It is not stated explicitly that this will include appointments and promotions, but, as this was a complaint of striking SANDF employees, this seems likely. There is also strong anecdotal evidence from the SANDF Union, as reported by Pikkie Greef in June 2015, that appointments are made according to political and other considerations, and that appointments as a result are no longer objective.

Researcher4124: The South African Defence Force publishes all promotions and the reasons for promotions are included in its Annual Report. These promotions are often questioned by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee in a Question and Answer session as indicated in source 3 (the Parlimanetary Monitoring Group).
However, there is no clear indication on whether the processes in place are based on merit. The recent appointment of the SA Navy Chief, currently Rear Admiral Samuel Hlongwane has been questioned. It is indicated that he will not improve the maritime arm of service. The DefenceWeb article reported that “He is a counter-intelligence officer with no combat or operational experience and has no expertise in actual naval operations.&quoute;

Assessor Response: as noted in the June 2015 DefenceWeb article, the appointments process, while it is formally announced, is not always adhered to; there are concerns that appointments are made with political and other considerations in mind. This suggests that there is little oversight on promotions, with the only criticisms being made by the media and political opposition. A formal process exists in as far as promotions involve the consideration or approval of the CSANDF and must be published in the defence bulletin. There is no evidence suggesting that senior promotions exist outside the command chain.The 2013 Interim Report of the Defence Force Services Commission will be replaced by a final report by the Commission once it has completed its mandate. At that point, progress in correcting these issues can be assessed.
It should be noted that while there is an official SANDF promotions policy, and they are publicly declared by the Chief of the SANDF via the defence bulletin board, it is unclear who sits on the board deliberating promotions. But there is what at least appears to be a board that periodically sits to consider senior promotions.

Researcher4124: The situation is the same as was reported in the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2013.
Conscription was abolished by the The 2002 Defence Act which was introduced by its predecessor in 1957. The 2002 act only allows for the compulsory mobilisation of reserves in case of war, a state of national defence or a state of national emergency.

Researcher4124: The compulsory mobilisation of reserves is allowed in the case of war, a state of national defence or a state of national emergency. A memorandum attached to the Defence Amendment Bill (2010) notes Reserve Force members currently serve on a voluntary basis or render service in terms of a contract. &quoute;The Bill seeks to make it clear that all Reserve Force members are required to conclude a contract of service with the Defence Force. Such a contract will set out the periods of service that a Reserve Force member is liable to render. To ensure that Reserve Force members present themselves for service when required to do so, the Bill provides that these members must comply with a call-up order.&quoute; South Africa has a 18 years of age for voluntary military service; women are eligible to serve in noncombat roles and there is a 2-year service obligation. While there is general guidelines against corrupt practices within the defence force, there is nothing specific to bribes within the recruitment process or for preferred postings.

Assessor Response: upon review, it was confirmed that there is no compulsory or voluntary conscription in the Defence Force. The general public can apply for membership, but they do not have to 'opt out' of a suggested conscription. As a result, score changed to N/A.

Researcher4124: In 2011, a government fund was set up to compensate struggling veterans. It is mired in disputes over fraudulent and questionable payouts amounting to hundreds of millions of Rands.
There is no evidence, however, to suggest that ghost soldiers exist on the military payroll, with the Annual Report by the DoD providing a full description of salaries and employees on the payroll. While the phenomenon could occur, nothing of this nature has been reported.

Assessor Additional Clarifications: the Special Defence Account does not apply to the payment of salaries. The Special Defence Account is for the acquisition and disposal of materiel only. The score is increased as there appears to be little evidence of ghost soldiers being an issue, however there is little to suggest that the situation since 2013 has changed substantially. Far more problematic are politically motivated appointments and patronage, as evidenced by SANDU's complaints against the SANDF top brass. As little appears to have changed since 2013, the 2013 is reverted to (2).

Researcher4124: Chains of payment are strictly through the Human Resources department and are not linked to the chain of command. This is clear from the Annual Report by the Department of Defence. Payment of soldiers is also not linked to rank as stated in the May 2012 News24 article but to years of service.

Researcher4124: South Africa does have a code of conduct that is publicly available (source 2) that all soldiers pledge to and sign before joining the SA Defence Force. This does include a section around reporting criminal activity, corruption and misconduct to the appropriate authority as well as not participating in any illegal activities. The general code of conduct does not cover bribery, gifts and hospitality for soldiers or senior officials. However in the publication of &quoute;South African Solider&quoute; there seems to be an indication that all soldiers should &quoute;declare their goods&quoute;. However, according to the interviewee, this is no enforcement or consequences of this code of conduct. This is seen in the 2012 &quoute;Guptagate&quoute; case. A chartered commercial aircraft, Jet Airways flight JAI 9900 from India, ferrying more than 200 guests to a wedding, landed at the Waterkloof Air Force Base which is illegal. As of early 2015, the four officers implicated in the event, have yet to go to trial and be charged.

Assessor Clarifications: the code of conduct does, in fact, refer to the need to report corruption and to not abuse positions of authority for personal gain. The Code of Conduct is integrated into the Military Discipline Code, and thus has the force of law. The Code of Conduct is applicable to uniformed members of the SANDF. A separate Code of Conduct for civilian employees of the Department of Defence could not be found. Distribution of the Code of Conduct is not at issue, as it appears that new recruits are obliged to swear to the code. However, considering anecdotal evidence of widespread corruption in the SANDF, it appears that the Code may not be enforced or adhered to.

Researcher4124: The interviewee has indicated that breaches of the code of conduct by military personnel are dealt with internally and not made public or shared with any other departments within government. This means that often the corrupt official is able to move to a different department in government without any consequences for their past transgressions. These breaches of conduct that are dealt with internally is seen with the Gupta case: a chartered commercial aircraft, Jet Airways flight JAI 9900 from India, ferrying more than 200 guests to the wedding of Vega Gupta and Aakash Jahajgarhia, landed at the Waterkloof Air Force Base in 2012 which is illegal. The four officers implicated in the event, have yet to go to trial and be charged. According to a City Press report in May 2014, &quoute;A trial date for the accused had not been set down and it was to be decided by the military’s prosecuting authorities. The SANDF was unable to provide a date to the media and at the time, media were not allowed to enter the court.&quoute;

Researcher4124: According to the Defence Department's Annual Report 2012/13 anti-corruption and fraud awareness training was conducted. The training also forms part of the induction training of members of the Defence Act Personnel (DAP) and Public Service Act Personnel (PSAP). Training of personnel in high risk areas was prioritised and follow up training is being scheduled on an annual basis. The areas of highest risk were identified as Finance, Personnel, Acquisition, Procurement and Logistics. However it is unclear as to whether this training is up to international standards, whether it is provided to all personnel and if it is done on a regular basis.

Researcher4124: The DOD Annual Report for 2012/2013 does publish the court cases that it dealt with throughout the year. The Court of Military Appeals finalised 54 cases that were set down for hearing. The Military Prosecution received 1861 dockets and 1256 boards of inquiry (BOI). According to the interviewee, no details of these cases are made known to the public. Interviewee 2 indicated that all crimes within the department are internally prosecuted and dealt with. The public is made aware of any wrong doing by the Department of Defence through whistle-blowers such as in the case of the Arms Deal and Guptagate. This is not a common occurrence.

Assessor Response and Clarification: there is absolutely no policy to make the outcomes of Military prosecutions through the Military Courts public. There is no evidence in the public domain of any successful prosecutions under this code. What legal action has been taken against Defence Department employees has been through other anti-corruption agencies such as the Hawks. However, as noted by Peer Reviewer 2, the Hawks are considered to be insufficiently independent from political influence and have been hamstrung by political infighting. In both the Guptagate and Arms Deal scandals, few, if any, of the wrong-doers have been properly prosecuted. In the Arms Deal, two individuals were successfully prosecuted (Tony Yengeni and Schabir Shaik). However, in both instances, their time in prison was foreshortened. Schabir Shaik was released controversially on compassionate grounds usually reserved for individuals in the terminal stages of illness. Since his release, Shaik has been spotted by journalists playing golf. He has also been accused of assault. This has undermined the belief that even if people are prosecuted, their punishment will be forthcoming in any meaningful way.

Researcher4124: South Africa has a legal framework in the form of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004, that prohibits and discourages facilitation payments. South Africa has also signed the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention. However, a report by ENSafrica (as mentioned in source 2) recently stated that between 2011 - 2012, &quoute;88% of public officials tried for financial misconduct were found guilty, only 19% were fired. The rest remained in the public sector, where they were potentially able to continue with their criminal activities&quoute;. This included facilitation payments. The OECD report argued that &quoute;The South African authorities have not been sufficiently proactive – neither in generating new investigations nor in investigating existing ones&quoute; and &quoute;South Africa has not made any foreign bribery-related outgoing mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests&quoute;.

Researcher4124: The Department of Defence has stated in its 2013/14 Annual Report that it has committed to &quoute;the Anti-Corruption and Fraud Support Strategy and Corruption & Fraud Prevention Plan&quoute; as a result of the expressed commitment of the department to fight corruption. All personnel follow a code of conduct which indicates how staff should behave during operations, however there is nothing specific to recognising corruption as a strategic issue during operations.

Researcher4124: According to the Defence Department's Annual Report 2012/2013, anti-corruption and fraud awareness training was conducted. The training also forms part of the induction training of members of the DAP and the PSAP. Training of personnel in high risk areas was prioritized and follow-up training is being scheduled on an annual basis. The areas of highest risk were identified as Finance, Personnel, Acquisition, Procurement and Logistics environments. However it is unclear whether there was specific training for commanders relating to operations.
In the 2013 /2014 Annual Report, about 37 corruption incidents were reported via the Whistle-blow Hotline 17 of which were detected and investigated for corruption and fraud, and only 5 were closed. The annual report, however, does not indicate if any of these incidents occurred during operations.

Response to peer reviewer: the training mentioned is not focused on corruption faced in theatre which is what the question attempts to capture. General anti-corruption training is covered in Question 49.

Researcher4124: There is evidence of corruption monitors in South Africa to oversee border control. These trained professionals (source 1) are from the South African Special Unit known as the Hawks, not the SANDF. However, there is no indication in the public domain that the Hawks are deployed on a regular basis for domestic operations. There is no indication of the deployment of the Hawks are deployed for peacekeeping or in-country missions. The Defence Inspectorate Division within SANDF assists the DOD in evaluating and improving the effectiveness of risk management, internal controls and governance processes. However, there is no indication within the annual report that this division deploys trained professionals to monitor corruption risk in the field in operations.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agreed and score lowered from 2 to 1.

Researcher4124: There are general guidelines for South Africa through its involvement with the African Union and South African Development Community. It is not clear if these extend to anti-corruption in operations. There are no mentioned guidelines within the public domain in regard to contracting whilst on deployed operations. However, the Annual Report of 2013 / 2014 by the DoD mentions internal controls which these guidelines would fall under. There is no specific detail as to what these guidelines are.

Researcher4124: Private Security Companies are employed outside and within South Africa. The South African Defence Review 2012 and 2014 both make mention of these companies and the need for greater regulation. The Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 56 of 2001 regulates Private Security Companies within South African borders. A 2012 ISS article indicated that &quoute;The Private Security Industry Regulation Amendment Bill, which seeks to replace the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 56 of 2001 proposes that any person who, within the Republic, recruits, trains, hires out, sends or deploys any other person to provide a security service outside the Republic must among other things provide to the director of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) on a monthly basis such information as may be prescribed regarding such recruitment, training, hiring out, sending or deployment within prescribed time limits. The Private Security Industry Regulation Amendment Bill will eventually complement the long-awaited Prohibition of the Mercenary Activities and Regulations of Certain Activities in Countries of Armed Conflict Act No. 27 of 2006 which will, inter alia, prohibit mercenary activities and regulate the provision of assistance or service of a military, security or other nature in a country of armed conflict&quoute;. This Bill makes no mention of of sanctions against corrupt Private Security Companies and also does not mention anything about corruption within the document. This bill which has been met with great controversy has recently been passed.

Assessor Response: response from Peer Reviewer 2 acknowledged as substantially correct. To clarify, and retract earlier comments, the Private Security Industry Regulation Act does not pertain to PMCs. There are no public reports of corruption involving PMCs in overseas duty, although there have been criticism regarding the sensitivity of their deployment in high-risk environments. Considering the high risk of corruption attached to PMCs and their operational environments, a lack of any prosecution of PMCs in South Africa may be considered to be indicative of a failure to properly investigate PMC wrongdoing. This may be a case of an absence of evidence being evidence of absence, but this is unclear. As such, score of 2 retained as it is difficult to justify a score that claims that PMCs are specifically excluded from oversight on corruption issues. The Mercenary Activites BIll was passed in 2006, but does not include any specific mention of corruption. It thus appears that PMC's who engage in corruption would be subject to other anti-corruption legislation such as the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Researcher4124: South Africa has a strict procurement framework, both generally and for the defence sector. This is in the form of the Public Finance Management Act 1999 (PFMA) which indicates that all accounting officers &quoute;on discovery of any unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure, must immediately report, in writing, particulars of the expenditure to the relevant treasury and in the case of irregular expenditure involving the procurement of goods or services, also to the relevant tender board&quoute;.

The Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) has been established with broad powers of oversight that can be used to investigate and make recommendations regarding the budget, functioning of Defence, acquisition and procurement policy. No items are exempt from this.

According to Interviewee 2, this framework is very hard to regulate as was seen in the case of controversial strategic defence procurement package (the Arms Deal). It involved a US$4.8 billion (R30 billion in 1999 rands) purchase of weaponry by the African National Congress government finalised in 1999. It has been subject to repeated, seemingly substantive, allegations of corruption.

Assessor Response: agree with Peer Reviewer 2. Score changed to 2.

Researcher4124: The Department of Defence does publish their procurement of supplies in a general way without going into much detail. However the most recent Auditor General's performance report found the following: &quoute;Effective steps were not taken to prevent irregular expenditure, resulting in noncompliance with section 38(1)(c)(ii) of the PFMA and TR 9.1.1..&quoute; This calls to question the transparency of the department.

Assessor Response: response from both Peer Reviewers acknowledged and accepted as correct. The Special Defence Account is a major blockage to reporting on defence acquisitions, although some headline figures are given. Score of 1 retained as supported by Peer Review comments.

Researcher4124: There are oversight mechanisms for the defence sector in place including SCOPA, the Auditor General, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence, the Public Protector, the Defence Review Committee and the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence. While the Public Protector, Auditor General, the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence and SCOPA oversee all government departments, they focus on the Defence Sector during annual audits and investigations such as the Arms Deal of 1999 and the Gupta scandal at Waterkloof airport in 2012. When these mechanisms meet, they are transparent in their findings and questions as seen with the Parliamentary Monitoring Group's Questions and Answers session in 2013. However, these oversight mechanisms have gaps in their accountability and effectiveness. The Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee of Intelligence (JSCI) has failed to report to Parliament on its activities since 2011 as was reported by the DA in 2013. There has been slight improvement as the Minister of Defence does attend and meet with Portfolio Committee regularly to answer questions. The Auditor General regularly reports on the Department of Defence's progress and shortfalls.

Response from Assessor: inputs from Peer Reviewers acknowledged. Transparency with regards to the Special Defence Account remains minimal, and this is a major concern as this covers a good deal of SA defence procurement. This was the basis on which disclosure and transparency around the notorious Arms Deal (which included the German and British procurement discussed above) was limited. Based on input from peer reviewers and additional research, score changed to 2.

Researcher4124: There is a policy to disclose defence purchases which are audited. The actual purchases are made public through the Department of Defence's Annual Report, the Strategic Plan and the National Treasury's Defence Vote. There is no detailed plan for defence purchases for the next few years published, only a general budget expenditure for equipment for the next year.

Assessor Response: Peer Reviewer 2 comments accepted and acknowledged. Score changed to 2.

Researcher4124: The Preferential Procurement Policy Act, 2000 provides a regulatory framework for all procurement in South Africa. It includes a racial redress policy in the form of &quoute;Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Requirement&quoute;.

However there is no evidence of a compliance / or an anti-corruption policy. In the 2012/13 Defence Department Annual Report it is stated that a comprehensive review of the Supply Chain Management Policy Regime was in process. The review would include the DOD Instruction on procurement, all relevant procurement regulations and procurement delegations.

The vetting of SLA’s, contracts, etc are now done by the Legal Services Division prior to signing of procurement contracts. Bidders’ details are now published on the DOD website for all requirements above R500k within 10 days after closure of the bid. ID numbers of bidders are now verified against the DOD’s post establishment table. Bidders are required to use the revised SBD 4 “Declaration of Interest” document and this must be done for price quotations and bids.

There is no publicly mentioned reference for companies to avoid corruption during the bidding process, however there is an emphasis on the company's relationship to the department or bidder. It is interesting to note that the PPPFA does allow for the exemption of the regulations if there is a threat to national security. This calls to question the effectiveness of this act within the defence sector.

Assessor Additional clarifications: there is no additional reporting on the Supply Chain Management Policy being updated in the defence sector in particular. However, a Supply Chain Management review for all public procurement was completed in 2015. It has indicated that a number of reforms are currently being undertaken to prevent wasteful expenditure and corruption. It explicitly acknowledges that the legal and regulatory environment guiding defence procurement is fractured in a problematic way, and needs to be reformed. A watching brief should be maintained in future reviews as to whether these recommendations have been implemented.

The full comment from the Review is as follows:
Unclear legal status of the different
regulatory instruments for general
and specific procurement practices, such as the SCM instruction on
norms and standards for general public procurement; industry specific
standards such as the defence industry’s armament procurement
instruction standards, and SITA’s procurement instruction standards,
codes and guidelines for ICT procurement. This splintered legal
framework creates uncertainty about which of these diverse
instruments takes legal precedence in regulatory interpretation when
public procurement cases are disputed in court.

Researcher4124: Defence procurement is derived from a well audited national defence and security strategy as shown in both the Annual Strategic Statement for 2013 and the strategic plan for 2011-2016.

Historically, there have been numerous allegations of opportunistic purchases in defence procurement. The book 'The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade' (2011) highlights a &quoute;special payment of £100 000 had been made to Arstow on 5 October 1999, after the South African government announced the purchase of the Hawk and Grippen aircraft. These two payments were approved through an extra ordinary &quoute;ex committee&quoute; procedure attended by a handful of BAE most senior executives&quoute;.

In the most recent Annual Report from the Department of Defence, misconduct in procurement was highlighted, although this was in relation to enforcement of diligence requirements from suppliers, rather than adherence to strategic requirements. However, this does highlight that while there are still effectiveness problems, they are recognised and there has been improvement in transparency.

Assessor additional clarification: The Defence Review of 2014 was approved by Parliament in 2015. The Defence Review provides a detailed Force Structure. It also outlines the principles that should be adhered to in future defence procurements. The Defence Review includes a Strategic Defence trajectory, with five year milestones, that is supposed to guide all defence procurement. This is an improvement on the fact that 17 years passed between the 1998 Defence Review and the current review, with little strategic consideration of Force Design (leading to the use of SCAMP). Further reviews of South Africa will need to assess the extent to which the Defence Review recommendations have been implemented.

Researcher4124: Generally speaking in the 2012/13 Annual Report's strategic plan and budget, all requirements and defence purchases are outlined and justified. All checks and balances are in place and major purchases need to be signed off by the South African government. The Defence Review of 2012 and 2014 has also indicated that the Army, Navy, and Air Force have laid-out criteria for effectively meeting their strategic demands. The Review stresses the importance of six broad strategic areas in which urgent procurements will be prioritised for the near to medium term. Historically, this has been met with a few questionable purchases as is in the case with the Arms deal. The “Strategic Defence Packages Performance Review Report”, audited 40 of 121 arms deal offset projects and found, among others, some companies obtained more credits compared to investments and sales created or caused by them. This indicates that some purchases were not for specific requirements but rather for personal and companies' gain.

Assessor comments: the response of Peer Reviewer 2 acknowledged; offsets are not relevant to this discussion. It should be noted that the Defence Review of 2014 has now been approved by Parliament. This includes a Force Design and a Defence Force Strategic Trajectory with a five yearly review. Previous behaviour suggests that opportunistic purchases may happen, but this will have to be evaluated as time goes on to see if procurements deviate from the Force Design and Strategic Trajectory.

Researcher4124: In December 2003, the treasury introduced the Supply Chain Management Framework, devolving procurement responsibilities to accounting officers in government departments (excepting strategic procurements such as arms).

According to a 2006 Freedom House report, in general, the procurement processes are transparent and require competitive bidding and limited sole sourcing. Since this report, there have been no reported cases of single source procurements.

The Arms Deal allows for fair and open competition to be used as far as is practical in the acquisition of armaments. This will include the invitation of foreign tenders.

Although it has been argued in the Arms Procurement Commission that selected companies were awarded tenders for opportunistic gains. During Financial Year 2011/2012 and 2012/2013, the DOD procurement received an unqualified audit opinion which confirms that the DOD is conducting its business in line with prescripts.

Assessor Response: peer reviewer 2 comments accepted and acknowledged. Acknowledge that the Arms Deal Commission is not a procurement body but a judicial commission of inquiry into the 1999 Arms Deal. As noted in peer reviewer 2 comments, it is difficult to establish the number of single source procurement, although this does take place and is allowed for in the procurement regulations. In the case of sophisticated equipment, such as that purchased under the terms of the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages, it is difficult to see how maintenance contracts could be anything but single-sourced from the original equipment manufacturers.

Researcher4124: The South African Tender Boards are subject to regulations and codes of conduct that are outlined in the Framework for Supply Chain Management legislation. The South African acquisition process is simple and on first appearance, tamper-proof. The Minister of Defence personally authorises all acquisitions with &quoute;cardinal projects&quoute; requiring Cabinet approval. The Secretary for Defence exercised control over these and was &quoute;professionally advised&quoute; by his staff, including those from the Defence Acquisition and Procurement Division (DAPD). Parliament played &quoute;a rightful watchdog role.&quoute; (3) This is subject to audit by the Auditor General and all acquisitions need to be reported to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee. All these audits are made publicly available in the Auditor General's report. However there have been reports of a delay in this process. The Department of Defence has failed to give Parliament detailed reports on arms acquisition programmes over the past four years, failing to reveal bottlenecks, failures, delays and cost overruns, according to the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) party. (5)

Assessor Response: Peer Reviewer comments accepted and acknowledged. Score increased to 3.

Researcher4124: The 2004 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act broadly cover activities of collusion but there is no specific legislation for the defence sector. The 2008 Companies Act also curbs the use of cartels. While historically the enforcement seemed weak with regards to this, the ongoing Arms Procurement Commission that is investigating the 1999 Arms deal provides evidence of progress in terms of punishment for the collusion of bidders. This is still in the early stages and the final judgement has yet to be published or decided on.

Assessor Response: Peer Reviewer 1 comments acknowledged and accepted. The Competition Amendment Act of 2009 has been passed and is now in force. This covers cartel behaviour, although it is not specific to defence. There is no public evidence of collusion in bidding beyond the 1999 Arms Deal, which is still under investigation by the Seriti Commission of Inquiry (although critics do not believe that the Commission will constitute an unbiased investigation). Considering the poor history of anti-corruption enforcement in defence generally, it can be assumed that cartel behaviour may not be properly policed.

Researcher4124: The Framework for Supply Chain Management Act released by the National Treasury in 2003 does require that all procurement staff be trained appropriately. The Defence Review 2014 recommended &quoute;Functional procurement training will be established for the education and training of procurement officials along a dedicated procurement learning path within the defence logistics career path. This training must be a continuous process to ensure capacitated and professional defence procurement practitioners.&quoute; The DoD annual report for 2013/2014 indicates that close to 10000 staff members have received corruption and fraud awareness training. This included training staff in Acquisition and Procurement. The existence of Armscor, the state tender board responsible for state procurement, illustrates that there is a specialised institution that is responsible for procurement; this would suggest that staff at Armscor are specifically trained in optimal procurement strategies.

Researcher4124: There are mechanisms in place for companies and individuals to report malpractice in procurement and any corrupt activities. This includes the Special Investigating Unit, the Hawks (law enforcement) and legal mechanisms. Companies can report these malpractices to parliament or the National Prosecuting Authority. While people can report these malpractices, they are often powerless to force the government to investigate. However, according to interviewee 2, in the case of the Arms deal, Mr Terry Crawford Browne in fact took Mr Jacob Zuma to constitutional court to force him to formulate and create a commission of inquiry for the 1999 arms deal. The effectiveness of this commission, however, has often been called into question.

Response from Assessor: peer review comments acknowledged. There are multiple mechanisms through which tender adjudication can be challenged. However, there is no guarantee that a company contending this matter would not receive hostile treatment in future. In this regard, it is notable that, despite considerable complaints about tender irregularities in the Arms Deal, not a single supplier lodged an official complaint, despite some threats from at least one losing bidder (Bell Helicopters). Thus score of 2 remains appropriate.

Researcher4124: There have been several investigations, prosecutions and court battles, with a few legal convictions, such as the Schabir Shaik and Jackie Selebi case; however, sanctions are almost never applied. Despite reports of alleged irregularities associated with companies such as Thomson CSF, BAE , and Ferrostaal, there were no sanctions applied against these companies.The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 2004 allows for a register of tender defaulters to be made up and barred from receiving contracts, but in practice there is no evidence that this has occurred.

Researcher4124: According to a 2013 article written by Peter Platzgummer, the usage of arms trade offsets to bribe public officials has been one - if not the - major allegation in defence procurement in recent years.This is especially the case when a company, personally associated with public officials, is a beneficiary in the second phase of the offset process, including in South Africa.
According to the Arms Procurement Commission (which has been set up to investigate the 1999 arms procurement scandal), offsets related to the Arms Deal only generated 26,000 direct jobs in ten years, instead of the 65,000 opportunities promised when the acquisitions were first mooted in 1999, according to the National Industrial Participation Programme’s (NIPP) Performance Review 2009. According to interviewee 2, this means that arms deal contractors only created 40 per cent of the jobs they committed to. There seemed to be no due diligence or performance requirements linked to this. While the deal has been recently audited in the “Strategic Defence Packages Performance Review Report&quoute; there seemed to be no consequences as of yet for this discrepancy.

Assessor Response: offset contracts with the South African government are concluded by means of so-called Umbrella Agreements. These stipulate remedies in the case of non-performance of offset obligations or bribery. However, from the few offset contracts that have been released (via the Seriti Commission of Inquiry), it does not appear that specific due diligence requirements are included in the contracting structure. Presumably, if corruption is to occur, it would be pursued by existing law enforcement authorities under the Prevention of Corruption Act. There is little evidence of consistent auditing of all offset contracts.

Researcher4124: There is very little detail given on past or current offset programmes. There is no detail other than general information provided in the reporting of offset contracts in the Annual Report.
A good example is that of the 1999 arms procurement scandal. The recent “Strategic Defence Packages Performance Review Report&quoute; has detailed that all the companies that won the Arms Deal contracts had Defence Industrial Participation Programme (DIPP) and National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP) offset obligations. NIPP activities were documented and monitored by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) while Armscor approved and documented all DIPP projects. It has also gone into the nuances of the offset programme. However, this was only done after the Arms Procurement Commission was established and started its investigation. Details of such programmes are not generally made public.

Researcher4124: There is no evidence that offset contracts are subject to competition regulations, not is there evidence that they are not subject to competition regulations. Accordingly, score 1 has been selected.

The Internal Audit titled “Strategic Defence Packages Performance Review Report&quoute; which is linked to the investigation of the 1999 Arms Deal, indicates that it was the massive offset offerings of companies that led to them being awarded the tender. Additionally, it reports that later, deals were negotiated that saw their actual investments massively inflated by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). This, in effect, enabled them to write off billions of rands owed to South Africa. What is interesting is that there is no evidence that this has been rectified and the recent Defence Review for 2014 makes no mention of offset contracts' regulations in its recommendations.

Researcher4124: Historically, evidence has shown that South Africa has had little control over the use of agents within the procurement cycle. This is also clarified in a 2008 article by Paul Holden which indicated that a minister took up a position in an offset benefiting company directly following his political term. In the Business day, Swedish company Saab admitted that in 2003 a contract was signed between Sanip, a Saab subsidiary, to pay R24m to Fana Hlongwane, an adviser to then defence minister Joe Modise. Saab had bid to supply Gripen fighter jets to SA with British Aerospace Systems (BAE) and the payment was an inducement to secure the deal. In 2012/2013's annual report, it was stated by the Department that &quoute;procurement support by both procurement agencies, Armscor /Central Procurement Service Centre (CPSC) remained extremely challenging. The S A Army’s final readiness and expenditure performance relied heavily on the performance of both procurement agencies. This created challenges for the SA Army resulting in the underutilisation of National Treasury funding.&quoute; The use of internal agencies in the procurement process has also seemed to be without any control, requirements or consequences. According to the 2013/2014 Annual Report in terms of agents such as Armscor, &quoute;The Policy on Procurement and Sales in respect of Commercial Goods and Services (Edition 2) is in the development process and is expected to be finalised by October 2014. Eight unit visits took place to verify procurement processes, compliance with regulatory framework and training in areas where required. Few deviations were found and a full report was submitted together with recommended changes for implementation.&quoute;

Researcher4124: The amounts and finance packages for major arms deals are usually published as seen in the Annual Report and in the media. The Minister will usually need to get sign off from the national government on all major arms deals such as the Strategic Defence Package which was reported to cost R47,2billion. As to the timelines, interest rates etc, there is little evidence of these aspects of the financial packages being made public.

Response from Assessor: Peer Reviewer comments acknowledged and considered correct. Score changed to 1 to reflect this. In addition to Peer Reviewer comments on this section, it is clear that the limited disclosure of procurement via the Special Defence Account limits disclosure on exact payment figures, financing costs and capital repayment timelines.

Researcher4124: The 2012/13 Defence Department Annual Report states that a comprehensive review of the Supply Chain Management Policy Regime is currently in process. The review will include the DOD Instruction on procurement, all relevant procurement regulations and procurement delegations.

The vetting of SLA’s, contracts, etc are done by the Legal Services Division prior to signing of procurement contracts. Bidders’ details are published on the DOD website for all requirements above R500k within 10 days after closure of the bid. ID numbers of bidders are now verified against the DOD’s post establishment table. Bidders are required to use the revised SBD 4 “Declaration of Interest” document and this must be done for price quotations and bids. While vetting will take place for contractors and sub contractors it does not specifically stipulate that anti-corruption requirements will be put in place.

The Defence Review 2014 also does not make mention of this in terms of vetting suppliers.

Researcher4124: Evidence indicates that, to some extent, arms deals are influenced by selling nations as seen with the allegations related to in the Arms Deal of 1999. It is reported that during the then British Prime Minister pressured the South African government to buy BAE Hawk and BAE/Saab Gripen fighter aircraft despite rejection in 1997 of those proposals by the South African Air Force on the basis of unsuitability and excessive financial costs of the aircraft. The deal was backed by EGGD to the tune of $2.4 million according to Nicholas Gilby. However, in general, evidence has proved it has not so much been the influence of selling nations but rather what the individual company can provide in terms of the offset contract. In media reports, it has been reported that it was the massive offset offerings (or National Industrial Participation Programmes) that swung the projects their way.

Assessor Response: the experience of the Arms Deal suggests that political and other incentives were incredibly important in determining the content of defence procurement. It has been difficult to assess the extent of political influence in purchases beyond this, as few have been subject to the same scrutiny as the Arms Deal. It should be noted that the SANDF has not undertaken acquisitions to the same size of the Arms Deal since 1999; this may limit the visibility of political considerations. However, with the 2014 Defence Review anticipating increased procurement activity, it will be necessary to maintain a watchful eye on how these projects are undertaken.